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- Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid -

Report on responses to crises – DRC, Pakistan, Lebanon and Burma/Myanmar

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1.	**INTRODUCTION**

The Commission launched an issues paper / questionnaire on 15 December 2006 as the start of a process leading to the adoption of a Communication on a "European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid".

In order to provide practical examples of the issues raised in the questionnaire, this paper provides an overview of experiences drawn from responses to four crises: the DRC; Lebanon; Pakistan and Burma/Myanmar.

Section two provides an overview of the issues and highlights specific experiences and conclusions that emerged. Section three to six contain the detailed descriptions of the contexts of and responses to these crises. Annex I provides a chronology of the crises and annex II an overview of funding decisions per country concerned.

2.	**OVERVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED**

2.1.	**Upholding the Principles of Humanitarian Aid**

The humanitarian space is put under pressure. Humanitarian actors need to be creative to ensure access to and protection of the humanitarian space and vulnerable groups. Funding for forgotten crises is part of the upholding of the principles, underpinning EU humanitarian aid.

In all cases, access to and security in crisis areas was an issue that obstructed the impact of the humanitarian aid. Lack of access and security not only affects the capacity to respond, it also makes it more difficult to find qualified (local and international) staff, as was the case in the DRC. Sometimes innovative approaches are needed: for instance, in the context of the Lebanon conflict, the deployment of a civil-military liaison officer to Tel Aviv to "liaise" with one of the parties to the conflict was the first experience of its kind. It was positive, as it not only improved the security management for the Commission itself, but also allowed DG ECHO to advocate in favour of secure access for its partners. In Pakistan, upholding the principles was easier during the emergency phase, when needs were highest. In the following recovery phase, actors were less unified. Tension related to the 'Danish cartoons' issue made the fragility of the humanitarian space apparent: it caused a series of security incidents with hostility from certain political and religious sectors of local society manifested towards the aid workers. In Burma/Myanmar, safety of local staff is promoted by the insistence of a presence of expatriate staff in the supported projects. Public and political interest in humanitarian crises often plays a controversial role regarding principles. This role needs to be managed properly: when attention is missing, such as is the case for Burma/Myanmar, donors need to ensure availability of funding. When there is a lot of political interest – as was the case in Lebanon - donors need to manage the challenge of upholding the principles.

2.2. Advocating the Respect for International Humanitarian Law

The EU forcefully advocated the respect for IHL through direct (letters, Council resolutions) and indirect actions (via partners). Even if there is a strong political stance vis-à-vis a government, it is still possible to provide humanitarian aid.

Strong advocacy is evidenced in many crises: In Lebanon, The EU made repeated calls for all parties to respect IHL, notably the protection of civilian populations and the facilitation of access to the victims. The visibility of the Lebanese conflict constituted an excellent opportunity to seize political and public interest in order to promote the principles of humanitarian aid and to push for respect of humanitarian space. The recurrent reference to the situation in the Palestinian territories in Commissioner Michel's interventions on Lebanon, in the Council Conclusions and the constant references to IHL were examples of a positive use of media and political interest.

With regards to Burma/Myanmar, the EU Common Position refers to restrictive measures vis-à-vis the government and to the assistance approach. These restrictive measures have been in place since 1996. The Common Position, extended in April 2007 for another year, refers to dialogue with the regime ("... engage with the government over its responsibility to make greater efforts to attain the UN Millennium Development Goals"). It mandates assistance, focusing on health and education, to be delivered through UN agencies or international NGOs. It allows only for programmes that emphasise advocacy for humanitarian principles and human rights and limits aid to humanitarian aid. Such aid is for instance provided to the ICRC and UNHCR, who dialogue with the military government for respect to minorities and IHL. The political dimension of the Common Position is highlighted by a number of EU statements (Presidency and Council Conclusion), e.g. when the ICRC was under increased government pressure and considering withdrawing from the country,, because they could not perform their protection mandate due to the obstacles created by the authorities. The EU intervention helped to oblige the government to change its position and was accompanied by continued financial support to ICRC activities, providing direct and indirect actions in terms of advocacy.

2.3. Emergency Response Policy

The deployment of DG ECHO experts allows for quick responses fulfilling several roles in terms of coordination and needs assessment. Redeploying of Headquarters staff proved successful to increase rapid response capabilities.

DG ECHO's presence in affected areas through its field experts before emergencies had facilitated fast delivery when needed. It also helped to respond in a context-specific manner, as was the case in DRC. In Pakistan, mobile (DG ECHO) teams were deployed to rapidly report back on needs and to advise on partner presence and performance for funding allocations. These teams took on coordination work to ensure quality of responses. Also in other crises, DG ECHO's presence provided for both quality by facilitating proper needs assessments and coordination, as well as speed thanks to its direct presence. However, access to the affected population as well as the scale of the needs provided challenges. In Pakistan, the huge impact of the crisis brought major difficulties in terms of logistics. Speed of delivery and

quantity of supply were real challenges. Overall, logistical capacity should be increased and more specifically, DG ECHO's role in ensuring availability and speed by better coordination and stronger field presence. The example of Lebanon could be followed, where a redeployment of staff at headquarters and field level took place and where the EC Delegation fulfilled a crucial role in coordinating efforts.

2.4.   Scope of Humanitarian Aid in Relation to Crisis Management and ESDP

In the context of the Lebanon conflict, the interface with the European military at headquarters level was important for the adequacy of the military assets used in support of the humanitarian intervention as well as for guaranteeing access. On the ground, the interface with the Israeli military, through the deployment of a DG ECHO's liaison officer to Tel Aviv was very functional in guaranteeing safe access. In DRC, DG ECHO initiated a liaison mechanism following MCDA guidelines. This helped to respect the mandates and roles of humanitarian operators and military to be fully respected, including the different visual identities. It also ensured that the military were not directly involved in humanitarian activities, but created the environment for others to do so. In Pakistan, DG ECHO supported the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) - a successful civil-military logistics operation coordinated with the government..

2.5.   Scope of Humanitarian Aid in Relation to Disaster Reduction and Transitional Contexts

Disaster Reduction and LRRD should be taken into consideration and mainstreamed at the start of any intervention and preferably guided by policies and funding. Follow-up funding needs to be made available by donors.

Humanitarian aid is one component in a multi-pronged approach which can be very expensive and human-resource consuming as all the components need to be put in place simultaneously. There is a need to start thinking about LRRD already when planning humanitarian interventions to be successful. By doing so, many of the humanitarian programmes can be successfully taken over by other partners as is done in DRC. In Lebanon, following the emergency, plans for 'return to normality' have been integrated and funding is needed for transition from emergency to development. This is especially the case for livelihood-recovery (transition) and de-mining (LRRD). Pakistan showed a successful follow-up of interventions by DG RELEX who had allocated € 50M for rehabilitation assistance and early recovery within two months. Disaster Reduction and Mitigation in Pakistan were further mainstreamed in the funding response, by providing adequate knowledge and information material on seismic safety to local governments, communities and schools. Strong ownership of the Government of Pakistan, supported by the EU, the Commission and UNOCHA was a key success factor. A structure was set up at field level to investigate the needs.

2.6.   Partnership and Professionalism

The diversity of partners contributed to effective responses as DG ECHO had partners on the ground in emergencies who worked with local partners. Local capacities can be built through various actions. Funding for capacity building

(thematic funding) and the availability of appropriately trained staff are crucial in this.

Working with a diversity of partners enables DG ECHO to support different technical and geographical areas.. It also enables to provide an integrated multi-sector assistance package to vulnerable groups. Partners in DRC work with local partners and provide capacity building wherever possible. In Pakistan, in addition to direct operational funding in response to the crisis, a number of UN agencies were already receiving thematic funding to improve their capacity to respond to just such a crisis. This was notably the case with UNOCHA, and WHO. Pro-activity towards the UN at head office level would help in ensuring the timely arrival of quality proposals. Besides capacity building through 'natural' partners, the situation of Burma/Myanmar provides a good example of reinforcing capacities of local NGOs through partnership relations with international organisations, supported by the Commission.

2.7. Direct and Indirect Aid Delivery

Existing direct aid delivery is crucial and should be strengthened, not expanded. DG ECHO field presence ensures rapid responses and coordination. ECHO flight facilitates access and logistics.

Earlier recommendations were made that DG ECHO should ensure faster and more flexible redeployment of staff, especially at headquarters, to ensure available capacity at the right place. Following these, the Lebanon team was successfully and on time reinforced during the crisis. In Pakistan, the DG ECHO field team was well-prepared as it included staff that had undergone the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) training[1]. Also in many other emergency contexts, DG ECHO was already present following previous interventions. This greatly facilitated the response in Lebanon, where field and regional expert were in a position to undertake immediate needs assessments as well as ensure proper monitoring of activities. One of the lessons learned from the Tsunami humanitarian response applied in Pakistan and Lebanon was to deploy teams with at least two members: experience shows that one will be absorbed by coordination meetings and reporting tasks, freeing the other to conduct needs assessment, discuss and appraise project proposals with partners and monitor implementation. Continuation of responses and needs is ensured by presence: in Lebanon, it was decided to establish a more permanent team of experts and in Burma/Myanmar, a DG ECHO office was recently set up to ensure better monitoring and follow-up of operations. This also facilitates problem solving regarding access of partners and contacts with the Burmese authorities. Apart from presence, logistics are in many emergencies considered complicated and expensive, though crucial for delivery. In DRC, the ECHO flight support provided – at no cost - access for humanitarian actors to areas otherwise inaccessible. In Pakistan, DG ECHO funded *Atlas Logistics* which was very successful in rationalising airport clearance and land transport for aid partners. This greatly benefited effectiveness and cost efficiency of partners' aid delivery.

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[1] Training is designed to enhance coordination between UN and other agencies during the vital first phase of emergency response.

2.8. Contributing to Strengthening of the International Humanitarian System

Implementing the cluster approach has so far only partially been successful. It increased the need for capacity and should focus more on the inclusion of partners. As responses necessitated the usage of the emergency fund, there is an apparent need for more EU humanitarian aid funding.

Pakistan was the first occasion that the cluster approach was applied. Many agencies, including cluster leads, had to learn about and develop the new approach at the same time as managing their emergency responses. This led to delays. To get presence for all cluster leads in the field hubs took a lot of time and there was confusion over the leadership of the key 'shelter' cluster. At the same time, implementation was constrained by the shortage of experienced staff due to other disasters like Tsunami and Darfur. Following the cluster appeal, it still took time to bring proposals up to an acceptable quality, despite good field coordination. Communication problems existed between field hubs and Islamabad coordination. This sometimes led to misinformation about the real needs. However, the major donors with field presence worked to assist UNOCHA to overcome these problems (DFID, USAID and DG ECHO). Following this experience, in Lebanon, a total of 4% of funding of the conflict response was allocated to coordination mostly to UNOCHA and UNDP. At the same time, a deliberate effort was made to establish coordination with non-traditional (Arabic) donors, which proved useful as they often did not have the movement constraints as the UN had. In DRC, assistance to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in developing a common humanitarian strategy evolved into a single strategy on which DG ECHO and other donors base funding decisions.

At the beginning of each financial exercise, DG ECHO establishes an indicative allocation of resources on the different "foreseeable" crises and an operational reserve of 15% of its budget that is used to respond to sudden disasters or to increased needs in a given context. For bigger crises, the Commission can also request to mobilise the emergency reserve. The entire € 50M provided in response to the conflict in Lebanon was drawn from this emergency reserve, avoiding the depletion of DG ECHO's operational reserve and a negative impact on other, less mediatised, crises. However, the repeated calls on the emergency fund over the last years emphasises the insufficiency of regular funds.

2.9. Coordination and Complementarity at EU level

Even though many initiatives take place to strengthen coordination, this is often based on good intentions and individuals more than it is on a systematic strategic approach. Country studies discuss coordination both at headquarters and at field level to ensure successful responses.

Even though few formal mechanisms at local or international level exist, DG ECHO experts and EU Member States representatives have regular meetings on humanitarian coordination. For instance in the DRC, other humanitarian actors are included. However, such coordination is often depending on proactive staff who take an initiative in order to fill coordination gaps. In Lebanon, the EC Delegation was very instrumental in providing support to DG ECHO and MIC experts in terms of office space and coordination meetings, while in Pakistan: information was shared through daily situation reports sent to all EU Member States. Close cooperation

between the Commission and the European Parliament ensured early availability of funding from the Commission reserve. It is argued, following Pakistan's experience, that the earlier formal EU coordination at Headquarter level takes place, the better leverage can be given to funding (also in terms of visibility). This was in particular relevant to counter misinformation circulated to the media about the extent of donor response to the crisis. It would also have avoided misunderstandings that arose from selective high level coordination between UNOCHA and different EU actors. Coordination from the EU as a block, building on EC and DFID field presence, could have assisted the improvement of overall planning and co-ordination. For example, introducing earlier lateral thinking could have addressed shelter needs. In Burma/Myanmar, donors have set up a Partnership Group for the Effectiveness of Aid (Paris Declaration) in which the Commission plays an important role. Regular informal meetings with other donors (DFID, JAICA, KOICA, and AUSAID) take place. Coordination should benefit from the recent decision to give to the UN Resident Coordinator the responsibility of "Humanitarian Coordinator".

2.10. Coordination with other EU Actors involved in humanitarian relief

DG ECHO presence in the field is particularly helpful to facilitate coordination with other actors. Action at headquarters is needed to ensure clear mandates and application of relevant guidelines. Cooperation with other EU actors is good, but time consuming.

With regard to the relationship between humanitarian aid and civil protection, clarification of the respective roles, expertise and mandates is discussed in the country studies. This clarification is needed based on the fact that presently more EU actors are working in the humanitarian aid field. The Presence of DG ECHO crisis teams in the field greatly helped such coordination with EU Member States, donors, UN and the team of civil protection experts (MIC) in Lebanon and Pakistan. Daily joint situation reports included Member States financial contributions (through the 14 points' system) as well as in-kind donations (through MIC) and were useful. Between 24 July and 18 August, the MIC sent three successive teams of civil protection experts to Lebanon. At the same time, DG ECHO needed to be more explicit to ensure that its mandate and the operations of EC humanitarian aid instruments were well understood by all parties. In Pakistan, two MIC-experts arrived and established contacts with the UK presidency. One remained as part of the UK (DFID) Humanitarian team. In the context of the Lebanon crisis, coordination at headquarters between EU military staff and the Commission ensured a consensus to apply MCDA guidelines and ensure adherence to the last resort principle. In addition to advocating the respect for the Oslo and for the MCDA guidelines at all opportunities, DG ECHO has contributed to the dissemination of the guidelines by funding the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Field Handbook

3. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1998-2007)

3.1. Context

The humanitarian situation in Congo has been severely affected by political developments since the early 1990s. The former Belgian colony had already suffered a considerable decline during the years of Mobutu. The consequences of the

Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the two so called 'Congo wars' have further worsened the humanitarian situation and eventually precipitated the change of regime.

The arrival of some 1.2 million Rwandan refugees into Eastern Zaire in 1994 exacerbated local ethnic tensions, which involved also Congolese populations of Rwandan origin. It also provided cover for troops of the former Rwandan regime to launch attacks into Rwanda. Judging Mobutu to be complicit with these attacks, the Rwandan Army supported a local rebel group under Laurent Désiré Kabila that overthrew Mobutu and took power in 1997, in what became known as the first Congo War. Zaire was then renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The second Congo war erupted in 1998 when President Kabila expelled his Rwandan and Ugandan supporters, provoking a Rwandan and Ugandan backlash against him, their former ally. This prompted the intervention of troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe in support of the new rulers in Kinshasa. In August 1999, the governments of DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and the main - but not all - Congolese opposition groups signed a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka. However, the fighting persisted.

President Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, was named Head of State. He began overtures to end the war once and for all. These resulted in the "Acte Global et Inclusif" signed in Pretoria in 2002, which provided for a 24-month transitional government, established in 2003, embracing some of the main protagonists from the civil war, including at vice-presidential level.

In order to monitor the peace accords the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established, in 1999, the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC). It now consists of approximately 17,000 troops and is the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. Over the years it has acquired a Chapter VII mandate in order to deal with the persistent armed opposition groups including *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) / Interahamwe* (Rwandans implicated in the 1994 genocide who subsequently fled to eastern DRC), *Mai-Mai* factions (bands of local DRC citizens originally formed to resist Rwandan army occupation), and ethnic or clan-based organizations that continue to threaten security in certain areas.

In Ituri, a separate ethnic conflict erupted in 2003. UNSC Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003authorised a Chapter VII intervention in Bunia, to which the EU responded by deploying a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force, known as "Operation Artemis", until MONUC reinforcements could take over in September of the same year.

Events in DRC over the last decade have claimed an estimated 3.3 million lives as a direct result of fighting or indirectly because of disease and malnutrition. The conflict had a disproportionate effect on civilians who were subjected to massacres, looting, raping and the destruction of their villages and crops. It has displaced 3 to 4 million residents, with up to 500,000 finding refuge in neighbouring countries. Especially in the East, it resulted in the collapse of the few remaining essential services, such as health and education, and it exhausted most of the coping mechanisms, livelihood and agricultural assets.

3.2. Co-ordination and strengthening of the international humanitarian system

Over the last three years, besides the European Commission, major donors have been the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, and Sweden[2]

In the complex situation in DRC, DG ECHO saw the need to encourage co-ordination and a coherent strategy in the various sectors. Thus, it funded the United Nations' Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Activities (UNOCHA) and encouraged them to deploy in the most affected zones.

The international community has started to pilot a number of humanitarian reform initiatives in the DRC, including the cluster approach introduced by the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator at the end of 2005, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the pooled fund established in 2006 by a group of bilateral donors and put at the disposal of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator, and the Needs Assessment Framework Matrix. DG ECHO is either directly or indirectly involved in most of these and whilst it is too early to assess the impact of these mechanisms, their main aims are to focus on better covering the needs of the beneficiaries and to define in a clear and simple way, and by consensus, objectives and indicators allowing for a better follow up and a more precise evaluation.

Together with the other main donors, the UN and its implementing partners, DG ECHO has assisted the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in developing a common humanitarian strategy for DRC. From this has evolved the Humanitarian Action Plan for DRC, which outlines the needs and the technical and financial resources required to meet them. The main thrust of the plan is to provide emergency assistance to the newly displaced and to support those returning home. DG ECHO funds are provided in conformity with this common humanitarian strategy.

EU Member States and the Delegation of the European Commission in Kinshasa hold regular meetings on political and development issues. Humanitarian co-ordination meetings are held under the aegis of the GHD (donors only) and with the Humanitarian Action Group, in which UN agencies and major NGOs also participate. There is no formal specific mechanism, neither locally or elsewhere, for co-ordination and complementarity at EU level. Instead, ad hoc initiatives are often taken by DG ECHO experts and/or representatives of EU Member States in DRC.

3.3. Specific response by the European Commission / DG ECHO

The European Commission, through DG ECHO, has been present with humanitarian aid interventions in DRC since the exodus of refugees from Rwanda in 1994. Since the current crisis resulting from the 2nd Congo war in 1998, it has allocated more than € 315M, excluding ECHO flight, in humanitarian aid, which makes it the single largest humanitarian donor to the affected populations.

Over this period of time, foreign aid has been the substantial source of survival for many Congolese people. It is estimated that well over USD 200 M/year of

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[2]   Source: Financial Tracking System, compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors and appealing organisations.

humanitarian aid has been committed to the DRC. The 2006 Humanitarian Action Plan alone has so far attracted USD 290 M.

The humanitarian aid community has paid a toll, facing constant threats, robberies, kidnappings, difficulties of access, and even deaths as in the case of six ICRC staff murdered in Ituri in 2001. A limited number of aid organizations have maintained a permanent presence in DRC and even these have found it difficult to attract and keep qualified international staff. Good local staff is also limited due to the lack of adequate educational opportunities.

Over the last year, security and access to remaining vulnerable populations have improved considerably. This, together with decreasing mortality and malnutrition rates and the successful completion of the elections, bear witness to the progress made in DRC. However, this must be viewed in the context of DRC remaining amongst the most vulnerable and the least developed countries in the world, with some of the lowest human development indicators.

Emergency responses are still required in the Eastern areas, where conflict and displacement of populations are still considerable. In Ituri, the Kivus and Katanga more than a million people are still displaced and even if most are now on the way home, they will need a wide range of assistance before they can become self-sufficient again. Also more than 300,000 refugees are still expected to return from neighbouring countries.

In order to adapt its response to changing needs, DG ECHO's intervention strategy in DRC has been evolving through different phases:

- In 1998 the focus was on assisting the population with short term life-saving programmes in the war zones, particularly in those rebel held areas in the east devoid of formal assistance. Humanitarian aid was provided as best as possible through the recruitment of partners in a few 'poles of assistance' where secure access could be achieved.

- As security improved from 2002 onwards and certain areas, such as the former front line, became accessible, DG ECHO widened its area of operation. Gradually the former 'poles of assistance' became large confluent areas allowing more substantial and sophisticated programmes to be put in place. For instance, together with other stakeholders, DG ECHO was able to evolve a comprehensive health programme providing a standard package of services across the whole east of the country.

- In 2002, DG ECHO provided a response to the humanitarian needs generated by the volcanic eruption in Goma.

- The steady return of government control and development donors from 2003 into those areas where security had improved has allowed DG ECHO to hand over some of its programmes requiring longer term solutions. DG ECHO will concentrate its efforts in 2007 on the few remaining areas of conflict in the east and on the huge task of assisting the 1.5 million displaced and refugees to return home and re-secure their livelihoods.

Since 1998, DG ECHO has issued nearly 400 grant agreements with some 40 implementing partners (UN specialised agencies, International NGOs, and the Red Cross family), often operating in cooperation with local actors. While, as stated above, DG ECHO's intervention in DRC has evolved according to the situation, its height of support was in 2004. These were some of its achievements:

- Support, on average, to 65 health zones per year, providing direct healthcare to an estimated 4 million beneficiaries/year;

- Nutritional support to an average of 50,000 children/year;

- Provision of food, seeds and tools to an average of 487,000 beneficiaries/year;

- The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, including 370 km of humanitarian access roads;

- Specific treatment programmes for victims of sexual violence, (which DG ECHO was one of the first to support);

- Support to protection activities.

The annex provides the main funding and the details of these allocations, which include funds from the humanitarian aid budget lines as well as the European Development Fund (EDF). For 2007, there is also a proposed initial allocation under the food aid budget line.

3.4. Partnership and professionalism

Over the last three years, roughly 80% of DG ECHO funds have been used to fund interventions by NGOs, whereas specialised United Nations agencies and the ICRC accounted for some 18% and 2% respectively.

The humanitarian impact of the second Congo war represented a challenge in terms of access for a major donor like the Commission, both in terms of security, as well as geography. The war and the savagery of the protagonists closed down humanitarian access to all but a few pockets. In the light of the experience following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the affected population was reluctant to find refuge in camps, rather preferring to hide in the bush, thus adding to the difficulty faced by humanitarian operators to provide them with assistance. DG ECHO concentrated on the Eastern rebel areas where all forms of government and donor support ceased and coping mechanisms collapsed. DG ECHO supported a critical mass of partners providing different components of an integrated multi-sector assistance package to population groups identified as particularly vulnerable. A particular example is the case of the population of Ituri which since 1999 had been provided with medical assistance, water and sanitation, shelter and food aid, as well as nutrition services.

Many of DG ECHO partners work with local NGOs and contribute to the capacity building and transfer of know-how to local staff, whenever this is possible given the conditions.

DG ECHO has also funded a humanitarian air service, ECHO flight, which since 2006/07 is exclusively operating in DRC. The Budget for the ECHO Flight was € 7M in 2006 and it is proposed at € 7.5M for 2007. The ECHO Flight proved instrumental in overcoming some of the major difficulties linked to access. Free access to the ECHO Flight scheduled service is provided not only to humanitarian agencies funded by DG ECHO, but also to all those who are involved in humanitarian or post-emergency development activities.

DG ECHO maintains three offices in DRC (in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu), as well as a satellite office in Bunia, employing a total of five expatriate technical assistants, including one, based in Goma, in charge of ECHO flight.

3.5. Relations between humanitarian and military actors

'Operation Artemis' was an example of civil military co-operation. At the initiative of DG ECHO, a clear, albeit informal, liaison mechanism was established between the humanitarian community and the "Operation Artemis", in line with the Guidelines on Military, Civil and Defence Assets (MCDA), which allowed for the respective mandates and roles of humanitarian operators and military to be fully respected, including in terms of differentiated visual identity. In particular, the military engaged in "Operation Artemis" were not involved in any activity consisting in the direct delivery of humanitarian aid to the beneficiaries. They provided a valuable contribution by creating the conditions for the civilian population of Bunia, who had fled when heavy fighting broke out, to return to normal levels. Their presence also allowed humanitarian organisations to implement without major disruptions the enhanced strategy that DG ECHO had devised since October 2002 in order to maintain the provision of basic assistance to the civilian population affected by the conflict in Ituri. This strategy incorporated advocacy, regular ECHO Flight services to Bunia, pre-positioned emergency stocks, and establishing new partners on the periphery of the District.

3.6. Disaster reduction and transitional contexts - Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

The process of handing over programmes and responsibilities to the Government and development actors as they became present, interested and capable started in 2003. Progress registered so far is encouraging in the health sector, which is a priority sector for both the EC development co-operation and the World Bank in DRC. For example, the EC development co-operation is taking over some of the health programmes previously funded by DG ECHO, as well as launching a € 65 M rehabilitation and economic revival programme in the East of DRC, where DG ECHO-funded activities have mostly taken place. Some sectors are easier to link than others, whilst some programmes were of a purely emergency nature and had no long term logic.

DG ECHO also promoted a common strategy in key sectors like health, by funding implementing partners that provided a minimum package of curative and preventive care, as well as encouraging, whenever possible, the use of existing structures and personnel of the Ministry of Health. Such a strategy was developed following a DG ECHO-sponsored conference in Nairobi with the participation of representatives of the World Health Organisation and all DG ECHO partners involved in the health

sector. The fact that both governmental authorities and rebel groups accepted the strategy was instrumental in its eventual success.

By December 2005, the country was sufficiently pacified to organise a constitutional referendum. The positive result allowed the first pluralistic and open elections in the DRC in 40 years to take place on 30 July 2006 without major incidents. The EC played a role in organising and supporting the election process through the EDF with € 165M. On 29 October President Kabila won the second round over Vice-President Bemba and was sworn in on 6 December. In April 2006, the EU and UN also approved the deployment of a special EU military force (EUFOR) to provide extra security, principally in Kinshasa, during the elections.

At the time of writing (March 2007) a Prime Minister has been nominated and is expected to submit shortly to the Parliament the list of Ministers for the proposed Government to be voted. At the same time, in the eastern part of the country there are resource rich areas that are still interspersed with irregular fighting forces and that remain out of effective State control.

4. LEBANON (SUMMER 2006)

4.1. Context

The 35-day conflict that affected Lebanon in July-August 2006 caught the Lebanese as well as the international community by surprise. Although internal tensions had been ongoing following the assassination in February 2005 of former Prime Minister Hariri, the subsequent withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and the international enquiry into the assassination, no one expected that a kidnapping by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July would trigger a large scale conflict between Hezbollah and the Israeli army with a significant human toll. The conflict resulted in the death of 1,183 Lebanese and injury of 4,551. In Lebanon, the bombing of Beirut, the Bekaa valley and the South of the country caused the massive displacement of 915,752 people, or a quarter of the country's total population[3], mostly IDPs (about 700,000 mostly hosted in families, with close to 130,000 sheltered in public buildings) with 220,000 having fled to neighbouring countries, especially Syria.

The crisis was rightly qualified as a "protection" crisis: besides the material humanitarian needs, the primary need of the victims was one of protection. The response capacity of humanitarian operators on the ground was largely conditioned by their capacity to deal with the "security factor": UN agencies were both hindered by their own security requirements and helped by the existence of a civil-military coordination with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) that allowed a number of convoys to go through; NGOs had the facility to operate in all parts of the country – except in the most affected areas bordering Israel - but were operating at "their own risk": many of those funded by the Commission were already present in the country, working with the Palestinian refugees and having their partnerships with local organisations. ICRC was best positioned, as is often the case in such circumstances, mobilising a substantial team, making best use of its local partner (the Lebanese Red

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[3]   According to the Government of Lebanon (GoL) Higher Relief Council (HRC).

Cross) whilst negotiating access with both parties to the conflict. For DG ECHO, all three types of partners brought a different added value thus confirming, once again, the advantage of working with a wide-range of partners.

The Israeli attacks on Lebanon caused widespread damage to homes and civilian infrastructure, including 630 km of roads, 78 bridges, 32 vital points (airports, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical plants, etc), 25 fuel stations, 72 over-passes and 15,000 private houses and apartments, leading to the disruption of essential services. The conflict was coupled with an air and sea blockade on the country combined with a severe limitation on road movements inside the country as well as towards neighbouring Syria. These constituted an access challenge for the relief effort as well as a protection gap for the local population. In the most affected areas (South of the Litani river) the "choice" for the population was either to remain trapped in their villages, with the risk of being bombarded in their own houses or to wander towards the North or coastal towns, and risk being shelled on the road.

The crisis was a high profile one, drawing a lot of media attention as well as political mobilisation from the international community. The latter was, however, either unable or unwilling to bring the conflict to a halt, or even to call unanimously for an immediate cease-fire, but finally intervened, following a Security Council resolution on 12 August.

For the EU, the crisis was felt as "close to home": about 200 kilometres separate Lebanon from Cyprus. Thousands of EU nationals were on holidays in the country and the events immediately prompted a major evacuation effort – by road to Damascus and by boat to Larnaca for onward transfer to their places of origin. Member States, the high representative for the CFSP as well as the Commission attempted, without much success, to broker a solution to the conflict.

4.2.   Coordination

Coordination was a significant challenge in this crisis: many actors were involved, information from the areas most affected was scattered, access was difficult, and the UN were constrained by the security measures imposed (it was considered level 4) which restrained their movements. These pitfalls have been identified by OCHA itself in its lessons learned paper on the Lebanon crisis. UNOCHA actually arrived only a few days before the launch of the flash appeal and with three people on the ground was unable to engage in the level of coordination that was needed. In Beirut, the Commission (EC Delegation with the support of DG ECHO and MIC-experts) actually covered a real gap in coordination and information sharing on the humanitarian responses of each donor. The Commission went a step further by engaging with the non-traditional donors, Arab countries, who were extremely active in this crisis, and had no movement constraints. Similarly, the Commission coordinated with the national authorities, municipalities as well as local NGOs. On the funding side, 4% of the total Lebanon conflict response has been allocated to coordination (with €800,000 going to OCHA during the emergency phase, and € 1M to UNDP in the post-emergency phase). Internal Commission coordination was also a priority. Daily joint situation reports with the MIC-experts were produced and distributed within the EU institutions. In addition, the Commission produced several times a week information notes on the humanitarian situation and responses, which

encompassed Member States financial contributions (through the 14 point system) as well as in-kind donations (through the MIC).

4.3.   Specific response by the European Community: a two-staged financial response

The need to mobilise humanitarian aid became apparent a few days after the beginning of the conflict. On 17 July, Commissioner Louis Michel announced an "earmarking" of € 5M which would be made available as soon as needs assessments could take place. As soon as the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict became clear, two financial decisions totalling € 20M were adopted on 24 and 26 July 2006, to address immediately the most urgent humanitarian needs in Lebanon – emergency medical supplies and equipment, water and sanitation, food, shelter, as well logistics (to support an operation made very complex by the effects of the blockade and the conflict situation) and in neighbouring countries (assistance to the refugees). This first allocation of funds allowed responding considerably to the ICRC appeal (€ 4M contribution to the preliminary appeal of 18 July for € 6.5M, later scaled up to € 64.6M on 27 July) and to the Consolidated Appeal of the UN (€ 9.1M of the first two decisions were in favour of the UN, who adopted a $ 150M (€ 119M) flash appeal on 24 July).

The definition of the sectors of intervention (relief food and non food items, logistics, shelter, health, protection, logistics and coordination) was sufficiently broad to allow the necessary flexibility to adjust to the evolution of the situation of the ground which was completely unpredictable and part of the € 20M has actually covered humanitarian needs of the aftermath of the conflict. Eventually, the breakdown of the emergency response has been as follows: 42% on relief food and Non Food Items (NFI), 12% on shelter, 10% on Water and Sanitation (watsan), 9% on health, 8% on protection, 15% on logistics (through WFP) and 4% on coordination (through OCHA). In total, the two decisions funded 23 projects, the smallest was for €22,500 for communication support through *Telecom Sans Frontières*, and the largest was for € 4M through the ICRC. Partners covered all three categories: UN (6 partners, 45.5%), Red Cross (1 partner, 20%) and NGOs (17 partners, 34.5%).

The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)

On 21 July, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was activated upon a request from Cyprus to assist in the coordination of the evacuation effort as well as the channelling of in-kind assistance provided by eleven Member States to Lebanon, transiting through Cyprus. This was complemented by a MIC deployment to Beirut in the following days. The MIC sent three successive teams covering the period of 24 July to 18 August to coordinate the provision of aid in kind from Member States' civil protection authorities and, in addition, several successive teams of marine pollution experts to deal with the consequences of the oil spill that affected the Lebanese coast. The expert teams were based in the EC Delegation premises in Beirut and contributed to the joint situation reports discussed above.

4.4.   Advocacy for the respect of IHL

The humanitarian crisis that resulted from the conflict in Lebanon was clearly a "protection crisis". In the letter to the Israeli authorities, the EU clearly called on all parties to respect international humanitarian law, notably the protection of civilian

populations and the facilitation of access to the victims. This call was repeatedly made by the EU[4]. The political interest in the Lebanon crisis was deliberately used by the Commissioner for humanitarian aid to advocate for the respect of IHL in the West Bank and Gaza. On 22 July, Commissioner Michel and Minister Lehtomäki (Finish Presidency of the EU) wrote to the Israeli MFA and minister of defence[5] calling for respect for IHL and for safe entry into and exit out of Lebanon for land, sea and air-borne cargo and for safe passage within the country. Following Council meetings[6] also made explicit reference to IHL. Advocacy was not just on security for humanitarian aid workers, but on the whole crisis as a protection concern, and on the respect of IHL. The letter of Commissioner Michel and of the Finish Presidency, mentioned above, was a concrete example of such advocacy efforts.

4.5. Civil-military interface: relation between humanitarian and military actors

The interface with the military played an important role in the Lebanon crisis in two respects: use of military assets in support of the humanitarian intervention, and liaison with one of the forces on the ground to guarantee access.

Advocacy of MCDA guidelines

The involvement of the (European) military in the crisis started with the evacuation of EU nationals (by military boat from Lebanon to Cyprus). The sea and air blockade made it difficult to access the country, even with clearance from the Israeli authorities, due to the damage inflicted on the airport. As a result, OCHA requested military assets for transport, which were provided by EU Member States (Portugal). During regular meetings between the Commission and the EU military staff of the Council, consensus emerged on the need to only use military assets if no civilian means were possible and to apply the MCDA guidelines. These meetings provided an opportunity to promote the principle that the military should intervene only in "last resort" and "in support of" the civilian humanitarian intervention.

Liaison with the Israeli military over access and IHL

The main obstacle to the humanitarian operation (and foremost concern) was access to the South (where about 200,000 persons were stranded) for humanitarian aid workers and access to the country as a whole for humanitarian goods. The message of Commissioner Michel and Minister Lehtomäki was reiterated during Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's visit to Tel Aviv on 26 July and the offer of the Israeli authorities to liaise with the Commission on humanitarian access was taken up with the dispatching of a Technical Expert with a military background to act as a "liaison officer" with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The IDF had put in place a system of "concurrence" by which planned movements in Lebanon were communicated to them, and they either gave green light or not (for instance if military operations were foreseen) to these movements. The UN and the ICRC used

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[4]   For example in the GAERC conclusions of 1st August 2006 which called the parties to "refrain from actions in violation of IHL" and referred to the similarly dramatic situation in Gaza and the West Bank.

[5]   This was an initiative in support of the ICRC and of UNOCHA, as M. Egeland had written on 20 July to the Israeli MFA asking for safe passage and for the nomination of a focal point with which the humanitarian agency could liaise.

[6]   For example in the GAERC of 1st August.

the system to ensure safety of their own movement, and in the case of the ICRC, that of the Lebanese Red Cross. The deployment of a liaison officer of DG ECHO was a first case for a donor, and proved to have a real added value in ensuring safe movement of staff in Lebanon and secure implementation of an EC funded operation. The Liaison Officer sensitised the IDF and the Israeli Centre for Coordination and Humanitarian Relief (CCHR) to the mandate of DG ECHO and to the needs and operational modalities of humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs.

4.6. **The post-emergency and recovery response: quick impact and LRRD.**

The 12 August cease-fire marked a turn in the crisis. The visit of Commissioner Michel to Lebanon and Israel from 14 to 17 August highlighted that the level of damage incurred, the loss of lives and livelihoods, the sheer numbers of potential returnees, as well as uncertainty as to how long the reconstruction effort would take to kick in, required a substantial additional humanitarian aid effort from the EU. An additional € 30M were estimated necessary to achieve this purpose.

A financial decision was adopted on 19 October 2006, following a call on the emergency reserve of the EC, to respond to remaining humanitarian needs especially in the shelter-, water and sanitation- and health sector, as well as for UXO clearance, and to pave the way for a "return to normality" by supporting livelihood recovery interventions in favour of the vulnerable affected population. This decision is expected to be implemented by the end of 2007, thus allowing for about 15 months transition from emergency to development. The financial envelope allocated is considerable and aims at providing a substantial and rapid support to the victims of the conflict to limit the impact of the conflict by addressing remaining needs and by initiating a quick recovery that will be sustained by medium to long term interventions from other – development - sources of funding. The LRRD perspective is very present in the implementation of this last funding decision with the emphasis being on livelihood recovery (26%) and de-mining (22%), the other sectors being shelter rehabilitation (20%), water and sanitation (11%), health and psychosocial support (8%), relief food and NFIs (5%), protection (4%) and coordination (4%, through UNDP). The choice of the two largest sectors responds to LRRD priorities: livelihood recovery of individuals or small groups of individuals is a first step toward full socio-economic recovery of the country, a priority which is pursued by the EC funding to Lebanon for 2007-2010 whereas de-mining is both a life-saving activity and one which has to be pursued for a number of years (the EC has earmarked € 4M for de-mining for 2007-2010). The scope of partners covered by this third and last decision is the following: UN (€ 6M, with a substantial funding to UNDP); Red Cross (one national society, € 0.5M) and NGOs (€ 21M so far; 18 partners) as well as a specialised agency of a Member State (THW, € 0.5M).

In total, when it comes to partnership, the response of DG ECHO has been implemented through the UN (7 partners); the Red Cross (2 partners); the NGOs (28 partners) and specialised agencies (1 agency). Ultimately, the entire € 50M[7] provided in response to the Lebanon conflict have been drawn from the emergency reserve. When the call on that reserve was made, a "replenishment" of the initial € 20M

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[7] The total of humanitarian aid for Lebanon in 2006 is 54 M€: 50 M in response to the conflict and about 4 M€ previously allocated in support of the Palestinian refugees.

response was requested, and accepted by the budgetary authority, to avoid depleting DG ECHO's operational reserve and to avoid a negative impact on other, less mediatised crises.

4.7. Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative

With regard to the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, the response to the Lebanon crisis is a good example of how GHD objectives, principles and best practices impregnate the humanitarian assistance provided by the Commission:

- The intervention reiterated the basic values and principles of humanitarian aid: independence, neutrality, impartiality, and the corollary of advocacy for IHL, respect and promotion of the MCDA guidelines (objectives 1, 2, 3; general principle 4; good practices 17, 19, 20).

- The operations that were funded were based on a continuous needs assessment. They provided an assistance package including basic relief needs, protection and livelihood recovery (objective 3) and in a way which is supportive of recovery and long term development (principles 5, 6, 9). By adopting timely emergency decisions, at the same time as the UN appeal was launched, and preceding them with a press statement of the Commissioner announcing upcoming funding, predictability was ensured but was combined with needs assessments (principle 6; good practice 12). A balance was found in the response to the appeals of the UN (45.5% of the emergency response), the ICRC (20%) and NGOs (34.5%) and support was provided to the coordination role of the UN (principle 10; Good practices 14).

- The intervention in Lebanon was met with a considerable funding response. The Commission deliberately strived to ensure that this would not be detrimental to needs in ongoing crises by requesting that the full humanitarian assistance package to Lebanon be met from the emergency reserve (good practice 11).

4.8. Direct aid and partnership: deployment of a team to Beirut

From the first day of the crisis, DG ECHO was on alert to follow up the evolution of the situation to determine whether a humanitarian aid intervention was needed and with what level of funding. The monitoring was done from DG ECHO's Regional Support Office in Amman, as was, in the following weeks, the backstopping for the operation.

DG ECHO's intervention was facilitated by its prior presence in Lebanon, for the past ten years, in support of the Palestinian refugees. The location in Amman of a DG ECHO expert who knew Lebanon very well and could be dispatched to Beirut as soon as the situation appeared to become protracted, and the presence of DG ECHO funded partners, notably in the South of the country, were instrumental both immediately gathering information on the evolution of the situation on the ground and being ready to respond to humanitarian needs in a timely manner. The DG ECHO intervention could also benefit from the full support of the EC Delegation in Beirut. On 20 July, the expert responsible for Lebanon opened a provisional office in the Delegation office and immediately started holding coordination meetings with

the ICRC, UN Agencies and NGOs, as well as carried out – whenever access allowed it - assessment missions in the country.

The team in Beirut was strengthened from 24-30 July with the deployment of the Head of Unit responsible for the Middle East, notably to put in place the coordination with the first of the MIC teams who also arrived in Beirut on 24 July[8]. The team was further consolidated with DG ECHO experts detached from other regions (Asia and Africa) for the duration of the acute phase of the crisis and regular support with experts and local staff deployed from Amman. The presence of a full DG ECHO crisis team in Beirut allowed to fulfil various tasks at the same time: conducting needs assessments and monitoring aid delivery which, due to security constraints and to the damage of the road network, were time-consuming; ensuring coordination with local authorities, with the team of civil protection experts (MIC), EU Member States, other donors, the UN and other humanitarian agencies; and reporting back to headquarters. The end to fighting of 14 August following the Security Council resolution of 12 August calling for a "full cessation of hostilities" did not end the suffering of the Lebanese population. The return of IDPs as well as continuing to cover humanitarian needs until a return to normality was likely to require more financial support from DG ECHO than the emergency phase itself. Hence the decision to open an DG ECHO office in Beirut and the recruitment of two experts was taken. The "permanent" team of experts for Lebanon arrived at the beginning of September.

5.   **PAKISTAN (2005 -2006)**

5.1.   **Context**

On Saturday morning 8 October 2005, at 3:52 GMT, an earthquake with its epicentre located 95 km north east of Islamabad in Pakistan, measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale created a major humanitarian crisis in both Pakistan and Indian administered Kashmir. It was followed by well over 1,700 aftershocks and major landslides especially during the monsoons in July/August 2006. A general overview of the impact was apparent after the first week, but a full picture took several weeks. The main humanitarian impact was in Pakistan where estimates were: over 73,000 dead, over 69,000 injured and an estimated 3 million 'homeless' defined as having damaged dwellings, with more than 600,000 houses estimated partly or totally damaged, and 150,000 internally displaced (IDPs) assisted in formal displaced camps. In Indian-administered Kashmir, estimates were of over 1,300 dead, 6,622 injured and 160,000 homeless.

Overall, the response involved a wide range of actors including the Pakistan and Indian governments, military and civil society, international aid agencies, and NATO, with the international response largely focused on Pakistan where the bulk of the needs were. While the international response was significant and very necessary given the scale of the needs, especially in Pakistan, the major part of the relief effort was covered by the governments and people of Pakistan and India. The main needs

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[8]   Several successive teams of the MIC went to Lebanon, first to coordinate the Member States provision of in-kind assistance and second, to deal with the oil spill that affected the Lebanese shores from the beginning of August.

identified were for shelter/domestic items, medical assistance, water and sanitation, and food. The main challenges for the humanitarian response were the scale of the needs and the logistics difficulties of access with much of the affected population in mountainous terrain at the feet of the Himalayas with winter looming.

5.2.   Coordination and strengthening of the international humanitarian system: the cluster approach

Overall coordination with the Government of Pakistan - through its specially created instrument, the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) - of the international response was led by UNDP, with UNOCHA for the humanitarian coordination component, but applied through the new 'cluster' approach. Planned for introduction in 2006, this approach was applied prematurely to the earthquake with the result that many agencies – including those involved as cluster leads - had to learn about and develop the new approach at the same time as managing their emergency responses. The approach involved different UN agencies leading different 'clusters' in Islamabad and several 'hubs' in the earthquake affected areas. Results were mixed, with problems such as delays of up to weeks in having a field presence for all cluster leads in all hubs, and initial confusion over the leadership of the key 'shelter' cluster. There were problems of communication between the field hubs and Islamabad based coordination leading to misinformation about the real state of the response to the needs and challenges faced. As part of broader close coordination with the other donors with substantial field presence, DFID and USAID, DG ECHO worked to assist UNOCHA in overcoming this. Such Islamabad level co-ordination was reinforced through DG ECHO participation in high level meetings and teleconferences with other key actors.

5.3.   Specific response by the European Community

As of 7:30 GMT on the morning of the earthquake, the Crisis Cell of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department was up and running, following the situation and making necessary contacts with DG ECHO field offices in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Regional Office in New Delhi, as well as DG ECHO partners in the affected area. In India, a DG ECHO team was already present in the affected area at the time of the earthquake, and was quickly reinforced. Within days of the earthquake the DG ECHO field office in Pakistan had been reinforced, and two mobile teams established in the earthquake affected area reporting back on needs and advising on partner presence and performance for the allocation of funding, as well as on real levels of coordination, to ensure the quality of the response. This information was shared through daily situation reports sent to all EU Member States during the emergency phase, and subsequently on a weekly basis.

The first partner aid agencies operational on the ground were notably *Télécom Sans Frontières, Médecins Sans Frontières (who had a field team present in Peshawar following DG ECHO funding for the Afghan refugees)*, Aga Khan Foundation, Oxfam, and the Red Cross/Crescent. A diversity of emergency response agencies with global reach, and area specific niche agencies.

Overall DG ECHO allocated € 49.6M, (which has up until now for almost 100 % been contracted); with € 13.6M of this within a week of the earthquake, and € 48.6M in just over two months. The remaining € 1M was allocated for the 2006-7 winter.

Also within two months DG RELEX had allocated € 50M for rehabilitation assistance and early recovery in Pakistan, ensuring funding in place for LRRD. Some of this funding came from the overall Commission reserve, which was made available with unprecedented speed notably due to the close cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament.

The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)

The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) immediately established contact with the UK Presidency to assess the situation. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was formally activated on Sunday 9 October at 9.15 GMT following an official appeal for international assistance by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). Two coordinators for MIC arrived within the first few days for over a week, with one then remaining but as part of the UK (DFID) humanitarian team.

23 out of the 30 countries participating in the Mechanism offered assistance in the form of food, blankets, medicine, medical teams, search and rescue and other experts / supplies. A number of European search and rescue teams were deployed as part of the relief operation. Some of the items donated were highly specialised, for example, the Finnish government donated 1000 special 'winter tents', each fitted with a wood-burning stove and providing heated accommodation for 15 persons; i.e. 15,000 persons in total. These were procured by the Finnish Ministry of Interior from the Finnish Ministry of Defence.

5.4.   **Sectoral interventions**

In response to the needs, immediately following the earthquake and through the winter, the first phase assistance was predominantly in the sectors of health and shelter/domestic items, with significant water and sanitation and some food. In coordination with the cluster approach, DG ECHO worked with partners to guide coherent sector approaches focused on the rapid delivery of results in core needs areas. DG ECHO, through its role as an engaged donor, worked to spread best practice and innovative approaches – thus from early on partners were encouraged to address shelter needs not just with tents, given the delays in securing supplies, but with kits of basic materials such as corrugated iron sheeting. This sectoral assistance also included guideline documents prepared by DG ECHO with its partners, such as for water and sanitation, as well as DG ECHO assisted international reference standards such as Sphere.

Before the winter, population displacements from the high altitude areas had largely contributed to there being 150,000 IDPs accommodated in formal camps - with the real figure for IDPs being much higher because any group of displaced of 50 or less were classified as informal IDPs and not included in the overall figure. With the onset of winter, constraints on access increased, and populations remaining exposed and isolated during the winter became the major humanitarian priority, in particular to consolidate their temporary shelter. This was reflected in the GoP/IOM[9] 'Race Against Winter' plan of 31st October. Subsequently, as needs evolved after the winter, the health sector remained important while shelter diminished as emergency

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[9]   International Organisation for Migration

needs were met and first phase livelihood support and water and sanitation became more important. Disaster reduction and mitigation was mainstreamed into the DG ECHO funded response[10]. This final phase of operations continues until April 2007. This is to allow the time necessary to achieve results such as harvest yields from seeds and tools projects, and completion of water supply systems. It also ensured the monitoring of humanitarian needs, and the presence of humanitarian agencies able to contain outbreaks of humanitarian need: e.g. those displaced during post-earthquake landslides, especially in the monsoon season; and most notably through the DG ECHO funded WHO Disease Early Warning System, which included guiding rapid responses to contain outbreaks of water borne diseases such as cholera during the summer and monsoon season.

5.5. Access and civil / military cooperation

Access was a major challenge given the mountainous terrain of much of the affected area, and helicopters were an urgent priority. This need was addressed immediately through Pakistani military helicopters, and by aid agencies already present such as the Aga Khan Foundation (with immediate DG ECHO funding). At the same time, with the urgency and scale of the needs exceeding available civilian capacity, additional helicopters were provided by NATO. In addition, WFP rapidly established UNHAS (United Nations Humanitarian Air Service), with DG ECHO as one of the donors. This civil-military logistics air operation was coordinated with the Government of Pakistan by the UN. The air operations extended the delivery of relief assistance to areas inaccessible by road, and enabled rapid overall needs assessment. Most of the relief items and personnel were transported by road. DG ECHO funded Atlas Logistics to rationalise the airport clearance and land transport for many aid agency partners, with consequent improvements in effectiveness of cost-efficiency of aid delivery.

5.6. Disaster reduction and LRRD transitional contexts

The GoP declared April 1st, 2006 as the beginning of the rehabilitation phase, and replaced the FRC with ERRA (Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority). With this LRRD introduction of the rehabilitation phase and phasing down of the relief phase, the Commission (DG ECHO - in coordination with DG RELEX and DG AIDCO), DFID, Austria (EU Presidency) and UNOCHA - organised and hosted a meeting in Brussels on March 16th. The first part was an EU Member States co-ordination meeting to review the remaining humanitarian needs to be met, the funds available amongst EU agencies to meet these needs, and the problems that remained to be addressed. The second part pursued these issues with an expanded meeting to include GoP, UN, Red Cross and INGOs, with presentations from GoP and UNOCHA.

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[10] To provide adequate knowledge and information material on seismic safety to local governments, communities and schools in order to increase awareness on disaster risk reduction and enable the population, especially women, to take disaster risk reduction strategies in earthquake recovery and rebuilding.

5.7. Partnership and professionalism

Reflecting pre-crisis preparedness, the DG ECHO field team included staff that had undergone the UNDAC[11] training designed to enhance coordination between UN and other agencies during the vital first phase of emergency response. Further, in addition to direct operational funding in response to the crisis, a number of UN agencies were already receiving DG ECHO thematic funding to improve their capacity to respond to just such a crisis. This was notably the case with UNOCHA, and WHO who performed well in this crisis. Finally, amongst DG ECHO funded partners, the Red Cross/Crescent proved particularly rapid in the first phase response, along with some specialised international agencies, through field hospitals and water supply units specially designed for rapid deployment in such crises.

Beyond the challenges of ensuring access, there were capacity challenges for the international relief effort. While, despite some reports in the media, implementation was generally not limited by the availability of funding, there were other constraints. From the outset, agencies struggled with a need for sufficient experienced international aid staff in a year of major humanitarian disasters such as the Tsunami and Darfur; there were few local NGOs as partners with good local knowledge for the international agencies and these few were development oriented; there were supply shortages of key relief items such as winterised tents. DG ECHO's own capacity to process funding to partners while ensuring quality of delivery came under strain a month after the crisis when major funding requests from the UN agencies began to arrive, notably from UNOCHA and individual cluster lead agencies.

In terms of security, from this second relief phase and into the recovery phase a series of security incidents began with hostility from certain political/religious sectors of local society manifested towards the aid workers; this despite the needs based and non-partisan focus of the relief effort in line with humanitarian principles. The most widespread such tension related to the 'Danish cartoons' issue.

The overall EU response to the earthquake was for € 235M by the time of the March 2006 conference and transition phase, with 48 % of this provided through UK (DFID) (at 28 %) and the Community (at 20 %) alone, and a further 41 % contributed by 7 other Member States. The UN appeal – which included the Red Cross/Crescent and INGOs together with UN agencies - was 66% funded which is average for such appeals. The recorded EU response[12] to the appeal amounted to 25 % of the funds requested, or 38 % of the funds received.

In addition to specific project evaluations and field audits during the response, DG ECHO is now conducting evaluations of key sectors of the response, and has commissioned an independent evaluation of its overall response programme – which will include analysis of to what extent different aid agency partners implemented the funds contracted to them. The results of these evaluations will provide information on the nature and costs of responses in such situations in the future in order to ensure the quality and cost-effectiveness of responses.

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[11]   United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
[12]   This is undoubtedly an underestimate given that the UNOCHA recorded figure is for $139 M, while the EU 14 point' system of contributions shows over € 235 M allocated.

6. BURMA/MYANMAR

6.1. Context

Burma/Myanmar, with a population of around 52 million inhabitants, is one of the least developed countries in the world. Since its independence in 1948 and the military coup in 1962, the country has known many internal conflicts, including governmental forces fighting against communist insurrections, ethnic violence and the militias of drug lords.

Ethnic violence, violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are constant factors of the political landscape. In the early 1990s, the country's self-imposed isolation was cautiously eased and some market-oriented economic reforms were implemented. For the military government (State Peace and Development Council, SPDC), the cease-fire agreements with ethnic armies in the 1980s and 1990s were the beginning of a long state building exercise. The 'Roadmap for constitutional and political reform' of 2003 promised a transition to a civilian government. A Constitution is expected by 2007. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi – winner of the 1990 elections and 1991 laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize – are marginalised. Reports indicate that there might be around 1,100 political prisoners in the country.

Burma/Myanmar is one of the poorest Asian countries, being 129th out of 177 countries according to the 2005 Human Development Index. In recent years, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated especially in the border regions. The health situation is particularly worrying and WHO, in its 2005 World Health Report, shows that public expenses in the health sector per inhabitant in Burma/Myanmar are the third lowest in the world (after DRC and Burundi). Some humanitarian indicators like the under 5 mortality rate (106 out of 1,000 newly-born) are three times higher than in neighbouring Thailand. Main causes of premature death in Burma/Myanmar are malaria, HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeic diseases. International NGOs involved in anti-malaria campaigns in 2005 estimate 2.5 millions cases annually. The situation is particularly serious in Rakhine State, where only a quarter of the population has access to primary health care. Food insecurity and malnutrition also affect these populations (31% suffer from acute malnutrition). The absence of potable water and the lack of hygiene are main causes of water-borne diseases and count for half of the morbidity. 57% of the population does not have access to sanitary installations (according to UNDP), and 40% does not even have access to potable water.

The protection of the population is a serious problem. Reports from international human rights organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) indicate that "massive violations" including forced labour, forced displacement and arbitrary taxation are commonplace. In border areas where conflicts occur between the army of the Myanmar Union and opposition groups, the civil population is particularly exposed to these violations. In Rakhine State, 800,000 Muslims are deprived of the Myanmar nationality and suffer from discriminatory practices varying from forced labour to extortion of money, limitation of freedom of movements and land confiscation. In the East and South-East, low intensity armed resistance continues. Forced relocations of villages have led in recent years to an outflow of refugees into Thailand (in September 2006, around 152,000 refugees were sheltered in nine camps

in Thailand and 30,000 in Bangladesh). The estimated number of internally displaced people is 500,000. The insurgent Karen National Union (KNU) have not agreed with the government on a cease-fire agreement. The repatriation of refugees from Thailand back to Myanmar is therefore not likely in the near future. Most refugees have orientated their hopes on resettlement in third countries. Meanwhile, the support to the refugees remains essential for their survival.

6.2. Access: the humanitarian space still threatened

Access to areas of continued insurgency, like Kayin State or Thanintaryi Division, is either difficult or dangerous (landmines) or prohibited by the authorities. This makes implementation of humanitarian aid difficult All humanitarian organisations have to obtain a travel permit when undertaking visits to projects outside Yangon. In 2006, new regulations imposed increased controls on humanitarian organisations (for example travel by expatriates require the presence of a government representative) and make access to projects more difficult for international staff. A survey led by the DG ECHO office in Yangon with partner organisations concluded that procedures delayed access to target areas. This led to the suspension of two operations in 2005. DG ECHO will maintain in 2007 its policy to ask for the presence of expatriate staff on the site of supported projects in order to better monitor the project, support and protect local staff employed in these projects.

6.3. Coordination and complementarity at EU level and the strengthening of the international humanitarian system

Four EU Member States have an embassy in Yangon (FR, UK, DE, IT). Only the UK has an ongoing humanitarian programme with a team in the field (intervening in the health sector with € 9.5M in 2006). Given the small amount of humanitarian aid, field-level coordination is relatively easy but remains insufficient: a monthly inter-NGO coordination meeting is limited to an exchange of information without a more operational sectoral coordination. The cluster approach has not yet been applied in Burma/Myanmar. This should change in 2007 following a decision (November 2006) by the UNSG to give the UN Resident Coordinator the responsibility as Humanitarian Coordinator. This would stimulate coordination with a better support from OCHA (with a regional office in Bangkok). In January 2007, donors set up a partnership group for aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration). The aim of this partnership is to come to a common understanding of the needs and problems and to increase aid effectiveness. The Commission will fund an assessment or mapping exercise of who is doing what and where in Burma/Myanmar. The Commission plays role in this group, through the participation of the Delegation in Bangkok and the DG ECHO office in Yangon. This office regularly participates at informal meetings with other donors (DFID, JAICA, KOICA, and AUSAID) present in Burma/Myanmar. It also participates in meetings of representatives of Member States. In February 2006, authorities adopted new rules to coordinate humanitarian aid, which have been applied to some extent during, without modifying existing practice (monthly reports to local authorities, regular contacts with them to manage movements of local and expatriate staff).

6.4.   Specific response by the European Community

Burma/Myanmar receives very low levels of international aid: € 2 per inhabitant in 2004 (compared to € 28 for Cambodia and € 40 for Laos). In many regions, the minimum services offered by humanitarian organisations are the only basic facilities for the population.

The EU approach towards Burma/Myanmar is defined by the EU Common Position. Adopted for the first time in 1996, it confirmed the already existing restrictive measures: an arms embargo imposed in 1990; the suspension of defence cooperation since 1991 and conditions on assistance. All EU programmes and projects have to be implemented by UN agencies, NGOs and through decentralised cooperation with local civil administrations. The Commission's Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 identifies health and education as focal sectors. The current EC commitment totals € 20-25 million. The HIV/Aids programme has been expanded through a "3-Diseases Fund", as a reaction to the withdrawal of the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria from the country (EC contribution: € 18 million for 2007-2010). Active EU-MS donors are UK, NL, DE and SE.

In all its programmes, the Commission endeavours to promote human rights, good governance, and civil society.

GSP (Generalised System of Preference) privileges were withdrawn in 1997 because of forced labour issues. The visa ban and asset freeze concern the senior military, and members of government and their families. EU registered companies are prohibited from making finance available to named State-owned enterprises. The Common Position refers to dialogue with the regime ("… engage with the government over its responsibility to make greater efforts to attain the UN Millennium Development Goals").

Since 1994, DG ECHO has financed humanitarian projects aiming at helping the most vulnerable populations in Burma/Myanmar and the 150,000 Burmese refugees living in camps on the other side of the frontier in Thailand (The first camps in Thailand for refugees from Burma/Myanmar were established in 1984). In response to the humanitarian situation, DG ECHO has increased its financial allocation for these populations, from € 6.5M in 2001 to € 15.5M in 2006, this last financing covering the year 2007[13]. In order to ensure a better follow-up of operations, DG ECHO opened an office in Yangon in October 2005.

In Burma/Myanmar, 22% of DG ECHO's financing is used for basic health care in remote areas, notably in favour of populations without citizenship in Rhakine State. Water and sanitation activities represent 20% of financing and are an important component of DG ECHO interventions in the South-East. The remainder is allocated to nutrition programmes, food aid and protection. DG ECHO supports in particular the ICRC and its mandate aiming at the respect of IHL and UNHCR notably for its protection activities. At the Thai border, programmes financed cover food (allocation of € 6M in 2007) and sanitation (€ 3.4M) for refugees living in camps.

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[13]   See annex for overview of funding decisions.

Over the last years, the humanitarian aid of the Commission has developed specific mechanisms that integrate the problem of forgotten crises as part of its intervention policy and tools have been refined, resulting in the forgotten crisis assessment. This has benefited the humanitarian aid funds allocation for Burma/Myanmar.

Even in a politically delicate situation like Burma/Myanmar, the Commission still tries to contribute to the development of guidelines. Thus, in January 2007, a group of donors, including the Commission, was set up in order to give a practical translation of principles of aid effectiveness following in particular the Paris Declaration.

6.5.   Upholding the humanitarian principles

Since 1996 and as a consequence of the human rights situation and the lack of transition towards a civilian, legitimate government the EU has adopted a "Common Position" as described above. It is not possible for the Member States and the Commission to support development programmes, with the notable exception of projects and programmes aiming at promoting human rights and democracy, good governance, conflict prevention and reinforcement of civil society capacities. Other exceptions include health and education programmes, programmes implemented by UN agencies, NGOs or by decentralised cooperation at the level of local civil administrations.

Humanitarian aid is an area not affected by the restrictions imposed by the Common Position. Since 2000 Burma/Myanmar has been considered in the Commission's humanitarian strategy as part of the "forgotten" or "neglected" crises (six crises selected by DG ECHO in 2007[14]. In this respect, the most vulnerable population of this country (minorities without legal status, refugees, IDPs) has received aid worth more than € 100M since the creation of DG ECHO. DG ECHO opened an office in October 2005. By clearly separating humanitarian aid from the political aspects of the Common Position, the Myanmar example can be seen as the EU's recognition of the principles and specificity of humanitarian aid.

6.6.   Advocating International Humanitarian Law

The promotion of International Human Rights and IHL is a challenge that the international community faces every day. A significant example is the difficulty for the ICRC to have its mandate respected by the authorities. Since December 2005, the ICRC is no longer allowed to visit prisons according to their principles, of interviewers' confidentiality. In October 2006, the junta demanded the organisation to close their field offices. The EU responded by a firm political declaration by the Presidency asking the authorities to reverse their decision. At the same time, at the humanitarian level a decision was adopted to continue the financial support to the ICRC efforts in Burma/Myanmar.

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[14]   These are, besides Burma/Myanmar, the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria; Chechnya and the neighbouring republics affected; the separatist conflict in Jammu and Kashmir; Nepal with the persisting crises of the Bhutanese refugees as well as the Maoist insurrection; the populations affected by the crisis in Colombia and neighbouring countries.

DG ECHO's funding allows the UNHCR to implement its programmes of integration of the "Rohingyas" community – a stateless population of 800,000 in Rakhine State. Besides finance, this support enables the UNHCR to continue its dialogue with the Burmese authorities in order to convince them to give a status to this oppressed minority.

6.7.   Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative

Humanitarian GHD principles recommend that the financing of a response to a new crisis shall not be to the detriment of existing crises. At a European level, no agreement exists on allocating sufficient and regular funds to forgotten crises. However, DG ECHO has made the support to this kind of crises a principle of annual programming. Burma/Myanmar has for several years been regarded as a forgotten crisis requiring a sustainable intervention according to the evaluation criteria set by DG ECHO. This strategic commitment has created a significant increase of financial support which has risen from € 1M in 2000 to € 6.4M in 2006. Between 2000 and 2006, the Commission has financed 68 humanitarian operations for a total amount of almost € 33M. For Burma/Myanmar, the tools used by DG ECHO have made a vital difference for areas not subject to large media coverage. Especially the rural population, which creates little mediatisation because of the difficulties for (foreign) reporters to travel freely has benefited. The sanctions policy which disallows public development aid to Burma/Myanmar results in low ODA-levels emphasizing the nature of a forgotten crisis. In addition, the military government's grip on the media and internet as well as a restrictive visa policy are other elements turning the crisis into a 'forgotten' one.

6.8.   Partnership and professionalism

The Commission works with the three "families" as each of them brings an added-value very appreciated in the Burmese context. NGOs have flexibility which allows them to quickly adapt themselves to a moving bureaucratic context. UN agencies can coordinate the humanitarian response and take charge of problems linked to the protection of persons. The ICRC tries to ensure a high-level dialogue about IHL respect in conflict areas. DG ECHO's humanitarian policy benefits from assets brought by each of these partners. Although the network of local NGOs is embryonic for understandable reasons, potential exists to reinforce capacities of some local NGOs through partnership relations with international organisations supported by the Commission. For example, this year DG ECHO supports a water and sanitation project in Shan State partly implemented by a local NGO. This kind of initiative is of particular importance in the framework of authoritarian and centralized governments.

6.9.   LRRD

The Common Position of the EU towards Burma/Myanmar has considerably limited the implementation of the concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development. It is useful to recall that until 2006, this country has not benefited from strategically planned financial envelopes. The first Country Strategy Paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programme have been adopted only in 2007, without formal consultations with the authorities. They foresee an annual envelope of € 8M The instrument mainly used by DG RELEX (prior to the CSP/MIP) was the budget line "Aid-to-Uprooted-People in Asia" Consequently, investments in terms of rehabilitation and

development projects remained modest (€ 6M in 2005). In these circumstances, DG ECHO and DG RELEX/AIDCO have tried to develop complementarities. An example is the financing of a food security programme which completes and exceeds the ambitions of a nutritional programme financed by DG ECHO in Rakhine State. These complementarities have recently been recognised by an evaluation of Commission action in North Rakhine. These last years, Community humanitarian aid has been in support of organisations which have developed programmes against malaria. The implementation of the new funds should enable this aid to concentrate on other objectives in the near future.

ANNEX 1: KEY DATES

DRC	
Year	**Chronology**
April 1994	Genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. Following Tutsi led counter offensive, 1.2 million refugees, mainly Hutus, cross border with Zaire. Another million flee to Burundi and Tanzania.
1995	Ex-FAR (Hutu) launch attacks into Rwanda from camps in Zaire. Ethnic clashes occur in Eastern Zaire.
1996	Revolt of Zairian Tutsis "Banyamulenge" in South Kivu; ADFL's (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) "Liberation" war led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and supported by Rwanda begins from East (1st Congolese War). Most Refugees return to Rwanda but some flee into interior of DRC. 200,000 are estimated to perish.
28 May 1997	Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaims himself President of Zaire and renames the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
1998	Congolese rebel forces, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, start attacking Kabila's forces and conquer the east of the country. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe come to Kabila's aid and push the rebels back from Kinshasa. (2nd Congolese War).
10 July 1999	Ceasefire is signed in Lusaka, Zambia, between the six countries involved in the conflict: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda. But the ceasefire is widely disregarded and so fighting and massacres continue.
24 February 2000	UNSC Resolution 1291 approves deployment, under Chapter VII of the UN Chart, of 5,537 peacekeepers to monitor implementation of ceasefire (MONUC). Beginning 2007, MONUC maintains 16,475 troops with a budget exceeding one billion dollars. It is the largest and most expensive mission in Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).
2000	Six-day war between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani.
January 2001	President Kabila shot dead by one bodyguard; his son Joseph takes over.
March 2001	MONUC deploys its first contingent to the east, first in rebel-held areas, and then in government-controlled zone.
2002	Eruption of volcano Nyiragongo in Goma.
2002	Accord signed between Presidents Kabila and Kagame of Rwanda committing Rwandan to withdraw its troops from DRC and Kinshasa to address Rwanda's security concerns.
October 2002	End of withdrawal of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, allied to DRC government. Rwandan forces also withdraw but Uganda forces only partially.
1 April 2003	In Sun City, South Africa, DRC government and rebel groups unanimously endorse a transitional constitution to govern DRC for two years, as well as global agreement signed in Pretoria on 17/12/02. Transitional government named by Kabila on June 30.
30 May 2003	UNSC Resolution 1484 agrees to creation of an emergency international force to secure Bunia, regional capital of Ituri. Codenamed Artemis, the force, deployed by the European Union under French command, is composed of 1850 troops from 9 countries, mainly France. The operation begins on 6 June 2003 and ends on 1 September 2003.
December 2003	Army reform and Demobilisation programme launched

May 2004	Fighting breaks out in the eastern town of Bukavu, between soldiers loyal to Kinshasa and renegade soldiers of a former Rwandan-backed rebel group.
October 2004	Expert panel on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in DRC accuses Rwandan government of supporting Congolese dissidents. International Criminal Court and DRC sign an accord allowing the prosecutor to begin investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in DRC.
January 2005	The Lancet publishes IRC Mortality Study: 38,000 people die every month as a result of war.
June 2005	EU sends EUSEC mission providing advice and assistance to Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring promotion of policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of rule of law.
December 2005	Congolese voters approve new constitution providing for a decentralized political system, limiting the president to two five-year terms, and guaranteeing women half the seats in government.
February 2006	The UN and the European Commission present in Brussels an ambitious Humanitarian Plan of Action asking for US$ 681 M for DRC.
March 2006	Warlord Thomas Lubanga, accused of forcing children into active combat, becomes first war crimes suspect to face charges at International Criminal Court in The Hague.
April 2006	UNSC's Resolution 1671 authorises temporary deployment of EU force to support MONUC during period encompassing elections. In the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, EU launches Operation EUFOR RD Congo, conducted in full agreement with authorities of DRC and in close co-ordination with them and MONUC, and successfully concluded on 30/11/06.
July 2006	Presidential and parliamentary polls are held, first free elections in four decades. With no clear winner in the presidential vote, incumbent leader Joseph Kabila and opposition candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba prepare to contest a run-off poll on 29 October. Forces loyal to the two candidates clash in the capital.
November 2006	Joseph Kabila is declared winner of October's run-off presidential election in polls that have general approval of international monitors, He takes oath as president on 6 December.

Lebanon	
Year	**Chronology**
February 2005	Internal tensions following the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, subsequent withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and international enquiry into the assassination.
12 July 2006	Kidnapping by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers.
July 2006	Beginning of Lebanon conflict.
17 July	Commissioner Louis Michel announced an "earmarking" of € 5M which would be made available as soon as needs assessments could take place.
18 July	Preliminary appeal from ICRC.
20 July	DG ECHO's expert responsible for Lebanon opened a provisional office in the Delegation office and immediately started holding coordination meetings with the ICRC, UN Agencies and NGOs, as well as carried out –whenever access allowed it- assessment missions in the country.
21 July	the MIC was activated upon a request from Cyprus to assist in the coordination of the evacuation effort as well as the channelling of in-kind assistance to Lebanon, transiting through Cyprus. This was complemented by a MIC deployment to Beirut in the following days.
24 July	Flash appeal from UN.
24 July	Arrival of the MIC team in Beirut.
24 and 26 July 2006	Two financial decisions totalling for € 20 M were adopted to address immediately the most urgent humanitarian needs in Lebanon.
26 July	Visit of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Tel Aviv
12 August	United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 calling for end to hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
14 August	End of fighting
14 to 17 August	Visit of Commissioner Louis Michel to Lebanon and Israel.
19 October	Financial decision following a call on the emergency reserve of the EC, to respond to remaining humanitarian needs.

Pakistan Earthquake	
Year	**Chronology**
8th October 2005	Earthquake. DG ECHO considers financing response actions.
9th October 2005	Community Civil Protection Mechanism formally activated at 9.15 GMT following an official appeal for international assistance by the Government of Pakistan.
10th October 2005	DG ECHO allocates € 3.6M in primary emergency assistance.
11th October 2005	UN Flash appeal for $ 312M
14th October 2005	DG ECHO allocates a further € 10M
21st October 2005	High level teleconference: UNOCHA + DFID, DG ECHO, Japan, NATO, UNDP, USAID.
26th October 2005	Geneva Donors Conference launches revised UN flash appeal for $ 551 M for UN agencies and INGOs to cover the ten clusters during immediate relief and the recovery phases.
31st October 2005	Race Against Winter Plan
2nd November 2005	UN funding proposals to DG ECHO for € 2.9 M received to date
3rd November 2005	High level teleconference UNOCHA + DFID, DG ECHO, NATO, USAID.
4th November 2005	Letter from EC Commissioner Michel to UNOCHA USG Jan Egeland expressing concern at the lack of UN funding proposals received, given Mr Egeland's complaints to the media at lack of funding for the UN relief effort (against a background of UNOCHA requests to increase the CERF).
18th November 2005	18th : DG ECHO allocates a further € 10M, bringing the total to date to € 23.6M
18th/19th November 2005	Conference Islamabad for Pledges for Rehabilitation funding following 3 week World Bank led rapid assessment mission. An estimated $5.8 billion needed, with $6.2 billion pledged. EC (DG RELEX) pledges € 50M.
November	Subsequently during November, € 25M of proposals were received from UN agencies.
16th December 2005	DG ECHO allocates 25M EUR, bringing total funding to date to € 48.6M
16th March 2006	Total EU humanitarian response to earthquake to date € 235M. DG ECHO hosts conference
1st April 2006	Rehabilitation phase begins, as ERRA replaces Federal Relief Commission as GoP instrument to coordinate earthquake response. All international aid agencies required to submit their projects, ongoing and planned. A number of humanitarian projects had to be re-scheduled to accommodate the delays arising from this process.
May 2006	ERRA/UN Early recovery Plan launched for the transition from humanitarian to rehabilitation.
July/august 2006	Heavy monsoon rains lead to major landslides, blocking roads and displacing populations. Up to 6,000 are estimated to have been displaced by aftershocks and landslides subsequent to the earthquake.
November 2006	WFP launches new helicopter operation to ensure access over winter to the many still vulnerable in highland areas.

Burma/Myanmar	
Year	**Chronology**
1962	Military coup d'Etat led by General Ne Win
1988	Thousands of demonstrators for democracy killed. The army creates the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) and adopts an earlier name for the country: "Myanmar". Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the national hero, founds the National League for Democracy (NLD),but is put under house arrest the following year.
1990	Elections organised by the military junta. The NLD wins 82% of the seats. The SLORC does not recognise the results. A national coalition government (NCGUB) is formed outside the country by the democratic forces.
1991	Aung San Suu Kyi is laureate for the Peace Nobel Price.
1991-1992	Around 250,000 Muslims flee from Rakhine State to Bangladesh following persecutions.
1994	Following an agreement between the authorities and the UNHCR,around 237,000 persons return from Bangladesh between 1994 and 2005.
1995	Aung San Suu Kyi released
1996	Fall of the Karen resistance's general headquarters at Manerplaw. Decisive weakening of anti-government forces EU formalises existing restrictive measures under the EU Common Position.
1997	Burma/Myanmar is admitted in the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). SLORC renamed SPDC (State Peace and Development Council).
2001	Beginning of a dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta. More than 200 political prisoners released.
May 2003	Assault against ASSK's motorcade during her visit to Depayin (Sagaing District). Junta announces her 'security detention' (house arrest) in September 2003. USA announce full economic boycott.
September 2004	Gentlemen agreement between Major General Khin Nyunt and the KNU leading to a temporary cease-fire.
November 2004	The conflict starts again between the Burmese army and the KNU.
August 2005	The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, withdraws from the country under US political pressure following restrictions on the implementation of their projects.
November 2005	The authorities start the process of transferring their administrative services from Yangon to the new capital Naypyidaw.
December 2005	Prisons visits by ICRC called into question by non-respect of interviews' confidentiality.
February 2006	Authorities produce directives for international humanitarian organisations concerning the implementation of humanitarian and development programmes.
March 2006	MSF-FR decides to withdraw from Myanmar
April 2006	Conflict increases with the KNU leading to the displacement of 11,000 persons. In 2007, the number of displaced persons is estimated to more than 500,000 and there is over a 150,000 Burmese refugees in camps in Thailand.
May 2006	The proposition of the "Three-disease fund" to fight Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV/AIDS is accepted.

August 2006	The UN Security Council decides against 4 opposition votes from China, Russia, DRC and Qatar to put Burma/Myanmar on the agenda.
January 2007	China and Russia veto an US motion for a UN Security Council resolution regarding the situation in Burma/Myanmar and its effects on peace and regional security.
February 2007	Division inside the KNU following the peace agreement signed between the 7th Brigade of KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army) and the Burmese army, agreement rejected by KNU.)

ANNEX II: FUNDING DECISIONS

Below gives an overview of the funding decisions per crises (as of 19.3.2007), not including disaster preparedness, evaluation and thematic funding). It also gives an indicative distribution per sector as well as an overview of partners based on contracts.

6.10. DRC

Decisions

Year	Decision code	Decision	EUR
1998	ECHO/TPS/210/1998/01000	Emergency Assistance, fight against the epidemic of cholera in the region of Eastern, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa.	187.500
1998	ECHO/TPS/210/1998/02000	Humanitarian Aid for the population affected by the crisis in the Great Lakes Region.	7.065.000
1998	ECHO/ZAR/254/1998/01000	Emergency assistance in the context of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Support to hospitals, nutritional program, emergency assistance to hospitals, health facilities.	942.000
1999	ECHO/TPS/254/1999/03000	Emergency humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.	6.662.000
1999	ECHO/TPS/254/1999/04000	Emergency food aid to vulnerable populations.	6.666.667
2000	ECHO/ZAR/210/2000/01000	Global Plan 2000 for DRC.	20.000.000
2001	ECHO/COD/210/2001/01000	Intervention plan 2001	35.000.000
2002	ECHO/COD/210/2002/01000	Global Plan 2002 - Humanitarian Aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo	32.000.000
2002	ECHO/COD/254/2002/01000	Humanitarian Aid for the Angolan refugees in the Bas-Congo provinces.	1.100.000
2002	ECHO/TPS/210/2002/03000	Emergency aid for the population of Goma and environs affected by the eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano on 17 January 2002	2.500.000
2003	ECHO/COD/210/2003/01000	Humanitarian aid to vulnerable population groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - Global Plan 2003	35.000.000
2003	ECHO/COD/210/2003/02000	Integrated assistance to displaced persons, refugees and host communities	5.000.000
2003	ECHO/COD/EDF/2003/01000	Assistance to displaced and other vulnerable groups in northern and eastern DRC	4.000.000
2003	ECHO/TPS/210/2003/11000	Support to UNOCHA in Respect to Information Dissemination, Strategic and Operational Co-ordination.	109.091
2004	ECHO/COD/BUD/2004/01000	HUMANITARIAN AID to vulnerable population groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) GLOBAL PLAN 2004	40.000.000
2005	ECHO/-CF/BUD/2005/01000	Assistance for the repatriation and reintegration of Congolese refugees (DRC)	1.000.000

| 2005 | ECHO/COD/BUD/2005/01000 | Global Plan 2005 | 38.000.000 |
2006	ECHO/COD/BUD/2006/01000	HUMANITARIAN AID for Vulnerable population groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	38.000.000
2006	ECHO/COD/EDF/2006/01000	Assistance to vulnerable populations in south eastern Congo.	5.000.000
2006	ECHO/FLI/BUD/2006/01000	Continuation of humanitarian air service (ECHO-Flight)	7.000.000
2007	ECHO/COD/BUD/2007/01000	Humanitarian Aid for vulnerable population groups in the DRC	30.000.000
			315.232.258

Sectors

Partners

ACF; ACTED; ALISEI, AMI; ASF; ATLAS; AVSI; CAFOD; CARE; CARITAS; CESVI; Children's Aid Direct; Concern; COOPI; Red Cross; CRS; Johanniter; FAO; FOMETRO; German Agro Action; Goal; Handicap; ICRC; IMC, IOM, IRC, MAG, Malteser Hilfsdienst; MDM; Medair; Memisa; Merlin; MSF; NRC; NOVIB; Oxfam; PMU Interlife; Premiere Urgence; PSF; StC; Solidarites; Tear fund; UNHCR; UNICEF; WFP; WHO; World Vision.

6.11. Lebanon

Decisions

Year	Decision code	Decision	EUR
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000	Emergency humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	2.500.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000	Humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	10.000.000
2006	ECHO/LBN/BUD/2006/01000	Emergency humanitarian aid for the population of Lebanon affected by the conflict	10.000.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000	Emergency humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	2.500.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000	Humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	10.000.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000	Emergency humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	2.500.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000	Humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	10.000.000
2006	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000	Emergency humanitarian aid for the populations affected by the conflict in Lebanon	2.500.000
			50.000.000

Sectors

Coordination 4%
Health/psychosocial 8%
Logistics 6%
Protection 6%
Relief food & NFI 21%
Shelter 17%
Watsan 10%
Demining 13%
Livelihood Rehab 15%

Partners

DRC, MPDL, CARITAS, Premiere Urgence, Handicap, Terre des Hommes, ICRC, UNHCR, WHO, World Vision, WFP, UNOCHA, CISP, ICU, THW, ADU, EMDH, MPDL, NRC, Danchurch Aid, FSD, MAG, UNDP, AVSI, Mercy Corps Scotland, ICU, Islamic Relief, WA, MDM, UNRWA, Care, TSF, Oxfam, ACted.

6.12. Pakistan

Decisions

Year	Decision code	Decision	EUR
2005	ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/05000	Primary Emergency aid to the victims of the earthquake of 8 October 2005 in South Asia	3.000.000
2005	ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/06000	Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 8 October 2005 in South Asia	10.000.000
2005	ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/07000	Humanitarian assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 8 October 2005 in Pakistan and India	25.000.000
2005	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2005/01000	Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 8 October 2005 in Pakistan	10.000.000
2006	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2006/01000	Humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 8 October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan	1.000.000
2005	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2005/05000*	Humanitarian Aid for victims of the Afghanistan crisis and natural hazard in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran	600.000
	* Decision of 9.209.000, part committed for the earthquake		**49.600.000**

Sectors

Partners

Actionaid, Oxfam, TSF, STC, IFRC, Red Cross, Aga Khan, WFP, Medair, NRC, Atlas, UNOCHA, Handicap, UNFPA, Merlin, Hilfswerk, Malteser, FAO, ICRC, Premiere Urgence, ACH, Diakonie, Solidarites, Mercy Corps Scotland, German Agro Action, WHO, UNHCR, IOM

6.13. Burma/Myanmar

Decisions

Year	Decision code	Decision	EUR
1992			207.472
1994	ECHO/BA-/B7-510/94/0100		240.000
1995	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/95/0100		1.520.000
1995	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/95/0200		800.000
1996	ECHO/BA-/B7-210/96/0100	Assistance to vulnerable groups in Rakhine State Myanmar	300.000
1996	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0100	Humanitarian emergency aid for Karens refugees coming from Myanmar	700.000
1996	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0200	Humanitarian emergency aid for Mons refugees, coming from Myanmar, in Thailand	220.000
1996	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0300	Humanitarian emergency aid for Karens refugees coming from Myanmar	500.000
1996	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0400	Humanitarian aid for Karens and Mons refugees coming from Myanmar.	2.000.000
1996	ECHO/TPS/B7-210/96/0600	Food Aid for refugees and DPs taken in charge by UNHCR in different countries.	500.000
1997	ECHO/BA-/B7-210/97/0100	Humanitarian assistance for the Rohingas and vulnerable population of Rakhine State	675.000
1997	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0100	Humanitarian aid for Karen population coming from Myanmar	780.000
1997	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0200	Humanitarian aid for population coming from Myanmar refugee in Thailand.	2.000.000
1997	ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0300	Humanitarian aid for population coming from Myanmar refugee in Thailand.	470.000
1998	ECHO/MMR/210/1998/01000	Humanitarian aid for the population affected by floods in Myanmar.	500.000
1998	ECHO/MMR/210/1998/02000	Humanitarian assistance for the displaced population in Rangoon and in the Rakhine State.	695.000
1998	ECHO/THA/217/1998/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of the refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.	1.390.000
1998	ECHO/THA/217/1998/02000	Humanitarian aid in favour of the refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.	800.000
1998	ECHO/THA/217/1998/03000	Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.	1.755.000
1998	ECHO/THA/217/1998/04000	Humanitarian aid in favour of refugees (coming from Burma) living in camps along the Thai-Burmese border.	699.000
1999	ECHO/MMR/210/1999/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of the weakest population in Burma.	1.000.000
1999	ECHO/THA/217/1999/01000	Humanitarian aid global plan in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps in Thailand.	4.500.000
2000	ECHO/MMR/210/2000/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of the most disadvantaged population in Burma.	1.000.000

2000	ECHO/THA/210/2000/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps.	4.500.000
2001	ECHO/MMR/210/2001/01000	Humanitarian aid for vulnerable ethnic minorities in Burma/Myanmar	2.000.000
2001	ECHO/THA/210/2001/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps along the Thai-Burmese border.	4.500.000
2002	ECHO/MMR/210/2002/01000	Humanitarian aid for the people of Burma/Myanmar	2.000.000
2002	ECHO/MMR/210/2002/02000	Humanitarian aid for the people of Burma/Myanmar	1.500.000
2002	ECHO/THA/210/2002/01000	Humanitarian aid for Burmese refugees living in camps at the Thai-Burmese border	1.200.000
2002	ECHO/THA/210/2002/02000	Humanitarian aid for the Burmese Refugees in Thailand	2.000.000
2002	ECHO/THA/210/2002/03000	Emergency aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps in Thailand and affected by floods in September 2002.	200.000
2002	ECHO/THA/210/2002/04000	Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps along the Thai-Burmese border.	1.565.000
2002	ECHO/THA/210/2002/05000	Humanitarian aid for the Burmese refugees living in the camps of Thailand	500.000
2003	ECHO/MMR/210/2003/01000	Myanmar	3.320.000
2003	ECHO/MMR/210/2003/02000	MYANMAR/BURMA	2.000.000
2003	ECHO/THA/210/2003/01000	Thailand	4.450.000
2003	ECHO/THA/210/2003/02000	Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in camps along the Thai-Burmese border.	1.790.000
2004	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2004/02000	Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in Myanmar and to refugees along the Myanmar-Thai border	11.650.000
2004	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2004/03000	Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake and resulting tidal waves in Asia	428.571
2004	ECHO/MMR/BUD/2004/01000	Humanitarian aid in favour of the vulnerable population of Myanmar	3.420.000
2004	ECHO/THA/BUD/2004/01000	Humanitarian assistance to the Burmese refugees living in the camps along the Thai/Burmese border	4.650.000
2005	ECHO/MMR/BUD/2005/01000	Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in Myanmar	1.500.000
2005	ECHO/-XA/BUD/2005/01000	Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in Myanmar and to Burmese refugees along the Myanmar-Thai border.	15.000.000
2006	ECHO/MMR/BUD/2006/01000	Humanitarian assistance in favour of the vulnerable populations of Northern Rakhine State in Myanmar/Burma	200.000
2006	ECHO/-XA/BUD/2006/01000	Humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable populations in Myanmar and to Burmese refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border.	15.500.000
			107.125.043

Sectors

- Wat/San 10%
- Others 11%
- Health 36%
- Food 43%

Partners

AMI, ICCO, Malteser Hilfsdienst, MSF, UNHCR, Handicap, ADPC, IRC, Mekong River Commission, World Vision, AF, UNICEF, STC, ACF, ICRC, Care, Terre des Hommes, CESVI, UNHCR, EMDH, Merlin, WFP, German Agro Action.