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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 25 June 2008

**9092/2/08
REV 2 EXT 1 (06.03.2012)**

**COSDP 358
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NOTE

From: Secretariat
To: Delegations

Subject : Lessons from the EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to the African Union Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) and recommended action

On 18 July 2005, the EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to the African Union (AU) mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) was adopted by Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP. On 31 July 2007 (UNSCR 1769) the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of the joint UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), constituting the final part of a three phased approach to enhancing peacekeeping in Darfur. UNAMID assumed authority from AMIS (and AMIS was incorporated into UNAMID) on 1 January 2008. After having been extended for a further fifth period of six months from 1 July 2007, the EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to AMIS was completed (through a repealing Joint Action (2007/887/CFSP)) on 31 December 2007.

This paper draws lessons, and recommends action in view of their implementation, from the supporting action. Contributions were received from the Council Secretariat (DGE, EUMS, CPCC, DGA), EUSR for Sudan and the Commission. Detailed military lessons have been inserted into ELPRO (EUMS Lessons Process) and will be further managed by the EUMS. Detailed civilian lessons by the Police Head of Mission are set out in his Final report (doc 8320/08) and should also be acted upon.

**LESSONS FROM THE EU CIVILIAN-MILITARY SUPPORTING ACTION
TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN THE DARFUR REGION OF SUDAN (AMIS)
AND RECOMMENDED ACTION**

I. Introduction

1. On 8 April 2004, a Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement signed between the Darfurian movements and the Government of Sudan entailed the establishment of a Cease-fire Commission and acceptance of an offer from the African Union to monitor the cease-fire compliance. The African Union Monitoring Mission (AMIS I) was launched as a result.
2. Prior to the EU civilian-military supporting action to AMIS, the EU provided an ever-growing amount of support to the AU efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur. The EU co-financed AMIS, via the European Development Fund (Africa Peace Facility) managed by the Commission, as well as bilateral contributions by Member States. The evolving situation in Darfur led the African Union Peace and Security Council in October 2004 to expand AMIS' mandate and means (resulting in AMIS II), and the AU requested the EU to continue its support to the mission. Taking into account the African ownership, the Council decided not to deploy a fully fledged ESDP Mission to Darfur, but to engage through an EU supporting action to AMIS. At the time of the termination of the supporting action, the EU stepped up its engagement to tackle the crisis in Darfur through the launch, on 28 January 2008, of a bridging military operation in eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) at the request of the UN
3. The objectives of the EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to AMIS (hereafter the supporting action) as set out in the Council Joint Action 557 were:

Article 6, tasks of the police component

The EU supporting action to the Civilian Police Component (CIVPOL) of AMIS II shall provide:

- support to the AMIS II Police Chain of Command by providing the AU with highly experienced Senior Police Advisors at all levels of the chain of command;

- support for training of CIVPOL personnel through providing a capacity for in-mission training by a group of EU trainers;
- support to the development of a police unit within the Secretariat of the AU.

Article 9, tasks of the military component

The military component of the EU supporting action to AMIS II shall cover different types of assistance:

- provision of planning and technical assistance to all AMIS II levels of command, including the logistic support co-ordination structure;
 - provision of Military Observers, in the context of AMIS II enhancement plan;
- and
- training of African troops and observers forming part of AMIS II enhancement, as required;
 - strategic and tactical transportation;
 - aerial observation, if required by the AU.

Simultaneously with the supporting action the Council appointed a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan through Joint Action 2005/556/CFSP. The mandate of the EUSR for Sudan included, among many other tasks, to ensure coherence between the EU's activities in support of AMIS.

4. The EU civilian-military supporting action was established outside formal, existing Mission formats and without an EU chain of command from Brussels (political-strategic level). As an ad hoc arrangement, the Brussels Joint Co-ordination Team (BJCT) lead by the Head of the EUMS Civ/Mil Cell, provided a forum to facilitate co-ordination within the Council General Secretariat (CGS), and with the Commission, to ensure timely and coherent EU support to AMIS across the range of military, police, other civilian and political supporting measures, and a Co-ordination Cell was established in Addis Ababa to support the EUSR for Sudan¹.

¹ Referred to in JA 2005/557/CFSP as the EU coordination Cell in Addis Ababa.

The BJCT provided support to the EUSR for Sudan team in Addis Ababa with respect to managing day to day co-ordination and assistance to AMIS. The BJCT also provided direct guidance as necessary to EU personnel. Certain more formal instructions were issued² while other guidance was provided on an "as required" basis. Military and police personnel regularly found themselves acting in a political or quasi-political role and did require guidance, for example, in respect of EU engagement with, and advice to, the AU or other partners.

5. The personnel of the supporting action (the above mentioned police and military component) were deployed inside the AMIS chain of command in a variety of locations across Darfur, as well as in Khartoum and Addis Ababa. This was a new experience for the EU, with the usual command and control arrangements for an ESDP mission not applying. Furthermore, the nature of the supporting action was a new experience in that it integrated military, police and political tasks within the same institutional framework.
6. The military and police advisers, who were part of the EUSR for Sudan team in Addis Ababa, among their other tasks, were responsible for day to day co-ordination of the military and police components and for day to day contact with the AU and its Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the AU operational command structure in Addis Ababa. The EUSR for Sudan team in Addis Ababa also maintained close contact with the European Commission Heads of Delegation in Addis Ababa and Khartoum and co-ordinated as appropriate with other donors to AMIS including the UN and NATO.
7. EU military personnel deployed to AMIS (tactical level) were under operational control (OPCON)³ of AMIS since arriving in Addis Ababa (except personnel assigned to the EUSR for Sudan team in Addis) while the full command of all EU military personnel remained in Member States.

² Co-ordinating instruction for EU military and police personnel supporting AMIS II (DG 051/07, 31 Jan 07; Contingency and Relocation Plan (CCM 128/06, 29 Nov 06); Medical Plans. Separate pre-deployment guidance is also provided for Military personnel and in the call for contributions for Police officers.

³ Operational control provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Because the EU did not have an EU chain of command, nor national support elements deployed, the BCJT established an unofficial/informal administrative chain of command to co-ordinate and to facilitate the support to EU deployed military personnel. With that arrangement the unofficial duty of care responsibility was given to the senior EU officer seconded to AMIS for personnel deployed to Sudan and Chad and to the Military Adviser to the EUSR for the EUSR for Sudan team and EU personnel in DITF in Addis Ababa. For the civilian personnel the duty of care was ensured with the creation of the CPCC.

8. The supporting action therefore required a high degree of civil-military co-ordination, at all levels, in order to ensure coherent and optimised support to the AU, to ensure that EU personnel were properly directed and administered and to ensure that timely, accurate and coherent information could be provided to the Political and Security Committee (Member States).

II. Lessons

9. The following lessons may be applicable in future situations where the EU decides to support an operation led by another actor in crisis management and where a range of EU tools are used simultaneously to achieve an effective overall EU response to a crisis. There are lessons to be drawn from the challenges and opportunities posed by internal EU co-ordination as well as interaction with the AU, including the visibility and impact of the EU in this regard. Despite certain difficulties encountered in delivery of this first EU supporting action, it can be considered that this type of undertaking could be one of the tools available to the EU in support to building AU capabilities, as set out in the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa (doc. 10538/4/04 REV4) (and based on the principle of *African Solutions to African Problems*, where the EU has encouraged the AU to take the lead in peace operations on the African continent). The effectiveness largely depends on the acceptance by the receiving organisation.

10. *Recommended action: The EU should establish a blueprint for possible similar supporting actions using the lessons from this one. It could be based on the following considerations:*
- *the political will of the organisation receiving support should be ensured and be a precondition for undertaking the EU engagement;*
 - *a multidisciplinary, advisory/training supporting action of limited size could be offered to temporarily assist the main operation;*
 - *the primary objective of the EU supporting action should be to increase the efficiency of the main operation;*
 - *a degree of autonomy from the main operation regarding mission support will most likely be necessary, e.g. for accommodation, communications, medical support, transportation;*
 - *in order to reduce risk exposure, deployment could be limited to the operational and regional headquarters of the main operation;*
 - *appropriate co-ordination arrangements need to be in place between Brussels and the host organisation to resolve operational issues at high level when needed;*
 - *the mandate of the supporting action should be clear and accompanied by benchmarks that are, if possible, measurable;*
 - *good communication and understanding of the mandate of a supporting action should be ensured at all levels in the host organisation;*
 - *in order to fill all supporting action positions, an efficient deployment/recruitment policy and provision of sufficiently attractive financial conditions are needed. Adequate logistical, medical and evacuation facilities should also be provided in order to attract qualified candidates;*
 - *lessons and experience from partners such as the UN should also be taken into account.*

Internal EU co-ordination

11. The supporting action inherited EU Member States' support and personnel who had been seconded (military personnel were OPCON) to the AU on a bi-lateral basis. It also brought civilian and military crisis management expertise together in a common EU effort. Over time, co-ordination and coherence between the civilian and military EU elements and with the EUSR for Sudan office steadily improved.

Challenges included high turnover of EU staff, an unpredictable working environment, great geographical distances and insufficient co-ordination and coherence within the AMIS.

Regular ESDP mission Command and Control arrangements did not apply to the supporting action.

12. *Recommended action: The Council should establish as early as possible whether a potential EU engagement in accordance with article 17.2 of the TEU (Treaty of the European Union) can be organised as a full fledged operation/mission or whether, due to specific circumstances, it needs to take the form of a supporting action. In any supporting action there should be clear EU command and control arrangements for deployed EU personnel, whilst taking into account the specific nature of supporting actions, which is to support the effectiveness of another organisation's mission by embedding EU personnel in its chain of command. They will also need to include sufficiently robust administrative control to ensure the EU's duty of care can be properly exercised. Work to develop a blueprint for possible future supporting actions should specifically address these requirements for appropriate command and control modalities.*

NOT DECLASSIFIED *Within a formal policy and co-ordination structure, the EUSR office needs to be sufficiently conversant on co-ordination requirements, to act effectively in this respect also with a view to projecting the EU's objectives and a positive public image of its engagement. The EUSR and the designated administratively responsible of the military and civilian personnel should receive clear direction and guidance on their tasks, responsibilities and authority.*

13. The comprehensive EU approach to supporting AMIS was intended to ensure a maximum effect of the resources allocated, with overall EU political coherence ensured by the EUSR for Sudan. The BJCT provided a forum to ensure this co-ordination at Brussels level, including with the Commission. Instructions were issued to the supporting action by the BJCT or the EUSR for Sudan, as appropriate. While in some respects this worked well, practical difficulties impacted on the ability to co-ordinate, such as the high turnover of staff, the geographical distances, problems in obtaining visas from Sudan, unreliable communications and internet access.

14. *Recommended action: A clear command and control structure is also crucial in order to facilitate coordination of activities and reporting. The coherence of EU action in the field should be ensured by the EUSR. This responsibility should be more clearly established in the Joint Action for the EUSR. Continuous, direct interaction between the different EU elements is needed in order to ensure the greatest possible coherence and impact of the resources available.*
15. Whilst the arrangements made for the supporting action provided for a certain degree of flexibility for the EU to deploy people on the ground quickly, experience shows that a more structured approach would have been desirable. Support was put in place within the AMIS framework, especially with regard to the living and working conditions of personnel and security. The fact remained however, that support for EU personnel was primarily provided by the AU and this support fell short of normal EU standards. Different terms of service and financial arrangements between and within the military and police elements, geographical distance, etc, further complicated the situation.
16. *Recommended action: A supporting action needs a strong and independent position in relation to the main operation when it comes to mission support should the latter not be able to provide this support up to EU standards. EU personnel need to rely on their own logistical support, including for communications and information systems as well as for medical support, transportation, accommodation and food. Planning of a future EU supporting action should foresee appropriate arrangements regarding equipment, health and logistics, and provide a sufficient budget so as to reduce the dependence on the receiving organisation in this regard. At the same time, these measures need to be assessed in relation to the impact they will have on the acceptance of the EU personnel inside the main operation.*

17. The different financial, administrative and welfare arrangements⁴ for police officers, for military observers and for military experts in the same EU undertaking resulted in a disparity of treatment between personnel, different financial responsibilities for some key personnel and it meant that the financial treatment and conditions for each component were managed differently. This could be potentially divisive and it impacts on the relationships between, and management of, military and civilian components that are deployed together. It also meant more resources needed to be devoted to financial management and reporting, including towards the AU.
18. *Recommended action: This supporting action has stressed the need of close co-ordination and exchange of information between the European Commission (as main financing partner of the operation) and the CGS (providing civilian-military support and expertise on the ground). The EU personnel deployed in a supporting action should have similar financial and working conditions across its different components. If local working conditions do not meet regular EU standards, sufficient financial or other compensation should be provided to the personnel.*
19. The mission operated on 6-monthly extensions of its mandate and budget, following the mandate for AMIS provided by the AU, which proved impractical and time-consuming for mission administration. Also, the budget for the civilian component of the supporting action came to follow another time-cycle than the mandate, differing by two months for the whole of 2007, which added to the burden.
20. *Recommended action: Coherence of legal and administrative planning documents of a supporting action should be sought, in particular where certain provisions of a Joint Action continue to be valid while others expire. The Legal Services of the Commission and the CGS should explore flexible ways that could be used to achieve this.*
21. EU personnel would be more effective if they all received a common EU-induction training, delivered in a centralised manner in Brussels, where the mandate, objectives and tasks of the mission are explained (military have received induction training in Brussels with involvement of all players).

⁴ E.g. on payment of *per diems*, accommodation costs, R&R flights, reimbursement of (re)deployment tickets.

22. *Recommended action: Personnel in future missions should receive pre-mission training from their sending State and, in addition, a centralised induction training on the specificities of the supporting action and the main operation.*

Interaction with the AU

23. As AMIS was the first full-fledged peace mission carried out under an AU flag, the experience gained is relevant for any future EU supporting actions to the AU. It helps to understand the AU's ability to lead similar peace operations in the future, and how EU contributions can be better geared towards increasing the AU's operational capabilities, including for the longer term and based on the African Standby Force concept.
24. *Recommended action:* **NOT DECLASSIFIED** *Follow-up on these lessons should be provided by the EUSR/Head of Delegation to the AU on issues falling under the Africa-EU Plan of Action for Peace and Security, and should be taken into account in long-term EU capacity-building activities with the AU.* **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

25. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

26. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

27. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

28. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

29. Additional EU efficiency measures should be explored in order to communicate the EU's political messages, objectives and assistance better to all relevant audiences in the host country, the region, the EU and across the world (governments, other political actors, the public). The mission should be regularly reviewed and evaluated *inter alia* for this purpose.

30. *Recommended action: The CGS and the Commission should explore ways to further strengthen communication to the public in order to improve the impact of a supporting action. This could include joint media campaigns and joint assessment/monitoring missions.*
