



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 17 April 2013

8541/13

**DEVGEN 93
COHAF 45
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RELEX 306
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COVER NOTE

from:	Secretary-General of the European Commission, signed by Mr Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director
date of receipt:	11 April 2013
to:	Mr Uwe CORSEPIUS, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

No Cion doc.:	COM(2013) 194 final
Subject:	Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Final Report on the implementation of the EU Food Facility

Delegations will find attached Commission document COM(2013) 194 final.

Encl.: COM(2013) 194 final



Brussels, 11.4.2013
COM(2013) 194 final

**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL**

Final Report on the implementation of the EU Food Facility

{SWD(2013) 107 final}

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Final Report on the implementation of the EU Food Facility

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFSI	L'Aquila Food Security Initiative
AGIR Sahel	Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Résilience
AU-IBAR	African Union Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources
CSP/RSP	Country/Regional Strategy Paper
DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
MFF	Multi- annual financial framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State actor
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
SHARE	Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience
SWD	Staff Working Document
UN	United Nations
UNHLTF	United Nations High-Level Task Force
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WB	The World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the long-term trend of decreasing food prices reversed with a sharp rise of staple food prices. As a consequence, **more than 100 million people in developing countries plunged into hunger**. High and volatile food prices worsened the food insecurity situation, particularly for the most vulnerable people, and contributed to food riots in several countries.

During the G8 Summit in July 2008, the Commission announced its intention for a **EUR 1 billion Food Facility instrument to react on a large scale to the effects of the food price crisis**, indeed the EU response through the existing instruments¹ required to be scaled up to address the needs resulting from such an economic shock. On 16 December 2008, the Food Facility ('Facility for a rapid response to soaring and volatile food prices in developing countries') was established.

The EU Food Facility constituted the **first major financial response to the food crisis** and helped to strengthen international coordination in the UN and the G8. For its most part, the Food Facility added to the US\$ 3.9 billion contribution made by the Commission to the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). The AFSI was launched by G8 leaders on July 2009 and amounts US\$22 billion in support of sustainable agriculture and food security in developing countries over three years. Following up on these commitments, **more recently the EU has launched two new initiatives to respond to the massive food crises that have hit the Horn of Africa and the Sahel** (SHARE² and AGIR³ Sahel). Moreover, the Commission has adopted a new policy framework to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable people and communities to future crises⁴.

Covering a period of **three years (2009-2011)**, the EU Food Facility **primarily addressed the period between emergency aid and medium-to-long term development assistance**. The objectives were to:

- encourage a positive supply response from the agricultural sector in target countries and regions,
- mitigate the negative effects of volatile food prices on local populations in line with global food security objectives, including UN standards for nutritional requirements; and,
- strengthen the productive capacities and the governance of the agricultural sector to enhance the sustainability of interventions.

In line with these objectives, three categories of measures were eligible for financing: measures to **improve access to agricultural inputs and services, safety net measures**, and other **small-scale measures aiming at increasing production** based on country needs.

This report provides information on the various implementation measures taken, the outcomes and likely impact, and the key lessons learned and recommendations in order to improve the current and future EU food security programmes.

¹ The Vulnerability FLEX mechanism (500 million EUR), the European Development Fund-B envelope (185.9 million EUR), the Food Security Thematic Programme (50 million EUR) and ECHO (210 million EUR).

² Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE).

³ AGIR : Alliance globale pour l'Initiative Résilience - Sahel

⁴ COM (2012) 586.

This Communication is accompanied by a Staff Working Document (SWD), which provides more detail on measures taken and their short-term impact.⁵

2. PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION

In March 2009, the Commission submitted to the European Parliament and Council an **Overall Plan for the implementation** of the Food Facility containing a list of target countries and the foreseen balance between entities eligible for implementation. It included the following indicative financial breakdown: (i) EUR 920 million would be allocated to 50 countries selected on the basis of indicative criteria, (ii) EUR 60 million would be used for regional-level interventions in Africa, and (iii) EUR 20 million was retained for support measures.

The **funds were entirely committed by May 2010**. The speed of the approval process owes much to the set up of a Task Force by the Commission, the use of fast track procedures, and to the flexibility shown by the European Parliament, which accepted shortened periods for exercising its right of scrutiny.

While the large majority of activities was implemented as planned, in the course of implementation a number of **changes were made to the Overall Plan, amounting to 5.2% of the value of the EU Food Facility**⁶. Implementation could not take place in the Comoros while, in a few countries, allocations were reduced (e.g. Madagascar, Guinea, Sao Tomé y Príncipe) or increased (e.g. Zambia). Budget support programmes could not be implemented as initially foreseen⁷, on the other hand **support channelled through NGOs and EU Member States agencies increased, compared to initial plans**.

The **large majority of activities ended in 2011**. However a few interventions were only completed in the first half of 2012⁸. By 31 December 2010, the EU Food Facility was contracted⁹ through a total of **179 contracts and agreements** covering **232 projects**. Budget Support operations and projects with International and Regional Organisations have been managed centrally at DEVCO, together with the support measures, while the projects with NGOs and Member States agencies were devolved to EU Delegations in January 2010. The Commission **disbursed almost 100% of the total amount of EUR 983.7 million** (excluding the support measures). This very high rate was achieved thanks to the use of fast track procedures, close monitoring, and flexibility in re-allocations.

A maximum of 2% of the EU Food Facility (i.e. a maximum of EUR 20 million) had been foreseen in the Regulation for **support measures**, including the recruitment of temporary staff in EU Delegations, monitoring, audit, evaluation, studies, conferences and technical assistance. Eventually, **EUR 17.3 million were used for these purposes**. In addition to the use of support measures, the Commission redeployed ten posts at Headquarter level to set up the initiative.

⁵ SWD(2013) 107.

⁶ SWD(2013) 107.

⁷ Budget support programmes became less important than planned in Comoros, Madagascar, Niger, Ethiopia and Zambia.

⁸ For a very small number of projects, the Commission has granted an extension until the 31st of December 2012, due to later reallocation of funds to a well performing project (Zambia) or to difficult contexts (Mali, Yemen, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan).

⁹ With the exception of EUR 5.8 million for Zambia, contracted in 2011.

3. MONITORING, AUDIT AND EVALUATION

The Food Facility has been closely monitored: **176 projects** (more than 75% of the Food Facility projects) have been **monitored using the Results-Oriented Monitoring ROM approach** and 236 monitoring reports have been drafted by external experts, analysed by the Commission staff in Brussels and in EU Delegations and shared, in most cases, with both the implementing partners and local authorities.

The project scores have been good, with 70% of the projects scoring a 'very good and good' performance, 23% performing 'with problems' and only 7% listed as having 'major difficulties'¹⁰. **These results are similar to the averages of the ROM results for EU projects in general, as assessed in 2011.**¹¹ A second monitoring mission was often conducted later during the lifespan of the project, aiming to measure the progress in performance and follow up on the recommendations.

Furthermore, **regular progress reports and specific final reports** have been delivered by the implementing partners¹² with whom field visits and regular coordination meetings have been undertaken. The whole set of monitoring information has been captured in a **global management scoreboard** developed as an interactive tool used to update in real time monitoring information at the Commission and in EU Delegations.

Independent evaluations have been undertaken at three levels: (i) **at project level** for the projects implemented by International Organisations, NGOs and Member State Agencies, (ii) **at implementing partner level** (e.g. FAO¹³, AU-IBAR), and (iii) **at global level**, on the EU Food Facility Instrument¹⁴. A Final Evaluation of the EU Food Facility has been carried out in 2011-2012 and followed the Evaluation Methodology of the Commission. It concluded notably that the Commission has been efficient and effective in implementing the Food Facility, the interventions were relevant and projects had a clearly positive effect on beneficiaries. However, a longer implementation period and a narrowed geographical scope would have allowed a greater impact. Moreover, the European Court of Auditors published recently a Special Report on the Effectiveness of EU food Security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa which recommends, among others, that the EU should examine the feasibility of a permanent instrument to address the consequences of potential future food-crises in developing countries¹⁵.

4. THE OUTCOMES AND LIKELY IMPACT

Despite its short timeframe, the Food Facility reached more than **59 million direct beneficiaries** with **spillover effects on 93 million indirect beneficiaries**, most of them vulnerable smallholders and their families¹⁶. The interventions have been aligned to partner countries' policies and priorities and implemented in **coordination, complementarity and**

¹⁰ Results-Oriented Monitoring final report available in DEVCO website.

¹¹ The Annual Report 2012 on the European Union's Development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2011. SWD (2012) 242 final.

¹² Aggregated data from reports are presented in the section 4 « Outcomes and likely impact ».

¹³ "European Union Food Facility. Foundations for future action. FAO Initial Review of Selected Projects". http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/EuFF_web.pdf

¹⁴ Food Facility Final Evaluation: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/ruraldev/food_intro_en.htm

¹⁵ Special Report n°1: Effectiveness of European Union Development Aid for food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2012. European Court of Auditors.

¹⁶ This figure does not include the Budget Support interventions and Regional Organisations activities.

coherence with the EU food security instruments such as the Food Security Thematic Programme and EU Member States' and other donor's programmes.

More than **65% of the interventions have scaled up on-going operations**, with additional funding channelled through existing implementation structures where relevant and possible. This allowed a **quick response and fitted in the short time span of the Food Facility**. Designed as part of the UNHLTF coordinated international response to the food price crisis, almost **60% of the funding was channelled through UN agencies**.

This permitted a **timely and tailored response thanks to the agencies' wide presence on the ground**, which provided a good visibility profile to the Food Facility at country level. The Food Facility has also been instrumental in **strengthening the Commission partnerships with the United Nations Rome Based Agencies**¹⁷, which ultimately led to the signature of a Statement of Intent for a framework for programmatic cooperation on food security and nutrition.¹⁸ The interventions have also been implemented by **more than 425 non-State actors**, most of them local and country-based. More than two-third of them have been contracted by the UN agencies while 124, operating under the Call for Proposals, have been contracted by the Commission.

The main achievements, results and short-term impact of the Food Facility interventions are presented below for each of the three types of interventions identified in the Regulation.

4.1. Measures to improve access to agricultural inputs and services

Most of the interventions of the Food Facility (62%) **focused on improving smallholders' agricultural production and/or access to inputs**. The distribution of agricultural inputs represented the largest component of the projects implemented by FAO and by NGOs. 124.600 metric tons of certified and ameliorated seeds and 950.000 metric tons of fertiliser have been distributed to the targeted farmers. The main challenge in this field was to meet the agricultural calendar-specific requirements despite binding procurement procedures and limited availability on the local market. As reported by the implementing partners, the various projects led to an **average increase in agricultural production of 50%** (with a range between 20% and 100%) and an **average increase in household annual income of almost EUR 290** (with a range between EUR 40 and EUR 2100).

In Guatemala, FAO and WFP jointly strengthened the agricultural productivity and marketing capacity of 14.000 smallholders. In Alta Verapaz, the maize productivity of farmers increased from an average of 2.1 tons/hectare to an average of 3.5 tons/hectare. Households were able to produce surpluses of 20% on average as some the producers could achieve a good level of organization and meet international quality standards.

Production has also been increased through projects **targeting livestock owners, by providing them with a total of 834.000 animals** (cattle, goats, pigs and chicken). An important impact has been achieved in terms of productivity through **increasing agricultural mechanisation** (in Zambia for example, the use of lighter seeding implements instead of heavy ploughs promoted gender equity as planting and weeding is traditionally women's work) and **decreasing mortality** through livestock vaccination.

AU-IBAR implemented the "Vaccines for the Control of Neglected Anima Diseases in Africa" (VACNADA) project in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries. A total of **44.6 million livestock were vaccinated** against 4

¹⁷ FAO, WFP and IFAD.

¹⁸ Statement of Intent - Programmatic Cooperation on Food Security and Nutrition signed by FAO, WFP, IFAD and the Commission on 27 June 2011.

contagious animal diseases, dramatically reducing the occurrence of those diseases in the target areas. The **higher immunity gained by vaccinating allowed livestock owners** (especially smallholders who could not afford to pay for vaccination) **to keep their stock, sell the surplus and cover household and unforeseen expenditures.**

The project also improved the production capacity (in some cases by 100%) and the quality of selected vaccines through the supply of equipment and the upgrading of facilities of vaccine producing laboratories, complemented with training activities to enhance veterinary services capacities.

Most of the projects have accompanied the **seed/fertiliser and livestock distribution with the distribution of tools, vaccines, and agricultural machineries.** More than 88.000 machineries and post-harvest facilities have been provided to beneficiaries. Partnerships with the private sector, in particular through local agro-dealers, contributed not only to **enhance inputs availability and circulation but also stimulated the local economy.** Various projects involved diversification of production (e.g. horticulture in Bangladesh, small animal rearing in Tanzania, fish-ponds, medium scale plantain or vegetable production in Haiti), which led to beneficiaries having **access to more diversified food.** In addition, projects enhanced production for the market, allowing the generation of a small cash income for households that previously lived on subsistence.

In the Self Help Africa project implemented in **Ethiopia** the **agricultural production increased by 35% for 17.500 households** through the distribution of 606 Mt of improved seeds, 29 Mt of animal feed, 278.000 animal drugs (antibiotics and antihelminthtics), machinery (seed cleaners, irrigation pumps, dairy materials) and the construction of 16 seed stores. The **yearly income** of the beneficiaries has **increased, ranging from approximately 290 EUR to 1.500 EUR.**

The operations involved **capacity building to support the sustainable achievement in increased agricultural productivity.** Capacity building activities were associated with a wide range of actions including the training of farmers in agricultural and irrigation techniques; they also enhanced the capacities of local farmer groups and producers' associations. Moreover, training sessions not only targeted farmers but also government officials and other stakeholders. Almost **2.5 million people have benefitted from the various training activities.** Extension methodologies, such as Farmer Field Schools and rural promoters, provided effective channels for advice through on-farm demonstrations on sustainable production intensification, good agriculture practices, conservation agriculture, soil fertility management, small-scale irrigation, crop diversification etc.

In **Zambia**, food production increased through an improved access to agricultural inputs and the promotion of conservation agriculture principles. During extension days at Farmer Field Schools (FFS) 400 Camp Extension Officers transferred their knowledge in Conservation Agriculture to 28 lead farmers who, in turn, each trained 15 other participating farmers. In this manner nearly 180,000 farmers were reached.

The dissemination of conservation agriculture practices resulted on average in a **30% increase in maize production from 2 tons/hectare to 2.6 tons/hectare.** Following on from the EUR 16.9 million channelled into the project through the Food Facility, a new contribution of EUR 11.1 million is planned (financed from the European Development Fund) to further spread the conservation agriculture approach in the country.

4.2. Safety net measures and nutrition interventions

Safety net type of interventions, amounting to approximately EUR 138 million, allowed beneficiaries to cope with the effects of high food prices, mostly through cash/food for work projects and voucher schemes. Rural poor (and sometimes urban poor) have benefitted from safety net measures (e.g. PSNP in Ethiopia) and cash or food for work projects (e.g. Sierra Leone, Pakistan). Safety net measures have been implemented by partners experienced in

cash or food distribution, like the World Bank, UNRWA, and WFP but also by NGOs, which have used one quarter of the amount channelled through them as cash for work (EUR 57 million).

In most cases, the extra income resulting from activities has helped the beneficiaries to overcome the food price crisis, as well as – in a few cases – the natural disasters affecting them during the lifespan of the Food Facility (droughts, floods). Moreover, it increased the resilience of the poorest and prevented the sale of their productive assets (animals, small machinery), which allowed households to improve their lives after the crises.

In Bangladesh, food and cash for work schemes benefitted 607,000 people through short-term employment provided to 121,000 marginal or landless agricultural workers during the lean seasons; **989 flood resilient agricultural assets including embankments, access roads, raising land and seed beds, and irrigation facilities have been built and rehabilitated to protect 1.7 million people.**

In very specific cases, food was also distributed, as food for work or even as food aid, to the most vulnerable people. For example, UNRWA, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, distributed 34.500 Mt of food, and WFP distributed 96.600 Mt in countries with areas characterised by severe food scarcity (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Guatemala).

More than one third (37%) of the projects had nutrition-related activities. The Food Facility improved the nutritional status of the most vulnerable people, especially children. Several interventions specifically targeted children up to 6 years and pregnant and breast-feeding women, in order to mitigate the effects of the food price crisis. In Niger, Mali, and Liberia for example, more than 25.000 Mt of nutritional foodstuff and millions of vitamins have been distributed while 141.000 beneficiaries, mostly mothers and medical and paramedical personnel were trained in nutrition improvement practices.

In Mali, more than 11 million children aged between 6 and 59 months received Vitamin A supplementation; 1.300.000 children in **Niger** have benefitted from mothers sensitization and awareness building campaigns related to prevention of malnutrition. **In Guatemala**, 100,000 children from 6-36 months and 50,000 pregnant and breast-feeding women received additional food rations while 8,000 subsistence farmers received food rations for participating in training activities.

4.3. Other small-scale measures aiming at increasing agricultural production

Many of the projects included other components that targeted production improvement, for instance by addressing post-harvest losses, water availability and conservation or access to markets. In total 315.350 ha of agricultural land was rehabilitated or irrigated while 13.656 dikes, dams, and micro-dams, and more than 10.600 km of road (mainly feeder roads) were rehabilitated or construction. Furthermore, other small-scale measures included the provision of micro-credit, the construction of seed centres and research facilities.

In Northern Afghanistan, 4,880 families participated in a cash for work programme in infrastructure and water activities resulting in the **construction and rehabilitation of 107 km of roads, 1,057 km of irrigation channels; 3,164 ha of land were made available for agriculture**, thus improving agricultural productivity and access to villages and markets, especially during winter. As a consequence, 218,000 people benefited from rehabilitated and newly built infrastructure and flood protection measures, and 6,500 families now have access to safe drinking water.

Other activities covered diverse domains including fishing (Cambodia, Philippines, Guinea Conakry, Mozambique), urban agriculture (Kenya), policy framework support (Nepal), seed multiplication (Burkina Faso, Niger, Nepal, Mozambique), or conservation agriculture (Zambia).

The Food Facility positively impacted the lives of **more than 59 million direct beneficiaries by boosting sustainable agricultural production from small-scale farmers, reducing post-harvest losses and facilitating access to markets.** The interventions improved smallholders' capacities in land, livestock, and water management, contributing to increase and diversify their sources of incomes. Furthermore, the Food Facility contributed to **increasing access to food and to strengthening the food and nutrition situation of the most vulnerable people, especially women and children.**

5. KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons learned

1. The EU has proven its ability to establish and effectively implement the EUR 1 billion Food Facility. This bold move has **placed the EU at the forefront of the donor community with regards sustainable agriculture and food security.** Since then, it has remained the first donor on food security, which continues to be on the top of the international agenda with the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative and the G8 New Alliance for Food and Nutrition Security initiative.
2. The successful implementation of the Food Facility owed much to its **swift set up, its scale, and above all to its responsiveness.** The creation respectively by the Commission and by the UN of two dedicated Task Forces to mobilise the appropriate work force and expertise played a central role.
3. The main objective was to **rapidly address the consequences of the food price crisis, rather than its causes.** However, the Food Facility enhanced the readiness of the poor people and communities to face subsequent crises, which was beneficial since **many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have since been hit again by food crises as a result of multiple and intertwined drivers** including poverty, climate hazards, high and volatile food prices, pressure on natural resources (including inappropriate land tenure systems), rapid demographic growth, fragile governance, and political instability. Furthermore, the most vulnerable people will be confronted more frequently and more severely to the impact of these factors, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
4. The Food Facility's focus on increased agricultural production has successfully triggered a positive supply response at local level. However, those interventions cannot substitute for the **need for partner countries to strengthen their long term support to sustainable agriculture and food security.**
5. The achievement of programmes' objectives has sometimes been challenging due to the relatively short implementation period. As it is already the case with SHARE and AGIR Sahel, the **articulation between short and medium-to-long term interventions must be strengthened.**
6. Moreover, Food Facility interventions **primarily targeted food availability and access to food.** While access to food is a major concern, access to nutritious food is even more challenging in many partner countries. **Addressing maternal and child under nutrition could have been given more attention.**

7. In 2012, nearly 30 million vulnerable people have been suffering from food crisis in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, it highlights the **need for the EU to maintain a strong capacity to react promptly**. As recommended by the European Court of Auditors and the Parliament, the Commission will **identify the best options taking advantage of the modifications of the Financial Regulation and the Financial Framework**.

Recommendations

The EU should increase its assistance in sustainable agriculture and food security. In the framework of its geographical programming for 2014-2020:

1. The EU should place **sustainable agriculture and food security at the core of its policy dialogue with partner countries** and further support partner countries' policies and priorities addressing the underlying factors fomenting food crises.
2. **The EU assistance should give particular attention to food insecure countries**. The "structured food security assessment" developed by the Commission to this purpose should be fully used.
3. **Fostering the resilience of the most at risk** people, communities, and partner countries is a **central aim of EU assistance towards food and nutrition security**. In the framework of its approach to resilience the EU should increase its support to vulnerability reduction by **increasing partner countries' capacities to prevent and to prepare to future shocks, and to respond to crises when they occur**. It means, notably enhancing Disaster Risk Management activities, in particular in disaster prone partner countries.
4. Building on the lessons learned from the Food Facility implementation as well as from the launch of SHARE, and AGIR Sahel initiatives, the EU should use the existing instruments and the recent possibility to set up Trust Funds to foster a structural approach to support partner countries confronted by food crises.
5. Using wherever possible the **existing national and regional structures and capacities**, the EU response to food crises will be designed according to the nature of the crisis and its context. Such an approach will pay careful attention to ownership, taking into account the **inter-relation between food security** on one hand, and **governance, state fragility and peace building** on the other hand, in particular in fragile states and in chronic food insecure contexts.

6. CONCLUSION AND STEP FORWARD

Through the Food Facility, instrumental in fostering a coordinated UN response, the EU has been able to rapidly and effectively respond to the effects of the 2007/08 food price crisis. The EUR 1 billion Food Facility has directly **benefitted over 59 million people in 49 developing countries**.

It has been able to **support a positive supply response from small-scale farmers**, increasing production and income. The **safety net measures have mitigated the effects of food price increases** on the most vulnerable segments of the population. Other measures have more broadly supported the production base for agriculture. In that sense, the Food Facility has

achieved significant results towards **increasing sustainable agricultural production, reducing post-harvest losses and facilitating access to markets.**

Moreover, the Food Facility has **contributed to placing sustainable agricultural development and food security at the frontline of the global development agenda.** It has stimulated continued international attention in fora like the Committee on World Food Security and the G8 and the G20 stressing the need to increase agricultural production and productivity on a sustainable basis and contributing to strengthen global governance mechanisms by improving global market information¹⁹.

While the Food Facility largely reached its objectives, more needs to be done to address food insecurity, particularly in low income and disaster prone countries. Building on the lessons learned from the Food Facility, the EU support to **sustainable agricultural development and food security should be strengthened as a focal sector of cooperation in chronically food insecure countries.**

In the framework of the joint programming exercise for 2014-2020, the EU Delegations have been provided a **specific guidance to ensure that sustainable agriculture and food security priorities** have been taken care of, in particular **in 52 partner countries selected according to structured food and nutrition security assessments.** These priorities should be reflected in the policy dialogue developed by the EU Delegations, which will emphasize **long-term impact and ownership²⁰, in particular from a long-term sustainability perspective.**

In this context, the EU should focus on the most off track countries in the area of food and nutrition security, using the most effective existing financing mechanisms **to reduce structural vulnerability in the long run,** and fostering the resilience of the poorest households, countries and regions in the face of future food crises, whatever their nature.

¹⁹ In the framework of its Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture, the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) initiative, launched in June 2011, aims for example, to increase global market transparency and information and strengthen policy coordination. <http://www.amis-outlook.org>.

²⁰ According to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour.