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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



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THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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10164/09 (02.03.15)

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NOTE

From : Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)
To : Political and Security Committee (PSC)
Subject : EU SSR Guinea-Bissau - Lessons identified and recommendations on the
planning phase

Following agreement by CIVCOM on 20 May and in view of the PSC meeting on 27 May (procedural point), Delegations will find herewith the Secretariat report addressing lessons and recommendations on the planning phase of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau.

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT

This report identifies lessons from the **strategic and operational planning phase** leading to the launching of the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Guinea-Bissau (**EU SSR Guinea-Bissau**). The report covers the period from the first EU Fact Finding mission in May 2007 to the declaration of initial operational capability of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau on 16 June 2008.

The 2007 decision to prepare for launching the mission came at a moment that was widely seen as a **window of opportunity** for the EU to provide advice and assistance to the local authorities on reform of the security sector in Guinea-Bissau. The government had presented a **National Security Sector Reform Strategy** to donors in November 2006. The largest three political parties in the parliamentary assembly had signed a national political stability pact in March 2007. The government had expressed its commitment to reform. This came at a time of **increasing concerns** that the country was becoming a base for the trafficking of narcotics from Latin America towards Europe.

The mission was thus not, as many other ESDP missions, deployed during an immediate post-crisis situation. Rather, it was deployed in a State with a history of a lack of the rule of law in which assistance was deemed necessary to enable the national authorities to **implement** the freshly presented National Security Sector Reform Strategy and to get and **keep its security sector reform (SSR) process on track during this time of new momentum**. SSR was necessary also to set-up the structures that would allow the country to counter narcotics trafficking in the long term.

The EU decided to concentrate on providing strategic advice on SSR reform and thus to deploy a **relatively small mission** (22 internationals) for a **limited period of time** that would allow essentially to prepare for the implementation of the reform, based on already existing but not sufficiently detailed national plans. This mission would be deployed in Guinea-Bissau, a **relatively small country**, with ca. 1,6 million inhabitants and **underdeveloped** - at the time it ranked number 175 out of 177 on the UN Human Development Index. Having gained its independence in 1974, it went through many years of one party rule, followed by a civil war (1998-1999) and various coups d'état, finally followed by legislative elections in 2004 and presidential elections in 2005. Despite the elections, the **political situation remained fragile** not least due to the continued influence of

the military and to the weak state institutions. At the time of planning for the ESDP mission, the next legislative elections were planned to be held in March 2008.

The phase from the sending of a first EU Fact Finding Mission in May 2007 to the adoption of the Joint Action in May 2008 and the following declaration of initial operational capability of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau in June 2008 took a little over a year, spanning altogether **three EU Presidencies**. The period from the adoption of the Crisis Management /General Concept (December 2007) to the finalisation of operational plans (CONOPS in February and OPLAN in June 2008) was relatively short.

The Commission was actively involved from the very beginning. During this period, a **reorganisation** took place within the Council Secretariat, leading to the establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). It was the **first (civilian/military) integrated Security Sector Reform mission** of the EU, which was planned at the political-strategic level by DGE VIII (Defense issues) and then handed-over to the CPCC after adoption of the CMC/General Concept, with close involvement of the CivMil Cell throughout the strategic and operational planning process. At the time of drawing lessons from the planning phase, a reorganisation of the strategic planning capacity of the Council Secretariat is underway.

Given this context, lessons identified from the planning of this particular mission may not be immediately applicable to all other missions. Any lessons and recommendations identified in this report are arguably of relevance mainly (1) to **future integrated missions**, (2) to the EU **SSR concept** as well as (3) to the planning of relatively **small missions** in perhaps relatively small countries. Still, due to the country's geographical dimensions and the alleged commitment of the local authorities to the reform process, some considered EUSSR Guinea-Bissau as a **test case for future SSR missions**.

This report was prepared on the basis of **written contributions** by the Commission, Member States, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and the various services within the GSC that were involved in the preparatory and planning phase (in particular DG E / PU, CivMil Cell, CPCC, EUMS, SIAC, the Security Office) as well as based on **interviews** with key actors in Brussels and in situ. Given the focus on the internal planning phase, mainly EU actors who were involved during that time were interviewed. Throughout the report, text boxes have been inserted to highlight a diversity of views or remarks deemed of interest for the process of identifying lessons.

The report is structured as follows: **Section 2** describes the strategic and operational planning phase and identifies lessons of relevance for future engagement. **Section 3** seeks to analyse relevant lessons for the EU SSR concept. **Section 4** discusses technical aspects of interest for mission planning, such as issues relating to procurement and staffing. Finally, **section 5** provides an executive summary of the key lessons identified and proposed recommendations. A list of interviewees and a bibliography is included in the Annexes to this report.

In order to ensure **follow-up**, lessons and recommendations contained in this report, once noted by PSC, will be integrated in ongoing processes and tools and their resulting actions, monitored by i.a. the “traffic lights paper”, the annual report on lessons identified and other tools foreseen in the guidelines on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions (doc. 15987/08, e.g. workplans, checklists, communities of experts, best practice officers, software tools).

2. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING PHASE

2.1. Description

The first discussion on possible EU involvement in SSR in Guinea-Bissau took place in December 2006. A year and a half later, in May 2008, an ESDP mission was deployed (see Box 1). A combination of factors can **explain the timing of the EU decision** to increase its engagement in this way: the particular political situation in Guinea-Bissau, the interest by the EU to strengthen SSR in that country with a view to help counter indirectly narco-trafficking, as well as internal EU institutional issues such as the desire to test its recently agreed SSR concept.

The agreed **National Security Sector Reform Strategy (NSS)** of November 2005, drafted inter alia with the help of the UK, was the starting point for the EU to consider further involvement in SSR. Key added value of an SSR mission would be the ability to provide serving military and civilian advisers with necessary experience to assist with the development of a detailed implementation plan. Creating the conditions for the implementation was seen as a necessary first step to increasing donor confidence for further support. Following the signing of a national **political**

stability pact by the three largest parties in the parliamentary assembly in March 2007, it was generally assessed that their commitment offered new momentum to implement the NSS. Increasing **concerns regarding narcotics trafficking** towards Europe added strategic importance to the country.

SSR was still a relatively new concept and the EU had gained first experience in the DRC. To some, an SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau perhaps offered an opportunity to build up EU expertise in this area. The final decision to go ahead with planning then came under the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007. The EU was **not a new actor** to Guinea-Bissau: its involvement - mainly in development co-operation - had a long history, most recently underlined by the consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which were finalised in April 2005 and then continued with political dialogue under Article 8.

Apart from the political situation in Guinea-Bissau and the EU interest in consolidating SSR, two general **institutional questions** had to be solved within the EU between the first discussions in 2006 and deployment of an ESDP mission in 2008: first, the complementarity of a possible ESDP mission with ongoing and planned first pillar activities in the field of justice under Community competence; second, the question whether the main effort of the ESDP mission would lie in the military domain, particularly given the focus of the NSS - in analogue to EUSEC DR Congo - or, whether an integrated approach under a civilian chain of command would be most appropriate.

Complementarity of first and second pillar action was ensured through close co-operation between Commission and Council Secretariat during the Fact Finding Missions (FFM) in May and October 2007 as well as in Brussels and on the ground. The creation of the 'Group of Friends of Guinea-Bissau' (an informal gathering of international organisations and bilateral actors active in the field of SSR in Guinea-Bissau) further helped to ensure coherence of action with UN and bilateral donors. The European Development Fund (EDF) already foresaw substantial programmes in the justice sector (under the 9th EDF 6 MEURO programme to benefit different aspects of the legal system; 7.5 MEURO to address gaps in DDR; under the 10th EDF 30 MEURO for conflict prevention including SSR). In addition, an election observation mission (EOM) was foreseen for the legislative elections in 2008. Last but not least, making use of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) for the first time, three SSR experts were foreseen to be deployed in support of the national structure which was set up to oversee implementation of the NSS.

At first sight, there thus seemed little need for any additional ESDP action in the area of justice. However, following the first FFM, in line with the EU SSR concept, and based on first experience with SSR activities in the DRC, it was assessed that for SSR to be effective, three sectors (police, justice and military) had to be covered in a **comprehensive manner** making use of officers in active service. One area in the field of justice that needed support but was not yet covered by the EDF and IsF programmes was then jointly identified, namely prosecution and judicial police.

Box 1: Chronology of events:

- 2005:** Council Decision to end Article 96 Consultations with Guinea-Bissau in **April**; At request of UN, UK advises on SSR Strategy - CivMil Cell participated in two UK lead FFMs in September and October; EU Concept for ESDP support to SSR adopted in **October**.
- 2006:** EU Concept on DDR adopted in **March**. National Security Sector Reform Strategy (NSS) presented to donors at conference in Geneva in **November**. Council conclusions on SSR of 21 **November** 2006. UK presents paper on possible follow-up in COAFR and PSC in **December**, agreement to organise EU mission to assess possible follow-up activities.
- 2007:** First joint Council/Commission Fact Finding Mission (FFM) on 7-11 **May**; Presentation of options to PSC in **June**; Creation of "Friends of Guinea-Bissau" and first meeting in London in **September**; adoption of National Plan of Action Against Drug Trafficking; on 14 September PSC mandated the GSC in co-operation with the Commission to conduct a FFM and agreed in principle to the appropriateness of an ESDP mission; Second Joint FFM on 8-12 **October**; Deployment of two experts funded by IfS in October; On 19 **November**, the Council considered that ESDP action in the field of SSR in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate, consistent with, and complementary to, the EDF and other Community activity. Deployment of a Technical Assessment Team (TAM) to inform the development of the draft CONOPS at the end of the month. Approval of General Concept (CMC) for potential ESDP action in Guinea-Bissau on 10 **December**. At its own request, Guinea-Bissau was placed on the agenda of the UN Peace Building Commission.
- 2008:** Invitation for ESDP mission by Guinea-Bissau in a letter dated 10 **January**. Second meeting of "Friends of Guinea-Bissau" in Brussels in January; deployment of third judicial SSR experts by Instrument of Stability in January; Council approves CONOPS and adopts Joint Action on 12 **February**; Appointment of Head of Mission on 4 **March**; Force Generation and Selection and subsequent Induction of key staff in **April**; Establishment of national structures to implement SSR in Guinea-Bissau; Advance team led by Head of Mission deploys in April to prepare Head Quarters, OPLAN and arrival of staff; Adoption of OPLAN in **June**. EU Agreement with Guinea-Bissau on the Status of the Mission (SOMA). Declaration of initial operational capability on 16 June.

2.2. Lessons Identified

Political-strategic aspects

- The overall assessment is that the planning for EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was well done.
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Although the political and security assessments were clear about the difficulties and obstacles that could be encountered in the field, in hindsight a rather optimistic assessment of both the **national authorities' commitment** to SSR and the **local capacity** to implement reforms was made in the CMC/General Concept. The assessment was made on the basis of the best available indicators at the time and must be seen within the political context of the desire to take action. The need for translation and **interpretation** (Portuguese and Creole) took additional time during the planning process.
- Those who were most acutely aware of the questions regarding the commitment and the capacity of the local authorities, were also those who saw most clearly the need for the EU to step in at this moment in time. Thus, the reasons for and interests in SSR reform, were the other side of the coin of the risks and hurdles the EU was likely to encounter. A dilemma that could only be solved by breaking the cycle and stepping in at what was perceived and presented as a **moment of opportunity**.

- Given the core task - essentially supporting preparation of detailed planning for SSR implementation and not implementation itself - the **one year mandate** was deemed sufficient, provided that local authorities were fully committed and capable. The EU could always either continue or terminate ESDP engagement in case no sufficient commitment of the local authorities was present or in case the underlying planning assumptions changed during the mandate.
- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The **Group of Friends of Guinea-Bissau** served as a good platform to ensure **coherence** and complementarity of activities between EC, ESDP, UN and donor states.

• **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- The **Technical Assessment Mission** (TAM) that was undertaken in November 2007 with a view to collecting findings for the draft CONOPS **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- A Council-Commission **task force** was created, which helped to ensure close co-operation and co-ordination during the operational planning phase.

- An **advance team** composed of the HoM, POLAD, a CIS expert and other experts was deployed in April 2008 to set up the initial mission facilities prior to the arrival of the bulk of the advisors in June and to prepare the draft OPLAN.
- The preparatory work of the **Instrument for Stability (IfS) experts**, for instance in preparing the census and a donor matrix and in explaining the purposes and aims of the ESDP mission to local counterparts, greatly facilitated the arrival of the ESDP mission.
- As the IfS experts, the SSR advisors of the ESDP mission were meant to be co-located with local authorities but, for various reasons (lack of understanding, will and basic facilities on the Guinean side), this did not materialize. More focused planning on the aspect of **co-location** might have help achieve a better result.
- Perhaps given its small size, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is at this stage the only ESDP mission without a **human rights and/or gender advisor** or focal point, yet most of the military, judiciary and police staff should be familiar with these concepts.

2.3. Recommendations

Political-strategic aspects

1. **Building on local EU presence** (in this case EC Delegation, local Presidency and other bilateral Embassies) greatly helps in planning and setting up an ESDP mission (a recurrent lesson).
2. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

3. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

4. Careful and early identification of the full list of activities to address the situation on the ground and leading to a division of labour and assessment of **complementarity between first and second pillar activities**, lays the ground work for effective and coherent co-operation upon deployment. The creation of a **common Council/Commission task force** with regular meetings at Head Quarters helps to ensure this.
5. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
6. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**.
7. The **Group of Friends** proved useful as a platform to increase coherence and could be replicated in future cases as appropriate.
8. In line with the EU document " Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP" (doc. 15782/3/08 REV 3), the office of the SG/HR Personal Representative for **Human Rights** should provide advise throughout the planning process. **Human rights and gender aspects** of SSR should be concretely taken into account when planning for SSR missions.

Operational aspects

9. In particular **small missions need a minimum number of staff** to be able to function. Apart from the HoM and Deputy HoM, an indicative minimum staff would comprise the following functions: political advice, press and public information, reporting, administration, finance, procurement, logistics, communication and information systems, security and human resources. Some functions might be combined. The costs of such a minimum size in comparison to the estimated costs and added value of the core tasks should perhaps be taken into consideration when planning for small missions.

10. If closely co-ordinated, as exemplified in Guinea-Bissau, preparatory work by the Commission or experts funded by the Community instruments can usefully help to **prepare the ground** for an ESDP mission.
11. **Co-location** with local authorities should be considered and pursued with the Host Country SSR advisors where possible.
12. Sending an **advance team** headed by the HoM if possible to prepare for the mission launch should become the norm, ideally even in the form of a planning team that can inform the development of the OPLAN.

Box 2 - Mandate of the mission (Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP):

"1. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating subsequent donor engagement.

2. The particular objectives of the mission are:

- Operationalisation of the National SSR Strategy through assisting in the development of detailed implementation plans for downsizing/restructuring the Armed Forces and security forces;*
- Assistance to the development and articulation of capacity building needs, including training and equipment, facilitating subsequent mobilisation of, and engagement by, donors;*
- Assessment of the potential and risk for continued ESDP engagement in the medium term in support of SSR implementation."*

3. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

3.1. Description

The **concept** of Security Sector Reform (or Security System Reform) is relatively new. It includes the military sector, the rule of law component (justice, police and penitentiary) as well as civil society. The SSR concept adopted by the EU (doc. 12566/4/05) was adopted at the same time as discussions on SSR in Guinea-Bissau started. It refers to the guidelines developed in 2004 by the OECD/Development Assistance Committee on "Security System Reform and Governance" (which include in SSR also the additional sectors democratic oversight, intelligence, border management and the private sector). In line with the concept, EU action should build on national ownership and partnership.

SSR as a concept is part of a **broader approach**. Within the security sector, the role and the importance of the military are very important, especially in Africa. When reform includes restructuring and downsizing, the process of **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration** (DDR) of the military and also former combatants is an important element of SSR, as exemplified also in Guinea-Bissau. DDR processes need to contribute to immediate security needs and be part of the foundations for longer term stability and development in a country or region. Past efforts in DDR had failed in Guinea-Bissau, leading to a relatively oversized and skewed military sector without democratic oversight. Also, the police structure was unnecessarily complicated and under-resourced. Compared to the military and the police, the justice sector was generally deemed to be in relatively good shape, but also in this sector there was corruption and a lack of capacity. The additional problem that SSR would need to indirectly address in Guinea-Bissau was **trafficking in narcotics and human beings** (though the exact scale of these problems remains unclear), which are usually part of organised crime networks.

The 2006 "**National Security Sector Reform Strategy**" (NSS) and the 2007 "**Action Plan** for the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Security and Defence Sectors" set out the national SSR and DDR process and set up a structure for implementation. However, there was judged to be one missing link: the **conditions to actually implement the NSS were not in place**. It was thus envisioned that an **ESDP mission** could contribute to creating such conditions through advice and assistance to the local authorities. In close coordination with EU, international and bilateral actors, particularly the UN, **donor confidence** could then be restored so that the necessary financial assistance could be available for the actual implementation of the NSS.

The **structure** of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau indicates a focus on military, police and, to a lesser extent, to the prosecution services. Due to the strong justice component in ongoing and planned programmes under the EDF, and due to the limited attention given to the justice sector in the NSS, a limited presence of the justice component was planned for the mission. Also, given the lack of a penitentiary system in Guinea-Bissau, no advisor in this area was foreseen. The idea was that the ESDP mission should be able to contribute to creating the necessary conditions for SSR in the **short term**, that is within a year. Community action would then continue to flank these short term measures and fund - in close cooperation with other donors - **medium to long term** activities for the SSR process in the wider justice field to be sustainable.

3.2. Lessons identified

- SSR in general requires a **long term vision**. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, it was not the ambition for ESDP to accompany the whole process but to kick-start SSR based on the agreed national strategy and to make an assessment of the potential and risk for continued ESDP engagement in the medium term. Nonetheless, it turned out that, as in previous similar cases, the early efforts to demobilise parts of the army and to send home former combatants failed because, after some time, they returned into armed forces or militias due to lack of income. The overall figure of the army was difficult to pin down, given an interest in inflating the numbers with a view to a possible reward for leaving the army. Therefore, a **census** and long term support are crucial to success. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the ESDP mission only got more traction once the military hierarchy understood that the reform process would be accompanied with the help of the Commission by a **pension fund** financed under the EDF and the International Community. For this fund to be set up, first a census had to be carried out, also funded by the EDF. It was useful that the ESDP mission deployed before the creation of the fund since a positive cooperation with the local authorities was likely to increase the willingness of the International Community to contribute to such a fund.
- **National ownership** and a shared vision on different aspects of SSR are key conditions for successful EU intervention. To obtain such a shared vision, the goal is to support the national authorities in their efforts to reform the security sector. It is necessary to **build up confidence** with local stakeholders and authorities and to take local conditions and possible limitations into consideration. This takes time. One year mandates may be appropriate to put a certain "pressure" on local processes, but the EU should also consider engaging for the longer term (i.e. to renew the mandates of SSR missions), even if, in the case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau it was "only" to prepare the ground for the implementation of the reform. Too frequent rotation of staff should also be avoided where possible.
- The **justice component** in the NSS was relatively weak. Despite the activities programmed in this area under the EDF and the IfS, a stronger justice advisory role could have been included when planning the mission. Whereas two prosecutor advisors were foreseen, one position remained vacant. Adding a judge to the ESDP team could have been a welcome reinforcement in support of SSR. Initially, the ESDP justice component had no real counterpart in Brussels.

• **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Long term vision and **concrete actions** have to go together. In this sense a close **co-ordination** between the different actors within and also outside the EU is essential. In the case of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau cooperation within the EU proved to be very good and complementary. Close Commission-Council co-operation at the planning stage has been crucial to develop a more EU comprehensive approach. Still, the mission felt it would have had a stronger position from the outset, had it had some "pocket money" for quick impact projects. Having "one voice" among EU actors vis-à-vis the local authorities increases the impact and **visibility of overall EU actions**. Such projects could also create an incentive to local authorities to co-operate.

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3.3. Recommendations

13. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

14. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau provides an excellent and **useful example of how ESDP and Community activities can go hand in hand** in contributing to a sustainable SSR process. Further fine-tuning and strengthening of the SSR concept could be achieved in the justice component of the ESDP mission. Implementation of flanking measures - such as a census, pension fund - and tools such as a matrix overview of donor activities - before or shortly after deployment are useful. Also, funds for quick and visible impact projects in support of SSR (possibly indirectly through Commission or bilateral donors) could help the mission to successfully achieve its mandate.

15. For success of this small EU SSR mission in this small country to be replicated elsewhere, **necessary (but not sufficient) conditions** would include: using a combination of clearly defined short and long term EC and ESDP action; ensuring close co-operation with Community instruments; setting up effective co-ordination mechanisms to ensure one voice and complementarity of action by EU, international and bilateral actors; ensuring appropriate visibility efforts (e.g. stressing that ESDP is part of overall EU intervention); developing a holistic approach towards SSR and DDR; building national ownership and realising that the necessary confidence building takes time; managing local expectations with regard to realistic results in case of a minimal approach/limited mandate (e.g. ESDP in Guinea-Bissau “only” prepares the ground for the implementation of SSR); .
16. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
17. In order to combine short term political pressure with longer-term incentives, the possibility of connecting a one year mandate for an ESDP mission (with eventual renewal dependent also on measures of progress) with the prospect of a long-term EC support program should be considered, in agreement with the Commission.

4. TECHNICAL ISSUES

4.1. Description

Compared to other ESDP missions, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was not set up during or in immediate response to a crisis. Therefore, more time was in principle available to get started, even if there was a wish to deploy as quickly as possible so as not to lose the perceived new momentum for SSR. Some of the technical difficulties encountered by other missions - for instance when setting up EUMM Georgia - were not faced in this case. Other difficulties existed, but more time was available to find solutions. Still, the **one year mandate sets time constraints** which are of relevance to other missions too. Also, the local market posed constraints on the quantity and quality of providers for procured goods and services, which is similar for other missions. Many of the technical difficulties relating to procurement, staffing, administration and logistics are already addressed in the **traffic lights paper** and are therefore not discussed at length here.

4.2. Lessons Identified

A. Training / Recruitment / Staffing

- The **common induction** or key staff in Brussels prior to deployment was deemed of extreme importance, for reasons of team building, familiarising staff with the CPCC, which saved time to constitute the mission. CD-ROMs with all key documents were distributed. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- According to the OPLAN, the HoM is responsible for the **selection process** of personnel. Some advisors already had local networks and were familiar with the country, which proved to be an asset. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- The mission has struggled with fulfilling **reporting** requirements due to the lack of a dedicated reporting officer that is standard in other ESDP missions.

B. Procurement / Administration

- A more complete **start-up kit** would have helped to set up the mission more quickly. As a "gap-stopper", it helped, however, that upon signature of the contract and following negotiation with the bank, the HoM could use the **10.000 Euro limit on the credit card** issued by the bank to buy the essential equipment in Brussels together with his advance team before deployment. The 'preparatory measure' as a concept was only agreed afterwards and therefore not applied in the case of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau. The mission also received **equipment from AMIS** - a mission which had just closed down. This helped with the start-up of the mission. The start-up kit brought by the **Elections Observer Mission** could - apart from the EU flags - not be donated to the ESDP mission for procedural reasons and was donated to the local authorities instead.

• **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Having staff with experience from other missions proved extremely helpful. Although some issues are the same for all missions in variable quantities or security circumstances (such as vehicles, phones, security SOPs, leave), mission staff found that there were **no standard forms or models available** which then took time to establish.
- Additional **support in procurement** was provided to the Head of Administration for the first six months. This was very welcome, even though the files could not be finished within that time due inter alia to the different local conditions (small market, often only one provider available but still three quotes need to be provided and deadlines to be respected). The Commission advised at an early stage, that, to a large extent, the four or five most urgent files (e.g. medical including MEDEVAC, security, renovation of office buildings, CIS) could have been prepared by the CPCC in order to save time. There are however severe limitations as to what CPCC staff can do. A longer planning phase and a planning team with relevant administrative staff could have helped.

C. Logistics / Security / CIS

- Setting up the **mission Head Quarters** took much longer than originally expected despite the strong support of the local Presidency to get the building in due time. Suitable premises had been identified rather quickly but were not immediately ready for use. Meanwhile, the mission operated from a hotel. Other options - such as co-location on the Commission premises in temporary containers - were not pursued further since this implied as well lengthy procurement procedures to obtain the containers. Despite initial agreement and a technical and security assessment, negotiations with the local authorities and the necessary works on the building took months. On the other hand, it was perhaps useful that the local authorities saw that the EU mission could still be productive despite logistical and administrative limitations.
- Although a **paramedic** was foreseen to be contracted, the position remains vacant to date. This has unacceptable consequences for the already sub-standard local **health care** facilities available to mission staff despite the agreed access to the UN dispensary as well as the

- framework contract for the high risk insurance. The procurement of paramedic services should have been pursued more seriously.

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- **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

- Most of the Council Security Office recommendations were not implemented for a while. The mission security officer was only able to deploy with a short delay and without the possibility to receive prior guidance in Brussels. According to the mission, the **security standards** imposed on the mission were too severe considering the fact that the risk for the mission was assessed as "low". It cost time to convince Brussels of the moderate needs on the ground. An on-the-spot security assessment did not take place in the first months following deployment. There was no **evacuation plan** for many months. Its staff is included in the evacuation plan of the UN. At the beginning, the ESDP Mission could borrow some satellite phones from the UN. The mission worked with regular mobile phones for the first seven months. Better planning of procurement of security equipment and services should have been foreseen already during the planning phase.
- A **Status of Mission Agreement** was in place shortly after deployment of the mission and prior to reaching initial operational capability. Local EU presence (Presidency, Commission Delegation) greatly facilitated early conclusion of this agreement as well as the first exchange of letters inviting the EU to deploy a mission. Issues of translation caused some delay.
- **CIS** equipment up to 10.000 Euro was bought prior to deployment for the advance team, but subsequent staff had to work from private computers for many months. This was not appropriate, also from an INFOSEC point of view. Drafting, commenting and revising the CIS contribution to the planning documents, has not been formally translated into standard operating procedures. A functional CIS planning guide was missing. Secure and reliable CIS could not be set up as it was originally planned due to the low quality of both fixed and mobile lines. There has not been a **secure link** to the mission, therefore classified information could not be forwarded. Due to the shortage of qualified CIS experts in the country, it was difficult to recruit a local CIS expert.

4.3. Recommendations

A. Training / Recruitment / Staffing

18. Common **induction** in Brussels and CD-ROMs for key mission staffs with key documents are a very helpful start for any mission. Networks of experts across missions could be set-up to discuss best practice following deployment.
19. When setting **deadlines for deployment** of core staff, a balance should be sought between an assessment of urgency in light of needs on the ground and the need to properly prepare staff for deployment.
20. The CRT concept could be revitalised and the CRT pool could be reviewed to assess whether certain kinds of expertise required in the preparatory phase (e.g. procurement, finance, engineers, logistics) is sufficiently covered or should be included.
21. Possibilities, such as service contracts, could be considered and budgeted for situations in which a mission needs **temporary experts** (such as engineers, CIS) which are not necessarily available locally.
22. International applicants who are **familiar with the local situation and/or with ESDP** procedures and missions are an additional asset to a mission. Local applicants with experience working for international organisations are also an asset. Local contracting contributes to building local confidence. Placements of officials from other organisations active in the same field (especially the UN) could facilitate de-conflicting and co-operation.
23. **Reporting** requirements, templates and guidelines must be clear and matched with adequate human resources.

B. Procurement / Administration

24. Start-up kits should be available to set up missions (e.g. individual computers, mobile phones, printers). While the concept of preparatory measures is being revised to better reflect

operational needs, for small missions, using the first **10.000 Euro credit** of the HoM's credit card (if allowed by the bank prior to the deposit of funds) could only be considered as a quick stop-gap option in the future for buying the necessary equipment upfront prior to departure. This would not replace the need to find structural solutions for fast access to cash such as the preparatory measure. Similarly, **passing on equipment from one mission to the next** should be repeated where possible in the future.

25. The mission administration team has to be of sufficient size to provide an **alternative signing authority** in the absence of the Head of Administration from the outset to avoid unnecessary delays in financial proceedings.
26. Additional **support in procurement and finance** at the start of the mission should be repeated, possibly through the Commission's "floaters" system or by making use of CRTs if available. Local procurement officers are an asset.
27. Being able to take advantage of knowledge of the local market and of available infrastructure (e.g. EC Delegation, local Presidency) is essential at the start of a mission.
28. A compilation of **standard forms, SOPs, models** should be provided to a new mission on issues such as rules on how to deal with leave, use of vehicles, security, phones, risks.
29. The most important **procurement files** (MEDEVAC, paramedics, security equipment) should be prepared at Head Quarters to the extent possible before deploying the mission in order to save time. Framework contracts should be concluded for all key areas.

C. Logistics / Security / CIS

30. Short term missions could perhaps be advised to consider all feasible options such as **co-location** with the Commission Delegation as part of overall EU engagement and visibility rather than looking for a permanent Head Quarters. If sufficient planning time is available, a balance should be sought in the number of staff to deploy before **appropriate premises** are available;
31. **Tending procedures**, for example for **vehicles**, should ensure that the company winning the tender will effectively be able to ensure possibilities for local maintenance.
32. For certain equipment, such as satellite phones, a **warehouse solution** should be considered (a recurrent recommendation).
33. **Secure links** should be established as fast as possible upon deployment.
34. A framework contract for **medical services** for all ESDP missions should be taken forward as a matter of priority to ensure **duty of care**.

35. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

36. When planning a mission, priority should also be given to negotiating a **Status of Mission Agreement** with the help of local EU presence and with a view to having it agreed by the time of deploying the mission.

5. SUMMARY: KEY LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The planning for EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is widely seen as very well done. The mandate was carefully drafted. The planning documents were solid and included the necessary background information and sound analysis, thus providing **useful guidance** to the mission. The Commission was closely involved throughout the planning process. The lessons identified and the suggested recommendations in this report should be seen in this positive light. Also, the **political context**, **institutional realities** as well as the key contribution of certain **personalities** involved, should be taken into account when considering lessons from the planning process and their applicability for future planning.

There are **three key areas of lessons identified** from the planning phase for the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission:

(1) **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

(2) **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

(3) **Technical aspects:** The **planned size of core mission staff** left no room for eventualities and proved challenging. SSR experts had to step in to help set up the mission, thus averting time and resources from starting to implement the core mandate. The deadlines set for deployment also meant that staff was not prepared as well as they could have been prior to deployment. Moreover, and as known from previous mission set-ups, **setting up the Head Quarters took time**. All in all, this (together with the limited mandate of the mission) contributed to a lack of visibility of the work during the first 8 months - with a mandate of up to a year. In view of these foreseeable administrative challenges, and given the political situation (postponement of elections, delay in setting up national SSR structures), perhaps more time could have been taken to prepare for deployment despite the pressure felt by the EU to “deliver” and not to lose momentum.

The **main recommendations** following from these lessons are the following:

(1) Thorough **country expertise, interpretation services** and preparation on the ground is essential to properly **assess the commitment and capacity of a host country** when considering and planning to deploy an ESDP mission. Attempts should be made to **define and agree with the Host country measures of progress** as a basis for the ESDP assistance provided, implying a certain conditionality. The higher the local commitment, the easier it should be to agree on such measures. EU means of leverage include close coordination with Community support to SSR as well as links to other potential donor financial support. A **political-strategic perspective** is

needed to ensure that the appropriate contacts take place at high level to keep reform on track over time. In line with EU policy, human rights and gender aspects of ESDP should be concretely taken into account throughout the planning process.

(2) **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

(3) **Small ESDP missions in particular require a minimum size of core staff** to effectively operate. Short-term mandates have consequences for available time and budget to establish mission Head Quarters which should not go at the expense of time and expertise needed to focus on core activities. Even if **early familiarisation and preparation of procurement files can help to speed up proceedings, normal procurement procedures are not adapted to ESDP missions in particular those of relative short duration and/or** in countries with a limited supply of providers and services. In order to make further time gains for short-term ESDP missions, the applicability of **emergency procedures** (e.g. ECHO) should be considered.

In order to ensure **follow-up**, lessons and recommendations contained in this report, once noted by PSC, will be integrated in ongoing processes and tools and their resulting actions, monitored by i.a. the “traffic lights paper”, the annual report on lessons identified and other tools foreseen in the guidelines on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions (doc. 15987/08).

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6. ANNEXES

6.1. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

6.2. References

6.2.1. Council documents:

The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia: Lessons and Recommendations on Rapid Deployment, doc. 8141/09, 27 March 2009;

Paper on vehicles/warehouse options, doc. SN 1957/2/09 REV 2, 26 March 2009;

European Union Security Sector Reform in Guinea - Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA - BISSAU), Six-Monthly Report, June 2008 to February 2009, doc. 6108/09, 5 February 2009;

Revised Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the ESDP Mission in support of Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), doc. 10135/1/08, 18 March 2009;

Traffic lights paper, 26 March 2009;

Draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the ESDP Mission in support of Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), doc. 5982/08, 1 February 2008;

Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions, doc. 15987/08, 19 November 2008;

Draft General Concept for potential ESDP action in support of Guinea - Bissau Security Sector Reform, doc. 16095/07, 5 December 2007;

Potential ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guinea - Bissau, doc. 12029/07, 12 July 2007.

Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defence Policy - Compilation of relevant documents (doc. 113590/07 of 10 July 2007 - public version June 2008).

Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP (doc. 15782/3/08 REV 3 of 3 December 2008).

EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) (doc. 12566/4/05 REV 4 of 13 October 2005).

6.2.2. COREU:

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Guinée-Bissau: Rapport conjoint de la Commission Européenne et du Secrétariat General du Conseil de la mission UE du 7 au 11 mai 2007 - Résumé et conclusions, CFSP/SEC/1172/07, 4 June 2007.

6.2.3. Official Journal:

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6.2.4. Commission documents:

Group of friends of SSR in Guinea-Bissau, Informal technical meeting on 28 January 2008, Brussels jointly organized by DG Development and DG RELEX, European Commission, 28 February 2008;

Décision de la Commission sur le programme d'action annuel 2008 en faveur de la Guinée - Bissau, a financer sur les ressources du 10e. Fonds européen de développement, 2008; République de Guinée - Bissau - Communauté européenne, Document de strategie pays et programme indicatif national pour la periode 2008-2013, 9 Decembre 2007.

6.2.5. UN documets:

UN Security Council, Resolution 1580 (2004), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5107th meeting, on 22 December 2004, S/RES/1580 (2004).

6.2.6. Other documents:

UK support to Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, Options for short and medium - term programming, ISSAT Assessment Mission Report, 20-26 September 2008; Guinea - Bissau: in Need of a State, Africa Report No. 142, International Crisis Group, 2 July 2008.