



**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 8 April 2013**

**6090/10  
ADD 16 EXT 1**

**ENFOPOL 38  
PROCIV 15**

**PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION**

---

of document:	6090/10 ADD 16 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
dated:	5 March 2013
new status:	Public
Subject:	Second Round of Peer Evaluation Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

---

Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.

---



**ANNEX**

**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 5 March 2010**

**6090/10  
ADD 16 EXT 1 (08.04.2013)**

**ENFOPOL 38  
PROCIV 15**

**ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE**

---

from : The Council General Secretariat  
to : Working Party on Terrorism

---

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation  
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

---

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Luxembourg** (18-20 March 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

1.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
2.	ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK .....	5
	2.1. Structures and organisational framework of the National Crisis Centres .....	6
	2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack .....	12
	2.3. Competences of the National Crisis Centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks .....	18
	2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack .....	18
3.	TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK .....	19
4.	SOFT TARGETS .....	20
5.	GOOD PRACTICES .....	21
6.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	21
7.	ANNEX .....	22
	7.1. Speakers .....	22
	7.2. Expert team .....	24

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluations covering "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack", an evaluation visit was made to Luxembourg from 18 to 20 March 2009.
- Threat assessment

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Brief description of institutions

The overall picture presented by Luxembourg to the Peer Evaluation team was a coherent and well-coordinated structure for the preparation and management of crisis situations. The overriding philosophy is to keep the strategic and operational management of the crisis situation at the central level unless there are sound reasons to extend it to the regional and local levels. In the event of a terrorist attack, however, coordination will always be ensured at the central level. Significant time and effort are devoted to crisis planning at local, regional and central levels.

The size of the country and the fact that the various actors know each other well results in a high-level of coordination and information exchange. Overall, this will facilitate central coordination in the event of a crisis.

On the other hand, for that very reason, the country depends on international cooperation and very efficient and fast exchange of information. An ongoing effort would be needed to ensure consistency between the different countries if a crisis required interaction between two or more states.

From the assessment of the threat to the organisation of emergency assistance, with planning providing the link, all aspects of crisis management seemed to be covered properly. The current arrangements could be amended by the adoption of a bill<sup>1</sup> in the coming months.

The *Haut Commissariat à la Protection Nationale* (High Commission for National Protection or HCPN) plays a key role in the field of preparedness and management consequences. In terms of legal framework, the National Crisis Centre (NCC), is a physical infrastructure used by various entities of the national security structure for crisis prevention and crisis management functions.

- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

---

<sup>1</sup> Bill 5347

## **2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

The organisation of crisis management in the event of a terrorist attack in Luxembourg is based mainly - but not solely - on the High Commission for National Protection (HCPN), which comes under the authority of the Prime Minister. If a crisis broke out, the HCPN would ask the Prime Minister to set up a Crisis Unit (CU), which would take over the operational management of the crisis. Lastly, at the political and strategic level, decisions are taken - at all times under the authority of the Prime Minister - by the Ministerial Council for National Protection (CMPN).

Moreover, the "National Security Committee" (CONATSUR), which is part of the national security structure, is responsible for devising national arrangements to be submitted to the CMPN. The CONATSUR is composed of the High Commissioner for National Protection, the Director-General of Police, the Director of the Intelligence Service, the judicial authorities and other high-ranking officials from pertinent bodies depending on the nature of the crisis. CONATSUR is one of a number of national committees, described below, that can be convened by Luxembourg's authorities.

It is worth mentioning that, as in many other small European countries, inter-authority coordination and cooperation in Luxembourg is based on a history of good, and in many cases, personal relationships between the authorities and individuals in charge.

## 2.1. Structures and organisational framework of the National Crisis Centres

In terms of legal framework, the National Crisis Centre (NCC) is simply a physical infrastructure located within the premises of the Government Communications Centre (CCG), which is part of the Prime Minister's Office. This infrastructure is used by various entities of the national security structure for crisis prevention and crisis management functions. It is permanently manned in terms of telecommunications and information monitoring. If a terrorist attack hits Luxembourg, management of the consequences will be operated entirely from the NCC. The HCPN chairs the national Crisis Unit, which will convene at the NCC in times of crisis. The Crisis Unit can take on different configurations depending on the type of crisis and competences involved. At the NCC, an automated computer system is used for calling up CU members. The system has built-in stages for operators to check and obtain verification for entering the next phases in the alert chain. The NCC structure is part of the Prime Minister's Office and also serves as the government's international conference centre. These facilities can house the CU, the operational command centre and a separate media room. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

A plan to extend the Centre is currently being examined. However, its current level of equipment and architectural layout already allow it to perform its tasks as a crisis centre well.

Hence, in this part of the report, it would be better to focus on the Centre's potential users and the main actors in crisis management rather than the actual Centre.

"National Protection" includes the mechanism applicable to and the competent structures for the management of a crisis at national level. Where necessary, those structures and mechanisms serve as frameworks for :

- national interministerial coordination
- international coordination
- public/private coordination.

The structures making up "National Protection" are the:

- "Ministerial Council for National Protection" (CMPN)
- "Higher Council for National Protection" (CSPN)
- "High Commission for National Protection" (HCPN)
- Crisis Unit (CU)
- National Committees (CONATs), in particular CONATSUR (National Security Committee)

The combined tasks of this mechanism are to:

- prevent crises and protect the country and population against the consequences of a crisis;
- initiate, coordinate and monitor implementation of measures and activities aimed at preventing the onset of a crisis through risk analysis and monitoring as well as arrangements to ensure the preparation and protection of the country and the population.
- in the advent of a crisis, to initiate, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the measures and activities to respond to a crisis and its consequences and to promote recovery.

A crisis falling under the management of "National Protection" is not limited to terrorist attacks but includes any incident that:

- threatens vital interests or essential requirements of all or part of Luxembourg's population;
- requires urgent decisions and;
- calls for coordination by various ministries, administrative authorities, services and organisations at national level, and if required, coordination at the international level.

This includes natural disasters (floods), technological or industrial accidents, road or rail accidents, acts of terrorism.

#### *2.1.1. Ministerial Council for National Protection:*

This body takes political decisions and provides strategic control. Based on the plans put before it, it defines the fields and objectives in which the HCPN should develop its action. It is chaired by the Prime Minister.

The Ministerial Council for National Protection is composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defence, Justice, Economy, Transport, Energy, Employment, Agriculture, Public Health and Public Works.

Its tasks are to:

- determine mainstream policy;
- define objectives by determining measures;
- ensure strategic control during implementation.

#### *2.1.2. Higher Council for National Protection:*

The Higher Council for National Protection (CSPN) is chaired by the High Commissioner for National Protection (HCPN) and comprises one delegate per ministry as well as the heads of agencies and departments directly involved in crisis management. The body has a consultative role, and assists and advises the Prime Minister and the CMPN. It is not an operational body that could direct a crisis. Under the new framework, the CMPN and CSPN will be merged<sup>1</sup>.

The composition of the CSPN is as follows:

- High Commissioner for National Protection
- Director-General of Police
- Director of the Intelligence Service (SRE),
- Chief of the Defence Force
- Director of Customs
- Director of the Rescue Services Agency (ASS)
- Director of Government Information and Press Office (SIP)
- Director of the Health Directorate,
- Director of the Government Communication Centre (CCG)

---

<sup>1</sup> Bill 5347

### 2.1.3. *The Crisis Unit:*

The Crisis Unit is activated by the Prime Minister, acting on a proposal from CONATSUR, in the event of an imminent or real crisis. Under the authority of the Government Council, it initiates, coordinates and monitors the implementation of all measures destined to counter the consequences of a crisis and promote recovery. It is composed of representatives of ministries, agencies and the services involved, depending on the nature and the scope of the crisis. It is chaired by the High Commissioner and meets, as far as possible, at the National Crisis Centre. The CU is solely responsible, under the authority of the Government Council, for initiating the coordination, monitoring and implementation of all measures to counter the consequences of a crisis and to promote recovery. The overall supervisor of the operation on the ground can be nominated by the CU. Occasionally, public or private institutions may be asked to participate in the CU if somehow concerned by the crisis. Generally speaking though, more or less the same people make up the CU. The CU can be convened in less than an hour.

Ministries, agencies and services involved in the implementation of measures and activities act in accordance with instructions given by the Crisis Unit and report directly to it. In the case of operations on the ground, the mission of the Crisis Unit extends to the coordination and control of their execution. The Crisis Unit may task an agency or service to direct operations in the field.

### 2.1.4. *The National Committees (CONATs)*

The CONATs are interministerial or inter-agency working groups. The basis for their work may be legal or simply informal. One of the objectives of the 5347 bill is to give all CONATs a legal basis. The CONATs are often co-chaired by a representative of the HCPN or a public body, usually the administrative body the most concerned by the specific field dealt with by the CONAT. They convene on a regular basis but may also be convened exceptionally. Horizontal coordination between the different CONATs is carried out by the HCPN.

At present, the CONATs include:

- CONATs for which a legal basis exists and which are currently operational:
  - National Telecommunications Committee (CONATEL)
  - National Civil Aviation Committee (CONATSAC)

- CONATs for which no legal basis exists but which are operational all the same:
  - National Critical Infrastructure Committee (CONATIC)
  - National Security Committee (CONATSUR)
  - National Information System Security Committee (CONATIC -S3I)
- CONATs currently in the pipeline but not yet operational:
  - National Transport Committee (CONATRAN)
  - National Resources Committee (CONATAPROV)

The National Security Committee (CONATSUR) is the only CONAT which is part of this assessment. It is composed of the High Commissioner for National Protection, the Director-General of Police, the Director of the Intelligence Service, the judicial authorities and other high-ranking officials from pertinent bodies, depending on the nature of the crisis. In the event of an imminent or real crisis or should ongoing interministerial coordination be required, crisis management falls to the CU.

#### *2.1.5. The High Commission for National Protection*

The Grand-Ducal regulation of 25 October 1963 set up the High Commission for National Protection, which is in charge of ongoing coordination and supervision of all civil and military measures taken or to be taken in order to protect the country and the population in the event of an armed conflict. These measures are taken by the government, through the High Commission, in order to determine general, long-term policy in this field.

The High Commission is assisted by a Higher Council (CSPN) composed of delegates from all the ministries concerned and chaired by the High Commissioner.

Since this institution was set up in 1959<sup>1</sup> in the days of the "cold war", it was put into cold storage when that came to an end in 1993 and reactivated on 1 December 2001 following the attacks in New York in September of that year. Its mandate was extended then so that it could deal with issues to combat terrorism.

---

<sup>1</sup> at the time known as the "Committee for National Protection"

**The tasks of the HCPN are to:**

- develop and coordinate a national strategy on crisis management matters;
- coordinate, under the authority of the Prime Minister, contributions from ministries, agencies and various departments;
- monitor the implementation of all decisions taken in this area;
- direct and coordinate crisis management tasks outside meetings of the Government Council and the CU;
- initiate, coordinate and monitor the implementation of measures and activities related to the identification, designation and protection of national critical infrastructures, whether public or private,
- define the typology, structure, body and format of plans and coordinate planning,
- prepare a common budget for crisis management and monitor its implementation,
- coordinate the organisation of training and exercises on matters of national security,
- monitor the set-up and operation of a NCC,
- chair and provide clerical support for the CSPN,
- represent the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in collaboration with ministries, agencies, departments and other concerned bodies, at European and international institutions and organisations dealing with matters related to crisis management.

The HCPN operates round-the-clock on the basis of duty personnel on call.

A new bill on the national protection structure was submitted to Parliament on 4 June 2004.

Since 2006 some substantial amendments have been made to take account of recent developments.

These major amendments include:

- Comprehensive crisis management arrangements, including for prevention and conduct of a crisis
- More detailed description of the tasks of HCPN
- Creation of a framework for critical infrastructure protection
- Staff regulations allowing broader recruitment

- A homogenous structure for all crisis plans
- Creation of the CU as a new body to be used during coordination in a real crisis
- The CMPN and CSPN will be merged and the CMPN abolished
- More formally established national committees

The new legal initiative is very sensitive because for the first time in Luxembourg's history, a public administration will have to follow instructions from a Committee which is not part of the same administrative body.

That said, the bill has not yet been adopted and no information could be given on how long its adoption would take.

## **2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack**

### *2.2.1. Threat assessment:*

Luxembourg's Intelligence Service (SRE) assesses the threat every quarter. This assessment is passed on to the Director-General of Police, the government and the HCPN. To discharge this duty, the Intelligence Service regularly exchanges information with the police departments and with the services of partner countries. This threat assessment takes account of the assessments carried out in neighbouring countries on account of Luxembourg's size and the short distances between it and its neighbours. There is a real cross-border component in this threat assessment.

The Intelligence Service's other main tasks are to:

- research, analyse and address, using a preventive approach, intelligence on any activity that threatens or could constitute a threat to: the security of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the countries to which it is bound by means of a common defence agreement or international organisations which have their seat or operate on Luxembourg territory, its international relations or its scientific or economic potential;
- conduct security investigations laid down by law or derived from an obligation under international law;
- ensure that classified documents are secure.

In relation to the application of paragraph 1 "an activity which threatens or might threaten the security of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg" is to be understood as any activity, individual or collective, deployed inside or outside the country or from another country which may be linked to espionage, interference of a foreign power in the affairs of the Luxembourg state, terrorism, the proliferation of non-conventional weapons systems and related technologies or organised crime linked to any of the above.

The Intelligence Service's tasks are essentially preventive and do not include looking for evidence of criminal offences, but rather gathering information on any activity which might endanger the democratic institutions of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Given that the Intelligence Service was set up on the basis of a defensive concept, its employees have neither judicial nor police powers such as arresting people, conducting searches and seizures, but are authorised to collect and process information on individuals while keeping these activities secret.

The head of the Intelligence Service reports to the Prime Minister who may give direct orders.

#### *2.2.2. Implementation and different levels of the VIGILNAT plan:*

The VIGILNAT plan is a catalogue of measures aimed at cultivating a general culture of security by instituting a permanent arrangement based on shared responsibilities.

The political authorities determine implementation of the plan at different levels based on a threat assessment conducted by the Intelligence Service, acting on a proposal by the HCPN.

The main objectives of the VIGILNAT plan are to:

- inform and alert ministries, administrative authorities and private operators;
- inform and alert the population;
- define the role and responsibilities of the public authorities;
- define vigilance, prevention and protection measures;
- activate operational chains;
- prepare the launch of intervention plans;

The plan is implemented according to four consecutive stages:

- threat assessment ;
- determination of alert levels and related security objectives;
- determination of vigilance, prevention and protection measures;
- implementation of measures.

There are four colour-coded alert levels (green, yellow, orange and red). Below those levels, the system is considered to be normal if there is no specific reason for an alert. That normal position indicates a permanent situation of security and, apart from the identification of vulnerabilities and information to the public on self-protection measures, does not entail specific measures.

The four levels of the VIGILNAT plan pursue the following security objectives:

- green level (1)
  - Raise alertness
  - Local self-protection measures
  - Minimal disturbance of normal activities
  - Ability to switch to yellow and orange level within days
  
- yellow level (2)
  - Prevention of a possible terrorist attack
  - Moderate disruption of normal activities
  - Phase lasting several weeks
  - Ability to switch rapidly to the orange or red level
  
- orange level (3)
  - Protection phase when there is evidence of risk of a terrorist attack
  - Protection of institutions
  - Reinforced protection measures; all services prepared to intervene
  - Major disruption of normal life over a long period
  - Coordination among intervention services
  - Reinforcement of usual intervention services
  - Preparedness of substitute sites and systems
  
- red level (4)
  - Maximum alert; risk has turned into a real attack
  - Public order and civil protection capacities are operational
  - National capacities are mobilised
  - Measures are extremely severe during a short period of time in a limited area.

Under each of these levels, there are many measures which the Crisis Unit may decide to implement individually depending on the alert level. The decision to modify the alert level is taken at the political level.

### *2.2.3. The multiple-victim plan*

This plan can be implemented as soon as the emergency services need to assist a high number of victims. Since no specific trigger level is set, implementation is relatively flexible. Its activation is context-specific; depending on the nature of, and the circumstances underlying, the incident that caused the victims. The plan is not specifically for victims of terrorism. On average, it is implemented three times a year. Minor adjustments are made to the plan on a regular basis and a major overhaul is undertaken every three/four years.

### *2.2.4. The role of civil protection in the management of consequences of a terrorist attack:*

The principal player involved in this plan is Luxembourg's Rescue Services Agency (ASS) which brings together all the national rescue services. This agency is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and has two main divisions - the Division of Civil Protection and the Division of Fire and Rescue Services. In the event of a catastrophe, the Agency directs operations and reports to the Ministry of the Interior. It also manages national assistance funds, sets up general and individual assistance plans and organises public training in first aid. The ASS manages the school of Civil Protection, where volunteers<sup>1</sup> are trained during weekend training courses as well as the National Civil Protection Support Base, where the heavy intervention equipment is located. In addition, the ASS maintains links with rescue services in neighbouring countries (Belgium, Germany and France) and helps to implement plans and directives arising from mutual assistance agreements concluded with these three countries.

The Division of Civil Protection is composed of 2 230 volunteers who are based in 25 regional centres and three regional support centres. One support centre is also preparing for special interventions in the areas of pollution, water supply, decontamination and chemical intervention.

---

<sup>1</sup> Except for departments in the city of Luxembourg, the civil protection services and fire brigade in Luxembourg are made up of volunteers.

The Division of Civil Protection includes ambulance personnel and rescue workers as well as the groups responsible for provisions. Furthermore, this Division includes specialised units, such as the Alert Group, the Canine Rescue Unit, the Psychological Support Unit, the Radiological Protection Unit, the Chemical Unit, the Rescue Divers Unit and the Humanitarian Assistance Team. It also mans the new emergency telephone number 112, which replaced the old emergency numbers in 2000<sup>1</sup>.

The Division of Fire and Rescue Services ensures the coordination of the local fire brigades at national level. The members of the national fire inspectorate report to the head of the Agency's Division of Fire and Rescue Services, but the local fire brigades report directly to the municipalities. The permanent operational staff of the Directorate is relatively small and concentrated in its coordination, planning and training functions. At the operational level, excluding the 2 230 volunteers for civil protection duties (ambulances and rescue), the Directorate and the municipalities together comprise 6 300 volunteers for local fire departments. The call-up time for volunteers is 40 minutes.

In addition to these responsibilities within the Ministry of the Interior, the Department of Radiation Protection (DRP), within the Ministry of Health, has set up a Radiological Protection Group (RPG). Members of the RPG are volunteers partly also recruited from the Civil Protection Division and trained for intervention at the practical level; they take samples from the environment, identify and recover lost sources and manage radiation accident response. In the event of a radiological threat and/or an attack, the DRP has a role in monitoring the levels of radioactivity in the country, alerting the population by sirens, giving information to the public and planning for emergencies. The Ministry of Health maintains a public information website concerning issues within its competence. This site has also a link to the Ministry of the Interior's website.

An Emergency Plan was issued in 1986 for the first time and updated in 1994. It contains information on the organisation and structure of the command post and describes the competences of the different actors, it provides guidelines on warning the competent authorities and the population, different levels of intervention and guidance on the implementation of counter measures.

---

<sup>1</sup> The police has retained its emergency number, which is 113.

*2.2.5. The role of the police in the management of the consequences of a terrorist attack:*

In the event of a terrorist attack investigations are handed over to the police under the authority of the Public Prosecutor or the examining magistrate.

The police is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and is headed by a Director-General. Under the Director-General of Police, there are administrative divisions, six national units and six police districts. One of the administrative divisions includes the operational centre which is used as police operational HQ in crisis situations. The national units consist of the police academy, criminal investigation department, national traffic police, border airport police, reserve guard and special intervention team (SWAT). Within the framework of the National Multiple Victim Plan (NMVP), which could also be applied in the event of a terrorist attack, a task force structure has been set up within the police, headed by the Director-General or his deputy. The HQ Operational Centre is managed by a senior Director. At the crime scene, police officers liaise with the emergency services in order to guarantee timely evacuation and transportation of victims to hospitals.

The police are responsible for securing the area and for public security in and around the site of the incident. The police also assign a liaison officer to the medical evacuation area to assist and collect information concerning victim issues.

The Police may request assistance from the military using a legislative basis. In any other case, involving the military would be a political decision. Military forces are seen as a service provider in crisis management. If requested by a competent authority, they provide guard and patrol services. Investigations into terrorism are assigned to a specialised unit of the Criminal Investigation Department. Information gathered by the Intelligence Service and transmitted to the police may be used, under certain conditions, as evidence in criminal proceedings. Cooperation between the police and the Intelligence Service is close and takes the form of weekly meetings.

### 2.2.6. *The Prosecutor's Office*

Luxembourg has a dual level court system, with two first instance district courts with territorial jurisdiction in Luxembourg and Diekirch, and the Court of Appeal.

There is no specific court for terrorism cases in Luxembourg, i.e. no court deals exclusively with terrorism. However, all terrorism issues are centralised in the first instance, before the District Court of Luxembourg. The prosecutor and the District Court of Luxembourg have exclusive jurisdiction for terrorist cases.

### **2.3. Competences of the National Crisis Centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks**

The National Crisis Centre is the contact point of Luxembourg for the exchange of information with crisis centres in other Member States. When acting in its own capacity, it maintains the state's international communication networks (NATO, EU, OSCE). It has permanent direct contacts with its partners in other Member States and third countries. Cooperation appears to be particularly advanced among the Benelux countries where information is exchanged about risk analysis, management of emergency situations and implementation of joint exercises. The development of a list of potential cross-border targets (critical infrastructure) takes place within the Benelux and, on a bilateral basis, with other neighbouring countries. Different agreements are in place e.g.: with Belgium, on the basis of the aforementioned Benelux agreement; with France, on the basis of close cooperation with the *Zone de Défense EST* (East Defence Zone); and with Germany, on the basis of close cooperation with the corresponding POCs of the federal states of Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland.

The DRP is the central point for bilateral and multilateral exchange of information on radiological incidents.

### **2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

**3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

The CONATSUR is responsible for administering the national/international exercises within its competence, including training on terrorism scenarios. On a more practical level, the HCPN coordinates and monitors the organisation of training and exercises on matters of national security.

A national exercise schedule exists where all authorities present their own exercise schedules. All relevant agencies and authorities are required to participate in those exercises. The telecommunications committee (CONATEL) is responsible for the communication systems' testing exercises; however, the communication networks and systems are tested regularly during ongoing incident handling in the field.

The authorities' response in any crisis situation is based on a national multiple victim plan, which is used following a decision of the HCPN. In that context, parts of the operational and communications capabilities are tested several times a year. This formula is also used in a terrorist scenario. The multiple-victim plan is assessed after each use and updated accordingly. Based on the multiple victim plan each authority prepares an action plan for responding to the incident. A Crisis Unit is activated four times a year in various crisis management situations.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

The last exercise (eulux 2007) took place in June 2007. That exercise was co-financed by the European Commission and involved the four organiser countries (Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg) and four guest countries (Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands and Hungary). This circumstances in which the exercise was carried out closely mirrored real life.

#### **4. SOFT TARGETS**

A list of soft targets is currently being drawn up. The underlying criteria for the list will not be publicised. The risk alert can launch the risk procedures independently of the kind of targets (critical, soft). In responding to or planning for a crisis such as a terrorist attack, the HCPN does not aim to or see a need to distinguish between soft and other targets. Irrespective of the type of target, the response and competent authorities would be the same.

The identification and protection of soft targets is conducted by the police. As part of their bottom-up prevention strategy within the concept of Community Policing, threat assessments on sensitive locations, objects and events are drawn up and corresponding measures are taken at regional level.

## 5. GOOD PRACTICES

- Crisis Centre staff appear to have a philosophy of facilitating coordination among the relevant authorities and/or disciplines without seeking to detract from their responsibilities or powers, encouraging a readiness on the part of other departments to work closely and transparently with the Crisis Centre.
- Cooperation appears to be particularly advanced among the Benelux countries where information is exchanged about risk analysis, management of emergency situations and implementation of joint exercises. This appeared to be an example of best practice which could potentially be replicated elsewhere on a regional neighbourhood basis.
- The functioning and content of the VIGILNAT plan is another example of best practice
- Luxembourg struck us as being particularly aware of best practice in other countries, especially neighbouring countries. Based on past experience, Luxembourg has been able to devise individual solutions based on the country's specific features, notably its size.
- The facilities to convene the NCC are located and set up well, in particular the three different rooms: one for political decision-making, one for operational staff and another reserved for the media.
- The installation of radiation detection gates at enterprises handling recycled metal scrap and the national waste recycling plant could become a common European standard.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

In terms of recommendations, it is proposed that Luxembourg:

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

## **7. ANNEX**

### **7.1. Speakers**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

High Commission for National Protection  
Ministère d'Etat

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

High Commission for National Protection  
Ministère d'Etat

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Rescue Services Agency  
Ministry of the Interior

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Health Inspectorate  
Health Directorate  
Ministry of Health

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Department of Radiation Protection  
Health Directorate  
Ministry of Health

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Government Communications Centre

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Government Communications Centre

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Public Security Directorate  
Ministry of Justice

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Public Prosecutor's Office

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Public Prosecutor's Office, Luxembourg District Court

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Office of the examining magistrate, Luxembourg District Court

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Directorate of Operations and Prevention

Grand-Duchy Police

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Grand-Duchy Police

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

State Intelligence Service

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

State Intelligence Service

## 7.2. Expert team

### Council General Secretariat

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

### European Commission

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

DG JLS - Directorate D - Unit F3

### Europol

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Serious Crime Department - Counter Terrorism

**Denmark**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Danish National Police

National operations and Emergency Centre

**Finland**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Situation Awareness Unit

Finnish Security Police

---