



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 28 February 2012

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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

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Brussels, 2 March 2006

**6950/06
EXT 1 (28.02.2012)**

**COSDP 140
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NOTE

From: Secretariat
To: Delegations

Subject : Options Paper - EU Support to AMIS and Possible AMIS-UN Transition

Delegations will find attached, an options paper on potential EU actions in support of the ongoing AMIS operation in Darfur and the possible transition to a UN-led operation.

EU SUPPORT TO AMIS AND TRANSITION TO UN-LED MISSION IN DARFUR

OPTIONS PAPER

I. BACKGROUND - POLITICAL CONTEXT

AU decision to transfer from AMIS to the UN

1. The meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on 12 January 2006 expressed its "support, in principle to a transition from AMIS to a UN operation" and requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to initiate appropriate consultations with the UN in this regard. The final decision on the transition and its modalities will be taken by a meeting of the AU PSC at ministerial level, expected to take place on 10 March. As basis for the decision to be taken, the 12 January PSC asked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to provide all relevant information, including on the modalities for a transition and the financial aspects of the ongoing operation in Darfur.
2. The decision on the transition is not uncontroversial and should not be taken as read. A number of African countries, not only from Northern Africa, remain resistant and Khartoum has launched a diplomatic campaign against it (while the US is pushing strongly for it). The meeting of the AU PSC on 10 March will therefore be difficult. It hoped that efforts to reach a consensus will succeed and that the decision on transition will be positive, however, it is to be expected that the AU will attach conditions to the transition (e.g. African military command in the future UN mission, Abuja talks to continue under AU auspices, AU to chair the Joint Commission).

3. In a statement by the President of the UN Security Council on 3 February, the Council took note of the outcome of the meeting of the AU PSC on 12 January. On this basis, it requested the Secretary General to initiate contingency planning without delay, jointly with the AU and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, on a range of options for a possible transition from AMIS to a UN operation. The statement set out a number of general modalities for the contingency planning including; unified, integrated approach; assessment of essential tasks to be carried out in southern Sudan and Darfur with a view to re-allocating existing troops and assets to the maximum extent practicable and readiness to review and adjust current structure of UNMIS to make best use of available resources. The Security Council also stressed the importance of maintaining strong support for AMIS until the completion of an eventual transition.

4. If the option of a transition to a UN-led operation is confirmed, the transition period is likely to take place from around the end of March to the end of this year. This is due both to practical and political reasons: UN DPKO seems to wish to avoid starting the operation during the rainy season, they would like to see AMIS reach UN operational standards and probably hope for a positive conclusion of the Abuja talks in the timeframe - thus facilitating an "entry strategy" for the UN. A relatively long transition period would also favour the preferred "exit strategy" of the AU, as it would increase the chances of reaching an agreement in Abuja and enable the AU to claim success. That said, there is also an argument for an early Transfer of Authority (TOA) to the UN in order that a stronger force can be put in place as soon as possible to tackle the security situation with urgency. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

Difficulties related to transition.

5. The security situation on the ground in Darfur is bad, with all parties regularly violating the cease-fire, and with no immediate prospect of improvement. It cannot be ruled out that the security situation could further deteriorate. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

6. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

7. Most importantly, the Abuja talks are not likely to make progress in the short term. The involvement of the SPLM is crucial for the progress of discussions on 'power sharing' which are at a stalemate, as rebel claims would not only compromise the supremacy of the traditional Northern elites over the country but could also affect the CPA equilibria. The deterioration of the security situation on the ground and the alignment of both a faction of the SLM and the JEM rebel movements with Chad will make a breakthrough in the talks even more difficult. The alleged possibility that another faction of the SLM could sign a separate deal with the Sudanese government would not improve the situation on the ground and would in fact serve the interest of Khartoum by further dividing the rebels and exposing the fractures between African communities in Darfur (the Zaghawa against all the others). It is therefore likely that most of the transition from AMIS to a UN operation (if not all) will take place without an agreement having been reached in Abuja.

II. CURRENT EU ACTIVITY

Political Support

8. The EUSR has maintained regular contacts with the African Union to accompany the operational EU support to AMIS with a political dialogue. This dialogue also includes regular consultations on the Abuja talks, which have been covered throughout by a member of the EUSR team (with support from the Policy Unit and from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs). The talks have made progress in all three areas under discussion (power and wealth sharing, security arrangements) but there is yet no agreement on key political issues. The EUSR and his team have provided continuing political support and advice to the AU mediation of the Abuja talks. The EUSR has also discussed the transfer from AMIS to a UN mission with AU Commissioner Djinnit and with representatives of the AU PSC and of important troop contributing countries.

Military Support

9. The EU agreed with the AU to provide sixteen military observers (MILOBS) to support the Cease Fire Commission. Currently only eleven are provided and without new offers from EU MS, this will fall to two by April, both located in Chad. The EU agreed to provide twenty five military staff officers to support AMIS across the whole operation. Currently seventeen are provided and without further offers, this will fall to thirteen by April. Three military personnel also support the EUSR in Addis Ababa. The EU agreed to provide MILOBS as part of the April 2004 Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement which requested international observers.

NOT DECLASSIFIED

10. The EU provided strategic airlift in coordination with NATO, supporting both the military and CIVPOL enhancement of AMIS in summer 2005 and the rotation of AMIS troops taking place between February and April this year. The EU has so far provided airlift for almost 1000 military and police personnel and is expecting to move a further 700+ shortly. In addition, a number of Member States have provided bi-lateral support to AMIS through the donation of military materiel including vehicles, fuel, communications equipment, generators and ration packs.

CIVPOL Support

11. The EU support to the CIVPOL element of AMIS should consist of fifty officers to provide support to the AMIS CIVPOL chain of command, to provide training to CIVPOL personnel and to support the development of a police unit with the AU Secretariat. As highlighted in the Joint Assessment Report (JAM) in December 2005, EU support in the field of police has been extremely well received by both the AU and by the police component of AMIS. The general view is that the EU Police Team has had a significant impact both in the field of training and in boosting the operational capacity of the police component through the support provided to the chain of command. The impact has however, been affected by force generation problems. There are at present only twenty nine personnel in the field; ten more Police Advisers are required to support sector commanders and seven more trainers are required. The EU and Canada are in the process of finalising the terms for a Canadian offer to provide four trainers who will be embedded into the EU police team. This will reduce the shortfall but will still leave the teams' capabilities hampered by the lack of human resources. **NOT**

DECLASSIFIED

12. The current budget for the police team expires on 28 July 2006. Any extension to the period or budget will require a Council decision implementing the Joint Action.

III. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE EU ACTION

13. The support provided by the EU has up to now been at the forefront of the international community's efforts to support AMIS. In political terms, the EU's support has been accepted and welcomed by all the parties in the conflict, including the Sudanese government. In view of the challenges faced by AMIS in Darfur, the EU should therefore at least continue, if not increase its support in the coming months. The AU will only be able to contend with the broad range of serious challenges that they now face, and which are likely to continue throughout the transition period, with full support from the international community. The fragile security and stability in Darfur also needs to be contained during the transition.
14. Reinvigorated EU action to support the evolving situation over the coming months will be required in three main areas: political and diplomatic action, continuing support to AMIS and supporting the UN.

Political Action

15. EU support is accepted and welcomed by the government in Khartoum; there is little chance that the international community will succeed in its goal to solve the Darfur conflict without the engagement of the Sudanese government. The EU has a stake in how AMIS is perceived to comply with its mission. A success for the AU will also be a success for the EU, and will respond to the EU's long-term, fundamental interest of a strong and credible AU.
 - The EU, together with the USA and the AU, should continue to coordinate their political approach to resolve the crisis. The first opportunity will be a meeting between SG/HR, Commissioner Michel, President Konaré and M. Zoellick, planned to take place immediately before or after the Paris meeting of the World Bank (9-10 March). The main subjects will be how to push Abuja forward, to strengthen AMIS now and during the transition, how to make the Joint Commission more efficient, and how to enhance pressure on the parties (threat of sanctions, ICC, arms embargo).

- Strong and well coordinated political pressure will be necessary at the appropriate time in order to make sure that a comprehensive agreement is reached at the Abuja talks. Such pressure is also warranted in view of the volatile security situation on the ground, which betrays a flagrant disregard of the cease-fire and of international humanitarian law by all parties. The EU, in cooperation with other international actors, should consider appropriate measures within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1591. **NOT**

DECLASSIFIED

- Furthermore, the structure of the Joint Commission (JC), which was supposed to be the interface between AMIS and the Darfur talks, should be reconsidered. **NOT**
DECLASSIFIED Meetings of the JC could also be held in Abuja, in order to summon the negotiating parties directly to explain cease-fire violations committed by military actors, presumably under their command.

Support to AMIS

16. AMIS must be able to maintain its role and presence on the ground and remain focused and determined to fulfil its mission during transition period. This is not only necessary for the credibility of the AU and for it to declare 'mission accomplished'; it is also critical to maintaining minimum stability and security during the transition. The new Force Commander will need to be supported where practical to help reinvigorate the momentum of the mission. Furthermore, any UN mission will be heavily dependant on the legacy of AMIS, including personnel and infrastructure, so a improvement in AMIS capability will greatly benefit any future UN mission.

17. In the first instance, it is essential that the EU lives up to its existing commitments to the AU/AMIS to provide the agreed numbers of military and CIVPOL personnel. **NOT**

DECLASSIFIED

18. Furthermore, the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations and access to the population in need remains of serious concern, as does the need for coordination between the AU and the humanitarian community. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

19. Pressure should continue to be applied to the AU to implement the recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission in December 2005. Currently little action has been taken by the AU/AMIS to do this and consequently to enhance AMIS capability. Key recommendations which the EU could assist with specifically are:

- Operating Tempo and Procedures. AMIS should be encouraged to operate 24/7, with proper tasking and reporting procedures put in place. **NOT DECLASSIFIED** the EU needs to continue to encourage at every level.
- Rules of Engagement. The EU needs to push the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) to devise and implement a standard Rules of Engagement (ROE) instruction in accordance with its mandate and ensure that all troops are properly trained in its usage.
- Joint Operations. The lack of joint military/CIVPOL operations hampers the capability and credibility of AMIS. Lack of coordination is a hindrance to the mission and is potentially dangerous as CIVPOL lack the protection provided by a military force. Further, the Cease Fire Commission needs to be better integrated with current operations.

- Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC). This needs to be integrated properly into the command and control structure and manned by competent officers. **NOT**

DECLASSIFIED

- The Joint Operations Centre(JOC). This has yet to be implemented despite being a recommendation of the previous JAM in March 2005.

Lack of joint operations is a critical problem area, the JOC in particular will need to be systematically managed, with an established HQ, manpower, communications and operating procedures as well as executive authority.

- Intelligence. AMIS should be encouraged to drive operations from an intelligence-led basis which relies on a coordinated intelligence structure and apparatus. Currently the force lacks the ability to collect, analyse and disseminate intelligence information. **NOT**

DECLASSIFIED

- AMIS Vehicle and Personnel Identification. This is an important issue. AMIS must immediately mark all its vehicles and provide personnel with the necessary berets etc which are available in Khartoum. AMIS flags and flagstaffs could be procured for AMIS vehicles by the donors providing the said vehicles, to help further with the identification problem.
- CIS management. A member state is currently providing additional CIS assets to AMIS. A CIS management and maintenance programme is now needed to ensure the equipment is properly controlled and maintained.

20. The EU should strongly press for and encourage improvements in all these areas and on all levels. The required improvements are mainly systematic, structural and organisational rather than equipment based. As a first step, the EU could provide more and better practical support if the full requirement of EU Staff officers promised to AMIS was made available. Further, the EUMS/CGS should have the flexibility (in discussion with the sending Member State) to redeploy EU personnel to different parts of the mission if priorities require it.

21. A number of tracks should be explored with a view to providing further support:

- First, by passing strong messages to the AU on the necessity of taking immediate and rapid action on the various points set out above. These messages should be passed, inter alia, through the EUSR and using the EU officers embedded in the AU chain of command. However, this likely only to have a limited effect unless the EU also provides specific, concrete support.

The EU should therefore:

- Fill the shortfalls in the current agreed support to AMIS.
 - o **NOT DECLASSIFIED** An alternative, subsidiary option therefore, may be to consider that, if Member States cannot provide at least eight (one per sector), all EU MILOBS should be withdrawn, thus allowing the EU to concentrate its resources on support to the AMIS chain of command. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- A full complement of personnel would help not only to provide much needed advice, but also impetus to the AU to encourage them to tackle the JAM recommendations and get projects of the ground. **NOT DECLASSIFIED** Training could be provided at the operational and tactical level to enhance capability (in line with UN standards) in a wide range of necessary skills including, patrol techniques, anti-ambush drill, situational awareness.

- Consider providing specific capacity building support related to the setting up and running of the Joint Operations Centre. This could take the form of training on structure, procedures and methods for running a FHQ, with an advisory team providing continuing support when the HQ is up and running. It would be essential to provide properly qualified individuals for this task.
22. In addition, the DITF must be encouraged to improve its liaison network during the transition, especially between DITF and HQ UNMIS in Khartoum and to the FHQ in El Fashir. Situational awareness and passage of information will be critical during this period. DGEUMS has made this recommendation to the Head of DITF suggesting that EU personnel in the DITF may be able to assist.
24. There will a further rotation of AMIS military and CIVPOL personnel later in the year, which will require strategic airlift. The EU should be prepared to support this as is has done previously.

Support to the UN during the transition Period

25. There are three main phases to consider in the transition to a UN-led mission; the planning phase, the transition process and the UN mission itself. The EU could provide support to all three.
- The Planning Process. The CGS is following events in DPKO closely, on both military and civil aspects, including through the Council Liaison Office and the EUMS Liaison Officer in New York. EU military and police personnel on the ground will be available to advise UN personnel on the forthcoming Technical Evaluation Mission (TEM) due to take place in mid-March. It is also planned to offer military and police planners with AMIS experience to DPKO for the subsequent planning phase in New York and, if appropriate, in the region, if DPKO assesses that it would benefit from this assistance. It would be useful if EU Member States could make available military and police personnel who have returned from a tour with AMIS to provide additional, time limited, technical assistance in New York or in the field.

- It will be important to ensure that the overall EU approach to the UN during this period and the advice provided to DPKO is coherent, both within the EU and in relation to Member States bi-lateral activities. Double-hatting Member States planners as EU contributions to the process would help ensure this and contribute to EU visibility

- The Transition Process. As DPKO planning develops it will be possible to see exactly what support is required, against what priorities, where and when. EU personnel supporting AMIS in the region will be a valuable source of advice and information to the UN during this extended period, as would experienced technical advisers as advised above. There will also be a need to enhance the capability of AMIS troops and CIVPOL who are likely to deploy to or re-hat to the UN force, with equipment and training, prior to the launch of the UN mission. Further details about UN standards will be sought but Member States might consider what training they could deliver on a bi-lateral basis. It will be important for these troops and police personnel, who will become the baseline for the UN operation, to be properly trained and prepared for operations in Darfur. The need for additional equipment will also come out of the planning process.

- The EU should expect to be asked to provide strategic airlift for troop and CIVPOL rotations later this year. Further, the UN mission is expected to be somewhat bigger than AMIS, drawing on troops from additional troop contributing nations. The EU may wish to offer strategic lift to deploy these additional personnel to build up the mission prior to the launch.

- UN Operation. Details about the UN mission will develop over the coming weeks, however, the need for specific support has already been signalled by J M Guéhenno. The exact nature of the support expected from the UN will be further clarified during the UN TEM and planning process.

IV. FUNDING

26. For the moment, AMIS funding has been ensured thus allowing them to operate until early April. A comprehensive finance plan for a transition phase will depend on the findings of the TEM and the AU PSC ministerial meeting scheduled for 10 March. Any comprehensive funding plan for the transition period should therefore take into consideration the transition modalities, in particular the start and end dates, and the configuration of AMIS during the transition (personnel, logistics, operational means, possible UN contributions).
27. In this context, the AU has recently circulated a preliminary budget estimate of 175 M EUR (208.4 million USD), regarding the support and assistance needed to sustain the mission during a nine-month period, from 1 April to 31 December 2006. This very rough figure is likely to be revised by the AU in the coming days. This initial budget estimate also does not include significant equipment purchases, but foresees support to the Abuja talks (5.9 M EUR). Should the revised AU budget proposal correspond to the upcoming, commonly agreed transition modalities, a more detailed analysis will be necessary. At present the existing manpower total is 7936 personnel, which comprises a protection force of 5398, 1560 civilian police and 773 MLOBS (including CFC personnel and HQ staff).
28. The EU should prepare a coordinated funding response including in cash and in kind contributions from the Member States and the Commission. In this respect, the Commission envisages a limited but short term replenishment of the African peace Facility, in order to be in the position to contribute significantly.

V. CONCLUSION

29. Prior to any hand over to the UN and in the immediate future, the EU should honour existing commitments to the AU and, if possible, enhance them. This means that Member States should commit competent personnel to ensure that the EU's quotas of MILOBs, military and police experts are filled. This will **NOT DECLASSIFIED** support, bolster and facilitate the improvement of AMIS capabilities. This in turn will help maintain sufficient stability and security in the region which will be crucial to the transition process.
30. If the AU PSC on 10 March agrees to a transition from AMIS to a UN-led operation, UN planning for this transition should begin in earnest. The EU has invested a great deal in support of AMIS and the resolution of the conflict in Darfur and should seek to underpin this investment, in co-ordination with the UN, by considering providing advice, personnel and/or capacity building where possible and appropriate over the transition period. The CGS would prepare a paper, following a possible AU decision to transition to the UN and discussion with DPKO, on what resources may be required to provide support to the UN.
31. The SG/HR, EUSR and the European Commission will continue their consultations with the AU, the UN and other international partners on the expected transition from AMIS to a UN-led mission. The EUSR is requested to prepare a political action plan for enhanced EU support to the AU-led Abuja process, **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, in close co-ordination with the US, other international partners and the AU. The EUSR will also undertake another mission to neighbouring countries in order to mobilise their influence on the parties in view of an early agreement at the Abuja talks.

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ROADMAP

12/01/2006	AU PSC - Decision in principle to transition to UN-led Operation
03/02/2006	UN Presidency Statement requesting contingency planning
10/03/2006	AU PSC - Expected confirmation of January decision
13/03/2006	Member States personnel contributions to existing commitments required (no later than)
06-17/03/2006	UN Technical Evaluation Mission (tbc)
mid-late March 2006	UN Planning for Transition options and Framework Plan
late March 2006	International Conference/Donors Conference Brussels (tbc)
late March - early April 2006	CGS Paper on possible resources required for UN transition and EUSR Action Plan on taking Abuja forward
01/01/2007	Prospective UN mission launch date
