



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 25 April 2012

**7349/06
EXT 1**

**ESDP/PESD
COSDP 171
DARFUR 4**

PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION

of document:	7349/06 RESTREINT UE
dated:	14 March 2006
new status:	Public

Subject:	Military Advice on EU Support to AMIS and Possible AMIS-UN Transition
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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 14 March 2006

**7349/06
EXT 1 (25.04.2012)**

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NOTE

From:	European Union Military Committee
To:	Political and Security Committee
No. Prev. doc.:	EUMC Mtg Doc 12/06 REV 1
Subject:	Military Advice on EU Support to AMIS and Possible AMIS-UN Transition

Delegations will find attached the Military Advice on EU Support to AMIS and Possible AMIS-UN Transition, which was agreed by the EUMC on 14 March 2006.

The EUMC recommends that the PSC note this military advice and agree to its conclusions.

References:

- A. 6950/06 (Options paper - EU support to AMIS and possible AMIS-UN transition), dated 2 March 2006.
- B. 15972/05 (AU led Joint Assessment Mission Report), dated 20 December 2005.

A. INTRODUCTION

- 1. A CGS Options paper on EU support to AMIS and the possible AMIS-UN transition (Ref. A) was discussed in the PSC on 3 March 2006. The PSC requested Military Advice in time for the PSC on 14 March.

B. AIM

- 2. The aim of this paper is to provide Military Advice on Ref. A, focussing on both the military support to AMIS and to the possible AU/UN transition process.

C. CONSIDERATIONS

Support to AMIS

- 3. The EUMC emphasises the need to further improve the capabilities of AMIS prior to a possible hand-over to the UN, in order that as effective a transition as possible can be achieved. The EUMC considers that progress in the Abuja process and an increase in the operational effectiveness of AMIS would help constitute a successful exit strategy for the AU and facilitate the take-over by the UN.
- 4. The EUMC is of the opinion that the range of military actions and measures suggested in Ref. A. represents, within realistic limits, the scope of what the EU could undertake. The EUMC considers however that an order of priority should be established for the various measures, focussing on those actions that are essential for maintaining and improving AMIS effectiveness. The EUMC stresses that the recommendations made in the report of the recent Joint Assessment Mission (JAM, Ref. B) must be fully implemented as soon as possible.

5. The EUMC assesses that AMIS' effectiveness is suffering mainly from two key command deficiencies, that is command and control and logistics. Although it is recognised that there are some improvements, such as a more proactive attitude of the new Force Commander and some progress in the establishment of the JOC, there is little direction being provided by the DITF and Mission HQ to the mission.
6. In addition, the latest concern is a decision by the DITF to terminate the Level 1 medical contract, which should now be provided by AU TCCs within their Bn ORBAT; the impact of this is now being assessed. Additionally, the AU will cancel its contract on the provision of the Level 2 medical facility in El Fasher effective 1 April 2006, delegating Level 2 medical care to the El Fasher local hospital. The EUMC notes with concern that this will directly impact on the medical care of EU personnel, notably the EU Military Observers. Therefore, the EUMC stresses the urgent need to address this situation with the AU at the appropriate political level.
7. The EUMC observes that the current EU military support to AMIS focuses on the provision of manpower and the delivery of strategic airlift to support the rotation of AMIS. The EU currently provides 4 MILOBS and 15 staff officers to support AMIS. In addition a military liaison team (3 officers) operates in support of the EUSR and the Brussels Joint Co-ordination Team in Addis Ababa. The EUMC considers that the current and foreseen shortfalls in EU manpower will lead to a loss of situational awareness in activities in Darfur and at the various headquarters, a reduced possibility of assisting AMIS with necessary improvements and a loss of EU credibility towards the AU. The EUMC is concerned that the current shortfall in EU manpower does not send a positive message either in Darfur or Abuja. It is worth noting, however, that the mission of MILOBS is more risky compared to April 2004 as the situation in the field has changed considerably since that date; deployment of EU personnel will always require safety considerations to be taken into account.
8. The EU, in the dialogue with the AU, should reflect on existing commitments to the AU and, if appropriate, enhance them, taking into account the requirement (e.g. medical care, safety and well-being and equal access to meetings and areas) for the AU to facilitate EU efforts.

9. The EUMC considers that the EUMS/CGS should have the flexibility (only with the consent of the parent Nation involved) to re-deploy EU personnel to different parts of the mission if priority requires. Particular attention should be paid to the evaluation of MILOBS conditions in order to allow their timely withdrawal from zones where combat is taking place, should this be deemed necessary.
10. The EUMC notes with satisfaction that the EU has effectively provided strategic airlift, in co-ordination with NATO, supporting both the military and CIVPOL enhancement of AMIS in the summer of 2005 and the military rotation of AMIS between February-April 2006. This airlift will likely be required again for a further rotation of troops later in 2006 and/or the deployment of additional UN troops. In addition a number of MS have provided bi-lateral support to AMIS through the donation of military materiel. This support has included the provision of vehicles, fuel, communications equipment, generators and dry rations. The EUMC feels that all AU international partners should work together in providing assistance to AMIS with the aim of mutually supporting each other, thereby avoiding duplication of efforts.

EU support to a possible AMIS-UN transition

11. The EUMC takes into account that the current UN DPKO planning yardstick is for the transition period to last until December 2006/January 2007, though this may change to an earlier or later date. The EUMC is of the opinion that EUMS and MS military personnel could provide valuable assistance to the UN DPKO in planning the transition as well as the follow-on UN mission in Darfur. EUMS and MS personnel involved in AMIS have accumulated a wealth of experience that will be to the benefit of UN DPKO. The EUMC considers that this experience should be made available immediately to UN DPKO as soon as UN DPKO opens up to external planners.
12. The EUMC considers, subject to an AU request, that providing military training teams in Sector locations will be a very demanding mission in terms of military manpower and materiel required, especially considering the time left to the possible hand-over to the UN. This needs very careful analysis with regards to its feasibility. Other alternative solutions may be more feasible.

Additional considerations

13. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

14. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

15. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

D. CONCLUSIONS

16. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

17. The EUMC recommends that the PSC note this military advice and agree to its conclusions.