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## DECLASSIFICATION

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Subject: **Policy recommendations on counter-terrorism**

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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

  

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# RESTREINT UE



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THE EUROPEAN UNION

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## "I/A" ITEM NOTE

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from : Presidency

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to : COREPER/Council

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Subject : Policy recommendations on counter-terrorism

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1. An important priority for the Union during 2005 has been the full integration of EU SitCen Counter Terrorism (CT) assessments into the CT policy making process.. Since July, the Working Party on Terrorism has spent time working in a secure environment to discuss the SitCen's assessments and to develop policy recommendations for combating the threats they highlight. The Article 36 Committee has also had a role in finalising the policy recommendations.
2. The SitCen assessments considered by the Working Party on Terrorism have covered a variety of subjects including the terrorist threat to aviation, terrorists' access to weapons and explosives, terrorist use of the internet, the threat from North African terrorist groups, the modus operandi of terrorists, and the anatomy of a terrorist network.

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3. In Annex, delegations find the six sets of policy recommendations deriving from consideration of these assessments:
  - Annex 1: The threat to aviation from Islamist terrorism;
  - Annex 2: Current and future trends in modus operandi used by Islamist terrorist groups;
  - Annex 3: Terrorists' access to weapons and explosives;
  - Annex 4: Islamist extremists' use of the internet;
  - Annex 5: Anatomy of a terrorist network;
  - Annex 6: Threat from North African extremists in Europe.
4. COREPER is requested to invite the Council to endorse the policy recommendations as set out in Annex.
5. The most significant policy recommendations will, once endorsed by the Council, be included in the revised Counter-Terrorism Action Plan which will support the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

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## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE THREAT TO AVIATION SECURITY FROM ISLAMIST TERRORISM

1. Improve the sharing of information within and outside EU Member States on the terrorist threat to civil aviation, including the potential for one State to be targeted through vulnerabilities present in the security arrangements of another state in order to inform their security responses and their contributions in regulatory fora. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES**
2. Member States and Commission to use their bilateral dialogues with third countries to underline the threat to civil aviation, and to press for responsible and robust aviation security. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
3. Mindful of Commission proposals for security-related R&D, Member States to examine the scope for best practice exchange/co-ordinated research into means of intercepting attempts to take explosives or improvised weapons onto flights. Areas to explore here include:
  - promoting the development of screening technologies with improved detection, throughput and reliability rates;
  - promoting research to improve understanding of the human factor in aviation security.**ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
4. Encourage EU Member States to fully implement their aviation security commitments under EU regulation and accelerate where possible the introduction of measures, including staff screening, to protect screened passengers, bags, cargo and aircraft. **ACTION: COUNCIL**

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS  
CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS IN MODUS OPERANDI  
USED BY ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS**

1. Examine measures to further restrict and regulate access to commercial and military explosives and to the precursors to Home Made Explosives (HME). More detailed recommendations on this subject are set out in separate policy recommendations (see Annex 3). **ACTION: COUNCIL AND COMMISSION**
2. Share best practice to improve protection around potential targets of terrorist attacks. Areas to focus on include personal protection of individuals at risk of attack and protective measures at locations considered likely to be targeted by terrorists. **ACTION: COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS, COMMISSION AND MEMBER STATES**
3. Share and build on existing research conducted in other fora on how to identify and deal with the threat of suicide bombers, both through technological means (eg scanning equipment) and practical policing measures. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
4. Given the risk of terrorist groups obtaining chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material from proliferating states, effective co-operation between the Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation Co-ordinators is encouraged. **ACTION: CO-ORDINATORS, COREPER AND COMMISSION**
5. Conduct research into the effects on the Muslim and/or wider community of different styles/levels of media coverage of terrorist attacks. For instance, is there any sign that substantial media coverage of a terrorist attack directly influences/prompts future attacks? Does intensive media coverage of terrorist attacks have the unintended effect of glorifying their acts and encouraging others? **ACTION: COMMISSION**

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS TERRORISTS' ACCESS TO WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES

1. Bring together, as proposed in the Commission's Communication, all major stakeholders in the public and private sectors with a view to setting up an Expert Group to elaborate an EU plan for the enhancement of the security of explosives and firearms. **ACTION: COMMISSION**
2. Where practical, pursue measures to limit the availability of precursors to Home Made Explosives (HME), including through the sharing of best practice on awareness-raising with police and the private sector, the introduction of a suspicious transaction reporting regime for precursors and the possible revision of the Fertiliser Regulation<sup>1</sup>, as proposed in the Commission's Communication. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
3. Consider the need to improve security surrounding the transportation and storage of explosives, in particular given that the Seveso II directive<sup>2</sup> alone does not adequately cover the security of installations storing explosives. Commission to conduct an analysis of best practice regarding the transportation of explosives across Member States. **ACTION: COMMISSION**
4. Consider improvements to the regime relating to the verification of end-users of military weapons and explosives when transferred across borders to confirm delivery to the intended recipient and to prevent unauthorised reselling. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES**

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<sup>1</sup> Regulation (EC) 2003/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 relating to fertilisers

<sup>2</sup> Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) on the control of major-accident hazards (OJ No L 10 of 14 January 1997)

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5. Conduct an analysis of detection techniques (including those used at airports) and their respective success rates for different types of explosive materials, including HME, together with research on means to improve detectability. This work is proposed in the Commission's Communication. Research should focus on current operational priorities, notably stand-off detection. **ACTION: COMMISSION**
6. Encourage Europol to continue with the development of its database on explosive devices with the support of Member States. **ACTION: EUROPOL AND MEMBER STATES**
7. Establish a network, incorporating Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units and other relevant parties, to exchange information on detection capabilities, techniques and operational tactics, as proposed in the Commission's Communication. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL AND COMMISSION**
8. Consider the possibility of making the dissemination of material and knowledge which assists in the fabrication of HME/improvised explosives devices (IEDs) an offence. **ACTION: COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS, MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
9. Through the presence of EU forces, improve control over illicit arms and explosives in the Western Balkans. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS AND EU MILITARY SERVICES**
10. Promote in countries outside the EU the adoption and enforcement of rigorous security regimes relating to weapons and explosives. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS' USE OF THE INTERNET

1. Encourage Member States to exchange information on the existing legal and practical possibilities for closing down websites in their respective jurisdictions. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
2. If necessary, encourage Member States to establish the necessary legal framework to permit the removal from the internet of material which is deemed to breach existing legislation, by requiring EU-based servers hosting such information to remove it and prosecuting those residing within the EU responsible for originating it. Such material may that which provides ideological inspiration to would-be terrorists, or instructions to support their activities, for instance on how to fabricate explosives. Encourage equivalent measures in third countries towards the development of a global framework. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
3. Consider the need for a specific offence relating to the incitement of terrorism, with specific reference to the role played by the internet. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES**
4. Encourage Member States to co-operate closely in the evaluation of terrorism-related websites and to inform one another of any measures taken against particular sites or service providers. Where relevant, encourage Member States to take combined action against extremist websites. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND EUROPOL**
5. Encourage Europol, within the limits of its remit, to develop its analysis of extremist websites through, for instance, the dissemination to Member States of lists of such sites, the identification of major sites by region and theme and the development of a common assessment of major sites. **ACTION: EUROPOL**



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6. Encourage Europol and the Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) to pool resources to allow a more effective analysis of extremist websites. **ACTION: COMMISSION AND EUROPOL**
7. Encourage Member States to put in place adequate protective measures against electronic attack on key computer systems in the public and private sectors from any source, including Islamist and indigenous terrorism and extremism. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES & COUNCIL**
8. Raise awareness amongst public and private sector organisations within the EU, including EU bodies themselves, of the risks of providing information on their websites which makes themselves or others more vulnerable to terrorist attack. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES & COMMISSION**
9. Pursue all opportunities to use the internet to counter inaccurate depictions of policies and to promote dialogue with non-violent Islamist organisations to reduce mutual antagonisms and to address prejudice on both sides. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL AND COMMISSION**

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## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON ADDRESSING THE ANATOMY OF A TERRORIST NETWORK

*Tackling the factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism amongst those resident in the EU*

1. Implement the measures detailed in the EU Radicalisation and Recruitment action plan to counter the main factors promoting the development of local Islamist extremist networks within Europe. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL AND COMMISSION**

*Improving the capacity to monitor and, where relevant, restrict the movement of suspected terrorists into and out of the EU*

2. Promote awareness of the terrorist threat and the potential for movement of suspected Islamist extremists among border authorities and officials. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COMMISSION AND EUROPOL**

3. Maximise the capacity of existing border systems:
  - i) to counter the risk of suspected terrorists coming into the EU;
  - ii) to help monitor the movement of suspected EU-based terrorists into and out of the Union. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**

*Taking measures to make it more difficult to engage in terrorist activity and terrorist facilitation within the EU*

4. Explore what further measures may be introduced to make the EU a difficult operating environment for terrorists, for instance in the areas of terrorist financing, the acquisition and use of false documentation and the circulation of knowledge relevant to these activities. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL WORKING GROUPS AND COMMISSION**

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*Developing tools to identify and analyse terrorist networks more effectively*

5. Undertake research and exchange best practice on analytical tools to fully identify terrorist networks and to map the roles and responsibilities of their members. **ACTION: MEMBER STATE**

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## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE THREAT FROM NORTH AFRICAN EXTREMISTS IN EUROPE**

1. Ensure that domestic regimes to prevent identify fraud, for instance when opening bank accounts or claiming benefits, are as rigorous as those being introduced at EU borders. Ensure that financial institutions have access to the necessary information to allow them to comply with their obligations under the Third Money Laundering Directive regarding the verification of their customers' identities. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COMMISSION**
2. Ensure that law enforcement authorities fully investigate relatively low level crimes such as financial fraud and document forgery and have in place mechanisms to keep relevant authorities informed where there may be terrorist connections. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND EUROPOL**
3. Explore what steps may be taken to limit the possibilities for knowledge to circulate and contacts to be made amongst terrorists during periods of imprisonment in EU Member States. Promote similar measures in dialogues with third countries. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COUNCIL**
4. Continue to offer support to North African countries' security and law enforcement agencies to enhance their investigative techniques and embed methods which are compatible with fundamental human rights. **ACTION: MEMBER STATES, COUNCIL AND COMMISSION**
5. Member States to continue to use their bilateral communications with third countries
  - i) to underline opposition to the existence of terrorist training camps  
**ACTION: MEMBER STATES AND COUNCIL**
  - ii) to continue efforts to improve the human rights records of countries in North Africa  
**ACTION: MEMBER**