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## **DECLASSIFICATION**

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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 23 October 2006

14098/06

RESTREINT UE

SCH-EVAL 142 VISA 260 COMIX 844

## **REPORT**

from:	Evaluation Committee
to:	Schengen Evaluation Working Party
Subject:	Draft report on the Evaluation Committee's mission to the Embassy - Consular
-	Section of Estonia in Kiev in the context of Estonia's preparations for the full
	implementation of the Schengen acquis (Time of visit: June 2006)

Delegations will find attached the draft report of the Schengen Evaluation mission to the Embassy - Consular Section - of Estonia in Kiev, drafted by the Evaluation Committee (Annex II) (hereinafter *EvalCom*). It is presented to the Sch-Eval Working Party for discussion and adoption, allowing for its eventual submission to the Council.

Comments of the Estonian authorities are set out in footnotes.

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#### **Introduction: General context**

Ukraine covers an area of 603 700 km<sup>2</sup>. The country has 47 million inhabitants, 78 % of whom are Ukrainian and 17 % Russian, the remaining 5 % being nationals of Belarus and Moldova. The capital, Kyiv, has 2,6 million inhabitants. The official language is Ukrainian, but Russian is still widely spoken, especially in the east and south of the country.

Ukraine became independent on 24 August 1991. The 2004 presidential election triggered a strong popular movement (the "Orange Revolution") which brought the democratic opposition leader to power. The March 2006 general election gave the advantage to the supporters of the former Prime Minister but at the time of the evaluation mission a government had not yet been formed.

The country is 70th in the world ranking of developed countries (2004 UNDP Human Development Index). The per capita GDP is USD 970 (the average in the EU was USD 28 500 in 2005). The official rate of unemployment is 4 %, but according to the ILO it is nearer 11-12 %. Since 2000, the Ukrainian economy has registered a steady growth rate of 8 % per year on average.

# The main problems facing the Schengen States' 1 visa services in Kiev are:

## managing migration risk and possible misuse of visas:

There is a substantial risk of illegal immigration to the Schengen States (cf. the monthly CIREFI reports), and the risks of visa misuse are real: given the differences in wage levels, a person can, in a month of illegally working in certain Schengen States, earn as much as in a year in Ukraine. The risk is especially high in the case of workers on building sites and farms and in nursing. The real, concealed reason for travelling to Europe may also be to contract a marriage or obtain medical treatment.

# – <u>detecting document fraud</u>:

Document fraud is widespread but seems to be confined to non-secure documents (employer's certificates, various invitations, etc.). Few falsified official documents (international or internal passports, deeds of ownership, etc.) have been detected, and the quality of the forgery of those that have been detected has been very high.

# - the internal passport:

Many Schengen representations consider the Ukrainian internal passport as a key supporting document. This document is issued once in a lifetime (only the photo is regularly changed and the holders' address is constantly updated) and is rarely forged or issued out of convenience. This document is very useful as a supporting document because the international passports issued to the holder are listed in it and thus the frequency of the change of passports can be verified.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this context "Schengen States" refers to the States applying the Schengen acquis in full.

# - <u>dealing with invitations of convenience</u>:

False invitations are commonplace but often easy to detect owing to conspicuous errors (spelling errors, incorrect geographic locations, etc.).

However, it is hard for consular services to do anything about invitations of convenience that are formally authentic but conceal the real purpose of the applicant's stay. Additional documents often have to be requested to prove the purpose of the trip (for example, receipts and evidence of customs clearance for products previously purchased may be requested for business trips).

#### managing tourist flows:

Most Schengen consular representations have introduced a procedure for accrediting local travel agencies so that visa applicants wishing to visit a Schengen State as tourists are spared the need to appear in person. To guard against abuses, a system of accrediting the agencies' representatives (who are issued with badges including photos) has also been introduced in most cases. Agencies are penalised for any shortcomings in the handling of applications. Moreover, it does happen that travel agencies submit applications (for a fee) for the sole purpose of sparing the applicant the need to appear in person.

#### - security situation

Ensuring the security of the premises and of the staff: the risk of pressure on the staff of the visa sections is a matter of concern as it may lead to irregular issuance of visas. This risk is not only hypothetical in Kiev. The physical security of the staff and of the stickers must also be taken into account.

#### Conclusion

It appears that the processing of visa applications requires considerable vigilance in both the detection of false documents and the investigation of the applicants' real situation. Decision-making thus requires a systematic and thorough examination of a range of evidence proving the actual purpose of the planned stay. Individual in depth interviews are also necessary whenever there is doubt as to the applicants' intentions.

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#### **Management summary**

EvalCom considers that, on the basis of the checks carried out and the informations gathered, the Estonian Republic, as far as its Embassy in Kiev is concerned, may be in position to implement the Schengen Acquis in full in due course.

Nevertheless, EvalCom wishes to comment on certain points which merit special attention or reviewing by the Estonian authorities in order for the Estonian Republic to achieve this goal:

- reinforcement of the security of the premises;
- improving the visa decision making process, especially handling time;
- and increase awareness of the issue of illegal immigration risk.

#### 1. ACCESS TO THE EMBASSY AND CONSULAR SECTION

### 1.1 Location and opening hours

The consular section of the Estonian Embassy in Kiev is situated on the 1<sup>st</sup> floor of a 5-storey building in central Kiev. The opening hours for visa applicants is Monday-Friday 9.30 - 10.00 for travel agencies and other representatives, and 10.00- 12.00 for individual applicants and passports are returned from 16.30- 17.00. The opening hours may be extended during seasonal peaks.

#### 1.2 Information

Information can be obtained by telephone, from the website (<a href="http://www.estemb.kiev.ua">http://www.estemb.kiev.ua</a>), and notice boards outside and inside the building in Russian, English and Estonian.

#### 1.3 Application forms

Application forms are available inside the building during the open hours and also on the website of the Embassy and of the Estonian MFA (<a href="http://www.vm.ee">http://www.vm.ee</a>). Application forms are available in Estonian/Russian combined and Estonian/English combined.

The content and layout to the uniform application form corresponds to the uniform format set out in Annex 12 to the CCI. However, the asterisk concerning boxes 19-20-28-30 to 36 concerning family members is missing. The reference to box 44 to "Schengen States" has been replaced by "Estonia". In the right hand column there is an additional box for the invitation number (see below)

#### 1.4 Access management

The entrance through the front door is used by staff only and applicants enter through the backdoor (in the yard). The external aspect is that of a gloomy backyard atmosphere and it is not immediately recognisable as the premises of a European Union Member State consulate. Applicants are queuing outside the building next to a muddy parking lot where no structure is provided for. Insurance companies offer their services to the applicants (who are obvious aware that this service is offered on the spot), and give assistance in filling in application forms. A Ukrainian security officer regulates the number of applicants allowed inside the combined waiting room/counter room (three persons at a time).

In the waiting room/counter room (ca 17m²) there is one counter for visa applications and one for Estonian citizens. The facilities in waiting room are adapted to the number of persons allowed in at a time.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

Measures should be taken to improve conditions in the applicants queuing area and clearly indicate that this is the consular section of Estonia.

Applicants are not protected against bad weather conditions. <sup>2</sup>

#### 2. SECURITY FEATURES OF THE BUILDING INCLUDING SECURITY CHECKS

## 2.1 Outside the building

Outside the building there are two cameras and a security alarm..

#### 2.2 Inside the building

The guard controls the applicants with a manual metal detector and applicants must also pass through a metal detector arch. The guard can supervise both entrances (monitor), the queue outside and the waiting room.

Video surveillance is assured in the waiting room and at the counters. Movements in this area are recorded. There is an alarm system with motion and impact sensors. The alarm system is connected to the local police department. Live pictures at cameras can be watched on line in Kiev and by central authorities in Tallinn and are kept for 5 months.

The windows are protected bomb blast foil. There are no bars in front of the windows.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

Security standards are satisfactory, except for the lack of protection of the windows in the premises where the main supply of the visa stickers is kept (ref. CCI Part VII, section 1) $^3$ . EvalCom recommends to improve physical security of these premises.

#### 3. SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS

## 3.1 Description of procedure

Generally applications must be submitted in person. As an exemption, visa applications may be submitted through a representative/travel agencies (original authorisation letter must be presented), and MFA or Diplomatic mission's courier/employee (ID required) and representatives of minors. All applicants may be invited to come to the consular section to provide additional information .

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Comment by Estonia: It is the intentino of Estonia to find a new Embassy premises within 5 years.

Comment by Estonia: It is under consideration to move the safe with visa stickers to the archive room with no windows

## **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom recalls the importance of the <u>basic rule of personal appearance</u> (set out in the CCI, Part III, section 4 and Part V, 3rd paragraph) and recommends caution when exemptions from this rule are introduced.

## 3.2 Nationality of applicants

The Estonian Embassy in Kiev receives applications from the citizens of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as well as third country nationals permanently residing.

#### 3.3 Issuance of visas to non residents

As Estonia does not have many representations abroad, third country nationals may also apply for a visa by surface mail if there is no Estonian Embassy in his or her country of permanent residence. Such persons may also apply for a visa through a representative. Applicants are informed if they have to appear personally in the consulate.

**3.4** Possibility of future representation under the provisions of CCI, Part II, section 1.2) EvalCom was informed that currently Estonian national law does not allow Estonia to be represented by other States for issuing visa and Estonia cannot represent any other State for the purpose of issuing visa. <sup>4</sup>

#### 4. PROCESSING THE APPLICATION

## 4.1 Reception of an application

The Estonian visa officer receiving the application checks whether the documents, incl. the supporting documents presented are complete, and registers the basic data related to applications in the Visa Register, making the link with the database on invitations, when applicable. The applicant must bring the "invitation number" (see description below). At this point the "application stamp" is put into the passport and the administrative fee is collected, if applicable. The applicant receives a receipt. Proof of travel medical insurance must be presented upon application. EvalCom was told that 40-50% of applicants are in possession of an invitation.

During this first check, the visa officer may draw the attention of the consul to certain aspects of the application by marking of a box on the screen indicating that the consul should examine that particular aspect it in detail.

Comment by Estonia: According to the Article 5 of the Aliens Act (Legal bases for alien to enter Estonia and stay in Estonia) paragraph 1 p 4, the legal base for an alien to enter in Estonia is since the accession to the Schengen a uniform visa issued by a competent agency of a Member State of the European Union, a Member State of the European Economic Area or the Swiss Confederation, except Estonia. Therefore the Estonian legislation foresees the possibility of being represented and does not exclude to represent other Member States. The regulations of EU about representation are also directly applicable in national law.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom also noted that the internal Ukrainian passport, which is a very useful document to verify the situation of an applicant, is not required by the consulate.

## 4.2 Cooperation with travel agencies

Travel agencies must be accredited in order to be able to submit applications. The following documentation must be provided: licence, registration certificate, specimen of signatures of the travel agency's authorised representatives, specimen of stamps, agreement with Estonian counter part, filled in specimen of original vouchers.

Currently the Estonian Embassy cooperates with 16 travel agencies and 1-2 couriers per agency.

Each time a courier brings applications, he/she must bring the original power of attorney and his/her passport as the power of attorney does not carry a photo.

# 4.3 Examination of visa applications

An Estonian permanent member of staff enters the data from the visa application into the database and scans the photo of the applicant.

All applications are checked against a national black list which is verified automatically by "the system" and it is possible to make consultations without any link to an application.

All applications are sent for consultation via the MFA who then decides which other relevant central authorities to consult, depending on the individual case. Generally replies are received within three days. The reply is transmitted through the MFA. If an body under the MoI does not give any reply within given period, it is considered that approval has been given.

The final decision on issuing a visa belongs to the head of the visa section - which might even go against the reply from the central authorities, although this is rare.

According to national law, application must be processed in 30 days and normally the processing time is 10 days.

These two types of consultation can only be performed by the head of the visa section.

# **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom considers that the handling time of the visa applications, 10 days, in too long if compared with the daily numbers of applications and should made shorter to prevent visa shopping when Estonia will implement Schengen in full.  $^5$ 

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Comments by Estonia: The shorter handling time of the visas is definitely related with the need of the extra work force. Second consul and visa secretary would enable halve the handling time of the visa procedure to 5 days. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proposed to send extra consular officer to Kiev and is considering sending also the additional visa secretary. Temporary extra staff is already provided during high seasons.

## 4.3.1 Interviews

EvalCom was informed that few interviews are performed, and there is no separate room for interviews. Visa applicants are invited separately for interviews. In case of security risk the interviews take place at the counter (in the afternoons) and if not, the interview may take place in the consul's office

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom recalls that interviews are essential to the risk-analysis related to illegal immigration and other forms of misuse of visas. EvalCom recommends that interviews are conducted in a separate secure interview room. <sup>6</sup>

## 4.4 Supporting documents

- A health insurance policy valid in Estonia (with a coverage of at least 11 000 € for the entire duration of the stay in Estonia
- Documents confirming the purpose of the visit i.e. a letter of invitation a voucher from a registered tourist/travel agency, a document proving employment in Estonia, tickets, documents confirming accommodation or other similar documents or in a case of a transit visa: a visa entitling entry to the country of final destination,
- If necessary, applicants must prove that they have adequate financial means equal to one fifth of the minimum monthly wage currently 38 € as determined by national legislation for every day that they plan to stay in Estonia. Border guard are entitled to control the financial means.
- Parental authorisation, in case minors are accompanied by others than (at least one of) their parents. This authorisation must be legalised.

## 4.5 Proof of invitation, sponsorship and accommodation.

According to national legislation specific forms must be filled in by sponsors and specific procedure must be followed:

Invitations by natural person (Estonians or aliens permanently residing in Estonia) or legal person in private law :

- 1. must contain following data:
  - details of the inviting person and of the invited persons, information on the purpose of the visit;
  - consent of the inviting person to cover the costs related to the hosting, accommodation, stay of an alien in Estonia and his/her departure, including costs incurred in connection to possible expulsion of an alien from Estonia (such as transport costs and costs of stay in the Expulsion Centre and a detention house of the police)

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Comments by Estonia If no security risk, the applicant may be asked to answer additional explanations in writing.

- 2. must be accompanied by following documents:
  - a duly completed standard form of a visa invitation;
  - a sponsor identification document a copy of the pages of a travel document of an alien who is invited to Estonia
  - a document concerning the economic status of a sponsor (not required from a legal person governed by private law) which enables him to cover the estimated costs of the stay;
  - a state fee

If the invitation is approved by the Citizenship and Migration Board, only a confirmation number is given to the sponsor and all the necessary data of the visa applicant and sponsor are already stored in the visa register and can be checked directly by the consular authority. The applicant must not submit additional documents to the consulates as proof of means of subsistence

Where an invitation is issued by a state or local government agency it shall be signed by the head of the authority. In such cases there is no necessity for the Citizenship and Migration Board to approve it.

Consulates and border police have access to the CMB database which allows for searches on inviting persons in order to detect possible fraud and misuse.

#### 4.6 Administrative fees

Citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova do not pay any fees for single entry B or C visas in accordance with bilateral agreements.

The consular officer is authorised to reduce the fee or process the application free of charge. Such a decision may be based on the economic situation of the person, upon motivated requests of the government, local or foreign authority or a diplomatic note.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom recalls that bilateral agreements on waiver of the handling fee (not covered by EU agreements) must be denounced upon application of the Schengen acquis in full.

The present organisation and work flow cannot be maintained, in particular in relation to the collection of the handling fee, once Estonia will apply the Schengen acquis in full.

**4.7** Practice followed when issuing visas to holders of travel documents not recognized Estonian consular officials do not issue visas to holders of travel documents that are not recognized in Estonia.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

When applying the Schengen acquis in full, Estonia should be aware of the rules applying when other Member States do not recognise a given travel document (i.e issuance of LTV visas).

## 4.8 Travel Medical Insurance (TMI)

Third county nationals (incl. those listed in Annex II of Council Regulation 539/2001) must be in possession of a health insurance policy when travelling to Estonia (with a coverage of at least 11 000 € for the entire duration of the stay in Estonia). Holders of diplomatic passports are exempted from this requirements

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

It is recalled that TMI was introduced as a requirement for visa applicants (Council Decision 2004/17/EC.

## 4.9 Types of visa issued

Type A, B and C visas are issued. Airport transit visas, "A", have not been issued yet. Transit visas, "B", are granted for one-way, two-ways or multiple transits according to the type and validity of country destination visa. Short-stay visas, "C", are granted for one entry, two entries or multiple entries, mainly for tourist, official/business purpose, visits, cultural and sport undertakings. The maximum validity of multiple entry visa is six months.

#### 5. THE VISA STICKER

- printing and affixing - use of the stamp of the issuing authority

The visa sticker is printed and affixed to the passport by the visa officer. The stamp is used by consul only. The sticker is not signed.

#### 6. REFUSALS

#### 6.1 Notification of refusals

Refusals are notified in writing. Grounds for refusal are not given and the decision cannot be appealed. The most frequent reasons for rejecting a visa-application are:

- reasons to believe the applicant will not return when the visa expires (based on a general assessment of the applicants situation / submitted documents
- past history of violating immigration rules
- the applicant is on the blacklist

#### **EvalCom note**

EvalCom recalls that s a consequence of procedural safeguards enjoyed by family members of EU under Directive 2004/38/EC detailed motivation must be given. Estonian legislation has to be adapted accordingly without delay as the implementation period for Directive 2004/38/EC has expired.

## **6.2** Rejection rates

In 2005 the Estonian consular section in Kiev rejected 2,26% of all applications. (The rejection rate for applicants with Moldovan nationality is generally higher than the rate for Ukrainian nationals.) This rate is very low and significantly lover than the rejection rates of the Member States applying the Schengen acquis in full.

#### **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

Compared to the average of all Member States, the refusal rate is extremely low. Awareness of the issue of illegal immigration risk and other form of misuse of visas should be increased as this will become a key issue/fundamental issues when Estonia starts issuing Schengen visa.

#### 7. DESTRUCTION OF VISA STICKERS

When an error is detected on visa sticker before it is put into the passport, a cross is drawn over the kinegramme. The visa is cancelled in the database and the cancelled visa sticker is kept in the safe of the consulate

If the sticker has already been affixed to the passport a line is drawn over the page - the visa is cancelled in the database. Cancelled visa stickers are destroyed from time to time by shredder.

A document with the sticker numbers, signed by the head of mission and the consul justifies the destruction

83 stickers were destroyed in 2005, and so far 61 have been destroyed in 2006.

#### 8. FILING

After each level of processing, the visa applications with passports and supporting documents are stored in the safe. No copy of the personal data page of neither the international nor the internal passport is kept. After the visa has been issued the applications are kept in archive for 2 years, refused visa applications (separately) for 5 years.

## 9. SECURITY

(NB security aspects of the building dealt with in chapter 2)

#### 9.1 Staff

#### 9.1.1 Division of tasks between expatriate staff and local staff

All staff are Estonian citizens and one of them is locally employed.

## 9.1.2 Checks upon recruitment and further evaluation

All personal data of future staff is checked by central authorities in Tallinn before staff can be hired.

#### 9.2 Sensitive documents (incl. transport, storage, access (keys), monitoring of stock)

Visa stickers are delivered to the embassy by diplomatic pouch. The consul gives the daily supply of stickers to the consular officer every day. The official must sign for the number of the received stickers. The visa stickers are stored in a safe connected to the alarm system

EvalCom was informed that currently there is no safe place to keep the key for the safe, so the consul is in possession of the keys 24h/day.

#### 9.3 IT

Entry/access

The Estonian National Visa register is an online computering system which can be accessed by all Estonian Embassies and Consulates Generals. Access to the Visa register is authorised by an administrator located at the MFA, both for expatriates and local staff members. There are different levels of authorisation for access in accordance with the allocation of tasks among staff members. The Consul has the highest access level and total access to databases. Passwords are provided by the system administrator according to the functions of the persons and expire every 90 days. Information is updated, back-up exists.

IT devices are located in a safe room which is permanently watched by one camera. The images are directly sent to the central authorities in Tallinn.

The blanking of screens takes place after 15 minutes, to reopen the system the user of the Visa Register system has to log-in inserting his or her password.

#### 9.4 Encryption

SSL protocol.

## 9.5 Data protection

Antivirus devices - fire wall are installed and updated. Files that the consul is working on are kept in a locked closet.

## **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

It should be ensured that searches in black lists (in future SIS II) can only be carried out in relation with a specific visa application file.

EvalCom recommends that screens are blanked out more rapidly.

#### 10. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

EvalCom was informed that regular in-service training, including IT-training, is provided, both for expatriates and local staff members. Each year regular meetings for consular officers working abroad are held in Tallinn.

Before being posted abroad, consular officers must pass a training and examination in order to receive a professional certificate. Local staff is also trained in Tallinn.

No specific pre-Schengen training has been provided.

## 11. EQUIPMENT FOR DETECTING FALSE DOCUMENTS

A portable device with UV and white light. There also five magnifiers. A handbook containing photos of specimen of travel documents issued worldwide is at the disposal of consular staff.

## **EvalCom comments and recommendations**

EvalCom recommends that the Embassy will be provided with more advanced equipment for detecting false documents as described in CCI, Part V.

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#### 12. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

EvalCom considers that, on the basis of the checks carried out and information gathered, Estonia, as far as its Embassy in Kiev is concerned, may be in position to implement the Schengen Acquis in full in due course.

Nevertheless, EvalCom wishes to comment on certain points which merit special attention or reviewing by the Estonian authorities in order to achieve this objective:

## 1. Organisational aspects

Security standards are satisfactory, except for the lack of protection of the windows in the premises where the main supply of the visa stickers is kept (ref. CCI Part VII, section 1). EvalCom recommends to improve physical security of these premises.

It is recommended that due attention is given to possible increase in the risk of pressure on staff when Estonia starts issuing Schengen visas.

EvalCom recommends that the Embassy will be provided with more advanced equipment for detecting false documents as described in CCI, Part V.

## 2. Practice related to submitting and processing of visa applications

EvalCom recalls the importance of the basic rule of personal appearance (set out in the CCI, Part III, section 4 and Part V, 3rd paragraph) and recommends caution when exemptions from this rule are introduced.

EvalCom recalls that interviews are essential to the risk-analysis related to illegal immigration and other forms of misuse of visas. The privacy of applicants should be provided for during interviews. EvalCom recommends that interviews are conducted in a separate secure interview room

EvalCom considers that the handling time of the visa applications, 10 days, in too long if compared with the daily numbers of applications and should made shorter to prevent visa shopping when Estonia will implement Schengen in full.

When applying the Schengen acquis in full, Estonia have to increase awareness of the illegal immigration as described in the CCI (Part V) to prevent illegal immigration to the other Member States.

Compared to the average of all Member States, the refusal rate is very low. Awareness of the issue of illegal immigration risk and other form of misuse of visas should be increased as this will become a key issue/fundamental issues when Estonia starts issuing Schengen visa.

# 3. <u>Legislative aspects</u>

Measures should be taken to provide for the possibility of both representing and being represented by another Member State for the purpose of issuing visas (ref. CCI, Part II, section 1.2.) when implementing the Schengen acquis in full.

\* \*

EvalCom emphasizes that the above mentioned comments and recommendations under points 1 and 2, which are based on the situation as assessed in Kiev, can be relevant for other locations. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should ensure an appropriate follow up.



# ANNEX I

## VISAS ISSUED BY THE ESTONIAN CONSULATE IN KIEV IN 2005

	VisasA	VisasB	Visas C	Total Visas	Visas D	Total Visas	Visas Not Issued	Rejection Rate	Rejection
				A+B+C		A+B+C+D			Rate in %
January	0	6	323	329	0	329	1	0	0.00
February	0	0	356	356	0	356	0	11	3.09
March	0	2	447	449	0	449	2	7	1.56
April	0	2	483	485	0	485	0	4	0.82
May	0	3	678	681	0	681	0	21	3.08
June	0	7	691	698	0	698	0	16	2.29
July	0	19	802	821	0'	821	1	32	3.90
August	0	8	613	621	0	621	1	4	0.64
September	0	1	440	441	0	441	1	27	6.12
October	0	0	403	403	0	403	1	3	0.74
November	0	0	556	556	0	556	6	14	2.52
December	0	11	556	567	0	567	0	13	2.29
Total	0	59	6348	6407	0	6407	13	152	2.26

## VISAS ISSUED BY THE ESTONIAN CONSULATE IN KIEV IN 2006

	VisasA	VisasB	Visas C	Total Visas A+B+C	Visas D	Total Visas A+B+C+D	Visas Not Issued	Rejection Rate	Rejection Rate in %
January	0	5	376	381	9	390	1	6	153
February	0	4	324	328	7	335	2	2	059
March	0	2	756	758	2	760	1	15	197
April	0	85	459	544	12	556	0	13	233
May	0	20	1016	1036	12	1048	0	8	0.76
June	0	32	899	931	10	941	0	5	0.53
July	0	18	1000	1018	18	1036	1	15	1.45
Total	0	166	4830	4996	70	5066	5	64	1.26

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# ANNEX II

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