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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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## **NOTE**

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from : General Secretariat of the Council/Commission  
to : Political and Security Committee

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Subject : Joint GSC/Commission Options Paper on Somalia and its neighbouring region

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Following the request by the Political and Security Committee on 5 December 2008 to update the July 2008 Options paper on Somalia (ST 11628/08 RESTREINT UE) in light of the latest developments and taking into account the regional dimension of the relations between Somalia and the other countries of the Horn of Africa, the Council General Secretariat (CGS) and the Commission have jointly elaborated this paper.

Recommendations from this paper could be taken forward at the International Contact Group for Somalia to be hosted by the European Commission on the 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> February 2009.

Taking into account that the situation on the ground evolves quickly and that the naval operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, officially launched on 8<sup>th</sup> December 2008, has a one-year mandate, this paper focuses on the coming six to nine months. Pragmatic options are explored to interact not only with the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), but also with regional and local authorities, including those from

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Puntland and Somaliland. Care must be taken to systematically communicate cooperation initiatives with these two regions to the TFIs, even if the Somali national government is not directly involved, so as not to appear to disregard the territorial integrity of Somalia.

Below follow recommended lines of action in the political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights dimensions (part II). The arguments in favour of addressing the problems of Somalia in its regional context are strong. Part III therefore outlines the regional aspects of the situation in Somalia and identifies a number of actions that could be explored further.

## II. RECOMMENDED LINES OF ACTION

On the basis of the latest developments described in annex I, the EU should be prepared for several scenarios:

- The **positive scenario**: reinforcement of the Djibouti process. The new transitional institutions are strengthened. Radical elements accept to join the political process or are progressively marginalized. The security situation improves.
- The **negative scenario**: breakdown of the Djibouti process and the transitional authorities. Control of the Centre and the South by a "patchwork" of various militias, including Islamic militias. A unified Islamist power, more radical than the Islamic Courts, could emerge from that situation.
- The **intermediate scenario**: the Djibouti process moves forward with difficulty. The transitional institutions enlarged to ARS remain in force in some areas of Somalia and Mogadishu. Uneasy cohabitation between them and the opposing militias.

In order to support the realisation of the positive scenario, the following options are proposed for action at EU level:

### A) POLITICAL DIMENSION:

1. **Continue to support the UN-led Djibouti peace process politically and financially.** This includes extending financial support to the enlarged parliament and the new Government of Unity, and by encouraging the parties to the Djibouti agreement to fulfil their commitments. Support the TFIs in keeping contacts with the members of the opposition, clan authorities and civil society, including the business community, in view of **enlarging the consensus over the Djibouti process**. This should primarily be done by HoMs in the region, in close coordination with the UNSRSG and the TFG. High level contacts should complement action by HoMs on appropriate occasions. Continued

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participation in the International Contact Group for Somalia by the EU and some Member States should also serve this purpose.

2. **Continue support for democratization and institution building processes in the relatively stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland.** Political contacts directly with these two regions should be reinforced primarily through HoMs in Nairobi. We should also encourage dialogue between these two regions, including to defuse tensions over the control of Sool and Sanaag areas on their common border and to ensure support for the Djibouti process.
3. Consider to adopt sanctions in line with **UNSC resolution 1844**. The resolution is in the process of being implemented through a Common Position. No names have been put on the sanctions list at this stage.
4. Continue to encourage the AU and regional organisations (IGAD, League of Arab States) to find a political solution to the situation in Somalia.

## **B) SECURITY DIMENSION:**

### *B i - Security related to the implementation of the Djibouti peace process.*

1. **Continue support to AMISOM, also by exploring whether it might be appropriate to channel EC/MS resources via the UN Trust Fund envisaged by the UNSC Resolution 1863, or to continue channelling assistance through direct contributions to the African Union.** The UN Trust Fund would aim at providing financial support to AMISOM until a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation is deployed and at assisting in the reestablishment, training and retention of all-inclusive Somali security forces.

In this regard the European Commission support to AMISOM includes:

**I. Utilisation of current APF € 20 million contribution under 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.** The EC is currently supporting AMISOM through the funding available under the ongoing €20 million support package (Contribution Agreement 1<sup>st</sup> December 08-31 May 09). Additional troops to be deployed could be supported under this package following some adjustments (reallocation of budget lines and adjustment of implementation period). The importance of the establishment of a mission HQ in Mogadishu, which represents a substantial part of the current €20 million contribution budget, will have to be taken into consideration when re-allocating resources.

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**II. Perspective APF contribution under 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.** As already indicated on the occasion of the AU PSC meeting of 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2008, the European Commission is disposed to further support AMISOM. Such an additional funding is available from early February. The APF fund could also address the Police component of AMISOM, as provided for in the Djibouti agreement, and consider the AU request of 2 February for funding 270 AU police trainers.

2. **Encourage the AU Commission to address the administrative and financial management shortcomings of AMISOM.** The most urgent aspects are the recruitment of personnel to the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) for which an amount of €4.7 million is available from the Instrument for Stability (IfS); recruitment of financial staff; reinforcement of Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) finance cell; and establishment of a financial procedures manual. Four European planners will be provided to the SPMU for a short-term mission from the EU military Staff, to be subsequently followed by planners detached by Member states for a period of 6-9 months under IfS funds. The EU could also consider seconding police expertise to the SPMU in light of the AU plans for an AMISOM police component.
3. **Support to the Somali security sector.** If the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the Somali Security Force (SSF) are developed according to internationally accepted standards of, inter-alia, accountability and respect of human rights, the EU could indeed provide financial support to the Somali security sector. The development of these forces should also comply with the requirements of the Somali Joint Security Committee and with the recommendations of the Security Sector Reform approved by the International Contact Group for Somali at the Oslo meeting of 30 April 2008. This compliance should be assessed continuously, primarily by HoMs in Nairobi.

Financial support from COM and MS to the civilian **Somali police force** (SPF) should continue through the UNDP under its Rule of Law and Security programme whereas support to the **Somali Security Force (SSF)** could be funded through other channels, such as the UN Trust Fund established in resolution 1863 (c.f. option B i 1) or direct contributions to the AU.

## ***B ii - Piracy***

The ESDP military operation undertaken by the EU to contribute to deter piracy should be accompanied by diplomatic activity to get the neighbouring countries involved. In particular, it should be avoided that international maritime presence is perceived as a unilateral western decision. Proposed lines of action could include:

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1. Support for improved regional coordination and cooperation mechanisms, in line with recent initiatives under the **International Maritime Organisation (IMO)** and with the outcomes of the Djibouti and Saana Conferences (Jan/Feb 2009). The Commission is currently identifying possible actions for improved maritime security under the Instrument of Stability (IfS). Ensure complementarity with recent US initiatives to set up coordination mechanisms in line with UNSC Resolution 1846.
2. **Support to countries in the region in their capacities to deter, arrest, prosecute and detain pirates.** Initial assistance is already being provided to the Government of Kenya by MS (UK) and US. A related programme has been launched by the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and partially funded by Germany. The pending Exchange of Letters between the EU and Kenya Provision includes the provision of technical support in the form of expertise, training and other assistance, upon request, to Kenya. This kind of support could be expanded to other countries in the region willing to prosecute presumed pirates, such as Tanzania and Djibouti.
3. Ongoing poverty reduction programmes will contribute, in the long term, to create an economic and social environment, where illegal activities will be less appealing. Additionally, the EU should continue **strengthening the capacity of the Puntland and Somaliland regions** to develop appropriate legal frameworks, judiciary and the penitentiary institutions as well as the police (*see annex II*). In order to support coast guards, adequate control mechanisms should be in place first (rule of law). Additionally, at the request of those authorities, once adequate control mechanisms are in place (satisfactory rule of law standards), and subject to the overall security situation, the EU could consider providing direct support to capacity building, such as coast guards units. This would enable gradually an improved control of Somali coastlines and territorial waters. Such support would presuppose a clear request from the authorities and an acceptance of a genuine cooperation based on a partnership of trust.
4. Lastly, it could be envisaged to **promote the establishment of an Information Centre in Somalia**, dealing with maritime security in general and piracy in particular. For the time being, in the context of the IMO work on regional cooperation, it is only envisaged to set up Information Centres in Aden, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, where the problems are less acute.

### C) DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION:

1. Through the Joint Strategy Paper 2008-2013 defined jointly by the EU and Norway as response to the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme, continue to ensure EU's medium-long term assistance to Somalia. Priority should be given to promoting a peaceful and secure environment in

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which human rights are respected and democratic processes and institutions can develop, to providing basic social services and to developing an enabling environment for sustainable and equitable economic growth. Capacity-building and programmes linking relief to rehabilitation and development are considered strategic approaches to be integrated into all sector programmes.

2. EC programme for the period 2009-2013 amounts to EUR 215.8 million, having as priority sectors Good Governance and Security, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), Education, Economic Development and support to livelihoods.
3. While most long-term activities are currently being implemented in the more relatively stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland, ongoing programmes in South-Central Somalia should be expanded, as soon as appropriate political and security conditions are in place.

## D) HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION:

1. Reinforce EU humanitarian aid to Somalia. Currently, the problem is more a matter of access and quality of the assistance, than funding. The EU response should continue to focus on the core humanitarian needs of IDPs, host communities, extremely marginalized communities and the chronically vulnerable in both urban and rural communities with shelter, food, non-food, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, food security and co-ordination.
2. Continue to call upon all the Somali parties, in particular those to the Djibouti process, to respect International Humanitarian Law and facilitate humanitarian access.

## E) HUMAN RIGHTS:

1. Support the process on justice, reconciliation and fight against impunity in the Djibouti agreement. In this respect, the TFG could decide, during a conference to be held in March on this subject, to put in place a commission of inquiry and a special tribunal.
2. Within the Human Rights Council, seek the extension of the Somalia country mandate.

## III. REGIONAL DIMENSION

Neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa and the Arab world have an influence on the situation in Somalia. It is therefore important to take account of the different interests and use them as leverage to gain further support to the Djibouti process. In addition to this, the influence of international players like US,

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China and India should also be taken into account. In autumn 2006 the European Commission adopted the Communication "EU Political Partnership for Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa" which recognised the multiple and interconnected challenges in the Horn and proposed an integrated regional response strategy. The Communication, which was endorsed by the European parliament in May 2007, links the concept of security and development and highlights Somalia as a "test case".

## A. Within Somalia: Somaliland and Puntland regions

As mentioned in the recommendations above (chapter III), the Somaliland and Puntland regions should be more actively and directly approached by the EU as part of its policy towards Somalia, in view of ensuring stronger and wider process for the stabilisation of Somalia as a whole.

## B. IGAD Members:

Ethiopia has major security interests in Somalia, with concerns that a non-friendly irredentist Islamic Somali government could increase instability in Ethiopia, especially in Ogaden. Military presence in Somalia has proven very costly to Ethiopia financially and diplomatically, and has had a corrosive effect on its forces. However, Ethiopia has powerful security interests in shaping politics in post-intervention Somalia. It is thus likely that Ethiopia will keep some forces along Somali border areas, to provide support to local allies. If a friendly Somali government is not an option, Ethiopia might feel that its interests are better served by a fragmented, unstable Somalia. Ethiopia has strong links to Somaliland and interests in access through the Berbera port.

Eritrea favours an inclusive peace process and regards the Djibouti peace process as divisive, excluding so far ARS-Asmara. Allegedly, it is also channelling weapons and resources to armed opposition groups. Eritrea supports the unity of Somalia and rejects all foreign presence (including AU peacekeeping), advocates a united, functional, peaceful government that is inclusive of all the relevant political and military elements. Eritrea states that Ethiopia's withdrawal must be guaranteed by the international community, and that there should not be any threat of intervention in the future.

As a secular regime with Marxist origins, Eritrea has no ideological links to Al Shabab or other Islamist group. One of its main underlying motives of its Somalia engagement is to weaken and destabilize Ethiopia, in the absence of Ethiopia's full acceptance of the border demarcation and subsequent normalization of relations between the two countries. Eritrea actively seeks closer links with the Arab world and Gulf countries to counterbalance its isolation in the region and globally. Recent rapprochement with Iran should be noted.



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Kenya sees a lawless unstable Somalia as the primary source of external threat to its stability, a perception increased by the influx of refugees, concern about rising Islamic fundamentalism in Kenya, and potential terrorist threats exacerbated by sizeable presence of Somali population in the North of Kenya. It is therefore in Kenya's security interest to play a major role in resolving the Somali conflict and restoring some of state authority. While it was a key player in past peace efforts, it only recently engaged again more forcefully under the IGAD framework.

Sudan had possible links with Somali Islamists in the past, but facilitated in 2006 as Arab League Presidency a dialogue between TFG and Islamic courts. Could serve as link between IGAD and Arab League.

Djibouti has a 60% ethnic Somali population and was known as "French Somaliland" until 1967. President Guelleh is supportive of TFG (and Djibouti) process and against desegregation of the country. Tensions with Somaliland (largely due to competition over cattle exports to Saudi Arabia) are decreasing, following a visit by Somaliland president Rayale to Djibouti end-2008.

Djibouti could potentially play an important role as a mediator in the region: it is a member of both IGAD and the Arab League, has good relations with Gulf countries (Dubai is a key investor in its port), but also has a complex, interdependent relationship with Ethiopia (main user of its port).

## **Possible actions:**

1. The European Parliament, in its resolution on the Horn of Africa of 15 January 2009, recommended the appointment of a EUSR for the Horn of Africa. Further consideration could be given to this proposal, bearing in mind the cost and the benefits associated with it.
2. Consider a more active EU role to attempt to normalize relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. If MS judge that time is ripe for an initiative, the Commission and the Council Secretariat could draft a possible roadmap for such action. While improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea would not automatically stabilise Somalia, it would open the political space in the country and facilitate the emergence of "home-grown" solutions.
3. Political dialogue with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and IGAD should systematically include an exchange on Somalia, with the aim to ensure constructive support for the Djibouti process. This would be particularly needed for Eritrea.

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## C. Arab and Gulf countries:

Egypt has close historical ties with Somalia and facilitated in the past an Arab League sponsored dialogue between the TFG and the Islamic courts, and had a few years back also joined a number of IGAD committees as observer. In 2007 Egypt supported an inter-factional dialogue in Somalia under the auspices of AU, IGAD and Arab League as well as deployment of AU peacekeepers, drawn from non-neighbouring countries.

In the past, Somalia was seen as a battleground for regional rivalries and political ambitions between Ethiopia (non-Arab, host of AU) and Egypt (host of Arab League). Egypt also has a rivalry with most IGAD states over the use of waters of the Nile River, in particular Ethiopia with its source of the Blue Nile. All Arab States (except Yemen) backed Somalia in the 77-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia.

Egypt has recently shown strong engagement in the fight against piracy. It is strongly affected by piracy, both directly with Egyptian ships/crews being high-jacked, but even more so indirectly as diversion of international shipping from the Red Sea (towards the Cape route) would substantially reduce its income from the Suez Canal. Egypt appears anxious to avoid non-Arab military presence in the Red Sea.

Yemen has strong links with Somalia, is supportive of the TFG and provides asylum to ex-President Yusuf. Troubled relationship in the past with Somaliland, partly because of the latter's support for Yemeni separatists in 1994, but also because of conflicts over fishing rights, have improved after a cooperation agreement was signed in 2006. Yemen is strongly affected by flows of Somali refugees and piracy. As with Egypt, the coinciding interests of EU and Yemen on the piracy issue could be used as an entry point for a larger dialogue on Somalia.

The United Arab Emirates have not intervened in Somali politics, but the country plays a very important role in Somalia, given that Dubai is the de-facto financial capital of Somalia. Most warlords and companies have branches in the country, and money that flows from Dubai is essential for the survival of some Islamic courts and warlords.

Saudi-Arabia has been supportive of the TFG in the past, including by providing direct financial aid to the former Prime Minister Gedi. At the same time, allegations persist that – probably private – sources from Saudi Arabia contribute to the funding of the spread of Wahabism and radical Islam.

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Qatar has been accused by Ethiopia to support (via Eritrea) Somali rebel movements within Ethiopia. As with Saudi Arabia, extent and exact type (private or other) of possible Qatari funding of Somali Islamists remain unclear.

## Possible Actions:

1. Use political dialogue with Arab and Gulf States, including the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, to strengthen support for the Djibouti process. Also explore possibilities for these states and organisations to exert pressure on Somali actors who are still outside the process.
2. Possible operational collaboration with these countries on Somalia and the Horn could be considered, notably in the fight against piracy.

## D. International Actors

Considering the influence and the role played by the US, China and India in the region both at the political and at the economic level, it would be difficult to achieve a sustainable political solution in Somalia without their engagement and their full backing of the UN-led peace process.

## Possible Actions:

1. US: engage new US administration early on, in order to influence US policy on the Horn and identify concrete possibilities for working together towards a sustainable solution on Somalia, including through the UN Security Council.
2. Address Somalia and the political situation in the Horn of Africa in political dialogue with China and India. Through the instrument of the newly adopted EU-AU-China trilateral dialogue, or bilaterally, try to engage China politically on Somalia, going beyond their military engagement on piracy.

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

**The Djibouti Peace agreement** – officially signed on 19<sup>th</sup> August last year thanks to the mediation efforts of the UNSG Special Representative, Mr Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and the support given by the international community, including the EU – represents the basis of the policy started early 2008 with the nomination of Nur Adde to the position of Prime Minister and the consequent acceleration of the reconciliation process between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the moderate wing of the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia led by Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed (ARS-Djibouti). Since then, the two main implementation committees, the High Level Committee (HLC) and Joint Security Committee (JSC) have been established and important steps forward have been taken, in order to strengthen the commitments of the Parties on both political and security cooperation.

On 26<sup>th</sup> October 2008, the *Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation* also covered the relocation of the Ethiopian troops and measures to avoid a security vacuum involving initially AMISOM, "with the assistance of TFG and ARS security forces, until the deployment of UN Forces". The same day, a Joint TFG/ARS Declaration foresaw the early establishment of a Somali Unity Government open to all Somali nationals and based on partnership and respect, with an inclusive Parliament.

On 24<sup>th</sup> November, the JSC established a Cessation of Hostilities Supervisory Committee, and Working groups to develop, among others, the integration and realignment of the Somali Police Force (SPF), as well as and the establishment of joint Somali Security Forces (SSF) to act in support of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

On 25<sup>th</sup> November 2008, the HLC agreed on a number of power-sharing guiding principles, including: the enlargement of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) to 550 members (out of the 275 new MPs, 200 from the ARS and 75 from the civil society and other factions, which would agree to later join the process); the extension of the transition for two years (August 2009 – August 2011); the possibility to establish a Commission of Inquiry to address human rights and impunity in Somalia.

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On 10<sup>th</sup> December, the Chairman of the ARS-Djibouti, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed returned to Mogadishu after an absence of almost two years. On 29<sup>th</sup> December, Somali President Yusuf resigned, by putting an end to a months-long feud with transitional PM Nur Adde.

On 27<sup>th</sup> January the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) voted in favour of extending the term of office of the new parliament to 2 years and eight months and expanding the Parliament by 275 seats (200 from the ARS and 75 from the civil society and other factions, which would agree to later join the process). On 28<sup>th</sup> January, the 200 MPs of the ARS were sworn in Djibouti in a ceremony facilitated by the UN.

On 31<sup>st</sup> January, the ARS-leader, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, was elected President of Somalia by the TFP.

Despite these positive developments at the political level, the situation on the ground has remained extremely volatile. The worsening of the security situation (with an escalating wave of attacks on humanitarian workers and human rights defenders in southern-central Somalia), the increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the inter-institutional crisis resulting from the long-standing dispute between President Yusuf and PM Nur-Adde have all been elements which have characterized the situation in Somalia over the last six months.

The year 2008 witnessed in fact the worst fighting in the last 16 years since the civil war in Mogadishu leaving hundreds of civilians dead, thousands injured and an estimated over 800,000 displaced people. Since January 2008, there have been approximately 167 security incidents affecting NGOs, causing a reduction of presence of humanitarian actors especially in South-Central Somalia. In 2008, assisted population has been increasing for 30 to 40 percent.

Taking supporting measures for stability in Somalia and the region, on 20<sup>th</sup> November the UNSC adopted unanimously the [resolution 1844](#) on targeted sanctions, including travel restrictions and financial assets, against those who breach the arms embargo and block the political process.

The key aim of the Djibouti peace process was to create a powerful political momentum for an inclusive political settlement that would stabilise the country. However, this was made difficult by splits within both the ARS and the TFG, and the rapid advance on the ground by militias like Al-

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Shabab that reject the process. The ARS split into two rival wings in May 2008, one based in Asmara and the other based in Djibouti. The ARS-Asmara, led by Hassan Dahir Aweys (who is on the US and UN terrorist lists), has rejected the Djibouti process so far. As a consequence, a gap has been formed between those being around the negotiating table on one hand, and the insurgents opposing the peace agreement and controlling most of the territory on the other.

Today the real challenges remain the further implementation of the Djibouti agreement and the enlargement of the political dialogue, in order to make the peace process more inclusive and, at the same time, more credible and effective on the ground. This implies the capacity of the new TFIs to aggregate the deeply fragmented Somali society as well as to address the problem of internally displaced persons. To do this, the role played by local communities and elders remains key.

Forces on the ground tend to be locally based and anchored in sub-clans. The primary loyalty of most ARS field commanders appears to be their local communities, rather than to either wing of the divided alliance. Clan contributions, diaspora-based fund-raising efforts and the Somali business community are critical in order to ensure financial support to the forces on the ground. Detailed information about the *al Shabab* is scarce, but the movement includes a number of fighters who are primarily aiming to establish a strong position for themselves, while rejecting all foreign interference. There are also fighters with an international agenda, aiming to use Somalia as a training ground for jihadists and hoping to establish a kaliphate on the territory. There are a number of young men, citizens of the EU, Canada or the US, of Somali origin who travel to Somalia to join the international fight of the *al shabaab*. While the clan structure remains secondary within *al shabaab*, some *al shabaab* fighters nonetheless use their clan affiliation to strengthen their position.

In the Somaliland region, Presidential elections - originally scheduled for 31 August 2008 – are now expected to take place on 29 March 2009, even if a further delay is not excluded. In the Puntland region, after years of widespread corruption among officials and increasing criminal activities (piracy, kidnapping, human smuggling, printing of fake currency, etc.) which brought Puntland institutions near collapse, a new President, Abdirihman Mohamed "Farole" took office in January 2009 after an orderly transfer of power. He rejected the outcome of the Djibouti peace process on grounds that Puntland was excluded and that federalism was at risk.

**At the security level**, latest developments concern the Ethiopian withdrawal and the subsequent AU-requested strengthening of **AMISOM** to respond to the security challenges in the country.

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Contrary to initial fears, the Ethiopian withdrawal did not lead to a total breakdown of security. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is actually strong of about 3,400 troops (from Burundi and Uganda), out of the originally mandated strength of 8,000. In addition to troops, the AU is developing a civilian component of AMISOM. In this respect, on 2<sup>nd</sup> February, the AU requested the EU to financially support the deployment of 270 AU Police officers in Mogadishu to train, advice and mentor the joint Somali police force, for an estimated cost of US\$ 39 million over twelve months.

On 16<sup>th</sup> January 2009, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1863, thereby extending the mandate of AMISOM until 16 July 2009. The Security Council determined that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region and expressed its intent to establish a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council by 1 June 2009. In parallel, the UNSC decided to establish a UN Trust Fund to provide financial support to AMISOM until a UN Peacekeeping Operation is deployed. To this end, Resolution 1863 requested the Secretary General to hold a Donor Conference to solicit contributions to this Trust Fund as soon as possible.

Piracy off the Somali coast has rapidly evolved over the last years from a domestic nuisance, aimed mainly at illegal fishing vessels, into a sophisticated and well-organized industry whose dramatic expansion poses a growing threat to international shipping, including humanitarian assistance. The maritime operation **EU NAVFOR ATALANTA** was launched in early-December last year with a mandate for 12 months. It acts primarily on the basis of the UNSC resolution 1846 related to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Among the legal aspects which remain to be solved are the seizure, detention, transfer and prosecution of presumed pirates captured by the force.

However, piracy is primarily a consequence of the crisis in Somalia. Any viable and lasting solution to this problem can only come by dealing with the root causes of the problem, which are the instability and the lack of rule of law and good-governance in Somalia. Deployment of naval forces can only address the symptoms without bringing a lasting solution. It is important that any EU action on piracy off the coasts of Somalia is accompanied by continued efforts and a long term strategy aiming to bring peace and stability to Somalia and its people.

## Ongoing programmes for strengthening the capacity of the Puntland and Somaliland regions in the security sector.

These programmes are part of the ongoing UNDP project *Rule of Law and Security*. The table below outlines objectives, expected results and activities, of which those specific for Puntland and Somaliland are highlighted in bold at the next page.

Objectives of the action	<p>Overall objective(s):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rule of law and access to justice strengthened with a competent, professional civilian police force, judiciary and custodial corps in compliance with international human rights standards</li> <li>2. Improved security through security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, small arms control and mine action</li> </ol> <p>Specific objective(s)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An efficient and effective adequately equipped and housed professional civilian police service that meets the needs and expectations of all Somalis is in place.</li> <li>• Basic systems for the administration of justice established and strengthened, and accessibility of justice and security for poor and vulnerable men, women and children enhanced.</li> <li>• Sustainable disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militias in South Central Somalia, and forces (army, police, custodial corps) reduced within the framework of security sector reform in Somaliland and Puntland.</li> <li>• Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) controlled through institutional strengthening, advocacy and community led initiatives.</li> <li>• Mine action coordination and clearance capacity strengthened and field EOD teams operational in line with international mine action standards (not financed under this proposal and excluded from budget and budget co-financing)</li> </ul>
Partner(s)	UNDP Direct Execution (DEX)
Target group(s) <sup>1</sup>	Transitional Federal Institutions, Federal and Regional Law Enforcement

<sup>1</sup> “Target groups” are the groups/entities who will be directly positively affected by the project at the Project Purpose level



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	and Judicial Authorities and personnel.
Final beneficiaries <sup>1</sup>	Communities in regions where project activities are implemented, law enforcement and judicial personnel, TFIs and regional authorities
Estimated results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police and judiciary have improved institutional, technical and operational capacity and are more responsive to community needs.</li> <li>• Comprehensive demobilization and reintegration of militia initiated with full participation of national and local stakeholders</li> <li>• Increased control over weapons (civilian + police) through registration and community awareness and adequate response mechanisms in place to address the land mine and UXO threat.</li> </ul>
Main activities	<p><b>Law Enforcement:</b></p> <p>1a. Finalization of Armo construction and at least 3 other police training institutions (Mandera, Mogadishu, Bay/Bakool)</p> <p>1b. Training of at least 4,000 police recruits and officers</p> <p>1c. Police command structure established and operational, with 8 regional headquarters established and equipped</p> <p>1d. Establishment of SPU in South Central and strengthening of SPU in</p> <p><b>Puntland and Somaliland</b></p> <p>1e. Rehabilitation of prioritized police infrastructure and provision of essential equipment (communication, transport, uniforms and IT equipment)</p> <p><b>Judiciary:</b></p> <p>2a. Support the establishment of a <b>Centre for Judicial Training in Somaliland and implementation of training for law professionals in Somaliland, Puntland</b> and South Central.</p> <p>2b. Establish Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Courts in South Central</p> <p><b>2c. Establish legal aid centres in Puntland and South Central</b></p> <p>2d. <b>Construction of Hargeisa Central Prison</b> and rehabilitation of 4 other prioritized prisons</p> <p><b>2e. Operationalization of police and prison monitoring committees in Somaliland and Puntland</b></p> <p>2f. Strengthen the capacity of the emerging Somaliland Human Rights Commission</p>

<sup>1</sup> “Final beneficiaries” are those who will benefit from the project in the long term at the level of the society or sector at large

## RESTREINT UE

	<p><b>DDR/Small Arms Control:</b></p> <p>3a. Support for security policy development for DDR and SSR in South Central Somalia</p> <p>3b. DDR of at least 2,500 militia in all 3 regions</p> <p><b>3c. SSR review completed and reform initiated in Somaliland and Puntland</b></p> <p><b>3d. Registration of civilian and police weapons in Somaliland and Puntland</b></p> <p><b>3e. Small arms control legislation and policy developed in Somaliland and initiated in Puntland</b> and to a lesser extent South Central Somalia</p> <p>3f. Completion of small arms survey in Puntland and South Central</p> <p><b>Mine Action (not covered under this proposal)</b></p> <p>4a. <b>Landmine Impact survey completed in Sool-Sanaag region</b> and undertaken in South Central on a region by region basis.</p> <p>4b. Regional mine action centres established in South Central Somalia</p> <p>4c. EOD teams have capacity and materials to undertake their activities within the police structures in all regions of Somalia</p>
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