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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

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THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 5 March 2010

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ADD 15 EXT 1 (13.02.2013)**

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ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE

from : The Council General Secretariat
to : Working Party on Terrorism

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Finland** (11-13 March 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

| | | |
|----|--|----|
| 1. | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 3 |
| 2. | ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK | 5 |
| | 2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres..... | 5 |
| | 2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack | 6 |
| | 2.3. Rules for internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack..... | 11 |
| 3. | TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK | 12 |
| | 3.1. Training/exercises for testing the National Crisis Centre and communication systems in the event of a terrorist attack | 12 |
| 4. | SOFT TARGETS | 13 |
| 5. | GOOD PRACTICES | 14 |
| 6. | RECOMMENDATIONS | 15 |
| 7. | ANNEX | 16 |
| | 7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions..... | 16 |
| | 7.2. Expert Team..... | 17 |

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluation covering "Preparedness and consequence management in case of a terrorist attack" an evaluation visit was made to Finland from 11 to 13 March 2009.
- Finland has a population of 5,2 million inhabitants in an area of 338,000 square kilometres, 10% of which is water with 188,000 lakes and forests covering 68% of the territory.
- Religiously motivated terrorism currently poses the main threat to Finland and Finnish interests abroad. However, the possibility of an attack against the country and its interests is considered to be low. This kind of threat could increase, for instance as a result of international events. The Muslim community consists of 40 000 to 45 000 people. Of the approximately 30 mosques and prayer halls, about 50% are located in the area of the capital.
- Among Finnish converts, a lack of knowledge of Islam and its culture has been identified which causes vulnerability to radicalisation and exploitation by extremists. Currently, the transfer of resources, including money, and travel by supporters of various organisations and movements to jihad and training camps, are the main priorities.
- A Crisis Centre as a structured body does not exist in Finland. However, Government has a Government Situation Centre, which can be enhanced and activated as Government Crisis Centre in the event of crisis or serious special situation The Helsinki Police Department runs a 24/7 Command Centre, which will have this function in the case of incidents handled by the police. The Centre also has the function of a national contact point between security authorities for both internal and international alerts and cooperation Government Situation Centre is a single national point of contact in European Union Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA).
- The keyword for the Finnish model of crisis and consequence management is cooperation. Relatively small forces, empowered by a very solid legal basis, play a prime role in the national response.

- Policing and rescue matters are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, where the Police Department and the Rescue Department are responsible for planning for the national arrangements regarding major/serious incidents.
- The actions of the police and rescue services are based on dealing with three levels of situations: normal, demanding and serious situations. A terrorist scenario would be an example of a serious situation, where a substantial amount of the resources of the police would be dedicated to dealing with the situations
- The Security Police is tasked to assess and analyse the threat caused by terrorism. Thus it is also the responsibility of the Security Police to assess the risk of a terrorist attack on all possible targets and to inform the Police and other relevant authorities about possible threats and risks.
- The different bodies involved in crisis and consequence management regularly train together, and no distinction is made, in the response, based on the motivation and causes of incidents (terrorist or other).
- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

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2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres

A Crisis Centre as a structure or body does not exist in Finland. There are arrangements between the police and the rescue authorities for establishing a crisis centre with supervisory authority in serious incidents.

At the political level, a Government Situation Centre (GSC) under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) operates on a 24/7 basis, supporting the situation awareness coordinator at PMO in drawing up thematic reports on topics of current interest and providing the Government with information in real time. In order to save resources, this centre is staffed by the Security Police and functions parallel as the Security Police's Situation Centre. GSC provides situation information also to the Security Police.

Different administrative sectors are obliged to report special situations to the GSC.

In the case of a crisis, in addition to the GSC a Governmental Crisis Centre (GCC) can be activated. It is composed of three main pillars: the GSC, crisis management including all partners, and a Communication Centre, including a Media Centre and a Contact Centre for the public. This Contact Centre providing telephone line operators and a web portal for citizens is currently under development.

On 29 August 2007, the Government set up a project to prepare an Internal Security Programme (ISP). The Government adopted a resolution concerning this Programme on 8 May 2008. The objective of the Programme is for Finland to be the safest country in Europe by 2015. The Internal Security Programme specifies objectives and measures for seven key areas of security:

- improving safety in the home, during leisure time and in travel,
- improving the security of immigrants and ethnic minorities,
- reducing violence,
- boosting competitiveness by increasing business security,
- preventing major accidents and environmental disasters,

- border security, prevention of illegal immigration, customs security, prevention of human trafficking and comparable crimes,
- combating organised crime, preventing cybercrime and Internet-related risks, combating terrorism, and preventing illegal extremist activities and violent radicalisation.

The Programme also contains 74 measures intended to maintain and improve security., and is updated every 4 years.

The Internal Security Programme and Government Resolution on the Strategy for Securing Functions Vital to Society are based on Government Report on the Finnish Security and Defence Policy.

2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

The current Resolution (2006) includes 50 strategic tasks for ministries, and development needs; it also includes 9 threat scenarios and 61 special situations (currently extended to 62, since school shootings are now also included).

At the political level, the Government Situation Centre has been established to fulfil the need to inform the Prime Minister to be informed and provide situation awareness. Cooperation is coordinated by the authority in charge: this simple principle, in addition to the strong legal basis, makes for clarity and efficiency.

The police is the authorised operational body dealing with terrorist incidents. The 24/7 police Operations Centre will launch a response alert and will notify the GSC, which informs the Heads of Preparedness and state leadership. If the Situation Centre at the MOI is activated, the information from police Operation Centre will be transmitted through it.

Simultaneously, the police Operations Centre will also launch a response alert and inform the Heads of Preparedness, which is a cooperative body of the ministries with an advisory role.

The Head of Preparedness is the first coordination body and is chaired by the Director of Government Security. The State Secretary at the PM's Office is the operational supervisor of the Director of Government Security. Permanent experts may be invited to these meetings as well as representatives of non-governmental organisations, the business community and relevant authorities as specially invited experts.

The Heads of Preparedness update the joint situation picture and assess how each administrative sector can support the ministry responsible, coordinating these efforts where required and preparing a meeting to be held at the next level, that of the permanent State Secretaries.

The State Secretaries' meeting is chaired by the PM's State Secretary. Supported by the State Secretaries, a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy is convened.

The Cabinet Committee conducts the preparatory work for the Government negotiation or Government Plenary Session, which takes the formal decisions.

In case more financial resources are needed, a Government plenary session issues an additional authorisation. The coordination meetings are chaired by the director of government security, or by the ministry responsible.

Political decisions will be taken very quickly in response to the situation. The operational command is the body which in fact deals with the situation based on all the possible concrete decisions.

Finland has one single Police Force under the responsibility of the MOI. This force is divided into three pillars:

The first pillar covers the National Units, the Police Training Establishments and other Units;

The Second pillar covers the Helsinki Police Department;

The Third pillar covers the Provincial Police Command and the Local Police.

The Helsinki Police Department has its own national responsibilities, i.e acting as a national focal point for operations with international partners, the Special Unit made up of the Dog Unit and the Special Intervention Unit (“Karhu”) and the General Command in certain “Special Situations”.

The duties of the Police are classified at three levels:

- Normal Situation
- Demanding Situation
- Special Situation

“Normal Situations” comprise the day-to-day work of the Police. “Demanding Situations” correspond to a large spectrum of situations from a kidnapping to a situation involving a bomb. In this last case the rescue service is in charge in the first phase to ensure the evacuation of civilians. The command will shift to the police as soon as the victims are rescued. “Special Situations”, correspond to extreme cases such as the hijacking of a plane or a ship, or an attack against a power plant.

“Demanding Situations” and “Special Situations” immediately require the setting up of a special command structure managed by the Helsinki police department.

The General Commander meets with his staff in the local Police Command Centre.

The Field Commander and his staff have seven modules at their disposal in order to manage the situation at the scene of the incident:

- Outer Perimeter
- Inner Perimeter
- Tactical Team (including CTU, IED, CBRNE)
- Negotiation Team
- Paramedical Team`
- Investigation Team
- Intelligence and Surveillance Team

Both the General Commander and the Field Commander can request the assistance of specific bodies: the Emergency Response Centre (RC), Rescue Service, Border Guard, Customs, Defence Force, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Civil Aviation Administration, Municipal Health Centres and Hospital Districts and the Red Cross for Urban Search and Rescue missions.

With the aim of ensuring effective operational ability to respond to “Demanding Situations”, special plans for certain locations are in place.

Such plans exist for response to aircraft hijackings, ship hijackings and nuclear plant and Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents.

Emergency calls to the 112 number in practice the only emergency number in Finland, excluding maritime rescue which has its own number, are directed to 15 Emergency Rescue Centres (ERC) covering the entire country, which are also under the supervision of the MOI and local health authorities. On receiving a call, these Emergency Centres dispatch the tasks to the Police and Rescue Services and also ambulance service and the urgent tasks of social authorities At start of the ERC’s the staff was recruited as follows : 1/3 from former rescue ERC’s, 1/3 from police alarm centers and 1/3 were recruited from graduates of duty officer training arranged by The Emergency Services College and by The Police College of Finland. Today the staff is recruited from graduates of duty officer training and from police forces.

For the future it is planned to reduce the number of ERCs and in parallel increase the number of staff in the other centres. In year 2008, about 3.8 million enquiries were received by ERCs, of which 2, 9 million were emergency calls, 30 000 calls were from alert devices and 950 000 were other enquiries.

In Finland there is no Civil Protection or Civil Defence: the rescue service assumes the same responsibilities as these bodies. The rescue teams receive training in the Emergency Services College specifically designed for emergency teams.

In the event of attack, within the police the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Security Police have the main responsibilities with regard to intelligence gathering, surveillance, investigation and international cooperation in terrorist cases. The Police manage the investigation as a whole and forward the finalised file to the Prosecutor.

The Security Police has the responsibilities of a security service, dealing with counter terrorism and counter espionage issues. It is also responsible for drawing up threat assessments. The Security Police is the main provider of staff for the Government Situation Centre.

The Police High Command, NBI and Security Police provide an on-call officer on a 24/7 basis.

An equally important body is the Finnish Border Guard (FBG). One of the most important tasks in terrorist crisis management is search and rescue at sea, in particular within the territorial responsibility of the FBG. The permanent provision of a helicopter to support airborne deployment of the Karhu is due to the lack of own capacities within the Police.

Likewise, the police can count on assistance by the Defence Forces in order to prevent or stop ongoing terrorist crimes. In these circumstances, depending on the specific situation, Defence personnel and equipment would be made available. All the resources of the armed forces may be used upon request by the police forces even if that means the use of, for example, armoured vehicles, naval vessels, military aircraft, etc. In these cases the Ministry of the Interior would request assistance from the Ministry of Defence and the decision to use military force would be made by the Government. However, it is possible that the threat of a terrorist strike may arise completely by surprise or at such short notice that the Government cannot form a quorum. In this case, the Ministry of Defence would make the decision upon a request from the supreme police command.

The President and the Government would then have to be informed immediately of the request and of the decision to provide assistance so that it would still have the opportunity to act on the situation at hand. In these situations the Defence Forces is always under the command of the Police.

An exercise was developed in 2007 with the scenario of a renegade aeroplane. F-18s from the air force were used, under the coordination and command of the police, since it is considered that this authority has the best capabilities to assess the situation and to decide what measures to adopt.

The Finnish Defence Force (FDF) regularly issues a list to all partners describing all capabilities for support functions. The list was last issued in February 2008.

The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), which is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MOSAH), functions in a support function as partner to the Police in “Demanding Situations” and “Special Situations”. It is responsible for emergency/contingency planning. Agreements between STUK and radio/TV stations have been set up in order to notify the public in emergency situations.

A special advisory board for IT is also in place. CERT-FI (Finish Computer Emergency Response Team) is composed of experts on ICT Security and aims to provide a coordinated response to information security incidents. The task force of experts is on hand 24 hours a day to respond a to possible crisis situation.

The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness is composed of two units; the Biological Defence Unit of the Finnish Defence Forces and the Biological Threat Unit of the National Institute for Health and Welfare (NIHW). The Centre works in close contact with the Department of Infectious Disease Surveillance and Control of the NIHW and with the CB-Defence and Environmental Health Unit of the Centre for Military Medicine.

In the context of a crime scene, the Police issue press statements on the state of the investigation and the perimeters. The Emergency and Rescue Services are responsible for issuing press statements on the rescue task.

2.3. Rules for internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack

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3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

3.1. Training/exercises for testing the National Crisis Centre and communication systems in the event of a terrorist attack

Finland has a system of frequent training events and exercises. Most of the exercises for demanding situations are conducted as a part of routine day-to-day work, since no distinction is drawn between terrorist and other types of criminal activity. For more specific situations, periodic training events and exercises are held. The STUK provides training to Rescue Services and the Police on nuclear, biological and chemical issues. Every three years a large-scale exercise is conducted at a nuclear plant including all forces, Private Public Partners and the Media. Government level exercises are organised on regular basis. Once in a year is an exercise, in which the State crisis management model is tested from the level of competent authorities to Government plenary session. Every four years a large scale whole-government exercise, including regional and local level, is conducted.

The Finnish authorities also conduct exercises with neighbouring countries (with the Russians twice last year; also with Sweden). Russia also takes part in FI exercises. Some of these exercises are prolonged (40hours). Scenarios include a nuclear accident and the deliberate irradiation of food. Many exercises are used for the training of staff and knowledge-building.

Karhu and the Special Emergency Response Team of the Border Guard organise common exercises one to two times a year.

FICORA organises a twice-yearly Communications Systems Preparedness Exercise ("TIETO") TIETO exercise is being organised jointly by the ministry of transport and communication (MINTC) and Finnish defence forces (FDF). FICORA actively participates in the preparations phase as well as the actual exercise phase.

Various what-if scenarios are enacted, ranging from sabotage of individual critical points of the network to all-out attacks. Such exercises also help to test-drive preparedness and wartime legislation.

Based on a framework scenario provided by the European Commission, Exercise Poseidon was conducted in autumn 2008. Detailed scenario planning was carried out by the Security Police and the Police Training Institute with the participation of the Police on the planning phase. A hostage-taking situation on a ferry commuting between Finland and Sweden with about 2 500 passengers on board was simulated. All strategic, operational and tactical bodies involved in terrorist crisis management were involved.

The Border Guard trains two to three times a year with neighboring country partners, four times a year at national level and approximately 10 times a year at local level.

4. SOFT TARGETS

Both public authorities and the private sector are responsible for preparing protective measures. Soft targets are identified at the level of municipalities, but they are not particularly distinguished from other police tasks.

Measures to respond to a possible attack are planned at the local level. In Finland there is no general national list of soft targets.

The Security Police (SUPO) is in charge of assessing and analysing the risk of any terrorist attack. In fact, one of the first priorities for SUPO is gathering information related to terrorism. The duty of the Security Police is to prevent such undertakings and crimes that may endanger governmental or social systems or internal or external security of the State and to investigate these crimes. The Security Police is also to maintain and develop general readiness to prevent activities endangering the security of the state

Concerning soft targets, the police is one of several partners when it comes to security issues. Nevertheless, the Police is consulted for advice during the planning phase for security measures relating to a possible soft target.

With regard to the security of existing Soft Targets, a cooperation mechanism with private security companies has been established, as well as with the administration of the companies in an effort to raise resilience security issue.

5. GOOD PRACTICES

- In Finland there is a clear intention and effort to simplify the model of crisis management as much as possible. This effort has resulted in extremely effective crisis management.
- Terrorism is considered as one type of threat to public security, and therefore as an issue to be dealt with by the Finnish police, and it is dealt with as a crime. Other authorities support the police in fulfilling these tasks, and for that reason the police is entitled to use the resources of the defence forces, as well as any other resources, from any body, which may be considered important to manage a situation related to terrorism. Because of the scarcity of resources, all functions are fulfilled through sharing of resources. The authorisations, which have a strong legal basis, together with regular training and communication, provide sufficient guarantees that resources will be used in the most efficient way possible. Since this management prevents duplication, considerable amounts of money can be saved on the acquisition of equipment as well as on its use in the event of an emergency.
- The Special Intervention Team (Karhu) assigns 40 % of its working time to day-to-day police work. This methodology ensures that unit members are kept up-to-date with the general police work, and establishes personal contacts between the unit members and the officers tasked with day-to-day police work.
- Fire-fighters are fully-trained multi-skilled operators, who are also capable of providing first medical response. As for Civil response, the fact that basic instructions for emergency civilian response are well distributed in phonebooks, is definitely a good practice.
- “Demanding Situations” frequently occur. Thus, the design and efficiency of the special structure are regularly tested under real conditions. This allows for ongoing and consecutive updates concerning procedures and the resources required. This dynamic process allows of good and efficient coordination between the bodies involved in crisis management.
- The regular exchange of staff between the Security Police and the NBI ensures a better understanding of each other's work and tasks and harmonises cooperation in the event of related investigations.

- In order to improve cooperation between the Police, Customs and Border Guard, a joint body has been set up. All three bodies make use of a common database and weekly meetings are held to discuss common issues.
- In terms of general investigative competencies, the Finnish police can request any information (including passenger lists) within its mandate without requiring any additional authorisation.
- Further good practices include rules for general conduct, such as keeping matters simple, a general aptitude for cooperation, flexibility, and adaptability to unpredictable situations. The level and intensity of exchange of situation awareness, early warning and familiarity with all possible stakeholders, which is possible thanks to the size of the country, make horizontal cross-service cooperation very intensive.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

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7. ANNEX

7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions

- Helsinki Police Department
- Security Police
- Ministry of Interior - Rescue Department
- Ministry of Interior - Police Supreme Command
- Ministry of Social Affair and Health

- Border Guard
- Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
- National Bureau of Investigations
- Ministry of Defence
- Command Center of Government
- Ministry of Transport and Communications

7.2. Expert Team

Council General Secretariat

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Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

European Commission

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Directorate General, Justice, Freedom and Security

Spain

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Slovenia

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Europol

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Serious Crime Department – Counter Terrorism
