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NOTE

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To:	Delegations
Subject:	Meeting of the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of Public Prosecutions of the Member States of the European Union and Workshop on Data Retention in the Fight Against Serious Crime: The Way Forward
	Eurojust, The Hague, 10-11 December 2015
	Conclusions

Delegations will find in the Annex the Conclusions of the meeting of the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of Public Prosecutions of the EU Member States held at Eurojust on 10-11 December 2015.

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10TH MEETING OF THE CONSULTATIVE FORUM

OF PROSECUTORS GENERAL AND DIRECTORS OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

AND

WORKSHOP ON

DATA RETENTION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SERIOUS CRIME: THE WAY FORWARD

THE HAGUE, 10-11 DECEMBER 2015

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The 10th meeting of the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of Public Prosecutions of the Member States of the European Union (Consultative Forum *or* Forum) was convened and chaired by the Prosecutor General of Luxembourg, *Martine Solovieff*, and organised with the support of Eurojust in The Hague, on 11 December 2015. It was preceded on 10 December 2015 by the Workshop on *Data Retention in the Fight Against Serious Crime: The Way Forward*, organised jointly by Eurojust and the Luxembourg Presidency.

The Forum discussed and reached conclusions on the following three main topics:

- 1. Data retention
- 2. Terrorism
- 3. Illegal immigrant smuggling

The Workshop on data retention shared views among prosecuting authorities on the practical and legal consequences of the annulment of the 2006 Data Retention Directive (DRD) by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its decision in *Digital Rights Ireland Ltd*

(*C-293/12*). Eurojust presented its recent work on Member States' legal frameworks and current challenges on data retention. Members of the Consultative Forum, other experts from the Member States, members of the College of Eurojust and representatives of the EU institutions, actively participated in the four working groups set up to facilitate discussion. The outcomes of the working groups were presented to the Consultative Forum and are available in Annex 1.

1. <u>The CJEU's Annulment of the Data Retention Directive: Practical Implications for Investigations and Prosecutions</u>

- 1. Data retention is a fundamental investigative tool. The prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of serious offences in several Member States have been affected by the annulment of the DRD. Most Forum Members that consider otherwise, base their position on the fact that national laws have not been challenged or remain operative.
- 2. Where national data retention laws have been struck down, access by law enforcement agencies to retained data is limited or non-existent given that there is no longer an obligation for telecommunication service providers to retain data or because this obligation covers only certain categories of data.
- 3. Challenges to the admissibility of evidence have been lodged in some Member States.
- 4. Forum members note that judicial cooperation also faces significant challenges. Cooperation is affected both within and outside the EU, whereby some countries are in the position to share more data than EU countries. Likewise, different retention periods seriously affect the execution of MLA requests.
- 5. The fragmented legal framework may cause further difficulties in parallel investigations, resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction (as the choice of best forum to prosecute may be undermined), the efficiency of JITs as well as in respect of the obtainability and admissibility of evidence. Judicial cooperation has been affected particularly with Member States where data retention legislation has been invalidated.
- 6. Judicial cooperation could be enhanced by expanding the possibilities to access data stored abroad under the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the so-called 'Budapest Convention'), with negotiations to that effect being led by the EU rather than Member States.
- 7. The Consultative Forum looks forward to further guidance and assistance from the ruling of the CJEU in case C-203/15 (*Tele 2 Sverige*). This case (and a subsequent preliminary reference from the UK Courts in case C-698/15) seek to clarify the effect of the judgment in DRD case C-293/12 and will be pertinent to any future EU work on the issue.
- 8. Considering the different regimes across the EU and the subsequent significant difficulties encountered in judicial cooperation, the Consultative Forum calls for an EU solution on data retention. A European common framework to harmonise retention of, and access to, data is deemed necessary. The Consultative Forum therefore invites the European

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Commission to take action in this regard (possibly after an impact assessment) in line with the requirements established by the CJEU in *Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12)*. Notably, the Forum recommends:

- Establishment of an obligation of retention of data under EU law.
- Consideration should be given to the appropriate conditions that should apply in relation to access to retained data, *e.g.*: (i) be limited to serious forms of crime (for instance, the crimes listed in Article 83 TFEU and/or a threshold of minimum penalties attached to the crime could serve as guidance); (ii) comply with the tests of proportionality and strict necessity; and (iii) attempt to balance confidentiality duties binding certain professionals.
- Consideration should be given to the appropriate security and storage conditions to be applied to retained data.
- Common minimum and maximum data retention periods should be foreseen as well as the obligation to destroy data afterwards.
- Additional procedural safeguards may include (i) notification of the person concerned after a period of time, and (ii) right of the data subject to require the deletion of data under certain terms.
- 9. At national level, different rules could apply according to the type of data in question (traffic data vs location data). Regarding control over access to retained data, it is important to ensure expedited access thereto in urgent situations because of direct threats to public order and security; in such situations, consent *ex post* might be a solution.
- 10. The Consultative Forum invites Eurojust to continue its analysis of the impact of the annulment of the DRD on national systems and, through an evidence-based approach, collect practical examples together with our prosecution services. This will be of great support in the context of the process leading to a possible new EU instrument on data retention.
- 11. The assistance of Eurojust would also be welcome in analysing potential problems in judicial cooperation, highlighting good practices and guidelines in relation thereto, and continuing the analysis of national legislation on data retention.
- 12. Eurojust could engage further in close cooperation with Europol's EC3 and equivalent expert networks so as to transmit relevant information to the Member States. Good cooperative relationships with States where the registered offices of the largest private service providers are located, *e.g.* the United States, are also important, and the fact that there is a US Liaison Prosecutor at Eurojust can offer interesting perspectives for fruitful cooperation.
- 13. The recent terrorist attacks in France have alerted all to the challenging times the world is experiencing, whereby a high level of security for all citizens cannot be guaranteed without some level of intrusion of the right to privacy. This notwithstanding, it is crucial to strike the right balance between the right to privacy and the security of the overall community.

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2. <u>Terrorism: Towards a Common Judicial Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters</u>

- 1. The Consultative Forum condemns the Paris attacks of November 2015 and recognises the increased terrorist threat and global challenge posed by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.
- 2. Forum Members listened attentively to the lessons learned during the tragic recent attacks. These include the importance of the early involvement of the judiciary, the speedy exchange of information with other Member States, and the positive feedback on the use of JITs in such situations.
- 3. The Forum supports the ongoing extensive efforts of Eurojust to assist Member States that are reflected in the steady increase of cases referred to Eurojust for coordination and assistance.
- 4. The Forum welcomes the findings of the third Eurojust Foreign Fighter Report, and notes its main conclusions and recommendations, particularly the need to consider input from the judiciary in de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes and to making greater use of the ENCS and of the National Correspondents for Terrorism.
- 5. The Forum calls for a common European and multidisciplinary approach as well as the fostering of judicial cooperation with key third States, also with the support of Eurojust.
- 6. Furthermore, the Forum calls upon the EU to assist judicial practitioners in overcoming major challenges which persist, such as the gathering and admissibility of e-evidence, the transmission and judicial use of information from the intelligence services and the need to take a European approach to dismantle organised criminal groups behind the trafficking of weapons.

3. <u>Illegal Immigrant Smuggling: Challenges and Best Practices in Investigations and Prosecutions</u>

- 1. The Forum considers that cooperation among Member States and with key third States, particularly for the exchange of information and execution of MLA requests, is crucial in illegal immigrant smuggling cases. However, practitioners continue to experience difficulties in this field.
- 2. Forum members consider that the collection of evidence is complex, also given that many evidentiary measures require execution in the country of origin. This undermines the identification of criminals among migrants. The current terms of the Dublin II System create additional difficulties. Furthermore, there are challenges related to gathering the testimony of victims, as they are often coached or refuse to cooperate, and in checking the identity of migrants as they often travel with forged or no documents at all. Therefore, the Forum believes that better systems for identifying migrants and gathering their testimonies are necessary.
- 3. A further difficulty relates to the lack of reliable translators, considering the amount of documents that require official translation in proceedings and the less common

languages often encountered.

- 4. Considering the complexity of illegal immigrant smuggling cases, Forum members consider parallel financial investigations of pivotal importance, as well as the monitoring of social platforms. Some Forum members suggest that consideration should be given to supporting investigations by special investigative techniques (*e.g.* surveillance).
- 5. The Forum is well aware of the specific challenges posed by smuggling illegal immigrants by the sea (particularly the assertion of jurisdiction and the execution of operational actions on the high seas). Several Forum members suggest the Consultative Forum should act as a 'strong awakening voice of the European institutions' regarding illegal immigrant smuggling by sea, highlighting the difficulties faced by frontline Member States.
- 6. Forum members highly value the support and assistance provided by Eurojust. In this context, the following points were mentioned:
 - a. The creation of the Thematic Group, which the Forum believes will greatly assist prosecutors in identifying and analysing obstacles and best practice stemming from national cases and in analysing gaps in legislation, also with a view to making proposals to the Commission;
 - b. The organisation in early 2016 of the first tactical meeting on illegal immigrant smuggling;
 - c. The support provided to practitioners through Eurojust's operational tools, including coordination meetings, coordination centres and JITs.
- 7. Furthermore, the Forum suggests Eurojust continues promoting cooperation with key third States, also through the establishment of new contact points in countries of origin, ensuring close cooperation with judicial contact points in the hotspots, and making greater use of Articles 6 and 7 of the Eurojust Decision.
- 8. The Forum also welcomes all efforts of other EU agencies, including Europol, Frontex and FRA, to counter the migration crisis and encourages and praises the close cooperation between them.
- 9. Considering the inner cross-border nature of illegal immigrant smuggling, the Forum calls for a common EU approach to this phenomenon, which should at least include some degree of harmonisation of the crime and applicable sanctions. The ongoing work on the revision of the so-called 'Facilitators Package' under the auspices of the European Commission was praised, though the lengthy procedure emphasises the need for more expedited responses.
- 10. The Forum considers with interest the French suggestion to create an 'operational group' to enhance regional cooperation among some key transit and destination countries in the North of Europe (including France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom).
- 11. Finally, the Forum agrees to support, possibly via Eurojust, the European Commission in its call for the gathering of additional information on the implementation of relevant EU legislation.

OUTCOME OF WORKSHOP ON

DATA RETENTION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SERIOUS CRIME: THE WAY FORWARD

TOPIC 1

Current EU framework on data retention: legal and practical impact of the CJEU Judgment in case C-293/12 on national systems and judicial cooperation

In the context of topic 1, participants discussed data retention in relation to: (i) the impact of the CJEU *Digital Rights* judgment in the Member States; (ii) indiscriminate data retention; (iii) access to and use of data; (iv) the role of Eurojust; and (v) possible solutions.

The key conclusions were:

- (i) With regard to the impact of the CJEU *Digital Rights* judgment in the Member States:
- There is a high level of fragmentation in the Member States and the CJEU judgment has
 magnified the scattered picture of data retention rules across the EU. In some Member
 States, the judgment has had a major effect, for instance, by invalidating national law
 on data retention and creating a situation of legal uncertainty or even a legal gap. In
 other Member States, the CJEU judgment has had, thus far, no or little effect.
- In some Member States, new legislation on data retention is being prepared to ensure strengthened procedural safeguards in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the CJEU *Digital Rights* judgment.
- Fragmented rules on data retention across the EU can have an adverse impact on the
 effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions at national level as well as on
 judicial cooperation between the Member States. With regard to the latter, specific
 examples were provided to illustrate that although the European Judicial Area is
 based on mutual trust and direct communication between judicial authorities different retention periods and legal gaps can seriously affect the execution of MLA
 requests.

(ii) With regard to <u>indiscriminate data retention</u>:

- Retention of bulk electronic communication for criminal justice purposes must be
 distinguished from bulk surveillance of data for national security purposes. Judicial
 and law enforcement authorities carry out criminal investigations in the context of
 specific serious criminal offences and request metadata for investigation/prosecution
 purposes on a case-by-case basis. While such investigations may interfere with the
 rights of individuals, they are subject to procedural safeguards, such as judicial
 supervision. Moreover, the evidence can be challenged before the courts and other
 legal remedies are available.
- Generalised data retention schemes are important, if not essential, for the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. Data retention must be carried out in a generalised manner as it is impossible to know beforehand whose data will be relevant in the course of a specific criminal investigation and prosecution.
- Generalised data retention is not only a useful tool to link suspects to an offence, but also to delink suspects from an offence.
- There are no equally effective alternatives to data retention. Metadata that are generated by telecommunications (*e.g.* traffic data, location data and other customerrelated data) are often the only way to identify a suspect or their whereabouts. These data can also be crucial to decide in a specific case whether it is justified or not to use more intrusive surveillance tools such as telephone interception.

(iii) With regard to access to and use of data:

- Different models on access to data exist in the Member States, depending on, *inter alia*, the nature of the data that is requested (*e.g.* subscriber data, traffic data, location data), or the authority that is required to give the authorisation (*e.g.* an investigating judge, prosecutor, the police and, when provided, an impartial examining judge/court not dealing with the investigation).
- Legal requirements for access to subscriber data tend to be lower than for traffic or location data. In many Member States, the latter require an authorisation, whereas the former do not. In some Member States, however, authorisation by a judge or prosecutor is not required at all (authorisation by the police) or it is, on the contrary, required for all types of data. Moreover, the exact meaning of "judicial authorisation" differs from Member State to Member State.

- Judicial authorisation enables the judicial authority to assess the necessity and proportionality of the requested data. The seriousness of the offence is an important factor that needs to be taken into account during this assessment. Member States use different parameters to define serious crimes, *e.g.* some Member States define serious offences on the basis of the years of imprisonment that are set for a crime while others use a list of crimes. There are also Member States that use a combination of different criteria that specify that all the circumstances and interests (including the strength of the suspicion) of the case need to be assessed. These different approaches in the Member States can lead to different outcomes in the assessment.
- The role of service providers needs to be reconsidered. Service providers from the private sector should collaborate, at all times, with law enforcement and judicial authorities. They should refrain from 'assessing' data retention requests on the basis of their own internal policies that can change at any time.
- The processing of MLA requests in relation to data retention tends to be cumbersome and slow. The possibility to address data requests directly to service providers in third States could be explored further. Several participants provided specific examples of where this direct approach to service providers in third States was successful. It was, however, also specified that much depends on the third State involved and the type of offence. Particularly for terrorism, cooperation tends to be swift.
- Traffic data should be provided by service providers in the Member State where they are offering their services although the data may be stored on servers in other jurisdictions. In this regard, the judgment that the Belgian *Cour de Cassation* delivered in the *Yahoo case!* on 1 December 2015 offers interesting perspectives.
- The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001) can be a relevant legal basis, particularly the provisions on the production order (Article 18(1)(b)) and on transborder access to stored computer data (Article 32).

(iv) With regard to the role of Eurojust:

- Eurojust can continue to play an important role in assisting judicial authorities in cases where data retention issues rise.
- Eurojust can continue the work carried out thus far in gathering information on national legal frameworks on data retention.
- Eurojust could establish a compendium of existing national legislation and relevant case law to be regularly updated and published on Eurojust's website.
- Eurojust could collect best practice and share this knowledge among practitioners.

- (v) With regard to possible solutions:
- The current fragmented legal situation requires intervention at EU level, either via guidelines or via legislation, but always following an impact assessment based on specific difficulties. An evidence-based approach is needed to establish, *inter alia*, the types of data that are needed and the minimum data retention period that is required.
- The development of a standardised, simplified 'smart form' between EU judicial authorities to facilitate data gathering should be explored.
- A clear legal framework will bring legal certainty and be beneficial to all parties involved, *e.g.* suspects, judicial authorities, law enforcement authorities and service providers.
- Any intervention should be TECH NEUTRAL and address procedural guarantees and safeguards in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in line with the CJEU *Digital Rights* judgment.

TOPIC 2

Data retention: admissibility and reliability of evidence after CJEU case C-293/12: national and transnational dimensions

In the context of topic 2, participants discussed data retention in relation to: (i) investigations and prosecutions generally; (ii) evidence; and (iii) judicial cooperation.

The key conclusions were:

- (i) With regard to data retention relating to <u>investigations and prosecutions generally</u>:
- Data retention is an essential investigative tool. Accordingly, the potential unavailability
 of this mechanism is undermining investigations and prosecutions. Some Member
 States have not been affected domestically by the decision of the CJEU in *Digital Rights Ireland Ltd* because their laws remain operative; however, the effect on judicial
 cooperation is clear.
- It is not possible to know *a priori* the data that might be necessary in the course of investigations and prosecutions. While it is possible to differentiate technically and legally between categories of data, limiting retention to specific categories or particular persons reduces the effectiveness of investigations and may apply nebulous distinctions, leading to allegations of prejudice, profiling and unlawful discrimination. Moreover, as a matter of law, 'limited' data retention constitutes surveillance or preservation of data (not 'data retention' as such).

- Addressing one of the shortcomings of the DRD, as described by the CJEU in its ruling, could balance out one or more other shortcomings.
- Properly regulating access to data is likely to be part of the solution to overcome challenges related to the existing fragmented legal framework in the EU.
- The fundamental right to privacy can be adequately protected by the introduction of effective procedural safeguards regarding access to data. Such procedural safeguards should include *e.g.* (a) prior authorisation by an independent judicial authority; (b) limitations on the purpose of access and persons entitled to access; (c) management regulations; (d) linkage of access to the seriousness of the crime; (e) assessment of proportionality; (f) evaluation of alternative investigative techniques; (g) destruction of data following the retention period; and (h) exceptions for certain professionals bound by the duty of confidentiality. However, a special regime for certain professional categories may open the way to impunity gaps.
- Reliable security conditions relating to storage including location within the EU are critical.
- Having a common retention period is crucial: the general view is that it should be longer than six months, preferably a minimum of one year.

(ii) As far as evidence is concerned:

- Communications metadata (which would fall under a data retention scheme) in itself does not yield direct evidence of involvement in a crime. Its evidentiary value lies in the relation with other evidence. Most of the time, the information helps direct the investigation.
- Systems on admissibility of evidence vary significantly throughout the EU. For instance, in some Member States, illegally obtained evidence is, in principle, inadmissible while in others it might be admissible if the offence committed in its gathering is lesser than that under assessment in trial, or there was no intention to consciously violate the privacy right. Likewise, evidence obtained illegally by a third party will be admissible in some countries if law enforcement and judicial authorities were not involved.
- Accessing data retained by telecommunication service providers for billing and commercial purposes assists in balancing the challenges emerging from the abolishment of data retention schemes for the detection, prevention, investigation and prosecution of serious crime. However, the amount and quality of data retained by telecommunication service providers for commercial purposes may differ among them. Moreover, this avenue is not available in all Member States.
- Requiring telecommunication service providers to maintain a full audit trail will enhance both the reliability and admissibility of evidence.

- The conditions of retention will concern more the authenticity than the admissibility of evidence resulting from data retention schemes.
- The European Investigation Order (EIO) may reduce challenges to the admissibility and reliability of evidence gathered from data retention schemes because of the limited grounds for refusal foreseen.
- An eventual new EU legal instrument could contemplate minimum evidentiary and transparency standards, maintaining a margin of appreciation for the Member States. This could include (a) obligation of retention of data; (b) minimum and maximum data retention periods; (c) harmonisation of conditions of access; (d) common level of accuracy and security of data; (e) maintenance of data within the EU; and (f) irreversible destruction of data at the end of the retention period. With common EU standards, Member States may trust the information provided by telecommunication services providers abroad.
- Minimum procedural/technical standards would be relevant in preserving the chain of custody. However, the decision on admitting evidence in court should remain within the judicial discretion of judges.
- Content data (though subject to higher legal protection) is usually voluntarily submitted to law enforcement agencies by the victim. To carry out investigations and prosecutions effectively it is then necessary to have access to traffic and location data.
- Were the EU to pass a new legal instrument on data retention, national laws remain of essence as they will determine the specific conditions of retention. A reliable system of records and logs of access is crucial.

(iii) In respect of <u>judicial cooperation</u>:

- The differences in data retention regulations particularly regarding retention periods are creating significant difficulties in judicial cooperation: the challenges thereby created are best addressed at EU level to put an end to the fragmentation of data retention legal frameworks across the EU.
- The status of evidence gathered abroad varies considerably, from no regulation of the matter to the presumption of admissibility and the application of standards applicable in the forum State. Evidence illegally obtained abroad might be admissible in certain jurisdictions unless it was shared for purposes other than its use in court. For others, the presumption of admissibility will be rebutted when it would otherwise make the process unfair; a serious breach of the right to privacy could ground a decision of the judge on the (in)admissibility of the evidence.

- In some Member States where data retention laws are no longer operative, it is unclear whether it would be possible to use evidence in court that resulted from data retention schemes voluntarily provided by another State. In others, such evidence would be ruled admissible if it had not been gathered at the request of the forum State, even though the latter could not internally collect and use it as evidence.
- Several examples were advanced by participants whereby differences in domestic legislation on data retention hampered investigations and prosecutions in other Member States and third States. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris provide a powerful example of how investigations are affected by the lack of data retention schemes in some of the affected countries.
- Examples of cases where data retention proved crucial to successful investigations, prosecutions, and or defence would assist the Commission in an impact assessment for potential new legislation. Eurojust, with the assistance of national authorities, may be well placed to collate such case illustrations.

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