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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 5 March 2010

**6090/10
ADD 24 EXT 1 (05.03.2013)**

**ENFOPOL 38
PROCIV 15**

ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE

from : The Council General Secretariat
to : Working Party on Terrorism

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Denmark** (13-16 October 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the framework of the second round of peer evaluation covering "Preparedness and consequence management in case of a terrorist attack" an evaluation visit was made to Denmark from 13 to 16 October 2009.

The threat to Denmark has changed over the past years. The "Mohammed cartoons" affair¹ has exacerbated the terrorist threat facing Denmark and the reprinting of the cartoons in 2008 has increased the focus on Denmark and Danish interests as targets for terror among senior militant extremists abroad.

In Denmark there are also persons and circles who sympathise with various terrorist organisations connected with regional areas of conflict. Such persons and circles might offer logistic support to possible terrorists or groups of terrorists entering Denmark with the intention of carrying out terrorist acts on Danish soil. Similarly, such persons might, on their own, carry out one-off acts of terror which do not require extensive preparation or planning. Furthermore, terrorist groups or individual terrorists may enter Denmark with the aim of carrying out terrorist acts on Danish soil without the logistic support of persons or circles in Denmark.

The evaluation team's impression of the main institutions visited was positive. Numerous arrangements have been established for different kinds of risk but not tested in the context of an actual terrorist attack so far. The overall picture presented by Denmark to the Peer Evaluation team was of a coherent and well-coordinated structure for the preparation and management of crisis situations.

¹ The "Mohammed cartoons" were a series of twelve cartoons published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, one picturing the Islam prophet Mohammed wearing a bomb-shaped turban. The cartoons were a reaction by twelve cartoonists to the case of Kåre Bluitgen, a writer who claimed that, following the assassination of film producer Theo van Gogh, he had been unable to find illustrators for his book on Mohammed. The cartoons, published initially on 30 September 2005 by *Jyllands-Posten*, one of Denmark's leading newspapers, provoked indignation among the Muslim community and led to worldwide demonstrations, some peaceful others violent, as well as to demonstrations in support of freedom of expression.

The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

NOT DECLASSIFIED

2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

The Kingdom of Denmark has a population of about 5,4 million. The country consists of 5 regions and 98 municipalities, as well as the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which are self-governing overseas administrative divisions.

Under the political supervision of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Justice, with responsibility for the country's internal security, supervises the National Commissioner of Police and the Chiefs of Police of each of the 12 police districts¹, plus the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

The Minister for Justice is accountable to Parliament for the work of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET).

The peer evaluation of Denmark was organised by the Ministry of Justice (Civil and Police Department).

¹ Since 1 January 2007, prior to which there were 54 police districts.

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of the National Crisis Centres

Preparedness for emergencies in Denmark is governed generally by the Preparedness Act. The Act stipulates that each Ministry, agency or other Danish government authority is required to carry out relevant planning within its sector to deal with a serious crisis.

Emergency preparedness is based on sectoral responsibility, meaning that in their respective spheres of responsibility the relevant authorities are also responsible for emergency preparedness.

Thus, all authorities are responsible for preventing major accidents and disasters wherever possible. They must be able to handle them with the required flexibility and, if necessary, restore the functions of society as quickly as possible.


Emergency preparedness work in all sectors and at all levels is traditionally based on three general principles:

- the principle of sectoral responsibility, whereby the authority or organisation that bears responsibility under normal circumstances will also bear the responsibility for both preventive and remedial action in the emergency preparedness area concerned.
- the principle of similarity, whereby there must be the greatest possible similarity between a given organisation under normal circumstances and the same organisation when faced by extraordinary events so as to ensure that organisational adaptation is limited solely to that required by the particular situation.
- the principle of proximity, whereby preparedness measures should be taken as close to citizens as possible and thus at the lowest appropriate and relevant organisational level.

The Danish Crisis Management Organisation comprises:

- at governmental level, the Government Security Committee;
- at the level of Ministries and Agencies, the Senior Officials' Security Committee, the Crisis Management Group and the National Operative Staff (NOST);
- at local level, the Local Preparedness Staff (LPS).

The National Crisis Management Structure in Denmark



Even in the event of a serious security policy crisis, all central government activity would continue unchanged as far as possible although the abovementioned crisis management fora would have to meet more frequently to coordinate the measures necessary to handle the crisis situation.

If a situation becomes more critical, it may be necessary to convene the Crisis Management Organisation at short notice or even to keep it in session permanently. Depending on the circumstances, some ministries and executive agencies not represented permanently on the Crisis Management Group may need to be involved in the Group's discussions to ensure greater inter-ministerial coordination between the relevant civil servants.

In a situation of war, for example, when the Government and the central government administration cannot continue their ordinary activity, the Government may be able to exercise its powers from a relocation facility.

2.1.1. Government level

The Government Security Committee consists normally of the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and the Minister for Justice.

2.1.2. Level of Ministries and Agencies

- The Senior Officials’ Security Committee or Committee of Civil Servants for Security Matters consists of the Permanent Secretaries of the Prime Minister’s Office (Chairman), the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence as well as the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) and the Director General of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). The Head of the Armed Forces and other officials may be part of the Committee as required.
- The Crisis Management Group or consists of representatives at the level of head of department, head of division and under-secretary from the abovementioned authorities, as well as from the Ministry of Health and Prevention, Defence Command, the Police Department of the Danish National Police and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). The Crisis Management Group is tasked with:
 - providing advice and recommendations concerning measures of preparedness in connection with war and terrorist activity, etc;
 - presenting consolidated proposals for cooperation – including planning – between the agencies and authorities concerned, with a view to utilising resources that are available for defence as a whole;
 - preparing reports and recommendations concerning existing regulations and planning etc with a view to facilitating knowledge-sharing, for example, between the relevant authorities.

The Crisis Management Group reports to the Senior Officials’ Security Committee and in this connection may submit proposals for decisions to be made by that Committee. The Crisis Management Group may decide to implement coordinating measures. The Crisis Management Group convenes at the Prime Minister’s initiative.

The National Operative Staff (NOST)

To strengthen coordination between the national defence, police and other civil authorities in the event of a major crisis, Denmark set up a National Operative Staff (NOST) in 2005.

The NOST, headed by the Danish National Police, includes representatives from the relevant authorities on an equal footing. The permanent members of the NOST are the Danish National Police, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), Defence Command, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), the National Health Board and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). Other partners from the administrative or private sectors may also be part of the group (e.g. the electricity, oil and gas supply sector, the IT and telecommunications sector, the transport and traffic sector, the foodstuffs sector, CBRN readiness, the environment sector, the financial sector, etc). These partners are on call at all times to assist the NOST in its work.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will also need to be integrated into the NOST where an event may have implications for foreign powers or for Denmark's relations with other countries, including international organisations, or where contacts with foreign authorities, international organisations, etc, are required. The same applies to security at political summits and similar events where, as in the case of major accidents and disasters, a number of contingency response forces have to be coordinated. The chairman is responsible for clarifying whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to join the Staff in situations where this may be relevant.

The National Operative Staff has the primary task of coordinating measures in connection with major events, disasters and security threats, including terrorist action in Denmark, where such coordination cannot be achieved by the regional authorities/police districts involved, as well as tasks of national coordination where a number of events are taking place in different regions or parts of the country at the same time¹.

¹ An International Operational Staff consisting of more or less the same authorities (plus the Prime Minister's Cabinet, the Interior and Health Ministries and the Ministry of Justice) was established at the same time. The purpose of the International Operational Staff is to assist Danish citizens abroad in connection with major crises or events (e.g. catastrophes, major accidents, natural disasters, terrorist attacks and major traffic accidents). The International Operational Staff is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Depending on the specific situation, representatives from the travel agency and insurance sectors, Copenhagen Airport and other relevant public or private players can be drafted in as International Operational Staff members).

The NOST is convened by decision of the National Police in the event of a situation that calls for national coordination. Any member of the NOST can ask the National Police to convene it. In addition, the National Police may be asked to convene the NOST, or parts of it, in a security policy crisis, for example. Each authority represented on the NOST participates within the sphere of its own competence in conformity with the principle of sectoral responsibility. The National Police provides the NOST secretariat. The secretariat supports the work of the NOST and the Security Committee.

The National Police, Defence Command and the Emergency Management Agency are manned around the clock.

The NOST is established when:

- the incident or disaster, terrorist or otherwise, is so extensive that it cannot be dealt with by local authorities with their own resources;
- several incidents are taking place at the same time in different places and coordination of tasks is required at national level.

The activation of the NOST (or Local Preparedness Staffs (LPS)) does not change sectoral responsibilities: individual sectors remain fully responsible for the management of all measures falling within their sphere of competence.

The responsibilities of the NOST are to:

- develop and maintain a general overview of a specific situation;
- gather relevant information (from local staff) in order to take the necessary decisions;
- establish the basis for the necessary coordination and set priorities with a view to the resolution of the situation and the allocation of resources,

2.1.3. Local level: Local Preparedness Staff (LPS)

LPS are being established in all 12 police districts. LPS are typically activated when there is a need for local and regional coordination. They coordinate the use of available resources in relation to major events, accidents and large-scale disasters.

As far as sectoral responsibilities are concerned, their task is to plan and establish operational coordination between authorities with responsibilities or duties in the area of preparedness with a view to:

- being able to make decisions on coordinated or prioritised use of local resources in relation to major events and large-scale accidents and disasters;
- being able to give consistent and complete information to the press and the community.

The LPS are chaired by the local Police Commissioner and consist of the Head of the regional Emergency Management Agency, the Head of the Home Guard Defence Region and other ad hoc members depending on the specific situation (e.g. municipal fire brigade, the Health Board, etc). The local Police Commissioner is responsible for coordinating operations following severe incidents but is not in command of the sectors.

The Danish framework incorporates an “All-Hazards Approach” consisting of Risk Reduction, Mitigation, Response and Recovery and based on international best practice incorporating cutting-edge academic principles.

2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

2.2.1. Threat analysis

Threat analysis is carried out by the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) at the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and is based on information exchange and sharing between the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (DSIS), the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The information is processed by the CTA, which then prepares assessments and risk analyses as a basis for an evaluation of the action required to prevent threats from developing further.

The outcome of the evaluation is communicated to the other government agencies and, where appropriate, private sector partners. Unlike many other countries, Denmark does not use a system of risk levels coded by colour, figure or letter. The various government agencies and private sector organisations involved take appropriate measures on the basis of the information received.

2.2.2. *Planning*

Under the national plans for preparedness for terrorist attacks, each sectoral authority is responsible for the preparedness planning within its own sphere of competence.

In addition, each authority is responsible for coordinating its response with other authorities that are part of the preparedness, both to events that have a broad impact and to incidents that are more specific to their area. The coordination obligation applies in relation to both higher and lower authorities as well as to other parallel authorities.

Therefore, the relevant authorities must define in advance how they intend to handle the core tasks of crisis management, i.e. activation and operation of the crisis management organisation, information management, coordination of actions and resources, crisis communication and operational response.. At the same time, authorities and other players must clarify the extent of their involvement in cross-functional crisis management bodies (at local, regional, national and international level) and the arrangements for ensuring that the necessary capacity is available.

At national level, Denmark has prepared the following general set of plans for deployment in the event of a terror strike:

- the national preparedness plan, which describes the general conditions and principles for Denmark's preparedness;
- guidelines for contingency response management, describing the main players and giving a detailed analysis of the responsibilities of the three key players (the police, the rescue preparedness service and the medical contingency service), as well as a specific account of the general managerial situation and cooperation principles underlying any type of contingency response;
The guidelines contain a section describing the special functions to be taken into account in the handling of incidents that can be related to terrorism;
- guidelines for tactical action and cooperation principles to be applied in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives terror incidents.

In addition, the Danish authorities have prepared a large number of sets of sectoral plans, which will also be relied on should an act of terror have to be dealt with.

Thus, the Copenhagen Police Service has prepared an operational plan for the deployment of police forces in response to terrorist acts. The National Commissioner of Police is in the process of having this plan implemented in Denmark's other police districts with the necessary adaptations to local conditions.

All sets of plans are updated on an ongoing basis.

2.2.3. Civil protection and action in the field of civil protection

The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) is a government agency under the Ministry of Defence. In accordance with the Danish Preparedness Act, the principal tasks of the Emergency Management Agency are to manage the National Rescue Preparedness, supervise the municipal rescue preparedness and advise the authorities on preparedness matters. DEMA has a staff of around 600, which can be extended by further 500 in 48 hours.

The Preparedness Act, which came into force on 1 January 1993, merged the former fire service and civil defence department into a single rescue preparedness unit, operational in peacetime as well as during a crisis or war.

The main tasks of DEMA are to keep Danish society on track and to protect it from the consequences of disasters and catastrophes, including terrorist attacks. DEMA's strategic aims are to ensure flexible and coherent preparedness across the national and municipal rescue services and to coordinate the preparedness planning the civil sector. DEMA also carries out supervision and counselling tasks in relation to municipal rescue services and other authorities and general development work in the field of emergency management.

DEMA also has a series of operational tasks which include providing daily assistance to municipal rescue services for major or more complex incidents, and engagement in international humanitarian operations. DEMA contributes to planning and crisis management. During the planning process, DEMA assists with contingency plans, planning assumptions, prevention, training, exercises and evaluation (for example it coordinated the preparation of the National Emergency Plan).

It offers guidance and draws up templates for relevant stakeholders and develops basic tools, methods and concepts. It also coordinates planning efforts at national level and offers general guidance to authorities in relation to emergency planning. DEMA plays a very important role in planning and conducting national crisis management exercises and coordinating exercises at local level. DEMA is involved in different parts of the crisis management organisation as a standing member of the Crisis Management Group, NOST, DCOK, IOS and LPS. DEMA has five fire and rescue centres, a chemical division and a nuclear division. It also maintains a crisis website where citizens can find information about different types of threat. At regional level, DEMA works through its five fire and rescue centres. They assist local primary responders (the police and other authorities) and they also have equipment for, and special expertise in, dealing with hazardous chemicals or unknown substances and carrying out large-scale rescue operations. Requests for special assistance in crisis scenarios go through DEMA.

The tasks and structure of the emergency services are the same irrespective of whether an incident has been caused by terrorism or some other event. Multi-level emergency preparedness means that the municipal emergency services are deployed initially in the event of a terrorist attack. If a municipality needs help in the form of special-purpose equipment or additional personnel, the fire and rescue centres of the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) can offer reinforcement and assistance.

In extraordinary situations, the police and the emergency services may call for assistance from the defence force and the home guard.

In the event of terrorist action involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosives devices or pollution (CBNRE), although the general system of crisis management and response described above applies (with the police responsible for the overall coordination of the crisis), the Guidelines for Tactical Response and Cooperation and the Guidelines for Contingency Response Management under the Preparedness Act provide in addition that special precautions are needed:

- in relation to any incident, terrorist or otherwise, involving chemical substances, in which case DEMA's Chemical Division (the National Response Laboratory) can assist the on-site commander and perform substance analyses;
- in relation to any incident involving dangerous biological agents, response assistance and instructions for counter-measures are provided by the Centre for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness (CBB);

- in relation to any incident involving radiological agents, in which case the National Institute of Radiation and Hygiene may intervene.
- Should a nuclear incident occur, DEMA's nuclear emergency preparedness will be activated.
- in relation to any incident involving explosives, in which case the Explosives Ordnance Disposal of the Danish Army may intervene.

2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks

The police conduct ongoing assessments of locations (contingency objects) likely to be potential terrorist targets, including cross-border targets.

In addition, several sectoral authorities, including the National Police, are part of the European Programme for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, defined as infrastructure of the highest importance to the Community and whose interruption or destruction will affect two or more Member States, or one Member State in cases where the critical infrastructure is located in another Member State.

The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden) have entered into an agreement on cross-border cooperation to prevent or limit injury to persons or damage to property or to the environment in the event of accidents. The agreement is referred to as the Nordic Rescue Treaty (NORDRED). Within the framework of the Treaty, the countries have prepared a Nordic Rescue Service Manual whose purpose is to facilitate day-to-day cooperation between the Nordic rescue services. It includes information about operational routines and alerts, as well as national points of contact. The National Police is the competent Danish authority for the purposes of the Nordic Rescue Treaty.

Finally, under the auspices of Nordic cooperation between national police commissioners, a joint forum has been set up for cooperation between the central departments for police preparedness in Nordic countries (NOFOPS). This forum conducts ongoing discussions on issues concerning police contingency resources, including counter-terror preparedness.

Denmark has also signed a bilateral agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany for provision of assistance that may be required following disasters or accidents.

2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack

NOT DECLASSIFIED Communication with the public and relevant authorities outside the security services is coordinated by the National Staff for Communications (DCOK). This group is constituted in the event of a national crisis or disaster where there is a need to coordinate a multi-agency response to media requests and communicate with the public. DCOK is subordinated to the NOST, which will provide the Government with detailed information on any given incident. It includes skilled communicators from the agencies of NOST authorities. Its main tasks are to respond to media requests, coordinate provision of information to the media and the public in cooperation with local or regional authorities, outline the communications strategy vis-à-vis the public and the media and provide the NOST with a general analysis of the media.

Best practice in the communications area was observed in the form of KRISEINFO.DK, a robust and overarching website which publishes simple and to-the-point information for the public. It is hosted on servers which are located outside Denmark's borders and which are robust in crisis situations, remaining operational even if the central communication system within Denmark has difficulties.



The screenshot shows the KRISEINFO.DK website interface. The header includes the site name, navigation links for 'Forsiden' and 'Oversigt', a search bar with 'Søg' button, and a language selector. The main content area is titled 'Daily life in Copenhagen during COP15' and contains several sections: 'Information for relatives' with a link to 'Detention of foreign citizens', 'Information from the police' with a link to 'Press releases from the police', and 'Traffic information' with links to 'The S-trains', 'Find your COP15 journey', and 'Copenhagen Airport during COP15'. A sidebar on the left lists 'Aktuelt' and 'Information til befolkningen under COP15' with sub-items like 'Frihedsberøvelse af udenlandske statsborgere' and 'Detention of foreign citizens'. The main text provides details on traffic disturbances and how to help the police during the event.

3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

Again, under the principle of responsibility, each player is responsible for making sure that staff has the training and knowledge required to carry out their tasks during a crisis. These needs are ensured

at all geographical levels by national and local authorities.

Preparedness exercises, including anti-terror exercises, are conducted on a regular basis at central and local level. They are organised both as exercises involving several authorities with sectoral responsibility and as exercises involving single authorities. However, no global exercise involving all levels with a stake in managing the consequences of an attack has taken place.

The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) plays a key role in the event of a terrorist attack, intervening in two areas: Planning and Crisis Management. There have been a range of National Crisis Management Exercises, mostly with terrorism as a central component. DEMA's stated aim is to protect society's resilience, people, property and the environment against the effects of accidents and disasters including terrorist attacks. Its role also includes planning, conducting national crisis management exercises and the coordination of exercise activities at local level. A National Crisis Management Exercise was held in October 2009 with the theme of the Climate Change Conference (COP 15) in December as a backdrop.

A comprehensive national crisis management exercise is carried out every second year with the aim of training participants in the national crisis management system, including interaction between the specific elements of the crisis management apparatus and communication with the public. The exercises are followed up by an evaluation report. The reports from 2003, 2005 and 2007 are accessible (in Danish) at www.brs.dk.

It has also been decided to set up a central training forum to be joined by several of the central preparedness players. The purpose of the forum is to ensure an overview of all organised preparedness exercises, both local and national, and ensure knowledge-sharing once exercises have been completed.

Under the auspices of Nordic police cooperation, there have been two inter-Nordic, table-top anti-terror exercises aimed at training participants in the Nordic cooperation structures to deal with an act of terror affecting several Nordic countries. It would be useful, however, if such exercises were also conducted on the ground.

The testing of communication systems is a key element of national and local crisis management exercises. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

4. SOFT TARGETS

As mentioned earlier, the Danish crisis management system is based on principles such as the principle of similarity, which means that there must be the greatest possible similarity between a given organisation under normal circumstances and the same organisation when faced by extraordinary events so as to ensure that organisational adaptation is limited solely to that required by the particular situation.

It follows from this principle that no special procedures have been established for contingency response to terror strikes as far as soft targets are concerned.

However, Denmark's emergency procedures appear to encourage inter-agency cooperation across all relevant sectors. This includes close cooperation with owners of soft targets. There are site-specific plans in place at specified targets and procedures exist for dealing with incidents at such locations. There is widespread and varied consultation between the police, the security services and the owners of vital locations. There are public/private partnerships in place in this regard. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service gives specific advice where necessary or if there is a perceived threat.

5. GOOD PRACTICES

- Good practice in the area of communication was observed in the form of KRISEINFO.DK, a robust and overarching website which publishes simple and to-the-point information for the public. It is hosted on servers which are located outside Denmark's borders and which are robust in crisis situations, remaining operational even if the central communication system within Denmark has difficulties.
- A website with a structure similar to that of KRISEINFO.DK would be a best-practice model for other EU States with no structure of this kind. The stated robustness of the KRISEINFO.DK website in communicating basic and vital facts to the public in a crisis situation is to be recommended.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

NOT DECLASSIFIED

7. ANNEX

7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions

- Presentation by the Danish National Police of arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack (structures and organisational framework in place) - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Presentation of the central operational communication preparedness (DCOK) - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Presentation by the Danish Emergency Management Agency of the general principles underlying Danish emergency preparedness work and of the national rescue preparedness in Denmark - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Presentation by the National Health Board - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Presentation by Defence Command - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Copenhagen Police:
 - Local Preparedness Staff - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
 - Communication, SINE, training and exercises, presentation by the Command & Control Centre (HS) and Special Operations Centre (KSN), **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
 - Counter-terrorist training - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- Presentation of the Danish Defence Command Crisis Management Centre - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- CBRN threat:
 - **NOT DECLASSIFIED** the Danish National Police
 - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Chemical Division, DEMA
 - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Director of the National Institute of Radiation Protection
 - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, DEMA
- The Danish Security and Intelligence Services, **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

The following people were also present throughout the visit:

- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Ministry of Justice
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Ministry of Justice
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Ministry of Justice
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, DEMA
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Danish National Police

7.2. Expert team

Council General Secretariat

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

European Commission

NOT DECLASSIFIED

DG JLS - Directorate F - Unit F1

Ireland

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Detective Sergeant

Major Emergency Management Section, Liaison & Protection

Slovakia

NOT DECLASSIFIED, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic
