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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

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## **COVER NOTE**

from:	European External Action Service
to:	Political and Security Committee
Subject:	Assessment of potential CSDP engagement in Libya

Delegations will find attached the EEAS document with reference EEAS 00379/12.

Encl.: EEAS 00379/12

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## EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



**Crisis Management and Planning  
Directorate (CMPD)**

**Brussels, 19 March 2012**

**EEAS 00379/12**

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## Assessment of potential CSDP engagement in Libya

### Executive Summary

1. Precise identification of options for possible CSDP activities is complex for a number of reasons:

- The Libyan authorities have a limited mandate and their focus is on immediate security needs, especially border security and the reintegration of the revolutionary brigades. Consideration in Tripoli is only starting to focus on the need for a security and defence strategy which could be the basis for a security sector reform and addressing security issues in a more sustainable and strategic way.
- The situation on the ground is still uncertain as the Libyan authorities attempt to work out what their specific requirements are. However, coordination between ministries (MFA, Defence and Interior) is rudimentary and, at times, counter productive.
- There are a number of bi-lateral and international support programs already in place or planned but delivery requires better coordination.
- The arrangements agreed under the Paris Agreement of September 2011 have undergone significant revision with the envisaged assessments for DDR and SSR being replaced by ad hoc working groups in Libya which have yet to prove themselves.

2. However it is possible to identify areas where support will be needed:

- There is a need for international expertise and capacity to assist in coordinating the overall process.
- DDR/SSR: There is an urgent need for advice and expertise to support development in these areas.
- Another Libyan concern and need relates to conventional weapons management such as MANPADS and other weapons.
- Border Management is finally an area where Libyan authorities have demonstrated a real interest.

3. Parameters for a possible EU engagement:

- Any EU engagement should be based on the principle of Libyan ownership fully taking into account the role of international partners including the UN.
- It should also be coherent and in coordination with other initiatives and should not duplicate other activities. Synergies should be sought between different EU instruments and with partners. CSDP intervention is only one dimension of EU engagement in and with Libya;

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- IfS and ENPI intervention may be much more effective, including in some security related areas of work (e.g. capacity building). EU engagement in supporting security in Libya could build on already existing EU efforts in supporting the security sector in Libya.
- EU engagement should be gradual, starting modestly and targeted at offering advice, expertise and support for immediate needs but also with an eye to the development of a wider security strategy, and, as Libyan needs and requirements further specify, building up with further expertise and support. This rather rapid EU engagement could develop into a second, longer term, intervention once the situation is clearer in Libya post elections.

### Background

In December 2011 the Foreign Affairs Council reaffirmed the EU's readiness to provide further assistance to Libya and called for options for possible CSDP action to be elaborated in early 2012.

### *A complex environment*

An assessment of potential CSDP engagement has proved challenging owing to the complex situation the Libyan Interim Authority (IA) is facing. Firstly, the IA has not had the ability to develop itself as a fully effective executive body. Moreover, in the absence of a political mandate beyond the planned 21 June 2012 constitutional elections, the IA has reassessed the original agreements made for the Libyan Coordinated Needs Assessments (LCNA) and concentrated on activities that will not last beyond its term of office, making planning difficult for medium and longer term programmes such as CSDP activity.

Secondly, since the beginning of 2012, the IA has either delayed, postponed or reshaped a number of meetings/security workshops in which the EU could have had the opportunity to progress dialogue on assessed Libyan security needs.

Thirdly, the LCNA process has had mixed progress; in some sectors such as those under EU responsibility (Border Management, Civil Society and Media Messaging) assessments are underway, whereas the UN-lead assessments in the domains of DDR and SSR have come un-stuck and it is unclear in which systematic way assessments in these fields will be conducted. However, coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior is currently weak and leading to confusion regarding the division of Libyan responsibilities for supporting the border management needs assessment.

Consequently, the Libyan authorities have yet to define fully and articulate their security needs to the International Community and to the EU; it is not apparent at what stage they will be able to do so.

## *EU activities*

Despite these difficulties the EU has been active and able to bear influence where the Libyans have supported such engagement. As an immediate response to the situation, the EU have already provided a €80M support package for humanitarian needs in Libya together with an agreed €30M package for short term capacity building for the Libyan Government and civil society. Projects are also underway to support Libyan authorities to manage the difficult issue of migration flows. In addition the EU is assisting the IA through its Delegation in Tripoli in developing its planning and strategy in a number of key sectors for the transition process. The EU has launched LCNA missions on Integrated Border Management (IBM), Media Messaging and Civil Society. Additionally, the EEAS has, since September 2011, maintained the constant provision of a small team of experts to provide technical advice to the EU delegation in Tripoli and to inform further potential CSDP options planning. Where possible, the EEAS has interacted with the IA through a number of high-level visits, workshops and working level meetings supported by the EU delegation in Tripoli in order to further understand Libyan security needs.

The EEAS has maintained close contact with key international actors (including the UN, NATO, EU MS and third states - in particular the US) to gain a better understanding of overall donor activity. This has proved challenging since an effective coordination mechanism to manage international donor activity has yet to be developed by the Libyan authorities (or any other agency).

## *Assessment of security needs*

Despite this confusing picture, a broad idea of possible Libyan security needs has emerged from which a range of possible EU support options can be deduced. These initial options have yet to be discussed with the IA and are therefore a potential menu from which Member States could decide where they wish to support the Libyan authorities. Once a decision is made, there will be a pressing need to engage with the Libyans to trigger a formal planning process.

Due consideration must be given to the uncertainty of the outcome of the constitutional elections planned for the latter half of June 2012 (which precede the main elections in Spring 2013), and whether these will result in a stable and representative government that has the capacity to be able

to provide a strategic vision of long-term needs. Effective security is still in the hands of the four main revolutionary brigades, rather than the IA. Although the IA has already embarked on the process of reintegrating individual members of the revolutionary brigades into either the security services or civil society, the delivery of an effective agreement to disarm these brigades will be a vital milestone towards Libya's evolution. Finally, the timing of the Islamic festivals of Ramadan and Eid could limit EU and other international donor effectiveness during the period 20 July - 19 August 2012.

## Findings

### *Areas of possible support*

The CSDP scoping mission and various other interventions have all confirmed the following main areas where support is required and the EU could add value in cooperation with other international actors. These are collectively:

Coordination: The IA has recognised its inherited weakness across legacy government structures and is about to develop a coordination cell, under the authority of the deputy Prime Minister. This needs urgent mentoring support and advice to establish the cell effectively.

Border Security: The IA has repeatedly stated that border security, particularly in its extensive and porous Southern border region, is a top priority. Given the precarious state of security and migration problems in the northern Sahel, this issue has clear political implications for both Libya and ultimately the EU. Moreover, there is a potential need to tie in the work of the EU's IBM mission which is envisaged to be in operation from 1 March - 31 May 2012 and may be best placed to respond to immediate tasking.

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): The Libyan authorities have already commenced a DDR plan, starting with actions to reintegrate the revolutionary brigades before embarking on longer term disarmament. This is a reversal of a classic DDR process but appears to be a pragmatic option as it avoids initial tensions on the sensitive issue of disarming the revolutionary brigades. The IA has stated that it wishes to place a particular emphasis on the reintegration of youth. It is still not clear exactly how the IA will

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deliver such reintegration or disarmament, how the UN will support this, and how effective existing actions have been in delivering such a complex undertaking.

Security Sector Reform (SSR): A strategic plan for the overhaul of the existing security apparatus is required. This could be developed to ensure a reduction in overall size of security forces which in turn would be firmly under the recognized political control of the authorities post election.

Conventional Weapons/Ammunition Security and Management /(CWAM)<sup>1</sup>: Some EU MS, the UN and the US have already responded in depth to address immediate needs in terms of CWAM. This activity has initially focused on addressing the potential threat from insufficiently secured MANPADS and urgent demining operations (both on land and in harbours). Immediate needs are emerging for the establishment of a local capacity to survey and secure the many permanent and *ad hoc* ammunition storage sites and deal with unexploded ordnance/explosive ordnance disposal. These are areas where Libyan expertise is lacking and could be reinforced by the presence of specialist advisors e.g. Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs). Finally, medium and longer term needs also focus on weapon and ammunition stockpile surveying, security and management, and creating an effective mechanism to oversee these efforts.

More broadly, in terms of capacity building the EU could look to harness the experience gained from within some of its own member states in terms of transition management (capacity building, reconciliation, civilian control over the security apparatus).

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<sup>1</sup> Conventional Weapons/Ammunition Security and Management - defined in this paper as activities that include the survey and safeguard of weapon stockpiles (such as MANPADS, heavy and small arms) and ammunition, in addition to de-mining activities and the rendering safe of unexploded ordnance.



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## International Community Action

The International Community is not being effectively coordinated and action is being delivered through a number of bilateral activities. This highlights the vital need for an overarching National Security Strategy which underpins future security engagement since most bilateral activity is currently short term in its focus and not addressing fundamental problems.

In terms of EU MS state activity, contributions largely comprise support to legacy or planned border management projects, demining operations and other CWAM related actions. Additionally a broad catalogue of training programmes for both the armed forces and the police are being offered (e.g. defence and police academy training).

A feature of these training programmes is that they are all similar and are even being replicated by some Third States (notably Turkey, Jordan and Qatar - all of whom have also provided a substantial degree of logistic and material support to Libyan security forces).

The UN has responded to the IA's realignment of the LCNA process and is creating a number of ad hoc working groups to oversee overall coordination and planning of DDR and SSR. Nonetheless the requirement for a detailed assessment of the needs in both these sectors still remains and the follow on process remains unclear.

The US has initially pitched its support in terms of addressing the MANPADS issue but has since broadened this to a wider CWAM remit in which it envisages an increased role for the nascent Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC) as the power house to deliver policy and oversee conduct of all CWAM related-issues.

## Parameters for EU support

In this framework, a logical approach for possible EU support would be to engage with the IA for short term actions only and leave discussion/requests for longer term support to the authorities after the June elections.

- Any EU action must be coordinated with other international community activity.
- EU action could be delivered under a broad combination of instruments i.e. CSDP, a possible Council Decision project under the CFSP budget, ENPI and Instrument for

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Stability. This will require a comprehensive and coordinated approach.

- A phased approach could be considered by which the EU would offer some further expertise/advice capacity through Member States experts deployed to the country. This low profile engagement could be put in place rapidly. It would not necessitate a fully-fledged CSDP mission, (although a small one cannot be excluded if appropriate) but could develop into a CSDP action over time. It would open doors, build further confidence with the Libyan Authorities and pave the way for a more structured engagement, whose precise parameters will have to be developed on the basis of further findings, and subsequent discussions with Libyan authorities, and political guidance by MS.
- Consideration must be given to address Libyan sensitivities on the profile and posture of foreign support and in particular the presence of uniformed foreign military or police operating in Libya. The IA has already allowed the discrete presence of very small numbers of foreign uniformed personnel operating in Libya (e.g. specialist demining teams, training instructors) but will not tolerate any deviation from this.

### Objective of a Possible CSDP Engagement

EU's interest : Mobility issues are dealt with in a cooperative and efficient way - Libya is not a source of instability in Northern Sahel.

EU political objective: Libya is reliable partner on Mobility issues, Libya is in a position to positively contribute to regional stability, in particular in Northern Sahel.

Objective of a possible CSDP engagement: To contribute to the setting up of security architecture which is able to provide and maintain a stable security environment in Libya, cooperate with the EU on transnational issues, and cooperate with neighbouring countries in order to improve regional security.

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## Possible Options

### In the short term

The EU could look to provide a modest support package before the June elections targeted to offer advice, expertise and support on pressing needs and then seek opportunities when the time is right to expand into more robust activity. The initial support package could include:

DDR: Assisting the Libyan authorities in DDR planning/structures and delivery. Initial emphasis would be placed on reintegration/mapping of Tuwars and inter-ministerial coordination.

SSR - Defence: Provision of expertise to plan the strategic restructuring of the armed forces through development of National Security Strategy at the Ministry of Defence in areas such as defence structure, human resources and budgeting.

SSR - Rule of Law: Advising on developing a Rule of Law strategy. This would require close coordination with the UN and focus initially on creating a new police force through a combination of identified specialist training and strategic mentoring of future decision-makers.

Border Security: The IBM needs assessment mission is currently configured to develop a longer term vision of integrated border management for the Libyans but its work in the shorter term could allow the EU to respond to immediate needs. These could include building operational capacity through training, provision of advice on command and control aspects, access to satellite imagery or other surveillance capabilities, and delivery of security training/mentoring possibly focusing upon key border installations including Libya's extensive coastline.

Conventional Weapons/Ammunition Security and Management: Immediate assistance to the Libyan Authorities could be achieved through deploying EU military personnel to provide a limited but specialist presence in the LMAC in order to advise on the management of the centre and to ensure coordination amongst international actors at the operational/tactical level. This could be also complemented with the deployment of ATOs to help advise/support the activities of the UNMAS. Potential Council Decision projects with CFSP funding (to be recommended in the CODUN working group and to be

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implemented by a third actor such as UNMAS or a suitable NGO) could add value to this activity and possibly be delivered in advance.

The above activities could be delivered by the provision of suitably qualified experts provided from EU MS (who must be ready to deploy for a period of several months to gain access/credibility) assigned to the MoI, MoJ, MFA, MoD and the Coordination Cell. This package of support could be provided either through FPI or CFSP funding or a combination of both. It could develop in the mid term into a small CSDP engagement.

### In the long term

A clearer picture of Libyan needs may emerge after the 21 June elections and allow the EU to propose to the Libyans a more structured programme as a fully-fledged CSDP operation which builds on possible actions already delivered. It will be important that a possible CSDP activity is part of a more global EU approach and, wherever possible, complementarity with other related EU instrument activity should be sought and coordinated. This could include:

DDR: Support in refining a DDR plan and practical activity such as registration of arms, identification of ex-combatants (database), reintegration training into the national army, police, border and critical infrastructure security forces. This would have to be accompanied by other EU instrument activity focusing on, for example, alternative livelihoods, reintegration, civil society and media, transitional justice and the investigation of alleged crimes.

SSR - Defence: Implementing a national security strategy and delivering military training (e.g. on strategic/operational planning, leadership and command, doctrine and concept development) culminating in a train the trainer programme.

SSR - Rule of Law: Further development of and training delivery to the concept of a National Security Strategy.

Border Security: Dependent on findings of the IBM assessment but could include support in organising/training integrated border management services.

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Conventional Weapons/Ammunitions Management: The development of local capacity to deal with CWAM issues through training and assistance in developing appropriate support structures.

CSDP activity could most likely be delivered as a Civilian Mission with military elements added as required to support any defence or CWAM activities. CSDP activity in Libya could also be reinforced through appropriate training offered by MS in Europe.

## Summary

- Limited mandate for current Libyan interim authority means that a longer term vision of requirements in the security sector is still unclear.
- Not sure that CSDP activity before elections is possible, appropriate or can be effective.
- Rather it is recommended that we start slowly to build up a capability to assist the Libyans in developing their strategy for the security sector, most likely within the line ministries responsible but certainly in the Deputy Prime Minister's coordinating office. This might be best achieved in the short term with call for contributions from MS or through another EU instrument.. Either way we should use this platform to develop options, notably through CSDP, as the picture becomes clearer after elections.

## Next Steps

- The EU should identify those areas where it wishes to engage in the short term.
- Propose the deployment of appropriate subject matter experts (SME) to the Libyan Authorities (and clarify under which funding mechanism and resource SMEs will be provided).
- Once agreed by the IA, deploy the SMEs to Tripoli.
- Guidance to be given on prudent planning for a fully-fledged CSDP option.