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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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NOTE

From:	European Union Military Committee
To:	Political and Security Committee
No. Prev. doc.:	EUMC Mtg Doc 12/07
Subject:	EUMC Initial Assessment and Recommendations on the Military Lessons Identified from Op EUFOR RD Congo

Delegations will find attached the EUMC Initial Assessment and Recommendations on the Military Lessons Identified from Op EUFOR RD Congo, which was agreed by the EUMC on 22 February 2007.

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References:

- A. SN 1257/07 – Op EUFOR RD Congo – End of operation report dated 22 Jan 07.
- B. IM 07-10/00c OPS 012/07 – EUMS report on lessons from Op EUFOR RD Congo dated 23 Jan 07.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In order to facilitate the overarching requirement for the provision of a joint report on lessons identified to the PSC, the EUMC undertook to initially assess the lessons identified by the OHQ at Reference A, the EUMS at Reference B and Member States, and to make recommendations accordingly. This report represents the initial findings of this process of examination. The EUMC is conscious that we are currently in the early stages of a lessons identified/lessons learned process and thus the report seeks to identify neither remedy nor action lead for the lessons identified at this stage. Rather it limits itself to providing appropriate guidance to help shape the deliberations in the joint discussions that will in turn shape the draft report to the PSC at the end of the second stage of the process.
2. The methodology applied in preparing the report has been to group individual lessons identified together where they are best viewed collectively under a number of themes. Whilst this has its utility in shaping further debate it should be borne in mind that the themes themselves should also be viewed collectively to establish an overall understanding as to where we might be best advised to reinforce success and to make improvement as we progress further through the process.

B. AIM

3. The aim of this report is firstly to provide an initial assessment to the PSC of the lessons identified of military provenance collected to date and secondly and in parallel to inform the second joint stage of the overall lessons identified/lessons learned process.

C. INITIAL LESSONS IDENTIFIED AND CONSIDERATIONS

4. Context. The EUMC recognises that EUFOR RD Congo can be assessed as a success for ESDP. It demonstrated the capacity of the EU to successfully conduct an autonomous military operation in a politically and militarily complex and challenging environment. When identifying lessons from EUFOR RD CONGO and, more importantly, drawing the appropriate conclusions, as outlined below, the EUMC considers it important to keep the specific context and political parameters and constraints in mind, that determined the planning of the operation significantly and defined its scope and developing. The EUMC recalls that EUFOR RD CONGO was planned and launched on the basis of a specific request from the UN to the EU to make available a deterrent force that, if necessary, could be deployed to the DRC and enhance MONUC's quick reaction capability during the electoral process. This required an EU military operation in support of MONUC for a limited period of time. This UN request was accepted at the political level as the basis and framework for the planning of the operation. The EUMC calls to mind that under the given circumstances at that time, it was only possible to produce one strategic option with operational/tactical variations. When planning commenced the envisaged date for the first round of the elections in the DRC was in April 2006, therefore planning at that stage took place under significant time pressure. The cautious approach of member states further increased the inertia within the overall planning process.
5. Political & Strategic Decision Making. Formal planning could not start until formal political direction was given. In spite of the fact that a decision for EU intervention was taken in principle there was a considerable delay between this decision and the designation of the military command chain which in turn precluded early military planning. Moreover, the planning at the political and strategic level was restarted after a pause of one month in order to allow Member States to satisfy the requirement for the multi-nationalisation of the operation. This further delayed the designation of the Operation and Force commanders and the subsequent activation of their respective headquarters including planning staff and enabling communications. Thus the time subsequently available to military authorities for operational planning was further reduced. In an effort to regain time and in the absence of a properly constituted EU Fact Finding Mission (FFM) available at short notice, a disjointed series of

FFM, either EU or nationally led, were deployed to generate the information to allow planning to be undertaken.

6. Procedure. The current Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) were not followed in full. The Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the Military Strategic Option (MSO) were replaced by the option paper which was a mix of political strategic and military operational/tactical considerations. It should be noted that the EUMC was not involved up to this stage. Moreover, the option paper was not amended in accordance with the EUMC and CIVCOM advice and had to be read in conjunction with the accompanying advice. This led to time consuming interactions at the military-strategic level with other EU activities in theatre. For the Force Commander, this was of significant inconvenience and served to complicate the operational planning process.
7. Planning. The non-simultaneous build up of the OHQ and FHQ resulted in a number of problems. It undermined the principle of parallel planning and required the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and his OHQ to address operational/tactical level planning for a protracted period. A failure to balance this division of responsibility restricted the freedom of action of the Force Commander (FCdr). Furthermore, contingency plans could only be developed after deployment in the Area of Operations (AO). The operation highlighted the need to influence opinion at all levels and in this regard CIMIC and Information Operations (InfoOps) were most influential although there were difficulties in funding CIMIC operations. This is a Lesson Identified from Operation ARTEMIS that has yet to be implemented. Several problems were identified due to diverging national concepts and standards.
8. Interaction. The lack of mutual understanding between the EU and the UN as to the requirements of the UN for EU support (objectives, tasks, timelines) persisted for a protracted period at the time when the need for military deployment was believed to be imminent. The lack of exchange of information regarding national plans for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) could have had a negative impact on the EU operation in case of an activation of these plans. The consideration of gender and human rights issues from the first planning stages, including the incorporation of advisors to the chain of command, improved operational effectiveness by adding credibility and gaining access to parts of society which would otherwise have been restricted.

EUFOR personnel in the DRC were afforded less protection than those in the GABON due to the application of different status agreements.

9. Command + Staff. In overall terms, once the appropriate decisions had been taken, the manning of the respective headquarters was achieved within the given timeframe. The recent training undertaken by the staff at MILEX05 proved extremely useful. There are nevertheless concerns as to the level of mutual understanding as to the roles and responsibilities of the OpCdr, FCdr and their respective headquarters. Moreover, there are indications that the Primary Augmentee Establishment Table (PAET) requires adjustment to incorporate specialists, notably for Financial Planning and Management and for CIMIC planning.
10. Force Generation and Capability. Force Generation is intrinsically linked to the development of the plan for engagement of an EU military force and should remain the responsibility of the OpCdr. Without clear and formal indication of Member States commitment the planning process remains potentially flawed as the late nomination of the OHQ precludes the formal establishment of potential forces levels and capabilities. Notwithstanding the adverse effect of the late establishment of the chain of command there are a number of other factors which had adverse effect on the capability of the forces that were eventually offered. National caveats and regulations restricted the Force Commander's potential manoeuvre capability. The restricted availability of tactical air transport and the national caveats and regulations associated with their employment illustrated this point. The provision of the reserve at the strategic level, as an important force element, was not addressed in the initial force generation process and proved difficult to resolve.
11. Information Exchange. The exchange of information, notably confidential and above, was problematic not only between the CGS and Member States but also between the OHQ and Member States. On a more positive note, at the operational and tactical levels best efforts by DE and FR forces enabled much to be achieved in accordance with accepted practice. This included the provision of dedicated CIS teams with equipment from the FR FHQ to subordinate forces and other organisations in the Kinshasa area, e.g. MONUC. Interoperability between MS CIS data and voice services remains limited.

12. Re-deployment. The political decision to conclude the mission based on a fixed end date, without reference to an end state, proved to be inflexible and left the EU unable to respond to the changing timetable of the election process. As a result, the operation terminated while EUFOR was still in theatre. EUFOR's redeployment undertaken after the 30 November 2006 (end date) without legal basis to use force outside the context of self defence under individual national regulations, represented a high level of risk to the outcome of the operation.
13. Logistics. The different logistic practices between MS and UN did not facilitate co-ordination and possible mutual support. The outsourcing of logistic support failed to meet the needs of the force within the restricted timelines of the operation. Both the Sealift Coordination Centre (SCC) and the European Airlift Centre (EAC) provided valuable support to the operation.
14. Lessons Identified/Learnt. Several lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS were not learnt when planning and executing EUFOR RD Congo, resulting in problems that could have been avoided. To date, the EU does not have a comprehensive methodology for the lessons identified/learnt process.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

15. On the basis of these considerations the EUMC recommends that the following themes, which are not exhaustive, should be taken forward for further scrutiny, analysis and subsequent development of proposed solution in stage two of the lessons identified/lessons learnt process:
- a. The timely engagement of the EUMC and the military chain of command.
 - b. The OHQ system and problems of availability within a difficult and realistic context.
 - c. Methods and means for the more efficient gathering of strategically relevant information.
 - d. Transparency of the application of Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures.
 - e. Measures to encourage the early engagement and commitment of Member States within the decision making process, including the timely identification of available capabilities and resources.
 - f. Simultaneous build up of OHQ and FHQ.
 - g. Improvement of the employment and funding for CIMIC.

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- h. Use of model EU status of forces agreement for all deployed units and personnel.
- i. Roles and responsibilities of the OpCdr, the FCdr and their respective headquarters, including the training and composition.
- j. EU connectivity.
- k. The relationship between end date, end state and exit strategy and their implications.
- l. Logistics and support for first entry operations.
- m. Interaction and co-ordination with the UN.
- n. Comprehensive methodology for lessons identified/learnt process.

16. The EUMC further recommends that discussion as to how to reinforce the success of the following should also be taken forward:

- a. Information Operations, Gender and Human Rights to improve operational effectiveness.
- b. Support to future operations provided by multinational movement co-ordination centres (MMCCs).

E. CONCLUSION

17. The EUMC concludes that, notwithstanding the overall success of the operation, there are considerable improvements that can be made to the planning and conduct of future operations as a result of lessons identified from Operation RD Congo on the basis of the considerations and recommendations above.
