



**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 9 July 2013**

**6090/10  
ADD 27 EXT 1**

**ENFOPOL 38  
PROCIV 15**

**PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION**

---

of document:	6090/10 ADD 27 RESTREINT UE
dated:	5 March 2010
new status:	Public
Subject:	Second Round of Peer Evaluation Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

---

Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.

---



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 5 March 2010**

**6090/10  
ADD 27 EXT 1 (09.07.2013)**

**ENFOPOL 38  
PROCIV 15**

**ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE**

---

from : The Council General Secretariat  
to : Working Party on Terrorism

---

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation  
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

---

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Germany** (25-27 November 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

1.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
2.	ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK .....	5
	2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres.....	7
	2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack .....	15
	2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks .....	21
	2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack .....	22
3.	TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK .....	24
	3.1. Training/exercises for testing the National Crisis Centre and communication systems in the event of a terrorist attack .....	24
	3.2. Training/exercises for testing the efficiency of the communications systems.....	26
4.	SOFT TARGETS .....	27
5.	GOOD PRACTICES .....	27
6.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	29
7.	ANNEX .....	29
	7.1. Speakers .....	29
	7.2. Experts team.....	30

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluations covering "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack", an evaluation visit was made to Germany from 25 to 27 November 2009.
- Threat evaluation  
So far the only major Islamist related attacks since 1998 involving immediate German interest were the attack against a synagogue in Djerba on 11 April 2002 and the bombings in Bali/Indonesia on 12 October 2002 when a number of German citizens were killed.

Nevertheless, although no attacks have been committed in Germany so far, there is evidence of a number of failed attacks, such as the "trolley case" in 2006, when two planned attacks against regional trains failed, and the arrest of the "Sauerland Group" in September 2007. The latter had purchased chemical substances to produce explosives comparable to 550 kg of TNT. The Sauerland Group plotted a multiple simultaneous attack against US military facility in Germany, discotheques, pubs and airports.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Another topic of concern for the German authorities is the propaganda campaign. In the period from 18 September to 3 October 2009, eight video messages were issued aimed at posing a direct threat against Germany, the recruitment of new fighters and the radicalisation of young Muslims in Germany. The election of the German Federal Parliament took place on 27 September. One video message showed German soft targets like the Central Station in Hamburg, Cologne Cathedral and the Oktoberfest in Munich **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Brief description of institutions

The main principle guiding the organisation of the crisis management system in Germany is the division of competences between the federal level (Bund) and the federal states (*Länder*), whereby the latter have the primary responsibility for threat prevention measures (taken by the police and other governmental agencies), crisis prevention and disaster management. The federal structures (Bund) are activated only in case of extraordinary events when the states can request support from the federal level (e.g. in case of disasters or emergencies affecting more than one state, the federal government has additional options for action if needed).

The impression gained from the institutions proposed and visited is entirely positive. Organisation of the state on a federal basis is not detrimental to the coherence of overall arrangements and does not cause organisational deficiencies. Coordination between local and federal missions seems to be organised harmoniously and does not give rise to lacunae or overlapping. From the assessment of the threat, then through the planning stage to the organisation of assistance, every aspect appears to be well covered.

The current arrangements result to a large degree from the earlier lessons that Germany drew from terrorist action in the country in the 70s and 80s (RAF = Red Army Fraction) and the attacks in Djerba, London and Madrid.

- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

1.

## **2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

The organisation of crisis management in the event of a terrorist attack in Germany must be considered in the light of the country's federal structure.

The administration is organised on the basis of a federal state, 16 *Länder* (including the three city-states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg), 301 counties, 114 municipalities not belonging to counties and 12 007 local authorities.

It is the division of powers between the federal state and the *Länder* and coordination between the latter and the federal state that will have the greatest influence on the subject of this evaluation, namely "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack".

The national level (Bund) acts in a coordinating and supporting role. The Bund coordinates the training curricula and activities on national and *Länder* level. The Bund also provides centralised services in support of the *Länder* if required.

The Federal Republic of Germany has no permanent national crisis centre (NCC) as defined by the EU, but there is a Communications, Command and Control Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Lagezentrum BMI), that is responsible for situation monitoring and analysis (24/7) in the field of public order, public security and civil protection. As a "National Contact Point" for the *Länder* and some other federal ministries, the EU - MS and all other countries, it draws up daily situation report on domestic security and distributes it to all *Länder*, federal ministries, relevant federal authorities and other partners. However, national task forces are set up at the strategic/political level of the federal government or federal ministries as needed for specific occasions and events.

In Germany, there is no need for a permanently staffed national crisis centre at federal level as defined by the EU, because the *Länder*, not the federal level, are responsible for police and non-police threat prevention as well as disaster preparedness and response, and thus also for the operational/tactical management of threats and large-scale emergencies (including terrorist attacks).

In the case of threats or emergencies extending across *Länder* or national borders, however, coordinating tasks are performed at federal level. To this end, a system of special crisis task forces within the federal ministries (BAO<sup>1</sup>) has been developed which takes into account the Federal Republic's federal structure. When one of these crisis task forces is called into action (e.g. within the Federal Ministry of the Interior), it performs coordinating tasks at the policy and strategic level in the manner of a national crisis centre.

In the case of a crisis which extends across national borders (whether a natural disaster or a terrorist attack), it is urgently necessary to ensure both an orderly exchange of information at the operational/tactical level and cooperation/information-sharing at the political level. Special crisis communication arrangements (CCA) have been created and national contact points (NCP) designated for the EU area based on the Manual on EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination<sup>2</sup> (in Germany, these are the Communications, Command and Control Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Crisis Response Centre at the Federal Foreign Office). These national contact points are staffed round the clock (24/7 in shifts).

The German crisis management system has undergone an overhaul based on the events of 9/11 and on own experience from e.g. the floods of 2002 or the organisation of the Football World Championship in 2006. Preparedness for potential acts of terrorism is a component of a broader emergency response system to deal with natural disasters, industrial accidents, epidemics or threats posed by terrorism. Germany follows a capability based approach. Each public authority contributes its respective capabilities to a common system in order to mitigate/prevent, prepare for, respond to or recover from disasters and crisis.

---

<sup>1</sup> **BAO** is the abbreviation for “**B**esondere **A**ufbau **O**rganisation”. If needed the Federal Ministries change into a special structure, differently from the daily routine organisation, which enables quick decisions and action

<sup>2</sup> The EU Manual is intended specifically for dealing with crises that have a **cross-border impact** in order to ensure coordination in the event of crisis and emergency (see Council Document 9552/2/06 REV 2 of 27 July 2006).

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the “New Strategy for Protecting the Population” adopted at the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the federal and *Länder* governments (IMK) on 6 June 2002 restructured federal and *Länder* crisis management to overcome the previous rigid divisions and tunnel vision and move towards a comprehensive, integrated approach. The new structures are better able to deal with the need to combine threat prevention by the police, criminal prosecution and non-police disaster preparedness. In the event of natural disasters, other threats or emergencies, or terrorist attacks, one should always be prepared to deal with mass casualties, so it is advisable to combine capacities for disaster preparedness, police and non-police threat prevention and criminal prosecution.

## **2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres**

The foundation for creating crisis task forces in the federal ministries consists on the one hand of the federal ministries' own organizational sovereignty and their responsibilities for certain tasks and on the other of experience gained from past operations during which interregional crisis coordination at strategic-political level was needed.

### **(a) State level**

Because the *Länder* are as a rule responsible for police and non-police threat prevention and criminal prosecution as well as disaster preparedness and response, and thus also for the operational/tactical management of threats and large-scale emergencies (including terrorist attacks), the federal level in case of disaster only has the authority to coordinate measures, resources and to give recommendations to the *Länder* in order to ensure uniform procedures. This can only occur in specific exceptional cases, namely when one Land or several *Länder* request for coordination (article 16 (2) ZSKG<sup>1</sup>; e.g. in case of disasters or emergencies affecting more than one state.

- In the context of criminal prosecution, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) may issue instructions to the *Land* criminal police offices
- when a *Land* asks to take over a criminal investigation, the Federal Minister of the Interior orders an investigation of a serious crime,
- or the Federal Public Prosecutor asks the BKA to open an investigation (e.g. in case of terrorist attacks, etc.).

---

<sup>1</sup> ZSKG = Gesetz über den Zivilschutz und die Katastrophenhilfe des Bundes (act on civil protection and support from the federal government in case of disaster), 29. July 2009)



According to Article 35 (3) and Article 91 (2) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in case of a natural disaster, accident, or an imminent threat to the existence of Germany as such or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a *Land*, the Federal Government may instruct the *Land* governments to place police units at the disposal of other *Länder*, may deploy units of the Federal Police or the armed forces to support the police of the *Länder*, and may place the police under its own orders.

On 8 November 2001, the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers (IMK) decided to carry out a critical review of the capability of Germany's emergency response system. To do so, a joint federal-state working group was tasked with developing the basic outline of a new strategy for civil protection. The IMK acknowledged the proposals for implementing the strategy at its meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2002.

Within the framework of this New Strategy for Protecting the Population, the federal and state governments worked together to improve the existing systems for emergency and disaster management. Components of this new strategy are the definition of protection priorities based on risk and threat analysis, the founding of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) and creation of a uniform command and control system at all levels.

The states agreed on a set of basic recommendations in order to standardise the command and control structures at the various levels of crisis management. This system of crisis task forces (crisis response staffs) ensures efficient coordination between the states, counties, municipalities and other local government bodies in the event of a crisis.

If a state does not have adequate staffing or resources to deal with a disaster, outside assistance is required. According to the Article 35 (2), second sentence, of the Basic Law, a state may call for the assistance of police forces from other states or personnel and facilities from other administrative authorities, the Federal Police or the armed forces. The Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) may also be called on to help. Such requests are sent directly to the point of contact at the local level or via states interior ministries.

(b) Federal level

Depending on the topic of a crisis, the federal ministry which is responsible for the respective subject (the ministry which is concerned mostly) is in charge for organizing the national crisis centre. At this level, the crisis centre is headed by the minister responsible for the relevant area or by one of his/her state secretaries (deputy minister).

More precisely, depending on the specific threat or emergency, the ministry with primary responsibility for the subject area concerned oversees the crisis management effort at the federal level.

Those ministries which can help with managing a threat or emergency have made arrangements (i.e. organizational/technical preparations, designation of contact points) in order to be able to call up a specific crisis task force at short notice. The lead ministry's crisis management staff (crisis task force) is responsible for coordination at the federal level and for coordination with the states affected by threat or emergency. At the same time, the other ministries ensure that liaison officers can be seconded at short notice to the lead ministry's crisis task force at its request.

All federal ministries ensure that the appropriate contact points are also available outside regular office hours and provide these contact details to the situation centres of the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

All ministries have designated contact persons for crisis management and counter-terrorism who are responsible for in-house planning and interministerial coordination and are members of the Interministerial Panel on National Crisis Management.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior plays a special role in managing crises which take place within Germany. In the event of serious threats to internal security, the Federal Ministry of the Interior crisis management staff (crisis task force) may be called on to manage the situation. This task force is responsible for coordinating measures taken by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Agencies within its remit, for coordinating between the federal ministries and the states, and for advising political actors. The communications Command and Control Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior calls up the crisis management staff (crisis task force). Depending on the situation, special advisers and liaison officers from the subordinate agencies of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, other federal ministries and the states will be added to the crisis task force. The crisis task forces set up at the various levels to deal with threats and emergencies coordinate their activities by exchanging liaison officers or via technical media.

In the case of crises abroad which affect German nationals or German interests (e.g. large scale consular emergencies, terrorist threats and attacks **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, political and military crises and natural disasters in other countries), the Federal Foreign Office sets up a crisis task force as needed, with participation from the ministries in dealing with the situation and/or their subordinate agencies.

Within the Ministry of Interior, the department of Public Security is responsible for law enforcement activities. Responsibility for consequence management lies with the "Crisis Management" department.

A permanent communication command and control centre (Lagezentrum BMI) for all kinds of responsibilities is operational 24/7 within the Ministry of the Interior. The crisis staff is called upon, in the event of a crisis. Representatives from subordinated agencies/Offices can be represented in the MOI crisis staff, if needed.

A special crisis management staff (crisis task force) with clearly defined participants and roles is set up for each of the crisis situations. A room can be set up at short notice at the Ministry of the Interior with all facilities needed for communications and exchange of information.

An Interministerial Coordination Group (IntMinKoGr) is set up in the event of a crisis that seriously affects interests of the Federation and/or has a major cross-border impact. This group is chaired by the Ministry of the Interior. Both the crisis management staff from different ministries and the crisis management staff from the affected Länder are represented. The task of the IntMinKoGr are a) ensure that a procedure operates across ministries and Länder, and b) giving advice to crisis management players on the basis of expert assessment and recommendations. The objectives are to provide joint situation reports (common operational picture), coordinated risk assessments and forecasts, jointly developed recommendations appropriate to the situation and a coordinated communication strategy for the Federation and the Länder.

The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) maintains the "German Joint Information and Situation Centre" of the Federation and the Länder (GMLZ). It is another means to support coordination of the Federal and Länder level.

The BBK was established on 1 May 2004 within the remit of the MOI. The mission of the office includes:

- carrying out the tasks of the Federation with regard to civil protection,
- the planning and preparation of measures to provide emergency supplies,
- carrying out emergency planning,
- the planning and preparation of cooperation between the Federation and the Länder with regard to special hazards and threats,
- the coordination of crisis management efforts,
- support the planning of critical infrastructure protection (CIP),
- basic and advanced training in the field of crisis and emergency management,
- raising awareness in civil protection, disaster relief and disaster medicine,
- warning and informing the population,
- providing coordination of technical-scientific research with regard to civil protection and Weapons of Massdestruction (WMD)
- dissemination of research results into the civil protection community, in particular concerning CBRN hazards,
- enhancing citizens' ability to help themselves in disasters.

In its own understanding, the BBK is a federal service centre for crisis and emergency management authorities at every level of administration. The BBK has developed concepts for integrated risk and crisis management, e.g. in Critical Infrastructures. The methodology can be used by public authorities as well as operators of CI. The BBK supports the international efforts concerning standardization in the field of incident preparedness and operational continuity management. It contributed to the Publicly Available Specification (ISO/PAS 22399), “Societal Security – Guideline for incident preparedness and operational continuity management”, published by the International Organisation for Standardization.

The BBK runs the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ). It provides training of executives at high and highest administrative levels. The AKNZ is part of a network of Academies in the field of safety and security, thus providing the appropriate training modules for stakeholders, like the armed forces, police, fire brigades etc.

The THW is the national force for civil protection and disaster relief operations. On behalf of the Federal Government, the THW can be deployed in international operations. Local authorities (i.e. fire brigades) can request the THW for assistance in emergencies and large-scale accidents. Besides the 800 professionals, 80.000 volunteers serve in the THW. Its units are organised at different levels (local, regional, supraregional and nationwide), and so it can intervene at the adequate level requested. In the case of deployment of volunteers, the Federation compensates the working hours to their employers. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, especially with a CBNR impact, the THW task consist in the following:

- construction and operation of assembly points and quarantine areas,
- operation of combined command and control centres,
- supply of electricity, water, sanitation and nutrition to all the forces on the scene.

Within its support function, the THW will act under the command of the local scene manager (like the fire brigade).

Some Special Deployment Units – CBNR have been set-up within the THW. Their tasks are search, rescue and clearance of debris under CBRN - conditions, in particular when heavy equipment is required<sup>1</sup>.

As a result of the new strategy aimed at adjusting the response at regional and federal level, the Federation has set up four "Analytical Task Forces" (ATF) so far. They are located within the professional fire brigade in Hamburg and Mannheim, the Police of Berlin and the Institute for fire brigades of Sachsen-Anhalt. In 2010 the professional fire brigade of Munich, Dortmund and Cologne will be fully equipped as ATF too.

The ATF are equipped with analytical instruments for radiological and chemical detection, with which they process analytical data to identify chemical substances. In the event of complex CBRN situations, the ATF can provide support to the operational commanders on site, ranging from expert advice via phone to in situ operation of the ATF at the incident scene (arriving anywhere in Germany within two hours).

---

<sup>1</sup> **Germany comments:**

The main task of the CBRN-Unit of the THW is the detection of hazardous material, the search and rescue (SAR) of persons and the clearing of debris. The special search for, identification of and measuring of hazardous material is not the task of the CBRN-unit of the THW. This is done by the ATF also mentioned in your report. The THW is mainly focused on its core capability SAR under CBRN-conditions. Decontamination is also not a topic of the THW.

On site, the ATF provides detection and identification of chemical agents and compounds, ensures surveillance of large areas using remote sensing devices, locates and identifies air-borne contaminants and recommends suitable counter-measures. The Analytical Task Force is supported by a background network of experts specialised in a variety of disciplines. The ATF Commander assumes only an advisory role to the local on site commander at the scene of the incident. It is envisaged that the ATF, currently well prepared for chemical scenarios, will also be equipped for RN situations, and in the longer term, when necessary detection technology is developed, also for biological situations.

The Federal Support Group in Response to Serious Nuclear Threat (ZUB) is made-up of the BKA, the BPOL (Federal Police) and the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS). **NOT**

**DECLASSIFIED**

The ZUB is deployed to support the Länder authorities in law enforcement operations. It evaluates the substances, the risk of possible chain reaction due to substance type, quantity and structure.

At the Federal Level, the standardised CBRN equipment includes 450 CBRN reconnaissance vehicles and 450 decontamination trucks. They are deployed across Germany thus covering the whole territory with the recon capability. They complement the capabilities of the states in case of disasters. In addition to this, 50 CBRN Recon vehicles are planned to be stationed at locations facing heightened threat potential (e.g. chemical and nuclear facilities, important traffic hubs etc.). Also, special forces for the decontamination of casualties (61 decontamination trucks) and for conducting chemical analysis will be procured. They will be deployed to selected sites. However, they will be enabled to provide their expertise and special capabilities across the entire federal territory if needed.

The Federal Police (BPOL) is the largest police force in Germany with 40.000 officers. It has no original responsibility in CT investigations. The main role of the BPOL lies in prevention. It acts as Border Police and Railway Police; it is responsible for Aviation Security and Maritime Security. After the accumulation of videos before the elections in September and in October 2009, the BPOL increased controls at stations according to a special plan.

By law, operators of airports and railway stations are obliged to install CCTV cameras that are under the full control of the BPOL. Data protection provisions allow the BPOL to maintain the data for 48 hours. This period can be extended under certain circumstances.

The Federal Prosecutor has the exclusive role of deciding whether he himself will take the lead in the investigation or appoint another high-level prosecutor at Länder level. The designated prosecutor will also determine the lead police agency, which is the BKA in the most large-scale cases. The BKA set-up a special task force in order to manage the investigation. The Special Task Force is a pre-defined modular structure that includes police forces from the Länder and the local level.

The Bundesamt für die Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) is an independent and neutral agency under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. In 2005 the Federal Government adopted an overall IT security strategy, the "National Plan for Information Infrastructure Protection". The BSI:

- Operates in the area of federal authorities
- Cooperates with industry and science
- Informs the general public

Vis-à-vis the federal authorities, the BSI is the only body for the protection of the federal IT network; it acts as a central reporting office; it issues binding minimum standards and warnings; it provides consultancy; it evaluates, certifies and provides accreditations. The BSI hosts the National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). Besides the international activities within the CERT's responsibilities, the BSI is responsible for further international cooperation by representing Germany in international expert bodies dealing with IT security. Several web sites<sup>1</sup> set up by the BSI provide authorities, private enterprises and citizens with information on protection of IT equipment and their networks.

---

<sup>1</sup> [www.buerger-cert.de](http://www.buerger-cert.de), [www.bsi-fuer-berger.de](http://www.bsi-fuer-berger.de), [www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)

## 2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack

### (a) Structures involved

As a rule, each federal ministry is responsible for the strategic/political management of crises within its remit and for heading the national crisis centre at federal level. In the case of a terrorist attack, this responsibility would fall to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (in case of attacks involving radioactive material or nuclear power plants, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety would also be involved; in case of attacks using biological agents, the Federal Ministry of Health would be involved). In that precise case, to ensure a consistent nation-wide response to situations affecting more than one federal ministry, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), and the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) have agreed to set up joint crisis management staffs (crisis task forces) patterned on the BMI crisis management staff. The joint BMI/BMU crisis management staff is intended to respond to serious threats or emergencies involving the illegal use of radioactive materials, and the BMI/BMG crisis management staff is to deal with pandemics and bioterrorism.

A wide range of federal support (information, advice and resources) for the states is provided in the case of impact on an especially large scale or of national significance.

At the same time, with respect to an appropriate law-enforcement / intelligence service response , there is close federal-state coordination on search and investigative operations and vulnerability assessments (for example in the joint Counter-Terrorism Centre - GTAZ).

In the case of interstate or national threat or damage, a number of different command and communications structures at federal and state level must be integrated into one overarching crisis management system.

The Federal Police and BKA are represented in the crisis task force at the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the heads of the ministry's directorates-general for the Federal Police and police affairs. The director-general responsible for internal security is also represented in the crisis task force with regard to deployment of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.



The Federal Republic of Germany's permanently operational Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) serves as an information exchange and co-operation platform and combines the counter-terrorism efforts of 40, primarily law-enforcement and intelligence service forces on both, federal and state level working in Germany on religiously-motivated terrorism. To combat Islamist extremism/terrorism, the GTAZ provides excellent conditions for sharing information in real time, producing fast and targeted analyses of potential threats, and coordinating operational measures. Besides the BKA and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), The Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the 16 *Land* criminal police offices (LKA) and 16 *Land* offices for the protection of the Constitution, the Federal Prosecutor, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Central Office of the German Customs Investigation Service (ZKA), the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) also work within the GTAZ framework.

The main emphasis is put on rapid information exchange, coordination of operational measures and drafting joint assessments for both, operational and strategic purposes. Therefore the following different boards with changing representatives were set-up:

- Daily briefing
- Threat assessment
- Information board
- Assessment board
- Structural analysis
- Intelligence on potential jihadist terrorists
- Measures concerning the legal status of foreign residents.

(b) Practical aspects

- **General principles**

Germany does not have a threat assessment level system based on colours or numbers as it is considered to be a difficult system for communicating to the public. In addition a threat level system consequently requires links to certain measures. The German system provides a certain flexibility with regard to individual measures taken that are adjusted to the threat.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

The national crisis centres (crisis management staffs on federal level) are staffed only when a crisis occurs. The national contact points (NCP; in Germany, these are the Communications, Command and Control Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Crisis Response Centre at the Federal Foreign Office) operate round the clock (24/7 in shifts) and thus are always capable of rapidly alerting the national crisis structures in the event of an incident/crisis.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

In the event of a crisis, the crisis management staff (crisis task force) is headed by the minister or state secretary in the ministry responsible for the relevant area; if more than one ministry is affected, then it is headed by the state secretary of the ministry with the lead role (or, in cases when BMI and BMU or BMI and BMG are affected, jointly by two state secretaries; see in particular number II. 2 a. below ). In principle, the crisis management staff is always headed by the minister or state secretary responsible for the relevant area. The management staffs leadership changes only when the crisis mainly falls within the remit of another federal ministry. But there is no rotation system.

The first response will take place at local level where police, fire brigade and rescue service cooperate. Germany has different emergency lines: 110 for police matters and 112 for fire brigade and emergency services.

On April, 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 the service number 115 was introduced. It is a service to the population to provide general information on administrative issues. It also takes calls on public security issues, like a broken traffic light. In case of major incidents, the 115 number can also function as a call centre. The 115 operators divert emergency calls to the 110 and 112 numbers; the contrary is not foreseen.

The fire brigade staff is made up of professionals (in particular in cities) but it largely consist of volunteers. The fire brigade takes the lead at a large-scale incident scene, an example that follows the principle of "Rescue before Prosecution". Each emergency service has its individual commander on the scene. A technically fully-equipped mobile command centre to be used by all services involved in the disaster scene management is located at the scene.

Recovery operations are also within the responsibility of the local and/or Länder level. A robust mutual support system within the Länder is in place for large scale operations.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- **The example of the city of Berlin**

The Länder structures within the Police and the Fire Brigade (FB) of the city of Berlin provide an example for dealing with crisis and consequence management at Länder level.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

If the incident is a disaster, the measures defined in the disaster protection law (like the involvement of Armed Forces, THW, the Red Cross and operators from different infrastructure) are applied.

An inter-governmental Working Group chaired by the Ministry of Interior of the City of Berlin meets at least four times in a year in order to define disaster management plans and responses. Once a year the Heads of the partners involved meet each other to define the main strategic goals.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

When the Working Group of Infrastructure Operators gather around a table, public authorities' representatives and critical infrastructures operators work on developing strategic and operational response plans. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- **Internal coordination**

Arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack are made by the *Länder* as part of their responsibility for police threat prevention. Arrangements to deal with an attack on critical infrastructures are made in close consultation with the *Länder*. The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) provides expert support and advice in close cooperation with the *Länder*.

In the event of a terrorist attack, the guidelines for cooperation between the BKA and the *Länder* police forces in cases of terrorism and politically motivated violent crime of nation-wide significance apply. These guidelines specify the division of responsibilities and the form of cooperation between participating police forces in the event of attack.

The tactics called for by the guidelines are regularly checked to make sure they are up to date and are the subject of agreements between the BKA and the participating *Länder* police forces. The guidelines are based on a resolution adopted by the Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the *Länder* (IMK) on 10 May 2001.

- External cooperation

The Federal Ministry of the Interior's crisis task force is responsible for coordination and the exchange of information (communication) with the EU and third countries at the strategic-political level in the event of a crisis if no German interests abroad are affected.

In normal situations, the Federal Ministry of the Interior's Communications, Command and Control Centre is the national contact point for its counterparts in the EU and third countries with regard to all matters concerning the police and counter-terrorism, civil protection and disaster preparedness. If German interests abroad are affected (in particular when Germans require protection and assistance as a result of attacks, abduction, accidents, disasters, military conflict, etc.), then the Federal Government's Crisis Management Commissioner and/or the Crisis Response Centre at the Federal Foreign Office are responsible for coordinating communication.

Important measures of international counter-terrorism consist of intensive bi - and multilateral information-sharing of various kinds, permanent and incident-related expansion of the BKA's network of liaison officers and its training and equipment assistance, the utilization and expansion of international cooperation frameworks and the possibility of setting up joint investigation teams at EU level in future.

In the event of an attack, the BKA network of liaison officers ensures especially intensive international cooperation. And the reciprocal deployment of specialized liaisons at the relevant authorities within the affected countries is especially important.

- Coherence between consequence management and crisis management

Arrangements for managing the consequences of a terrorist incident are part of the national crisis management facilities which lie within the responsibility of the *Länder*. The Federation assists the *Länder* within the framework of augmented disaster management.

At the political-strategic level, the federal and *Länder* crisis management systems and structures are largely standardized. Owing to Germany's federal structure, there is no single national crisis management facility at the operational-tactical level. In the event of a terrorist attack in which the BKA assumes responsibility for law enforcement tasks, the BKA's State Security Division oversees operations. A special project team (BAO) is set up within the State Security Division in this case. The BAO is a temporary unit primarily intended to concentrate the necessary and wide range of investigative and search measures. The BAO works closely with the responsible federal and *Länder* authorities to ensure an uninterrupted exchange of incident-related information.

The exchange of general counter-terrorism information between the various federal and *Länder* security authorities is conducted via designated channels, expert conferences, project groups and certain forums for cooperation such as the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) specifically for the field of Islamist extremism/terrorism.

### **2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED** The Federal Ministry of the Interior's crisis task force at political (federal) level has no competences relating to cross-border targets. It has no authority to issue instructions to the operational-tactical crisis task forces of the *Länder* authorities. The Federal Ministry of the Interior's crisis task force performs an exclusively coordinating function between the *Länder* and ensures communication with the relevant facilities abroad at the political-strategic level.

International cooperation is governed by paragraph 3 of the Act on the Bundeskriminalamt and the Cooperation between Federal and State Authorities in Criminal Police Matters (BKAG).

Under the Act, the BKA is the ***Federal Republic of Germany's National Central Bureau*** for the International Criminal Police Organization Interpol. The BKA is responsible for the official relations between Germany's federal and *Länder* police forces and the police and judicial authorities and any other responsible public agencies in other countries necessary to prevent or prosecute crime.

Further, Article 39 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement governs law enforcement cooperation between the EU Member States; on the basis of this convention, the Federal Republic of Germany has concluded bi- and multilateral treaties on law enforcement cooperation with the EU's neighbouring countries.

The responsible ministers of Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria signed a multilateral treaty on stepping up cross-border cooperation, *particularly to combat terrorism*, cross-border crime and illegal migration (Treaty of Prüm).<sup>1</sup> The Treaty significantly improves the exchange of information between the signatories for the purpose of preventing and prosecuting crime.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the deployment of the THW forces within the country and abroad.

#### **2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

---

<sup>1</sup> Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, of 27 May 2005.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**



### **3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

#### **3.1. Training/exercises for testing the National Crisis Centre and communication systems in the event of a terrorist attack**

The Conference of the Ministers of Interior led to a "New Strategy for the Protection of the Population" that was enacted in 2002. This strategy also identified the need for exercises on the political-administrative level (strategic crisis management).

Since 2004 the Federal Republic of Germany carries out a major crisis management exercise (LÜKEX) at regular intervals (every two years) with the participation of several *Länder*.

The primary goal of the LÜKEX<sup>1</sup> crisis management exercise is to test crisis management structures and procedures, task force structures and cooperation with the *Länder* at the political-strategic level in the event of interregional threats, large-scale emergencies and disasters.

The concept is meant to improve Federal and *Länder* Government crisis management at strategic level, to involve the political level, to enhance interdisciplinary cooperation, to establish and improve networks. An important element of the exercise is capability building. An objective is to develop crisis response structures, not just to test them. This is why the preparation of the exercise itself is conceptualised as a comprehensive learning process and is very resource-demanding. Consequently LÜKEX involves the players as early as in the preparation stage by improving the participant's capabilities through on-site coaching.

---

<sup>1</sup> Joint federal-state crisis management exercise at strategic level in which the ministries, subordinate agencies, relief organizations, associations and private companies all participate.

In different workshops before the final exercise the participants develop strategic and operational responses on the exercise scenario:

- "follow-on" attacks (directed to rescue teams)
- psychological aspects of crisis management
- detection, decontamination and/or treatment of contaminated injured persons
- risk and crisis communication.

So far three LÜKEX have been conducted:

- 2004: Power black-out, terrorist attack
- 2005: World Championship 2006, terrorist threat and natural disasters
- 2007: Pandemic (Influenza)

The following exercises are in preparation or planned:

- 2009/2010: Dirty bomb

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

LÜKEX is structured as a strategic staff framework exercise, and not as a full-scale exercise.

During the execution phase, up to 3.000 persons from the crisis staff of the Federal Government, the exercising Länder and other participants from private operators (mainly CI) are/were involved. In the framework of these exercises, communication, media and public relations activities play a significant role.

The scenarios for these interregional exercises are drafted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior's Crisis Management Office in consultation with the ministerial leadership (State Secretary for security). The basic scenario is then elaborated under the supervision of the LÜKEX project team based at the Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection within the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, in close coordination with the governments of the participating *Länder* and districts. The lessons learned from the exercise are shared with all states and relevant stakeholders, and federal states can also participate as observers.

The exercise has proven very helpful in discovering gaps, weak spots and in generating incentives to federal states as well as other stakeholders to actively improve their systems and coordination.

In addition, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and its subordinate authorities test their crisis management in an annual table-top exercise using various scenarios.

A number of (police) agencies, public safety organizations and federal and *Länder* institutions also take part in cross-border (disaster) exercises.

The *Länder*, districts, cities and towns also carry out a number of exercises at the operational level.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

### **3.2. Training/exercises for testing the efficiency of the communications systems**

All communications systems available to the participating crisis response teams are used and tested during the LÜKEX exercises and in the framework of these exercises, communication, media and public relations activities play a particular significant role.

An exercise specifically devoted to the communications systems of the Federal Ministry of Interior and its remit was held in October 2006 (Hermes 06).

At national level, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance is commissioned by the Crisis Management Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior to draft exercises to test the communications systems, with expert participation and advice from the ministry's Office of the Chief Information Officer and the Federal Office for Information Security.

At the local and regional level, the *Länder* are responsible for the installation, management and repairs of the communication systems.

#### 4. SOFT TARGETS

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

#### 5. GOOD PRACTICES

- The organisation of the state on a federal basis is conceived in such a way as not to be detrimental to the coherence of overall arrangements and not to cause organisational deficiencies. Coordination between local and federal missions seems to be organised harmoniously and does not give rise to lacunae or overlapping. From the assessment of the threat, then through the planning stage to the organisation of assistance, every aspect appears to be well covered.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The BSI with responsibilities in different areas (public authorities, private enterprises and citizens) is an excellent example of building communication security issues into one body. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- The structure and functioning of GTAZ (Federal Republic of Germany's Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre), combining the counter-terrorism efforts of 40 forces working in Germany on religiously motivated-terrorism, allow an effective assessment of threat.
- **The strategic exercises "LÜKEX"**. These exercises have been organised on a bi-annual basis, whereby the preparation of the exercise stretches over a period of 12-16 months when individual actors (at federal as well as state level, public and private stakeholders, civil and military authorities) are already actively involved and coached for the exercise itself. In this way, the exercise not only serves to test the existing structures, processes and coordination, but also helps develop the capacities of the relevant participating bodies.
- An interesting practice is the **voluntary based** operations of the **Federal Technical Relief Agency (THW)**, which provides concrete technical support (on request) in the field of civil protection in dealing with disasters, large-scale emergencies and accidents. Ca. 80 000 of its staff are volunteers and 800 are full time professionals, organised from local to nation-wide levels. While the predominance of the voluntary element may pose certain challenges (concerning e.g. professionalism, availability of volunteers, availability of a wide range of skills), so far, the system has proven its robustness in Germany. The broad volunteer base at the same time represents a considerable outreach to the population and a certain level of awareness and crisis management competences widely spread across the societal structures.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- The following recommendations can be made:

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

## 7. ANNEX

### 7.1. Speakers

- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI)  
**NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Counter-Terrorism
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Division ÖSII1: Legal and General Affairs of Counter-Terrorism
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Division ÖSII2: International Counter-Terrorism Matters
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Division KM1: Crisis Management Coordination Centre
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, KM4: Critical infrastructure protection
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, KM2, Civil Protection - Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster assistance; EU and NATO disaster management matters

- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, ÖSII
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, KM1
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, BMI, Project Group on Digital Radio for Security Authorities and Organizations (PG DBOS)
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** BMI, IT5: Federal IT infrastructures and IT security management
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Berlin Senate Department for the Interior, III B 2
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, BBK
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** THW association for Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Federal Criminal Police (BKA), ZD37
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, BKA, ST 33
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Federal Police Headquarters, Head of Division 21
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, Federal Police Headquarters, Head of Division 31
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED** (Interpreters)

## 7.2. Expert team

### Council General Secretariat

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED** Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

### European Commission

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

DG JLS - Directorate D - Unit F1

### Europol

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Serious Crime Department – Counter-Terrorism

**Sweden**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Swedish Security Service (SAEPO)

**Latvia**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Counter-Terrorism Centre

Ministry of the Interior

---