**COUNCIL OF
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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.

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ADD 22 EXT 1 (05.03.2013)**

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ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE

from :	The Council General Secretariat
to :	Working Party on Terrorism
Subject :	Second Round of Peer Evaluation
	Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Romania** (16-18 September 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the framework of the second round of peer evaluation covering "Preparedness and consequence management in case of a terrorist attack" an evaluation visit was made to Romania from 16 to 18 of September 2009.

Due to the Romanian preventive approach of terrorism – fully intelligence oriented – it is considered that Romania does not face today a direct, explicit and immediate terrorist threat. The last and so far apparently the only significant terrorist crisis has occurred in the early 1990's, when an attack on the Indian ambassador took place. The current situation reflects the level 2 (Blue / Cautious) on the 5 level scale of terrorist threat. At the same time, in comparison with the latest years, the risk follows an upward trend.

The terrorist risks mainly derive from Romanian military participation (previous and present) in the fight against terrorism in crisis areas like Afghanistan and Iraq. Also, potential attacks could target foreign interests on Romanian territory (such as foreign embassies).

Actually, the national mechanisms related to crisis management in case of terrorist attacks were never initiated. The most relevant commitment of the national system for preventing and countering terrorism, was carried out during the NATO summit in April 2008, when the system was involved at the maximum level and no incidents occurred with regard to the terrorist threat.

According to the analysis presented to us, the Muslim communities from Romanian territories are not subject to a radicalisation process leading to recruitment by terrorist organisations. The autochthonous Muslim population (Tatars and Turks) have shown resilience against attempts of islamist proselytising. Thus, there is no autonomous local group susceptible of preparing a terrorist act. The foreign communities in Romania are mainly preoccupied of improving their economic status and limit themselves to propaganda activities. The number of converts is limited.

Authorities, and in particular the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), pay great attention to members and/or alleged members of organizations that are considered - internationally or in their region of origin - to be terrorist or extremist movements. They are mainly involved in propaganda activities as well as proselytism and logistic activities in terms of Islamic NGOs activities.

A threat assessment is conducted on a regular basis and there are no indications of the situation deteriorating in the foreseeable future. At this time, there is no evidence regarding the presence of Al-Qaida and/or affiliated organisations in Romania.

The impression of the main institutions the evaluation team visited was positive. Numerous arrangements have been established for different kind of risks, but no tested in the context of a real terrorist attack so far. The mechanisms to manage the consequence of a possible terrorist attack seems to be quite appropriate. The overall picture presented by Romania to the Peer Evaluation team was a coherent and well-coordinated structure for the preparation and management of crisis situations.

The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:
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2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

The peer evaluation of the Romania was organised by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI).

The adoption of the Law n° 535/2004 on preventing and countering terrorism was of particular importance and for instance, among other improvements, at the origin of the current National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism (SNPCT) and the Antiterrorist Operative Coordination Centre.

The law n°535/2004 is currently in the process of being amended. The very origin of the system even dates back to 1972 but it was mainly established after 2001. In 2002 a "National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Terrorism" has been adopted. Apart from a comprehensive legal framework the procedures of interaction and coordination within SNPCT are furthermore based upon a legally binding general protocol, updated in 2008. A clear focus on prevention and countering at an early stage is obvious.

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres

In Romania, the activities for preventing and countering terrorism are organized and conducted in a unitary manner, within the **National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism (SNPCT),** which integrates public authorities and institutions with competencies in this field.

Within this organizational framework there is a clear distinction between the political/strategic level, the operational/technical level and the tactical/field level. The tasks corresponding to each level are allocated to separate bodies.

The following institutions are part of the National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism:

1) the Romanian Intelligence Service, that provides for the technical coordination of the System;
2) the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE);
3) the Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI);
4) the Guard and Protection Service (SPP);
5) the Ministry of National Defence (MApN);

6) the Special Communication Service (STS);

7) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE);

8) the Ministry of Economy (ME);

9) the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development (MAPDR);

10) the Ministry of Environment (MM);

11) the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure (MTI);

12) the Ministry of Public Health (MSP);

13) the Ministry of Communications and Information Society (MCSI);

14) the Ministry of Justice and Citizens' Liberties (MJLC);

15) the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Cassation and Justice Court (PÎCCJ);

16) the National Bank of Romania (BNR);

17) the National Agency for Exports' Control (ANCEX);

18) the National Office for Preventing and Countering Money Laundering (ONPCSB);

19) the National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities (CNCAN)

20) the Ministry of Public Finance (MF)

21) the Ministry of Regional Development and Housing (MDRL)

The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) is the technical coordinator of **SNPCT**. Whereas the director of SRI has the rank of a minister SRI itself is not a part of the government. SRI receives guidance from the Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT) and reports to the Parliament (parliamentary surveillance committee).

− The antiterrorist system is clearly and mostly prevention oriented/designed or intelligence led organized, and this underlines the overwhelming importance of intelligence to prevent terrorism. Consequently, SRI is the main key player internally, being the leading resource.

− SRI exercises a very valuable role in terms of coordination and, as already mentioned, has been designated by CSAT as national antiterrorist authority and technical coordinator of SNPCT activities. With other words, SRI works as a vertical pivot (from CSAT to CCOA via SNPCT) and as the only common interface that bridges all players parts of SNPCT and CCOA

− SRI is also responsible for counterterrorist interventions (antiterrorist brigade, SRI requesting other intervention units when needed).

- **The Antiterrorist Operative Coordination Centre (CCOA)** - established within the Romanian Intelligence Service is a 24/7 coordination-cell. It was founded in 2002 and ensures the ongoing coordination of the cooperation activities carried out within SNPCT. It is permanently staffed and headed by SRI.

  CCOA is responsible with:

  − integrating the data and intelligence, provided by all the public authorities, members of SNPCT, on terrorist activities, in order to identify and implement the appropriate measures;

  − monitoring terrorist activities and informing the public authorities and institutions from SNPCT, in order to implement the appropriate measures, according to their legal competencies;

  − **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- CCOA is a round the clock coordination structure, that ensures the efficient integration and use of the relevant intelligence in the antiterrorist field. The available intelligence is processed and the informational products are disseminated – in due time – to the institutions from SNPCT and the authorities responsible for deciding on and/or implementing the appropriate measures.

- The public authorities and institutions from SNPCT have created special compartments in their organisational chart and designated permanent representatives (point of contact) for CCOA, in order to ensure efficient communication with the Centre and, thus, the efficiency of the cooperation activities.

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Legal Basis

The existence of the Antiterrorist Operative Coordination Centre (for the ongoing coordination of preventing and countering terrorism) and the National Centre for Antiterrorist Action (for the coordination in case of a terrorist crisis situation), respectively, is stipulated in:

- the Law no.535/2004 on preventing and countering terrorism (section 1, art. 6 and 14);

- the General Protocol on the Structuring and Functioning of SNPCT (approved by the Supreme Council for National Defence, in 2002 and updated in 2008 - *classified document)* and the inter-departmental protocols on preventing and countering terrorism;

- the Statute for the organizing and functioning of CCOA (approved by the Supreme Council for National Defence, in 2005 - *classified document*);

- the methodology for organizing and carrying out the antiterrorist intervention (approved by SRI leadership, in 2006 - *classified document*);

- the methodology for organizing and carrying out the counterterrorist intervention (approved by CSAT, in 2006 - c*lassified document*);

- the Strategy for public communication, in terrorist crisis, adopted in 2007.

At strategic level, the activities for preventing and countering terrorism (including SNPCT and, respectively CCOA/CNAAT, as technical coordination structures) is coordinated by **the Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT)**. The CSAT meets on a regular basis every three months but extraordinary meetings are organized on short notice if necessary.

CSAT - the autonomous administrative authority that provides for the unitary organizing and coordinating of the activities for national defence and security - approves the organisational chart and personnel structure of CCOA.

The President of Romania is the president of CSAT and the Prime Minister is the vice-president of the Council. The other members are:

- Minister of National Defence

- Minister of Administration and Interior

- Minister of Justice and Citizens' Liberties

- Minister of Foreign Affairs

- Minister of Economy

- Minister of Public Finance

- The Director of SRI
- The Director of Foreign Intelligence Service
- The Chief of the General Staff
- The President' advisor on National Security

According to Law no.535/2004 on preventing and countering terrorism, the activity in this field is organized and carried out in a unitary manner. Thus, CCOA / CNAAT serves as joint centre of the communication - cooperation - coordination mechanisms integrating the institutions of SNPCT. It is a flexible command and control structure, designed to meet the characteristics of the evolution of the operational situation in the antiterrorist field. CCOA is placed within the Romanian Intelligence Service, as - according to the national legislation in force - the Service carries out the role of technical coordinator of SNPCT.

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2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

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NOT DECLASSIFIED .The director of SRI forwards to CSAT the proposal regarding the level of terrorist alert.

The alert system is a five level one:
- One – Green - Low level - means attacks are unlikely
- Two – Blue - Cautious level - means low risks of attacks
- Three – Yellow - Moderate level - means possible attacks
- Four – Orange - High level - means probable attacks
- Five – Red - Critical level - means imminent attacks

The alert system clearly stipulates the measures to be implemented at each level of the threat and there is a communication strategy adapted to each level of alert.

2.2.1.   *The management of the consequences of a terrorist crisis*

The management of the consequences of a terrorist act is carried out at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical.

At strategic level, CSAT takes the political decisions and approves the proposals forwarded by CNAAT.

At operational level, CNAAT takes the decisions corresponding to this level of authority.

At tactical level, the antiterrorist forces and the support forces take the decisions on the field.

According to art.12 from Law no.535/2004, the national methodology for counterterrorist intervention, in case of a terrorist attack, is drafted by the Romanian Intelligence Service and approved by CSAT.

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- There is a unitary action plan, at national level, for all types of terrorist threats (regardless of the nature of the threat), approved by CSAT – **the National System for Terrorist Alert (SNAT)**. There is also specific action plans for attacks using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, for civil emergencies and operational procedures for the general activities that need to be carried out by the Romanian Police in case of potential bioterrorist incidents.

  The National System for Terrorist Alert creates an effective framework of successive measures to be implemented by the institutions from SNPCT, in relation with the probability of a terrorist attack.

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2.2.2.   Criminal investigation:

a)   At the level of police forces

Besides SRI the **Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI)** has established its own departmental system for preventing and combating terrorism.

The National Police is divided into 41 county polices and the Bucharest Police. The Prefect of each county is responsible for the Police and accountable to the Minister of Administration and Interior. In each county, joint response task forces consisting of CBRN / Bomb Disposal Unit and forensic experts have been established.

The response teams of the Police are activated in case of a criminal offence.

In this respect MAI has responsibilities inter alia in preventing and countering threats generated by extremist-terrorist activities in or aiming at Romania, in preventing and countering connected activities of internal and trans-border organized crime, in carrying out or participating in anti- and counter-terrorist interventions as well as in the limitation of the effects of terrorist attacks (crisis management and damage control). MAI also gathers **intelligence** on entities resident in or transiting Romania suspected of terrorism or assimilated/associated offences and performs **criminal investigations** in terrorism cases and related organized crime.

It is the Ministry of Administration and Interior (and mainly the Directorate for Combating Organised Criminality) which is in charge of the investigation under the control of the investigating DIICOT prosecutor.

With respect to terrorism related intelligence issues, the key component of the Ministry of Administration and Interior is the General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI), whose role is to collect, process and store intelligence/information from the field of criminal activities and classified information, to provide necessary information in the process of criminal prosecution, as well as organisation of intelligence protection of the personnel of the Ministry of Interior. To that end, The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection receives and process data and intelligence coming from all structures that are part of the Ministry of Administration and Interior (in particular, the General Inspectorates of the Police, Border Police, Gendarmerie, for Emergency Situations, The General Directorate for Operational Management , Romanian Immigration Office, the General Directorate for Passports).

It is tasked as follows:

− gathering, processing, stocking the intelligence and counteracting the risks of terrorism within the sphere of competence of the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs,

− gathering intelligence regarding the presence and illegal actions undergone by the physical persons signalled by other structures

− to ensure exchange of intelligence among the institutions part of the Ministry of Administration and Interior

- to manage activities in the domain of organized crime and potential connections with terrorist actions or networks (financial resources available, human resources, logistics)-   to act as an interface with the security structures
- to support antiterrorist intervention with intelligence, independently or in cooperation with specialized forces.

The others main agencies of the Ministry of Interior are:
- the General Inspectorate of the Police,
- the General Inspectorate of Border Police,
- the General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie,
- the General Inspectorate of for Emergency Situations,
- the General Directorate for Operational Management
- the Romanian Immigration Office

Under the authorization of the Court, DGIPI performs specific activities (i.e. surveillance and communication monitoring). The results of these activities may be used as evidences in Court.

In practical terms, **SRI** ensures the management of terrorist crisis, and Ministry of Administration and Interior ensures the management of the consequences (civil emergencies). There are specific procedures for the coordination of the two systems.

At **tactical level** anti-terrorist field actions and interventions are carried out by the **Antiterrorist Brigade** which is under direct command of SRI and other specialised forces of the Gendarmerie and the Police. In a field intervention integrated command posts are established which operate on the basis of tactical intervention procedures.

b)   Within the Public Ministry

The criminal prosecution in terrorist domain is conducted by the Directorate for Investigating the Offences of Organized Crime and Terrorism **(DIICOT)** within the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PICCJ).

DIICOT

- Is the only structure within the Public Ministry specialized in combating and investigating offences of organized crime and terrorism;

- Functions within the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PICCJ);

- Has its own budget and its own juridical personality;

- Is leaded by a chief prosecutor;

- The general Prosecutor of the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice is leading the DIICOT through the chief prosecutor of the Directorate.

The 230 prosecutors and 40 specialists of DIICOT carry out their activities within the different departments of this Directorate. At central level, there are the following structures:

− Service for combating organized crime

− Service for combating drug trafficking

− Service for combating economical-financial macro-criminality

− Service for combating cyber-crime

− Service for combating crimes of terrorism and against state security – the only section that is relevant for the purpose of this evaluation

At local level, DIICOT comprises of:

− 15 territorial services organized at the level of the Prosecutor's Offices attached to the Courts of Appeals,

− 26 territorial offices organized at the level of the Prosecutor's Offices attached to Tribunals.

2.2.3. Civil protection

A **National Centre for Coordinating Public Order Missions** was established within MAI. It consists of a monitoring and situation office, a risk assessment office, a mission planning and coordinating office and a decision centre. The internal workflow in an intervention is also organized along this structure. The Centre coordinates the forces involved in an anti-terrorist field intervention. The General Directorate for Operational Management (DGMO) is the operational coordinator for crisis management.

Consequence management is the responsibility of the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) which is on of MAI subordinated units and its regional structures including fire brigades and rescue services. IGSU is integrated in MAI' departmental system for preventing and combating terrorism at technical (ministerial) and tactical/field level. IGSU is the leading agency in civil emergencies without terrorist implication and has its own operational centre. Hospitals are prepared to take up a larger number of victims, each county has an own mobile field hospital.

The IGSU has identified a total of 28 types of possible emergencies, 16 of which can be linked to terrorist incident. According to the Romanian legislation this General Inspectorate have responsibilities to participate to preventive and operative actions and measures which require specialized response in term of managing the consequences.

The missions and responsibilities of the IGSU are settled by specific legislation as follows:

− Government decision n°21/2005 approved by law n°15/2005 regarding the National System for Emergency Management;

− Law n°481/2004 on civil protection

− Government decision n°2288/2004 for approving distribution of the main support task ensured by the Ministries, NGOs, and other central agencies for emergency situations management prevention.

The IGSU coordinates all the actions to limit and remove the consequences of the natural disasters and other civil protection situations, in this context taking into account all the emergencies caused by human factor or specific events of natural disasters that are consequences of human action. Its tasks in the framework of the Plan of the Ministry of Administration and Interior for terrorist alert situation consisting in preventive measures, reporting information regarding evolution of the operative situations and participation in actions to remove the effects of emergency situation caused by actions of terrorism.

The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has 41 county inspectorates for emergency situations one in each county.

At local level, the structures for emergency situations are also subordinated to the county prefects (appointed by the Prime Minister) or city/ town mayors. Each county, city, town, village etc. has a Local Committee for Emergency Situations conducted by the prefect/ mayor with representatives from all the responsible ministries. Initially, the response to disaster is managed locally, but the case is notified to the central response authority (the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, the National Committee for Emergency Situations). In case the local response authority is lacking sufficient intervention and mitigation means, additional means and forces are sent from neighbouring areas, from the central level or the international environment.

2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks

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Currently, the activities of preventing and countering terrorism take into consideration the risks concerning all the potential targets of terrorist attacks. In a cross-border perspective, a special attention is paid to the elements of the national critical infrastructure (the energy system, communication systems, petrochemical targets near the frontier etc.) as well as of the European critical infrastructure, but also the Romanian diplomatic missions abroad.

There are several regional cooperation structures that Romania takes part in and that assess, among other problems, the terrorist risk for potential cross-border targets, but none of them is exclusively designed to meet this request.

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- Romania concluded more than 50 bilateral agreements of cooperation with EU member states and third states in the field of countering terrorism.

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3. **TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

- Periodical exercises for testing the efficiency of SNPCT/CCOA in managing terrorist threats are carried out under the coordination of SRI. The member institutions of SNPCT carry out their own exercises for testing the internal action mechanisms in crisis situations. The scenarios for the national exercises for terrorist crisis are drafted by SRI / CCOA, in cooperation with the institutions from SNPCT involved in the exercises.

  The last major exercise (RAMADA 2008) was organised in the perspective of planning NATO Summit in Bucharest. The exercise tested the functioning of SNPCT in a potential terrorist crisis (coordination of counterterrorist intervention, the interoperability of SRI, MAI, SPP and MApN forces, SNPCT communication system etc).

  A previous exercise to test the national crisis centre - **„The national exercise for preventing and countering nuclear terrorism"** – took place on the 7th of September 2007, and has been organized by SRI and CNCAN.

  Besides CNCAN and SRI, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Directorate for Investigating the Organized Crime and Terrorism Offences (the specialised structure within the Prosecutor's Office by the High Court of Cassation and Justice), other structures with competencies in protecting and guarding nuclear objectives, have been involved in the activities.

  Several officials from the European Euratom Commission, the International Agency for Atomic Energy (AIEA), the American Commission for Nuclear Regulation, NATO, SECI and ambassadors / military attaches accredited at Bucharest have also been present.

It was national exercise of one day long but it benefited from international representation. The analysis of this exercise has been carried out, in cooperation, by CNCAN, SRI and MAI. The main conclusions of this exercise are that the warning mechanism is working and that the responsibilities for managing the crisis situation have been carried out effectively by SRI. Then, the coordination responsibility has been transferred in an operative manner to MAI, for the management of crisis consequences (the management of civil emergencies, imposing public order and creating the adequate framework for collecting the evidence needed for building a criminal case);

– the structures involved proved a good knowledge of their competencies and responsibilities, and of the internal procedures, that ensured an efficient coordination and the absence of overlapping situations;

– there is a command and coordination inter-operability in terms of actions in the affected area.

But some categories of technical means need to be modernized

- The Romanian competent authorities have also periodically carried out exercises to test the efficiency of the communication system.

There have not taken place, so far, special training courses on the use of the communication system of SNPCT, given the fact that the personnel with competencies in monitoring and managing the communication system is already qualified in this area. However, there are regular activities for the professional training that the members of the personnel responsible for the administering of the communication system of SNPCT take part in.

The scenarios for the exercises testing the efficiency of the communication system of SNPCT - both national and local/regional - are drafted by the Romanian Intelligence Service.

The most recent exercise for testing this efficiency took place between 24-28.09.2007. It was a five days exercise both national and regional level. The post-factum analysis of this exercise has been carried out in cooperation with the technical structures of institutions from SNPCT (SRI, STS, MCSI).

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- About the exercises with neighbouring countries concerning a cross border terrorist attack, the Romanian authorities provided the example of the trilateral Romanian-Bulgarian-Serbian exercise "DANUBE GUARD-07" and "DANUBE GUARD-08", organized at the initiative of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence. The 2007 exercise took place at the common Romanian - Bulgarian - Serbian frontier, in the region Calafat - Porţile de Fier II and aimed at managing a crisis situations generated by a terrorist attacks at the frontier. The subject of the 2008 exercise was a terrorist attack on the hydro-electric power plant (cross-border critical infrastructure).

The activities involved the participation of specialized structures from SRI, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Special Telecommunication Service and the Ministry for Public Health.

There have also participated similar structures belonging to the ministries of defence, home affairs, the national intelligence services and other institutions and agencies with competencies in managing crisis situations at the frontier, from Bulgaria and Serbia.

Also, Romania took part in:

− as observer, to CCA / EX 07.

− an exercise under Black Sea Border Security Initiative (2006).

− CMX 2005, CMX 2006, CMX 2008 – exercises developed within NATO framework.

− SEESIM 2006, SEESIM 2008, SEESIM 2010 – regional exercises performed by the Member States of SEDM.

4.   SOFT TARGETS

At a national level, there is general list of potential targets for terrorist attacks but which don't consider especially soft targets. This general list is available to the antiterrorist brigade and 112 emergency call centres. Each institution with responsibilities in preventing and countering terrorism assesses the situation of the possible terrorist targets and drafts intervention plans in case of a terrorist attack.

The criteria used for drafting this comprehensive list took into consideration both the potential impact on the national security of a terrorist attack targeting these objectives, as well as the level of accessibility for the terrorists (the level of protection for the potential target).

The CNAAT, activated on the CSAT decision, is the responsible structure in the event of a terrorist attack on a soft target. In CNAAT there are representatives of the institutions with direct responsibilities in carrying out the counterterrorist/antiterrorist intervention and ensuring the security of the target under attack, and also from other institutions part of SNPCT that can contribute to effectively managing the crisis situation.

5.   GOOD PRACTICES

- There is a clear vertical organizational framework and a clear distinction between political/strategic, operational/technical and tactical tasks and responsibilities. The tasks at each level are clearly defined and the procedures are laid down in protocols and other provisions.

- SNPCT has a very comprehensive structure which permanently includes all relevant actors in the area of preventing and countering terrorism. Based on this structure and on the relevant protocols and legal provisions the existing management system of CCOA guarantees a permanent information flow to and from the relevant organizations within SNPCT. Thus, good preconditions for a timely reaction to an upcoming crisis situation are given.

- Strong emphasize is also given to a well functioning communication and IT-infrastructure including redundant lines for safe communication and backup systems in case of a system failure. There are also exercises to train secure communication. The Special Telecommunications Service which is part of the defence system provides for dedicated communication lines which work independently from public networks.

- Within the CCOA of the SRI, a telephone hotline as been set up for notifications concerning potential terrorist threats. This hotline is free of charge and available 24/7. Terrorism experts are available to identify hoax calls and immediately assess the (limited) relevant information.

- Besides the continuous collection of intelligence by the SRI and other intelligence services, Romanian authorities are strengthening community policing. The full implementation of this concept will allow the authorities towards preparedness to a large-scale emergency situation.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

NOT DECLASSIFIED

NOT DECLASSIFIED

7. ANNEX

7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions

- The Presidential Administration ; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Romanian Intelligence Service; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Romanian Intelligence Service; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Romanian Intelligence Service; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Romanian Intelligence Service; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Ministry of Administration and Interior; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

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- The Ministry of Administration and Interior; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The Ministry of Administration and Interior; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Public Prosecutor Office; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Ministry of Public Health; **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

7.2. **Expert team**

Council General Secretariat

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Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

European Commission

NOT DECLASSIFIED

DG JLS - Directorate F - Unit F1

Europol

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Serious Crime Department - Counter Terrorism

Austria

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Italy

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Polizia di Stato

Central Directorate for Prevention Police

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