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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 5 March 2010

**6090/10
ADD 11 EXT 1 (02.05.2013)**

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ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE

from : The Council General Secretariat
to : Working Party on Terrorism

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Belgium** (21-23 January 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- As part of the second round of peer evaluations covering "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack", an evaluation visit was made to Belgium from 21 to 23 January 2009.

- **Threat evaluation**

The national authorities consider that Belgium itself is not a strategic target, but that it does have a number of strategic targets, including the international institutions (European institutions, NATO), on its territory. In their view, there is a moderate threat where US interests are concerned, and a serious one as regards Jewish, Israeli, Turkish and Kurdish buildings and interests.

The main problem is the presence in Belgium of individuals who have taken part in the conflicts in Afghanistan and learned to use weapons and explosives. Some of these individuals also have high-level connections with Al Qaida, which makes them potentially dangerous.

- **Brief description of institutions**

The impression gained of the institutions which were presented and visited is altogether positive. The overriding philosophy is to keep the strategic and operational management of crisis situations at the local level unless there are sound reasons to extend it to the regional and federal levels. In the event of a terrorist attack, however, coordination will always be ensured at the federal level. The federal structure of the State does not impair the coherence of the overall system or give rise to gaps in its organisation. Coordination between the local and federal agencies seems harmoniously organised, without gaps or duplication. From threat assessments to planning to the organisation of emergency services, all aspects of crisis management appeared to be well covered.

Furthermore, the Belgian authorities are extremely experienced in terms of handling all aspects of security concerning large scale events, notably with foreign VIPs visiting the international institutions in Brussels (EU and NATO) on a regular basis; sometimes at very short notice. These events require planning, threat assessments, and especially a large degree of cooperation and coordination between relevant actors in order to work smoothly.

The National Crisis Centre (NCC), which in this case is the General Directorate Crisis Centre, (GDCC) plays a major, central role in this area, based primarily on the analyses and threat assessments produced by the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA).

The current system is in large part the result of lessons drawn by Belgium from terrorist activities on its territory in the 1980s (*Cellules Communistes Combattantes* – CCC) and from the London and Madrid attacks.

- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

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2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

When considering the organisation of crisis management in the case of a terrorist attack in Belgium, the federal structure of the country has to be taken into account.

The administration is organised on three levels: federal, provincial and local. The police is organised on two levels: federal and local. It is divided into three directorates: administrative police, judicial police, and operational support. The specialised units and analytical and strategic planning functions are concentrated at the federal level, which also serves as a general reserve which local police forces can draw upon.

In this country the level of crisis management (and of emergency planning) is determined on the basis of several criteria: factual information, surface area, number of victims, implications for the environment, economic repercussions, social repercussions, resources required, nature of the emergency (Seveso, nuclear, terrorism, etc.).

There are several levels at which crises are managed.

Finally, the federal level concerns the management of an emergency situation where, e.g.:

- it affects two or more provinces, or the national territory as a whole
- the resources required exceed those which the governor has at his disposal by virtue of his coordinating role.

Each of these levels has an emergency plan in place as well as a coordination committee.

The Minister for the Interior, via the National Crisis Centre, is responsible for national coordination. It should, however, be pointed out that responsibilities at the local level do not come to an end when the provincial or federal level becomes involved.

In the case of a terrorist attack, coordination will be carried out at federal level.

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of the National Crisis Centres

2.1.1. Origin

Belgium has a National Crisis Centre: the General Directorate Crisis Centre (GDCC). The GDCC was established by a Royal Decree of 18 April 1988. For the sake of readability, the GDCC will be referred to in this report as the National Crisis Centre (NCC).

The Decree was motivated by a number of events which had occurred during the 1980s.

- far-left terrorist activity by the *Cellules Communistes combattantes* (CCC) in 1984,
- the Heysel tragedy (when many lives were lost in clashes between groups of supporters at a football match) in 1985,
- the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986),
- the sinking of the ferry "Herald of Free Enterprise", with considerable loss of life, in 1987.

These tragic events revealed gaps in the continuity of the Government's action, the lack of any real crisis management at national level, the lack of suitable infrastructure for managing this type of crisis and problems of coordination.

2.1.2. The NCC's place in the system:

Although the NCC works for the Government as a whole, it is placed under the authority of the Minister for the Interior. The NCC was not placed under the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister in order to preserve the latter's role as the ultimate arbiter between the different administrations involved in crisis management. The participation of the police in managing most of the different types of crisis – whether there is a security aspect or not – was also part of the rationale for placing the NCC under the authority of the Minister for the Interior.

The NCC is headed by a Director-General in the federal administration, appointed for a term of 6 years, which can be renewed once.

2.1.3. *Role of the NCC:*

The NCC

- has a team that works on a rota system, operating a round-the-clock service (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) to collect, analyse and distribute to the competent authorities all urgent information of any nature. Counterpart from the different departments are capable of meeting within one hour of being alerted by the NCC staff;
- is also the official national and international alert contact point. The competent authorities can rapidly be informed through the Crisis Centre of any event, whether on the national territory or abroad, which could affect Belgian security. The management of crises of international origin is centralised within the NCC. If necessary, the NCC can activate alert procedures;
- outside office hours, monitors events round the clock for a number of federal departments for which the Crisis Centre has been given this role, among them the Prime Minister's monitoring service;
- is responsible for planning, coordinating and monitoring security for major events ¹ that could pose a threat to public order and security. This entails sending the authorities a threat forecast, in liaison with the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), coordinating the maintenance of public order and security, keeping the Minister for the Interior informed of developments in the situation, and monitoring the course of the event, taking the necessary measures.

The NCC is also responsible for coordinating security measures to protect VIPs visiting Belgium or the international institutions on its territory. The main objectives are rapid response and the flexibility to adapt, in all circumstances, to the evolution of the threat.

¹ Major trade union and political demonstrations, terrorist threat (GIA 1999, 11/09/01, anthrax, Madrid and London terrorist attacks, terrorist threat against Belgium at the end of 2007).

2.1.4. *Functioning of the NCC:*

To enable it to fulfil all these roles, the NCC functions as a clearing-house for information. Crisis Centre staff appear to have a philosophy of facilitating coordination between relevant authorities and/or disciplines without seeking to detract from their responsibilities or powers. The NCC receives its information from:

- the *Sûreté de l'Etat* (State Security Agency) (civil intelligence service)
- the *Service général de renseignement* (SGR) (military intelligence service)
- the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)
- the Federal Police
- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- the international institutions' security services
- open sources
- various public- and private-sector sources.

For some specific issues relating to public order, security and terrorism, the NCC's permanent staff is reinforced by liaison officers from the State Security Agency and from local and federal police forces.

In addition, the NCC can always request the participation of other services or partners, depending on the cases with which it has to deal. Consequently, when drawing up threat assessments, a collegial, multidisciplinary approach is adopted, through coordination meetings bringing together all the partners involved. The final decisions are taken by the NCC, acting on behalf of the Prime Minister.

These final decisions incorporate the options proposed by provincial or local crisis centres.

The NCC then sends its instructions to all participants including the police, at both local and national level.

The NCC pays particular attention to informing the public, in order to forestall the emergence of rumours which would subsequently be difficult to control.

As regards partnership with the private sector, and in particular within the context of an early warning system, the role played by the FEB (*Fédération des Entreprises Belges*) should be emphasised. The FEB, an association to which all Belgian companies belong, is the NCC's partner. The telecommunications company Belgacom is the NCC's single contact point for all companies. A private-sector company can thus send information on a possible threat to both local police and Belgacom. These two pathways lead, at federal level, to the NCC. Similarly, when the NCC wishes to send instructions, or indicate appropriate measures, to private-sector companies it can do so both via the FEB, through the intermediary of Belgacom, and via the police forces.

Initiation of the federal phase of crisis management – which does not take responsibility away from the lower levels – can lead to three bodies, each of which, in its own area of competence, contributes to the decision-making process, being convened at the NCC. A meeting of these three bodies constitutes the coordination committee at federal level (see below). They are:

- the assessment unit, which assesses the situation. It is made up of experts and scientists from the various competent authorities and services. It is chaired by the department most concerned by the emergency, which is designated by the management unit;
- the management unit (sometimes also referred to as the Federal Coordination Committee), which takes the necessary measures. It is made up of the relevant Ministers, or their representatives. It is normally chaired by the Minister for the Interior, or a representative appointed by him;
- the information unit, which is responsible for informing the public, through the media, at regular intervals, of developments in the situation and decisions taken by the management unit. The information unit is made up of the communications officers, or spokespersons, of the departments concerned.

In some cases, a socio-economic unit may also be set up.

2.1.5. Back-up system

If its main structure were damaged, the NCC could continue to fulfil its roles by setting up its operations in one of the provincial crisis centres. These centres are as well equipped – especially as regards transmission networks – as the NCC.

Plans are in place to transfer the NCC's activities to these provincial crisis centres, but they have not, to date, been tested in exercises.

At one stage, there was a plan to provide the NCC with a lorry fitted with all the necessary transmission equipment, which could have served as a substitute for the NCC.

The provincial governors of Namur, Walloon Brabant and Luxemburg have together bought a “mobile crisis centre”.

2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

2.2.1. Action plans:

In order to ensure that assistance during emergencies or crises is rapid and coordinated, emergency plans are drawn up at mayor, governor and minister level. There are six fully or partly confidential national emergency plans:

- nuclear and radiological risk
- flooding and high water
- aviation risk (including hijacking)
- influenza
- CBNR terrorism
- power failure

Each plan covers specific topics:

- decision-making
- evaluation of the situation
- coordination of national resources
- information for the public
- foreign contacts and contacts with the EU and international organisations

Responsibilities under these plans are shared among five disciplines: discipline (1) (fire brigade), discipline 2 (medical, hygiene and psychosocial services), discipline 3 (police), discipline 4 (civil protection) and discipline 5 (information). All these services and the agencies concerned are involved in drawing up the emergency plans.

Some general emergency and intervention plans (plans généraux d'urgence et d'intervention – PGUI) may incorporate certain features of the specific emergency and intervention plans (plans particuliers d'urgence et d'intervention – PPUI), depending on the type of emergency or risk. Some risks require specific aspects to be taken into account in the interests of increased preparedness; for instance, a provincial general emergency and intervention plan might incorporate a specific intervention plan laying down measures relating to specific risks (e.g. Seveso emergency plans, nuclear emergency plans).

For the purposes of coordination at international level, emergency plans incorporate various provisions and agreements on international cooperation on matters such as mutual assistance in dealing with disasters and accidents.

To supplement the general and specific emergency and intervention plans there is provision in them for single-discipline intervention plans for each discipline (e.g. discipline 2: medical intervention plan and hospital alert plan).

Lastly, institutions, industrial and business sectors as well have internal emergency plans to mitigate the harmful consequences of a crisis.

Local plans¹ are checked, coordinated and adopted at provincial level. Provincial plans are checked, coordinated and adopted at federal level. However, the plan for managing the consequences of a terrorist attack is drawn up at federal level. The federal and provincial plans are sufficiently flexible to incorporate lower tier plans without difficulty.

All these plans are regularly updated in the light of exercises and/or experience in dealing with real incidents.

¹ Under the Royal Decree of 16 February 2006 all local authorities must identify the risks on their territory.

It seems sensible to have incident-based plans based on risk assessment for the federal authorities, and the six topics are highly relevant to efficient crisis management. **NOT**

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2.2.2. *Threat assessment:*

The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) was set up under the Law of 10 July 2006 and two Royal Decrees of 28 November 2006 and 23 January 2007. The CUTA took over from the Interforce Antiterrorist Group (Groupe Interforce Antiterroriste – GIA) which was set up in September 1984 but not given a legal basis until 17 October 1991¹.

The CUTA is the national body responsible for central threat assessment. It is under the joint authority of the Ministers of Justice and the Interior. CUTA personnel are seconded from the different ministries and only analysts are partly recruited from outside. This agency operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It brings together representatives of the following services:

- Police
- State Security
- Military Counter Intelligence Service (SGRS)
- Federal Public Service for Home Affairs (immigration service)
- Federal Public Service for Finance (customs)
- Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs
- Federal Public Service for Mobility (air transport, public transport, safety at sea).

¹ Royal Decree of 17 October 1991

Intelligence received from foreign countries is passed to the CUTA either directly or via the special services. Intelligence provided by the intelligence and security services, customs and the Federal Foreign Affairs Service, which they have received from their opposite numbers in foreign countries with an explicit request for the information not be passed to other services, and which, if passed on, might compromise the safety of a human source, is communicated exclusively by the head of one of those three services to the Director of the CUTA. If the head of service concerned and the Director of the CUTA consider that this intelligence is essential in relation to measures to protect persons, it is taken into account in the assessment. This rule has of course been spelt out to all partner foreign services.

Nearly all CUTA's work is concerned with aspects of terrorism prior to the commission of an act. The only work it does after the commission of a terrorist act is analysis. As well as providing information to the Prime Minister's Security Advisor, CUTA's analyses are forwarded to the Federal Prosecutor and the Director-General of the NCC.

CUTA's mandate is the following:

- to analyse all types of terrorist or extremist threats to the internal and external security of the State
- to assess all possible threats to Belgian interests, Belgian citizens abroad and any vital state institutions
- threats may be to persons, facilities (civilian and military), organisations and events
- services supplying information must communicate any relevant information concerning possible threats linked to terrorism, extremism and radicalism.

Regarding ongoing events, CUTA:

- issues specific and strategic assessment reports concerning terrorist, extremist and radical situations and/or threats
- informs national authorities and the Federal Prosecutor's office of possible incidents
- maintains a permanent liaison and information exchange with counterpart foreign services.

The threat assessment criteria are as follows:

- description of the nature of the subject that has to be assessed,
- antecedents and known incidents concerning this subject,
- current circumstances and recently-gathered information,
- determination of the threat level.

The threat level is then assessed as follows:

- Level 1: the threat level appears to be low and an incident unlikely.
- Level 2: the threat level appears to be moderate and an incident possible.
- Level 3: the threat appears to be serious and an incident likely.
- Level 4: the threat appears to be very severe and an incident very likely.

CUTA assesses and analyses threats to specific targets, events or persons. There is no general threat level for the country as a whole. The NCC decides what measures should be taken in relation to the threat level determined by CUTA.

2.2.3. Coordination and Response Planning

Operational and strategic coordination is implemented under the following measures:

2.2.3.1. Operational command post

- For operational coordination on the ground an operational command post (PC-Ops) is set up, with the following tasks:
 - drawing up an initial operational report on the situation,
 - keeping the authorities regularly informed of developments in the situation,
 - advising the competent authorities and carrying out or ordering action on any decisions they take,
 - organising the area of intervention and, if necessary, imposing and lifting perimeters.
- The PC-Ops is composed, as a minimum, of the heads of the disciplines concerned on the ground. Operational cooperation on the ground is the responsibility of the Director of Operations (Dir-PC-Ops).

Usually Dir-PC-Ops is the fire brigade officer present at the site of the intervention, but the competent authority may appoint a leader from another discipline more closely concerned by the specific nature of the emergency. In the event of a terrorist act the Director of Operations PC-Ops will most likely be the head of discipline 3 (police).

2.2.3.2. Strategic Coordination Committee

As strategic coordination at federal level has already been discussed ¹, only local and provincial strategic coordination is dealt with here. There are Provincial Coordination Committees (PCC) and Communal Coordination Committees (CCC).

- The job of the Coordination Committee (provincial or communal) is to assess the emergency, advise the mayor or the governor as to what measures to take and arrange for information of the public and the business community and neighbouring communes.
- The Committee is run by the mayor (CCC) or the governor (PCC), assisted by representatives of the five disciplines and by the official responsible for emergency planning. These committees can be extended depending on the urgency

2.2.4. *The role of the criminal police in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack:*

2.2.4.1. Police organisation – Interaction between the central and local levels:

The police force is organised on two levels: the Federal Police and 196 local police districts.

At central level, the federal police force is headed by a Commissioner-General assisted by 3 Directors-General (administrative police, criminal police, support and management). The Belgian police force as a whole is structured according to the two functions of administrative policing and criminal investigation.

¹ See above, page 10 (Federal Coordination Committee).

The central level of the Federal Police is essentially responsible for developing working methods and various support measures – sometimes specialised – for the local police districts and for the decentralised levels of the federal police ¹. It is these decentralised levels, 27 in number, which are in charge of investigations on the ground, including those concerning a terrorist attack ².

Each of the 27 decentralised "district" police directorates has executive power in its district. Each one is also linked to a district Prosecutor's Office. In the fight against terrorism, the local police have an important role to play in information gathering and transfer ³.

2.2.4.2. The Federal Prosecutor's Office

Although terrorism is not the exclusive domain of the Federal Prosecutor's Office, in most cases it will be in charge of the detection and prosecution of terrorist offences and be entitled to institute criminal proceedings.

2.2.4.3. Measures in the event of a bomb attack

Once information is passed to the police (at a local police station or at the provincial communication centre) three measures are taken:

- a first response team is dispatched to the incident with information on the person who reported the incident, the incident scene, any contamination risks and measures that have been taken or need to be taken immediately
- the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group (EOD Group) is contacted (see below)
- the criminal police of the district concerned are informed.

After this alarm phase measures fall into 5 categories:

- installing perimeters for safety reasons and to preserve evidence,
- setting up information flows between all actors involved,

¹ The Federal Police has drawn up and circulated a handbook for local police on dealing with terrorist incidents.

² Royal Decree of 14 November 2006.

³ Ministerial circular PLP 37 of 20 December 2004 regarding cooperation and exchange of information concerning terrorism and extremism.

- intervention of the specialised team,
- intervention of the emergency services (ambulance and fire services) which are given full priority,
- criminal investigation.

One of the basic stages in the criminal police investigation is the action taken by the Bomb Scene Manager. Creation of the post of Bomb Scene Manager is one of the lessons learned from the London and Madrid bombings. Around forty officials were trained in 2008. Their role is to act as the link on the ground between the work of the administrative police and that of the criminal police. This involves managing a smooth transition between crisis management (the aim of which is to limit danger and damage and save lives) and the criminal investigation (looking for clues and evidence). They therefore work in close contact with the head of discipline 3 (police) and report on their actions to the chief investigator. This calls for specialisation, training and a multidisciplinary approach.

The Bomb Scene Manager, who is a criminal police officer of district in question, will also direct all criminal police activities at the scene in a coordinated manner. As such, he will be involved in the crisis from the outset, collecting and trying to protect evidence. However, he must never hinder or obstruct the work of the emergency services.

The following teams will usually be deployed on the ground after a bomb attack or a bomb alert:

- The EOD team is a unit in the Defence Ministry with exclusive competence in the field of explosives. The EOD team advises local authorities on evacuation, installation of the security perimeter and any other protective measures called for, including intervention of the emergency/auxiliary services (fire brigade, civil defence, electricity, gas, etc.). The commanding officer of this team is generally classed as a technical expert by the Public Prosecutor or the investigating judge. The EOD's technical report can thus be used in criminal proceedings. Also, all IED and ammunition are registered and held at the National Registry which forms part of this unit. Before an explosion the EOD team will disarm any devices. After an explosion, it will collect samples.

- A police laboratory team is responsible for collecting and analysing all traces of explosives, except on the device itself. The laboratory will focus on identification of the offender. If necessary, and if requested by the judge, the National Institute for Criminology and Criminalistics (NICC) may be called in to provide backup for the police laboratory team.
- A Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) team deals with the dead.
- A camera team is sent to film all details of the crime scene and any suspicious behaviour among onlookers in the surrounding area.

Other teams involved are;

- a team responsible for questioning and identification;
- In consultation with the officer leading the tactical investigation a number of people will be questioned. A police officer will also remain in the hospital to collect the clothes of victims and to draft a report on the general situation of all casualties.
- a team responsible for the tactical investigation;
This team, headed by a prosecutor, conducts the criminal investigation including the use of any nearby electronic equipment such as ATMs, cell phone masts and surveillance cameras.
- a team responsible for local investigations;
- the Intelligence Cell;
This cell will be responsible for collating information gathered from the central criminal police directorates, the intelligence services, international partners and other relevant partners. The information will be sent to the tactical investigators. Special attention will also be paid to the external borders, where control measures will be stepped up.

2.2.4.4. Measures in the event of hostage-taking

The judicial and political authorities are closely involved in the decision-making process in such cases. As a result a number of different bodies will be set up:

- A strategic staff made up of:
 - the Prime Minister, the Minister for Justice, the Minister for the Interior and the Minister for Foreign Affairs or their representatives;

- the Federal Prosecutor and the investigating judge he appoints;
- the prosecutor with territorial competence;
- the Attorney General with territorial competence;
- the Commissioner-General of the Federal Police assisted by:
 - * the Director-General of the criminal police;
 - * the Director-General of the administrative police;
- the Director-General for state security,
- the Director of the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA),
- the Director-General of the NCC,
- any other person whom the Chairman of this committee invites to take part.

Without prejudice to individual legal competences, the strategic staff is jointly chaired by the Prime Minister (or his representative) and the Federal Prosecutor (or the judge he appoints). All decisions regarding the responsibilities and competences of the judicial and political authorities are taken unanimously. Decisions must therefore be taken in the framework of a permanent dialogue between the representatives of justice and politics.

- An operational staff made up of:
 - – a prosecutor assigned to this post by the Federal Prosecutor;
 - – the administrative director-coordinator of the district in question;
 - – the judicial director of the district in question;
 - – a police officer from the Directorate-General of the criminal police;
 - – police officers specialised in terrorism;
 - – any other person invited by the general staff to take part (for instance local police, EOD etc.).

2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attack

Although Belgium has no list of cross-border targets, the NCC is nevertheless active in this regard, using analyses carried out by the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) as a basis.

In general, international cooperation is based on:

- National contact points forming an international warning network
- Crisis management preparation in cooperation with neighbouring countries
- Exchanges of experience and best practices.

At regional level the NCC cooperates with the other Crisis Centres of the Member States, meaning that it exchanges information with them as current events and crisis situations require. Furthermore, formal cooperation has been established with the Dutch NCC. The Dutch NCC and the Belgian Crisis Centre exchange weekly reports on the situation in their respective countries. In other cases, depending on the problem at hand, the NCC exchanges information with the other Crisis Centres of the Member States, either directly or through channels that exist between these services.

Within the Benelux framework, the cooperation mechanisms have been formalised in the Senningen Agreements. The three Benelux member states have signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning cooperation in the event of an emergency with possible cross-border consequences. Two administrative agreements have also been concluded: an agreement on joint police patrols and a cooperation agreement between the Crisis Centres.

This Benelux agreement is intended to promote cooperation and communication between the three countries mainly with a view to improving the coordination of emergency management policy. More specifically, information is exchanged on risk analysis, including mapping; planning of emergency measures; management of emergency situations, including assistance; implementation of joint exercises; public information in the event of a crisis.

2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack

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3. TRAINING:EXERCICES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

Exercises are organised at the initiative of the Mayor, the Governor or the Minister to test the emergency plan and to enable the various disciplines to perform their duties. A steering committee devises a scenario and sets the aims of the exercise. Two kinds of exercise are organised. There are theoretical exercises, in which the various disciplines meet around a table and have to react as they would in reality. However, there are also exercises in the field, which are staged on the site of a potential emergency, with people and resources actually deployed.

The organisation of exercises is an important aspect of emergency planning and crisis management. To optimise cooperation, the parties involved should have developed some sort of routine for work in hand, so that they are not overwhelmed by the emergency.

There are a number of regulations which stipulate that exercises have to be organised, notably for Seveso companies and nuclear installations.

On November 29 2001 the "Zaventem Red" exercise was organised at the Crisis Centre. This exercise focused on the hijacking by terrorists of an aircraft and its passengers at Zaventem airport. The aim of the exercise was to see how the legislation in force operated in practice. Since the exercise focused both on a crime (hijacking/hostage taking) and on the security of persons, it was possible to assess cooperation between judicial and administrative authorities. After the exercise, several debriefings were held in order to adapt the legislation and determine a coherent approach to the problem.

In 2003 three "table top" exercises were organised, focusing on the NRBC issue. Following the tragic events of 9/11, the matter of appropriate emergency planning arose.

The first NRBC exercise was held on 27 and 28 May 2003. The scenario focused on a biological risk. The subject of the exercise was supposed contamination of the water supply of the province of Antwerp, emanating from a district of the city. During the exercise it emerged that this was an act of terrorism. The second exercise was held on September 9 and 10, focusing on the chemical risk. The scenario for this exercise was the explosion of a truck loaded with propane gas at a road junction in Brussels, plus the explosion of a small number of chlorine gas bombs under the Brussels North railway station.

The last exercise was held on October 20 and 21. The scenario focused on a bomb alert in a public car park and the explosion of two radiological bombs in the Guillemins railway station in the province of Liège.

These three NRBC exercises enabled us to address several shortcomings, on the basis of which various recommendations have been made to ensure that the different rescue and safety services are better prepared to deal with such events.

The Crisis Centre participates in NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX). In 2004 the CMX was the first NATO exercise with a scenario based on an NRBC incident in Western Europe, more specifically in Geleen (the Netherlands) near the Belgian border and with a direct impact on our territory. Coordination was necessary between several national and regional Crisis Centres and also within the framework of the NATO civil protection committees.

Since 2004, however, there has been no national exercise involving all disciplines and different districts. There have, however, been exercises within each discipline or exercises involving all disciplines but at provincial level only. These exercises did not necessarily focus on terrorist attacks. National and regional exercises should again be organised, on a more regular basis, to update the lessons learned in the past. In practice, it transpired that greater resources needed to be committed to exercise preparation and implementation at all levels. It was not clear that there was any methodology for comprehensive debriefing and implementation of lessons learned from exercises. While the National Crisis Centre participated in the 2004 NATO crisis exercise, greater effort appeared to be necessary as regards the organisation of exercises with neighbouring Member States.

4. SOFT TARGETS

There is no list of soft targets at present.

Since the 1970s a database of the national critical, vital and sensitive points (CRIVISEN) has been created. It contains about 13 000 entries.

The main aim of CRIVISEN is to put the national critical infrastructure in a database so that protective measures can be taken before a crisis occurs and the crisis managed when it does occur. To attain this goal, CRIVISEN was structured in 2002-2003 to enable the data pertaining to the most sensitive sector to be used flexibly and rapidly. The database is constantly evolving and is divided into sectors and subsectors. The sectors are: military installations and the like, Belgian institutions, non-Belgian representations, international institutions, places associated with a particular religion, transport, hazardous industries and laboratories, schools, commercial and leisure spaces where people congregate, protection of the population, information and telecommunications networks, supplies and water, banks and finance, national monuments and emblems. CRIVISEN sectors therefore include certain soft targets (transport, schools, commercial and leisure spaces where people congregate, protection of the population, etc.).

The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) evaluates the specific risk to soft targets as it does with all other targets.

The actual structure of this database is undergoing modification. Over the next two years the current system should be replaced by an approach based on concentric circles. The first circle would cover critical infrastructures of European importance (10 to 15 entries), the second on critical infrastructures of national importance (around 100 entries), while the third and widest circle would contain all other points that might be threatened.

5. GOOD PRACTICES

- Organising the work of the police in the event of a terrorist incident. The approach of appointing a bomb scene manager could be introduced at European level. Such a post makes for effective coordination of both the investigative and administrative tasks of the police and contacts between the police and the other emergency services.
- Organisation of the NCC. The NCC organisational structure consists of two main divisions: Operations (Gestion opérationnelle) and Planning (Planification d'urgence). The presence of a planning division reflects the inclusion of emergency planning as one of the NCC's main tasks. This organisational arrangement merits a positive mention. Most importantly, it provides a strong and very important link between emergency planning (essentially a "peacetime" activity) and management activities during a crisis, as efficient crisis management depends on the planning carried out as part of daily business. Furthermore, it ensures guidance for the emergency planners at federal, provincial and municipal level; it facilitates coordination and harmonisation of emergency plans and gives the NCC a thorough knowledge of the quality of the various authorities' emergency planning. Also, the Crisis Centre staff appear to have a philosophy of facilitating coordination between relevant authorities and/or disciplines without seeking to detract from their responsibilities or powers, encouraging a readiness on the part of other departments to work closely and transparently with the Crisis Centre.
- The NCC's links with the private sector via the system put into effect through the FEB (Federation of Belgian Enterprises) appears both flexible and highly effective. Such an approach could also be introduced at European level.

- The structure and functioning of the CUTA, which permits effective threat assessment.
- Five "disciplines" are present in all multi-disciplinary forums dealing with incident or crisis management, whether at the physical site of the incident or in the crisis coordination centres at municipal, provincial or national level. The Armed Forces are already integrated in the planning phase of the overall plans within Discipline 4. A deployment can be arranged through the Military Command of the respective province and does not have to go through the whole governmental hierarchy. In terms of best practice, it is also the inclusion of the fifth discipline (information for the public) that deserves attention. This task is quite important, particularly when dealing with large-scale incidents such as terrorism. Therefore, it is very satisfying to see that the Belgian authorities have made "information for the public" an integral part of the crisis management setup in all forums where authorities work together to manage incidents or crises.
- All the security forces (police, fire brigade, ambulances) can communicate on the same digital network (ASTRID). This ensures consistency of relief efforts at all levels.
- Within the MOI there is a "Higher Institute of Emergency Planning", acting as a knowledge centre that develops tools and know-how, establishes networks with academics, experts and centres at European and international level, provides training and a training environment and a discussion forum. Such a specialised centralised body with cross-border links appears to be an excellent tool for the exchange of best practice and knowledge.
- Cooperation appears to be particularly advanced among the Benelux countries, where information is exchanged on risk analysis, management of emergency situations and implementation of joint exercises. This appeared to be an example of best practice which could potentially be replicated elsewhere on a regional neighbourhood basis.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations may be proposed:

NOT DECLASSIFIED

7. ANNEX

7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions

- Competences of the National Crisis Centre
- Principles of emergency planning
- REGETEL communication network (secure communication network)
- Civil Protection
- Defence
- Federal Police
- Public Health
- Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)
- Provincial crisis centre – visit and presentation

7.2. Speakers

NOT DECLASSIFIED

NOT DECLASSIFIED

7.3. Expert team

Council General Secretariat

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Police and Customs Cooperation Unit – DG Justice and Home Affairs

European Commission

NOT DECLASSIFIED

DG JLS – Directorate D – Unit F3

Europol

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Serious Crime Department – Counter Terrorism

Denmark

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Danish Emergency Management Unit

Estonia

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Security Police Board of Estonia
