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Objet: Session plénière du Parlement européen - Bruxelles, le 1er février 2012
**L'Iran et son programme nucléaire - *Déclaration de la haute représentante
pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité***

La Haute Représentante, Madame Catherine Ashton, a prononcé le discours qui figure à l'annexe I.

Les MPE suivants sont intervenus au nom des groupes politiques:

- M. Salafranca (PPE, ES) a félicité le Conseil d'avoir pris une décision difficile (notamment pour certains États membres) mais cohérente et a estimé que l'embargo pétrolier serait efficace et qu'il pousserait l'Iran à négocier. Il a invité l'UE à trouver des alliés, tels que l'Inde ou le Japon.
- Mme Muñiz (S&D, ES) a estimé que l'impact de l'embargo sur l'Iran serait très important, étant donné le degré de dépendance de ce pays par rapport aux exportations de pétrole vers l'Europe. Elle a déclaré que la double approche poursuivie par l'UE était la bonne mais qu'il fallait insister sur le volet diplomatique, en ajoutant que son groupe excluait toute option militaire.
- Mme Schaake (Verts/ALE, NL) a félicité l'UE pour la décision prise à l'égard de l'Iran, qui prouve, à son avis, que, lorsqu'elle est unie, l'Europe est forte et peut avoir une grande influence au niveau mondial. L'Iran lui-même a été surpris d'une telle décision.

Quant à la voie à suivre, elle a donné les indications suivantes: travailler avec la Turquie sur le dossier iranien, agir de façon indépendante vis-à-vis des États-Unis, ouvrir une représentation de l'UE à Téhéran et empêcher toute exportation de technologie répressive vers l'Iran.

- Mme Cronberg (Verts/ALE, FI), Présidente de la délégation pour les relations avec l'Iran, a proposé un amendement au projet de résolution afin d'enlever toute ambiguïté sur l'exclusion de l'option militaire. À son avis, le temps est venu d'engager des négociations sans conditions préalables et d'y associer la Turquie et le Brésil. Elle aussi a souhaité que l'UE ouvre une représentation à Téhéran.
- M. Tannock (ECR, UK) a déclaré que l'Iran représentait un risque pour la paix régionale et que, si le pays se dotait de l'arme nucléaire, cela entraînerait une course aux armements au Moyen-Orient. Il a salué qu'à cette occasion, l'UE ait su parler d'une seule voix.
- Mme Ernst (GUE/NGL, DE) a tout d'abord mis en doute l'efficacité des sanctions: à son avis, non seulement elles n'amèneront pas l'Iran à faire des concessions, mais elles affecteront la population. Elle a ensuite déclaré que la décision d'imposer des sanctions avait été prise sur la base de simples présomptions, car il n'y aurait, selon elle, aucune preuve que l'Iran poursuit un programme nucléaire à des fins militaires. Elle a ajouté que l'UE devrait plutôt agir en faveur de la dénucléarisation du monde.
- M. Belder (EFD, NL) a parlé d'une opportunité historique de changer la situation.
- M. Ehrhenhauser (NI, AT) a lui aussi fait remarquer que la communauté internationale n'avait aucune preuve concernant le programme nucléaire iranien et a interrogé la haute représentante sur un éventuel plan B si les sanctions devaient se révéler inefficaces.

Les députés intervenant à titre individuel ont confirmé les orientations des groupes. Les membres du Parlement issus des groupes PPE, ALDE et ECR ont salué l'adoption des sanctions, estimant qu'elles pouvaient être un moyen efficace de ramener l'Iran à la table des négociations (entre autres M. Brok (PPE, DE), M. Lambsdorff (ALDE, DE), M. Svensson (PPE, SE)). Les socialistes ont, certes, soutenu les sanctions, mais ils ont insisté sur la nécessité de bien cibler celles-ci afin de ne pas affecter la population. Ils ont tout particulièrement insisté sur le point suivant: les sanctions ne doivent pas constituer le premier pas d'une escalade militaire et l'UE doit insister davantage sur le volet diplomatique de la double approche (entre autres Mme Van Brempt (S&D, BE) et Mme Benova (S&D, SK)). L'extrême gauche s'est, quant à elle, résolument opposée aux sanctions, qu'elle

considère inefficaces, contreproductives et injustifiées en l'absence de preuves concernant le programme nucléaire iranien. Ces sanctions ne seraient qu'un prétexte pour en arriver à l'option militaire (Mme Lösing (GUE/NGL, DE), M. Angourakis (GUE/NGL, EL)). D'autres ont tenu à laisser la porte ouverte à l'option militaire: pour Mme Dodds (NI, UK) l'UE doit dire à l'Iran qu'elle passera à l'action si ce pays ne donne pas une réponse adéquate à la proposition de négociation.

D'autres sujets ont été évoqués lors du débat. Un certain nombre de MPE ont félicité l'UE d'avoir enfin parlé d'une seule voix. D'autres ont exprimé leur préoccupation face aux menaces de l'Iran de fermer le détroit d'Ormuz. D'aucuns ont souhaité que des mesures soient prises afin d'empêcher que des entreprises européennes contournent l'embargo ou qu'elles exportent vers l'Iran des technologies susceptibles d'être utilisées à des fins répressives.

En reprenant la parole à la fin du débat, Madame Ashton a abordé la question des alliances. Elle a reconnu qu'il importait de trouver des alliés prêts à adopter le même type de mesures que celles prises par l'UE, afin que le vide créé par les sanctions européennes ne soit pas comblé par d'autres. La haute représentante a cité la Russie, le Japon et la Corée comme possibles alliés. Elle a également reconnu le rôle important joué par la Turquie sur le dossier iranien et, pour ce qui est du Brésil, elle a indiqué qu'elle se rendrait dans ce pays dans les jours suivants et qu'elle avait l'intention d'y aborder, entre autres, cette question. Le but, a-t-elle expliqué, est tout d'abord de faire en sorte que la démarche européenne soit bien comprise par ses partenaires. Concernant la population iranienne, la haute représentante a rappelé que le but des sanctions était d'amener le régime à reprendre les négociations et que, par conséquent, l'UE veillerait à ce que leur impact sur la population soit le plus faible possible et à ce que les citoyens iraniens comprennent les objectifs poursuivis par l'UE. Quant aux effets sur les États membres de l'UE, elle a expliqué les mesures prises pour les atténuer. Madame Ashton a enfin rappelé que le contrôle du respect de l'embargo par les particuliers était principalement du ressort des États membres.

Le 2 février 2012, le PE a adopté la résolution sur l'Iran et son programme nucléaire qui figure à l'Annexe II.

Catherine Ashton

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission

Speech on Iran and its nuclear programme

Check Against Delivery
Seul le texte prononcé fait foi
Es gilt das gesprochene Wort

European Parliament

Bruxelles, 01 February 2012

The Iranian nuclear programme is a very serious concern for the EU and the international community as a whole. As you know EU Foreign Ministers discussed the issue in the context of agreeing new sanctions on 23 January.

We are committed to maintaining the pressure on Iranian authorities to comply with their international obligations. This forms a key part of our "twin track" approach along with the E3+3 process which I lead.

We have had several UNSC Resolutions, but in spite of them Iran continues to violate its obligations by not fully co-operating with the IAEA and by accelerating the expansion of its nuclear programme. In early January, Iran started operations to enrich uranium to a level of near 20% at the underground facility near Qom, a site controlled by the Iranian military.

For a number of years serious concerns have been expressed concerning the lack of Iranian co-operation to resolve outstanding issues, including those pointing to a military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme.

The IAEA report of November 2011 presented findings on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology. On this basis, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted, by overwhelming majority, a resolution expressing increasing concerns on the Iranian nuclear programme.

I and the EU remain fully committed to efforts aimed at achieving a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue based on the twin-track approach. I have written to Dr Jalili setting out proposals which would allow Iran to draw benefits in the nuclear, political and economic field. Despite reminders, so far I have received no response to proposals to enter into a confidence building process based on reciprocity and a step-by-step approach.

The EU has always expressed its readiness to address, in the framework of a confidence building process, other issues of concern, which may be of interest for Iran, for instance co-operation in the area of counter-narcotics.

Be assured that I continue to use every opportunity to reiterate this message to the Iranian side, most recently in a series of contacts with Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi.

In parallel, I am using my contacts with third countries, particularly Turkey, to pass the message to Iran that the door remains open for negotiations through a confidence building process, which could be launched once Iran demonstrates its readiness to do so.

It was against this background that the Council decided to adopt further restrictive measures against Iran at the last Foreign Affairs Council. This was a very important step which clearly demonstrated that EU is united and is taking the lead.

The measures are designated to significantly affect Iran's financial capacity to pursue its nuclear programme, by curtailing its revenue from crude oil exports.

The sanctions on oil are of particular significance because of their effect on the revenues of the Iranian government. Oil exports count for approximately 80% of Iran's exports and 70% of the government's revenues. The EU imports amounted to 20% of Iran's oil exports. So by targeting this important source of revenue, we are strongly increasing pressure on the Iranian government, whilst avoiding negative effects as far as possible on the wider Iranian population.

The EU does not stand alone in this effort. UN sanctions continue to be in force. On 31 December last year the United States decided to strengthen further its sanctions against Iran, targeting in particular the Iranian financial system and its revenues from different sources, including from oil exports.

We now need to convince like minded countries, in particular those which import oil from Iran, to take similar steps and consider reducing their import of Iranian oil. This will maximise the effect of the sanctions on Iran.

The prohibition on the import of Iranian oil is done in a phased manner, allowing us to adjust to the new situation. A review has been built-in for the EU to take stock of the effect of the measure in the course of the coming months and address any problem that may arise. By doing so, we have ensured that the EU and all of its Member States will be able to have the time and the means to adjust and ensure the continuity of energy supplies.

We also continue to harbour grave concerns regarding the human rights situation in Iran. This relates in particular the ongoing repression of political opposition, but also the increasing and excessive application of the death penalty.

In reaction to the repression and the dramatic increase in executions, there is since April 2011 also an EU sanctions regime against Iran that addresses the human rights situation. The sanctions target those persons complicit in or responsible for these grave human rights violations. Since the measures were strengthened in October of last year they now include 61 listed persons. A prohibition on the supply of equipment that can be used for repression is also part of our sanctions on Iran.

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Iran and its nuclear programme

European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on Iran and its nuclear programme

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran,
- having regard to the statement of 22 January 2011 by the EU High Representative on behalf of the E3+3 countries following the talks held with Iran in Istanbul on 21 and 22 January 2011,
- having regard to letter of 21 October 2011 from the EU High Representative to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saeed Jalili,
- having regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report of 8 November 2011 on implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
- having regard to the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 18 November 2011,
- having regard to the EU High Representative's statement of 18 November 2011 on the IAEA Board of Governors resolution,
- having regard to the EU High Representative's statement of 29 November 2011 on the attack on and pillaging of the UK Embassy in Tehran,
- having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 December 2011,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on Iran of 14 November 2011, 1 December 2011 and 23 January 2012,
- having regard to Iran's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and to the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
- having regard to the recommendation by its Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Council on a consistent policy towards regimes against which the EU applies restrictive measures, when their leaders exercise their personal and commercial interests within EU borders,
- having regard to Rule 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

- A. whereas Iran has, by ratifying the NPT, foresworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and is legally bound to declare all its nuclear activities, including nuclear material, and place them under IAEA safeguards;
- B. whereas Iran has still to comply with its obligations under all relevant UN Security Council UNSC resolutions, the most recent of which is Resolution 1929 (2010), and all the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, which specify full and unconditional access by the Agency to all sites, equipment, people and documents that would allow for proper inspection of Iran's nuclear programme and would enable the IAEA to fulfil its role as nuclear watchdog;
- C. whereas the November 2011 IAEA report expresses 'serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme' because 'some activities' 'relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device' 'may still be ongoing';
- D. whereas on 27 December 2011 the Iranian Vice-President, Reza Rahimi, threatened to use military force to close the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions were imposed on Iran's oil exports; whereas there has been a further deployment of European and US navy forces to counteract this threat and the military status has risen to 'high alert' throughout the region;
- E. whereas, in breach of its obligations under the NPT, Iran has clandestinely constructed an enrichment facility at Fordow close to Qom and only notified the IAEA of its existence long after its construction started; whereas this secretive approach further undermines trust in Iranian assurances about the purely civil character of its nuclear programme;
- F. whereas on 5 January 2012 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, conveyed an invitation from the EU High Representative to Iran to resume nuclear talks with the E3+3; whereas during the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, stated that Iran is ready to resume talks;
- G. whereas the EU Foreign Ministers have agreed additional restrictive measures against Iran in the energy sector, including a phased embargo of Iranian crude oil imports to the EU, in the financial sector, including against the Central Bank of Iran, and in the transport sector, as well as further export restrictions, notably on gold and on sensitive dual-use goods and technology, and additional designations of persons and entities, including several controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC);
- H. whereas the Council again reaffirmed its commitment to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the dual-track approach;
- I. whereas the Council reaffirmed that the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate right to peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT;

1. Reiterates that the proliferation risks in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme remain a source of serious concern to the EU and is deeply worried by the IAEA report's statement that credible information 'indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device';
2. Deeply deplores Iran's acceleration of enrichment activities in violation of six UNSC resolutions and eleven IAEA Board resolutions, as reflected in the recent start of operations of enrichment of uranium to a level of up to 20% in the underground facility in Fordow near Qom;
3. Reiterates its call on Iran to stop developing enrichment technology which goes far beyond the need to ensure secure fuel supplies for civil purposes, with disregard for international concerns over clandestine military intentions;
4. Supports the additional restrictive measures adopted by the Council against Iran in the energy and financial sectors, as well as additional sanctions against persons and entities, including several controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); recognises that sanctions and diplomatic measures could be helpful in bringing the Iranian government to accept and respect UN resolutions avoiding further escalation; notes that sanctions are not an end in themselves and that to date the EU sanctions against Iran have not achieved their stated goals;
5. Reiterates the EU's long-held position that the outstanding issues with Iran over its nuclear programme must be solved peacefully and that there is no military solution to the conflict;
6. Notes that there will be a phased embargo on Iranian crude oil exports to the EU and that contracts already concluded may still be executed until 1 July 2012; calls on the Council to decide on measures to offset the impact of the embargo on the various EU Member States;
7. Asks for sanctions or restrictive measures to be targeted at and proportionate to the objective pursued and aimed at influencing mainly the accountable elites of repressive or criminal regimes and the responsible non-state actors of failed states and minimising, as far as possible, the adverse impact on civilian populations, especially the most vulnerable groups;
8. Supports the Council's commitment to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the dual-track approach and the EU's objective of achieving a comprehensive and long-term settlement; calls on the Iranian authorities to reply positively to the offer for substantial negotiations as set out in the EU High Representative's letter of 21 October 2011, by clearly demonstrating its readiness to engage in confidence building measures and, without preconditions, in meaningful talks to seriously address existing concerns on the nuclear issue;
9. Renews its call on the Iranian authorities to fulfil Iran's obligations under the NPT; calls on the Iranian Parliament and Government to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and to fully implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement;
10. Welcomes the fact that Iran agreed to receive a high-ranking IAEA delegation for inspections, headed by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts, from 29 to 31 January 2012;

11. Strongly urges Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing full and unconditional access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and not to object to the appointment of inspectors; stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA has all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;
12. Supports the efforts of the IAEA to monitor the development of Iran's nuclear programme in order to provide the international community with an accurate overview of the situation;
13. Recognises that the dialogue and cooperation with Turkey can play an important role with a view to reaching a settlement;
14. Strongly condemns the Iranian threat of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz; urges the Iranian authorities not to block the Strait of Hormuz; believes that such an act could lead to a regional conflict and trigger retaliation by the international community;
15. Regrets the ongoing refusal of China and Russia in the UN Security Council to support sanctions against Iran; calls on Russia to cease providing assistance with Iran's nuclear development until Iran has fully complied with its obligations under relevant UN resolutions;
16. Strongly condemns the attack on the UK Embassy in Tehran on 29 November 2011; calls on the Iranian Government to fulfil its international obligations, including the Vienna Convention, to protect diplomats and embassies;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States, the Government and Parliament of Turkey, the Government and Parliament of the People's Republic of China, the Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, the Director General of the IAEA, the Secretary-General of the UN, the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
