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NOTE

From: General Secretariat of the Council
To: Delegations

Subject: Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union
Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2016)

Delegations will find in the Annex the Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2016), endorsed by the Council at its 3516th meeting held on 6 February 2017.

ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2016)

INTRODUCTION

1. This Progress Report on the implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (doc. 15708/03) covers activities carried out in 2016. The Report is non-exhaustive and focuses on the main developments. All activities were undertaken within the broader context of EU security and conflict-prevention policy.
2. Based on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (doc. 10715/16), the European Union strategy against the proliferation of WMD and the New Lines for Action (doc. 17172/08), the guiding principles of the European Union continue to be:
 - a. effective multilateralism, including promoting the universality of international treaties, conventions and other instruments and their implementation, through diplomatic action and financial assistance to third countries and international organisations;
 - b. close cooperation with countries to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime.
 - c. addressing non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral political and non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings and in more informal contacts;
 - d. the effective and complementary use of all available instruments and financial resources – the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), other instruments – in order to maximise the impact of the EU's activities in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.

3. The European External Action Service (EEAS), including in many cases the Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation and Chairpersons of CONOP and COARM, represented the EU in a number of key international meetings in 2016:
- the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors' Group meetings in Tokyo (12-14 January 2016), Hiroshima (2-5 March 2016) and Vienna (26 September 2016);
 - the special meeting in Madrid of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee established under UNSC Resolution 1540, in connection with its Comprehensive Review (12-13 May 2016) and the subsequent Open Consultations on the Comprehensive Review of the Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540 (20-22 June 2016);
 - the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 10th Anniversary meeting in The Hague (15-16 June 2016);
 - the 60th International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference held in Vienna (26 – 30 September 2016);
 - the UN General Assembly First Committee in New York (October-November 2016);
 - the 8th Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) held in Geneva (7-25 November 2016);
 - the 21st Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) held in The Hague (28 November – 2 December 2016);
 - the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions held in Vienna (5-9 December 2016).

The Special Envoy focused on:

- a. promoting universal adherence to and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and enhancing the visibility of the EU's commitment;
 - b. initiating and maintaining non-proliferation dialogues with major partners and mainstreaming non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral relations;
 - c. preparing for EU participation in the Nuclear Security Summit process and follow-up activities;
4. The EU Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation convened 11 times in 2016, including at Directors' level, to discuss EU positions and future activities. The EU delegations in Vienna, Geneva and New York prepared a number of EU statements for multilateral fora and contributed actively to policy-making through regular EU coordination meetings.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

5. The EU is fully committed to promoting universal adherence to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. Throughout the year, the EU reiterated its firm support for full, complete and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. Also high on the agenda was the start and early conclusion of negotiations, at the Conference on Disarmament, on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

6. The EU attaches great importance to the core responsibilities of the IAEA regarding non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and technical cooperation. Together with the bilateral contributions from its Member States, the EU is the second largest donor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The total EU financial contribution to the Fund based on six successive Council Joint Actions/Decisions has reached almost EUR 42 million for the period 2009 - 2016. Building on the success and lessons learned from Council Decision VI, 2013/517/CFSP, the EU adopted in December 2016 the 7th Council Decision supporting the IAEA nuclear security activities undertaken under the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for the period 2017 – 2019 with ca EUR 9.3 million.
7. EU funding to the IAEA has helped the Agency to assist countries to upgrade and ensure the physical protection of selected facilities, improve their national regulatory infrastructure concerning physical protection and the safety and security of radioactive material and to enact the necessary legislation. Numerous vulnerable sources have been protected, dismantled or disposed of; sensitive nuclear equipment and technology and border monitoring equipment have been upgraded and the training of officials has served to strengthen nuclear security worldwide.
8. The European Commission Joint Research Centre has continued to support the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database. The IAEA has acknowledged the improvements in reporting achieved through modernising the website of the Incident Notification Forms. The EU support in this respect will continue.
9. The EU has been contributing to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by coordinating the Joint Commission established by the JCPOA and a number of expert-level working groups established under the Joint Commission. All coordination activities were conducted while fully respecting the IAEA's long-term mission of verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments. Moreover, the EU has engaged in implementing Annex III of the JCPOA in close coordination with the IAEA to foster civil-nuclear cooperation with Iran, in particular on projects to improve nuclear safety.

10. In February 2016 EU delegations in 63 countries, supported by EU Member States, engaged in diplomatic outreach activities to prepare the way for the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The EU supported the IAEA in promoting the original Convention and its Amendment. Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP contains a heading 'Increase in the number of States that adhere to the CPPNM and its Amendment and/or have declared their intention to implement the international legal instruments supporting the nuclear security framework'. The EU welcomed the entry into force in May 2016 of the ACPPNM and will continue to help countries in their efforts to fully implement its provisions.
11. Building on the Council of the European Union's commitment of 8 December 2008, on 15 November 2016 the Council adopted its Decision (CFSP) 2016/2001 on a Union contribution for the establishment and the secure management of a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank under the control of the IAEA. The over EUR 4 million contribution will help to ensure that nuclear fuel is supplied in a secure and safe manner. It will also help the IAEA guarantee the security and safety of LEU transport from procurement to supply, and during storage at the Bank's site. The European Commission under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace has already provided EUR 20 million for the purpose of acquiring the LEU once the project is fully operational.
12. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols constitute the current verification standard and the EU continues to call for them to be made universally adhered to without delay. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA allows for effective and efficient safeguards. The EU actively supports the IAEA's safeguards system through the European Commission Safeguards Support Programme and the Support Programmes of some of its Member States.

13. To further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the EU has allocated EUR 225 million over the period 2014-2020 to promote nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards in third countries. The EU and its Member States attach the utmost importance to the worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of nuclear safety. One of the aims of the Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations is to prevent accidents and, should they occur, mitigate the consequences by avoiding early and large radioactive releases. The EU and its Member States continue to be strong supporters of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through substantial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and the Peaceful Uses Initiative. The EU's ranking as second largest contributor to the Technical Cooperation Programme also demonstrates its commitment to all three pillars of the NPT.
14. The EU and the IAEA hold an annual Senior Officials Meeting to review and plan their broad-range cooperation. The 2016 meeting was hosted by the IAEA on 21-22 January in Vienna. The EU Political and Security Committee visited Vienna on 25 April 2016 and held meetings with the IAEA at senior level. Discussions covered IAEA activities in the area of verification, including regional issues, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear applications.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

15. The early entry into force and universality of the CTBT are important objectives of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All EU Member States have demonstrated their commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it and by provisionally applying its basic obligations. On the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty, the EU adopted and implemented an EU Action Plan in support of the CTBT and the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) promoting the benefits and added value of the Treaty to peace, security and non-proliferation, including in its civil applications.

16. On 13 June 2016, at the invitation of the CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP) Ms Federica Mogherini attended the ministerial segment of the 46th Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and delivered an agreed EU statement. Together with the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan she co-chaired a closed ministerial roundtable discussion to promote the ratification of the CTBT and the benefits of the CTBTO verification regime and opened a special anniversary exhibition. By way of drawing parliamentary attention to the promotion of the Treaty and its benefits, HRVP Mogherini together with the ES Zerbo participated in an exchange of views on the 20th Anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT held by the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on 7 July 2016 in Strasbourg. The HRVP also spoke on behalf of the EU at the 8th CTBT Friends Ministerial Meeting "Time to finish what we started", held in New York on 21 September 2016 in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly.
17. The EU uses every opportunity to advocate CTBT ratification in international fora and meetings with countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, and continues to use diplomatic means to promote the entry into force of the Treaty in those countries. The CTBT was raised bilaterally in the EU political and NPD dialogues with India, Pakistan and the US. On 31 August 2016 the EEAS Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation made a presentation on "EU policies and activities in support of disarmament and non-proliferation" at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and took the opportunity to promote the CTBT.
18. The EU will continue to strongly support the CTBT both politically and financially. Since 2006 the Council has adopted seven Joint Actions / Council Decisions to support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and to further strengthen the Preparatory Commission's monitoring and verification capabilities. The EU's total financial support to the CTBTO so far exceeds EUR 18.5 million.

Nuclear Security initiatives

19. The EU was among only four international organisations invited to attend the Nuclear Security Summit chaired by US President Obama from 31 March to 1 April 2016. The European Union was represented by the President of the European Council Tusk and HRVP Mogherini. The Summit concluded with a communique and five action plans in support of relevant work at the UN, the IAEA, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In December 2016 the EU joined the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG).
20. The EU continued to support the GICNT and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The EU participated in the successful GICNT Anniversary Meeting which took place on 15-16 June 2016 in The Hague, Netherlands. The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Action Plan comprising 124 actions, was successfully implemented. Based on an all-hazard approach, the Action Plan overall goal was to reduce the threat of, and damage from CBRN incidents of accidental, natural and intentional origin, including terrorist acts. The EU Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials (EUSECTRA) has been fully operational since 2013 for the benefit of European Union Member States and partner countries, among them several GICNT members. The Centre is operated by the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) at its sites in Karlsruhe (Germany) and Ispra (Italy), in close co-operation with other international initiatives promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and several GICNT partner countries. The Centre is also used for practical exercises mainly related to countering nuclear smuggling such as the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Workshop held in Karlsruhe on 8-10 March 2016 in partnership with the United States. Experts from several countries together with representatives from the GICNT, the IAEA and INTERPOL shared best practices and lessons learned in leveraging investigative and technical capabilities to counter smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material. On 23 November 2016 in Karlsruhe JRC organized a high-level scenario-based exercise "APEX-Europe" for all EU Member States.

21. The European Commission and the EU Member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterisation of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements. Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined thus providing support to competent authorities in EU Member States and beyond.

Regional issues

22. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear weapons, WMD and ballistic missile programmes and its decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA continue to be a major cause for concern to the EU. The HRVP condemned in the strongest terms the two nuclear tests carried out by the DPRK on 6 January and 9 September 2016. The EU used every opportunity to state its concerns and to underline a) that nuclear weapons test explosions represent a threat to international peace and security and undermine the non-proliferation regime, and b) that the DPRK actions aggravate tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the detriment of all and are in clear violation of its international obligations under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including UNSCR 2270 and UNSCR 2321, as well as under relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions. The EU has put into effect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In line with the objectives of these resolutions it has adopted additional autonomous restrictive measures as a further step in the defence of the international non-proliferation regime.
23. The EU, through the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, co-sponsored a seminar on the nuclear and ballistic missile dimensions of the DPRK crisis in Seoul on 24-25 October 2016.
24. Regarding other regions, the EU continued to demonstrate its commitment in relevant multilateral fora to establishing a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. This issue also falls within the scope of discussions in the newly established EU – League of Arab States Working Group on Non-proliferation and Arms Control set up under the EU-LAS Strategic Dialogue. The Working Group held two meetings in 2016.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD)/ Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or other Nuclear Explosive Devices

25. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), in accordance with its mandate, plays a crucial role in negotiating multilateral disarmament treaties. The EU is therefore concerned about its continued stalemate.
26. A clear priority for the EU is the immediate start and early conclusion of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The EU welcomes the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) which reflects the views expressed and identifies areas of convergence and divergence. The EU fully supports future discussions at the High-Level Preparatory Group, as envisaged in the 71 UNGA First Committee Resolution: "General and complete disarmament: treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".
27. The EU calls on all CD member states to start negotiations on such a Treaty without delay and to begin work on the other issues on the agenda in line with the adopted Programme of Work CD/1864. The EU also encourages all countries possessing nuclear weapons to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, if they have not already done so. Furthermore, the EU reiterates its longstanding commitment to the enlargement of the Conference.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

28. The EU continued to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with voluntary contributions to the Chemical Weapons Convention's (CWC) core objectives and the Organisation special operations regarding Syria's chemical weapons programme.
29. In this respect, the EU supported the OPCW Director-General's decision that the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) continue its work and that the Declaration Assessment Team continue to examine gaps and discrepancies in the Syrian declarations. The EU welcomed the adoption of UNSCR 2319 (2016) extending by one year the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) established by UNSCR 2235 (2015) to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. By way of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 adopted on 30 November 2015, the EU has already provided financial support of EUR 4,6 million to the costs associated with the Joint Investigative Mechanism activities under UNSCR 2235 (2015).
30. The EU also continued monitoring the implementation of EU Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP adopted in February 2015 in support of the OPCW core agenda, for the years 2015-2017.
31. Council Decision 2014/74/CFSP of 10 February 2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 124/2014 of 10 February 2014 introduced a derogation for the possible use of Syrian frozen assets to cover expenses related to OPCW verification and destruction activities in Syria. In November 2014, the EU addressed a letter to the OPCW Director-General informing him of this possibility and requesting him to approach the Syrian authorities on this matter. The proposal has been transmitted to the Syrian authorities who have rejected it so far. However, the EU continues to refer to this proposal on all appropriate occasions including in the EU statements at the OPCW.

32. While the initial core objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) such as universality, destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and national implementation are yet to be fully achieved, the EU and its Member States are looking ahead and starting to reflect on the post-chemical weapons destruction stage. In view of the upcoming 4th CWC Review Conference (December 2018), the EU and its Member States have started to consider future challenges in keeping the organisation relevant (i.e. prohibiting the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the use by non-state actors and terrorists, convergence with biology), and hence supporting the effectiveness of the Convention. In this regard, the EU supported the establishment of the OPCW Open Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities and engaged in drafting an EU common position to contribute to the relevant OPCW debate.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

33. The EU played a proactive and constructive role in preparations for and deliberations at the 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 7-25 November 2016 based on the common position set forth in Council Decision [2015/2096/CFSP](#) of 16 November 2015. The EU's strong political and financial commitment to a successful and significant outcome of the 8th Review Conference was underpinned by numerous activities: four regional workshops to support the consensus-building efforts of the President of the Conference (in Astana, Addis Ababa, New Delhi and Brasilia); EU 'démarches', including on universal adherence to the Convention; EU working documents; side events and EU statements.

34. Since 2006 the EU has provided substantive support to BTWC core activities through 4 consecutive assistance programmes. The EU Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP adopted on 18 January 2016 sets up the most comprehensive framework in this respect. It provides funding for BTWC projects related to universalisation; regional workshops on science and technology developments relevant to the Convention; national implementation; support for the preparations for the 8th Review Conference; support for the UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons; awareness-raising and education. The financial amount for the implementation of the projects for the period from 2016 until 2018 is EUR 2,3 million thus bringing the overall EU support for BTWC core activities to EUR 6,3 million.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Hague Code of Conduct

35. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is the result of efforts by the international community to regulate the area of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The HCoC is the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument relating to the spread of ballistic missiles. The EU has strongly supported the Code since its inception. All EU Member States have subscribed to it.
36. By subscribing to the HCoC, members voluntarily commit themselves politically to provide pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. Subscribing countries also commit themselves to submitting an annual declaration of their country's policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.
37. Since the signing and entry into force of the politically-binding HCoC in November 2002 in The Hague, Netherlands, the number of signatories has increased from 93 to 138.

38. The EU plays a leading role in promoting and supporting the universality, full implementation and enhanced functioning of the HCoC. In December 2014, the EU adopted Council Decision 2014/913/CFSP that provides the means for continued support to The Hague Code of Conduct and to missile non-proliferation in general; its practical implementation started in April 2015. Through this Council Decision, the EU finances HCoC outreach activities, expert meetings and regional awareness sessions. These activities are carried out by the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS). Recent events organised with EU financial support took place in Cape Town, April 2016, in Vienna, June 2016, in Amman, September 2016, in New York, October 2016 and in Thailand and Myanmar/Burma, November 2016.
39. In November 2016 EU delegations in a large number of countries were instructed to demarche the relevant authorities of their host countries encouraging them to consider favourably their subscription to the HCoC.

Missile Technology Control Regime

40. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among countries that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR guidelines and control lists constitute an international best practices benchmark for controlling exports of missile-related items and technologies.
41. The 2016 plenary meeting of the MTCR took place in Busan, Republic of Korea, on 19 -21 October. The EU delivered an opening statement and a statement on its outreach activities, under its EU-P2P Export Control Programme. Among other topics, the MTCR plenary meeting held an in-depth discussion on individual applications for membership, including those from nine EU Member States. The membership issue will continue to be on the MTCR agenda. An MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact meeting was held in Paris, in March 2016, where the EEAS delivered a comprehensive statement.

CBRN RISK MITIGATION

42. Substantial political and financial support was given to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The EU shares the objectives of assisting countries in identifying specific technical assistance, raising awareness of relevant programmes of technical assistance, and enhancing cooperation with international and regional organisations to help with national capacity building.
43. The EU Centres of Excellence initiative on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation (CBRN) is a worldwide programme currently involving over 55 partner countries financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Its objective is to mitigate risks related to CBRN materials and nurture a security culture and governance.
44. The Centres of Excellence network has expanded into a worldwide structure currently clustered around eight Centres of Excellence. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a bottom up approach, national and regional coordinating and governance structures. These platforms develop policies and capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported through several regional cooperation projects funded under the initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 55 regional projects have been financed. The budget for the initiative for the 10 –year period starting in 2010 amounts to EUR 250 million.
45. The Centres of Excellence network is now well developed, allowing the EU to take further initiatives to address security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructures, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, and to further develop cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual use items. This approach has also been suggested by the European Court of Auditors¹, followed by Council Conclusions on 26 October 2015².

¹ Court of Auditors Special Report 17/2014

² Council conclusions of 26 October 2015 (13279/15)

46. The 2009 EU CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) Action Plan had to be implemented by the end of 2015. Towards the end of that year, the Commission undertook to review its level of implementation. The review was done by the Commission and the Member States. The main EU achievements include the opening of the EU Nuclear Security Training Facility for the detection of and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials, the development of a database of the CBRN-E Glossary and the organisation of numerous multinational and/or cross-border training courses and exercises. The 2nd Progress Report will be published shortly.
47. A new strategic document exploring the security dimension of the CBRN policy will be released in the first half of 2017. The priorities of the new communication will be developed in close cooperation with key stakeholders, including Member State representatives in the CBRN-E Advisory Group. It will probably follow the structure of the European Agenda on Security and will focus on better usage of existing tools for exchanging information, enhanced operational cooperation and close cooperation with key international partners. There will be also a strong emphasis on supporting actions such as training and research. The Commission will continue to provide financial support to projects in the CBRN area via the Internal Security Fund–Police.
48. The CBRN Action Plan has received scientific and technical support from a range of research projects funded by the Secure Society Programme under the 7th Framework Programme. The research covers the entire crisis management cycle from prevention to recovery. Activities to identify standardisation needs could lead to "European Norms" (EN) standards. The Horizon 2020 programme will strengthen on-going work in CBRN research through focused topics.

THINK TANKS

49. Based on Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July 2010, the implementation of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been actively supported by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium which started its activities in January 2011. Under Council Decision 2014/129/CFSP adopted on 10 March 2014 the activities of the Consortium are being extended for a further three years by building on the achievements to date and by adding new and innovative projects.
50. The Consortium's activities increased EU visibility vis-à-vis third countries and civil society and contributed substantially to EU policy shaping in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament. The Consortium provides a platform for informal contacts among practitioners and stimulates dialogue between different stakeholders. Its activities have helped raise awareness of the challenges posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It has an extensive network of 73 think tanks across Europe.
51. The 5th EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, hosted by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, took place on 3-4 November 2016 in Brussels. It was the largest so far with over 300 participants from 70 countries and international organisations

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND EXPORT CONTROLS

UNSCR 1540

52. The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture. It is the first international instrument to deal in an integrated and comprehensive manner with weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. UNSCR 1540 (2004) establishes binding obligations on all countries. They aim to prevent and deter non-State actors from obtaining access to such weapons and weapon-related materials. Adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Resolution requires all countries to adopt the necessary legislation barring non-state actors from getting nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and to establish appropriate domestic controls for related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking.
53. In 2016, the 1540 Committee carried out, as mandated by UNSC resolution 1977 (2011), a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In this exercise the Committee interacted with the UN membership, international organisations, academics, industry and parliamentarians. The EU participated actively in this review process, e.g. the EU set out its activities in support of UNSCR 1540 in a report addressed to the 1540 Committee and formulated a series of recommendations for the future development of the Resolution. Many of these recommendations were included in the report on the comprehensive review that the 1540 Committee submitted to the UNSC, and in the subsequent UNSC Resolution 2325 (2016) adopted on 15 December 2016.

54. Over the last decade, the EU has provided, through a successful multiannual funding scheme, a substantial amount to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The EU support was provided through Council Joint Actions adopted in 2006 and 2008 respectively and a Council Decision adopted in 2013. This support to the UNODA, provided by the EU as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, was intended to:
- a. boost national and regional efforts and capacity building in close cooperation with other EU programmes to ensure synergies and complementarity;
 - b. contribute to the practical implementation of UNSCR 1540, in particular on technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness;
 - c. help countries develop and implement national action plans, when they request this.
55. The most recent Council Decision in this regard was adopted in 2013 and expired in April 2016. The EU has prepared for adoption in 2017 a new Council Decision in support of UNSCR 1540 implementation and universality, taking into account the outcome and recommendations of the comprehensive review conducted in 2016.
56. In 2016, the EU carried out targeted outreach work through its network of EU delegations in the 17 countries yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee. The EU outreach effort was well received in a number of countries and will give rise to EU follow-up support action at the request of and in partnership with the countries concerned.

EXPORT CONTROLS

57. In 2016 the EU continued to regularly update its regulations to reflect developments in multilateral export control regimes. Thus, Commission Delegated Regulation (EC) No 2016/1969 of 12 September 2016 updated the EU control list in line with decisions taken in multilateral export control regimes in 2015, and introduced changes to e.g. the control of laser measuring systems and electronic equipment that can perform high-speed analogue-to-digital conversions
58. The Dual-Use Coordination Group continued to support the effective and consistent implementation of export controls in the EU. New functionalities were introduced to the "Dual-Use Electronic System" which improved information and technical exchanges within the EU. The EU adopted guidance notes for the effective implementation of specific control parameters e.g. concerning encryption products. An annual report³ was published to ensure transparency regarding export control and licensing activities.
59. A review of EU export control policy was initiated. The European Commission adopted a proposal for modernising EU export controls⁴ and their adaptation to rapidly changing technological, economic and political circumstances. The proposal has been transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council for discussion under ordinary legislative procedure.
60. EU positions and statements were coordinated as appropriate in preparation for the relevant meetings of the export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary meeting in Seoul (23-24 June 2016); the Australia Group Plenary meeting in Paris (9 June 2016); and the Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary meeting in Busan (17-21 October 2016).

³ COM(2016) 521 of 24 August 2016.

⁴ COM(2016) 616 of 28 September 2016.

61. The implementation of the EU P2P Export Control Outreach programme to enhance the effectiveness of export control systems of dual-use items and related materials, equipment and technologies continued. The programme currently covers 34 countries from six regions. In September 2015 it was extended to enable cooperation with new partner countries. New activities were implemented in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Ukraine, Georgia and in the UAE. EU long-term experts were dispatched to Kazakhstan and Jordan to strengthen ties with partner countries. A special programme was set up in South East Asia.
62. Intensive coordination of the EU P2P Export Control Outreach programme with the US Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Programme continued. Joint EU-US table top exercises were organised to stimulate cross-border cross-regional cooperation between export control authorities. An annual EU summer university course on non-proliferation and export control was established in the framework of the European Forum Alpbach. The EU P2P Outreach portal (<https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>) continued to serve as a platform for all EU outreach programmes on export control of military and dual-use goods, with the aim of customising information exchange with the EU partner countries. The programme is funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

SPACE

63. The EU and its Member States are increasingly important users of outer space. The EU has developed two ambitious space programmes, Galileo and Copernicus, which complement national space programmes. The EU also benefits from the European space programmes of its Member States and the European Space Agency. The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016 therefore reconfirmed the long-standing EU commitment to promote international cooperation in outer space and to promoting space security and sustainability: "In space, we will promote the autonomy and security of our space-based services and work on principles for responsible space behaviour, which could lead to the adoption of an international voluntary code of conduct".

64. In October 2016, the EU issued a new Space Strategy for Europe, which sets out Europe's ambitions in space and confirms that the EU continues to be an active and globally engaged partner. Based on the values and principles enshrined in UN treaties, the EU continues to work with its Member States and partners to promote international principles of responsible behaviour in outer space and to protect the sustainable and peaceful use of space by all nations.
65. The EU and its Member States will show continued commitment in these areas, which are important to our security and our prosperity.

WMD NON-PROLIFERATION CLAUSES

66. The EU continued, in accordance with its WMD non-proliferation strategy, to mainstream the non-proliferation of WMD into its contractual relations with third countries. Further negotiations took place on WMD non-proliferation clauses in relevant agreements between the EU and third countries. Negotiations were successfully concluded with Cuba and Malaysia, while negotiations with Japan and Armenia made good progress. Furthermore, preparations and consultations took place on the upcoming discussions with Mercosur and Mexico in early 2017. Negotiations help raise awareness of EU non-proliferation and disarmament policies. They also provide a forum to increase mutual understanding, identify possibilities for future cooperation and encourage concrete progress in non-proliferation and disarmament.

OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA

G7

67. The EU continued to participate actively in the meetings of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group (NPDG) which in 2016 were held under Japanese Presidency. The highlight was the adoption on 11 April 2016 of the G7 Foreign Ministers Hiroshima Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

68. The EU is also committed to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), in particular through the technical assistance (threat assessment, national action plans) provided worldwide by the EU Centres of Excellence initiative on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation. The EU recognises that GP programmes and activities to combat WMD terrorism are closely related to the Nuclear Security Summit process, the BTWC Review Conference and UNSCR 1540 Comprehensive Review. In this regard, the EU welcomes the continuous expansion of the GP beyond the G7; the Partnership currently includes 30 active members, five of which have EU Regional Secretariats.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE MEETINGS

69. The EEAS Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation Mr Jacek Bylica held non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings with India, Japan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the US and Israel. He conducted numerous bilateral consultations with various stakeholders in the margins of major fora such as the UNGA First Committee, the IAEA General Conference, the BTWC Review Conference and the CWC Conference of States Parties. Bilateral consultations were held with the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UNIDIR Director, among others.