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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

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Brussels, 5 March 2010

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NOTE

from:	The Council General Secretariat
to:	Working Party on Terrorism
Subject:	Second Round of Peer Evaluation
	Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Spain** (1-3 April 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluation covering "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack" an evaluation visit was paid to Spain on 1-3 April 2009.
- Because of its recent history Spain pays a great deal of attention to matters of terrorism. Over the last forty years or so more than a thousand people have been killed there in terrorist attacks. Spain is a victim of both internal and external terrorism. Internal terrorism is basically the result of the activities of the following movements: ETA¹, "Resistencia Galega" and GRAPO³. External terrorism is the result of the activities of Al Qaeda.

The attack on 11 March 2004⁴ caused a national trauma which led to improvements in the anti-terrorist system that was, however, already very effective.

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ETA was created by dissident members of two organisations: the avatar of the Basque Nationalist Party, founded in 1952, and EKIN, a nationalist group founded in 1953 by a group of students at the University of Deusto (Bilbao). Those two movements seek to promote Basque nationalism. EKIN's objective is the independence of the Spanish and French provinces of the Basque country, which make up Euskadi. The movement became progressively more radical and resulted in the creation of ETA on 31 July 1959.

² A Galician independence group

The "Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre" (The First of October Antifacist Resistance Groups or GRAPO) were formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain of the Franco area. GRAPO has killed more than 80 people and injured more than 200. GRAPO is an urban terrorist group that seeks to overthrow the Spanish Government and establish a Marxist State. It opposes Spanish participation in NATO and the U.S. presence in Spain and has a long history of assassinations, bombings and kidnappings, mostly against Spanish interests, during the 1970s and 1980s.

In that attack, responsibility for which was claimed by Al Qaeda, nearly 200 people died and 1400 were injured, making these attacks the bloodiest in <u>Europe</u> since the <u>Lockerbie bombing</u> on 21 <u>December 1988</u>, in which 270 people were killed. Out of thirteen bombs used, ten went off. That attack far exceeded the <u>Basque ETA</u> bombing of a <u>Barcelona</u> supermarket in <u>1987</u>, which killed twenty-one civilians and was until 11 March the bloodiest attack ever on Spanish soil.

With the exception of ETA, which still represents a very high level of threat (thirty-five ETA attacks have already been carried out in 2009), the other terrorist movements ("Resistencia Galega" and GRAPO) are regarded as posing little or very little threat at present. In fact, in the case of "Resistencia Galega", three terrorist attacks on construction companies were carried out in 2008 without causing any casualties. In the case of GRAPO, as a result of successful counter-terrorism operations the organisation's operational capabilities and infrastructure have been disrupted.

External terrorism by the Al Qaeda movement is rated as a serious threat hanging over both the country's internal situation and its interests abroad. The National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA) believes that **NOT DECLASSIFIED** factors are combined to make Spain a target of the international jihad:

As regards the internal situation, special attention is given to local and independent cells and to radicalised individuals, Islamist networks, jihadists coming or returning from conflict zones, AQIM activities and jihadist networks in touch with organisations activated in the Indo-Pakistani region. As regards the external situation, Spanish interests and individuals seem more threatened particularly in the following regions:

- the Maghreb and the Sahel;
- Lebanon and Afghanistan;
- India, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Indonesia and Iraq.
- The impression of the main institutions the evaluation team visited was excellent. Spain appears to have a system of very high quality preparedness and consequence management in the event of attacks. The law enforcement institutions staff have great experience of such situations and the actions of the various services are very well coordinated; no overlapping or gaps were found on this evaluation mission. In addition, the communications channels of the Ministry of the Interior are clear and well structured, as regards both operational units as well as regional and local levels.
- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:



2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

The Kingdom of Spain is a parliamentary hereditary monarchy. The country has three levels of government and is highly decentralised. It is divided into seventeen autonomous regions comprising fifty provinces and 8112 local entities, as well as two autonomous governments of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of the National Crisis Centres

In Spain the National Crisis Management Centre is part of the National Crisis Management System and it is operated twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week by the Department for Infrastructure and Monitoring of Crisis Situations (Department de Infraestructuras y Seguimiento para Situaciones de Crisis, DISSC).

2.1.1. National Crisis Management Centre (Centro Nacional de Gestión de Situaciones de Crisis, CNGSC)

The National Crisis Management Centre (CNGSC) was created in the 1980s, and its functions have evolved since then. It is the nerve centre of Spain's crisis-management system and it interlinks all the crisis management centres in Spain. It deals with the management of all crises (not only those resulting from terrorist action) at the strategic and political level.

From this Centre, the Government's Committee for Crisis Situations (Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Situaciones de Crisis, CDGSC), assisted if need be by other counselling and support bodies of the National Crisis Management (Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Situaciones de Crisis, SNGSC), controls and coordinates crisis situations which may arise.

The CNGSC is the centre for command and monitoring at strategic level of the National Crisis Management System and is established within the structure of the Prime Minister's Office (Presidencia del Gobierno). Accordingly it is the Prime Minister (Presidente del Gobierno) that is in charge of the Centre. That function is carried on through the Secretary of State-Director of the Prime Minister's Office (that person acts as Secretary of the CDGSC).

In addition, the CNGSC is the permanent working seat of the instrumental body of the System - the Department for Infrastructure and Monitoring of Crisis Situations (DISSC). The CNGSC is run and maintained by the staff of the DISSC.

In normal (non-crisis) situations, the CNGSC keeps permanent contact, through the DISSC, with all ministerial departments, bodies and institutions involved in the National Crisis Management System, as well as with the Intelligence Community and, when needed, with private entities, regarding activities related to the infrastructure of the system, alerts and follow-up, analysis, forecasting, prevention, and readiness for the management of crisis situations. Meetings are convened regularly with representatives of various ministerial departments as well as more relevant bodies and entities within the National Crisis Management System.

In crisis or emergency situations, representatives of ministerial departments are involved in crisis management activities within the CNGSC, either at the highest political level (Ministers within the Government's Committee for Crisis Situations, CDGSC) or, when the situation does not require the setting up of the top decision-making level, at lower levels (the Support Committee or the Interministerial Cell for Crisis Situations).

The CNGSC operates round the clock, twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week carrying out the following activities:

- the monitoring, analysis and assessment of events and situations, at both national and international levels; the dissemination of alerts (through the Early Warning Unit);
- preparation for the management of crisis situations through the compilation and updating of strategic information on relevant sectors, making inventories of plans and protocols for action, recreating crisis scenarios and setting up training exercises for the management of such situations in coordination with the essential entities in the SNGSC (defence, state security, civil protection and emergencies, health and other authorities);
- the designing and updating of technologies and carrying out the maintenance of the CNGSC,
 the network of ministerial centres for crisis management and the strategic network for
 encrypted communications of the SNGSC.

The authority responsible for the maintenance of the operations of the CNGSC is the Director General of DISSC, who reports directly to the Secretary of State-Director of the Prime Minister's Office.

In crisis or emergency situations, when some of the strategic bodies (Government's Committee for Crisis Situations, Support Committee, Interministerial Cell for Crisis Situations) involved in crisis management meet within the CNGSC, the Centre is chaired by the Chair of that body (during the meetings of the CDGCS, the Prime Minister would chair the Centre).

2.1.2. National Crisis Management System (Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Situaciones de Crisis, SNGSC)

The National Crisis Management System (SNGSC) is the set of institutional entities, operational instruments and infrastructure at the disposal of the National Government for the prevention, control and management of crisis situations which could jeopardise the lives, security and wellbeing of citizens as well as the rule of law or the stability of the State.

The SNGSC functions by means of the following institutional bodies:

- (a) <u>the Government's Committee for Crisis Situations</u>¹ (Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Situaciones de Crisis, CDGSC), which operates under the authority of the Prime Minister or one of the three acting Deputy Prime Ministers and consists of the following entities:
 - the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
 - the Minister of Defence;
 - the Minister of Interior;
 - the Minister of Economy and Finance;
 - the Secretary of State-Director of the National Intelligence Centre;
 - the Secretary of State for Security;
 - other Ministers concerned, depending on the type of crisis.

The secretariat of the CDGSC is provided by the Secretary of State-Director of the Prime Minister's Office.

The main tasks of this Committee are:

- approving standard operational procedures,
- approving operational plans and programmes, and
- directing and coordinating the prevention, control and management of crisis.

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The main regulations on the subject are Royal Decree (RD) 2639/1986, which sets up the Government Delegate Commission for Crisis Situations, as amended by RD 1194/2004, and RD 1689/2004 on the establishment of the organic structure of the Presidency of the Government.

(b) the Support Committee¹ (SC), which consists of the key Ministers (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economy and Finance, Interior) under the direction of the Secretary of State-Director of the Prime Minister's Office, assisted by the Director General of DISSC.

The main tasks of the Committee are:

- studying, coordinating and planning missions,
- (c) the National Civil Emergency Planning Committee², which consists of staff of the Prime Minister's Office, assisted by other ministerial staff (depending on the resources that would need to be mobilised for each kind of crisis situation). The Committee is headed by the Secretary of State-Director of the Prime Minister's Office, assisted by two vice-chairmen, one for defence policy and the other for civil protection.

The main tasks of the Committee are:

- issuing planning directives, and
- coordinating resource contribution plans.
- (d) the Department for Infrastructure and Monitoring of Crisis Situations³ (Departmento de Infraestructuras y Seguimiento para Situaciones de Crisis, DISSC), which is a permanent body led by a Director General and fulfils the following functions:
 - ensuring the proper operation of the National Crisis Management Centre and the special telecommunication systems of the Prime Minister's Office;
 - monitoring of crisis situations of all types and supporting the Prime Minister's Office in the decision-making process;
 - proposing legislation to ensure the proper operation of the National Crisis Management System;
 - programming and coordinating crisis management exercises.

GCMCS Resolution of 28 January 1987 and of 26 March 1990.

² Cabinet Decision of 15 January 1988.

³ RD 163 of 1987 and RD 1689 of 2004.

Under the responsibility of its Director-General, DISSC comprises three Sub-Directorates:

- the Early Warning and Crisis Monitoring Sub-Directorate;
- the Crisis Management Sub-Directorate;
- the Infrastructure Sub-Directorate.

The Early Warning and Crisis Monitoring Sub-Directorate is divided into two units:

- the 24/7 Early Warning Unit (Servicio Permanente de Alertas, SEPAL);
- the Crisis Monitoring and Assesment Unit.

The mission of SEPAL consists of continuous monitoring of crisis situations, broadcasting early warnings as well as drafting regular and specific reports. SEPAL operates on a 24/7 basis and is permanently in contact with the corresponding 24/7 departments at other ministries and agencies.

The Crisis Monitoring and Assesment Unit monitors situations and assesses short- and medium-term risks related to security, defence, social issues, technology, environment and other areas. It issues regular reports to the Prime Minister: daily reports concerning current events, weekly reports constituting analysis, and monthly reports regarding the current threat level as well as prognosis of future developments.

The National Crisis Management System also comprises an Analysis and Response Sub-System, the main body of which is the Crisis Management Sub-Directorate responsible for the following functions:

- keeping crisis files comprising information about essential services and sectors,
- coordinating crisis management exercises at strategic and political level,
- drafting sectorial and multisectorial crisis scenarios as well as methodologies to produce scenarios,
- holding sectorial meetings with relevant authorities.

The Crisis Management Sub-Directorate has produced over 175 crisis scenarios.

The crisis management policy implemented in the framework of the SNGSC consists of managing crises on the spot (from bottom to top approach). Accordingly, 75 % of crises can be managed at the level of one of the seventeen autonomous regions using its own resources. Only 20 % of crises necessitate assistance from other autonomous regions and coordination by government (Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies). Finally, only 5 % of crises are regarded as severe, demanding a decision-making process at the strategic and political level, and therefore requiring the activation of the SNGSC.

2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for making national arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack through its State Secretariat for Security (SES) and its Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (DGPCE): SES adopts the operational plans of the police forces (the "Cuerpo Nacional de Policía" and the "Guardia Civil") and DGPCE elaborates emergency plans. The Ministry of the Interior and more particularly SES are therefore at the heart of the crisis management process.

2.2.1. The Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior is divided into two main parts: the State Secretariat for Security and the Under-Secretariat of the Interior. They are under the immediate authority of the Minister. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of:

- preparing and implementing government policies as regards the general management of public safety;
- the high command as well as the direction and coordination of the national law-enforcement bodies and agencies.

The National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA) is also under the direct responsibility of the Minister for the Interior.

2.2.2. State Secretariat for Security (SES)

The State Secretariat for Security (SES) is under the immediate authority of the Minister of the Interior and is responsible for:

- commanding national law enforcement bodies and agencies, which include the "Cuerpo Nacional de Policia" and the "Guardia Civil";
- coordinating and supervising the services and functions relating thereto.

2.2.2.1. "Cuerpo Nacional de Policia" and "Guardia Civil"

Under the responsibility of the SES, the Directorate-General for the Police and the Civil Guard is in charge of the operational management of crises. According to Spanish Law the "Cuerpo Nacional de Policia" (CNP) is competent in urban areas, all provincial capitals and in the main cities, and the "Guardia Civil" (GC) is competent in the rest of the country and in territorial waters, which also applies to terrorist offences . If, however, assistance is required the two services support each other.

Concerning terrorist offences, the CNP and the GC each have their own intelligence services: the General Commissariat for Information for the CNP and the Information Service for the GC.

The two information services have different territorial sectors but the same functions. They are responsible for:

- gathering, receiving, processing and developing any relevant information of interest for purposes of public order and safety maintenance;
- the operational use of information, specifically in the anti-terrorist field, of national and international scope.

In addition, with a view to increasing its capacity to react against a major terrorist attack, in January 2006 the SES set up a Police Support Team for the management of major terrorist attacks, consisting of the CNP and the GC experts in information, forensic science, bomb disposal and CBNR threats. The Team is intended to be a counselling and support unit for the police and other services responsible for the investigation of terrorist attacks of major dimensions. The command of the Support Team is exercised by the CNP and the GC alternately for a year at a time.

2.2.2.2. National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure

The National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (CNPIC) is also under the responsibility of the SES. It is in charge of directing, coordinating and supervising the protection of national critical infrastructure.

CNPIC was established by a Council of Ministers Act dated 2 November 2007. It is a coordinating agency and is responsible for, among other things, updating the catalogue of strategic infrastructure; issuing threat and risk assessment and alerts; disseminating information; drafting territorial and sectorial plans, communication and coordination with other departments, police forces, international counterparts, stakeholders, etc. Consequently, its main tasks are the ensuring of physical security and information communication technology security infrastructure protection against any type of threat, especially terrorist attacks.

2.2.3. Action Plans

Through the SES, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for activating the three main plans of action:

- the Plan for Prevention and Protection against Terrorism;
- the National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure;
- the Standing Plan for Security in ports and airports.

In the event of a terrorist attack, at operational level the national police forces (the CNP and the GC) would implement their own action protocols.

• Plan for Prevention and Protection against Terrorism

This Plan regulates the following topics:

- Specific security measures enabling to prevent, control and detect terrorist individuals
- Mobility and rationalization of human, operational and technical resources of the police bodies

- Surveillance and protection of highly crowded places, as well as guaranteeing the essential strategic targets
- Consideration to Armed Forces cooperation
- Different levels of alert activation.

• National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure

The <u>National Plan for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure</u> ensures the permanent, updated and homogeneous protection of the Spanish strategic infrastructure system. SES compiles a national catalogue of strategic infrastructure (secret) which is agreed by Spain's Council of Ministers. The agreement is a legal framework for monitoring and coordinating the most appropriate action to protect essential infrastructure against terrorist attack.

• Standing Plan for Security in ports and airports

The <u>Standing Plan for Security in ports and airports</u> lays down protection measures for ships, port facilities, maritime traffic, aircraft and air traffic.

• Operational protocols of Police Forces

Both CNP and GC have operational protocols laying down the measures to be taken in the event of a terrorist attack, which would be implemented by the operational head on the scene –incident commander-, being their main goal to provide immediate help to victims, to minimise or limit collateral damage and to facilitate future investigation. The protocols define the tasks regarding Public Order, Explosives Disposal Units, the Crime Scene and Forensic Police and the Intelligence Units. In the event of an attack, the local police, ambulance, emergency, and fire and rescue services are also alerted. In some cases hospitals, coroners' departments, special cleaning-up services and even private entities like security companies and gas/electricity/network suppliers are involved in scene management. The coordination is done from the respective Emergency Call Rooms (CNP or GC);

• Operational schedules for CBRN Incidents

CNP and GC have both of them specialized CBRN Units. In general terms, these units are organised to attain two main functions: 1) search and detection of CBRN material in order to adopt the first security measures in the event of a suspicious existence of this material. 2) Disposal of CBRN material.

Both Police services have developed their own operational protocols in the event of a CBRN emergency.

The operational structure of the Police services is supplemented by special Civil Protection and Emergency units, the Military Emergency Unit (UME), the Council for Nuclear Security, the network of laboratories for biological alert (RELAB) and the national health system.

As far as organizational models are concerned, here it is, as an example, the one followed by GC. The Guardia Civil CBRN defence system and the Action Plan for Explosives and CBRN Incidents were established in 1999. It is put into action only in the event of a major threat and/or damage, in particular terrorist attacks.

The "Guardia Civil" CBRN defence system consists of:

- special qualified units: the most important ones being the first-response units (UPI) and the
 CBRN bomb disposal units;
- qualified training: there are three qualification levels;
- technical equipment.

The main goal of the "Guardia Civil" CBRN defence system is coordinated fight against CBRN threats by the use of special units and in coordination with other police corps and emergency services at different coordination levels:

- at provincial level through the "Guardia Civil" provincial commander, a headquarters and an incident commander;
- at regional level through the "Guardia Civil" regional commander;
- at national level through the "Guardia Civil" deputy director (supreme operational commander).

UPIs are mainly technical units specifically designed to face CBRN threat or risk situations and able to evaluate and give professional advice to all authorities involved.

The hierarchical organisation of these special units into functional, support, first-response and technical units allows for decentralisation in line with the territorial organisation of the country, ensuring that units can reach the scene quickly in the event of an incident. There are fifty-four CBRN functional units on local (provincial) level, several CBRN support units and first-response units, and one CBRN technical unit in the country. A CBRN unit consists of twenty-three police officers. The units assist each other across local borders and are therefore available and ready for action around the clock

The CBRN defence system provides for three levels of qualification: basic individual training, complementary individual training and individual training for specialists. In the event of a CBRN terrorist attack, an incident commander assumes the task of coordinating the technical police units and the emergency services.

Ongoing participation in international crisis management exercises and national exercises ensures that these structures and systems are frequently tested.

2.2.4. *Under-Secretariat of the Interior*

Under the supervision of the Under-Secretariat of the Interior there are, among others, the Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies and the Directorate General for Assistance to Victims of Terrorism.

2.2.4.1. National Civil Protection System

<u>The Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies through the National Civil Protection</u>

<u>System</u> is in charge of the following activities:

- ⇒ preparing state schedules relating to civil protection or regulations or guidelines for which it has been assigned competence;
- ⇒ organising and maintaining the Operational Cooperation Centre, the Radioactivity Alert network, the networks providing proper communications in the event of emergencies;

- ⇒ requesting intervention by the Military Emergency Unit (Unidad Militar de Emergencias, UME);
- ⇒ distributing risk analyses and alerts;
- ⇒ preparing and managing exercises and simulations;
- ⇒ compiling guidelines and procedures for grants and different kinds of aid.
- ⇒ EU & international relations in Civil Protection matters.

There is one National Civil Protection School in Spain, which is located near Madrid.

There are two coordinating bodies for civil protection:

- ⇒ the Civil Protection National Commission;
- ⇒ the Civil Protection Commission of the Autonomous Communities.

Means and resources of the Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies are

- ⇒ national law enforcement agencies (the "Cuerpo Nacional de Policia" and the "Guardia Civil");
- ⇒ military (the Military Emergency Unit);
- ⇒ public and private companies.

In the event of a terrorist attack, the Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies gives support to the law enforcement agencies.

2.2.4.2. Directorate General for Assistance to Victims of Terrorism

The Directorate General <u>for Assistance to Victims of Terrorism</u> is in charge of working with associations, foundations and any other public and private institutions aiming to assist victims of terrorism and of working with the competent bodies within the State General Administration and within the rest of the public administration on the matter of bringing assistance and support to victims.

2.2.5. National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA)

The National Centre <u>for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA)</u> was set up on 28 May 2004, shortly after the Madrid attacks. With the aim of facilitating the exchange and coordination of intelligence, it brings together representatives and information of the Prison Service and all the intelligence services: the General Commissariat for Information (in the jurisdiction of CNP), the Information Service (in the jurisdiction of GC) and the National Intelligence Centre (external intelligence service of the Ministry of Defence). Through that Centre, the Ministry of the Interior has access to all intelligence in the field of the fight against terrorism. The Centre is directly answerable to the Minister and its main tasks are:

- to receive strategic information and make strategic analysis,
- to issue threat assessments, and
- to plan operational responses.

2.2.6. Threat levels and alert levels

The Prime Minister's Office in cooperation with the Intelligence Community is responsible for the forecasting of the threats and risks .

There are four levels to measure terrorist threats:

- \Rightarrow level 0 green = normal situation
- ⇒ level 1 yellow = potential risk
- ⇒ level 2 orange = slight threat/risk
- ⇒ level 3 red = extreme or imminent risk/threat

Regarding terrorist threats, according to the Plan for Prevention and Protection against Terrorism there are specific levels contemplating different measures of protection and prevention for the different levels of threat whose activation is responsibility of the Secretary of State for Security. ¹

- activation level 1: action by law enforcement services
- activation level 2: additional action by specialised units
- activation level 3: additional action by armed forces

2.2.7. Crisis management at provincial level in the event of a terrorist attack

In every province an Integrated Centre for Operational Coordination (CECOPI) is set up in the Government Delegation. The CECOPI is set up at the request of the Government Delegate and is chaired by him. It has at its disposal all the necessary means of communication. From the CECOPI, emergency direction systems and emergency management systems are activated. The Director of this Centre and his Direction Team can give instructions or directives to the operational forces (EOD and radioactive team, health team, police team, logistics team, technical advisory team).

The CECOPI is in permanent contact with DISSC, CNGSC, SES, and, in the event of a CNRB emergency, with the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) and its coordination centre SALEM, as well as the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Emergencies (DGPCE) and its coordination committee CECO. CECOPI can request national resources from the abovementioned bodies if necessary. CECOPI is also responsible for emergency management through the media. The Centre uses a wide range of information communication technology (data, voice, image) for its work.

The mission of the CECOPI is to ensure that all operational information is passed from regional to national level and vice versa. Coordination on the ground is provided by the CNP or the GC in order to preserve the possibility of collecting evidence and facilitating investigations.

It is important to note that in June 2009the Ministry of Interior has updated the Plan for Prevention and Protection against Terrorism. The updating has modified the different levels of threat. The Plan will count with four levels of activation which will be aligned with these four levels of threat.

2.3. Competences of the national national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks

2.3.1. Although the competence of the CNGSC is not defined in terms of the border or non-border nature of any target, the CNGSC could be potentially used for both cross-border and any other targets.

2.3.2. International Police Cooperation

The identification of dangers and threats to the security and the transmission of information between Spanish authorities and their counterparts in neighbouring countries is implemented at two levels: through the Interior attachés and liaison officers as well as through cross-border police cooperation regulated in their respective bilateral agreements.

International police cooperation in fighting terrorism is implemented via liaison officers at the embassies, bilateral agreements on counter-terrorism cooperation, cross-border cooperation and measures of cooperation regulated by international legal instruments within the EU. There is also a National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination.

Specifically, there is an Agreement for cross-border police and customs cooperation between Spain and France, signed at Blois on 7 July 1998, with a view to coordinating common action in the border area in the framework of the prevention of threats against security and public order and the exchange of information on police and customs matters.

Bilateral relations with Portugal, as far as police cooperation in the border area is concerned, is governed by the Agreement of 19 November 1997 on the creation of joint police stations, which will soon be replaced by the new Agreement on cross-border police and customs cooperation signed in November 2005.

There are four joint centres operating on a permanent basis with France and another four with Portugal. There are plans to establish two new centres on the border with Portugal. It is, however, not certain whether cross-border communication is carried out in the most efficient manner both in terms of fast reaction capability in the entire border area, full compatibility of the means of communication and existence of back-up structures. It may be useful to undergo an additional analysis to evaluate the efficiency and compatibility of the communication systems between all the relevant services at both sides of the border.

Between Spain and Morocco joint patrols are carried out with the aim of fighting illegal migration networks and the use of their channels by terrorist individuals connected to extremist Islamic international terrorism.

Bilateral agreements are in force with France (11 October 2001) and Portugal (9 March 1992) also in the field of civil protection.

2.3.3. Communications with the European Union

In the event of a terrorist attack, the European Union is informed, through SITCEN, by the General Commissariat for Information (CNP).

Collaboration with EUROPOL is ensured, where appropriate, by the National EUROPOL Unit, which is part of the Terrorism Department of the Ministry.

The Directorate General for Civil Protection and Emergencies is Spain's National Contact Point within the Community's structures in Civil Protection matters . It is connected with the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in Brussels. Communication with the MIC is facilitated by CECIS (Common Emergency Communication and Information System). It is also connected with international centres and with contact points in several other countries.

2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack

3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

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The Spanish communication systems have been tested in several management exercises at political, strategic and national level. Spanish authorities regularly organise national crisis exercises and frequently participate in cross-border and international exercises. The National Crisis Management Centre has taken part in several EU's Crisis Management Exercises (CME 03, 04, 08) EU's Crisis Coordination Arrangements Exercises (CCAEX 06, 07, 08), NATO's Crisis Management Exercises (CMX 04, 05, 06, 07, 08), as well as in other international initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In addition, in 2008 two international exercises on nuclear terrorism related to the GICNT were conducted by Spain. In the framework of the international exercises the Spanish authorities sometimes hold their own sub-exercises. Planning and feedback is carried out by DISSC.

Spain regularly carries out exercises with neighbouring countries, France and Portugal, and participates in joint exercises with other countries such as the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and USA.

The communications network is tested every day by information forwarding and contacts with several ministries, authorities and police units.

In addition, the training centres of the police services and the National School for Civil Protection offer courses to teach or refresh skills of staff directly involved in managing terrorist incidents and their consequences.

The Spanish secure communication systems have been and will be tested in crisis management exercises of political and strategic nature as well as at national and international level.

4. **SOFT TARGETS**

The National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (CNPIC) was set up on the basis of a Council of Ministers Act dated 2 November 2007. That Act defines the State Secretariat for Security (SES) as the department responsible for critical infrastructure protection, it grants appropriate human and physical resources and defines the tasks and responsibilities of public administration and critical infrastructure operators.

A database on critical infrastructure has been set up by the CNPIC. Some of the information included in the database, i.e. the personal data of the operator of a critical infrastructure object and details of the corresponding law enforcement contacts, is classified "secret". The CNPIC's main tasks are the maintenance of the database, the drafting of threat assessments and the exchange of relevant information. Soft targets do not have the consideration of critical infrastructures.

5. GOOD PRACTICES

- The general cohesion and effective organisation of the entire National Crisis Management System (SNGSC) are in themselves a good practice. The arrangements and mechanisms listed below may, however, also be considered good practice.
- A National Crisis Management Centre (CNGSC) for all kinds of crises, in operation twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, is a guarantee of effectiveness.
- The creation in May 2004 of the National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA), which makes it possible to provide the Minister of the Interior with all the intelligence collected by all administrative entities that are involved in the fight against terrorism, is a considerable advantage.
- The use of the **NOT DECLASSIFIED** in everyday work helps to improve users' knowledge of the system and makes its use efficient and easy in the event of a crisis or emergency.
- The centralised reference database within the CNPIC on critical infrastructure appears to be highly efficient. It also provides the correct contact persons in the event of an incident and a first set of measures to be taken by first responders.
- The fact that the law enforcement and the civil protection agencies work with the same four-level system of threat guarantees their sound and coherent understanding of each other's assessments.
- The Police Support Team for the management of major terrorist attacks, created in January 2006 and composed of experts from the CNP and the GC, is very useful in the event of a major terrorist attack. The alternating command of that group by the CNP and the GC is also good practice.
- It is a sign of an efficient use of resources that in the framework of international crisis management exercises the Spanish authorities sometimes hold their own sub-exercises

6. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Spain is very well prepared for dealing with threats posed by national and international terrorism. The expert delegation was impressed with the presentations on organisational and communication structures, the action plans to prevent terrorism, to deal with terrorist threats and to manage the impact in the event of a terrorist attack.

Having suffered a number of terrorist attacks over the years, Spain has a great deal of practical experience in dealing with terrorism and its consequences. This experience and shortcomings that were identified have always led to the creation of new institutions and elements or the optimisation of existing ones, and to the revision and adaptation of action plans.

It is therefore safe to assume that the elements, precautions, structures and plans created are optimal in view of the country's political and territorial circumstances and structures, and leave little room for improvement.

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7. ANNEX

7.1. Speakers

<u>Directorate-General for International Relations (MoI):</u>

NOT DECLASSIFIED

State Secretariat for Security (MoI):

NOT DECLASSIFIED

National Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination

Department for Infrastructure and Follow-Up of Crisis Situations (DISSC/PMO)

Sub-Directorate for Early Warning and Crisis Monitoring

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Sub-Directorate for Crisis Management

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Sub-Directorate for Infrastructure

NOT DECLASSIFIED

"Cuerpo Nacional de Policia" (MoI)

NOT DECLASSIFIED

"Guardia Civil" (MoI)

NOT DECLASSIFIED

<u>Directorate-General for Civil Protection (MoI)</u>

7.2. Expert team

Council General Secretariat

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Police and Customs Cooperation Unit – DG Justice and Home Affairs

Germany

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Federal Ministry of the Interior

Crisis Management Coordination Centre

Hungary

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Ministry of Local Governments and Regional Development Defence Secretariat

European Commission

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DG JLS – Directorate D – Unit F3

Europol

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Serious Crime Department – Counter Terrorism