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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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
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ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE

from : The Council General Secretariat
to : Working Party on Terrorism

Subject : Second Round of Peer Evaluation
Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack

Delegations will find enclosed the report of the evaluation mission in **Hungary** (2-4 July 2008) in the framework of the above-mentioned round of peer evaluation.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the framework of the second round of peer evaluations covering "Preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack", an evaluation visit was made to Hungary from 2 to 4 July 2008.
- In general terms, Hungary pays attention to new and emerging threats, like international terrorism, the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational organised crime.

However, Hungary cannot today be considered a target of international terrorism. The national authorities do not consider any major risk to exist in this field and no terrorist case or event related to the threat from international terrorism has been recorded.

In addition, there is no evidence regarding the presence of Al-Qaida and/or affiliated organisations in Hungary.

However the presence of sympathisers of such groups cannot be ruled out and it is considered that Hungary could be used as a transit country.

The Muslim community in Hungary is relatively small compared to those in other Member States and it is not considered a risk factor from the point of view of national security.

Cases of radicalisation are not significant, and existing incidents mainly concern individuals who have expressed verbally their radical positions. The only potential danger comes theoretically from the small number of Hungarian converts led by a religious zealot, and it is greater than the threat from native Muslims.

The low level of terrorist threat to the country is not expected to change in the near future. The risk elements are the following: military presence in ISAF and KFOR, NATO membership, presence of Hungarian citizens in certain regions and a more significant negative change in the international environment.

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- During the past few years the Hungarian administration has developed important reforms of its national structures. In 2006 the number of ministries was reduced from 15 to 12. In the case of the Ministry of Interior the main part was integrated into the Ministry of Justice, which led to a change of name to Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement. In August 2006 the National Directorate General for Disaster Management was transferred to the competence of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. In May 2008 new governmental reforms led to the separation of this latter, and the National Directorate General for Disaster Management remained under the competence of the newly formed Ministry of Local Government. During the same period (January 2008) the Border Guard was integrated into the National Police.

However, up to now no large-scale exercises have taken place which would allow an evaluation of the coordination of these new administrative arrangements, and in particular coordination between the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development.

- The main recommendations resulting from this evaluation mission focus on the following areas:
 1. The new Hungarian ministerial organisation that places the fire brigade outside the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement should be tested on a large-scale exercise.
 2. The National Situation Centre (NSC) functions well, but nevertheless the process of deciding who takes the lead in the response to a crisis should be clarified, in order to ensure transparency and expediency of decision-making in the event of a crisis.
 3. Hungary clearly possesses a broad range of informal contacts, which would be very useful in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, such links need to be formalised so that there is a clear path to follow in case international cooperation is required during a crisis.
 4. Regular exercises involving neighbouring countries (EU Member States or third countries) should be organised.

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2. ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

2.1. Structures and organisational framework of National Crisis Centres

2.1.1. *Main competences of authorities*

The **National Situation Centre (NSC)** within the Ministry of Local Government assumes the role of a central analysis and assessment body in the event of crisis situations surpassing the capabilities of individual sectoral ministries responsible for Civil Emergency Planning¹. The Minister for Local Government is responsible for the management of the NSC.

The NSC is primarily a tool for preparing Government decisions, by supplying the Government's Cabinet for National Security with relevant information.

The NSC is a well-developed structure, which brings together various ministerial and police representatives in the event of a crisis. Consequently, the NSC is able to aggregate information from multiple sources, with a view to providing decision-makers with a single analytical product, which can be used as the basis for a national or local response to a crisis. As such, the NSC functions as a sort of "fusion centre" for information.

Furthermore, the NSC has special responsibilities if the level of alert is established as B, C or D by the Minister for Justice and Law Enforcement when considering the terrorist threat to Hungary.

The general role of the NSC is set out in Government Decree No 2010/2002 (I.25.) on national tasks stemming from NATO Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency Planning.

¹ Civil Emergency Planning to be construed as a national civil emergency planning based on NATO Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency Planning.

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2.1.2. Escalation of the response – priorities:

Law enforcement authorities use a four-level scale where the threat level rises from A to D.

According to the characteristics of the terrorist threat to Hungary, the threat levels and the corresponding states of readiness are marked A,B,C and D. The threat level should be established in accordance with the actual level of threat, and if any threat level is invoked, measures pertaining to lower levels of threat are also implemented if necessary (without declaring a constitutional state of emergency or introducing a special legal order).

An imminent threat or the execution of a terrorist attack in Hungary corresponds to level D. The special functions according to terrorism threat levels A, B, C and D are ruled by Joint Directive No 9/2007 (IK 8.) of the Minister for Justice and Law Enforcement and the Minister for Local Government and Regional Development on the integrated implementation of actions against terrorism.

The Minister responsible for law enforcement is entitled to invoke threat levels (for the whole country or a part thereof). The threat levels are the following:

- **A** : "The threat level A could be invoked if the threat of a terrorist incident is detected in any Member State of the EU or NATO or in any neighbouring country."
- **B**: "The threat level B could be invoked if a terrorist incident has taken place in any Member State of the EU or NATO or in any neighbouring country and if its effects on Hungary are unpredictable, however the situation does not justify the invocation of a higher threat level. Threat level B should be maintained until there is a high probability that the threat to Hungary can be excluded.
- **C**: "The threat level C could be invoked if information, verified or partially verified, indicates an increase in the level of threat or a specific risk to Hungary. The level C should be maintained until verified information indicates a decrease in the level of threat.

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- **D:** "The threat level D could be invoked if specific information indicates the imminent risk of a terrorist incident in Hungary or that a criminal offence with serious consequences has been committed or a similar event has taken place in Hungarian territory which might have a connection with international terrorism. Threat level D should be maintained as long as the level of threat exists, the consequences have not been dealt with and until measures corresponding to this threat level effectively facilitate the investigation and arrest of perpetrators and the prevention of further terrorist incidents."

2.1.3. - *The National Situation Centre (NSC)*

2.1.3.1. Description

The following structures may be called to attend the work of the NSC:

Prime Minister's Office

National Security Bureau

Civil security services (National Security Office, Information Office, Special Service for National Security)

Centre for e-Government

Ministry of Local Government

National Directorate General for Disaster Management (integrated headquarters of the civil protection and fire service)

Ministry of Health

National Public Health and Medical Officer Service

National Ambulance Service

Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ministry for National Development and Economy

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Ministry of Transport, Telecommunications and Energy

Ministry of Defence

General Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces

Military security services (Military Intelligence Office, Military Security Office)


Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

Headquarters of the National Police

Headquarters of the Prison Service

Office of Immigration and Nationality



Ministry of the Environment and Water Management

National Meteorological Service

National Water Management Centre

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Culture and Education

Ministry of Finance

Headquarters of the Customs and Finance Guard

- Private entities

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Nuclear Power Plant of Paks Ltd.

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2.1.3.2. The legal framework

The NSC does not have direct cooperation with EU structures and similar centres in third countries (either in crisis situations or in normal circumstances). Cooperation is pursued indirectly, i.e. by way of other structures (National Directorate General for Disaster Management).

When it is established that a civil protection emergency or a disaster situation has been caused by a terrorist incident (e.g. attack against installations, bombing in crowded places), the specific arrangements for handling the terrorist incident (arrangements attributed to terrorism threat level D and other procedures¹) are applied in parallel and in coordination with the arrangements for the management of the emergency or disaster situation. When the terrorist incident does not trigger a civil protection emergency or a disaster situation (e.g. hostage taking, hijacking), only the specific arrangements for handling the terrorist incident are applied.

2.1.4. The staff

The NSC has permanent staff composed of three groups: The *Duty Communication and PR Group* and the *Logistics and Technical Support Group* are permanent structures made up of designated staff from the Ministry of Local Government and sectoral experts. Standard criteria (work experience, sectoral expertise, etc.) are applied for the designation of the permanent staff.

When activated² the NSC is supported by the Analysis and Assessment Group, reinforced with sectoral experts as required by the nature of the crisis situation, and the Decision Making Group. When activated in connection with terrorism threat level B, C or D, the Analysis and Assessment Group becomes a special Crisis Steering Group, led by the State Secretary for Law Enforcement of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.

¹ Such as coordination of operational actions by the civil and military security services and the national police in the framework of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee established by Government Decree No 2339/2005. (X.28.) on the operational coordination of detection of terrorism and the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee.

² The National Situation Centre is activated when a major crisis situation occurs or when the terrorism threat level is designated as B, C or D.

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2.1.5. *How the NSC is chaired*

In crisis mode the NSC is chaired by the chairperson of the Decision Making Group designated on an ad-hoc basis, taking into account the sectoral responsibility and the level of seniority required by the crisis situation.

When the NSC is activated due to terrorism threat levels B, C or D, the chairperson of the Decision Making Group is likely to be a senior official of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.

2.2. **National arrangements in the event of a terrorist attack**

2.2.1. *Action plans:*

Since 2004 Hungary has specific regulations and action plans against terrorist threats. The Government Decree No. 2112/2004 on the actual tasks combating terrorism established the Interministerial Working Group Against Terrorism and created the National Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism (Action Plan I). Furthermore the Hungarian Government allocated near by 10 million EUR for the implementation of these tasks. In 2005 a new Government Decree (No. 2151/2005) was issued on the review of the National Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism (Action Plan II). That was followed by the Directive No. 29/2005 of the Minister of Interior on the integrated implementation of actions against terrorism, ruling the implementation of terrorism threat levels from A to D (this Directive became later the above-mentioned Joint Directive No. 9/2007). In 2007, the National Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism was modified by the Government Decree No. 2046/2007 (Action Plan III). (In connection with the subject, it must be noticed that in 2008 the Government Decree No. 2080/2008 on the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program was issued).

Emergency plans drawn up in the context of civil protection planning take into account the consequences of terrorist threats. Regulation No 20/1998 (IV.10.) of the Ministry of the Interior on the system and requirements of civil protection planning obliges designated towns, districts of the capital and designated civil entities to establish emergency plans which should take into account the effects of terrorist acts and the effects of threats of execution of terrorist acts.

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On the basis of local emergency plans, regional civil protection authorities prepare consolidated emergency plans with the purpose of coordinating emergency management activities at a regional level. Based on these consolidated emergency plans, the National Directorate General for Disaster Management builds up a central emergency plan for the coordinated management of emergencies which overwhelm the intervention and management capacities of regional civil protection authorities.

Emergency plans are updated yearly by those obliged to establish such plans. Planning for training/exercises is regular.

2.2.2. *Scope and threat level:*

The NSC is part of the decision-making structures of the government in the event of a terrorist incident. The national decision-making structure is composed of five main levels:

1st level: the Government, which is responsible for the decision and execution of measures to protect citizens against the effects of natural or manmade disasters and to sustain public order and safety;


2nd level: the Government's National Security Cabinet, which functions under the direction of the Minister of the Civil Service of National Security;

3rd level: the Interministerial Working Group Against Terrorism, which is responsible for the coordination of ministerial and sectorial tasks;

4th level: the Anti-Terrorism Committee (ATC), which is responsible for the coordination of the six operational entities (intelligence and law enforcement agencies).

5th level: the Crisis Scene Management Headquarters is the operational body to handle the incident in the field.

In the event of an incident, the National Security Cabinet is provided with operational information from various sources including the NSC and the Crisis Scene Management Headquarters (led by the police).



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The Anti-Terrorism Committee (ATC) was founded in 2003 and consists of representatives of various security services. The ATC brings together information from various services in order to assess the threat level and to recommend taking the necessary preparedness measures. Consequently, the ATC plays a key role in assessing whether the threat level index should be considered (A, B, C, D levels).

ATC is composed of six entities: the National Security Office (NSO), the Information Office, the Special Service for National Security, the Military Security Office, the Military Reconnaissance Office and the National Police Headquarters. The ATC is chaired by the Deputy Director General of the National Security Office.

Services of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement (MoJLE) and Services of the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) are involved. These Services are: Services of the National Police, Office for Immigration and Nationality, National Directorate General for Disaster Management.

2.2.3. *Response Planning*

- Central, regional and local branches of individual services (police, disaster management, etc.) establish plans for the implementation of measures corresponding to each threat level, a bottom-up approach applies to planning.
- Plans contain necessary information for implementation, command and control and switching to a higher threat level.
- The plans are built on each other, i.e. plans established on a central level comprise the main duties identified in regional-level plans, the accumulated human and equipment needs for the accomplishment of these duties, the command, control and cooperation arrangements (plans contain classified information).
- When threat level B (or C, D) is invoked, a special Crisis Steering Group is activated on the basis of the National Situation Centre. It is a tool for preparing decisions and controlling their implementation.
- The special Crisis Steering Group, which is also referred to as the Analysis and Assessment Group, is led by the State Secretary for Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.

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- When it is established that a civil protection emergency or a disaster situation has been caused by a terrorist incident (e.g. attack against installations, bombing of crowded places), the specific arrangements for handling the terrorist incident (arrangements attributed to terrorism threat level D and other procedures) are applied in parallel and in coordination with the measures for the management of the emergency or disaster situation in question.
- When the terrorist incident (e.g. hostage taking, hijacking) does not trigger civil protection emergency or disaster situation measures, only the specialised arrangements for handling the terrorist incident are applied.

2.3. Competences of the national crisis centre for potential cross-border targets for terrorist attacks

There are no specific arrangements in the event of an attack on a cross-border target. The NSC would be activated in the same way as if the target was simply a national one.

The NSC has no direct competence in relation to cross-border targets, no legal arrangement sets out a specific role for the NSC in this regard. However, the NSC could be involved indirectly, i.e. through national structures which are connected to cross-border crisis management arrangements such as bilateral and multilateral agreements, EU networks and other cooperative structures.

As regards communication systems, Hungary uses the TETRA system for internal communication.

As in many other States, there is a problem in terms of cross-border compatibility of the system.

2.4. Rules of internal communication in the event of a terrorist attack

2.4.1. The entities making up the internal communications network in the event of a terrorist attack

Permanent components of the internal communications network are the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, the Ministry of Local Government, the National Police, the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, the Office of Immigration and Nationality, the Hungarian Prison Service, the Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard, the three civil security services (National Security Office, Information Office, Special Service for National Security) and the two military security services (Military Intelligence Office and Military Security Office). Other entities may be involved in the communication network as required by the situation.

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2.4.2. *National or local communications systems are used in the event of a terrorist attack*

National communication systems, interlinking central, regional and local authorities, comprise the TETRA (GSM-based single encrypted digital radio communication) system, different encrypted message-sending systems and encrypted telephone and fax connections.

The interrelation between the communication systems is not hierarchic, but rather horizontal, thereby no primary system and no back-up systems have been designated.

Responsibility for management of the communication systems is determined in the respective legal acts or administrative arrangements establishing those systems. Among those systems, the TETRA system, the K-600 KTIR (Governmental Communication and Information System) encrypted message-sending system and the encrypted telephone and fax connections are managed on a central level, i.e. responsibility for their management is set out in legal acts adopted by the Government. Other networks are managed on a decentralised level, i.e. according to the sectoral arrangements provided for their establishment.

2.4.3. *CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team)*

Hungary has a very efficient Computer Emergency Response Team (HU-CERT), which is actively engaged in international cooperation. HU-CERT started operating in 2004. This team was initiated by the Theodore Puskas Foundation (PTA) with the support of the Ministry of Information and Communication. The unit provides network security services to government and private sector entities, as well as providing expertise to critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) processes. There is a close relationship between the CERT and certain national security authorities.

The CERT (computer emergency response team) is the network security centre of the Hungarian government, for the protection of the Informatics and Communication of the public administration and governmental networks.

As a public service, CERT-Hungary is engaged in raising awareness of information and network security issues. It also provides services to the private sector in areas such as preparedness, prevention, incident handling, and training.

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Another important role in the field of critical information infrastructure protection is the 24/7 telecommunication incident duty service outsourced by the National Communications Authority. It is also active in preparing regulatory work on network and information security and providing expertise for a recommendation on safe internet banking to the Financial Regulatory Authority.

Due to its government mandate, CERT – Hungary serves as a national contact point. This provides a good framework for mutual agreements with the civil, private and public sector. Mutual agreements have been signed with many international organisations and private companies. Since 2006, national and international cooperation has increased, and regular exercises have been organised.

3. TRAINING/EXERCISES FOR TESTING THE NATIONAL CRISIS CENTRE AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

3.1. Training/exercises for testing the National Crisis Centre and communication systems in the event of a terrorist attack.

The NSC is tested every six months in the context of crisis management exercises. Small-scale exercises designed for testing of the Analysis and Assessment Group of the NSC have included terrorist threat elements. Large-scale exercises have not to date included any response to terrorism. A large-scale exercise scenario involving response to terrorism is being developed for this year (2008).

The last exercise involving a terrorist situation took place in May 2006 (the most recent testing of the NSC took place in November 2007, in the form of a nuclear incident response exercise).

No exercises have been developed with Member States and/or neighbouring countries concerning a cross-border terrorist attack.

3.2. Training/exercises for testing the efficiency of the communication systems

The testing of the communication system, including the assessment of its efficiency, is integrated into the regular exercises conducted by the NSC.

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4. SOFT TARGETS

4.1. Prevention of terrorist attacks on soft targets

No structure is responsible for risk assessment of the soft targets in Hungary. Prevention of attacks on such targets is mainly guaranteed through a general mechanism for assessing the threat. Among the threat evaluation tools available to the Hungarian authorities are the Anti Terrorist Committee (ATC) and the OSINT group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- The Anti - Terrorist Committee (ATC)

This group was created in 2003 on the basis of a decision of the Hungarian National Security Cabinet. At its regular meetings the following organisations are represented:

- National Security Office (NSO)
- Information Office (IO)
- Military Security Office (MSO)
- National Police Headquarters (NPHQ)
- Special Service for National Security (SSNS)
- National Investigation Office (NIO)
- Military Intelligence Office (MIO)

The Anti Terrorist Committee (ATC) also functions as a forum for exchange of operational information and for coordination with the following, more specific aims:

- to enhance the counteracting of security risks arising from the global terrorist threat,
- to speed up the assessment, evaluation and analysis of operational information,
- to decide on flexible and definitive measures.

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To achieve these objectives the following tasks have been allocated to the ATC so that it may be possible to avert, reconnoitre and hinder terrorist acts:

- effective, speedy coordination,
- definition and coordination of prompt professional measures,
- presentation of preparatory pre-decision materials, suggestions, evaluative reports,
- discussion and definition of anti-terrorism strategies, concepts, and instructions for professional analysis.

The Anti Terrorist Committee (ATC) develops the following tasks on a permanent basis:

- Analyses and assesses information obtained from international bilateral and multilateral cooperation,
- Monitors and evaluates the execution of previously suggested measures,
- Suggests necessary completion and amendments,
- Evaluates the state of anti-terrorist preparedness and the effectiveness of coordination,
- Assesses and prepares summary reports on the state of the terrorist threat.

- The "OSINT" group (Open Sources Intelligence)

This group was created in 2007 under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It provides assessment on various topics, particularly information on the safety of Hungarian citizens and interests abroad. The areas of interest are: terrorist organisations, individuals involved in terrorist activities, proliferation. On request it could monitor an issue or an area.

The sources are conventional media outlets, blogs, Tariqa, various search engines and conversations with experts. The products consist in stress on facts and figures, short-term predictions and highlighting of a certain issue. The recipients of the products are the decision-makers within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, desk officers and foreign missions.

The OSINT group shares information with foreign partners (DG RELEX, crisis room, Siten and EU Member States). The main advantages of this group are quick answers to questions, compiling assessments at short notice, long-term analysis, maintaining a limited searchable database.

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Beyond the two structures of threat assessment that have been described, when preparing for major events attracting significant attention and/or large crowds (e.g. sports/cultural/political events), an individual security/emergency plan is drawn up. This plan is produced by the organiser of the event (State or private entity), but police and emergency services also establish their own event-specific plans when there is any chance of their involvement. However, a terrorist attack is usually not a specific part of these plans, as it is not considered to be a typical key risk factor in Hungary.

4.2. Management in the event of terrorist attacks on soft targets

The responsible structure in the event of a terrorist attack on a soft target is the same as in the case of any other type of terrorist attack. For consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack (also in the context of wider crisis management), the specific arrangements for handling the terrorist incident (arrangements attributed to terrorism threat level D and other procedures) are applied in parallel and in coordination with the facilities for management of the emergency or disaster situation. When the terrorist incident (e.g. hostage taking, hijacking) does not trigger civil protection emergency or disaster situation measures, only the specialised arrangements for handling the terrorist incident are applied.

5. GOOD PRACTICES

- **An interesting assessment structure; the OSINT (Open Sources Intelligence) group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.** The group was set up in 2007 under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It provides assessments on various topics, particularly information on the safety of Hungarian citizens as well as other subjects related to Hungarian interests abroad such as e.g. terrorist organisations, individuals involved in terrorist activities, proliferation.
- **An efficient institution to fight against cyber attack; CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team).** The CERT:
 - is the centre handling cyber-crime crises,
 - is responsible for critical information infrastructure protection of government institutions and the private sector,

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- offers training to management and staff of private companies,
 - offers a tailor-made database service according to individual needs,
 - offers periodic (daily/weekly) information on subscription.
- **An efficient communication network TETRA.** This communication network is digital and encrypted. It is necessary to extend this network to all Hungarian territory.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The new Hungarian ministerial organisation that places the National Directorate General for Disaster Management outside the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, under the competence of the Ministry of Local Government has not been tested yet. The last exercise concerning this matter dates back to 2003. **Coordination between the two ministries (Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and Ministry of Local Government) should be tested on a large-scale exercise.**
2. As mentioned above, the NSC functions well. Nevertheless, a few possible recommendations can be made with a view to further improving the centre:
 - **The process of deciding who takes the lead in response to a crisis should be clarified**, in order to ensure transparency and expediency of decision-making in the event of a crisis. Making this process crystal-clear would help to avoid situations in which senior officials disagree on who is responsible for leading the response in a particular situation.
 - **A manual should be developed for senior decision-makers with step-by-step instructions on issues to be dealt with in the event of a crisis.** Such a manual should clearly spell out the types of priority issue which need to be addressed in the event of a crisis. Various manuals may be developed, but in principle they should be as short as possible in order to maximise their usability.
 - **Links to external crisis centres should be formalised.** Hungary possesses a broad range of informal contacts, which would be very useful in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, such links need to be formalised so that there is a clear path to follow in case international cooperation is required during a crisis. As a first step, a formalisation of links with regional partners should be undertaken.

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3. **Regular exercises involving neighbouring countries (EU Member States or third countries) should be organised.** Focusing on this type of exercise may be crucial in the event of a cross-border event or a terrorist attack.
4. **Better cross-border crisis communication is needed.** It is necessary to look, perhaps at EU level, into the possibility of creating an interface between the different radio systems (TETRA, very often) used in the EU.

7. ANNEX

7.1. Presentations were made by the following institutions

- National Situation Centre
- CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) Hungary
- Crisis management centre of Budapest International Airport
- National Police HQ (Command and control structures)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (OSINT Group)
- Civil Protection (Emergency plans)

7.2. Speakers

National Situation Centre:

- STEFÁN Antal, Police Lieutenant-Colonel . Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement. Crisis Management and Duty Unit. Head of Unit.
- TÓTHI Gábor, Ministry of Local Government. Counsellor
- DSUPIN Ottó, Ministry of Local Government. Head of Department

Anti - Terrorist Committee

- FARKAS Tamás, National Security Office
- TÓTH Gyula, National Security Office
- KATREIN Ferenc, National Security Office

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Computer emergency response team (CERT-Hungary)


- MEICHL Géza, Police Colonel, Prime Minister's Office. Head of Unit
- SUBA Ferenc, Chairman of the Board, CERT-Hungary, Theodore Puskás Foundation. Vice-Chair of the Management Board, European Network and Information Security Agency
- SÁNDOR Csaba, Prime Minister's Office. Secretariat for E-Government and Public Services. Counsellor

Budapest International Airport Police

- LADANYI Sandor, Police Lieutenant Colonel, Head of the Airport Police Directorate
- BALLA Imre, Police Lieutenant Colonel, Duty Unit, Head of Unit

Police Headquarters

- SAMU István, Police Major-General, National Police HQ, Director General for Law Enforcement
- SZILÁGYI József, Police Major, National Police HQ, Counter-Terrorism Service, Coordination Section. Head of Section
- VELÉNYI Balázs, Police Captain, National Bureau of Investigation, Unit of Counter-Terrorism and Extremism, Senior Expert
- IGAZ Tünde, Police Major, National Police HQ, International Information Unit, Expert
- JÁNOSIK István, Police Major, Budapest Police HQ, Department of Public Order, Head of Unit
- HAMPÓ Norbert, Police Lieutenant Colonel, National Police HQ, Department of Public Order
Supervisor of the special intervention units



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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (OSINT Group)

- BUDAI János, Head of Department, Head of the Crisis Management Centre of the MFA
- RÓBEL Sándor, Head of Unit, Deputy Head of the Crisis Management Centre of the MFA
- SZÁNTÓ Péter, Member of the OSINT
- FEHÉR Diána, Member of the OSINT
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