



Council of the
European Union

Brussels, 5 October 2015
(OR. en)

16072/2/12
REV 2 EXT 1

CSDP/PSDC 691
COSDP 969
PESC 1375
COAFR 356

PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION

of document: 16072/2/12 REV 2

dated: 5 December 2012

new status: Public

Subject: Revised draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP
military mission in Mali

Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



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COVER NOTE

from: European External Action Service
to: Political and Security Committee
Subject: Revised draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP military mission in Mali

Delegations will find attached the EEAS document with reference EEAS 01968/2/12 REV 2, ARES (2012) 1329207.

Encl: EEAS 01968/2/12 REV 2
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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



**Crisis Management and Planning
Directorate - CMPD**

Brussels, 5 December 2012

EEAS 01968/2/12

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From: Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)

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Delegations will find attached the revised draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP military mission in Mali.

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References

- A. European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, dated March 2011
- B. UNSC Resolution 2056, dated 5 July 2012
- C. Council Conclusions on Mali, dated 23 July 2012
- D. Note Verbal from ECOWAS addressed to EEAS, ECOWAS request for Assistance for the deployment in Mali, dated 5 September 2012
- E. Letters from Mali PR & PM to the EU (Ref XRW/000.844/04/11) dated, 18 September 2012
- F. Note to the PSC, Comprehensive approach to Mali: Options paper, dated 2 October 2012
- G. UNSC Resolution 2071, dated 12 October 2012
- H. Council Conclusions on Mali, dated 15 October 2012
- I. Lettre du Président du Conseil européen et du Président de la Commission européenne au Président de la République du Mali en date du 17 octobre 2012
- J. Mali National Assembly Resolution 12-06 / AN-RM on the institutional and security crisis in Mali, dated 18 October 2012
- K. Meeting of the support and follow-up group on the situation in Mali, dated 19 October 2012
- L. AU Strategic Concept for the resolution of the crises in Mali, dated 24 October 2012
- M. Joint Strategic Concept of Operations for the International Military Force and Malian Defence and Security Forces, dated 5 November 2012

I. Background

1. The Foreign Affairs Council of 23 July 2012 recognised that, while the EU should continue to work within the framework of its *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* (Ref. A), the dramatic changes in Mali required a review of the actions the EU should undertake in order to support the restoration of democratic government and the rule of law throughout the territory of Mali. It requested the HR and the Commission to make concrete proposals for EU action in a number of areas to respond to the changing situation.

2. Through letters of 18 September 2012, the President of the Malian Republic and the Prime Minister of Mali requested the assistance of the EU (Ref. E). A response to this request was provided on 17 October (Ref. I) proposing the deployment of a CSDP mission.
3. As a follow on, On 2 October 2012, the EEAS, presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) a note on the EU "Comprehensive Approach to Mali - Options Paper" (Ref F). This note reviewed the recent evolution of the political and security situation in Mali, actions undertaken to date, and proposed a number of options for further action.
4. On 13 October, UNSC Resolution 2071 (Ref. G) invited international partners including namely the EU to provide training and mentoring support to the Malian army and security forces.
5. On 15 October, Foreign Affairs Council (Ref. H) requested that work on planning a possible CSDP military operation be pursued and extended as a matter of urgency, in particular by developing a crisis management concept relating to the reorganisation and training of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), in close collaboration with the organisations, States and actors concerned.

II. Situation

General

Political situation

6. The political situation in Bamako has in some ways improved even though risks for the stability of the State remain. UNSCR 2056 of 5 July 2012 (Ref. B) combined with ECOWAS and international pressure, led to the return of interim President Traoré to Mali in August and the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) led by Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra. However progress towards a return to constitutional order is slow: the PM, with the support of some military factions, seems content with the status quo, while the President lacks the political muscle and will to move things forward. The result is the risk of a political stalemate, possibly precipitating a new political crisis. The EU uses every opportunity to urge the Government of National Unity (GNU) to adopt and implement a credible Roadmap including (i) an agenda leading to free and fair elections (ii) the reconstruction of the army

under civilian control and a security sector reform with short and longer term objectives
(iii) the establishment of a framework for South / North dialogue and negotiations with legitimate interlocutors from Northern Mali.

Economic situation

7. The institutional crisis has hit Mali's economy severely. According to recent exchanges between the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (mid-September), the growth rate in 2012 was revised to -3.1%, against an initial forecast of 5.6%, and 4.4% in 2013. The government estimates that the economic recession is mainly due to the suspension of Official Development Assistance (ODA) associated with a drastic reduction in public investment (-60% compared to 2011). In addition, the worsening of the business environment and the increase in country risk due to political instability have weakened the level of private investment. Business sectors such as food, construction, tourism (in particular in the northern regions), trade and services are particularly affected by the current situation. A revised 2012 budget law is currently being examined by the National Assembly. The government proposes to cut public spending to 988 billion FCFA from 1483 billion FCFA presented in the initial budget law. This revision is based on the assumption that budget revenue decreases by roughly 400 billion FCFA due mainly to the suspension of virtually all Official Development Assistance (ODA), and that in the absence of general budget support, the existing deficit of 47 billion FCFA can be financed through treasury bonds. Fiscal revenue, however, is expected to decline by only 7% according to the revised budget, in line with end of June numbers stating that 46% of mid-year fiscal revenue as presented in the initial budget law had been collected. If the situation does not deteriorate, 2nd half of 2012 fiscal revenues should ensure the payment of priority expenses, such as salaries.

Humanitarian Situation

8. The needs of affected population by the conflict, including some 200,000 displaced people within Mali and of approximately 200,000 refugees in neighbouring countries (Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger) are a priority for the humanitarian community. Displacements from Mali also put additional pressure on areas already severely affected by the food and nutrition crisis. Host families are increasingly vulnerable and are struggling to cope with the task of hosting IDPs. The situation of refugees in neighbouring countries remains critical and coverage of basic services needs to be improved, especially in terms of access to water and sanitation and

protection.

9. The resilience of the population of Mali has been severely undermined by displacement and the impact of the serious food crisis. An estimated 4.6 million people are at risk of food insecurity. As food prices continue to rise, the most vulnerable households affected by drought in Mali still have difficult months ahead of them.
10. Access to Northern Mali is difficult but possible. The humanitarian community continues to work on the ground to deliver assistance. But, despite the establishment of clusters and the reinforcement of the humanitarian country team in Mali, further efforts to strengthen coordination remain a key priority.
11. The Commission gives great importance to ensuring adhesion to basic humanitarian principles and in protecting the humanitarian space when negotiating access for humanitarian aid to the population in need. A Code of conduct for humanitarian agencies has been agreed between agencies working in Mali. It is important that all humanitarian interventions in the north worked in conformity with this code.

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Engagement of the international community

ECOWAS

20. UNSC Resolution 2071 dated 13 October 2012 (Ref. G) requested ECOWAS and the African Union, in close consultation with Mali, the neighbouring countries of Mali, countries of the region and all other interested bilateral partners and international organizations, to conduct a joint planning efforts to respond to the request of the Transitional authorities of Mali for an international military force.
21. The 19 October Ministerial meeting of the Follow Up and Support Group on the situation in Mali (Ref. K) co-chaired by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN urged the Malian Government of National Unity to present and implement a roadmap with concrete steps for the transition process including (i) an agenda leading to peaceful, inclusive and credible elections by the end of transition, (ii) the immediate reestablishment of a chain of command within the army and a genuine security sector reform under civilian control, (iii) a peace prospect for northern Mali including dialogue with all stakeholders except for extremists and terrorists.
22. It further "*encouraged ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and the EU, in cooperation with Mali and other stakeholders, to expedite the finalization of the joint planning to respond to the request of the transitional authorities of Mali for an African-led international military force to assist the Malian armed forces to recover the occupied regions in the north of Mali*". The EU participated therefore in the Joint Planning Conference in Bamako (30 Oct – 4 Nov) which resulted in a Joint Strategic Concept of Operations (Ref. M). Additionally planning support will be provided in Abuja by the EU Liaison Officer to ECOWAS once deployed.

The AU

23. The African Union suspended Mali's membership days after the coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. Acknowledging the significant progress made by the authorities and other political actors in Mali in resolving the institutional crisis provoked by the coup d'état, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) lifted the suspension of Mali's participation in the activities of the AU on 24 October. The AU PSC also endorsed a Strategic Concept (Ref. L) agreed upon by the 19 October Ministerial meeting of the Follow Up and Support Group. This Strategic Concept is intended to enhance the coherence of international actions to resolve the crisis in the short and longer term and mobilize international engagement to support durable stability in Mali.

24. Following the UN resolution 2071 (2012) adopted by the UN Security Council on 12 October 2012 and the conclusions of the meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group held on 19 October (Ref. K), ECOWAS, the AU, the UN and the EU, in close coordination with Mali and other stakeholders, have pursued joint planning efforts and elaborated a Joint Strategic Concept of Operations, which should pave the way to discussions on a UNSC Resolution mandating the International Military Force (IMF) in Mali.

The UN

25. The UN has adopted a first resolution framing the political situation in Mali on 5 July (UNSCR 2056). The high level event chaired by UNSG Ban Ki-Moon in New York on 26 September has created an opportunity to establish more effective international cooperation. It has paved the way to a second resolution highlighting the security challenges (2071 of 15 October) and to the appointment of a UN Special Envoy on 1 October in the person of Mr. Romano Prodi. Under his authority, the UN should finalize and implement an integrated UN Strategy for the Sahel region. A third resolution should be adopted after the report of the UNSG expected for the 26th of November, which will notably take into account the input by the AU of its Strategic Concept and the Joint Strategic Concept of Operations produced by the Bamako Planners Conference.

26. In addition, UN DPKO has sent a planning team to Abuja and Bamako to reinforce ECOWAS planning capability and UN DPA indicated that efforts were currently being made to establish the office of Special Envoy Prodi and organize his next visit in the region. Special Envoy Prodi

and SRSJ Djinnit are expected to work in tandem.

Existing EU engagement

27. The EU is committed to contribute actively to (i) a peaceful and credible transition process in Mali and to (ii) long lasting solutions to the security crisis in northern Mali and in the Sahel region across the board.

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Humanitarian assistance

30. The EU, through the European Commission and Member States, has been providing needs-based humanitarian assistance from the early phases of the crises and will continue to address the needs of the victims of the crisis irrespectively of other political or CSDP action.. Over 19 M€has already been allocated in 2012 by the European Commission (DG ECHO) in response to the crisis, both to help those affected in Mali and those who have fled as refugees to

neighbouring countries. An estimated 400,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of 2012. EU humanitarian funds mobilised so far have been instrumental in ensuring access for those in need to basic health and nutrition services, clean water, shelter and food. Humanitarian agencies supported by the EU are also active in advocating for respect for humanitarian principles, for the protection of civilians and for unhindered access to the population in need. As the situation evolves the need for further humanitarian aid is under continuous assessment. The Commission has sent humanitarian aid experts on the ground and remains in close coordination with all the aid agencies trying to deliver aid in difficult circumstances and at considerable risk.

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Participation of Non-EU countries

106. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and to the single institutional framework, and in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the European Council, third States may be invited to participate in the mission. The legal framework for their participation would be established by the relevant participation agreements to be concluded between the EU and the concerned third State.

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Legal Framework

109. On the basis of letter of invitation received from the Republic of Mali (Ref. E), the Council will adopt, pursuant to Articles 42(2) and 43(1) TEU a decision establishing the military mission and, once it is assessed that the mission can start implementing its mandate, a Decision launching the Mission.

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Financing

112. The common costs of the military mission will be funded under the ATHENA mechanism. At the current stage of planning, with a number of uncertainties, the financial estimate is indicative and reflects the assumptions set out in the CMC.

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115. A reference amount will be proposed by ATHENA in the framework of the preparation of a possible Council Decision.

Information Strategy

116. A coherent EU Information Strategy, including public master messages, will aim at informing local, regional and international audiences of the EU's objectives and actions, and to support the political and military objectives of this CSDP action.

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