



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 9 August 2012

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EXT 1**

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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



ANNEX

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(OR. en)**

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COVER NOTE

from :	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
to:	Political and Security Committee
Subject :	Guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units - IPU - in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution mission and interoperability of IPU and Police Headquarters.

With a view to the PSC meeting on 14 December, delegations will find attached the document "Guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units - IPU - in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution mission and interoperability of IPU and Police Headquarters".

The first version of this document was prepared during the Greek Presidency in June 2003 and its contents updated in light of the lessons learned as a result of the police exercises "Lucerna" held in Italy in November 2003 and "Periland" held in France in June 2004.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management invites the Political and Security Committee:

- to take note of this document
- to invite the General Secretariat to develop a complementary paper on other police elements, as well as an overall concept for IPU and other rapidly deployable police elements, by April 2005.

PART I

GUIDELINES FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF INTEGRATED POLICE UNITS - IPU_s - IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF AN EU-LED SUBSTITUTION MISSION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF IPU_s AND POLICE HEADQUARTERS

REFERENCES

1. EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS:

- SANTA MARIA DA FEIRA SN 200/00 ADD1 REV 1
- NICE SN 400/1/00 ADD1 REV 1
- GÖTEBORG 9526/1/01
- LAEKEN SN 300/1/01 REV 1

2. SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEDURES FOR COHERENT, COMPREHENSIVE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT, 11127/03

3. EUROPEAN UNION CONCEPT FOR POLICE PLANNING, 6923/02 (RESTREINT)

4. GUIDELINES FOR POLICE COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT, 7854/02 (RESTREINT)

5. EUMC ADVICE, 7400/02 (RESTREINT)

6. COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR STRENGTHENING OF LOCAL POLICE MISSIONS, 9535/02

7. COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR POLICE SUBSTITUTION MISSIONS, 15048/02

8. STANDARDISATION AND INTEROPERABILITY, 13307/01

9. EUMS DEFINITIONS

1. FOREWORD

1.1. AIM OF THE DOCUMENT

To set out principles and procedures in order to:

- 1.1.1. define the guidelines for the **rapid deployment**¹ of Integrated Police Units (IPUs) and of a Police Mission (EUPOL) Headquarters (HQ) in a substitution scenario from the initial stage until the stabilisation stage as defined in the document 8655/1/02 "Comprehensive concept for Police Substitution Missions";
- 1.1.2. ensure a sufficient level of interoperability² for IPUs, notably for rapid deployment (short-term goal), including the ability to set up operational headquarters (OHQ) for a EUPOL in a substitution scenario as defined at the Nice European Council;
- 1.1.3. To identify and to define recommendations leading to enhanced standardisation and interoperability (medium-term/long-term goal) between IPUs and to lead into integration and coordination with other components of the EU Mission.

1.2. DEFINITIONS

1.2.1. Essential aspects:

- a) **IPU**: a police component that meets to the following conditions according to the European Council conclusions of Feira and Nice:
 - (1) robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and **interoperable** forces;
 - (2) able to perform executive tasks;
 - (3) preferably (to be deployed) in non stabilised situations;
 - (4) in case of an EU operation including military forces, subject to their national rules and legislation, may be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population.
- b) To meet the above conditions an IPU:
 - (1) must possess the following characteristics: structured and existing units,

¹ To be intended as the actions and measures linked to the decision-making, planning, force generation, command and control and means to be deployed to achieve a rapid reaction to a crisis.

² Document 13307/01 "Standardisation and interoperability" which defines interoperability as "The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces

with its own chain of command, possessing common TTPs and training, able to perform different police tasks, capable of self-protection in performing standard police operations;

- (2) and satisfy the following technical aspects: availability of logistics, of personnel/unit equipment, of some heavy equipment (if needed).

1.2.2. **Qualifying Aspects.** According to the above definition the following points must be considered:

- a) **Robustness.** IPU should be provided with weaponry and equipment (some heavy equipment can also be used) to enable them to operate with appropriate self-protection and security conditions in non stabilised situations ³.
- b) **Rapid deployable.** They should if possible be able to deploy within 30 days ⁴. A rapidly deployable EUPOL HQ will be essential for this deployment. These units should have an adequate logistic capability according to the tasks related to the mission (and specified in the CONOPS), and will bring their organic equipment.
- c) **Flexibility.** They should be able to perform different tasks by adapting their elements to new situations.
- d) **Interoperability.** They should be interoperable among themselves and with other Police Elements ⁵.

1.3. OTHER PRINCIPLES

1.3.1. The employment of IPU as well as the other elements of a EUPOL in operations is governed by some key factors that must always be taken into consideration.

1.3.2. Initiative and flexibility

Vast distances, extended spans of control and multi – faceted situations imply that IPU Commanders and personnel at any rank should have great initiative and a

and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

³ Concerning the use of force see doc. 12415/5/02 "Compendium of principles for the use of force and consequent guidance for the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) for police officers participating in EU crisis management operations".

⁴ Until now only 6 out of the 13 IPU offered by MS meet this requirement.

⁵ Doc 13307/01 "Standardisation and interoperability".

flexible approach to all events in order to maintain control of incidents and avoid their degeneration.

1.3.3. Personnel requirements

Personnel must have undergone appropriate training and possess appropriate professional preparation in police matters as an essential requirement in order to carry out the particular tasks of IPU.

1.3.4. Information-gathering attitude

IPU personnel at any rank must have in his/her professional background a marked orientation to collect information from various sources in the relevant operational areas, especially within the civilian environment, in order to prevent critical situations from occurring and to establish an information resource for operational needs.

1.3.5. Freedom of action and movement

IPU personnel will have, inside the mandate and tasks assigned to them, freedom of action and movement in those pre-emptive activities throughout AOR in order to carry out their tasks.

1.3.6. Contacts with local population

IPU personnel at any rank, when performing operational activities, should consider contacts with the local population as an essential factor for succeeding in the assigned mission. The contacts will be researched and maintained with impartiality towards different groups in accordance with the mission statement and aim to obtain collaboration and essential information.

1.4. SECURITY GAP: A Priority For Substitution Missions

1.4.1. The use of IPU is expected to reduce as much as possible the gap in which the military component might assume, on its own, public security tasks. Therefore

interaction with the military will be a priority ⁶. The simultaneous deployment of military and police components will require close coordination including an integration of planning processes. The mandate approved by the Council should define the relationships between the military and police components of the EU mission.

1.5. RESERVE

1.5.1. The need for the availability of a reserve IPU should be considered since the planning phase. Such a reserve should be considered as a flexible instrument able to reinforce or support other units should unforeseen situations arise so to ensure appropriate operational reactions.

1.5.2. The size and location of such a reserve should be planned according to the scenario, but as matter of principle, the reserve should be:

- a) Of the same size and composition as any other IPU except for specialised elements;
- b) Co-located with another IPU, normally in such a geographical location that in terms of space and time it would be able to reach other sectors in the most effective way;
- c) Kept together as a mass for manoeuvres, avoiding being split into sub-units. In this sense, utilisation of reserves platoons or minor units as a temporary reinforcement of other units, should be considered as exceptional.
- d) Once the EUPOL has reached the stabilisation stage and the other components have been deployed on the ground the EUPOL HoM can reconsider the need to maintain the availability of such a reserve.

1.6. SCENARIOS

1.6.1. During the initial stage IPU's will deploy to an assigned AOR where they will exercise **area responsibility**. At the stabilisation stage IPU's will exercise **functional responsibility**.

⁶ As mentioned in the "Guidelines for Police Command and Control Aspects Of EU Crisis Management" 7854/02 (RESTREINT)

- 1.6.2. The interoperability of the IPU's should take into consideration the evolving scenario ⁷ of a substitution mission over time.
- 1.6.3. The initial stage of an EU police substitution mission will in principle consist of a EUPOL HQ and of IPU's with defined AOR, together with the necessary capabilities represented by other specialised elements, so as to be able to operate and to prepare a smooth transition to the stabilisation stage.
- 1.6.4. During the following stabilisation stage the IPU's will form the core of the mobile element of the mission.
- 1.6.5. The time frame for the initial stage of the operation will be determined by the evolution of the situation. It should be as short as possible taking into account the security conditions and the logistic constraints.

1.7. MISSION AND TASKS

- 1.7.1. According to the mandate, IPU's can perform a large spectrum of police functions as mentioned in the "substitution mission" scenario, i.e.:
- a) Patrolling and public surveillance operations;
 - b) Information gathering;
 - c) Public order, civil disorder, riot and crowd control functions;
 - d) Without prejudice to activities to be carried out by specialised units, they may carry out other police functions and tasking such as:
 - (1) to conduct criminal investigations;
 - (2) to investigate major crimes against human rights, assistance to refugees and internal displaced persons - IDP;
 - (3) to provide support to the International Criminal Courts or Tribunals;
 - (4) to ensure, if needed, other police functions such as traffic police and border policing;
 - (5) to provide assistance for security of personnel of the international

community;

(6) to perform security tasks such as close protection and VIP escorts.

1.8. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

1.8.1. IPU are intended to cope with the civilian population and shall avoid using lethal force. In any case, the use of force needs to be accurately graduated in accordance with specific authorised Rules of Engagements (ROE).

1.8.2. The use of deadly force is the last resort and it is to be applied according to the provisions of document 12415/5/02 " Compendium of principles for the use of force and consequent guidance for the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) for police officers participating in EU crisis management operations", to which the Police Planners will refer.

1.8.3. ROE are essential in order to establish and regulate the use of force by IPU; they have to be carefully assessed in order to establish whether they are sufficient for, or compatible with, achieving the aims of the mission, taking into account the proactive attitude that police forces must take in preventing, rather than reacting to, a security threat.

⁷

As defined in document 8655/1/02 1 of 8 May 2002 " Comprehensive concept for Police Substitution Missions".

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1. In the Nice European Council Conclusions it was acknowledged that, where necessary, military and police components must be part of an integrated planning process and should be used on the ground in a closely coordinated manner.

2.2. GENERAL ASPECTS

2.2.1. In the initial stage of the EUPOL the deployed IPU's will have an area responsibility in which they will exercise the main police functions: in terms of C2 this will imply the decentralisation of command and control functions to local commanders and the overall responsibility of the POL HoM who will exercise his functions through an appropriate system of communications, reporting procedures and inspections.

2.2.2. Command options

- a) The POL HoM will exercise the Command option that will be approved in the Joint Action and CONOPS document.
- b) The IPU commanders will exercise Tactical Command - TACOM over own units.
- c) The POL HoM can re-deploy units in the AOR of other units under Tactical Control - TACON to the Commander responsible for that AOR. If necessary, on a case by case basis, a temporary "Operational Task Force" can be created joining two or more IPU's under TACOM of the Police HoM or a senior officer appointed by him. If any, the transfer of authority will imply limits in terms of tasking and time of deployment.
- d) Other C2 options can be foreseen and applied in accordance with the provisions of doc. 6922/02 "Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU police operations in civilian aspects of crisis management".

2.2.3. By their very nature, operations in theatre involve considerable autonomy and

initiative on the part of the units employed because communications can be difficult and erratic, the situation can change and deteriorate very quickly, and it is not always possible to rely on the normal flow of information.

- 2.2.4. Commanders will therefore need to have a degree of autonomy commensurate with the demands involved and to be able to act on their own initiative; for this reason, orders and instructions cannot be excessively detailed: they must relate solely to the mission (task and aim of the operation), the assigned forces, the instructions for coordination with the units and/or other organisations on the ground, any time limits (predetermined or linked to the achievement of an objective – the end state) and limits in terms of Area Of Responsibility - AOR.
- 2.2.5. In the case of operations to be conducted in an area under military responsibility, the police will seek the assignment of its own Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) or "Blue Box".⁸
- 2.2.6. Command and control of police elements deployed. In case of deployment or redeployment of police elements (notably specialised or reserve element) in the Area of Operation for a limited period of time/limited tasks (not in case of reassignment of AOR), the POL HoM will assign appropriate the Command and Control option to the Officer responsible for the AOR concerned, establishing also the limits in terms of tasking and time.

2.3. EU CHAIN OF COMMAND

⁸ The TAOR of police can be defined as " an area in which the police component will conduct its operations. This TAOR will be defined in terms of space and, if possible, of time. The transfer of authority - TOA will be done in advance of the operation. The concept is included in the documents: Guidelines for Police Command and Control Aspects Of EU Crisis Management, 7854/02 (RESTREINT)" and 7400/02 "Military advice", which also mention the TOA.

- 2.3.1. Police components of a EU-led mission must be placed under an EU Chain Of Command. In this case the chain of command will be determined according to decisions taken by the EU Council through approval of the Joint Action and CONOPS⁹.
- 2.3.2. The provisions of document 6922/02 "Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Police Operations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" will be applied.

⁹ Doc 7116/03 "Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management".

2.4. EUPOL HEADQUARTERS (EUPOL HQ)

- 2.4.1. The HQs represent the main instruments to ensure the command and control of the mission. For this reason it must be deployed at the very beginning of the initial stage together with the IPU, and other elements so as to ensure appropriate planning and organisation of the mission.
- 2.4.2. The general requirements for an EUPOL HQ, which should be multinational from the first phase of deployment, include the necessity for it to be capable of planning at short notice for operations of the size and scale envisaged, in the area of deployment, coupled with the ability to communicate both with the EU Headquarters in Brussels and its depending IPUs in theatre.
- 2.4.3. Sufficient and appropriate resources, notably housing, communications, computer facilities and general connectivity must be in situ prior to its activation. In particular, the ability to communicate with advance elements is an essential requirement for a fully functional EUPOL HQ.
- 2.4.4. Additional requirements, commensurate with the scale and scope of the intended operation, will be considered. The core staff, around fifty personnel ¹⁰, must be capable of conducting the key staff functions pending the complete deployment, so as to advance in planning and organisation of the Mission. The EUPOL HQ must be capable of operating at short notice. A number of complementary capability will be added to this core staff as required throughout the mission.
- 2.4.5. Staff personnel must be capable of using the working language as agreed by the Political and Security Committee.

¹⁰ See document 8655/1/02 REV1 of 8 May 2002 " Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions".

2.4.6. In addition the EUPOL HQ:

- a) must be completed by an Operations Centre linked to operations rooms of the depending IPUs.
- b) must be provided with the complete range of administrative and support functions such as i.e. transport, feeding and accommodation.

2.4.7. EUPOL HQ CIS infrastructure must be in place to support the command of an EU police operation from strategic to tactical levels. Effective links between the EU Institutions and the EUPOL HQ must be guaranteed by means such as VTC links and secure data transfer. A Local Area Network (LAN) must be available to support the staff.

2.5. EUPOL HQ FUNCTIONS (see Annex 1)

2.6. SCENARIO WHERE THE POLICE ELEMENT IS UNDER THE MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

2.6.1. According to the Nice European Council conclusions the Police mission must be placed under EU chain of command: a temporary and limited overall responsibility of the Military Component of the EU mission over the Police can be envisaged in a destabilised situation for the first stage.

2.6.2. In case of simultaneous deployment of both military and police components on the ground the provisions of document "Guidelines for Police Command and Control Aspects Of EU Crisis Management, 7854/02 (RESTREINT)" will be applied. An integrated military/police planning process - strategic and/or operational - is required.

- 2.6.3. Should the use of IPU fall under military responsibility, the use of IPU should be centralised by:
- a) assigning all the command and control functions to the POL HoM as the sole commander of all the IPU elements;
 - b) seeking the unity of the IPU so that they are preserved from fragmentation and dispersal over the territory and will not be answerable to separate military units.
- 2.6.4. As a matter of principle joint military/police operations should be avoided, even if cases of mutual support can be envisaged and planned. In this case specific planning addressing the respective command and control positions and an appropriate communications system must be put in place.

2.7. SCENARIO WHERE A LOCAL POLICE PRESENCE EXISTS AND MAINTAINS EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS.

- 2.7.1. If local police force(s) continue to exist, the relationship between the international presence and the local police must be given appropriate consideration. Overlapping and duplication of roles and functions should be avoided with the aim of:
- a) Avoiding conflict of competencies between police forces;
 - b) Concentrating EUPOL efforts on the major security issues;
 - c) Saving EUPOL forces where local police are present.
- 2.7.2. The concept is that during this phase the Local police will act as an auxiliary to the EUPOL which will have the overall responsibility for operational decisions. In addition a mechanism of coordination should be established with the local police and lead by EUPOL HQ – Operations. The mechanism of coordination will defuse the situation in case of overlap between EUPOL and local police responsibilities in operational issues, taking into account the EUPOL mandate, the situation on the ground, the availability of forces and the priorities.

2.7.3. Normally in this cases local police will be placed under Command and Control of the EUPOL when the situation deems it necessary. The appropriate level of command will be identified inside the EUPOL to parallel the local police Command and Control structure.

2.7.4. In case where the local police force is entitled to retain some executive functions, but it is considered to be unreliable or incapable of acting in an appropriate way according to best international practice, the EUPOL will either support or mentor the local police activities. Such function can be temporarily exercised by the IPU components and be transferred to the strengthening component of the EUPOL as soon as available.

2.8. REPORTING AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS

2.8.1. Guidelines

- a) Contents. EUPOL specific reports will be precise and concise in relation to the subject matter and will contain the recommendations, comments and/or impression of the signing authority so as to allow the Chain of Command to get appropriate and timely information and to be able to take appropriate decisions;
- b) Communication system. Reports will be forwarded by appropriate technical means to ensure secure and timely transmission. The report chain will follow the EU chain of command.

2.8.2. Reports. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

2.8.3. Information Exchange

EUPOL will actively seek and exchange information with other main Actors in Theatre:

- a) Especially, EUPOL will establish a working exchange of information with the Military component regarding the security situation and development of operations on the ground, as part of the force protection measures;
 - b) With other main IC organisations which can be valuable sources of information.
- Permanent procedures for such exchange of information can be set up by the POL HoM (LNOs, joint WG etc).

2.8.4. Content/Procedures of Reporting. At tactical level the content, reporting procedures and aim of reports will be identified by the POL HoM and managed by the EUPOL HQ/IPUs staff. The basic policy will be to have a complete and updated vision of the situation on a regular basis.

3. LOGISTICS

- 3.1. Before the field deployment, at the initial stage, a logistic planning process will help to take advantage of resources available and identify logistic shortcomings so that a support system can be developed in the most cost-effective way to ensure timely and effective support for the EUPOL.
- 3.2. For the purpose of this document the principles of logistics are defined according to the ones developed by the document containing EUMS Definitions ¹¹, as far as applicable and with some changes due to the specificity of the civilian logistic approach, and whenever the IPU or other deployed units/personal will be supported the military logistics. The following definitions must be taken into consideration:
 - 3.2.1. **Framework Nation:** A Member State, or a group of Member States, that has/have volunteered, and that the Council has agreed, to have specific responsibilities in an operation over which the EU exercises political control. These responsibilities can cover some logistic functions, some aspects of CIS, and the availability of the EUPOL HQ;
 - 3.2.2. **Lead Nation:** A Member State that assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or part of the multinational force or EUPOL HQ. Possible costs charged for the supply, be it as a rent or as a property transfer, to the EUPOL HQ could then be subject to agreements between the parties involved in the EUPOL . The Lead Nation may also assume the responsibility for coordinating logistics of other Member States within its functional and regional area of responsibility.
- 3.3. A list of logistic tasks and responsibilities is given in Annex 2 to this document.

¹¹ EU Military Staff definitions. This military document is not yet finalised.

- 3.4. As a matter of strategy the EUPOL logistic in any stage should be kept flexible and commensurate with the operationality requested by the mandate and tasks assigned. This can only be achieved by combined planning of IPU's and EUPOL logistic capabilities and assets, so as to be able to integrate the different components. For this reason a common IPU logistic structure is an imperative, so as to allow the planners to better combine the different logistic capabilities.
- 3.5. Regardless of its own logistic structure and capacity, the EUPOL might be able to benefit from military logistic organization which is in place. The support of the military component might be necessary to facilitate strategic projection and to provide logistical support to the required logistic functions ¹².
- 3.6. The police force should be able to respond with mobility and operating capacity, for certain logistic functions (e.g. maintenance of certain heavy equipment such as armoured vehicles, supply of some material or services). However, this could possibly be provided through military logistic units (in order to minimise the police logistic footprint on the ground) if properly prepared and coordinated well in advance. Those aspects would have to be taken into consideration at an early stage in the planning for the operation.
- 3.7. Making large recourse to all the available logistic assets – military, civilian and local resources - through appropriate coordinated planning a EUPOL logistic structure will support:
- a) EUPOL HQ;
 - b) IPUs;
 - c) other units, elements or individuals.
- 3.8. A Framework Nation system, involving one or more Member States taking the responsibility for providing a defined spectrum of logistic equipment for the Mission, should be considered.

- 3.9. As a matter of principle each IPU-contributing Nation will be responsible for logistic support in its own AOR for its own IPU and those other police assets deployed in the same AOR. The level of forces that can be supported must be planned in advance.
- 3.10. Given the urgency of the situation, it is foreseeable that most operational expenditure related to common costs will be temporarily covered by one or more Lead Nations. The Member States could be paid for such services and/or resources provided or, subject to specific agreements, between parties involved. The Lead Nations would solve the logistic problems for their respective IPUs in own AOR in coordination with EUPOL HQ, which will deal with the common aspects of logistic policy and implementation, defined since the planning phase.
- 3.11. A EUPOL must be able to solve the logistic problems related to:
- 3.11.1. its **self-sufficiency**, which will be influenced by:
- a) the tasks to be performed;
 - b) the extent of the AOR assigned to it;
 - c) the level of support eventually ensured by the Host Nation¹³ and military forces present in the area of operations (with which it is necessary to have agreed procedures for integration and/or interoperability on the basis of specific arrangements);
 - d) the available local resources;
 - e) the possibility of receiving periodic supplies and specialised support from their Nations;
 - f) possible initial inertia of the logistic system in working properly.

¹² EU Military Staff definitions. This military document is not yet finalised.

¹³ Host Nation Support. The civil and military assistance rendered by a Host Nation - HN to another state and/or organisation which forces located on or in transit through the HN territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from bi- and/or multi-lateral agreements. The term Nation is maintained with the only purpose of maintaining a widely recognised terminology.

3.11.2. the **Logistic Structures** in the respective Nations and in the Area of Operations. The Logistic structure:

- a) will designate the logistic components;
- b) will manage the supply of logistics components (in which full, independent powers for managing the logistic effort are to be vested right from the planning stage);
- c) is composed of management bodies which have a capacity commensurate with the potential requirements of the various logistic sectors;
- d) executive bodies are able to ensure that the identified level of logistic self-sufficiency, in terms of vehicle maintenance, medical/health care, transportation, communications, catering and infrastructure maintenance services for the Units is in place.

3.12. **Logistic Activities** with regard to the EUPOL:

3.12.1. **Supplies:** the policy should be based on the extensive use of local resources where possible, supplemented by materials supplied by the respective Lead Nations through the military chain of logistic supplies and/or civilian contractors, chosen according to the applicable procurement rules. The balance will be determined by consideration of opportunity, availability, sustainability and/or special requirements.

3.12.2. **Restocking** (routine, urgent and preventive): should be designed to ensure that the EUPOL receives an unbroken logistic supply: restocking will take different forms depending on when it can be carried out in the operational cycle (readiness, deployment, employment, re-formation or withdrawal). Restocking should be coordinated into a functional flow:

- a) from the respective Lead Nations to the area of operations. This is the responsibility of the national logistic bodies and must always be carried out from the home country, using standardised containers which can be readily transported

by civilian/military carriers and used for emergency storage in the area of operations. Particular importance attaches to customs procedures, which must be carefully examined at the organisation stage;

- b) inside the area of operations restocking is governed by the basic policy developed for the EUPOL and is related to the operational situation. A minimum level of emergency stocks will be defined in the planning phase to ensure capability to respond to unforeseen situations.

3.12.3. **Maintenance:** given that it could be difficult to bring deficient equipment up to an acceptable standard and that supplies may be available on the local market, the aim should be to keep the maintenance structure in the area of operations commensurate with needs but not redundant. As a basic policy each IPU should be capable of ensuring operationality of own equipment/vehicles with 1st level maintenance capability, while 2nd level maintenance can be ensured through military/civilian structures.

3.12.4. **Recovery And Evacuation of Equipment.**

- a) Inside the area of operations, these functions will be governed by the basic policy of the EUPOL (that will be defined in consultation with the Lead Nations):
- b) From the area of operations to the contributing States: to be assessed on the basis of the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of on-the-spot repairs and of transportation difficulties. In principle, evacuation operations should follow the same route used for restocking.

3.12.5. **Transportation:**

- a) The logistic policies, tasks and responsibilities are defined at operational level. Within the framework of his mission, the POL HoM is responsible for coordinating, prioritising and de-conflicting the national deployments,

transportation for restocking, and redeployment of Member States' contingents from the operational point of view. This must be done in cooperation with the nations concerned.

- b) Member States remain primarily responsible for obtaining transportation resources and for planning and controlling the movement of national contingents, taking into account the need for cooperation, coordination and economy. The responsibility for the deployment of multinational headquarters and units with a high degree of multinationality should be assigned to a Lead Nation.
- c) For EU Police operations, with long distances of deployment and/or prolonged periods of operations, sufficient strategic movement assets must be available. Furthermore, the whole chain from Port(s) of Disembarkation (POD) through logistic base(s) to units in theatre must have the infrastructure, material handling equipment and means of (tactical) transport needed in order to deliver the forces and their associated logistic support. Without those assets, the operational feasibility of the plan might be severely restricted. This will have to be a two way process to allow for the timely reverse flow of equipment, e.g. return of repairable. Coordinated planning with the military components will be necessary.
- d) strategic transportation operations are the responsibility of strategic level (DGE IX - Police Unit) in cooperation with military planners and/or appropriate agencies.
- e) Transportation inside the area of operations is the responsibility of:
 - (1) each IPU, whose mobility and carrying capacity must be commensurate with the AOR requirements, bearing in mind that it may be required to support several subordinate units simultaneously;
 - (2) the EUPOL chain of command for those components that do not possess own transportation capability.

3.12.6. **In-Theatre Logistic Support.**

The logistic capacity allocated to a unit may mean that it has to use resources belonging to other police/military units. This will entail:

- a) drawing up the relevant MOU with the countries concerned or with other units in theatre for the possible charges related for supplies received;
- b) planning of requests during the organisation stage. Such planning is crucial, to avoid possible delays or reductions in logistic support which may be affected by reliance on third parties;
- c) reconnoitring the logistic instrument on which units will rely for their operational deployment, so as to assess whether the support is adequate.

3.12.7. **Medical And Health Care Support.**

- a) Lead nations must provide, in respective AOR, medical services able to offer at least immediate care, collection of casualties, initial treatment, stabilisation and MEDEVAC - inside the area of operations - to civilian or military facilities authorised to provide further treatment;
- b) EUPOL HQ will manage MEDEVAC from the area of operations to national facilities or to allied or friendly-nation facilities;
- c) Other health directives relating to preventive measures, vaccinations, food controls and environmental hygiene must be considered in the planning phase;
- d) The same logistic approach as for MEDEVAC will be applied, as far as possible, to casualty evacuation - CASEVAC.

3.13. **Financial And Logistic Policy**

3.13.1. At **strategic level**, they should be determined:

- a) implementing rules, especially where it is necessary to form an advance party, with its connotations of administrative detachment, tasked with organising the logistic groundwork for introducing the unit into the area of operations;

- b) the allocation of supplies to the mission area, procedures for logistic tasks, management responsibilities and the financial means needed to ensure that the EUPOL has an adequate level of self-sufficiency and operationality (i.e. hiring of interpreters and local staff, rental of premises etc.).

3.13.2. At **operational level**, the following must be planned:

- a) procedures for administrative tasks and the financial authority conferred on personnel;
- b) “welfare” measures, with particular reference to home leave, postal and telephone services.

3.14. **Equipment:** see an indicative list of equipment and distribution ratio in Annex 3.

3.15. LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS

3.15.1. Each IPU should be based on the structure in Annex 5 that will include a logistic component able to perform the logistic functions in Annex 5.

4. COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim is to outline the means, and how they can be used most effectively to provide secure, reliable and adequate Communications and Information Systems (CIS) in support of EUPOL.

4.2. PRINCIPLES

4.2.1. The **Lead Nations** contributing the IPU's will solve the CIS problems for their respective AOR in coordination with EUPOL HQ.

4.2.2. **EUPOL HQ** will deal with the common aspects of CIS policy and implementation to be defined from the beginning of the planning phase in consultation with the Member States-Lead Nations.

4.2.3. The **CIS Framework Nation** will provide those assets that are necessary to ensure exchange of communications and information between different components at the operational level.

4.2.4. The **EUPOL HQ** will:

- a) Identify the appropriate level of communications to ensure operability of forces taking into account operational needs, ground constraints, interoperability and necessary connections with other Forces or appropriate Agencies;
- b) Establish the appropriate CIS structure and design the CIS system architecture at operational and tactical levels;
- c) Establish rules concerning the use of working languages;
- d) Define the dedicated networks that will be needed (such as logistic, personnel etc).

- 4.2.5. The **Lead Nations** will:
- a) Make the appropriate means available in such number as to ensure interoperability, where needed, and back-up with other police units or elements deployed in their own AOR;
 - b) Put in place the CIS system in terms of equipment and support;
 - c) Ensure the appropriate back-up and alternative systems to overcome any unforeseen situation.
- 4.2.6. Communications facilities in support of the EUPOL will also depend on existing infrastructure available in the host country. In order to have an independent and reliable system, radio relay and commercial satellite telephones will be used where necessary.
- 4.2.7. Mission Radio Networks are recognised useful tools to be used as an internal means of communication and to liaise with the military component and with international organisations where necessary. Such interconnection should be made available in the first instance by military forces or, in case of need, by the police components. Exchange of LNOs will help in dealing with exchange of communications and information.
- 4.2.8. CIS facilities in the area of operations should ensure secure connections to the greatest possible extent.
- 4.3. COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE
- 4.3.1. The communications structure supports the different levels of the chain of command: Political/Strategic, Operational and Tactical level.
- 4.3.2. **Political/Strategic level.** These links are provided to connect Brussels with EUPOL HQ and EUSR (if appointed).

4.3.3. **Operational level.** To connect the EUPOL HQ with the EUSR (if appointed), the different IPU's and other mission components.

4.3.4. **Tactical level.** To connect the IPU staff with its subordinate elements and other police elements deployed in the same AOR.

4.3.5. The EUPOL will establish its own internal communications systems and be responsible for their planning, control, operation, support and supervision.

4.4. GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS

4.4.1. At the Tactical and Operational level the following facilities will be used according to the security constraints:

- a) Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). This will be the primary communications backbone among EUPOL HQ and IPU HQ (secure/non-secure voice and fax).
- b) Mobile telephone. Mobile phone is to be considered as a possible means of communication. Spare sets to be stored in the CIS pool.
- c) Commercial satellite telephone. This means of communication allows EUPOL to have an independent and reliable communications system. It is mandatory that it be used by EUPOL and IPU dispersed teams when they are outside urban areas and by EUPOL or IPU HQs in case of disruption of the local PSTN or to ensure a permanent communications link.
- d) Radio. Due to the potential threat which will always be present when radio is used, EUPOL will consider use of radio communications following pre-defined procedures to reduce risks.

For this purpose free local channels, to be identified and selected by EUPOL HQ, will be used. Radio links are useful, not only for security purposes (direct link at every level) but also to overcome possible weaknesses in the local telephone service. The use of **encrypted radio communications** will, of course, overcome the above security problems and make the radio system the main one.

4.4.2. To link with the international military presence and international organisations networks where appropriate.

4.4.3. Independent serving mobile command posts can be set up where appropriate.

4.4.4. Independent networks for “ad hoc” purposes where appropriate and necessary.

4.5. EQUIPMENT

4.5.1. To ensure proper coherence within the mission, the chain of command from EUPOL and IPU HQ, to the most minor unit or team should be interoperable. Each vehicle should be equipped with a mobile radio set.

4.5.2. Telephone, GSM and satellite telephone sets should be distributed when needed to any element to back up this main radio network..

4.5.3. Global Position System (GPS). GPS are to facilitate EUPOL and IPU units in their movement throughout the country, ensuring their correct location, which is crucial in case of MEDEVAC by air transportation. The remainder to be stored in the CIS pool.

4.6. CIS POOL

4.6.1. Some communications assets including satellite phones are critical. In order to optimise their employment and ensure quick availability, permanent assignment should be foreseen. A CIS Pool will be established in EUPOL and IPU HQ where the remaining CIS assets are to be stored, ready to be used at short notice by Mission members in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

4.7. MAINTENANCE

- 4.7.1. The policy will be defined on the basis of an assessment of the internal and/or local maintenance expertise which is available and/or the availability of a service contract with the supplier. Nevertheless, a limited redundancy of sets will be considered to overcome the possible initial inertia of the systems.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1. RAPID DEPLOYMENT.

5.1.1. **Structure of the Mission.** The general structure of a police substitution mission is to be considered as a process going from:

- a) the initial stage where the deployment of police elements, mainly EUPOL HQ, Logistic Support, IPU's and some specialised elements, will assume area responsibility covering all the achievable police functions;
- b) the stabilisation stage where the successive deployment of all the police components will lead to functional responsibilities;
- c) the final stage when some executive functions will be withdrawn from the IPU's together with some police elements.

5.1.2. The above deployment schedule leads to specific consideration of capabilities, level of forces and logistics to be available at short notice for the initial stage and to the different specific structures of the EUPOL on the ground which are set out in Annex 4.

5.1.3. **Engagement of Member States.** According to the above consideration of the need for rapid deployment and the consequent availability of police forces and logistic assets at short notice the use of two concepts, of the Framework Nation or the Lead Nation, should be pursued from the non-crisis period. Member States, according to the need highlighted and to the logistic concept suggested, should commit themselves to assuming a specific role in dealing with one or more logistic or CIS aspects of the mission. Particular emphasis is placed on those Member States which already possess logistic/CIS capabilities or have committed themselves to providing rapidly deployable EUPOL HQ.

Bilateral agreements announcing partnership between Member States with different logistic capabilities should be pursued so as to balance the different levels and enhance the overall EU rapid response capability.

This solution could imply the definition of costs charged for making available logistic support.

5.1.4. **Financial arrangements.** Where one or more Member States will assume the role of Framework or Lead Nation and start, from the non-crisis period, to build specific logistic/CIS capabilities, specific financial arrangements should be set up to reimburse those expenses.

5.1.5. **Strategic transportation.** Even if the EUPOL will probably be deployed in the initial stage with reduced personnel, equipment and logistics, this deployment will nevertheless impact on the strategic transportation capabilities. Such capabilities are not available in any police force so that the problem can only be solved either through the strategic transportation set up by a possible military component or by recourse to civil contractors chosen according to the applicable procurement rules. While the use of military transportation will be planned at strategic level by the planning element of the Council General Secretariat, the use of civil assets will be addressed with the Member States concerned.

5.1.6. **Equipment.** The indicative list of the equipment in Annex 3 to this document should be considered by the Member States in dealing with the composition of the units, logistic organisation and training of personnel of their own. The decision is to be taken as to whether and to what extent:

- a) the cost of the equipment for a specific mission should be considered to be financed by the Community budget which is submitted to the Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union. This solution will allow interoperability/standardisation of the equipment that can be decided upon by Member States;
- b) the resources and materials, generally intended as part of the police equipment, should be made available by each Member State.

5.1.7. **Need for common / interoperable CIS equipment** (including radio repeaters).

Pending a higher degree of interoperability, Member States contributing the Rapidly Deployable EUPOL HQ and IPUs should at least consider the possibility of defining interoperable CIS standards and, eventually, acquiring a specific equipment, in accordance with the decision that will be taken about the financial issue as pointed out in 5.1.5. such a decision will affect the overall communication structure of future operations and for this reason should be taken in consultation with those Member States that are willing to contribute rapidly deployable capabilities.

5.1.8. **EU logistic concept.** The logistic concept, to be developed during the planning phase, will take into consideration the above principles and aspects related to equipment and financial concerns.

The solution to the logistic problem is a precondition of the final result of the EUPOL. Therefore, it can not be left only to Member States but -in the spirit of cooperation and interoperability- must be seen as an overall ESDP issue.

In any case, according to the indications given by Member States in reply to the logistic questionnaire forwarded with document 15447/02 "Questionnaire to Member States concerning available police equipment in terms of deployment" of 10 December 2002, the need for a EU Logistic Warehouse able to support at least a possible fact finding mission and, eventually, some police elements to be rapidly deployed to accompany the action of IPUs should be taken into consideration.

5.1.9. **Training and exercises.** Rapid deployment and interoperability of EUPOL HQ, IPUs and other specialised components is strictly linked to a specific training and exercise policy to be implemented over time by the Member States following a programme that can be prepared by the Council General Secretariat.

5.2. INTEROPERABILITY of IPUs:

5.2.1. Similarity in functionality of IPUs. Composition and dimension of IPUs is and remains a national issue. Nevertheless, as explained in this document and in the light of enhanced interoperability, IPUs should have a similar structure mainly based on

the Commander, a Staff, the operational component and logistic element. This structure is presented in Annex 5.

The achievement of a standardised structure will enable planners at all levels to make better use of available IPU.

Member States should consider this proposal in developing IPU for deployment under ESDP.

- 5.2.2. Specific SOP for IPU. Building on the experience of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPM, generic SOP can be prepared for the Member States to approve and to use as a basis for training and to adjust their own internal regulations according to the possible deployment of IPU under EU crisis management.

Part II

IPU TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND PROCEDURES "IPU TTP"

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
 2. COMMAND AND RELATIONSHIP
 3. PATROLLING AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE
 4. INFORMATION GATHERING
 5. PUBLIC ORDER POLICING, CIVIL DISORDER OPERATIONS, RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL
 6. OTHER POLICE FUNCTIONS AND TASKINGS
 7. MISCELLANEOUS
(Force protection, Use of specific equipment and Specialised elements)
 8. LESSONS LEARNED
-

REFERENCES

1. "GUIDELINES FOR POLICE COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT", ST 7854/02 (RESTREINT)
 2. "COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR POLICE SUBSTITUTION MISSION", ST 8655/1/02 REV 1
 3. EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS OF FEIRA, NICE, GÖTEBORG AND SEVILLA
 4. "COMPENDIUM OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF FORCE AND CONSEQUENT GUIDANCE FOR THE ISSUE OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR POLICE OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS", 12415/5/02
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. GENERAL

1.1.1. "The main task for a police component, which should be deployed as early as possible in a crisis situation, is to contribute to restoring public security (keep public order, protect people and property). This means tackling violence, reducing tension and defusing disputes of all kinds, particularly by facilitating the re-activation of judicial and penal facilities" (Nice European Council Conclusions).

1.1.2. While protecting the population, it is crucial to make the police component adhere to the principles that will help to rehabilitate the social links and the rebuilding of a society governed by the rule of law. Therefore, in the deployment of IPU among a population, every effort must be made to make their presence acceptable and their integration as easy as possible, while offering a new perception of policing.

1.1.3. IPU ensure an effective and pro-active police presence fulfilling the following activities in close coordination with other actors including the military component and the local police:

- a) deploy to areas where public security situation requires a police presence to restore public order;
- b) respond to the threat of civil unrest (harassment of refugees, looting etc.) and disturbances, and if prevention fails, take the appropriate action, including the use of riot and crowd control capabilities when necessary;
- c) provide police control of the Area of Responsibility, fulfilling a police role such as crime prevention, and providing a response to criminal acts, carry out public surveillance, enforce traffic regulations, border policing, gather information, and enforce the rules related to the possession, use and carriage of weapons;
- d) work to establish familiarity with local population and the areas and conditions where IPU are likely to operate. This will include close cooperation with other actors, notably with the military in collecting and sharing of information (including information that could lead to the prevention of public security

- problems);
- e) monitor the public security situation in order to ensure preventive measures to stop criminal activities and to ensure that decisions with regard to civil unrest are taken in a timely and decisive manner;
 - f) support the enforcement of international law (including support for the International Criminal Court or Tribunals);
 - g) advise the military on police related matters.

1.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.2.1. The aim of this document is to provide guidelines, standards and best practices for IPU in relation to tactics, techniques and procedures which are applicable when conducting police missions in crisis management operations (in particular in substitution missions). It is also intended to standardise IPU techniques, tactics and procedures. Furthermore, it will allow IPU to operate effectively with the required interoperability.
- 1.2.2. These **Techniques, Tactics and Procedures - TTP** address the essential mission tasks for IPU including, but not limited to, patrolling and public surveillance, information gathering, riot and crowd control, and response to other forms of civil disorder, and law enforcement including war crime investigations. IPU face a wide spectrum of different types of situations; therefore, the mission tasks listed in this handbook are not exhaustive. There can be no formal police instructions or guidance which will cover all mission circumstances and situations.
- 1.2.3. This document does not address ROE, because these are already covered in the document in reference.

2. COMMAND AND RELATIONSHIP

- 2.1. IPU are centrally commanded police units, specialised in the field of public security and able to cover the basic police functions. They will form an integral part of the first EU Police elements deployed in a substitution mission. They will operate under the command of a Police Head of Mission (POL HoM) appointed by the EU Council and in accordance with the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) and Rules of Engagement (ROE), also approved by the Council.
- 2.2. In some instances IPU may be temporarily placed under the responsibility of the military authority¹ which is entrusted with the protection of the population and overall security. This specific situation requires a continuous and strong synergy and complementarity with the military component.
- 2.3. The two following points need to be addressed:
- a) **Definition of the command relationship** between the main EUPOL HQ and the subordinate IPU, within the police mission.
See Part I - Command and Control of this document and " Guidelines for Police Command and Control Aspects of EU Crisis Management", 7854/02 (RESTREINT).
 - b) **Civil / military coordination.** In a destabilised situation, particularly during **mutually supportive military/police operations** in the field related to the maintenance of public security, coordination is a key issue. As a matter of principle civil/military joint operations should be avoided because the difference in TTPs will make reciprocal understanding difficult and can lead to confusion in action.
 - c) Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage operations where civil/military can work in mutual support: these operations must be planned in advance and the reciprocal positions of Command and Control must be carefully determined so as to ensure to both components the appropriate level of initiative and freedom of movement. At the request of one component, and according to their expertise and field of competence, the other will cooperate in order to create, or help to

¹ Nice European Council Conclusions.

create, the conditions under which both components will be able to fulfil their tasks more effectively.

- d) For such mutually supportive operations specific joint civil/military guidelines will be prepared a during the planning phase and will be taken into consideration while drafting the Rules of Engagement for both police and military components.
- e) Therefore, there is a need to define the respective Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) of each component in order to avoid unhelpful conflict or interference. The EUPOL will seek its own TAOR or "Blue Box" (see note n.8 at page 12).
- f) The military authority may/will establish a Security Zone (SZ) around the Police Blue Box or in which the IPU elements will conduct the police operation, as appropriate.
- g) If it is necessary for military personnel to enter the Blue Box those personnel will automatically be under TACON² to the IPU's during the period when they are within the Blue Box. The commander of the IPU's has the responsibility for implementing decisions concerning police actions inside the Blue Box.

² "Guidelines for Police Command and Control Aspects Of EU Crisis Management", 7854/02 (RESTREINT).

3. PATROLLING AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE

3.1. General

Patrolling and public surveillance is a preventive and pro-active police activity. IPU's conduct such routine area familiarisation and reconnaissance operations. These patrols help the IPU's to establish an extended and continuous presence throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in hot spots. Such familiarisation aims to gain the confidence of the population and is crucial for successful deployments of IPU's in quick-reaction operations in their respective TAOR in the future. The IPU's will plan and conduct these patrol operations in accordance with priorities set by the POL HoM.

3.2. Aim

3.2.1. The main targets are:

- a) to secure the population by an active and extensive IPU presence on the ground in the AOR;
- b) to carry out surveillance in public areas, in particular, in sensitive areas and hot-spots;
- c) to establish contacts with the local population, to create a partnership with the aim of collecting information;
- d) to react to incidental criminal activities, disturbances and disputes.

3.3. Coordination Procedures

3.3.1. Patrol plans.

- a) Based on identified areas of interest and hot spots such as those with ethnic problems and tensions with returnees, the IPU's will carry out patrols. It is essential for IPU's to coordinate their patrol programmes with neighbouring IPU's and a military component. This coordination can be achieved through a liaison system based on communications, LNOs or meetings which will be determined by the EUPOL HQ.
- b) The plans will include the geographical limits of the patrolling activity, date and

expected duration of patrols, means of communication, point of contact and name of Officer in Charge. The plan will be submitted through the chain of command. In circumstances in which the security is inadequate or if a specific operational need so dictates, the final decision on whether a patrol should be conducted will rest with the chain of command.

3.3.2. Patrol Briefing, Exchange of Information, Reporting.

- a) The IPU's will be dispatched on patrols under the supervision of the Chain Of Command and according to the patrol plan. The local Military HQ will inform the IPU's of any recent negative/hostile activities in the area and any other information that could impact on the conduct of the IPU patrol, including information that will help the element understand the current situation in the area of interest.
- b) Prior to departing from an area of interest, information will be exchanged through the chain of command. The military authority and other actors will be informed as appropriate concerning the results of the operation. All pertinent information will be exchanged.
- c) All information obtained during the operation will be compiled, notably in the daily report and as appropriate in the reports defined in the reporting system. All incidents will be reported in the incident report (INCREP) as appropriate.

3.3.3. Civil / military coordination

- a) In the event of a situation getting out of control and subsequent deployment of military forces it is essential to closely coordinate police patrolling with supporting military forces in advance of executing a patrol programme.
- b) Depending on the situation and on the decision of the chain of command, mutual support should be considered according to the respective expertise of each component, to the mandate, and to possible arrangements with the military component. Liaison Officers and/or possible reinforcements may be provided by the military authority in consultation with the IPU, or vice versa, as circumstances dictate.

4. INFORMATION GATHERING

4.1. General

It will be necessary for IPU's to gather information to obtain specific knowledge of the area of interest and of hot spots. This will be crucial for the successful deployment of the IPU's in future quick reaction operations, as well as for normal police operations in their respective TAOR.

4.2. Aim

The main targets are:

- 4.2.1. Acquire relevant information that may impact on the security of the local population, the security of the IPU's (self-protection), and the security of other actors including the military component.
- 4.2.2. Collect general information which will contribute to the overall risks/threat assessment (by relevant level of the chain of command).
- 4.2.3. Obtain information which will contribute to the maintenance of public order and security, prevent criminal activities and prevent civil disorder and crime, or help in conducting further investigation operations.

4.3. Coordination Procedures

4.3.1. Information Gathering Plan

- a) Coordination with other actors and mainly the military can be assured through the liaison system which will be determined by the EUPOL HQ. Each deployed IPU will elaborate its own plan for information gathering based upon the specific characteristics of the Area of Responsibility and guidance from the Information

Management cell of the EUPOL HQ, that will approve the Information Gathering Plan.

- b) The IPUs will collect information through patrols, planned operations, contacts with locals and organisations, etc. The information gathered will be analysed, evaluated and forwarded to the chain of command according to a reporting system to be defined.

4.3.2. Content of the Information Gathering Plan

This plan will notably include the priorities, and define the objectives to be reached, the dates and times of operations, the numbers of personal involved and the locations where the operation will be conducted, the reporting system and procedures for the exchange of information with other actors.

4.3.3. Briefings prior to the activities

- a) The IPUs will contact the military component prior to the planned information gathering operation. The chain of command will inform the IPUs in case of any recent relevant activities in the area and supply any other information that could impact on the IPUs' information gathering operation. The briefing should include information that will help the elements understand the current situation in the area of interest. Short-notice restrictions to the information gathering procedure plan will be made at this time.
- b) In circumstances where security is considered inadequate or if a specific operational need so dictates, the final decision on whether a patrol should be conducted will rest with the chain of command.

4.3.4. Reporting system

The IPUs will forward relevant information obtained during an operation in the daily report. Following the operation, the IPU will contact and debrief the chain of command and other relevant actors as appropriate.

5. PUBLIC ORDER POLICING, CIVIL DISORDER OPERATIONS, RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL

5.1. General

5.1.1. Public Order can be defined as the "status quo" that allows citizens to exercise their fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance. The definition of public order policing is generally accepted as "the policing of assemblies and/or large gathering of persons, whether peaceful or of an unruly nature". The management of public order breaches and crowd control is a prime competence of IPU's which are trained to act within a very strict legal framework, with the minimum appropriate use of force, keeping in mind the principles of proportional escalation in the use of force, and in the necessity for continued negotiation. As a civilian instrument contributing to the demilitarisation of a crisis, IPU's in charge of public order will guarantee the POL HoM a constant capacity to intervene with specialised forces and necessary means to ensure the maintenance of public order and retention of control over events. Civil disorder operations and riot and crowd control in a crisis situation where there is a power vacuum can cover a full range of situations. These situations include, but are not limited to:

- a) Intimidation of one (ethnic) group by another, in a crisis management operation usually in the context of a minority group returning to its home area;
- b) Aggression characterised by groups of people harassing another (ethnic) group;
- c) Riots, entailing sustained and organised violence in response to specific events or situations;
- d) Looting and general attacks on properties and infrastructure;
- e) Demonstrations and public meetings.

5.2. IPU Response

The IPU response to these situations can take place in two ways:

5.2.1. **Planned Operations.** Planned operations, which are requested by the chain of

command to cover specific events during high-risk periods that may last several days. Prolonged operations may require the rotation of IPU into and out of an incident area.

5.2.2. **Quick Reaction Operations.** IPU Quick Reaction operations are short-notice deployments ordered by the chain of command in response to unexpected situations involving potential or actual civil disorder. Therefore, IPU should keep an on-call element which is ready for deployment at short notice.

5.3. **Principles**

The objective of a public order operation is to prevent and to solve a civil unrest situation through decisive intervention. The intervention must be executed while applying the lowest possible level of force. Factors which will assist in the achievement of a successful outcome in such operations include:

5.3.1. Early IPU Involvement, as soon as civil tension increases, to prevent possible escalation of the situation.

5.3.2. Assessment of the Situation:

- a) Based on information gathered which should include the political problems or other causes or motives for the unrest, the attitude of the people as well as the identification of possible leaders of opposing factions.
- b) To that end the IPU will deploy a reconnaissance party. The technical aspects of the mission will be reported to the chain of command.

5.3.3. Planning Factors: operational and tactical planning has to take into account the following factors:

- a) The size, attitude and composition of the crowd, their intentions and motivation and the presence of violent or armed elements, and other considerations such as the presence of women and children;
- b) Legal aspects and intervention framework;
- c) Possible scenarios, possibility of spill over;
- d) Available IPU resources and capabilities, including availability of a (rapidly

- deployable) reserve element;
- e) Availability of a military back-up force and coordination aspects;
- f) MEDEVAC support;
- g) Logistics and communications aspects, specific equipment required (helicopters and APCs);
- h) The identification of the security zone;
- i) The requirement for deployment of specialised personnel (snipers, SWAT teams and dog units).

5.4. **Operational Phases**

5.4.1. Pre-deployment

IPU representatives should become involved in planning and, eventually, in negotiations with the local groups' organisations/authorities as soon as possible in potential civil disorder situations with a view to reducing tensions as early as possible. The IPU mission will be to assess the situation on the ground and to plan the appropriate response operation in coordination with the EUPOL HQ. The IPU personnel will be briefed before the deployment.

5.4.2. Deployment

Based on the initial plan developed during the pre-deployment phase the IPU must deploy to the area of intervention in a timely manner. For operational efficiency they should not deploy with less than one platoon (around 20 personnel), the unit to be considered the minimum level able to perform such operations in self-sufficiency. If needed an “operational task force” involving several IPUs under the responsibility of the POL HoM or a senior officer appointed by him, can be deployed.

5.4.3. Negotiation

- a) This phase (which follows an iterative process) is the most sensitive phase of a public order operation. Its goal is to defuse a volatile situation and reach a peaceful solution. The use of language assistants or interpreters is a necessity; furthermore, the following capabilities could be used:
 - (1) Local authorities (in particular representatives of the parties involved)

and/or authorities responsible for public order;

(2) Representatives of competent International Organisations and NGOs.

- b) The officer in charge of the operation should be involved in the negotiations as early as possible. Qualified negotiators should be used where possible. The goal should be to control the situation and negotiate a solution. A negotiation phase should not allow for a worsening of the situation or for the counterpart to better organise.

5.4.4. Intervention phase.

- a) In this phase the IPU will intervene with the appropriate level of force and equipment, as decided by the chain of command, and according to the mandate, the applicable law, and the Rules of Engagement ¹. This phase should not be implemented until absolutely necessary. An untimely demonstration of force may worsen the situation.
- b) However, a display of strength can indicate a dominant position and give a psychological advantage.
- c) **Issuing of warnings.** Warnings issued to the crowd must be given and repeated in the local language by appropriate means. The message must be clear, leaving no room for ambiguity or misunderstanding. Sufficient time must be given to the opposing factions or to the crowd to follow the given order before appropriate force is applied.

d) **Intervention**

When possible, negotiations and warnings of the intent to use force must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated. Intervention must be limited to the minimum essential level of force, which can be escalated as appropriate in accordance with guidelines. However, the level of force used must be proportionate and restrained, and in line with the objective to be achieved. In case of a clearly identified need to prevent or divert a demonstration, authorisation for the use of force to disperse a mob or an unruly assembly should, if the circumstances so permit, be given by the police Head of Mission, as civilian

¹ "Compendium of principles for the use of force and consequent guidance for the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) for police officers participating in EU crisis management operations" 12415/5/02.

authority, to the police commander in charge of the operation.

Once the decision is taken, IPU will intervene in a very determined way to ensure an effective and efficient resolution of the problem. The intervention will be based on the following:

- (1) Opposition / adversary / situation: The composition of the opposing factions;
 - (2) Attitude: The opposing factions' attitude and level of aggression;
 - (3) Availability of offensive objects: The availability of offensive objects to the opposing factions, e.g.: rocks, batons, Molotov cocktails or weapons of any kind;
 - (4) Reinforcements: The opposing factions ability to reinforce their efforts.
- e) **Control of surrounding area**: must be maintained following the police intervention to keep the situation from degenerating after the contingency has been resolved. This action requires an accurate assessment of the demonstrators' motives, which may be accomplished by holding key positions or by patrolling the surrounding area;
- f) **Coordination with the military component**. Is a key factor to ensure the control of the area next to that of the police operation and to avoid a recurrence of events. Because the military will remain in place after the withdrawal of police forces, previous planning and clear sharing of respective roles is fundamental to lasting success of police operation.

5.5. **Tasking Procedures and Planning**

Any intervention in the field of public order policing will be initiated through the chain of command. In emergency cases IPU commanders may take initial and

appropriate measures according to the ROE and will refer to the chain of command for guidance and support.

5.5.1. Requests from a military or a civilian authority.

- a) When IPU's are placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population, and this authority requires the support or assistance of IPU's in an operation, a request form for such assistance will be forwarded through the EUPOL HQ.
- b) The same process will be followed by a civilian authority requesting the deployment or assistance of IPU's.

5.5.2. EUPOL HQ Action, Release Order

The EUPOL HQ will plan the operation with the “operational task force” command, the IPU's involved and with the military authority as appropriate. Once the plan has been approved the EUPOL HQ will send a release order (mission, location of intended operation, expected duration of IPU's employment, Security Zone, TAOR...) to the IPU's involved and to the requesting authority for implementation.

5.6. **Coordination Procedures - Civil / military coordination**

5.6.1. Joint planning and execution of operations with the military:

- a) In a destabilised situation, particularly during a mutually supportive military/police operation in the field related to the maintenance of public security, coordination is a key issue.
- b) At the request of one component and according to their expertise and field of competence, the other will co-operate in order to create, or help to create, the conditions under which they will both be able to fulfil their tasks.
- c) Within the Blue Box the Officer in charge of the Operation is responsible for technical decisions with regard to timing and implementing actions to resolve or respond to the civil disorder and will exercise TACON on all elements present in the Blue Box. During the planning phase the provisions for emergency military support need to be defined..

5.6.2. Tactical Command Post - TCP

The “operational task force” command, the IPU Commander or the officer in charge of the operation will establish a TCP with appropriate communication capacities where he will coordinate the operation and liaise with other actors as appropriate.

5.6.3. Communications

Communication between the military and the IPU is essential to facilitate coordination. An exchange of radios and/or LNOs will be required to facilitate effective communications throughout the operation.

5.6.4. Security Zone - SZ

If a Security Zone is required it will be based on a threat analysis. The military component will establish this SZ around the area where the civil disturbance operation is to take place. The military component will control access into and out of the SZ and will specify the Blue Box in liaison with the IPU Commander.

5.6.5. Assembly Area

A reconnaissance team will establish a secure assembly area outside the area of operation and within the SZ (if such a zone is established), in conjunction with the military component, where IPU elements will prepare themselves for the civil disturbance operation.

5.6.6. Use of force

See document "Compendium of principles for the use of force and consequent guidance for the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) for police officers participating in EU crisis management operations", 12415/5/02. The POL HoM will issue guidelines regarding the circumstances in which the use of force is allowed.

6. OTHER POLICE FUNCTIONS AND TASKINGS

6.1. General

IPUs are flexible and multi-functional. Therefore, they are able to perform tasks in all fields of policing. They act as a police force with general competence (within a broader Rule of Law approach) and in coordination with other actors to enforce and re-establish law and order. The use of IPUs in the initial stage of the crisis is expected to contribute to restoring public security, to fill the possible "security gap" and to defuse tensions.

6.2. According to the capabilities available and without prejudice to activities to be carried out by specialised units, IPUs may undertake in the initial stage and support during the stabilisation stage:

- a) to conduct criminal investigations;
- b) to investigate major crimes against human rights, assistance to refugees and internal displaced persons - IDP;
- c) to provide support to the International Criminal Courts or Tribunals;
- d) to ensure, if needed, other police functions such as traffic police and border policing;
- e) to provide assistance for security of personnel of the international community;
- f) to perform security tasks such as close protection and VIP escorts.

6.3. When dealing with the above police functions a specific command and control relationship will be established, if absolutely needed, with the military component according to the impact of the police operation on the general security situation. Generally, those police operations should only be coordinated with the military.

7. MISCELLANEOUS

(Force protection, Use of specific equipment and Specialised teams)

7.1. Force protection

Since IPU's will be deployed in a non-stabilised situation, a certain level of force protection has to be considered. This will have to be based on a risk assessment of the situation. Although IPU's are equipped with weaponry and equipment to enable them to operate with adequate self-protection, there is no specific personal capability available in the structure of an IPU for force protection. This will impinge on the general capacities for police tasking. Against this background close coordination and cooperation with the military component is essential. Arrangements for co-location with the military units should be considered as a possible track to eliminate the possible consequences on the execution of the required police tasks.

7.2. Use of specific equipment

(Armoured Personnel Carriers - APCs and helicopters)

Although IPU's are equipped to handle a broad spectrum of police operations, some situations may require very specialised or additional equipment that is not normal for IPU's (additional APCs, bulldozers, CBRN resources, helicopters, etc.) but is available within the military units. Close cooperation and coordination with the military units may alleviate this. This requires not only close cooperation while planning such deployment but also mastering the required techniques and other arrangements with regard to interoperability aspects.

7.3. Specialised teams/capabilities

If the operational situation so warrants the POL HoM has the discretion to:

- a) temporarily merge specialised elements from various (national) IPU's;
- b) deploy specialised teams that are not an integral part of IPU's.

A decision on the actual engagement of such elements and teams can/will only be delegated to the on scene commander by the POL HoM.

8. LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS

Lessons from the operation will be drawn after the operation according to a process to be defined by the chain of command in coordination with other actors. The EUPOL HQ “Operations” is responsible to set up the process and to disseminate the outcome.

PART III

ANNEXES

EUPOL: HQ FUNCTIONS ¹

<p>CHIEF OF STAFF</p> <p><i>(If appointed)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the first collaborator of the Commander. ▪ Is not part of the Chain of Command (unless replacing the Commander). ▪ Is responsible for management of the staff, its structure and functioning. ▪ Is responsible for the forwarding of Commander's decisions through appropriate orders. ▪ Will work in a proactive way with such necessary autonomy as to ensure that decisions are taken even in a temporary Command vacuum. ▪ Under the Commander's guidance, prioritise and delegates the day to day work required to the cells. ▪ Prepares, through the staff, the solutions to the operational and logistic problems to be presented, for approval, to the Commander. ▪ Maintain main liaison with Military and Civil structures through the LNOs.
<p>HUMAN RESOURCES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Manages all the common aspects related to personnel, discipline, organisation, training and legal affairs.
<p>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Receives, processes, analyses and disseminates information gathered. ▪ Plans and supervises info-gathering activities. ▪ Maintains and updates the database concerning public order and security, HSs and AIs, LP/security forces, criminal organisations and terrorist threat. ▪ Gives guidance for the gathering of information during all kinds of operations (especially patrolling). ▪ Deals with security-related matters, including information security.

¹ To be determined according to the structure set up by the Lead Nation.

OPERATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Plans all routine and QR operations. ▪ Co-ordinates investigations and promotes contacts with international law–enforcement agencies. ▪ Plans future operations. ▪ Follows the current operations. ▪ Elaborates and issues orders in the course of operations and controls their execution, including through mobile command posts where appropriate. ▪ Plans exercises. ▪ Manages the “Operation Centre”. ▪ Elaborates the “lessons learned”. ▪ Co-ordinates the operations between EUPOL and Local Police forces if existing and entitled with executive powers.
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LIAISON	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EUPOL HQ maintains relations with the military forces, local Authorities, GOs/NGOs and international Agencies acting within the AOR in the relevant matter through an appropriate number of LNOs.
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STRENGTHENING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Especially during the stabilisation stage, will deal with those non executive functions that the EUPOL can be called on to perform to strengthen local police, i.e. monitoring /mentoring, training, advisory and technical support.
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COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Manages the communication systems including Information Technology systems. If needed, will set up a specific logistic CIS. ▪ Manages the radio frequencies. ▪ Ensures the strategic, operational and tactical communications. ▪ Is responsible for ensuring effective communications with the other friendly forces deployed within EUPOL AOR.
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LOGISTIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Plans, manages and supervises logistical aspects of the EUPOL, including HNS (host nation support) and support from other organisations. ▪ Prepares orders to ensure logistical support to the EUPOL ▪ Manages the stock, the supplies and the warehouse of the Mission. ▪ Makes appropriate proposals to enhance interoperability of the available resources.
FINANCIAL/ TENDERING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is responsible for all financial aspects including procurement and tendering procedures. ▪ Signs contracts and manages local contractors.
POLITICAL ADVISOR(S) *	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Monitors and advises on global diplomatic and political events.
LEGAL ADVISOR(S) *	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provides advice and guidance on legal aspects including local legislative and judicial systems. ▪ Links with Judicial and Rule of Law structures.
PUBLIC INFORMATION *	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Manages public information–related issues.

(*) Under the direct supervision of the Police Head of Mission.

LOGISTIC TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **Contributing Member States / Third States**

- 1.1. Take the necessary measures for planning and controlling logistic support for their forces, and national components of multinational contingents, to meet the requirements of the POL HoM.
- 1.2. Are responsible for providing logistic resources to support their own forces.
- 1.3. Operate, coordinate and control national military and civil logistic resources for the operation.
- 1.4. Agree, if needed and possible, to cooperative arrangements (logistic partnership), inter alia by identifying nations to take the lead in performing specific logistic tasks.

2. **Host Nations**

- 2.1. Provide Host Nation Support (HNS) on a bilateral or multilateral basis ¹.
- 2.2. When appropriate, provide national logistic representatives for the relevant phases of logistic planning and execution.

¹ Host Nation Support. The civil and military assistance rendered by a Host Nation - HN to another state and/or organisation which has forces located on or in transit through the HN territory. The basis for such assistance is commitments arising from bi- and/or multilateral agreements. The term Nation is retained for the sole purpose of maintaining a widely recognised terminology.

3. **Lead Nations**

- 3.1. Take the responsibility for providing a defined spectrum of logistic support for all or part of the multinational force.
- 3.2. Take into account all applicable regulations affecting the logistic support of other nations' forces for whom they have the lead.
- 3.3. Take the lead in performing specific tasks as identified at strategic level through Joint Action and CONOPS.
- 3.4. Will be compensated and/or reimbursed for services and/or resources provided.

4. **Role Specialist Nations**¹

- 4.1. Take responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class of supply or service.
- 4.2. Take into account all applicable regulations affecting the logistic support of other nations' forces for whom they are undertaking the specialist role.
- 4.3. Will be compensated and/or reimbursed for services and/or resources provided, subject to agreements between the parties involved.

5. **The EU Police Unit**

- 5.1. Monitors and takes initiatives for the development of policies and procedures in the field of logistic support.

¹ "One State that assumes the responsibility for procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the POLM. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The term Nation is used with the only purpose of maintaining a widely recognised terminology". EUMS Definitions.


- 5.2. Develops logistic annexes of CONOPS, consulting nations as necessary.
- 5.3. Updates logistic parts of generic plans and, following Council guidance, produces the first draft of the logistic part of contingency plans.
- 5.4. Consults with nations and convenes logistic planning conferences.
- 5.5. Drafts, with the assistance of national representatives, the logistic parts of the final contingency plan.
- 5.6. Improves interoperability and standardization in the field of logistic support.


6. **The EU POL HoM**

- 6.1. Is responsible for both the planning and coordination of the deployment, support and recovery of the EUPOL. He/she is responsible for the coordination of logistics resources, including medical. The limitations and procedures associated with this responsibility will be defined in the CONOPS.
- 6.2. Develops all the operational requirements for planning and execution of supply and restocking.
- 6.3. Establishes requirements, initiates and participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations and, where appropriate, concludes logistic arrangements.
- 6.4. Exercises coordinating authority in the field of Logistics through the EUPOL HQ.
- 6.5. Coordinates, prioritizes and de-conflicts national and multinational supply and restocking issues, in accordance with operational requirements.
- 6.6. Coordinates the allocation of the support, assets and/or funding for the operation offered by Non-Sending nations.

Pages 62 through 69: NOT DECLASSIFIED

POLICE MISSION - EUPOL STRUCTURE AT INITIAL STAGE OF DEPLOYMENT





The number of personnel and the size of the different component of the IPU are not defined and will respond to National regulations, while the structure of the IPU should respond to the above so to facilitate the work of planners.