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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 19 July 2005

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**RESTREINT UE
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FORWARDING NOTE

from : European Union Military Committee
to : Political and Security Committee

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Subject : EU Battlegroups Concept

*This document **10501/1/04 REV 1** has been issued to indicate that it is releasable to NATO. It is identical with the initial document **10501/04**.*

Delegations will find attached the EU Battlegroups Concept as agreed by the EUMC.

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I. NOT DECLASSIFIED	

NOT DECLASSIFIED

EU BATTLEGROUPS CONCEPT

References

- A. EU Military Rapid Response Concept (5641/1/03 REV1).
- B. EU Military C2 Concept (11096/03).
- C. EU Framework Nation Concept (11278/02).
- D. General Principles and Procedures for EU Force Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment (12398/02).
- E. Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC) 2002. (13332/02).
- F. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- G. Headline Goal 2010 (6309/6/04 REV6).

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In January 2003, the EUMC agreed the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (Ref. A), with the aim of providing a general conceptual basis for the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations (CMO) requiring a rapid response. Since then, the conceptual and procedural aspects of rapid response have been taken forward, leading in December 2003 to the GAERC¹-conclusion that the work on the EU military rapid response capability should aim "*at complementing the Headline Goal with a precise definition and subsequent identification of and modalities for EU rapid response elements*".
2. In this context, the original food for thought paper "The Battlegroups Concept" was welcomed by the GAERC², in March 2004, as a useful contribution to the ongoing work on rapid response and to the development of the structure and organisation of the rapid response capabilities of the EU. The Council further underlined its intention to take forward this work as a matter of priority, with a view to achieving concrete results as soon as possible both in the field of capabilities available and deployable at very high readiness and with regard to appropriate planning arrangements.
3. On 3 March 2004, the EUMC tasked the EUMS³ to develop an EU Battlegroups (BG) Concept. The concept is to be a building block within the overall approach of rapid response and should therefore be fully complementary to the accelerated measures and actions in the field of decision-making and planning, as described in Ref. A.
4. In May 2004 GAERC noted the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. G) which integrated the development of Battle Groups in the overall capability development

¹ 2552nd Council Meeting - General Affairs Conclusions 8-12-2003 (15535/03)

² 2571st Council Meeting - General Affairs Conclusions 22-04-2004 (7380/04)

³ Outcome of proceedings EUMC dated 3 March 2004 (6948/04)

B. PURPOSE

5. The purpose of this document is to provide a conceptual basis for the preparations, provision and employment of BGs in order to conduct EU-led military CMOs requiring a rapid response.

C. SCOPE OF PAPER

6. In the context of EU-led CMOs requiring a rapid response, this document defines the BG and provides related characteristics and requirements for BGs and associated capabilities. It covers the provision of BGs and relevant arrangements to ensure a well prepared and timely employment.


D. DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS

7. The BG is a specific form of the Rapid Response Elements defined in Ref. A. It constitutes one possible answer to the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU-led CMO requiring a Rapid Response.
8. In this context a BG:
 - a. Is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations;
 - b. Is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and re-inforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A generic outline is depicted in Annex A (pt2);
 - c. Will be based on the principle of multinationality and could be formed by a Framework Nation⁴ or a multinational coalition of Member States. In any case, interoperability and military effectiveness have to be the key criteria;
 - d. Must be associated with a (F)HQ and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

⁴ In accordance with Ref. C, a Framework Nation is defined as "A Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control".

9. In addition, the following main characteristics relate specifically to a BG:

- a. The ambition set out in Ref. G is that the EU should be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of a Crisis Management Concept and that forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after that decision.



This requires that BGs are to be built on assets and capabilities held at a readiness⁵ of 5-10 days. This readiness criterion applies as a benchmark to the Member States as a whole. However, having regard for national decision making, some Member States may be in a position to contribute to a BG at higher readiness.

- b. The BG is designed for a range of possible missions and would have in its generic composition a strength of around 1500 troops. It will require specific guidance to tailor the BG for one particular mission in advance. Therefore, in response to an operation, some adaptation by the designated OpCdr is to be expected;
- c. Air, naval and other operational and strategic enablers are to be associated as required. A BG requires pre-identified Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) capabilities, with adequate force protection commensurate with the threat and independent of host nation resources;
- d. The BG needs to be sustainable until mission termination or until relief by other forces. As a planning basis BGs should therefore be sustainable for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately;
- e. Given their close interrelationship, interoperability and prior training is required between the (F)HQ and the core of a BG, the infantry battalion.

10. The EU BG-Concept is complementary with NATO (NRF) documents, while taking into account the characteristics of the EU.

⁵ **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

NOT DECLASSIFIED

15. Required Number of Battlegroups. A very first estimation⁶ indicated the need for 7-9 BGs, with the clear understanding that the future required number of BGs had to be further analysed in detail, although it was already understood that not all BGs were to be held on a readiness of 5-10 days at the same time. The number of BGs required based on this concept will be determined to a large extent by concurrency, redundancy and rotation considerations.
16. The number of BGs available at a readiness of 5-10 days depends on the need to guarantee, at any time, the fulfilment of the defined requirement (2 concurrent, single BG sized operations), and to permit the appropriate degree of flexibility.

F. PROVISION

17. Commitment. A crucial factor enabling the conduct of EU-led CMO requiring a rapid response is Member States' readiness to rapidly contribute the required interoperable assets and capabilities for the conduct of operations. The structure within which BGs and associated capabilities are provided needs to be credible and should ensure the timely availability of the required, interoperable capabilities for the conduct of EU-led CMOs.
18. Battlegroup Generation. The basis for the process of generating BG will be initiatives from Member States to offer and make available rapidly deployable force packages (**NOT** **DECLASSIFIED**) associated with pre-identified deployment, support, logistic assets and C2, at the required readiness of 5-10 days. In this context the Member States will indicate when and how long their offers remain available. The EUMC, will direct the EUMS to conduct a co-ordination process that will ensure that the requisite number of BGs is permanently available. This process should allow enough flexibility in order to take advantage of all forms of contributions that Member States may desire to forward. In all cases it is understood that the final decision to commit assets and capabilities to a specific EU led CMO rests with the Member State concerned.

⁶ Capabilities development in support of EU Rapid Response 'The Battlegroups Concept', UK/FR/DE Food for Thought paper (10 FEB 2004)

19. Further details of the process of providing BGs with associated assets and capabilities, will be subject to additional work as a matter of urgency.


G. GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS

20. Standards. Commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards for BGs are a necessity. Wherever possible such standards should be the same as those required for similar formations assigned to the NATO Response Force.
21. Training/Preparations. The necessary training and preparation of the forces to meet these defined requirements remains the responsibility of the contributing Member State(s). BGs will need to undertake regular and realistic training, including multinational exercises. BGs, including HQs and associated air and naval capability packages will need to be trained using HQ exercises as well as national and multinational field exercises, organised by Member States. BGs and associated capabilities packages are encouraged to develop working relationships with relevant (F)HQs. Training could culminate in a joint and possibly combined field exercise at unit level, including an augmented FHQ and the required additional capabilities, guaranteeing full operational capability (FOC) for the deployment and conduct of potential EU-led CMOs requiring a rapid response.
22. Certification. Certification of formed elements is required, in order to guarantee that the defined standards are being met. The certification of BGs remains a national responsibility of the contributing Member States, who should undertake this certification, according to fixed EU-agreed procedures, recognising the principle of multinationality and the overall evaluation principle identified in Ref. G. The EUMC is the overall guiding authority and should monitor the certification process.
23. Deployment. Assured deployability is a fundamental component of this concept. Member States offering BGs will need to ensure that their contribution includes associated strategic lift assets, pre-identified, earmarked and available to meet the EU ambition as stated in Ref. G.

24. Sustainability. Meeting the sustainability⁷ requirements will necessitate sufficient deployable logistic support that is to be arranged with the commitment of a BG for a specific operation. Depending on the mission and given the likely operational theatres, the amount of host nation support will be variable and, in the worst case, non-existent.
25. Complementarity with NRF. The EU BG Concept seeks to be complementary with NATO (NRF) documents. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures mentioned in this document are analogous to those defined within NATO (NRF). This is of utmost importance as Member States may commit their assets and capabilities (from a single set of forces fielded by each Member State) to both the BG and the NRF.

H. COMMAND & CONTROL

26. The C2 structure for EU-led CMOs requiring rapid response will be established in accordance with the EU Military C2 Concept (Ref. B). Because of the short reaction time, the Framework Nation Principle (see Ref. C) is likely to be applied in many cases. However, regardless of the command option, it is essential that the C2 structure and commanders for the operation are identified as early as possible.



27. OHQ. Selection and designation of the OHQ shall take place in accordance with the Presidency Paper (SN 307/03, 11 December 2003) endorsed by the European Council.

⁷ 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days.

28. FHQ. The exact C2 arrangements will depend on the mission- and will require case by case analysis. The simplified requirements of BG operations could allow for the adaptation and augmentation of Brigade based HQs as a basis for an FHQ. It must have the ability to conduct joint operations and be certified to meet the military criteria defined. Such a HQ should be activated and suitably augmented on a multinational basis, in accordance with EU HQ-activation and augmentation procedures. The size of the FHQ to be rapidly deployed for BG-type operations should be kept as lean as possible.
29. Given their close interrelationship, interoperability is required between the FHQ and the core of a BG, the infantry battalion. It would therefore be advantageous if both could be provided by the same Member State(s). The appropriate FHQ should be identified in advance by the Member States providing the BG, just like its activation and augmentation should be prepared and trained.

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