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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 5 March 2010**

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ADD 19 EXT 1 (09.07.13)**

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**ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE**

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from : The Council General Secretariat  
to : Working Party on Terrorism

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Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation  
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

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Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Estonia** (6-8 May 2009) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

1.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
2.	ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK .....	5
2.1.	Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres.....	5
2.2.	National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack .....	11
3.	TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK.....	15
4.	SOFT TARGETS .....	16
5.	GOOD PRACTICES .....	16
6.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	18
7.	ANNEX .....	19
7.1.	Presentations were made by the following institutions.....	19
7.2.	Expert Team.....	20

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluation covering "Preparedness and consequence management in case of a terrorist attack" an evaluation visit was made to Estonia from 06 to 08 May 2009.
- The Republic of Estonia is a country in which no large-scale terrorist incidents have taken place. It is however worth mentioning the Märt Ringmaa case (several improvised explosive devices that caused 7 fatalities over the period 1994-2005, although not motivated by the definition of terrorism), and the cyber-attack on government institutions in 2007.

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- A major problem regarding security in Estonia is posed by the huge amount of explosives remaining from the World Wars and the Soviet Army during the occupation period. Despite counteractions and the successful inter-institutional campaign "Report Explosives", the amount of illegal explosives that are still in circulation is significant. In 2008 227,9kg of explosives, 38,1 kg of gunpowder, 2641 detonators for different use, 543 grenades, 760 different mines and missiles, 32 453 cartridges with different calibres and 29 firearms were detected and removed. In 2008 the overall number of unexploded ordnance was 3409.

- The Ministry of the Interior has the main role in crisis management, carrying out risk assessment in order to identify emergencies which may occur in its area of government, plan the use of resources necessary for responding to an emergency, direct the response to an emergency in its area of government and organise crisis management training in its area of government.
  
- The following organisations are under the responsibility of the MOI:
  - The Estonian Security Police Board (KAPO)
  - The Estonian Police Board (EPB)
  - The Board of the Border Guard
  - The Citizenship and Migration Board
  - Estonian Rescue Board (ERB)
  
- Based on the Government coalition's programme for the period 2007-2011, the Estonian Parliament adopted on 6 May 2009 a new regulation aiming at the merging of the EPB, the Border Guard Board and the Citizenship and Migration Board into one board. This process is expected to be finalised by 31 December 2009. The objective of this reform is a “one-stop shop” approach in order to streamline services, optimise the use of resources and make their use more flexible.
  
- The Security Police Board (KAPO) is responsible for operational crisis management in the event of a terrorist incident or other security-related incidents like hijacking, piracy or hostage taking for political reasons.
  
- The security community in the Republic of Estonia is relatively small and mutually interconnected. Many subjects share the relevant equipment, communication and cooperation seems to be based not only on formal, but also on informal links.
  
- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:

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## **2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

### **2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres**

Estonia does not have a formal National Crisis Centre. Instead of an NCC there is a decentralised system of crisis management. The organisation, direction and co-ordination of the response to emergencies in the event of terrorist actions is implemented at two levels, strategic and operational. On a strategic level the Government Security Committee (GSC) coordinates the activities of security agencies including the Security Police Board and the Information Board. The chairman is the PM, the members are the Minister of Defence (MOD), the MOI, the Minister of Justice (MOJ), the Minister of Finance (MOF) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

The system of crisis management is based on three main legal documents:

- Emergency Act (EA);
- Emergency response plans;
- Resource catalogue of emergency response plans.

The Government Crisis Committee (GCC) consists of 17 members and is chaired by the MOI. The members are the permanent secretaries of ministries, the Directors-General of the different boards and senior officials from the State Chancellery. The GCC meets quarterly in order to discuss strategic planning topics. It develops and submits crisis management proposals to the Government; it coordinates crisis management planning and preparedness planning of government agencies. .

In the Ministry of the Interior, the Rescue and Crisis Management Policy Department has following tasks:

- 1) developing and organising the implementation of a state crisis management policy based on the Emergency Act;
- 2) organising the work of the Crisis Management Committee of the Government of the Republic and enforcing decisions adopted by the Crisis Management Committee of the Government of the Republic;
- 3) assisting in organising nationwide exercises;
- 4) coordinating the crisis management related activities of the institutions in the Ministry's area of government;
- 5) representing the interests of the Republic of Estonia in international crisis management related activity concerning protection of the population, including developing NATO and European Union crisis management policy pertaining to the population.

**The Ministry of the Interior (MoI)** is responsible for the strategic and operational management of crisis situations, including terrorist incidents. Any incident involving casualties is automatically reported to the MoI. It coordinates the information flow of civilian and military sources and is responsible for the agencies that deal on an operational level with the crisis: the Police Board, the Security Police Board, the Border Guard and the Rescue Board. Guidelines have been drawn up outlining the different responsibilities and competencies of the agencies. The MoI decides in cases of competence disagreements between the agencies and may appoint a crisis manager to take the lead in a particular crisis situation. MoI has access to all relevant information and provides the link to external partners. In the event of a major and prolonged crisis situation a crisis management committee can be convened, which may form specific crisis teams and which links to the political decision makers.

Estonia is in the process of renewing its legislation concerning internal security. One major aspect is the merging of the police, border guard and migration board into a single agency. After finalisation of the process, the unified corps will consist of 7 000 sworn officers as well as heavy equipment (helicopters, ships). This will create a more efficient force, able to deal not only with day-to-day threats but also possible terrorist events; it will also constitute a single point of contact for citizens, always aiming at offering a better service. In addition, it will help to reduce costs, and will presumably reduce the risk of conflicts between different institutions..

The **Security Police Board (Kaitsepolitseiamet, KAPO)**<sup>1</sup> is an internal intelligence service with police competences who plays a key role in the security concept of Estonia.

The KAPO was separated from the EPB in 1993 and became a security authority in 2001. It is responsible for operational crisis management in the event of a terrorist incident or some other security-related incident. Its competencies are established by law and include:

- prevention of terrorist attacks in Estonia;
- counterespionage;
- protection of the constitutional order and territorial integrity;
- protection of state secrets;
- risk management (gathering of relevant information);
- international counterterrorism cooperation;
- fight against financing of terrorism<sup>2</sup>
- some tasks relating to protection of vital services or objects under high-risk attack; fight against high-level corruption.<sup>3</sup>

KAPO can directly access police databases and in case of need can also obtain “capacities, information and resources” from the Police Board (to close off perimeters, for translation etc.).

With regard to countering terrorism, the KAPO is responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis, police jurisdiction and crisis management at tactical level.

KAPO was re-established out of the police force in March 1991 and is subordinated to the MoI. There is a close cooperation between the political and strategic decision-makers and the operational level. KAPO also has its own small SWAT team to carry out specific operations.

A communication strategy is being developed to facilitate communication with the public in the event of an incident which falls within their competency. One major challenge, however, is to find a way to communicate more with the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in an emergency case, as this part of the population usually uses besides Estonian media and television also Russian media sources.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.kapo.ee/eng\\_index.html](http://www.kapo.ee/eng_index.html)

<sup>2</sup> in cooperation with Central Criminal Police

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.kapo.ee/eng\\_korruptsioon.html](http://www.kapo.ee/eng_korruptsioon.html). According to the Government decree no 193 July 19<sup>th</sup> 2007, the investigation of corruption cases of 6 biggest Estonian cities are under the competence of the Security Police.



The **Estonian Rescue Board (ERB)** is responsible for rescue work in the event of a crisis. Four different regional rescue areas have been established in the country. ERB is the leading agency in five pre-defined major crisis scenarios (forest fires, explosions in industrial buildings, explosion/fire with many casualties, storms, flooding). In the event of a terrorist attack the ERB acts as supporting agency, mainly responsible for dealing with rescue work. It is subordinated to the Ministry of Interior with its 2670 employees (fire fighters, fire safety control, line 112 operators, bomb technicians, divers and dog-handlers, experts on crisis management and prevention).

**Fire rescue** There are 88 fire stations in the country (and 1950 fire fighters). Volunteers are called for help with fire extinguishing on a limited scale. Volunteer fire-fighters need permission by the employer to be released from his duties (that is not always possible). The management of the Rescue Board, focuses more on prevention campaigns for overall public (smoke detectors) and more specifically, to children (schools have to request them).

The **Estonian EOD Centre** focuses its resources on the recovery of explosives, which have become a major issue in recent years, mainly due to buried explosives left over from former conflicts, which are increasingly rising to the surface. In addition, demolition of IEDs, support of VIP protection, post blast investigation, managing bomb threats and bomb suspicions are other main activities. The civilian EOD team also supports the military and police forces, if requested. CBRN capabilities, however, are less developed.

Ordnance experts have more rights than the police forces (which may require evacuation of an area, penetration into buildings, etc.). Ordnance experts are also involved in so-called pre-forensic inspection carried out at the scene.

Ordnance experts also train police officers (to identify explosive system, IED)

As regards CBRN protection, Estonia is continuously improving its capabilities, through its missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ordnance experts are not specialised in accidents in chemical plants. There are 6 rescue units with chemical capabilities as well as EOD centre's capability to detect and decontaminate CBRN-related threat. "Dirty bombs" would be addressed by EOD in cooperation with fire-fighters. At the border crossings and ports are radiation monitors capable of detecting gamma and neutron radiation.

The Act on the evacuation of buildings was amended recently because teenagers were misusing the legal framework, to avoid tests and exams in the schools. The phenomenon of misuse is on the decrease, sanctions are having a deterrent effect and detection of perpetrators has also become more successful.

A campaign to develop awareness among children (with special emphasis on the group aged 11-13, which was previously the group most frequently connected with false alarms) has also been established, with positive results.

In the Estonian countryside is possible to find explosives from World Wars I and II and from the occupation period by the Soviet Union. This is a subject of interest to "collectors" who are either themselves looking for remnants of ordnance or are trying to purchase it to be exported (usually on a ship, thereby threatening the entire vessel). Possession of any kind of explosives is a crime in itself under Estonian law.

**112 Operational centre** is an independent part of the Rescue Board (with its own uniforms, ranks and educational system). The Unit operates in four operational centres (North, East, West and South). The unit's staff was until recently<sup>1</sup> recruited among firemen and healthcare specialists, and the Tallinn Branch (North) includes a doctor and a representative of the public administration (to address issues within the jurisdiction of the municipality).

A system that allows the position of all the medical and fire department vehicles to be pinpointed in real time is going to be introduced by 2011. It is also planned to install this system, developed with the cooperation of Switzerland so that every police unit on duty would be located through his TETRA portable system.

The 112 Operational Centre does not aim at present for complete centralisation. Certain considerations are being assessed, such as the merging of lines 110 and 112, and the establishment of 2 operational centres instead of 4, but no decisions have been taken yet.

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<sup>1</sup> Nowadays personnel is recruited from the external job market. Special qualification will be acquired in rescue education system.

One final point: health care facilities in Estonia are fully privatised. The State only prescribes certain standards for the performance of their practice.

The **Estonian Police Board** and the **Central Criminal Police** form the regular Estonian police force to deal with the prosecution of criminals. The police board coordinates the activities of the police agencies while the Central Criminal Police (staff of 262 people) deals mainly with international organised crime and other forms of serious crime in Estonia, using intelligence methods and relying on special operating teams. Only this body within the police can use special investigative techniques and is responsible for witness protection.

The Central Criminal Police is also responsible for:

- financial investigation and the fight against financing of terrorism (part of the service is a Financial Analytical Unit);
- international police cooperation (Interpol, Europol, Sirene, liaison officers agenda).

This force cooperates closely with other relevant agencies such as the Security Police. The Estonian police also seem to have very far-reaching competences in terms of access to databases. In case needed, the police, for instance, has the access to the databases of the health insurance services in order to identify the addresses of suspects.

The State Informatics Center and **Estonian CERT** give advice to governmental institutions and private entities in the field of cyber-security. The agency provides guidance for policy-making bodies (e.g. Cyber Security Council and Council on Vital Services Continuity) but also on the working level (e.g. Ministries). However, with just five permanent staff members, human resources in this body are rather scarce. Unlike similar institutions in other Member States, CERT does provide assistance to the public in limited scale, e.g. warning of cyber risks or providing public domain software.

CERT-EE (RIA Agency)<sup>1</sup> is subordinated to the State Informatics Centre, which is integrated within the structure of the Ministry of the Economic Affairs and Communications. However, CERT-EE networks are physically separate from other public networks. CERT-EE does not specialise merely in the issues of terrorism or deliberate attacks in general, but monitors the internet traffic and manages routine cyber incidences.

According to the Estonian Cyber Security Strategy, the early warning and advising capabilities of CERT-EE will be strengthened. In addition to CERT, the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Unit has been established under the same agency in September 2009 which primary objective is to support and advice the critical companies and agencies in information security issues, coordinate information exchange and cyber incidence management.

## **2.2. National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack**

The overall Estonian Crisis Management System (ECMS) is based on four pillars:

- Prevention
- Preparedness
- Response
- Recovery

The ECMS envisages three levels of emergencies:

- Emergency: big/large event;
- Emergency Situation: natural disaster, catastrophe or infectious disease, has to be declared by the Government;
- State of Emergency: law and order or existence of the Government is under threat, has to be declared by the Parliament.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://ww.ria.ee>

No Emergency Situations or States of Emergency have been declared in Estonia to date.

The MOI has identified 26 emergency scenarios<sup>1</sup>. Risk analysis and emergency response plans have been drafted in cooperation with competent authorities involved. This methodology and procedure were approved by the GCC in October 2008.

Crisis management is envisaged from the bottom to the top in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity :

- Municipal Crisis Committee (227 municipalities)
- Territorial Crisis Sub-Committee of regional crisis committee if decided so
- 4 Regional Crisis Committees
- Government Crisis Committee

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<sup>1</sup> Major maritime (oil) pollution;  
Major coastal (oil) pollution;  
Major inner-country environmental pollution;  
Major forest and all-terrain fires;  
Major fires and explosions in industrial buildings and warehouses;  
Major fire, explosion or collapse, which requires evacuation or creates a need for medical aid for at least tens and hundreds of people;  
Storm;  
Flood;  
Murrain (animal disease);  
Large-scale aeroplane accident;  
Large-scale train accident which creates a need for medical aid for at least tens and hundreds of people (accident to passenger train);  
Large-scale train accident which causes environmental pollution (accident with goods train);  
Large-scale ship accident;  
Large-scale transport accident on road;  
Extremely cold weather;  
Extremely hot weather;  
Epidemic;  
Mass poisoning;  
Domestic radiological incident;  
Cross-border nuclear incident;  
Riot on streets;  
Riot in prison;  
Hostage incident;  
Mass refugee immigration;  
Massive cyber-attack;  
Major financial emergency (shortage of cash, problems in electronic pay-system etc).

In the field of crisis management KAPO is responsible for incidents involving hostage-taking for political objectives, hijacking of planes, and acts of terrorism. In those cases the K-Commando will go under command of the Security Police.

In the event of an incident with casualties KAPO takes over as soon as the Rescue Board has finished its work at the crime scene, i.e. when there is no imminent danger to human lives.

However, the conditions of and responsibility for this change of competences are determined on the ground by the forces present. In cases of competence disagreement, however, the MoI will assume its command role and decide on the leadership.

KAPO is also responsible for communication in the event of a terrorist attack. **NOT**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Within KAPO, are trained experts who are authorised to communicate with the public. **NOT**

**DECLASSIFIED**

The police are supported by about 2 000 - 3 000 registered volunteers. They usually come from an environment in which social pressure exists to promote voluntary assistance to the police (some of them are even members of parliament). Volunteers are very disciplined. After a comprehensive check, a volunteer is treated as a "normal" police officer who in certain cases might be equipped with a car, a gun and access to information systems. Volunteers can by definition, although in practice very seldomly implemented, also assist the Criminal Police. Volunteers are quite often tasked (and paid) by relevant municipalities.

#### *2.2.1. Communications systems in case of a terrorist attack*

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According to the Electronic Communications Act, imposition of restrictions, in the interests of public order and national security, on radio communications is permitted by the following authorities in the following cases:

1. by the Defence Forces, within the territory of objects with a national defence purpose which are marked correspondingly;
2. by prisons, within their territories;
3. by the crisis management committee of the Government of the Republic or the head of a crisis management team, for management of crisis in crisis areas;
4. authorities responsible for internal security, for providing security protection in areas of occurrence of events which require heightened security;
5. authorities responsible for internal security, for prevention of explosion risk in areas of potential explosion risk.

The list of events which require heightened security specified in clause 4 of this section (see above) and the procedure for restriction of radio communications are established by the Government of the Republic. It is the task of the person responsible for the protection measures of the event to decide whether in terms of security it is possible to provide information on imposing restriction on radio communications. The same person will notify Technical Surveillance Authority on possible time and premises about restricting radio communications not later than 1 day before the event. In case earlier notification is not possible, it could be done 1 day after the event.

Since 2009, the police in Estonia “do not use paper”. The entire agenda is digitised. The administration of information systems is centralised (computers, telephones); the prefectures do not deal with it separately.

The use of existing information systems by the police (and intelligence) forces in Estonia is de facto unlimited. Relevant security forces can “look” into literally all possible databases (medical treatment, accommodation, vehicle registration, unemployment, insurance, register of offences, database of local administration and local government, etc.) only in accordance what has been stipulated in the legal framework.

Information systems (wireless Intranet, accessible in all police offices and cars, as well as in all SIS II countries) in general contain only non-classified data (with one exception – a database of informants). It is claimed that the system is technically well protected. Information systems are mutually interconnected (GIS, database of justice etc.).

### **3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK**

Exercises to test the availability of the members of the GCC are conducted regularly. A crisis management exercise is conducted every four years in the framework of emergency preparedness.

In Estonia in 2006 an exercise called Pandora took place. The basis of the scenario was a large proportion of the population falling sick and a simultaneous economic breakdown. Competent political bodies were present during the entire exercise. It was followed by a number of legislative and organisational changes (e.g. to deal with lack of beds in hospitals or lack of capacity to quarantine).

In 2011 the MOI will organise a national crisis management exercise, involving Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, the Netherlands and United Kingdom. The scenario will be based on a fictional radiological incident at an airport.

Crisis communication is regularly practised, with a special focus on the availability of persons to handle communications. Exchange and assessment of information are tested as well as the flow of information. The cooperation between different parties involved in crisis management and the technical resources available are tested as well. The KAPO is the responsible body for the drafting of the relevant exercise scenarios.



Equally important to mention is the participation of the EOD/IED teams and the police in each other's training activities. This has made it possible to develop cooperation and to become more dynamic and interactive in management of real situations.

#### **4. SOFT TARGETS**

The Emergency Act defines 41 vital services (Critical Infrastructure), grouped in 12 sectors. The responsibility for preparing the risk analysis and continuity plan lies with the service supplier. Cooperation between authorities and private partners has just started and will be developed further through dialogue. Ensuring the security of vital services is considered one of the important issues to be dealt with.

#### **5. GOOD PRACTICES**

- Estonia has made an effort to reduce the number of agencies involved in a crisis situation by merging various agencies into one emergency body. This will reduce costs, improve the accessibility of the service to the citizen and help to avoid conflicts of interest and competencies. Although Estonia is a comparatively small country, where such an administrative reform might prove easier, the Estonian example may encourage other Member States to examine whether merging agencies may also create synergies and provide clear responsibilities.
- The key players in the Estonian security community seem to know each other very well, which facilitates crisis management. This is due to the fact that there is much exchange of personnel among the authorities.
- The MoI has developed a list of 26 different emergency scenarios in order to prepare individual response plans for each incident. Although the list seems to be very long and may contain some duplication, the concept of developing standard operation procedures for specific scenarios may help to respond more quickly and effectively in an emergency, provided the emergency plans provide for a suitable degree of flexibility.

- There is a very elaborate volunteering system in the country (Defence League, volunteers who assist the police). To improve co-operation with the police, a framework agreement between the General Staff of the Defence League and the Police Board is concluded annually. According to the agreement, the setting up of public order protection units has been started at all Defence League regional units. The units comprise members of the Defence League with the status of assistant policemen, who help police officers in the protection of public order and in crises can also perform the tasks of the military police. In addition to direct military training, the Defence League provides its members with many other skills and experiences necessary in life. Using the first aid and paramedical skills acquired in the Training Group, members of the Defence League have frequently acted rapidly and decisively, saving many fellow citizens whose life has been in danger.
- Cooperation of ordnance services: There are 2 demining forces in the country: one is involved in the emergency service (the largest one; daily activities, public campaigns etc.); another is military (often abroad);. The forces train together, and exercises involving detonations are carried out also in military territory.
- Cooperation of SWAT units. There are 4 forces in the country which, however, engage in joint training activities and - depending on the situation - joint interventions as well: military team (intervenes on its own in purely military situations, often abroad), K-Commando Criminal Police. **NOT DECLASSIFIED** .Law Enforcement Police team (acts independently in cases of street riots), Prison Service team (suppressing unrest in prisons) and KAPO team (acts on its own in cases where the highest confidentiality level is required). As part of the teams' training, various situations are practised.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

## **7. ANNEX**

### **7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions**

- Cabinet of the Secretary General of the Internal Security System
- National Council for the Civil Emergency Planning
- Integrated System of Security and Emergency Networks
- National Authority for Civil Protection
- Army General Staff
- National Institute for Medical emergency
- Judiciary Police
- Intervention Unit of the National Republican Guard
- Special Police Unit of the Public Security Police
- Security and Intelligence Service
- Technological and Nuclear Institute

## 7.2. Expert Team

### Council General Secretariat

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Police and Customs Cooperation Unit - DG Justice and Home Affairs

### European Commission

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Directorate General, Justice, Freedom and Security

### Europol

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Serious Crime Department – Counter Terrorism

### Germany

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Federal Ministry of the Interior

Division P II 1 (Counter Terrorism: Policy and Legal Affairs)

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