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Subject:	Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2017)

Delegations will find in the Annex the Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2017) adopted by the Council at its 3613rd meeting held on 16 April 2018.

ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2017)

INTRODUCTION

1. This Progress Report on the implementation of the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (doc. 15708/03) covers activities carried out in 2017. The Report is non-exhaustive and focuses on the main developments. All activities were undertaken within the broader context of EU security policy and conflict-prevention.
2. Based on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (doc. 10715/16), the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD and the New Lines for Action (doc. 17172/08), the guiding principles of the European Union continue to be:
 - a. effective multilateralism, including safeguarding the centrality and the promotion of the universality of global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, through diplomatic action and financial assistance to third countries and international organisations;
 - b. close cooperation with countries to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime;
 - c. addressing non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral political and non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings and in more informal contacts;
 - d. the effective and complementary use of all available instruments and financial resources – the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), other instruments – in order to maximise the impact of the EU's activities in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.

3. The European External Action Service (EEAS), in particular the Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation represented the EU in a number of key international meetings in 2017:

- the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors' Group meetings in Rome;
- the launch ceremony of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Astana (29 August 2017);
- the 61st International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference held in Vienna (18 – 22 September 2017);
- the meetings of the Nuclear Security Contact Group;
- the 72 UN General Assembly First Committee;

The Special Envoy focused on:

- a) promoting universal adherence to and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and enhancing the visibility of the EU's commitment;
 - b) initiating and maintaining non-proliferation dialogue with major partners and mainstreaming non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral relations;
4. The EU Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation convened 11 times in 2017, including at director level, to discuss EU positions and future activities. The EU delegations in Vienna, Geneva and New York prepared a number of EU statements for multilateral fora and contributed actively to policy-making through regular EU coordination meetings.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

5. The EU is fully committed to promoting the full, complete and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. The start and early conclusion of negotiations, at the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains high on the agenda.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency

6. The NPT review cycle started in 2017 with the First session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT taking place in Vienna from 2 until 12 May 2017. The EU delivered four statements: one in the general debate and three in the debates on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses respectively; a specific statement in support of the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East was also made. In addition, the EU organised two side events on the EU support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and on EU-IAEA co-operation in nuclear science applications and submitted two working papers on nuclear non-proliferation and on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. All EU Member States supported the statement calling for strict implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

7. EU support for the core responsibilities of the IAEA regarding non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and technical cooperation continued. The EU welcomed the adoption of the 2018-2021 IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and engaged in promoting the need for predictable and sustainable resources for nuclear security. Together with the bilateral contributions from its Member States, the EU is the second largest donor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The EU financial contribution based on seven successive Council Joint Actions/Decisions has reached more than EUR 45 million for the period 2009 - 2017. Building on the success and lessons learned from Council Decision VI, 2013/517/CFSP, the EU adopted a 7th Council Decision supporting the IAEA nuclear security activities undertaken under the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for the period 2017 – 2019.
8. EU funding under Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 of 21 December 2016 aims to encourage progress towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments; assist States in the establishment of indigenous technical, scientific and human capacity, necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security; strengthen capacities to prevent, detect, respond and protect people, property, environment and society from criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control; strengthen the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material; contribute to computer security in the nuclear field; strengthen the security of radioactive sources, to bring them to a safe and secure storage in the countries in need of support, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier; strengthen physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material.
9. The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) continued to support the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database. The IAEA has acknowledged the improvements in reporting achieved through modernising the website of the Incident Notification Forms. The EU support in this respect will continue. In the margins of the 5th EU-IAEA Senior Officials Meeting (15 February 2017), the JRC and the IAEA signed 'Practical Arrangements on Cooperation on Nuclear Science Applications' aimed at developing joint activities and avoiding duplication of efforts.

10. The EU continued to contribute to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by coordinating the Joint Commission established by the JCPOA and a number of expert-level working groups established under the Joint Commission. All coordination activities are conducted while fully respecting the IAEA's long-term mission of verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments. Moreover, the EU has engaged in implementing Annex III of the JCPOA in close coordination with the IAEA to foster civil-nuclear cooperation with Iran, in particular on projects to improve nuclear safety.
11. The EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation participated in the launching ceremony of the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank held in Astana on 29 August 2017. With its Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2001 on a Union contribution of over EUR 4 million for the establishment and the secure management of the LEU Bank, the EU helps ensure that nuclear fuel is supplied in a secure and safe manner. The contribution helps the IAEA guarantee the security and safety of LEU transport from procurement to supply, and during storage at the Bank's site. The European Commission under the Instrument for Stability has already provided EUR 20 million for the purpose of acquiring the LEU once the project is fully operational.
12. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols constitute the current verification standard and the EU continues to call for them to be made universally adhered to without delay. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA allows for effective and efficient safeguards. The EU actively supports the IAEA's safeguards system through the European Commission Safeguards Support Programme and the Support Programmes of some of its Member States.

13. To further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the EU has allocated EUR 225 million over the period 2014-2020 to promote nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards in third countries. The EU and its Member States attach the utmost importance to the worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of nuclear safety. One of the aims of the Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations is to prevent accidents and, should they occur, mitigate the consequences by avoiding early and large radioactive releases. The EU and its Member States continue to be strong supporters of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through substantial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and the Peaceful Uses Initiative. The EU's ranking as second largest contributor to the Technical Cooperation Programme also demonstrates its commitment to all three pillars of the NPT.
- 14 The EU and the IAEA hold an annual Senior Officials Meeting to review and plan their broad-range cooperation. The last meeting was hosted by the EU/ EEAS on 15 February 2017 in Brussels. The EU Political and Security Committee visited Vienna on 22 May 2017 and held meetings with the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. Discussions covered IAEA activities in the area of verification, including regional issues, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear applications. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP) held discussions with the IAEA Director-General in the margins of the Munich Security Conference and the Bled Strategic Forum.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

15. The early entry into force and universality of the CTBT are important objectives of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All EU Member States have demonstrated their commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it and by provisionally applying its basic obligations. The EU promotes consistently the benefits and added value of the Treaty to peace, security and non-proliferation, including in its civil applications and supports financially the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO).
16. At the invitation of the CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr Lassina Zerbo the EU HRVP participated in the ministerial-level 2017 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT also known as the Article XIV Conference which took place in New York on 20 September 2017. At the Conference HRVP Mogherini delivered a statement on behalf of the EU. She held bilateral meetings with the CTBTO Executive Secretary in the margins of the Munich Security Conference, the Bled Strategic Forum and the UN General Assembly.
17. The EU uses every opportunity to advocate CTBT ratification in international fora and meetings with countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, and continues to use diplomatic means to promote the entry into force of the Treaty in those countries. The CTBT was raised bilaterally in the EU political and NPD dialogues with India, Pakistan and the US. The EU also encouraged Thailand to move to ratification.
18. The EU will continue to strongly support the CTBT and its Organisation. Since 2006 the Council has adopted seven Joint Actions / Council Decisions to support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and to further strengthen the Preparatory Commission's monitoring and verification capabilities. The EU's total financial support to the CTBTO exceeds EUR 18.5 million.

Initiatives related to nuclear security

19. The EU continued to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The EU participated in the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group meeting (8-10 February 2017) hosted by India and in the GICNT Plenary held in Tokyo (1-2 June 2017). The EU and its Member States are actively involved in the work of the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group, in all areas: nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation. The EU has actively contributed to the substance of all reference documents of the IAG working groups. In the Plenary meeting, Finland was selected as the Coordinator for the Implementation and Assessment Group for 2017-2019. The European Union and its Member States organise and participate in events to help foster international awareness and commitment to nuclear security such as the Sentinel 2017 Workshop: Best Practices for National Nuclear Security Exercise programs organized by Governments of the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, under the auspices of the GICNT, the Magic Maggiore Technical Reach-back workshop organized at JRC in Ispra, Italy, the Vigilant Marmot Legal Frameworks workshop organized by Slovakia together with Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime within the framework of the GICNT and Exercise Olympus: Law Enforcement and Technical Reachback Dialogue, organized by the Government of Romania in cooperation with the GICNT and Interpol.
20. The EU Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials (EUSECTRA) has been fully operational since 2013 for the benefit of European Union Member States and partner countries, among them several GICNT members. The Centre is operated by the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) at its sites in Karlsruhe (Germany) and Ispra (Italy), in close co-operation with other international initiatives promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and several GICNT partner countries. The Centre is also used for practical exercises mainly related to countering nuclear smuggling.

21. The European Commission and the EU Member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterisation of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements. Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined thus providing support to competent authorities in EU Member States and beyond.

Initiatives related to nuclear verification

22. The EU and its Member States supported the 2016 UNGA resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Verification on the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and the subsequent decision of the First Committee in 2017 to keep that item on the agenda. The EU is supportive of the work of broader partnerships and cooperative verification arrangements and has participated in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) since its inauguration in 2015. In Phase II of the IPNDV, which was launched at the Fifth Plenary meeting in Buenos Aires in November 2017, the EU (the EEAS, the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and DG ENER) will continue working to prepare technical capacities for effective verification of future nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements. Substantive support to the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are defined as main goals.

Regional issues

23. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear weapons, WMD and ballistic missile programmes and its decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA continue to be a major cause for concern to the EU. The EU condemned in the strongest possible terms the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The European Union's message is unequivocal: the DPRK must abandon its nuclear, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, immediately cease all related activities and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards. The President of the European Council and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy both issued strong statements following the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 3 September 2017. The CTBTO responded immediately and effectively to the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK: it demonstrated the verification regime's ability to provide independent and reliable data. This is an important contribution to regional and international stability. EU statements were also delivered immediately at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and at the technical briefing organised by the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna.
24. On 25 September the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) with the support of the EEAS organized a one-day seminar 'The DPRK nuclear and ballistic crisis: The way forward'. Participants included senior diplomats from EU Member States, the Republic of Korea and Japan, FRS, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation academics, the CTBTO, the French Ministry of Defence and the European External Action Service. The seminar analysed the fast progression of the DPRK nuclear and ballistic programmes, the strategic dimensions of the crisis, the regional perspectives and looked into the possible common approaches to managing the crisis.
25. The EU sanctions' regime towards the DPRK is currently the most restrictive in operation. On 16 October EU Foreign Ministers adopted a further package of additional EU autonomous measures that go beyond those decided by the United Nations.

26. Regarding other regions, the EU continued to demonstrate its commitment in relevant multilateral fora to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. This issue also falls within the scope of discussions in the EU – League of Arab States Working Group on Non-proliferation and Arms Control set up under the EU-LAS Strategic Dialogue. The Working Group held a meeting on 27 November 2017.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD)/ Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or other Nuclear Explosive Devices

27. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), in accordance with its mandate, plays a crucial role in negotiating multilateral disarmament treaties. The EU is therefore concerned about its continued stalemate. The EU calls on all CD member states to start negotiations on such a treaty without delay and to begin work on the other issues on the agenda in line with the adopted Programme of Work CD/1864 and reiterates its longstanding commitment to the enlargement of the Conference.
28. The EU stresses the important role that the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is designed to play as a deliberative body of the UN General Assembly on disarmament matters and supports the efforts to improve its working methods. The EU welcomes the adoption by consensus in April 2017 of recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons for the first time since 1999. The EU also welcomes the consensus on recommendations for objectives and agenda for the Fourth Special Session devoted to Disarmament.

29. A clear priority for the EU is the immediate start and early conclusion of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. All EU Member States supported the 2016 UN General Assembly Resolution 71/259 on the FMCT, which sets up an inclusive process by organizing informal consultative meetings with all UN Member States and the Chair of the high-level FMCT expert preparatory group. With Council Decision (EU) 2017/2284 of 11 December 2017 the EU decided to provide support to States in the African, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean regions to participate in the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group consultative process.
30. The EU encourages all countries possessing nuclear weapons that have not done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, if they have not already done so.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

31. The EU continued to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with voluntary contributions to the Chemical Weapons Convention's core objectives and the Organisation special operations regarding Syria's chemical weapons programme.

32. In this respect, the EU supported the OPCW Director-General decision that the Fact Finding Mission continue their work and that the Declaration Assessment Team continues to examine gaps and discrepancies in the Syrian declarations. The EU welcomed the adoption of UNSCR 2319 (2016) extending by one year the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) established by UNSCR 2235 (2015) to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria while noting with great concern that the UNSC was prevented from renewing the JIM's mandate again in 2017. The JIM's reporting in 2016 and 2017 acknowledged three uses of chlorine gas as well as one use of sarin, all by the Syrian Armed Forces. The JIM also identified ISIL to be responsible for the use of sulphur mustard in two incidents. By way of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 adopted on 30 November 2015, the EU had provided financial support of EUR 4, 6 million to the costs associated with the Joint Investigative Mechanism activities under UNSCR 2235 (2015). With Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 of 12 December 2017 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 of 12 December 2017, the EU provided assistance to the OPCW for the provision of satellite imagery in support of operations in Syria (1 million EUR) and for the decontamination of the former storage site of Libyan chemical weapons in Ruwagha (3, 3 million EUR).
33. The EU also continued monitoring the implementation of EU Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP adopted in February 2015 in support of the OPCW core agenda, for the years 2015-2018.
34. Council Decision 2014/74/CFSP of 11 February 2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 124/2014 of 10 February 2014 introduced derogation for the possible use of Syrian frozen assets to cover expenses related to OPCW verification and destruction activities in Syria. In November 2014, the EU addressed a letter to the OPCW Director-General informing him of this possibility and requesting him to approach the Syrian authorities on this matter. The proposal has been transmitted to the Syrian authorities who have rejected it so far. However, the EU continues to refer to this proposal on all appropriate occasions including in the EU statements at the OPCW.

35. While the initial core objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) such as universality, destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and national implementation are yet to be fully achieved, the EU and its Member States are looking ahead and starting to reflect on the post-chemical weapons destruction stage. In view of the upcoming 4th CWC Review Conference (December 2018), the EU and its Member States have started to consider future challenges in keeping the organisation relevant (i.e. prohibiting the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the use by non-state actors and terrorists, convergence with biology), and hence supporting the effectiveness of the Convention. In this regard, the EU supported the establishment of the OPCW Open Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities and engaged in drafting an EU common position to contribute to the relevant OPCW debate.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

36. Despite the lack of agreement on intersessional work programme at the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) held on 7-25 November 2016 the European Union continued its strong political and financial support for the implementation and the universalisation of the Convention, including through the consistent and comprehensive implementation by the BTWC Implementation Support Unit of the EU's fourth assistance programme laid down in Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP. Two regional workshops supporting universal adherence to the Convention in the Pacific region and enhanced dialogue on science and technology in Eastern Europe and Central Asia were organised. Ten extended assistance programmes on national implementation of the Convention have been launched by the ISU as well.

37. The European Union and its Member States were furthermore actively and constructively engaged in the discussions in the run up to and during the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention held on 4-8 December 2017. The European Union firmly supported the fulfilment of the MSP's mandate as laid down in the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference, including 'reaching consensus on an intersessional process' and adopting decision on a work programme during the period until the Ninth Review Conference. In this respect, the European Union conducted a demarche to a large number of BTWC States Parties and put forward an EU working paper outlining the Union's relevant activities and positions. The European Union welcomed the agreement reached by the Meeting of States Parties on an Intersessional programme of work for 2018-2020 that will help to maintain the relevance of the Convention and bring impetus to efforts to promote universalisation and implementation. The European Union will continue to offer capacity-building assistance in the framework of the EU Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP and other instruments such as the Centres of Excellence on the mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks.
38. Since 2006 the EU has provided substantive support to BTWC core activities through four consecutive assistance programmes. The EU Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP adopted on 18 January 2016 sets up the most comprehensive framework in this respect. It provides funding for BTWC projects related to universalisation; regional workshops on science and technology developments relevant to the Convention; national implementation; support for the preparations for the Eighth Review Conference; support for the UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons; awareness-raising and education. The financial amount for the implementation of the projects for the period from 2016 until 2018 is EUR 2, 3 million thus bringing the overall EU support for BTWC core activities to EUR 6, 3 million.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Hague Code of Conduct

39. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is the result of efforts by the international community to regulate the area of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The HCoC is the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument relating to the spread of ballistic missiles. The EU has strongly supported the Code since its inception. All EU Member States have subscribed to it.
40. By subscribing to the HCoC, members voluntarily commit themselves politically to provide pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. Subscribing countries also commit themselves to submitting an annual declaration of their country's policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.
41. Since the signing and entry into force of the politically-binding HCoC in November 2002 in The Hague, Netherlands, the number of signatories has increased from 93 to 139.
42. The EU plays a leading role in promoting and supporting the universality, full implementation and enhanced functioning of the HCoC in support of the Code's three main objectives: universality, implementation and enhancement. During more than a decade, the EU Council has adopted, in the CFSP framework, a series of Decisions/ Joint Actions that have provided the means for continued EU support to the Hague Code of Conduct and to missile non-proliferation in general. Through these Council Decisions, the EU finances HCoC outreach activities, expert meetings and regional awareness sessions. The activities are carried out by the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, usually also involving the rotating HCoC Chair.

43. With the newly adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017, the EU will continue to promote the subscription to the Code and ultimately its universality; support the full implementation of the Code; promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all; reinforce the Code's visibility and raise public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; and to explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.

Missile Technology Control Regime

44. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among countries that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR guidelines and control lists constitute an international best practices benchmark for controlling exports of missile-related items and technologies.
45. The 2017 plenary meeting of the MTCR took place in Dublin, Republic of Ireland, on 18-20 October 2017. The EU delivered four statements on the relevant agenda items, including on recent developments in missile proliferation and membership. The EU supported the adoption of a stronger Public Statement to reflect international concerns about the ballistic missile launches and significant missile technology development by the DPRK since February 2016. An important issue in the MTCR context for the EU remains the blocked accession to the regime of Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND CBRN RISK MITIGATION

46. The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture. It is the first international instrument to deal in an integrated and comprehensive manner with weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. UNSCR 1540 (2004) establishes binding obligations on all countries. These aim to prevent and deter non-state actors from obtaining access to such weapons and weapon-related materials. Adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Resolution requires all countries to adopt the necessary legislation barring non-state actors from getting nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and to establish appropriate domestic controls for related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. The 2016 comprehensive review process of UNSCR 1540 reaffirmed its centrality, importance and authority as reflected in UNSCR 2325.
47. In order to help implement the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review and to support the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, on 11 May 2017 the European Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Council Decision covers a period of 36 months and is being implemented by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in New York which has sub-contracted some of the implementation to the OSCE in Vienna. The EU shares the objectives of assisting countries in identifying specific technical assistance, raising awareness of relevant technical assistance programmes, and enhancing cooperation with international and regional organisations support national capacity building.

48. The EU CBRN risk mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative is a worldwide capacity building programme, gathering 58 partner countries grouped around 8 regional Secretariats, located in the following regions: African Atlantic Façade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; Gulf Cooperation Council Countries; Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; South East Asia; South East and Eastern Europe.
49. The CBRN CoE is financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN materials, strengthen partner countries' preparedness, and nurture security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a bottom-up, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. These platforms develop policy proposals and capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported through several regional cooperation projects funded under the initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 66 regional projects have been financed. The budget for the initiative for the 10 –year period starting in 2010 amounts to EUR 250 million.
50. The Centres of Excellence network is now well developed, and allowed the EU to undertake training table-top and field cross-border exercises on matters including civil protection, incident response, bio-security, and waste management in the framework of CoE projects, in order to enhance visibility and concretely assess their impact. Moreover, the Initiative is mature enough to support further actions addressing security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructures, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, as well as to further develop cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual use items. The CoE model has also been welcomed by the EU Court of Auditors¹, followed by Council Conclusions on 26 October 2015².

¹ Court of Auditors Special Report 17/2014

² Council conclusions 12747/15 from 8 October 2015

51. In October 2017, the Commission presented – as a part of wider Counterterrorism Package – an Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risk. The new Action Plan, building on the achievements of the EU CBRN Action Plan 2010-2015, proposes a wide range of measures to improve preparedness, resilience and coordination at EU level. It proposes creation of a more security-focused CBRN architecture at the EU level, emphasising the need to better use existing resources and to pool together existing expertise. The Action Plan calls also for strengthening EU CBRN preparedness and response through cross-border and cross-sectoral training and exercises. It underlines the need to include whenever relevant border and customs authorities and military partners. The Action Plan underlines also the importance of close links between internal and external CBRN security-related activities as well as cooperation with specialised multilateral organisations such as IAEA, OPCW or Interpol. Implementation of the Action Plan will be supported financially via the Internal Security Fund – Police.
52. The CBRN Action Plan has received scientific and technical support from a range of research projects funded by the Secure Society Programme under the 7th Framework Programme. The research covers the entire crisis management cycle from prevention to recovery. Activities to identify standardisation needs could lead to ‘European Norms’ standards. The Horizon 2020 programme will strengthen on-going work in CBRN research through focused topics.

THINK TANKS

53. Based on Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July 2010, the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been actively supported by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium which started its activities in January 2011. In 2017 the Council discussed new Decision with a view to its adoption by the end of the year which further extends the EU support for the activities of the Consortium for the period 2018-2021 by building on the achievements to date and by adding new projects.

54. The Consortium's activities increased EU visibility vis-à-vis third countries and civil society and contributed substantially to EU policy shaping in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament. The Consortium provides a platform for informal contacts among practitioners and stimulates dialogue between different stakeholders. Its activities have helped raise awareness of the challenges posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It has an extensive network of more than 70 think tanks across Europe.
55. The 6th EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, hosted by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, took place on 12-13 December in Brussels.

EXPORT CONTROLS

56. In 2017 the EU continued to regularly update its regulations to reflect developments in multilateral export control regimes. Thus, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation on 26 September 2017³ updating the EU control list in line with decisions taken in multilateral export control regimes in 2016, and introduced changes to e.g. the control of information security items (restructuring of Category 5 Part 2) and the addition of new controls for integrated circuits with analogue-to-digital converters and for aerothermodynamics test facilities and ultra-high temperature ceramics.
57. The Dual-Use Coordination Group continued to support the effective and consistent implementation of export controls in the EU. New functionalities were introduced to the 'Dual-Use Electronic System' which improved information and technical exchanges within the EU. The EU adopted guidance notes for the effective implementation of specific control parameters e.g. concerning encryption products. **An annual report⁴** was published to ensure transparency regarding export control and licensing activities, and an Export Control Forum was organised on 19 December 2017, bringing together stakeholders from Member States, industry and civil society.

³ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/october/tradoc_156134.pdf

58. The review of EU export control policy continued. The Council and the European Parliament actively discussed the Commission's legislative proposal for modernising EU export controls and their adaptation to rapidly changing technological, economic and political circumstances. The legislative process was supported by numerous technical briefings, workshops and seminars. The European Parliament's Committee for International Trade adopted its report on 23 November 2017 and the Plenary Session of the European Parliament adopted a 1st reading position on 17 January 2018.
59. EU positions and statements were coordinated as appropriate in preparation for the relevant meetings of the export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary meeting in Bern (24-25 June 2017); the Australia Group Plenary meeting in Paris (26-30 June 2017); and the Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary meeting in Dublin (18-20 October 2017).
60. The implementation of the EU P2P Export Control Outreach programme to enhance the effectiveness of export control systems of dual-use items and related materials, equipment and technologies continued. The programme currently covers 34 countries from six regions. In September 2015 it was extended to enable cooperation with new partner countries. New activities were implemented in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Ukraine, Georgia and in the UAE. EU long-term experts were dispatched to Kazakhstan and Jordan to strengthen ties with partner countries. A special programme was set up in South East Asia.

61. Intensive coordination of the EU P2P Export Control Outreach programme with the US Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Programme continued. Joint EU-US table top exercises were organised to stimulate cross-border cross-regional cooperation between export control authorities. An annual EU summer university course on non-proliferation and export control was established in the framework of the European Forum Alpbach. The EU P2P Outreach portal (<https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>) continued to serve as a platform for all EU outreach programmes on export control of military and dual-use goods, with the aim of customising information exchange with the EU partner countries. The programme is funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

SPACE

62. The EU supported the continuation of work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and on a shared understanding of the existing principles of global space governance as a measure to prevent conflict and to promote international cooperation
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63. The EU supported the work that had been carried out by the COPUOS Working Group on Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities which concluded negotiations on a first set of guidelines in 2016. The EU will work with the Chair and all partners to conclude negotiations by the deadline set for the conclusion of the Working Group in June 2018.
64. The EU and its Member States will show continued commitment in space activities and technologies, which are important to our security and our prosperity and are essential tools that can greatly help us all to deliver on the realisation of the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda.

WMD NON-PROLIFERATION CLAUSES

65. In accordance with its WMD non-proliferation policy, and in line with the 2003 Council Conclusions, the EU continued to work on the mainstreaming of WMD non-proliferation commitments in agreements with 3rd countries. Hence, negotiations were finalised in 2017 with Japan and Mexico on a WMD clause in the new Agreements with these countries. Furthermore, negotiations on a WMD clause for a new Agreement with MERCOSUR continued. Negotiations were also opened with Azerbaijan, Chile and Kirgizstan.

OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA

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66. The EU continued to participate actively in the meetings of the Directors Group on Non-proliferation and Disarmament. In 2017 the EU took part in the meetings under the presidency of Italy which focused on topical non-proliferation and disarmament issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, SALW control, regional challenges to non-proliferation as well as enhancing biosecurity and biosafety in Africa.
67. The EU is also committed to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, in particular through the technical assistance (threat assessment, national action plans) provided worldwide by the EU Centres of Excellence initiative on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE MEETINGS

68. The EEAS Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation held non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings with India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the US. He conducted numerous bilateral consultations with various stakeholders in the margins of major fora such as the UNGA First Committee, the meeting of the first Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the IAEA General Conference. Bilateral consultations were held with the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, among others.
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