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Delegations will find in annex the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018.

# TE SAT

EUROPEAN UNION  
**TERRORISM  
SITUATION  
AND TREND  
REPORT**

**2018**



 **EUROPOL**

TE  
SAT  
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**EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2018**

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# FOREWORD

In 2017 European countries were again hit by terrorist attacks and there were many innocent victims of this indiscriminate violence. It therefore goes without saying that combatting terrorism remains a top priority for Europol.

To fight terrorism, it is essential to have optimal information exchange and accurate data. That is why the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was created in 2007 so that the European Parliament and all national governments and police forces have an overview of the European situation on an annual basis. Since the first report, which gave an overview of the situation in 2006, many things have changed. Although it already appeared that the internet played an important role in the radicalisation of some perpetrators, and terrorists showed a preference for improvised explosive devices, the terrorist landscape has further diversified and the threat has increased.

In the years following the first edition of the TE-SAT, the overall number of terrorist attacks in the European Union (EU) decreased, largely owing to a substantial drop in the number of separatist attacks, which over a

ten-year period comprised the largest proportion of attacks reported by Member States. In contrast, the threat of jihadist terror has increased considerably since 2006, culminating in large-scale attacks such as those in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels, Nice and Berlin in 2016. Attacks committed by right-wing extremists have rarely been reported by Member States over the years and were therefore never prominently covered in the TE-SAT. The same applies to acts of single-issue terrorism, whereas left-wing extremist terrorism appears to be a constant in some Member States, as reflected in the TE-SAT reports over the years. However, none of the reported activities in any terrorist category have been as lethal and have had such an impact on society as a whole as those committed by jihadist terrorists – such as those also committed in 2017 and since the beginning of 2018.

This 2018 edition of the annual TE-SAT provides an overview of the nature

and volume of terrorism that the EU faced in 2017. Although the majority of Member States reported that they did not experience any terrorist attacks during the reporting period, the human suffering and the threat of attacks remains high. In this report you will not only find information about how many terrorist attacks took place in 2017, but also the number of arrests and convictions for terrorist crimes. A brief overview of the terrorist situation outside the EU is also included.

I would like to thank all EU Member States, Eurojust and our cooperation partners outside the EU for their contributions to the TE-SAT 2018. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the work of the members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the 'troika' (Presidencies of the Council of the EU, namely Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria), France, Spain, Eurojust, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Their valuable contributions were indispensable for the production of this 2018 edition of the TE-SAT.

The numbers in this report are not just statistics. Behind every number is human suffering. I therefore want to close this foreword with a thought for the victims of terrorist violence.

**"We must never forget that behind every number there is an innocent victim."**



**Catherine de Bolle**  
Executive Director of Europol

# TRENDS

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## # 1

In recent years there has been an increase in the frequency of jihadist attacks, but a decrease in the sophistication of their preparation and execution. Jihadist attacks, however, cause more deaths and casualties than any other terrorist attacks.

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## # 2

Recent attacks by jihadist terrorists have followed three patterns: indiscriminate killings (London, March and June 2017; and Barcelona, August 2017); attacks on symbols of Western lifestyle (Manchester, May 2017); and attacks on symbols of authority (Paris, February, June and August 2017). New attacks in the EU by jihadist terrorists following one of these patterns or a combination thereof are highly likely.

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## # 3

Jihadist attacks are committed primarily by home-grown terrorists, radicalised in their country of residence without having travelled to join a terrorist group abroad. This group of home-grown actors is highly diverse, consisting of individuals who have been born in the EU or have lived in the EU most of their lives, may have been known to the police but not for terrorist activities and often do not have direct links to the Islamic State (IS) or any other jihadist organisation.

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## # 4

Recent attacks prove jihadist terrorists' preference for attacking people rather than other targets provoking less of an emotional response from the general public, such as damage to premises or loss of capital.

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## # 5

Jihadist terrorists may operate in groups, but have often found to be lone actors. They may have managed to keep their environment completely in the dark about their intentions prior to the attack. However they may have friends and relatives in their environment who know of, sympathise with, facilitate or even assist in the preparation of an attack.

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## # 6

The number of individuals travelling to the conflict zones in Iraq or Syria to join jihadist terrorist groups as foreign terrorist fighters has dropped significantly since 2015. The number of returnees was low in 2017.

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## # 7

Online propaganda and networking via social media are still essential to terrorist attempts to reach out to EU audiences for recruitment, radicalisation and fundraising. As IS's capacities to produce new propaganda material are severely affected by losses of both operatives and infrastructure, the group continues to spread its message to wide audiences, by increasingly redistributing older material by new means.

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## # 8

The often rudimentary and fragmented knowledge of Islam of (aspiring) jihadist terrorists makes them vulnerable to being influenced and manipulated by those who selectively use religious texts to fit a violent ideology.



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## # 9

The degradation of IS organisational structures may reduce the attractiveness of the group. However, this may not affect the threat of jihadist terrorism, as disaffected IS members and sympathisers – including those residing in EU Member States – will likely continue to adhere to jihadist beliefs and might be drawn to join other groups, such as al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is still a powerful player and actively encourages terrorist attacks in the EU. Near-future terrorist activities in the EU ordered, guided or inspired by al-Qaeda or other jihadist organisations remain a realistic possibility.

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## # 10

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks continue to far outnumber attacks carried out by violent extremists inspired by any other ideologies or motivations.

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## # 11

The violent right-wing extremist spectrum is expanding, partly fuelled by fears of a perceived Islamisation of society and anxiety over migration.


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## # 12

There is no evidence of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weaponry being used by terrorists in the EU, despite indications of jihadist terrorists taking an active interest in its possibilities. Improvised explosive devices, firearms and improvised weapon, such as knives and vehicles, are the weapons of choice with which recent attacks were carried out. These weapons, except for explosive devices, do not require much preparation or special skills to be employed in terrorist attacks, which are either carefully prepared or carried out spontaneously.



# 1/ GENERAL OVERVIEW



# terrorist attacks and suspects arrested

## Attacks

In 2017 a total of 205 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks were reported by nine EU Member States. The United Kingdom (UK) experienced the highest number of attacks (107<sup>1</sup>), followed by France (54), Spain (16), Italy (14), and Greece (8). Belgium and Germany reported 2 attacks each; Finland and Sweden noted 1 attack each. Spain, Finland and Sweden reported on jihadist terrorist attacks after a long period of having been unaffected by this phenomenon. In 2017 68 victims died as a result of terrorist attacks and 844 people were injured<sup>2</sup>. Similarly to 2016, nearly all reported fatalities and casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks<sup>3</sup>.

The total number of attacks (205) is a deviation of the downward trend that started in 2014 owing to a 45 % increase in the number of attacks in 2017 compared to 2016 (142).


Overall, attacks specifically classified as ethno-nationalist and separatist accounted for the largest proportion (137) and represent an increase

<sup>1</sup> 88 attacks reported by the UK were acts of security-related incidents in Northern Ireland. Of these, five involved attacks on national security targets.

<sup>2</sup> Data sourced from media reports and contributions of EU Member States. Figures exclude casualties of Northern Ireland security-related incidents.

<sup>3</sup> 62 people died and 819 were injured in jihadist attacks in 2017.

**figure 1**  
Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks from 2014 to 2017.




compared to 2016 (99). The countries reporting terrorist attacks linked to separatist terrorism are the UK (88), France (42) and Spain (7). The number of jihadist terrorist attacks more than doubled, from 13 in 2016 to 33 in 2017. Attacks carried out by left-wing terrorists reached a total of 24, of which most were reported by Greece (8) or performed by Greek perpetrators in other countries (2).

Terrorist attacks primarily targeted civilians and private enterprises, followed by public institutions and representatives of law enforcement

(police and military forces). In terms of weaponry, the use of firearms and explosives were the most prevalent<sup>4</sup>. However, compared to previous year, the use of explosives decreased from 40% to 30%. Firearms were used in 41% of all attacks, a slight increase compared to 2016 (38%). Hungary mentions that because of the past conflicts between Western Balkan countries and the ongoing unrest in Ukraine, large amounts of small arms are available on the market.

**figure 2**  
Failed, foiled or completed attacks by affiliation in 2017.




<sup>4</sup> 88 security-related incidents in Northern Ireland included 58 shooting incidents and 30 bombings.



## Arrests

**figure 3**  
Number of arrested suspects from 2014 to 2017.



In 2017 a total of 975 individuals were arrested in the EU for terrorism-related offences, which represents a continuation of a downward trend (1077 in 2015; 1002 in 2016). 18 EU Member States reported arrests of suspects. Similarly to 2016, the overall number of arrested persons remained highest in France (411), the UK (168) and Spain (91).

Most arrests (705 out of 791<sup>3</sup>) were related to jihadist terrorism. This number does not follow the trend of a continuous increase in jihadist arrests prevalent over the past three years (395 in 2014; 687 in 2015; and 718 in 2016). Similar to 2016 the number of arrests for left-wing and right-wing terrorism remained low (36 and 20 arrested persons in 2017 respectively; 31 and 12 – in 2016). The number of arrests for separatist terrorist offences continued to decrease sharply (168 in

2015; 84 in 2016 and 30 in 2017).

In 2017 most arrests (660) were performed on suspicion of participating in activities of a terrorist group; planning; and preparing attacks. 73 persons were arrested on suspicion of facilitating terrorism (dissemination of propaganda, recruitment and financing of terrorism). Arrests for travelling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes continued to decrease for the third year in a row (141 in 2015; 77 in 2016 and 28 in 2017).

The average age of those arrested was 30, with 45% of the suspects falling in the range of 20-30 years old; 25% in the range 30-40 years old. More than 80% of the arrestees were male. The number of EU citizens among the arrestees comprises 50% and is between the proportions of previous years (58% in 2015; 43% in 2016).

<sup>3</sup> 184 terrorism-related arrests for 2017 were reported without differentiating between types of terrorism, therefore they are not included in the ranking.



**figure 4**  
Attacks and arrests by EU Member State in 2017.

**ATT** ATTACKS    **ARR** ARRESTS

# terrorist and violent extremist activities

## Financing of terrorism

In 2017 Member States carried out several investigations into financing of terrorism. One major investigation focused on a large network of Lebanese nationals offering money laundering services to organised crime groups in the EU and using a share of the profits to finance terrorism-related activities of the Lebanese Hezbollah's military wing. The cooperation of these money launderers and Hezbollah's military wing was a clear example of a nexus between organised crime and terrorism. Another such investigation dealt with the financial support of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the conflict zones in the Middle East (Iraq and Syria) and North Africa (Libya). This investigation uncovered the mechanism used by FTFs to obtain financial support from their families in Europe through a network of facilitators and money collectors. The monitoring of around 5 000 money transfers from around 2 000 senders to around 1 000 recipients, for a total amount of more than EUR 2 million, provided proof of life of known FTFs and, interestingly, also identified previously unknown FTFs and sympathisers of IS.

The above investigations and other cases of financing of terrorism together illustrate the diverse methods that the financing of terrorism may employ, from very basic to highly complex schemes. In terrorism financing, cash transactions, in which couriers may be used, and unregulated and illegal financial networks take a prominent role. The use of informal value transfer services<sup>6</sup> adds significant complexities to

<sup>6</sup> Hawala is an informal method of money transfer based on trust and honour, operating outside the traditional banking system, whereby money is paid to a network of brokers (known as a hawaladars).

ascertaining the origin and destination of financial transactions. Value transfer systems such as hawala are highly adaptable to conditions such as war, economic sanctions and blockades, and are reliable alternative outside of the conventional banking system. They offer possibility to transfer money without direct money/value flows between sender and receiver thus tracing the money/value flow in a hawala network is virtually impossible. Many prominent hawala operators are based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which frequently serves as the international platform for illicit finance activities.

Money being transferred via the hawala system generally moves from – and not to – the EU. It is probable that hawala is used more often by support networks that send money to terrorist organisations abroad than for plotting attacks within the EU.

Diaspora communities living in the EU play a significant role in financing and procurement activities for conflicts in their countries of origin. There is a high potential for mobilisation with regard to fundraising among jihadist sympathisers. In most cases, the calls for donations are made in mosques, via websites and web fora. Non-profit organisations (NPO) may be used for money laundering and terrorism financing under the umbrella of humanitarian activities.

The *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) is known to systematically and, if need be, forcibly collect funds in the EU to finance its activities. The organisation also uses front organisations and charities in the EU for this purpose and is suspected of being involved in criminal activities to supplement its income to cover expenses in Turkey, the Middle East and Europe.




Kidnapping remains a high-profile form of jihadist terrorism impacting on foreign nationals overseas. The prospect of large ransom payments, apart from prisoner exchanges or increased notoriety via propaganda, ensures terrorist groups continue to view foreign hostages as valuable commodities.

Most terrorist activities with which the EU was confronted in recent years, irrespective of affiliation, were inexpensive and did not require external sources of funding, in particular attacks committed by lone actors using weapons such as cars and knives. For instance, micro-financing of jihadist groups operating in the EU usually works via the private financial means of group members. In addition to licit employment incomes, state subsidies and social benefits, funds provided from like-minded individuals within the community are the main sources of income. Dissident Republicans in Northern Ireland are associated with both minor and serious criminality, including drug dealing, extortion and fuel laundering<sup>1</sup>. Anarchist and right-wing extremist groups are mainly financed by their members through contributions and fundraising events (parties, concerts). Members of the anarchist and left-wing extremist milieus have been found to sometimes revert to crime (robberies of banks and supermarkets).

Virtual currencies, among which Bitcoin is the most well-known, have gained popularity due to their key characteristics that include ease of access, anonymity, safe transactions, low cost and high speed for international transfers. Their expansion among terrorist organisations, however, seems to be slow and has not yet matched the use made of them by organised crime groups, especially those involved in cybercrime. The number of known cases of virtual currencies related to terrorism financing remains very low.

<sup>1</sup> Fuel laundering is removing the dye from low-price dyed fuel and selling it illegally at the higher price of undyed fuel.



## Explosives

Although the majority of attacks in 2017 were committed using simple means, the use of explosives remains a preferred modus operandi for terrorists, because of their proven effectiveness and, for jihadist terrorists in particular, their ability to create mass casualties and high media impact. In a number of jihadist attacks in 2017, the perpetrators wore person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) in suicide vests or belts, although these mostly proved to be fake.

Anarchist groups have used explosives against state structures, including public services and services of general

interest; economic structures, such as banks, branches of multinational companies; and law enforcement targets. These anarchist groups either sent parcels with explosive contents to their targets by postal services, left improvised explosive devices (IEDs), improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) at their target locations, or carried out attacks by throwing IEDs or IIDs while passing their targets.

However, lacking the ability to acquire military-grade explosives and firearms, or having no wish to do so (possibly to evade the higher risk of detection) has led terrorists to primarily use rudimentary IEDs made of home-made explosives (HMEs). The HME production undertaken by the cell responsible for the August 2017 attacks in Barcelona



and Cambrils, for example, has shown that jihadist individuals and groups may have the ambition to execute complex plans and conduct large-scale IED attacks. The acquisition of HME-making knowledge has mostly been facilitated by the internet and encrypted social networks, such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Facebook. Even though content such as bomb-making instructions is continually removed from the internet, various sites persist where such information can be retrieved. The internet is also increasingly used for online procurement of explosives precursors through web shops located in various EU Member States. The procurement of explosives precursors from outside the EU is also facilitated by legal companies apparently

conducting legitimate business.

With regard to HMEs used by jihadist terrorists, triacetone triperoxide (TATP) continued to be predominant. It was noted however, that in some cases, terrorists used TATP in combination with other types of explosive materials, in order to enhance the IED's power and aggravate their lethal effects. In those instances TATP has mostly been used as a booster, while the terrorists used ammonium nitrate (AN)-based explosives and/or gas cylinders/ cartridges as a main or additional charge.

In 2017 IEDs used in anarchist attacks were made from an array of readily available shop-bought materials. They were simple devices for which no

special knowledge was required. The attack methodologies and capabilities used by Dissident Republican (DR) groups in Northern Ireland vary. In many attacks, firearms or small IEDs such as pipe bombs were used, but they also deployed larger and/or potentially more destructive devices such as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs). All groups retain access to a range of firearms and explosives and there is an ever-present threat of under-vehicle IED attacks.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) and illicit trafficking of explosives from former conflict areas still present a significant threat to the EU. Hand grenades, rocket launchers, high-grade explosives and detonators are mostly used by various organised crime groups. However, some terrorist groups, such as Northern Irish DR groups, are known to have acquired and used these weapons as well. Some of the military explosive ordnance is sourced via thefts from military explosive storage facilities and the illegal collection of ERW and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

The use of pyrotechnics in constructing IEDs is mostly employed by left-wing extremist and separatist groups. However, there have also been cases in which jihadists have misused pyrotechnic articles (alone or in combination with HMEs) in preparing IED attacks. This development might be explained, at least partially, by the lack of success by some terrorists with regard to producing and using TATP. In addition to legal pyrotechnics shops and illegal street markets, online shops and vendors on various social networks have become the main sources of illegal pyrotechnic articles. Their characteristics and availability make pyrotechnics a viable alternative to TATP and their use in IEDs has been widely promoted in various online jihadist bomb-making instructions. Using gas cylinders to cause explosions in attacks is also promoted through these media.



## Threats to contaminate food by anarchists

On 19 December 2017 anarchists published threats on the internet to contaminate food products in Athens and Thessaloniki in Greece. An activist group claimed to have deliberately introduced hydrochloric acid in soft drinks, milk, sausages and sauces. A post by user Green-Black Commando titled "Green Nemesis Act 3" on the Athens Indymedia website warned that the group had poisoned several drink products of multinational companies with hydrochloric acid and that they would be replacing the items on supermarket shelves shortly after. They also posted online photos showing the poison being injected into the products. Similar threats of food contamination in Greece were published by anarchists in previous years, in 2016<sup>9</sup> and 2013<sup>10</sup>. These plans usually involve targeting major multinational corporations in order to force them to withdraw their products, thereby generating significant loss of revenue, in particular during busy periods of the year.

<sup>9</sup> In December 2016 Greek anarchists published a warning claiming they contaminated several food and drink products produced by multinational companies. The operation called Green Nemesis #2 was planned to take place during the Christmas and New Year period in the Attica region of Greece. The warning message posted on the anarchist website explained how to introduce chlorine and hydrochloric acid to products while leaving packaging intact.

<sup>10</sup> Similar threats to contaminate beverages produced by the same multinational company were also expressed in December 2013.

## CBRN

As in previous years, no terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) substances were recorded in the EU in 2017. No EU Member States reported that any of their investigations involved planning or preparations for terrorist attacks with a CBRN component, such as recruitment of skilled individuals, attempts to access CBRN facilities or to acquire CBRN materials.

CBRN-related topics recurrently appeared in the terrorist propaganda online. The number of online jihadist propaganda messages and tutorials addressed to lone actors and proposing easy-to-implement scenarios for small scale CBRN attacks increased compared to previous years. In particular, several jihadist media outlets used social media channels to release knowledge about chemical weapons and related terror tactics in 2017.

CBRN materials recommended as terrorist weapons are usually toxic industrial chemicals accessible within the EU due to their dual use nature and use in many peaceful applications. Several documents from the "Knights

of Lone Jihad" series<sup>8</sup>, released by *Furat Wilayah* Channel in English in 2017, specifically suggested CBRN scenarios involving food and water contamination as possible terrorist tactics for lone actors. The proposed simple methods with use of available means allow untrained individuals, even lone actors, to put in practice attacks with CBRN materials. By suggesting simple methodologies, terrorist organisations make CBRN attacks more accessible with the intention of increasing the number of attempts in the hope of carrying out a successful attack regardless of the initial scientific knowledge or experience of the actor.

A plot to create an improvised dispersal device to release toxic hydrogen sulphide gas, which was disrupted in Australia when the suspects were arrested on 29 July 2017, illustrates the intent of jihadist terrorists to use chemical weapons in a terrorist attack in the West. In this CBRN terrorist-related case, the perpetrators had reached the preparation phase, including procuring components and precursors, designing, and testing a device.

<sup>8</sup> Series of articles published on social media.





## Recruitment and propaganda

By 2017 over 150 social media platforms were identified as being abused by terrorists for propaganda dissemination<sup>11</sup>. Additionally file sharing sites are used to store and disseminate terrorist content, messaging and bot services advertise links to such content and social media aggregators store and stream content to other social media platforms. Industry and law enforcement action however have resulted in a reduction of the terrorist abuse of mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, but similar progress has yet to be made with start-up social media and companies with limited resources.

Most terrorist activity concerns the surface web. Some terrorist activity however can also be found on the Darknet. This mostly relates to fundraising campaigns, the use of illicit markets and further advertisement of propaganda hosted on mainstream social media.

<sup>11</sup> Eurapol, *Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2017*, 2017, p. 53.

## Cyber-attacks

While terrorist groups use the internet to reach their followers and spread their message, their capability to launch attacks via the internet appears to remain extremely limited. The absence of any major cyber-attacks by terrorist organisations can be interpreted as the result of a lack of appropriate technical skills within the groups. A number of cyber-terrorist groups have come to light over the past few years. However the overall threat from a cyber-attack of terrorist origin appears to remain low.

The Islamic State Hacking Division, also known as the United Cyber Caliphate, incorporates any online group identifying itself as the digital army for IS. To date, this has included the Caliphate Cyber Army, which was largely responsible for a number of website defacements; the Islamic Cyber Army, which is believed to be focused on gathering intelligence related to the energy industry and power grids, purportedly in preparation of an attack; and the Sons of the Caliphate Army, which focuses on hacking social media

accounts on Facebook and Twitter. More recently, in December 2017, the Electronic Ghosts of the Caliphate (EGC) threatened to conduct a global cyber-attack. However no attack materialised.

Some studies<sup>12</sup> suggest that, rather than trying to develop their own capability and tools, some terrorist groups now turn to online criminal markets, using the crime-as-a-service industry to buy access to the capabilities that they themselves are lacking. If this is true, it is likely that the effectiveness of cyber-terrorist groups will increase, perhaps with short delay. Such attacks are unlikely to create as much public attention as a real-world attack. However a cyber-attack may amplify the impact of a real-world attack, if carried out in conjunction with the latter, in what may be called a hybrid attack, for example, by disrupting emergency or other essential public services.

<sup>12</sup> Walt K., *Cyber jihadists dabble in DDOS: Assessing the Threat*, 2017, <https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/cyber-jihadists-ddos>



# convictions and penalties

In 2017 17 Member States reported a total of 565 individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences<sup>13</sup>. This number is similar to the numbers submitted over the past two years<sup>14</sup>.

In 2017 the UK was the Member State that reported the highest number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences

<sup>13</sup> Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2017 from the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

If a verdict pronounced in 2017 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final verdict.

<sup>14</sup> Please refer to Annex I for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.

(125), followed by France (120) and Belgium (85)<sup>15</sup>. In France and Spain four individuals were tried twice during the year in different terrorism proceedings. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2017 was 569.

Some of the defendants who appeared before courts in the EU Member States were minor of age at the time of trial and/or when the offences were committed. The number of female defendants judged in 2017 (66) increased compared to 2016 (53). The practice in some countries to render sentences in absentia continued with

<sup>15</sup> The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2017 refers only to convictions.

respect to defendants who were believed to be in conflict zones or were claimed to have died but were not officially declared dead. Some individuals sentenced for terrorist offences in 2017 had previously been convicted of terrorism in the same Member State or abroad.


The majority of the verdicts reported in 2017 are final, while others are pending judicial remedy, as appeals have been submitted<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> According to Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, the information to be submitted to Eurojust is in relation to final convictions. Due to the specifics of reporting, some Member States submit information on final decisions only, while other Member States report also on not final decisions. The data provided by the UK did not distinguish between final decisions and decisions pending judicial remedy. As reported, all convictions in the UK are effective from the moment of their being pronounced, even if an appeal is made.

**figure 5**

Number of **individuals in concluded court proceedings** for terrorist offences in 2015, 2016 and 2017, as reported to Eurojust\*.

\* The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.



## Type of terrorism

In 2017 the vast majority of verdicts (352) in the Member States concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015<sup>17</sup>. Similar to the recent years, the largest part of the verdicts for jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq; however persons who had engaged with Al Qaeda, the Taliban or Al-Shabaab were also tried in 2017. In one case in Austria a member of Hamas was imprisoned for life after the Supreme Court found him guilty of membership in a terrorist organisation and attempted incitement to murder as terrorist crime.

The highest number of verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2017 (114) were rendered in France. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden reported only verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2017. The vast majority of jihadist terrorism verdicts rendered in 2017 was in relation to ISIL or its affiliated groups.

In Belgium, for example, seven members of the Salafist group Way of Life were sentenced to prison terms of up to five years by the Criminal Court

<sup>17</sup> The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the numbers that follow.

of Antwerp in July 2017. The court found them guilty of (attempted) participation in the activities of a terrorist group (ISIL). The court found that three of the defendants had formed the core of Way of Life – the new jihadist group that adopted the ideology of the banned Sharia4Belgium – and had tried to recruit young men via a non-profit organisation. Four of the defendants had unsuccessfully tried to reach Syria, while two others had succeeded and one already returned. Some of the verdicts were appealed and upheld by the Court of Appeal of Antwerp in December 2017.

In Italy the Court of Appeal of Trento confirmed a sentence issued by a lower court against four members of the Merano cell of the terrorist group Rawti Shax. Rawti Shax had cells in Europe and the Middle East that communicated and operated via the internet and had provided logistical and financial support to recruiting foreign terrorist fighters to be sent to Iraq and Syria. Their stated aim was to establish a theocratic state and to overthrow the government of Kurdistan. The Merano cell members had been arrested as part of a big multinational operation coordinated by Eurojust in November 2015. The court ruled that they were theoretically capable of carrying out attacks and confirmed the six-year sentence given to one of the group members and the

four-year sentences given to the other three.

In Spain six men were sentenced to six years in prison each after the National Court found them guilty of membership in a terrorist organisation. The six had supported Muslim radical extremism, aiming to recruit fighters for Al Qaeda in order to carry out attacks in the Maghreb or in the West. They had used several networks, such as Blogger, Contactime, Facebook, Flickr, Google+, Issuu, Paltalk, Scribd, Twitter and YouTube, to spread propaganda, share their strong disapproval of Western society, distribute combat manuals to train their followers for potential missions, and organise meetings. One of the men had established Sharia4Spain, the Spanish branch of the global Sharia4 movement. The group had also established an independent system for financing its activities and had shown a particular interest in the development of biological or chemical weapons.

In 2017 courts in the EU Member States continued to refer to the so-called ISIL registration forms filled in upon entry into the terrorist organisation. In the Netherlands, for example, the authorities launched an investigation into alleged participation in a terrorist organisation triggered by information on such a registration form provided to the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service



by the US Department of Defense. Corroborating it with other evidence, the District Court of Rotterdam held that the registration form attributed to the defendant was authentic. Owing to the nature of the information that would have been primarily known to the defendant, the court considered it proven that he had provided the information stated in the registration form. The ISIL registration forms were also introduced in evidence in two cases in Denmark.

As in previous years, Spanish courts tried the largest number of individuals charged with separatist terrorism offences in the EU in 2017. One of them belonged to the terrorist group *Resistência Galega* (RG, Galician Resistance), while all others belonged to or were affiliated with *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA, Basque Fatherland and Liberty). In France, Germany and the Netherlands, PKK members were convicted of offences, including participation in a terrorist organisation, financing of terrorism, complicity in money laundering, recruitment and/or training of its members, while in Belgium four people were acquitted for alleged fund raising for the PKK. In the Netherlands also five members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were sentenced by the Supreme Court to serve prison terms for their role in the terrorist group, after the court ruled that the claim that LTTE fighters could be defined as “combatants” cannot be supported under international humanitarian law and they can be prosecuted and sentenced under

Dutch criminal law. In Lithuania a man who had attempted to support and finance the Real IRA was imprisoned by the Court of Appeal.

In 2017 courts in the Czech Republic, Greece and Spain heard left-wing terrorism cases, marking an increase in such cases compared to last year. Germany was the only Member State that reported verdicts for right-wing terrorist offences. The majority of the female defendants (42) were tried for jihadist terrorist offences confirming an upward trend from the past couple of years.

## Type of offences

In a large number of cases concluded in 2017 the defendants were brought to court on charges of participation in (the activities of) a terrorist group. In May 2017 in Germany, for example, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin convicted a 20-year old Syrian man of membership in a terrorist organisation and sentenced him to a five-year juvenile sentence. Before moving to Germany in August 2015 and being recognised as a refugee, the defendant had been a member of ISIL in Syria. In 2013 he participated in the siege of an airport and in the spring of 2014 in a city siege eastern Syria. After arriving in Germany, he became a contact person for ISIL in Germany. He provided them with information about soft targets in Berlin, well aware that such information could be used to plan terrorist attacks.

A smaller number of the defendants in 2017 were tried for glorification of terrorism, recruitment and (self-) training for terrorist purposes, financing of terrorism, instigation to commit terrorist acts, or for attempting to commit such crimes. In some cases, terrorism charges were filed in parallel with charges for other offences, e.g. murder, possession of weapons and explosives, war crimes, or forgery of official documents.

In Spain a 38-year old man was sentenced to five years in prison for having used social platforms to spread the word and symbols of ISIL and to recruit female minors to travel to the ISIL-controlled areas in Iraq and Syria and marry fighters there. He contacted the girls at an Islamic cultural centre with the intention of indoctrinating them and offering them the possibility to travel to Syria.

In a case that had no precedent in Sweden, the Court of Appeal of Malmö confirmed the six month sentence issued earlier in 2017 by the Malmö District Court against a man who had urged others to finance ISIL via Facebook. The court admitted in evidence that he had posted a message asking for help to supply weapons to those fighting “at the front”. The message also contained the names of two people who could be contacted in order to transfer the money; one of them is on the United Nations (UN) and EU lists of terrorist financiers. The court heard that the post could be accessed by anyone, even without a Facebook account.





In the Netherlands the brother of a Dutch fighter in Syria was found guilty of financing of terrorism, among others, and given a two-year prison sentence for sending approximately EUR 17 000 to his brother via a middleman in Turkey. The court held that the man was well aware of the actions of his brother and those of ISIL in Syria. By providing financial support to a person whose involvement in terrorism was known to him, the man consciously accepted the significant possibility that these funds be used for the purpose of committing terrorist offences.

The female defendants in 2017 were tried for preparing to commit terrorist acts, participation in or collaboration with a terrorist organisation, financing of terrorism, glorification of terrorism, spreading messages inciting to commit a terrorist offence.

In Denmark a teenage girl was found guilty of attempted terrorism for having tried to make bombs to be used in terrorist attacks against her own former local school and against a Jewish school in Copenhagen. The first attack was not carried out because she did not receive an order from ISIL/ jihadists with whom she corresponded via the internet. The second attack was prevented as she was arrested by the police. The girl, who lived in a village in the countryside, became radicalised via the internet and chat contacts in just a few months after having converted to Islam. She bought chemicals to produce TATP and started experiments with the substance in the basement of her house. She was

15 years old when she committed the offence.

In Spain the National Court sentenced a 20-year-old Moroccan woman to five years in prison. The court found that she became radicalised since 2015 and shared her religious and political views on social media. She posted messages supporting ISIL and the jihad and planned to travel to the conflict zone controlled by ISIL and wished to marry a mujahid. She posted photos and videos of ISIL fighters and executions via Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. She also accessed chat rooms used and managed by ISIL members. The court found her guilty of collaboration with a terrorist organisation.

In the Netherlands the first female returnee to be sentenced for terrorist offence was given a two-year prison term, of which one year on probation. She was convicted for having helped her husband travel to Syria and participate in the fighting there.

## Convictions and acquittals

In 2017 Denmark and Estonia were the only two Member States that had convictions and no acquittals for terrorist offences<sup>19</sup>. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain also witnessed a vast majority of successful prosecutions resulting in convictions for terrorist offences. The record high

conviction rate registered in 2016 (89%) continued in 2017. In some cases defendants were acquitted of terrorist offences but convicted of other offences, such as an attack on air transport, drug trafficking, burglary, attempted extortion, preparation of an explosion, theft, firearms offences, and abduction of a minor<sup>20</sup>.

All prosecutions for right-wing terrorist offences resulted in convictions in 2017. The concluded jihadist terrorism cases continued to have a very high conviction rate (89%), similar to 2016 (92%) and 2015 (94%). The acquittal rate among the verdicts related to separatist and left-wing terrorism was higher (29% and 28% respectively)<sup>20</sup>. In Spain, for example, the National Court acquitted an ETA member for his alleged role in an attack on a local government building in Guipuzcoa in July 1995. The attack had been carried out by ETA's *Donosti* command in 1995, using a grenade launcher and two grenades. The court ruled that the defendant was no longer criminally liable for the alleged acts, due to the application of the statute of limitations. In Greece the criminal prosecution of some acts in a left-wing terrorism case was definitively ended due to the statute of limitations.

<sup>19</sup> Euro just considers it as one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism.

<sup>20</sup> The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate.

<sup>19</sup> The UK data for 2017 refers only to convictions and is not included in the numbers in this section.



## Penalties

The average prison sentence for terrorist offences in the EU in 2017 was five years<sup>21</sup>, similar to that of 2016. The lowest prison sentence ordered by courts in the EU Member States in 2017 was 45 days. Sentences of up to five years of imprisonment remained the majority of the penalties handed down with the guilty verdicts in 2017 (61%); sentences of ten or more years of imprisonment remained similar to 2016 (12%).

The most severe penalty – imprisonment of 158 years – was handed to an ETA member in Spain convicted of 11 counts of attempted assassination. As mentioned above, in Austria a 27-year-old member of Hamas was sentenced to life-long imprisonment for having used social media to call on others to kill Jews in Jerusalem. The same sentence was pronounced in Germany against a man who had attempted to attack Bonn train station in December 2012 and planned the murder of a political party leader. Courts in the UK also gave life sentences to persons found guilty of preparing to commit acts of terrorism.

It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case would depend on the respective offence and cannot serve any comparative purposes. Additionally, in some Member States the average sentence is calculated on the basis of one conviction, while in others it is based on a considerably higher number of convictions.

Left-wing terrorist offences continued to bear the highest average prison sentence (ten years). The average prison sentence for jihadist terrorist offences remained five years and four years for separatist and right-wing terrorist offences<sup>22</sup>.

In addition to prison terms, several courts imposed fines, restrictions on civil rights, travel bans and expulsion from the national territory. In France some of the convicted persons were written in the national judicial database for terrorist offenders. In some cases youth penalties were given or the sentence was partially or fully suspended. In other cases the sentencing or the execution of the prison sentence was postponed upon certain conditions, or no penalty was yet ordered at the time of reporting.

In the cases in which the guilty verdicts did not result in prison sentences, the courts ruled on fines, community service, rehabilitation, or community orders. Treatment in a mental health institution was ordered in some cases, in addition to or as an alternative to imprisonment. In one occasion it was also ordered for a person declared insane and acquitted of terrorist offences.

<sup>21</sup> For the purpose of the calculation of the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years. In the cases where the court ordered a minimum number of years of the life sentence to be served, the sentence was included in the overview with the minimum number of years indicated.

<sup>22</sup> The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview.

figure 6

Average sentences (excluding non-prison penalties) per Member State in 2017, as reported to Eurojust.

### Average sentence in years




\*The average sentence is based on one conviction.




# 2/ JIHADIST TERRORISM





**figure 7**  
Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in EU Member States in 2017.



**figure 8**  
Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism from 2013 to 2017.



# terrorist attacks and suspects arrested in the EU

EU Member States reported 33 foiled, failed and completed jihadist terrorist attacks in 2017, more than double the figure of 2016 (13). Ten of the 33 attacks were assessed as having been completed, i.e. perceived by EU Member States as having reached the goals that the perpetrators may have had in mind, which invariably seems to be the killing of what the perpetrators perceived as “enemies of Islam”, as legitimised by jihadist ideology. 12 attacks were assessed to have failed to reach their objectives in full, and 11 were foiled – mostly in France and the UK.

A total of 62 people were killed in ten of the 33 attacks. Reportedly most fatalities were in the UK (35<sup>23</sup>), followed by Spain (16), Sweden (5), France (3), Finland (2) and Germany (1). In addition a total of 819 people were injured in 14 attacks.

A total of 705 people were arrested in 18 EU Member States (373 of those arrests took place in France) on suspicion of involvement in jihadist terrorist activities, roughly the same number as in 2016. Most arrests (354) were on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation, followed by arrests on suspicion of planning (120) or preparing (112) an attack.

<sup>23</sup> This figure is from open sources and does not contain casualties of Northern Ireland security-related incidents.

Targets included the military, civilians and the police. Among the deadliest attacks were when vehicles were used as weapons.

The ten attacks with fatalities<sup>24</sup> in 2017 were the following<sup>25</sup>:

## MARCH

On 22 March a 52-year-old male drove his car into pedestrians walking across Westminster Bridge in London (UK). He subsequently stabbed a policeman guarding the nearby Houses of Parliament, before being shot dead by police. Five people were killed and at least 50 injured. The attack was claimed by the so-called IS (IS) through a breaking news message issued by A'maq News. It was reported in IS's Arabic weekly newsletter *al-Naba'* and in the monthly multi-language magazine *Rumiyah*.

## APRIL

On 7 April a 39-year-old male hijacked a lorry transporting beer and drove it into a busy pedestrian street in Stockholm (Sweden), killing five people and injuring 14. He crashed the vehicle into a department store. A rudimentary improvised explosive device (IED) was also found in the

driver's cabin. The attacker ran from the scene, but was later arrested. The attack remained unclaimed; however the perpetrator had recorded and sent a video in which he pledged allegiance to IS.

On 20 April a 39-year-old male opened fire on a police vehicle parked on the Champs Elysées in Paris (France) killing one police officer. Two other police officers and a tourist were seriously wounded. The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news message issued by A'maq News. It was reported in *al-Naba'* and *Rumiyah*.

## MAY

On 22 May a 22-year-old suicide bomber, born in the UK to Libyan parents, killed 22 people and injured 512, including children, in an attack on a concert hall in Manchester (UK). The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news message issued by A'maq News. In addition IS issued a statement from its central leadership; it was also reported in *al-Naba'* and *Rumiyah*.

## JUNE

On 3 June eight people were killed and 48 injured in central London (UK), when three attackers drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge and launched a knife attack after exiting the vehicle. The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news message

<sup>24</sup> Excluding perpetrators.

<sup>25</sup> Details about attacks in the UK are derived from both Europol and open sources.

issued by A'maq News. It was reported in *al-Naba'* and *Rumiyah*.

### JULY

On 28 July a 26-year-old unsuccessful asylum seeker in Hamburg (Germany) attacked several people in a supermarket with a knife that he had taken from a shelf, killing one and injuring six. The attack was not immediately claimed by IS. However an article in *al-Naba'*, published on 4 August, reported on the incident citing Western media reports. While the victims of the attack were identified as "crusaders", the perpetrator, by contrast, was not described as an "IS soldier"<sup>26</sup>.

### AUGUST

On 17 August fifteen people were killed and 131 injured, when a van sped into La Rambla promenade, a busy downtown street in central Barcelona (Spain) packed with tourists.

Some eight hours later in Cambrils, a city 120 km south of Barcelona, a car drove into pedestrians, killing one and injuring six civilians and a police officer. The attack in Barcelona was immediately claimed by IS through a breaking news message issued by A'maq News. Both attacks were subsequently claimed in a statement from the IS central leadership. The attacks were also reported in *al-Naba'* and praised in *Rumiyah*.

On 18 August two people were killed and eight injured in a knife attack in Turku (Finland). The main suspect is an 18-year-old male, who was arrested just after the attack. The attack was not immediately claimed by IS<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> Alongside this incident, the article also referred to a shooting incident at a nightclub in Constance (Germany), which was not related to terrorism.

<sup>27</sup> In an article in *al-Naba'*, published on 8 February 2018 IS reports on the trial of the perpetrator, including his statement that he was a "soldier of the caliphate".

### OCTOBER

On 1 October two women, aged 17 and 20, were stabbed to death at Marseille's main railway station (France). The attacker was shot dead by a soldier from a military patrol as part of the Sentinel Operation. The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news message issued by A'maq News and reported in *al-Naba'*.

In addition people were injured in the following attacks<sup>28</sup> in 2017:

### JUNE

On 6 June a French soldier was attacked and injured by a hammer-wielding man while patrolling in front of Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris (France).

### AUGUST

On 9 August six French soldiers, patrolling as part of the Sentinel Operation, were wounded, three of them seriously, when a driver deliberately drove into the patrol as they left their barracks in the western suburbs of Paris (France). The attack was not immediately claimed by IS, however, an article in *al-Naba'*, published on 11 August, reported on the incident, citing Western media reports. While the victims of the attack were identified as "crusaders", the perpetrator, by contrast, was not described as an "IS soldier".

On 25 August three police officers suffered injuries, while arresting a 26-year-old man in possession of a sword in a car outside Buckingham Palace in central London (UK), reportedly shouting "Allahu Akbar". The attack remains unclaimed.

<sup>28</sup> Details about attacks in the UK are derived from both Europol and open sources.

On 25 August one soldier was lightly wounded, after a machete-wielding man attacked them in Brussels (Belgium). The perpetrator was shot dead at the scene. The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news statement issued by A'maq News and later reported in *al-Naba'*.

### SEPTEMBER

On 15 September an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated on a tube train at Parsons Green station in south-west London (UK) during the morning rush hour. Thirty people, including a young boy, were injured, when the bomb partially detonated and sent a fireball along a carriage. The attack was claimed by IS through a breaking news item by A'maq News, and the IS leadership issued a separate claim of responsibility. It was also reported in *al-Naba'*<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> In the same article in *al-Naba'*, IS also claimed responsibility for an evacuation of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport on 17 September, alleging that its "soldiers" had planted several IEDs.



Eleven attacks were foiled and seven attacks did not result in fatalities or casualties. In these attacks the military or police were targeted, mostly using simple weapons, such as knives or hammers, without causing major injuries. Two failed attacks were claimed by IS. On 19 June a 31-year-old perpetrator drove his car loaded with gas canisters into a police van on the Champs Élysées in Paris. He was killed in his car by toxic fumes. The next day a 36-year-old individual failed to detonate an IED hidden in his luggage trolley at Brussels Central train station. Both attacks were not immediately claimed by IS, but were mentioned in an issue of *Rumiyah* (a multilingual magazine whose name referred to the city of Rome, which was to be conquered by Muslims) published on 13 July, where the perpetrators were described as “caliphate soldiers”.

Jihadists who carried out terrorist attacks in the EU in 2017 were mainly home-grown, meaning that they were radicalised in their country of residence without having travelled to join a terrorist group abroad. A substantial number had a criminal past or had previously been known to authorities, but were not considered a major terrorist threat.

For attacks in the EU in 2017, no direct links to a terrorist group or previous terrorism offences by the perpetrators were identified at the time of writing. Most carried out their attacks alone or in some cases with one or two others. However a number of people in their environment may have been aware of their plans and tolerated and possibly even facilitated or supported them. These lone actors’ use low-tech means to carry out an attack.

This applies to all of the above-listed jihadist terrorist attacks, except for the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in Spain, and Manchester and

London (Parsons Green) in the UK. In Barcelona, the driver of the van who drove into pedestrians was believed to be part of a group that had planned a much larger operation that was thwarted by a massive explosion the day before in the house occupied by the group in Alcanar. Two members of the cell were killed in the explosion, including a 40-year-old imam thought to be the cell’s mastermind. The explosives destroyed in the incident were allegedly prepared for one or more other attacks using large vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs).

The Manchester attack was an exception because it was carried out successfully with an improvised explosive device (IED), requiring a certain level of sophistication and preparation to complete as intended. A total of 22 people were killed, which made it the deadliest attack in the UK since the suicide bombings on London’s transport system in 2005. Ostensibly the perpetrator acted alone. However he had travelled back to the UK from Libya shortly before carrying out the attack. He may have received IED construction training while in Libya.

In general however, the increase in the number of jihadist terrorist attacks in 2017 ran in parallel to a decrease in sophistication in their preparation and execution. In cases in which more sophisticated methods were required, a lack of expertise led to failure in some cases. On 20 June a 36-year-old male tried to detonate a bomb in a luggage trolley in Brussels Central train station, but only the trolley caught fire, after which the suitcase exploded due to the gas bottles it contained. It is assumed that the device failed to function as intended, probably because of poor manufacturing. No one was hurt in this incident except for the attacker, who

was shot dead by soldiers guarding the station. The Parsons Green incident is another example of a failed detonation of an explosive device that could have caused mass casualties, if manufactured and handled properly, which fortunately it was not.

The attacks that were committed in 2017 reflect the preferences of terrorists driven by jihadist ideology in selecting their targets and the goals they want to pursue, as seen also in attacks committed in previous years. They aim at indiscriminate killings as well as on eliminating symbols of Western “hedonistic” lifestyle and symbols of authority. These perpetrators attack people rather than targets that provoke less of an emotional response from the general public, such as damage to premises or loss of capital. The intent of indiscriminate killings was illustrated – among others – by the attacks in London, Stockholm, Manchester, Barcelona and Cambrils. The detonation of an explosive device in a concert hall in Manchester doubled as both an attack on a symbol of Western lifestyle and as an attack to cause indiscriminate mass casualties. In 2017 the police and military once again remained a focus of attacks.

Not all EU Member States were affected equally by jihadist terrorism, with a number reporting no such attacks over the course of 2017, despite some of them having been threatened in IS propaganda. Jihadists have proven to be able to radicalise without raising suspicion and to prepare attacks, while remaining undetected by law enforcement. Therefore, the threat of jihadist attacks in the EU remains acute, as demonstrated by the attacks which took place in 2017 and those that were prevented in time.





## Travel for terrorist purposes

Around 5 000 individuals from the EU were believed to have travelled to conflict areas in Iraq and Iraq and Syria. By late 2017 the number of people from Europe fighting in IS may have been as low as 2 500. It was thought that about 1 500 foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returned home and 1 000 were killed. Belgium, Germany, France and the UK were the major source countries. Hungary asserts that around 1 000 individuals from the Balkan states joined IS between 2014 and 2016 and expects a significant number of them to return to their former home countries, facilitated by organised crime groups engaged in illegal migration.

In 2017 there were considerably fewer EU-based FTFs travelling to conflict zones and a diminishing number of returnees. Due to the military situation in Iraq and Syria, it appeared to have become even more difficult to leave IS territory. After losing control of significant terrain, some IS members were however seeking to leave the combat zone, either to return home, or to travel to other conflict areas (for example to Afghanistan; within the Middle East and North and West Africa; Central, South or Southeast

Asia), potentially increasing the risk of more organised spectacular-type attacks in Europe in the medium to long term. Austria reported that the number of FTFs started decreasing at the beginning of 2015. Switzerland has not recorded any new departures to conflict zones since 2016. The number of departures from Belgium in 2017 was described as "limited or non-existent".

The Netherlands reported that the decline in successful travellers was evident and steady. However in June 2017 a Dutch man succeeded in travelling to Syria to join IS (the first time since November 2016 that someone was able to reach the conflict zone). Before his journey, there were no apparent indications of his radicalisation. Spain also reported that the flow of travellers had decreased significantly. Over 2017 Poland did not note any departures or returns of Polish FTFs (however an FTF of Chechen origin with refugee status in Poland was detained in 2017, charged with participation in a foreign military organisation and illegal possession of weapons and ammunition).

Despite this apparent reduction in travellers, it should be underlined that IS, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups, continue to pose a major threat. They have the ongoing intent and capability to conduct terrorist attacks against the West.



## RETURNEES

EU Member States reported that returnees to Europe may have a certain amount of combat and operational experience; gained an enhanced capability to commit acts of terrorism; and be particularly dehumanised and prone to violence upon their return. They also serve as role models and might be involved in recruiting and radicalising others. Furthermore, returnees and other extremists in prison may encourage inmates to ultimately travel overseas to fight or conduct other terrorist activities.

Belgium, for example, reported that the number of returnees was very limited in 2017 (amounting to only five fighters, some of whom had already been detained in prison in Turkey since 2016). However, Belgium also reported that currently the phenomenon of home-grown terrorist fighters seemed to be a greater threat than that emanating from returnees. Denmark expected that only a limited number of its FTFs would return. Although in total Denmark observed approximately 50 returnees from Iraq and Syria, the number continued to decline in 2017. Denmark also reported that a number of travellers no longer had their passport or residence permit, and returning to Denmark became less attractive given the prospect of criminal prosecution. Switzerland reported only three returnees over the reporting period. Overall, the Netherlands reported some 46 returnees from 2012, but only four in 2017, but also that returning from the conflict zones had become very difficult, and that they were aware of Dutch men and women who had the intention to leave Syria, but who were not actually able to do so.

Although no concrete examples were available, Bulgaria reported its concerns of being used as a transit route, i.e. the possibility of FTFs or linked individuals passing through Bulgaria on their way to and from Syria, but due to entry bans for Turkey, they were returned back to Bulgaria. Hungary reported that up to 2017, FTFs used their country mainly for transit in order to reach the conflict zones or to travel back using the Balkan route to their Western Europe-based contacts. They also stated that based on 2017 data, it was apparent that several of these individuals or groups spent considerable periods in Hungary. From time to time Romania has been used as a transit area or secondary route for FTFs travelling to and from Iraq and Syria (albeit that they noted the descending trend as with the rest of Europe). Between January 2013 and November 2017 Portugal asserted that their territory was used as a transit platform by a total of 12 (non-Portuguese) FTFs on their way to the conflict areas (including nationals from France, Morocco, Poland, Russia and the UK). In addition Poland indicated that in 2017 militants involved in the conflict in the Middle East were examining the possibility of crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border to reach other EU countries. Border pressure and logistical considerations have also made it more difficult for aspirant attack operatives to travel from Syria via Turkey into Europe.

## ACTIVITIES ON RETURN TO EUROPE

As IS gets weaker, it has been urging its followers to carry out lone actor type attacks in their home countries, rather than guiding them to attempt to travel to the so-called caliphate. Exhortations

to action – including via propaganda outlets – have comprised specifying attacks on civilian targets by means of new methods, including those tested in the conflict zones. This poses a significant challenge to the authorities in terms of setting up counter-measures. Moreover, IS sympathisers in Europe, in contact with individuals abroad who have the required skills and mind-set to commit acts of terrorism, may become involved in planning or support activities. One of the most significant threats posed by those who have travelled to the Syrian conflict zone comes from jihadists in conflict zones that engage in planning attacks against Europe or incite others to do so. However, the ability of such individuals to continue this kind of activity in theatre is likely to be reduced due to the impact of increased military pressure, loss of cohesion, lack of infrastructure and reduced access to resources.

As noted above, recent attacks in Europe have, for the main part, been committed by lone individuals who have not been to a conflict zone – but who may have been inspired by terrorist propaganda and/or the extremist narrative, as well as by other successful attacks worldwide. This was evidenced by several successful attacks in the UK during 2017, for example, the attack on Westminster Bridge, London, in March. Furthermore, the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in Spain in August 2017 – although not committed by FTFs – were reported as being ideologically linked to IS. In addition, Spain also reported that in June 2017 a Danish citizen – who had been in the conflict zone between 2012 and 2015 – was arrested in Spain, having travelled from Denmark, possibly in order to purchase a weapon (presumably to carry out an attack). Italy, for example,



stated that one of the main sources of terrorist threat to them included potential sleeper cells from the external operations units of IS or al-Qaeda and “affiliated” organisations inspired by jihadist ideology. In 2017, investigations in Italy led to 26 arrests for terrorist offences: including for recruitment (on behalf of IS), sharing IS propaganda, providing logistic support to a terrorist organisation, and facilitating the movement of FTFs to jihadist combat zones.

Germany reported that on 12 April police officers arrested a 31-year-old Syrian member of IS. It was alleged that he travelled to Germany with the aim of recruiting members, as well as coordinating terrorist cells already active in Europe to carry out attacks on unspecified targets.

Furthermore, between February and November 2017, the Swiss authorities arrested individuals on terrorism charges for preparing and facilitating jihadist travel to the Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone; for providing financial support to IS; for the radicalisation of a number of persons from Italy and Switzerland; for travelling to the Iraqi-Syrian conflict zone; as well as for association and support of terrorist organisations.

In 2017 various Dutch or Dutch speaking jihadists, including members of both al-Qaeda and IS, threatened to commit attacks against the Netherlands or called upon others to do so, both online and offline. In a number of cases, the threats seem to have originated from Syria. The Netherlands reported that IS in particular continued to make full use of the network that foreign jihadists in Iraq and Syria had access to, in their home countries.

Finally also of note, is that jihadists located in different (non-European) locations may increasingly focus on attacking local Western targets, as it becomes increasingly difficult to travel to conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria.

### TRAVEL OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

Austria noted that a number of women (including minors), left or wanted to leave for the war zone. They reported that contacts were established via the internet and by friends and acquaintances. Some of the women married foreign terrorist fighters under Islamic law, sometimes via social media. The UK also reiterated that there was an increase in the number of women, families and minors engaging in the conflict, although they remained a small proportion of overall travellers.

The Netherlands reported that there were indications that Dutch jihadists in Iraq or Syria – mainly women and minors – were in refugee camps or in the hands of non-jihadist combatants. The Netherlands assessed that in the near future a number of men, but mainly women and/or minors, would probably attempt to reach to the Netherlands (potentially also posing as victims in order to deflect authorities’ attention). Moreover, Belgium asserted that the returning wives (and children) of jihadists also caused concern, due to the reported involvement of female activists in preparing attacks.

Consequently, the presence of both returnee men and women, and to an extent minors (who together with their parents have stayed with FTFs/jihadists in the conflict zone, or have themselves undergone indoctrination and military training) are believed to comprise a continuous threat to security.

### USE OF IRREGULAR MIGRANT FLOW

As previously reported, terrorist use of the migrant flow has been observed, but it is not deemed systematic. Austria reported that it was particularly affected by migrant flows emanating from the conflict areas of Africa and Asia, but there is not enough evidence



to assess whether potential terrorists have been smuggled in systematically via these flows. They did, however, state that in several cases the suspicion that certain individuals were members of a terrorist organisation was substantiated, and that some individuals who came to Austria along with the migrant flows were arrested for suspicion of supporting, or being a member of, IS.

Investigations in Greece and Italy also did not support the suggestion that terrorists were systematically using the migrant flow in 2017 – but they could not rule out the possibility that these flows and/or posing as refugees might be used as a method in the future to enter Europe. Romania reported that the activities which facilitate (illegal) migration from the conflict areas do not appear to have ties to terrorist organisations, and are mainly financially motivated.





Finally it has been assessed to be more difficult now for terrorists to exploit the migrant flow, owing to increased security measures, such as intensified control of EU borders. Nonetheless, travel to Europe may still be possible, for instance via third countries using stolen or forged travel documents.

#### INCITEMENT OF LONE ACTOR ATTACKS IN THE WEST

A continuing point of similarity between al-Qaeda and IS is the explicit call for lone offenders to target civilians in the West. Over 2017, the two major jihadist organisations disseminated operational manuals with instructions on how to carry out these attacks. The differences lie in the way in which they convey the message and the justifications provided. Al-Qaeda bases its propaganda on political grievances, uses a softer tone and justifies the lone actors' attacks

as a natural reaction to the perceived injustice suffered by Muslims. For example, in an audio speech published on 7 May, Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), called for lone actor attacks in the West in retaliation to tragedies suffered by Muslims around the world. Such attacks, he explained, would have a deterring effect on the West's actions in Iraq, Syria, the Arabian Peninsula (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Yemen) or Asia. The group also published a new issue of its English-language electronic magazine *Inspire* in August, in which it praised lone actor attacks in the USA and suggested modus operandi for the perpetration of attacks.

IS considerably more ruthless rhetoric purports to be embedded in Islamic eschatological tradition, the idea that the final confrontation between good and evil is approaching and every individual must choose sides.

Numerous IS videos produced during 2017 reiterated the urgency of carrying out retaliatory attacks against the West, and their publications emphasised the atmosphere of terror and panic in the aftermath of attacks carried out in Western countries. IS continued to encourage individuals to carry out terrorist attacks in countries of the anti-IS coalition, with whatever means they have at their disposal, including bladed weapons, vehicles and arson, which, were explicitly suggested in IS propaganda, among other things.

For much of 2017 IS was quick to claim that attacks had been committed in its name and to take responsibility, despite a lack of substantiating evidence. In several cases the subsequent investigations did not bring to light a link to the group, such as with regard to the mass shooting on 1 October targeting an open air concert in Las Vegas, USA, which killed 58 people and injured several hundred. IS was quick to describe the perpetrator as a "soldier of the caliphate" in an official statement and as an "IS soldier" in A'maq News releases, alleging that he converted to Islam several months before the attack. By the time of writing, however, no evidence of a jihadist motivation of the perpetrator or links to IS have come to light. IS also claimed an attack on a casino in Manila, the Philippines, on 2 June 2017 which killed at least 36 people. The Philippine National Police, however, stated that the attack more likely had a criminal background.

## TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Online propaganda continues to be an essential part of jihadist terrorist attempts to reach out to EU audiences for recruitment, radicalisation and fundraising. The often rudimentary and fragmented knowledge of Islam of aspiring jihadist terrorists, derived from religious texts selected to fit a violent ideology, makes them vulnerable to being influenced and used by those who misuse religion to incite violence.

The serious losses that IS sustained in territory and human and material resources in 2017 had a significant impact on the organisation's media production capabilities. The IS media department was forced to relocate and restructure. The increased military pressure resulted in a noticeable disruption of its media activities and a marked decline in the quality and quantity of content production, especially in the second half of 2017. By December however, the IS media network began showing signs of recovery and increased its content output slightly.

Nevertheless, IS media appeared to have remained centralised in 2017 despite the evident damage caused to its media infrastructure. The weekly *al-Naba'* newsletter, for example, continued to state on its front page that it was produced by IS's "media Diwan [ministry]". IS provincial media outlets that generated higher media output in 2017 appeared to match with regions witnessing heightened IS military activity. In these areas local IS media staff likely maintained smoother communication means with the various central media mouthpieces. Apart from *al-Naba'*, in 2017, IS officially endorsed propaganda outlets were the A'maq News Agency, the *al-Hayat Media Centre*, the *al-Furqan Media Production Company*, the *al-Ajnad Media Production Company*, the *al-Himma Library* and *al-Bayan Radio*.



Since its creation in 2014, A'maq News had acted as an independent news outlet, pretending to be a journalistic organ. By 2016 it had become one of the main tools for IS to claim attacks, including lone actor attacks in western countries<sup>30</sup>. IS officially endorsed A'maq News in July 2017. The Nashir Agency is also suspected of belonging to the IS media apparatus, although it has not been formally or publically endorsed by the IS.

By the end of 2017, IS's main publication remained the weekly Arabic newsletter *al-Naba'* ("the news"). Starting in 2016 the organisation launched *Rumiyah*. In 2017, *Rumiyah* was published in Bosnian, English, French, German, Indonesian, Kurdish, Pashto, Russian, Turkish, Urdu and Uyghur on a near monthly basis. However, the publication however ceased after its 13<sup>th</sup> issue, which was released on 9 September

<sup>30</sup> Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, 2017*, pp. 26-30.

2017. *Al-Naba'* and *Rumiyah*, although addressing different audiences, had the similar goal of setting and adjusting the organisation's political discourse and highlighting significant ideological developments. Additionally, *al-Naba'* provided in-depth information on military advances and practical guidance on how to carry out terrorist attacks. With the interruption of *Rumiyah*, the organisation's ability to reach out to non-Arabic speaking audiences outside and inside Iraq and Syria significantly decreased.

In addition to the decrease in propaganda production, IS online dissemination capabilities were heavily curtailed by the increasing disruption efforts led by social media companies working jointly with law enforcement agencies and government bodies. This clampdown resulted in further and more extensive disruption of IS activity on a number of major social media platforms.





In 2016 a large proportion of IS sympathisers had already migrated from their main hubs on Facebook and Twitter to Telegram, an encrypted messaging application perceived as more secure and less law-enforcement friendly. 2017 saw them move further from public Telegram channels to private and closed chat groups, for which a link key – available for a short period of time and shared on associated channels – is needed to gain access. Due to this mechanism, combined with the fact that information on Telegram can neither be searched (without prior access to the given channel) nor indexed by search engines, Telegram remained a relatively safe haven, albeit with limited outreach and recruitment potential. As a result Telegram is largely used for community building, discussing targets and methods of attacks, advertising links to material posted on more accessible platforms and coordination of so-called media raids (*ghazawat i'lamiyya*) to be launched on Twitter and other social media platforms. For example, the pro-IS Nashir Telegram channel, stressing the need to reach out to wider audiences, increased its calls to IS supporters, starting in late March 2017, to occupy popular platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter and has itself repeatedly attempted to set up accounts on these platforms.

In order to counter the large-scale closure of IS supporter accounts on various platforms, dedicated volunteers have been working for the past few years on building a pool of accounts (*Al-Ansar Bank* or “bank of supporters”) on Facebook, Gmail, Instagram and Twitter. These accounts enable IS sympathisers to bypass the registration process, thereby ensuring their anonymity, and to retain an online presence when their accounts are shut down. Similarly, IS sympathisers continued to invest resources into promoting open source

tools which ensure anonymisation of communication (e.g. TOR Browser, TAILS OS) on specific IS propaganda sites and some Darknet sites in order to safeguard the interests of their sympathisers when accessing online terrorist propaganda. The need for increased secrecy also led online sympathisers to revert to blogs and traditional web forums, more adapted for peer-to-peer mentoring, as well as to smaller platforms with less capacity for – or focus on – carrying out disruptive procedures.

At the same time, sympathisers of terrorist organisations (IS and al-Qaeda) continued to take advantage of cryptocurrency adoption. IS, for example, triggered cryptocurrency donation campaigns (e.g. Bitcoin donations) in IS-affiliated websites, as well as in chat environments (e.g. Telegram), in order to raise funds.

The decrease in official IS propaganda in the last quarter of 2017 spurred IS supporters into producing more user-generated – and translating older – content (UGC), thereby blurring the distinction between official and unofficial activism. Indeed, despite retaining a close group of core sympathisers for reasons of authentication, IS has gone to great lengths to glorify information warfare and repeatedly encourages sympathisers to become more active online. The IS’s supple definition of media operatives – which encompasses the organisation’s “war correspondents” as much as online propagandists – and the possibility of taking part in active, yet lower-risk, activism has encouraged many to join the circle of these “martyrdom-seekers without a belt”. This strategy seems to have been designed to bolster the resilience of IS’s online media model. Most of this UGC focuses on praising the attacks perpetrated by IS affiliates, or on inciting Muslims in Western countries to take part in the struggle.



Other sympathisers focus on archiving historical content (including on the Darknet) and creating clearinghouses and libraries, with some providing bespoke services. The importance of these archivists has grown as the organisation lost the ability to dominate the online space with large quantities of new material. As a result, IS retains an extensive archive of material across a variety of online platforms.

In 2017 it became increasingly difficult to locate terrorist content in English on major social media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram. This is both because English content was taken down more quickly and less material was produced in the English language. Arabic content, by contrast, as well as emotive chants (*anashid*) and non-visual content, was still widely available and accessible on Facebook and YouTube. This may be because social media companies have, in general, been quicker to respond to videos containing extreme violence than to speeches or ideological treatises produced by terrorist groups but which feature no explicit calls to violence. Similarly, social media companies' focus on removing violent content produced mostly by IS has led to material produced by its rivals, such as al-Qaeda or *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham*, becoming more visible. For instance, al-Qaeda released several recordings of Hamza bin Laden, a son of al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, in 2017, including a speech in May in which he called for lone actor attacks in the West. The organisation might want to attempt to exploit his name in order to regain prominence on the international stage.

In this context, it is worth noting that only a fraction of terrorist propaganda (both for al-Qaeda and IS) features ultraviolent videos. The larger portion of propaganda material has focused on community projects, religious preaching or even poetry recitals. The promise is that of a culturally engaging environment where redemption is possible. As such, non-violent material



is an integral part of the propaganda message and is in many ways more insidious. Indeed jihadist organisations have long realised the importance of garnering more followers and appealing to those who would otherwise shy away from these groups' brutality, but who are nevertheless moved by the idea of a global Muslim community (*umma*) and caliphate.

In terms of narrative, the discourse promulgated by the major jihadist groups (IS and al-Qaeda) remained largely constant over 2017, although a few changes were noted. IS propaganda, in particular, witnessed a significant thematic shift since 2016. Idyllic depictions of governance and civilian life in the caliphate dropped considerably. These were replaced by a defensive and defiant discourse and a stronger focus on victimhood and resilience. Just as it does for al-Qaeda, IS ideology rests on a strong sense of injustice. More than in previous years, propaganda released in 2017 told a story of existential conflict, in which Sunni Muslims are portrayed as the primary victims of a coalition of Christians, Jews and Shi'i Muslims.

It is safe to say that the IS core narrative, namely the establishment of a functioning caliphate, failed in 2017. Likewise its focus on apocalyptic eschatology (and the *Dabiq* discourse<sup>41</sup>) lost much of its resonance. Instead of conceding defeat, however, the organisation attempted to reframe how it defined victory. It professed the inconsequentiality of territorial control and emphasised the prophetic nature of the "trials and tribulations" that it faced, stressing that these were proof that the group was on the right path and that victory was imminent. In a further show of denialism, IS focused on documenting raids carried out by its fighters on remote army outposts in Iraq and Syria in an attempt to prove that it still held sway over strategic areas and that mainstream media was merely peddling fake news to damage sympathisers' morale.

Whereas IS propaganda continued to present the group's choices as the only true interpretation of Islam, a

<sup>41</sup> Including the final battle between good and evil which according to Islamic tradition will take place in Dabiq in northern Syria. It last Dabiq in Turkish troops in 2016.



fragmentation on ideological grounds within IS also came to the fore in 2017. In May, the Delegated Committee<sup>22</sup> issued a circular which attempted to set out the group's approach to *takfir*, the act of declaring other Muslims unbelievers, which for IS is a justification for their killing. In addition, several doctrinal IS publications were declared void. The May circular argued that *takfir* was a foundation and an obligation of the Islamic faith and held the opinion that ignorance in this matter was not excusable (a principle roughly equivalent to *ignorantia juris non excusat*). In practice this interpretation means that anyone doubting the judgements of IS with regard to the definition of the enemy would himself be liable to be killed. A number of indications, including an article published in *al-Naba'* in mid-June, which hinted at the apostasy of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, suggest that the memo exacerbated simmering conflicts within IS, which ultimately led to its repeal. A circular published in October 2017, supposedly after a shift in personnel within the Delegated Committee, revoked the earlier previous memo and reinstated the earlier IS ideological guidelines.

A major contrast in narratives between al-Qaeda and IS lies in the fact that the former has taken great pains – since

2011 and due to a failed experience in Yemen – not to alienate local populations and instead to embed itself into local insurgencies in order to court local appeal and establish robust support bases. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular appeared to be conscious of the importance of popular support and continuously advised against actions that would antagonise Muslim masses. This was made obvious in the code of conduct issued by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in June 2017 – and drafted in consultation with al-Zawahiri – which forbade carrying out operations that have the potential to alienate the masses. As such, it sees itself more as a spiritual spearhead and recognises advantages in letting locals take command over issues of security and governance.

Another interesting element to note is the evident development in the way terrorist movements reach out to – and attempt to engage and recruit – women. IS female sympathisers in particular have successfully made use of the internet to mentor and mobilise other women.

In contrast to al-Qaeda, which conceded that women were allowed to fight but never encouraged them to do so, IS appeared to be openly calling on women to take up arms. An article published in *al-Naba'* on 5 October, entitled "The duty of women in [waging] jihad against the enemies", encouraged women to take part in armed action. This followed on from an article published in *Rumiyah* in July, in which the "courage and sacrifice" of women who fought alongside Prophet Muhammad are given as examples for today's *mujahidat* to emulate. The call to take up arms came as IS was haemorrhaging territory and marked a shift away from its earlier discourse where women were described as essential but in which their supportive role was emphasised (mainly providing financial support to jihad, taking care of their husbands and producing children). Nevertheless, as is evident in *Rumiyah* Issue 12, a woman's default role is still that of a home-maker and caretaker of her family.

Moreover, IS promotes the idea that every Muslim, regardless of his/her physical condition, can play a role in jihad. It has issued at least three videos in recent months featuring disabled fighters to reinforce this argument.

IS propaganda also continued to showcase minors and children, thereby stressing the importance of handing down the message to future generations. Videos featured children taking part in religious and military training. On a few occasions, they were also filmed carrying out extra-judicial executions of prisoners. IS teaches these children IS ideology to prepare them for their role on the battlefield and to reinforce their determination.

<sup>22</sup> The *al-Lajna al-Mufawwada* ("Delegated Committee") is the highest decision making body within IS after the caliph.



# Terrorist situation outside the EU<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This section is largely based on open sources.



## Western Balkan countries

None of the Western Balkan countries have reported acts of jihadist terrorism having taken place in their territories in 2017. Kosovo<sup>34</sup> reported a decline in jihadist propaganda activities and no apparent cases of financial or logistical support of terrorist groups. The country shares its concerns about the possibility of returning FTFs from the conflict areas with EU and non-EU countries. In 2017 Kosovar authorities initiated a total of 54 cases on suspicion of participation in terrorist activities in Iraq and Syria. These include cases in which there was no evidence of involvement of its nationals in fighting in the conflict areas. Arrests made in Kosovo were primarily based upon suspicion of engagement in propaganda activities.

<sup>34</sup> This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of independence.

Members of Albanian, Bosnian and Roma minority communities are predominant in jihadist groups in Serbia. The country also reported propaganda activities being recorded in 2017, both through personal contacts in informal religious groups, from some informal religious venues as well as via the internet and social networks. These propaganda activities were aimed at the radicalisation and recruitment of new members for terrorist organisations. Increasingly women are being approached, as well as members of the Roma population. Spouses of radical Islamists are found to be very active in recruiting other women.

However, in 2017 there was a significant decline in activities aimed at recruiting persons for terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria. This decline was – apart from the military defeats and territorial losses of IS – at least in part caused by the arrest of a group of people in 2014 who participated in the recruitment and dispatching FTFs to the Syrian battlefield. No new cases of foreign terrorist fighters were recorded in 2017.

Montenegro reports the presence of several radical groups in its jurisdiction, of which two groups are most exposed: *takfiris* and jihadists. *Takfiris* are seen as being very rigid in the interpretation of the basic Islamic postulates and perform religious rituals by strict Sharia rules. They distribute various propaganda materials via the internet but are not

regarded a viable terrorist threat. The same applies to jihadist groups in the country, although some of their members, in particular returned FTFs, possess knowledge and skills that could be used for terrorist purposes. Moderate groups oppose violent methods and seek to distance themselves from radical elements in their midst.

Bosnia and Herzegovina asserts that up to December 2017 approximately 300 persons had travelled from the country to Iraq and Syria. As per 31 December 2017 an estimated 107 were still in Syria, of whom 61 men and 46 women. It is believed that by that date 41 FTFs had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that 71 FTFs had lost their lives. In 2017 only one (failed) attempt has been recorded of an individual attempting to travel from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the conflict areas. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is little reporting to indicate that extremist groups susceptible to violence have an organised and systematic network structure. Indeed, there is evidence that within the extremist groups there are factions with different religious and ideological beliefs, creating opportunities for internal disagreement and disputes.





## North America and Australia

In 2017 the USA suffered a number of attacks for which IS claimed responsibility, without providing evidence of its direct involvement. Two attacks in New York City were clearly inspired by IS. On 31 October a 29-year-old Uzbek citizen legally residing in the USA, drove a rented truck into a walkway in Manhattan, killing eight people and injuring 12 others. After crashing into a school bus, he exited the vehicle brandishing imitation firearms, before being shot and arrested. A note claiming the attack on behalf of IS was found in the truck. The perpetrator, who was known for minor offences, but not for terrorism, deliberately chose the date in order to target civilians during Halloween celebrations. In its weekly newsletter *al-Naba'*, IS described the perpetrator as an "IS soldier", however no separate

statement by the IS leadership claiming responsibility for the attack was issued.

On 11 December a 27-year-old Bangladeshi man legally residing in the USA detonated, probably prematurely, a person-borne IED (PBIED) in an underground passage in Manhattan. The blast injured three people. The perpetrator was arrested and admitted to carrying out the attack in support of IS and in protest against United States (US) policies, including in the Middle East. He began his radicalisation process in 2014 and appeared to have been influenced by IS calls on its supporters to perpetrate attacks in their countries of residence, should they be prevented from travelling to join IS. The attack was mentioned by IS in *al-Naba'*, but only by reference to Western media reports according to which the perpetrator stated that he was an "IS soldier". However, IS failed to officially confirm this in any other way.

In Canada, a 30-year-old refugee from Somalia deliberately struck a police officer on traffic duty in Edmonton, Alberta, with a van on 1 October, before trying to stab him with a knife. The perpetrator initially fled on foot, then acquired another vehicle, with which he subsequently injured another four people, before being arrested. The attack was not referred to in IS propaganda. However, reportedly, an IS flag was found in the car used for the attack on the police officer.

In Australia, on 5 June, a man took

a woman hostage in an apartment building near Melbourne, after having killed another person at the building entrance. The perpetrator was shot and killed by police. He reportedly shouted "This is for IS. This is for al-Qaeda". IS claimed responsibility for the attack through a message issued by A'maq News, which described the perpetrator as an "IS soldier". In an article in *al-Naba'*, the group claimed that the "caliphate soldier" killed one "crusader" and engaged in a fight with police officers, injuring three of them before being killed. The attack was also praised in *Rumiyah*. The perpetrator had been charged in 2010 over an alleged terrorist plot but was acquitted. At the time of his death, he was on parole for offences unrelated to terrorism.

On 29 July 2017 two brothers of Lebanese origin were arrested on suspicion of plotting a major attack. They had planned to detonate an IED aboard an airliner flying from Sydney to Abu Dhabi in mid-July. The plot failed because they failed to check in a bag containing an explosive device for the targeted flight, on which a third brother travelled. They had received the explosive device from an IS contact via mail from Turkey. After the failure, the brothers started planning an attack using a chemical dispersal device, which was disrupted by their arrest. The brothers in Australia were in contact with a fourth brother, who allegedly was an IS commander in Syria.

## Russia

On 3 April 2017 a suicide attacker detonated a bomb on a train in Saint Petersburg killing 14 people. The suicide bomber was identified as a 22-year-old naturalised Russian citizen born in Kyrgyzstan. The bomb was reportedly an improvised explosive device using commercially available explosives. Another device, planted at another metro station, allegedly by the same perpetrator, was found and defused. The perpetrator is said



to have had ties with radical Islamists. The attack was claimed by a hitherto unknown group using the name *Imam Shamil Battalion*, which alleged that

the perpetrator followed guidelines given by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The claim was denied by a media outlet of the al-Qaeda-linked *Caucasus Emirate*.

On 19 August a man stabbed several passers-by in the Russian city of Surgut. In an A'maq News statement, IS described the perpetrator as an "IS soldier". A video published three days after the attack by IS media outlet *Furat* showed the perpetrator pledging allegiance to IS, stating that he was happy to die as a martyr and calling for more knife attacks.



## Turkey

After a series of attacks in Turkey claimed by or attributed to IS in 2015 and 2016, which culminated in the 31 December 2016 attack on a nightclub in Istanbul that killed 39 people, no major terrorist attack was carried out by IS in Turkey in 2017, although the threat of lone actor attacks persists. Turkish security forces arrested hundreds of suspected IS members in Turkey, partly on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks throughout the year, including prior to the 2018 New Year celebrations. On 13 August 2017 a Turkish policeman was stabbed to death in Istanbul by an alleged IS member. According to Turkish media,

the man suspected of preparing a bomb attack had been detained in a counter-terrorism operation. During his transfer to the police headquarters he was able to attack and kill the officer with a knife, before being shot dead by a fellow policeman.

IS propaganda in 2017 continued calling for the killing of members of the Turkish government, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish religious institutions and Muslim groups which IS consider apostates. In addition IS accused Turkey of killing Muslim civilians, including children, and of collaborating with the "enemies of Islam" in Syria. Official IS publications featured pictures of Turkish soldiers killed in Syria.

## Iraq and Syria

Two years after it reached the limits of its expansion in mid-2015, IS lost most of the territories that it controlled in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, after a military campaign that started in October 2016, Iraqi armed forces and allied militias took full control of Mosul in July 2017. More than 800 000 inhabitants fled the fighting, and it was reported that IS was deliberately targeting civilians. Tal'afar, located between Mosul and the Syrian border, was recaptured in late August 2017. Hawija, the last significant town under IS control in Iraq, fell in early October. In December 2017 the Iraqi government declared that it had achieved victory over IS in Iraq.

Several hundred foreign IS members, including large numbers of women and children, were captured after the fall of IS-held territory in Iraq. Some foreign nationals were sentenced to death or imprisonment by Iraqi courts. By September 2017 1 400 foreign women and children of presumed IS fighters were held in a camp south of Mosul, according to media reports relying on sources in Iraqi intelligence.

These included European nationals. They were said to have surrendered with their husbands to Kurdish forces, who then handed over the women and children to Iraqi authorities. Male IS fighters were said to have remained in captivity with the Kurdish forces.

In reaction to the offensive on Mosul, IS increased the number of large scale



terrorist attacks in Iraq, targeting in particular the Shi'i majority population and Iraqi security forces and militias allied with it. The attacks aimed to increase the tensions between Sunnis and Shi'is in Iraq and to destabilise the fragile security situation in the country. By summer 2017 the rate of attacks in Iraq seemed to have diminished, but large-scale attacks continued to occur.

In late January 2017 IS propaganda started showing attacks allegedly

carried out with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) commonly known as drones. Footage allegedly taken by these UAVs showed the apparently successful dropping of explosive devices on enemy targets.

In Syria IS also lost most of its territory in the course of 2017. Control of IS's main stronghold in Syria, al-Raqqa, was achieved by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)<sup>35</sup> by October 2017. Prior to the conquest, hundreds of Syrian IS fighters left the city according to human rights activists, while foreign fighters remained. Following an agreement with the SDF, IS fighters and their families left the city on 15 October, retreating south along the Euphrates River. Between 200 and 300 IS fighters reportedly remained in the city. On 17 November, the SDF declared that they had complete control of the city.

In early November the Syrian army and its allies with Russian air support reportedly expelled IS completely from the Dayr al-Zawr province. On 9 November, the city of Al-Bukamal on the Iraqi border was taken by Syrian regime troops. IS fighters evacuated

<sup>35</sup> The SDF is an alliance of Arab and Kurdish militias dominated by the Kurdish *Yekineyen Parastina Gel* (YPG – People's Protection Units) supported by the USA and other Western countries.



the city. By the end of 2017 IS territory was reduced to a stretch of the Euphrates valley and the adjacent desert.

On the Lebanese-Syrian border, the Lebanese army launched an offensive against an IS enclave in late August 2017, while Syrian army and Hezbollah forces attacked IS from the east. As part of the ceasefire agreement with the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, on 30 August 2017, a convoy of IS fighters left the Lebanese-Syrian border area in direction of al-Bukamal. The convoy, which was escorted by the Syrian army and Hezbollah, was stranded in the Syrian Desert after anti-IS coalition airstrikes attempted to prevent it from



reaching its destination.

In speeches published on the internet, the IS leadership called for supporters in Australia, Europe, Russia and the USA and elsewhere to perpetrate attacks in order to deviate its enemies' attention from the "caliphate lands". They also praised the achievements of IS affiliates in countries beyond Iraq and Syria, in particular the Philippines.

In Syria, relationships between al-Qaeda-linked factions and the rest of the Syrian armed opposition remained complex and, at times, tensions escalated into violence. In late January 2017 several fighting factions, including *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham* (the Levant Conquest Front), merged to form *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* (the Levant Liberation Committee). The merger was an attempt to unite al-Qaeda-linked factions and local groups of jihadist orientation. *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* was initially headed by Abu Jabir Hashim al-Shaykh, who defected from his position as senior commander in *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham* (the

Levant Free Men Movement) for this purpose. Concurrently, other jihadist groups opposing the merger rallied around *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham*. This rearrangement led to the formation of two competing jihadist coalitions in northern Syria.

*Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* also experienced splits in the course of 2017. Several factions declared that they left *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* in protest at its aggressive attitudes towards other forces within the Syrian armed opposition. One of the most prominent was *Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki* (*Nuruddin al-Zinki* Movement), which broke away in late July in opposition to what it saw as unacceptable aggression against *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham*<sup>36</sup>. In early October former *Jabhat al-Nusra* and *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham* leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani succeeded Abu Jabir Hashim al-Shaykh as leader of *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham*, showing *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham*'s predominant position within *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham*.

Among jihadist ideologues, however, opposition to *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* also grew. Certain decisions taken by *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* were deemed to contradict jihadist principles. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading Jordanian jihadist ideologue, vehemently accused *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* of "diluting" jihad by compromising jihadist convictions, for example, by collaborating with Turkey.

The relation between *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* and al-Qaeda has been ambivalent since the beginning. *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham* is the successor organisation of *Jabhat al-Nusra*, which publicly broke its ties with al-Qaeda in late July 2016, declaring that it was an organisation without ties to any external organisation. This public disassociation from al-Qaeda appears to have been accepted at the time by the al-Qaeda leadership under the promise that the relationship would be continued in secret. This was likely done to eschew being labelled as a proscribed terrorist organisation and facilitate the group's cooperation and

integration within the Syrian armed opposition. However, a significant faction of al-Qaeda loyalists rejected the break of relations with the mother organisation.

In 2017, rumours continued to spread that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri never gave his agreement to *Jabhat al-Nusra*'s severing of ties with al-Qaeda. Apparently, the al-Qaeda loyalist faction was planning to establish a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria since the declaration of *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham*. The tensions escalated after the deployment of Turkish military in Idlib province in mid-October 2017, to which *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* had agreed. On 26 November 2017, *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* launched a large-scale detention campaign against al-Qaeda loyalists in areas controlled by it in the Idlib province, Syria. In an audio message published on 28 November 2017 in the context of the detentions, Ayman al-Zawahiri confirmed the rumours that he had not agreed to *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham*'s defection from al-Qaeda and asked *Jabhat al-Nusra* to renew its pledge of allegiance to him. He emphasised that this "breaking of the pledge of allegiance" did not lead to the aspired unity of the "mujahidin" in Syria and did not stop the USA from putting the new organisation on the terrorist list. Finally, *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* had to stop its campaign against the al-Qaeda loyalists due to heavy internal and external pressure, with several factions suspending its activities within *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* and threatening secession. The events show the difficulty in accommodating global jihadist factions within a broader framework, which would entail the acceptance of compromise in rhetoric and deed. The events also show the continued influence of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri through trusted middlemen on the ground.

<sup>36</sup> On 18 February 2018 *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham* and *Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki* announced their merger under the name *Jabhat Tahrir Suriya* (Syrian Liberation Front).



## Egypt

In Egypt, two German female tourists were stabbed to death and four other people, including a Czech woman, wounded in a hotel in Hurghada on 14 July. The Czech woman later died as a result of her injuries. According to media reports the attacker, a 28-year-old student from northern Egypt, was tasked to attack foreigners by online contacts that claimed to belong to IS. He swam to the hotel beach, sat with the women and had a conversation in German, prior to the attack. He then swam to an adjacent hotel, where he also wounded two people, before being apprehended. According to German authorities, based upon information from the appropriate Egyptian counterparts, there was no evidence for a religiously motivated terrorist attack.

On the Sinai peninsula, the fight against the local IS affiliate, the IS Sinai province, escalated in 2017, with terrorist attacks followed by violent repression. Numerous attacks

targeted Egyptian military forces, Christians and Sufi mosques. A series of assassinations of Coptic Christians in the northern Sinai led hundreds of families to flee the peninsula. The assassinations were not claimed, but in propaganda messages IS Sinai province had previously threatened to kill Christians. In addition, one policeman was killed and three others wounded in a shooting on St Catherine's monastery in the Sinai on 18 April, which was claimed by IS. In an attack on a Sufi mosque in the northern Sinai on 24 November, 305 people, including many children and elderly people, were killed, according to the official count. The assailants reportedly carried IS flags, but no claim of responsibility was issued by the group.

Christians were also targeted in several attacks claimed by IS in 2017 in different parts of Egypt outside the Sinai. For example, in Tanta, a city in the Nile Delta, a suicide attacker detonated his IED in a Coptic church during Palm Sunday service on 9 April, killing 27 people. Hours later a second attack which killed 17 people targeted



the Coptic cathedral in Alexandria, where the service was led by the Coptic Pope who remained unharmed.

The security situation in Egypt's western desert remained of concern to Egyptian authorities, due to its proximity to Libya. For example, on 26 May an attack claimed by IS on a bus carrying Coptic Christians near Minya caused the death of at least 19 people. In response, Egypt carried out airstrikes on targets in Libya, from where the attackers were said to have come. On 20 October according to an official statement, 16 policemen were killed in a shootout following a raid on a supposed terrorist hideout in the Bahariya Oasis.



## North Africa

In Libya the competition between rival governments continued in 2017 despite the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in March 2016, based on a Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015 in the Moroccan coastal town of Skhirat. The GNA, which is led by a Presidency Council and is the internationally recognised government of Libya, struggled to consolidate its position. Powerful militias and local warlords siding with either of the two other Libyan governments – the officially dissolved Government of National Salvation (GNS), mainly supported by Islamist factions, in Tripoli in the west of the country, and the House of Representatives and its government in Bayda in eastern Libya – continued competing for control of territory and resources.

In particular the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar and linked to the Bayda government, continued to expand in 2017 its control over territory to the south of Benghazi. After seizing much of the oil-rich Gulf of Sirte in September 2016, it continued south taking control of the Jufra district in early June 2017. In addition, in July 2017 the LNA announced that it had achieved victory over the factions controlling parts of Benghazi city.

Despite several attempts to international mediation to achieve a ceasefire between the parties, the military confrontations between the rival blocks increased in 2017 and were accompanied by accusations of war crimes committed by different parties.

The chaotic situation in Libya severely hampered counter-terrorism efforts. After the expulsion of IS from the coastal town of Sirte in December 2016, which it had seized in early

2015 by forces linked to the GNA, remaining IS fighters retreated to desert areas. From there the group continued perpetrating attacks in areas south of Sirte and the Jurfa district. By late August IS had become more assertive again, staging checkpoints in the LNA-controlled Jufra district and perpetrating terrorist attacks in populated areas along the coast. These terrorist activities continued for the remainder of the year.

In late May 2017 *Ansar al-Shari'a* in Libya, a local ally of al-Qaeda, declared its dissolution, stating that others would need to continue the fight. The group's decline, which had started in 2015, was probably linked to the growing influence of IS in the country. It is likely that former members of *Ansar al-Shari'a* joined jihadist factions in western Libya. The low profile adopted by al-Qaeda in Libya is in line with its official strategy of creating alliances with local groups.

## Sahel and Nigeria

The security situation in Mali remained precarious in 2017, with frequent attacks by jihadist groups targeting Malian and foreign military forces present in the country. For example, on 18 January 2017 77 people were killed in a suicide attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) on a military camp in Gao during morning assembly. The camp housed Malian government soldiers and former rebel forces conducting mixed patrols under the Joint Operational Mechanism, a UN-brokered peace agreement. On the same day, a statement was issued by the *al-Andalus Media Production Company*, the official media outlet of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which specified that the attack was conducted by a member of the *al-Murabitun* brigade of AQIM. *Al-Murabitun* (those who are lined up [against the enemy]) had split in 2015 into a faction pledging allegiance to IS and another one that remained loyal to AQIM.

In early March 2017 *Ansar al-Din* (also known as *Ansar Dine*, "supporters of the religion"), al-Murabitun and AQIM's Sahara division merged under the name *Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin* (JNIM, "group in support of Islam and Muslims"). In addition, the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front joined the umbrella organisation. The main groups forming the alliance had already cooperated closely in the past<sup>37</sup>. The new formation was to be led

<sup>37</sup> Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, 2017*, p. 36.

by the leader of *Ansar al-Din*, Iyyad Agh Ghali, who in the foundational video pledged allegiance to the leaders of AQIM, the al-Qaeda central leadership and the leadership of the Taliban. The merger was subsequently endorsed in public statements by AQIM and the al-Qaeda central leadership. In its statement, AQIM linked the approval of the merger with hopes for new attacks in France.



To mark its autonomy and programmatic orientation, JNIM created a new online brand with a centralised media outlet, the *al-Zallaqa Media Production Company*, named after the Battle of Sagrajas (*al-Zallaqa* in Arabic) in Spain in 1086, in which Christian forces were defeated by a Muslim army.

The merger led to improved operational capacities and an increase in the number of casualties owing to terrorist attacks in the region. JNIM continued the violent activities of its predecessor organisations with several attacks on military targets, including the forces of French military in Operation Barkhane and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali

(MINUSMA) troops. These included two attacks on UN camps in Douentza and Timbuktu on 14 August which killed at least 19 people.

Foreigners continued to be targets of attacks or hostage taking. On 18 June JNIM attacked a tourist resort in Kangaba near the Malian capital Bamako, which was popular with Western citizens. Five people were killed, including two French citizens and a Portuguese soldier working for the EU Training Mission Mali.

In a video published on 1 July albeit not under the *al-Zallaqa Media* label, JNIM declared that at that moment in time it held hostage six foreign nationals from Australia, Colombia, France, Romania, South Africa and Switzerland. These included a Colombian nun, kidnapped on 7 February in southern Mali close to the border with Burkina Faso. She remained in captivity throughout the year.

In addition, the faction of *al-Murabitun* that pledged allegiance to IS, now commonly known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, continued to be active in the border region between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. On 4 October 2017 it attacked a unit of Nigerian and US Army Special Forces, killing five Nigerian and four US soldiers<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> The attack was among a number of incidents claimed in a statement signed by the group's leader, Abu al-Walid al-Sahravi, which was sent to local news outlets on 12 January 2018. In a video released in early March 2018, the group presented footage taken from a camera on one of the US soldiers' helmets.



In Nigeria, despite repeated army claims to have defeated it militarily, the different factions of the jihadist militia known as *Boko Haram* (“Western education is unlawful [in Islam]”) continued to conduct large-scale violence and abductions in 2017. Numerous attacks across north-east Nigeria and neighbouring countries Niger, Chad and Cameroon targeted military and police forces, mosques, markets and internally displaced persons (IDP) fleeing *Boko Haram*.

In 2017 an increased use of women and children in suicide attacks using person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) was noted. Many of the women had been abducted by *Boko Haram* in previous years. These attacks led to a significant increase of

fatalities caused by terrorism in 2017. Most attacks remained unclaimed.

In August 2016 *Boko Haram* split into two main factions, one led by Abubakar Shekau, who had pledged allegiance to IS in 2015, and another one led by the son of *Boko Haram* founder Muhammad Yusuf, using the *nom de guerre* Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi (“Abu Mus’ab from Borno”), who was recognised by the IS leadership as the head of its West Africa province in August 2016. In 2017 the two factions operated in largely separate geographical areas. The IS West Africa province under al-Barnawi was based in the Lake Chad region. It acquired capabilities to conduct highly organised attacks. Abubakar Shekau’s faction was mainly active around the

Sambisa Forest in southern Borno State and adjacent areas. Many suicide attacks targeting mosques and crowded places are attributed to this faction.

## Arabian Peninsula

In Yemen, the civil war between the *Houthi* rebels, who refer to themselves as *Ansar Allah* (“servants of God”), and the internationally recognised government under President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi continued unabated. The Hadi government continued to receive support from an alliance of Arab Sunni countries led by Saudi Arabia, backed by Western states, which started conducting airstrikes in the country in 2015. The conflict created one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes in Yemen’s history.

The *Houthi* militias, whose members belong to the Zaydi branch of Shi’i Islam, were allied with forces loyal to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been ousted in 2012 in the wake of popular protests. After Salih declared that he had withdrawn from the alliance with the *Houthis*, he was assassinated by *Houthi* fighters on 7 December 2017 when he tried to flee the formal Yemeni capital Sana’a, which had been under *Houthi* control since 2014. The *Houthis* declared that he was killed on account of his treason.

The turmoil in Yemen allowed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to continue building and expanding its popular support base, after being forced to withdraw from Mukalla in April 2016, by creating strong links with Sunni tribes, in particular in the eastern Hadramawt governorate, without attracting public attention. AQAP profited from the smuggling trade fuelled by the war economy.

Militarily, AQAP focussed its attacks on *Houthi* rebels and the Yemeni military. In its propaganda, AQAP portrayed its fight against the Yemeni army as an attempt to protect Sunni tribes in Yemen against their enemies, who in the group’s ideology comprise Western countries, in particular the USA, Arab countries involved in the war in Yemen, the Hadi government as well as the *Houthi* rebels. For example, after a USA raid on an alleged AQAP stronghold in Yemen’s Bayda province on 31 January, AQAP’s leader Qasim al-Raymi denounced the death of women and children in the raid, including a daughter of late jihadist propagandist Anwar al-Awlaqi, and expressed his sympathy with the Sunni tribe on whose territory the incident had occurred. He alleged that the USA was conspiring with the *Houthi*





rebels to fight the Sunnis in Yemen. On several occasions in 2017 AQAP also denounced Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as deviating from Islam and collaborating with the USA in its alleged war on Muslims. The two Arab countries were accused of trying to corrupt the Yemeni tribes by inciting them to fight one another. The high civilian death toll inflicted by the Saudi-led coalition and accusations of human rights violations perpetrated by both the *Houthi* rebels and forces linked to the Saudi-led coalition, in particular the UAE, are likely to increase the effectiveness of such arguments. AQAP warned local populations that, in case they joined the coalition side, they would become attack targets.

Contrary to AQAP, from late 2014 armed factions in Yemen which pledged loyalty to IS sought integration into the local tribal structure to a far lesser degree and instead adopted a rhetoric aimed to deepen sectarian divisions in Yemen. Several bomb attacks and assassinations in Yemen were claimed by IS, mainly in the al-Bayda' governorate and Aden. Videos showed training of fighters and idyllic scenes on life with IS. In mid-October 2017, a US airstrike targeted two IS training camps in al-Bayda' province, killing dozens of IS members, according to the US army. The camps were allegedly used to train fighters in the use of different weapons and rocket launchers. In November 2017 AQAP celebrated the defection of IS members in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia, which was among countries singled out in IS calls for lone actor attacks, continued to witness sporadic terrorist plots. For example, two men blew themselves up on 21 January 2017 when confronted by security forces in Jeddah. Their affiliation was not disclosed. On 23 June, according to authorities, a terrorist plot allegedly targeting security, pilgrims and worshippers at the Grand Mosque in Mecca was foiled. One of the suspects blew himself up when engaged in a fire fight with security forces at a hideout. Saudi authorities did not attribute the plot to a specific group.



## Somalia

Somalia witnessed continued conflict and severe drought in 2017, the effects of which compounded to create the most severe famine in the country since 2011 affecting half the population. Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin (HSM – “mujahid youth movement”), which still controlled rural areas in southern Somalia, continued launching assaults on troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces. For example, on 27 January HSM fighters attacked Kenyan AMISOM troops at Kulbiyow in Somalia near the Kenyan border. The attack started with two VBIEDs driven into the military base, followed by a large number of HSM fighters attacking it. HSM claimed that they killed more than 50 Kenyan soldiers, a number denied by the Kenyan army.

Through such attacks and roadblocks on major routes, HSM constituted the greatest impediment to the delivery of relief to drought victims, in particular in areas under its control in the country's south. In April a roadside bomb exploded 100m behind a moving World Food Programme (WFP) convoy in the outskirts of Mogadishu. HSM stated that the remotely controlled

landmine targeted the WFP convoy and its escorting soldiers.

In 2017 HSM in particular targeted the capital Mogadishu, which suffered multiple attacks. These attacks were carried out mainly by remotely detonated VBIEDs, suicide attacks using VBIEDs or suicide assaults. They targeted military and police, populated areas and hotels. In addition, numerous attempts on the lives of Somali military, intelligence and government personnel as well as Somali journalists occurred.

Most but not all of these were claimed by HSM. In one of the deadliest attacks in Somalia in decades, VBIEDs hidden in two lorries exploded on a busy junction in central Mogadishu on 14 October. More than 350 people were killed. The attack was attributed to HSM but no claim of responsibility was published. The group may have hesitated to claim the attack due to the risk of the high civilian death toll alienating Somali citizens. Two weeks later, by contrast, HSM claimed responsibility for an attack in Mogadishu on 28 October in which 23 people were killed. The target was a hotel scheduled to host a meeting between the Somali Federal President and his five regional peers. After two VBIEDs detonated nearby, armed fighters assaulted the hotel. The attackers were reportedly killed

during the ensuing siege. These and other attacks may have aimed to disprove speculations about the group being weakened by the killing of an HSM commander in a US drone strike in the Lower Shabelle region in early August, who was believed to have been responsible for leading HSM forces operating in the Mogadishu and Banaadir regions and planning and executing attacks in Mogadishu.

An armed faction in Puntland which split from HSM in October 2015 and pledged allegiance to IS<sup>39</sup> remained

<sup>39</sup> Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2016*, 2016, p. 33.

active in 2017. In October 2016 the group had taken over the town of Qandala in Puntland's Bari region, declaring it the seat of an "Islamic caliphate in Somalia", but was driven out in early December 2016. Its recruitment efforts reportedly targeted disaffected HSM members in southern Somalia. Despite its more international orientation compared to HSM, the group has been able to attract only a limited number of foreign fighters. On 8 February 2017 the group's fighters stormed a hotel in Bosaso, the economic capital of Puntland. On 23 May it carried out its first suicide attack, killing five people

when a PBIED detonated at a police checkpoint near a hotel in Bosaso. In November the US military started conducting airstrikes targeting the IS faction in Somalia.

In Kenya in 2017 HSM concentrated its violent activities on the regions bordering Somalia, conducting several attacks on Kenyan security forces and local inhabitants.



## South Asia

Afghanistan witnessed continued violence throughout 2017 from both the Taliban movement and IS Khorasan province. The Taliban claimed responsibility mainly for attacks targeting security forces, including NATO troops. IS claimed a high number of suicide attacks, often using PBIEDs in combination with firearms, on religious and civilian targets, including foreign embassies. On 10 January a twin bomb attack targeting the provincial governor's office in Kabul killed 11 people, including five UAE diplomats, who were member of a visiting delegation. The governor and the UAE ambassador to Afghanistan were among those injured. On the same day, a twin bomb attack targeted the Afghan parliament. Both attacks were claimed by the Taliban.

On 31 May 2017 a large water tanker

filled with explosives detonated at the entrance of the diplomatic quarter in Kabul after being denied access; more than 100 people died. The explosion took place near the German embassy, which was severely damaged and had to be evacuated. IS claimed responsibility for the attack, but Afghan authorities tended to attribute it to the Haqqani Network (HQN), which is linked to the Taliban.

IS targeted the Shi'i minority in Afghanistan in several attacks. Among other incidents, the group claimed suicide attacks on Shi'i mosques in Herat on 1 August, which killed at least 29 people, and in Kabul on 25 August, which killed some 40 people.

Presumed IS members killed six Afghan employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross in northern Afghanistan on 8 February.

Several attacks were claimed by both the Taliban and IS, including an attack with nearly 50 rockets fired on Kabul's main airport during a visit by the US Secretary of Defense and the NATO Secretary General on 27 September.

On 26 July, al-Qaeda announced the creation of *Ansar Ghazwat al-Hind* as a new affiliate operating in the region of Kashmir, which is disputed between India and Pakistan. The new entity was to be headed by a 23-year-old former *Hizb al-Mujahidin* ("Mujahidin Party") member.

The Pakistan-based Taliban offshoot *Jamaat-ul-Ahrar* ("Group Of Free Men") claimed responsibility for several attacks in February 2017. IS claimed several bomb attacks killing more than a hundred people in Pakistan in 2017, targeting Sufi shrines, Christians, politicians. On 16 February an attacker detonated his PBIED at a Sufi shrine in Sehwan in southern Pakistan. According to the authorities, 83 people died. IS claimed responsibility.

A series of attacks on 23 June in different regions of Pakistan, which killed at least 42 people in Quetta, Parachinar and Karachi, was claimed by both *Jamaat-ul-Ahrar* and IS. Other attacks remained unclaimed.





## Southeast Asia

In the Philippines in late May 2017 at least 100 Islamist rebels attacked Marawi, a city of 200 000 inhabitants Mindanao Island. The clashes reportedly started when soldiers tried in vain to arrest Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of Abu Sayyaf, which had pledged allegiance to IS in 2014 and intended to unite all IS factions in the region. The attackers were said

to consist of Abu Sayyaf and Maute members. According to a military spokesman, they were supported by fighters from other Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

IS used the success in the Philippines to project an image of invincibility. For example, in a comment on the 22 May bomb attack on a concert in Manchester, an article in *Rumiyah* in early June stressed that the loss of territory would only result in future expansion, citing as an example the takeover of Marawi. In an IS video featuring the events in Marawi, which was published on 20 August, the group stated that the city was “liberated” on 23 May, almost two years after the *mujahidin* in Indonesia pledged allegiance to Abubakr al-Baghdadi. The video showed armed men storming a church and destroying statues and pictures of Pope Francis. A fighter

threatened that “we will be in Rome, God willing”. Muslims in East Asia, especially in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand were asked to come to Marawi and join jihad there.

In mid-October the Philippine army announced that it had killed Isnilon Hapilon and another IS leader, Omarkhayam Maute, in Marawi. On 23 October the Philippine government declared that the battle against the terrorists in Marawi had ended.

## Kidnappings

In 2017 Western citizens continued to become victims of terrorist attacks and kidnappings, mainly in and around conflict zones. During the reporting period, attacks and kidnap operations against westerners occurred in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria and the Philippines. No such incidents were reported in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen but the risk of EU citizens being attacked or kidnapped remained high. Moreover, a number of western citizens who were abducted in previous years by criminal or terrorist groups remained in captivity. Hostages have been used by their captors for propaganda and political pressure on local and foreign governments; financial gains via ransom payments; and prisoner exchanges.


In Afghanistan, terrorist and criminal groups continued to pose a grave kidnapping threat for both locals and foreigners. The Haqqani Network (HQN) maintained the intent and capability to conduct kidnap operations

against Western targets in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The arrest of the HQN leader’s brother in 2014, and his subsequent death sentence in Afghanistan, led to the HQN making considerable efforts to kidnap westerners for use in negotiations. The rescue of an American-Canadian family in Pakistan in October, deprived the HQN of the opportunity to use them in a prisoner exchange. The HQN currently holds two Western hostages, an American and an Australian, professors at the University of Kabul, who were kidnapped in Kabul in August 2016. In October 2017, HQN released a statement that the American hostage was in poor health and urged for a prisoner swap. In May 2017, an incident occurred in Kabul, in which unidentified militants attacked a guesthouse of Operation Mercy (a Swedish NGO) and killed a German woman and an Afghan guard and kidnapped a Finnish aid worker, who was later released.

In the Sahel region, militants of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and IS continued their terrorist activities. A Romanian citizen kidnapped

in April 2015 in the border area of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali remained captive at the time of writing. He was abducted by an IS-affiliated branch of al-Murabitun and his last appearance was in a video posted online by AQIM in July 2017. Furthermore, a Swiss missionary has been held by AQIM since January 2016 when she was abducted from her home in Timbuktu. This hostage has featured in a number of AQIM videos in which the terrorist group demanded the release of its imprisoned fighters in Mali and of a member of *Ansar Dine* that was facing trial at the International Criminal Court. Her most recent appearance in one of these videos was in June 2017.

During the reporting period, two attacks targeting westerners also occurred in the same region. On 18 June in a terror attack on a luxury resort in Bamako (Mali), a Portuguese soldier and two civilians with dual nationality (French-Malian and French-Gabonese) were killed. AQIM claimed responsibility and its intention to target members of an EU military training delegation in Mali. On 14 August one



French national was killed during an attack at a Turkish restaurant popular with expatriates in Burkina Faso.

A Swedish citizen and a British-South African citizen held by AQIM were released in June and July 2017 respectively. They had been abducted from a restaurant in Timbuktu in November 2011 along with a Dutch citizen who was freed in 2015, and were held in different locations. In October an Italian catholic priest who was kidnapped in Benin City (Nigeria) by a criminal group demanding a ransom was released having been held for five days.

Libya experienced no kidnapping of EU citizens in 2017, but the security situation in the country has not changed; political instability and violent conflicts continued. In September 2017, there were reports

concerning the death of one Austrian, one Czech, one Ghanaian and four Filipino hostages abducted by IS militants at al-Ghani oil field in March 2015.

No kidnapping of EU citizens was reported in the Philippines in 2017. Nonetheless, in February the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) posted a video online showing the execution of a German hostage that they had abducted in November 2016. Western tourists in the Philippines continued to be an attractive target for kidnapping by local terrorist organisations, especially the ASG. In 2017 militants expanded their area of operation beyond the Mindanao province and the Sulu Archipelago. In April Filipino security forces thwarted an attack, probably aiming at kidnapping tourists, by a group of heavily armed ASG

members in Bohol, a major tourist destination. The provinces of Cebu and Palawan were also considered to be within the reach of terrorists based in the south of the country.

Three EU citizens remained hostages in Syria in 2017: an Italian Jesuit priest kidnapped in July 2013 in Raqqa; an Italian businessman kidnapped in May 2016, who appeared in a video in November of the same year; and a British journalist held by IS since November 2012, who has featured in numerous IS propaganda releases. Their whereabouts and fate remain unknown at the time of writing.



## 3/

# ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

Most terrorist attacks carried out in the EU in 2017 were specified as separatist attacks (137 out of 205). France counted 42 attacks, Spain experienced 7 attacks. There were 88 security-related incidents in Northern Ireland, of which 58 were shooting and 30 were bombing incidents.

The completed separatist attacks were aimed at businesses and critical infrastructure, but also at civilians and the military. A total of 30 individuals were arrested in Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Austria<sup>49</sup>.

## UK / Dissident Republican groups

In 2017, included in the 88 security incidents mentioned above, there were five Dissident Republican (DR) attacks against national security targets<sup>41</sup>, including one in January in which a police officer was seriously injured in a shooting in Belfast.

DR terrorist groups opposed to the peace process remain the most significant threat to national security in Northern Ireland. The UK lists four DR groups: the new IRA; *Óglaigh na hÉireann* (ONH); the Continuity IRA (CIRA); and *Arm Na Poblachta* (ANP), who continue to consider violence a legitimate means of achieving their goal of a united Ireland. These groups consider police, prison officers and members of the armed forces in Northern Ireland as their primary targets.

Attack methodologies and capabilities used by DRs vary across the groups

<sup>41</sup> Attacks on national security targets is a measure used by the security service and includes those targeted principally (but not exclusively) against the security forces, those who support them and premises and institutions associated with policing justice and security.

with many attacks involving firearms or small improvised explosive devices such as pipe bombs. They have, however, also deployed larger and/or potentially more destructive devices such as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and explosively formed projectiles.

Apart from attacks on the security services, many dissident republicans are also heavily involved in criminal activities for personal gain, including smuggling and extortion. Their activities range from minor to serious criminality, including drug dealing, extortion, fuel laundering and murder.

## Spain / Euskadi ta Askatasuna

No terrorist attacks were perpetrated by the Basque nationalist and separatist organisation – *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) during 2017. Indeed, it has not carried out any attack since announcing a ceasefire in October 2011. ETA's activities have been focused on "partial disarmament" and on issuing communiqués aligned with the separatist strategy of the left-wing *Abertzale* movement. Their main demand is for the complete

<sup>49</sup> The arrests contributed by the UK were not included in the ranking as not specified by type of terrorism.

amnesty for the ETA militants serving prison who have been convicted and are currently in jail. In 2017 a series of criminal damages against bank offices and public transportation infrastructure were perpetrated by members of the left-wing *Abertzale* movement. The senior members of the group reside in France; other militants have moved to different EU countries, including Germany. Two members of the group were arrested in Berlin, Germany, in October 2017.

## Kurdistan / Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanê

Prior to the constitutional referendum, held throughout Turkey on 16 April, Belgium reported incidents between Kurdish and Turkish militants. France also reported attacks against Turkish consulates, institutions and associations. In February the premises of the Turkish newspaper Zaman in Seine-St-Denis, and the cultural association Millennium, in Marseille, both France, were also targeted. During 2017 French counter terrorist units arrested several militants, accused of criminal damages using at times, incendiary improvised devices in 2016.

Turkish authorities assess that the *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanê* (PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party) generates income from many different types of crimes including drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking,

fuel and cigarette smuggling, extortion, kidnapping and money laundering<sup>\*\*</sup>. Austria, France, Romania and Switzerland reported activities of the annual *kampanyo* to finance PKK and its armed branch *Hêzên Parastina Gel* (HPG – People's Defence Force)<sup>\*\*</sup>. Most funds appear to come from voluntary donations obtained, in some cases, under intimidation. France reports an estimate of EUR 6 million proceeds. In November 2017 eight PKK militants were convicted of terrorist financing.

The PKK is believed to use Europe as a base for logistics and procurement of weapons and recruitment<sup>\*\*</sup>, and transporting the conflict into the Kurdish diaspora. France reported the process of recruitment of militants through the organisation *Kamalen Ciwan* (Kurdish Youth Organisation). Kurdish youngsters residing in France are lured to join the organisation. Subsequently, they are sent to indoctrination camps scattered in Europe, far from their families and under the influence of PKK senior ranks. Finally they are trained in combat techniques in military camps in Armenia, Iran and Iraq. However, France estimates that only dozens of Kurdish fighters are recruited annually in Europe.




<sup>\*\*</sup> Based on figures provided by Turkey.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Belgium does not confirm direct financing of HPG.


<sup>\*\*</sup> Based on figures provided by Turkey.





**figure 7**  
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 2013-2017.

**figure 8**  
Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in EU Member States in 2017



# 4/ LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

## Terrorist attacks and suspects arrested

The number of attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups and individuals (24) decreased slightly in 2017 (27 in 2016). Left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity occurs almost exclusively in Greece, Italy and Spain. Attacks reported by Germany and France were both related to terrorists active in Greece. A slight increase was observed in the number of arrested people over 2017 with a total of 36 arrests, compared to 31 in 2016.

Consistently with previous years, *modi operandi* employed by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups included predominantly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Attacks were principally targeted on government and police officials, property and infrastructure and were carried out exclusively by groups and individuals of anarchist ideological background. Groups in Greece and Italy continued to claim they comprise an international network they call *Federazione Anarchica Informale/ Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale* (FAI/FRI, Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front). However, there appears to

be no operational cooperation or coordination other than the exchange of solidarity messages via a number of anarchist websites.

On 1 January a bomb exploded in front of a bookshop with links to the neo-fascist activist group Casa Pound in Florence (Italy), seriously wounding a bomb-squad officer. Open source media reported the arrest by police of five anarchists for “attempted manslaughter”.

In Greece left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups and individuals continued to have enhanced operational capabilities and access to military-grade weapons. In 2017 eight attacks were carried out: six with the use of IEDs and two with the use of firearms. Furthermore, a total of 12 people were arrested on charges related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism.

Terrorists from Greece were behind two attacks that occurred in Germany and France. These were part of a terrorist campaign involving the sending of a total of ten victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs, specifically parcel bombs) occurred in March. One of the parcel bombs was addressed to the German Minister of Finance and was discovered and dismantled by the authorities in Berlin. A second was sent to the director of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) in Paris and exploded in the hands of an employee causing light injury. Greek law enforcement discovered eight more parcel bombs at the sorting centre of the Hellenic Post Office in Athens. *Synamosia Pyrinotis Fotias* (Conspiracy of Cells of Fire) claimed responsibility merely for the VOIED sent to Germany. In a similar attack in May, a parcel bomb exploded in the car of a former prime minister of Greece injuring him and two police officers.

Militants of *Organosi Epanastatikis Aftoamynas* (Revolutionary Self-Defence Organisation) carried out two identical attacks against police officers guarding the headquarters of a Greek political party in the centre of Athens. On both occasions the perpetrators shot at the police using an assault rifle. The first took place on 10 January and resulted in the injury of one police officer and the second on 6 November without causing any injuries or damage.

Two terrorist attacks were claimed by *Omada Laikon Agoniston* (Group of Popular Fighters) in 2017. On 19 April an IED exploded outside the central offices of a bank and on 22 December another device detonated in front of the building of the Athens appeals court. Both explosions were preceded by a warning call to newspapers.

In Italy anarchist terrorist activity






figure 9

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism from 2013 to 2017.

declined in comparison with the previous year. A total of seven attacks occurred in 2017, most of which were in expression of solidarity with incarcerated members of anarchist terrorist groups. For yet another year, anarchist terrorists in Italy used IEDs, VOIEDs and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) in their attacks. Italian law enforcement arrested 11 people in relation to anarchist terrorist activity.

The FAI/FRI was responsible for three attacks. On 7 June parcel bombs were sent to two Turin-based prosecutors in charge of several cases against anarchist terrorists. The two devices were detected and dismantled at the Turin Courthouse. A similar VOIED was detected at the headquarters of the prison department in Rome on 12 June. The *Santiago Malonado* Cell of the FAI/FRI also claimed responsibility for the explosion of an IED outside the Carabinieri Roma San Giovanni police station that caused moderate damage to the building.

Anarchist terrorists in Italy were behind three arson attacks in the first half of 2017: two arsons of telecommunication transmitters, on

26 January in Milan and on 7 June in Rovereto; and an attack using Molotov cocktails against the offices of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in Meledugno.

In Spain left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity continued its qualitative and quantitative decline of the past three years. Seven anarchist terrorist attacks were reported for 2017 out of which two were carried out with the use of crude IIDs in a parking lot of the Spanish National Police on 25 May and a bank branch on 7 June respectively and five were foiled. Spanish authorities also arrested three people on charges related to anarchist terrorism.

In 2017 the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist group *Devrimci Halk Kuvvetleri Partisi/Cephesi* (DHKP/C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) remained active in both Turkey and the EU. On 20 January in Turkey, it carried out an attack against a police station and the provincial administration building of the Justice and Development Party in Istanbul using a rocket launcher. Although the organisation has never carried out

terrorist attacks outside Turkey, its members maintained a fixed structure on EU soil that provides logistical and financial support for terrorist activities in Turkey, under the guise of legally established associations. An indication of this structure was the arrested of nine DHKP/C operatives on 28 November in Greece on terrorism-related charges and the discovery of weapons, explosives and forged documents in their possession.


## Violent extremist activities

Several EU Member States reported that in 2017 left-wing and anarchist extremism remained a threat to the public order. It predominately derived from anarchist groups and individuals that form loose collectives without hierarchical structure and organized their actions largely in squatted buildings and "social centres". Marxist-Leninist groups and individuals appeared to be less violent in the reporting period, although there appeared to be no change in their rhetoric.

**figure 10**

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for **left-wing and anarchist terrorism** in EU Member States in 2017

attacks  arrests 



In most of the EU Member States, anarchist extremist activity remained low in intensity. In Greece and Italy, however, the anarchist extremist milieu is considered to be an antechamber to terrorism, in the sense that it provides fertile ground for radicalisation and recruitment. In addition, the anarchist movement supports imprisoned anarchist terrorists with solidarity and fundraising activities.

The issue of migration remained central in the anarchist extremist agenda. Anarchists focused their activities on government migration policies and on the expression of solidarity with migrants. The core of their mobilisation, however, was against right-wing political parties and right-wing extremist groups. Other central issues were the support to arrested or imprisoned terrorists and extremists; the eviction of squatted properties; and generic themes, such as the economy and the criminal justice system. Furthermore, emerging issues that attract the public's

attention (e.g. corruption scandals) continued to appear in the anarchist rhetoric.

Like in previous years, anarchist extremist violence largely targeted police personnel and infrastructure, government property, banks, migration-related private businesses and right-wing extremists. Modi operandi included launching attacks during demonstrations, arson attacks, and vandalisms. Acts of arson were carried out with the use of improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) or with the throwing of Molotov cocktails in hit-and-run operations. Such attacks were reported by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Italy. Vandalism occurred mainly during protests but also in surprise attacks by small groups of extremists against police stations or other targets.

In 2017 anarchist extremists in the EU maintained contacts with and continued to express their support to each other. This was achieved via references on their online propaganda

and via solidarity events. Further synergy was observed during large-scale international events with much media attention. The Hamburg G20 Summit, for example, attracted numerous extremists from around Europe: police arrested anarchists from the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK and identified protesters from Italy and Spain. Extremists in the EU also followed and reacted to developments on the international political stage. On two such occasions, anarchist extremists in Greece vandalised the Embassy of Israel and the Embassy of Saudi Arabia at the end of the year, in reaction to the two countries' policies on Palestine and Yemen respectively.



# 5/ RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

Five foiled, failed or completed terrorist attacks attributed to right-wing extremists (RWE) were reported for 2017: all of them by the UK. On 19 June one person died and 10 were injured after a van was driven deliberately into a crowd of Muslim worshippers in North London by a man who had previously expressed hatred of Muslims. Four days later, on 23 June, a known supporter of the far-right party *Britain First* drove a vehicle into an Indian restaurant in London, injuring several people. Prior to the attacks, he was caught on CCTV making Nazi salutes.

In addition to attacks classified as terrorism, other violent incidents took place in 2017 motivated by RWE, for example on 15 April two men with a proven affinity with National Socialism threw incendiary devices at an asylum hostel in Germany.

The number of individuals arrested in relation to RWE offences almost doubled in 2017 (11 in 2015; 12 in 2016; 20 in 2017). The vast majority (15) were reported by France. Of the 20 people arrested<sup>45</sup>, 16 were arrested for preparing an attack, 3 for committing an attack and one for inciting and/or praising terrorism.

<sup>45</sup> The arrests contributed by the UK were not included in the ranking as not specified by type of terrorism.

There are RWE groups that are prepared to use violence to advance their political agenda. In March 2017 EU Security Commissioner Sir Julian King highlighted the growing menace of RWE. Sir King said that he was not aware of a single EU Member State that is not affected in some way by the phenomenon. However, he also noted that it tended to receive less media coverage<sup>46</sup>. This may contribute to underreporting on the subject.

The RWE scene is fragmented and manifests itself in a variety of forms. In EU Member States, a myriad of often small RWE groups, including National Socialist-oriented and neo-Nazi groups, exist. Germany reported New Right factions, such as the *Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland* (IBD, Identitarian Movement Germany) and supporters of the Reich Citizen ideology, to be gaining visibility. These RWE groups adopt a variety of ideologies, ranging from the condemnation of the political establishment and the membership of international organisations (e.g. NATO and the EU), to the rejection of asylum policies, migrants and individuals and groups associated with a different racial, ethnic (e.g. Roma), religious (e.g. Jews and Muslims) or political background. Furthermore, members

of RWE groups have targeted anarchist groups.

Neo-Nazi groups reported by EU Member States include the *Generace Identity* (Generation of Identity) movement and the *Pro-Vlast* movement in the Czech Republic, the group *Soldiers of Odin* in Belgium and the *Blood & Honour* organisation in Portugal. Other RWE groups try to present themselves in a more widely accepted fashion. These groups sometimes publicly advertise populist views in a way to make them socially acceptable within segments of the population, as reflected in the existence and electoral successes of legally constituted political parties in EU Member States that have adopted elements of RWE agendas.

An important trigger for the current expansion of the RWE scene is the fear of an assumed Islamisation of the Western world. A major and active representative of the RWE scene motivated by fear of Muslim domination and the introduction of Islamic law (*shari'a*) is the *Identitäre Bewegung*, which originated in Germany and currently has branches in other EU Member States including Austria (*Identitäre Bewegung Österreich*, Identitarian Movement Austria) and the Netherlands (*Identitair Verzet*, Identitarian Resistance). On its Facebook page the IBD has taken up a video of the French *Génération Identitaire* and the intentions and aims formulated therein, and has

<sup>46</sup> Tempest, M., "Commissioner warns of 'growing menace' of right-wing terrorism in EU", *Euractiv.com*, accessed 31 January 2018, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/commissioner-warns-of-growing-menace-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-eu/>

obviously taken this as a reference and role model for its founding. In Belgium, the group *La Meute Belgique* (Belgian Pack), with an anti-Islam agenda, had its first meeting in 2017 to commemorate the March 2016 attacks in Brussels on the airport and the Maelbeek metro station. The Dutch group *Identitair Verzet* temporarily occupied buildings associated with Islam, including a Salafist school and a mosque under construction. The UK assessed that protest activity by RWE groups will continue to target predominantly Muslim areas, provoking racial hatred and harassment. Triggers cited for such activities included new or expanded Muslim places of worship, media coverage of sex offences by refugees and (jihadist) terrorist incidents in the UK.

In August 2017 two 36-year-old German nationals were arrested for suspected preparation of a serious act of violence endangering state security. Both suspects considered the German refugee policy misguided and worried about a breakdown of state order. To this end, they were believed to stock up on food and ammunition for their weapons legally obtained before. In their opinion, a crisis situation would provide the opportunity to capture and kill representatives of the left-wing political spectrum. In April 2017 a serving German soldier was arrested. In December 2015, he had posed as a Syrian refugee and applied for a asylum in Germany, allegedly with the intention to assassinate high-ranking German politicians and blame it on migrants or refugees.

The UK reported that the majority of RWE activities were private meetings and ticketed music events that can be organised legally. This type of activity has also been observed in other EU Member States. In addition, protest activities included demonstrations against temporary accommodation centres for asylum seekers and refugees

and hate speeches against migrants.

Activities sometimes included training in self-defence, shooting and other combat skills. An example of such a group is the *Slovenskí Branci* in Slovakia. This group believes that the Slovak armed forces are insufficiently able to resist potential "outside threats". In the UK, following the proscription of *National Action* in December 2016, two groups, *Scottish Dawn* and *NS133*, emerged and were assessed to hold the same ideology and membership as *National Action*. In September 2017, both groups were also proscribed, it having been recognised that these groups were alternative names for *National Action*. Arrests against this group in October 2017 included individuals that were serving in the British army. *National Action* encourages its member to prepare for a "race war" in the UK. The group has held training camps in 2017, where fighting and weapon training was provided. Members also sought to join the army or develop links with serving personnel to give them the opportunity of gaining military training and enhance their individual capability. Other instances of RWE attack planning in the UK, including the construction of viable IEDs and acquisition of firearms were identified and disrupted in 2017.

RWE groups have been found to foster international contacts. Belgian RWE groups, for example, have developed contacts with peer groups in Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, the USA and Austria. The *Identitäre Bewegung Österreich* participated in the "Save and Rescue" mission as part of the Defend Europe action in the Mediterranean Sea to stop NGO ships from leaving Italian seaports to rescue migrants with Italian, French and German representatives of the movement. The Dutch branch of PEGIDA has contacts with far-right organisations abroad, including *Hooligans gegen Salafisten* (HoGeSa, Hooligans against Salafists)



in Germany. Demonstrations held in Slovakia against the influx of migrants, also attended by non-extremist right-wing participants, attracted supporters from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The Portuguese *Blood & Honour* organisation sends delegations to major RWE events abroad.

Additionally, links have been found between some RWE groups and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG). The groups concerned are also associated with arms and drug (steroids) trafficking.





## 6/ SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

No attacks classified as single issue terrorism were reported by EU Member States for 2017. The influence of left-wing and anarchist extremists in protest movements related to environmental and animal rights issues and the opposition to the building of large infrastructure projects appeared to decline.

Almost all EU Member States reported no or minimal activism related to animal rights. Nevertheless, the UK experienced a revival in the animal rights movement that covered a spectrum of activity from low level protest and direct action through to more serious forms of criminality. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) was involved in over 66 violent actions including trespass, criminal damage and arson.

## ANNEX 1

# Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2017 per EU Member State and per affiliation

Member State	Jihadist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Separatist	Single issue	Not specified	Total
Belgium	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Finland	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
France	11	1	-	42	-	-	54
Germany	1	1	-	-	-	-	2
Greece	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
Italy	1	7	-	-	-	6	14
Spain	2	7	-	7	-	-	16
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom	14	-	5	88	-	-	107
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>205</b>

- › The number of foiled, failed and completed attacks classified as jihadist terrorism (33) more than doubled, compared to 2016 (13). However, less than one third of the attacks (10) were completed. Nine jihadist attacks were claimed by IS. Four attacks were attributed to IS.
- › The UK and France reported the highest number of jihadist attacks in total, together with the highest rate of foiled and failed attacks – of 11 attacks in France, only 2 were completed. The UK experienced 5 jihadist attacks and reported 9 disrupted plots.
- › The category of jihadist terrorism caused the most casualties – 62 people dead (out of 68) and 819 injured (out of 844).
- › In terms of weaponry, knives and other bladed weapons were used most frequently by jihadist attackers, often combined with the use of vehicles. However, stabbing attacks also had the highest rate among foiled attacks, followed by attempted bombings.
- › Jihadist attackers targeted mostly civilians in public places and law enforcement personnel. However, the vast majority of attacks on soldiers and officers were not successful.
- › In 2017 left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups or individuals in the EU carried out 24 attacks. This was a downward movement after a sharp increase in 2016, when 27 left-wing attributed attacks occurred in EU Member States (13 attacks in 2015).
- › Greece (8), Spain (7) and Italy (7) experienced the highest number of left-wing attacks; also in terms of completed acts (60%). Furthermore, 2 attacks that targeted France and Germany were caused by Greek extremists. Left-wing attacks resulted in five injuries and no fatalities.
- › Private enterprises and government institutions were among the most frequent targets for left-wing attacks. In Italy, critical infrastructure was targeted in 3 attacks.



- › The majority of the left-wing attacks in 2017 were carried out using unsophisticated improvised incendiary/explosive devices, parcel/letter bombs containing gunpowder and a crude ignition mechanism, and bottles with flammable liquids.
- › Although the number of right-wing attacks remained low (1 in 2016; 5 in 2017), the attack attributed to right-wing extremism in the UK caused the death of a person in 2017.
- › Similarly to 2016, the countries reporting terrorist attacks linked to separatism were the UK, France and Spain. The total number of separatist attacks increased by 40 % (from 99 in 2016 to 137 in 2017), mainly due to increased frequency of attacks reported by France (18 in 2016, 42 in 2017).

## ANNEX 2

### Arrests in 2017 per EU Member State and per affiliation

Member State	Jihadist	Left-wing	Separatist	Right-wing	Not specified	Total
France	373	10	13	15	-	411
Spain	78	3	10	-	-	91
Germany	52	-	3	3	-	58
Belgium	50	-	-	-	-	50
Austria	46	-	2	-	-	48
Netherlands	28	-	2	-	5	35
Italy	26	11	-	2	-	39
Denmark	14	-	-	-	3	17
Greece	3	12	-	-	-	15
Bulgaria	14	-	-	-	-	14
Ireland	3	-	-	-	8	11
Finland	9	-	-	-	-	9
Hungary	2	-	-	-	-	2
Poland	2	-	-	-	-	2
Romania	2	-	-	-	-	2
Czech Republic	1	-	-	-	-	1
Portugal	1	-	-	-	-	1
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom					168	168
<b>Total</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>975</b>

A total of 975<sup>47</sup> persons were arrested on suspicion of being involved in terrorism-related activities. Most arrestees (638) were male, against 123 female<sup>48</sup>. The most frequent offences were 1) membership of a terrorist group and 2) planning and/or preparing a terrorist act.

- › A total number of 705 persons were arrested on suspicion of offences related to jihadist terrorism, similarly to 2016 (718) and 2015 (687). Most arrests occurred in France (373), Spain (78) and Germany (52).
- › Arrests for jihadist terrorism continued to represent the largest proportion of the total arrests for terrorism-related offences in the EU.
- › The percentage of women arrested on suspicion of offences related to jihadist terrorism decreased from 26% in 2016 to 16%. The majority of arrested women (64%) held the citizenship of an EU Member State and were born in the EU. The average age of the suspects in jihadism-related arrests is 29 years, similar to 2016.
- › EU Member State authorities arrested 36 people related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism in 2017 (54 in 2014, 67 in 2015, 31 in 2016), most of them in France, Greece and Italy. For the second consecutive year, the number of arrests related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism continued to decrease.
- › The number of individuals arrested in relation to right-wing terrorist offences almost doubled in 2017 (from 11 in 2015 and 12 in 2016 to 20 in 2017). The vast majority of them (15) were reported by France. The individuals arrested with right-wing affiliation were mostly suspected of preparing a terrorist act.

<sup>47</sup> 184 terrorism-related arrests for 2017 were reported without differentiating by types of terrorism.

<sup>48</sup> The gender of more than 200 arrestees was not reported.



## ANNEX 3

## Convictions and penalties (Eurojust)

This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2017, as reported to Eurojust. It highlights some key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.

**table /** Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences per EU Member State in 2015, 2016<sup>49</sup> and 2017<sup>50</sup>, as reported to Eurojust.

<sup>49</sup> The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.

<sup>50</sup> Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2017 from the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

If a verdict pronounced in 2017 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final verdict.

Member State	2015	2016	2017
Austria	29	26	18
Belgium	120	136	85
Czech Republic	-	-	8
Denmark	1	8	4
Estonia	-	2	2
Finland	-	4	2
France	14	66	120
Germany	17	30	34
Greece	38	3	19
Hungary	-	2	-
Italy	-	11	23
Lithuania	1	1	2
Netherlands	18	42	46
Poland	-	-	4
Portugal	-	1	1
Slovenia	1	1	-
Spain	166	154	69
Sweden	2	4	3
United Kingdom	106	89	125
<b>Total</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>565</b>

In 2017, 17 Member States reported a total of 565 individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences. Four of those individuals appeared twice before the court in 2017 in the framework of different criminal proceedings<sup>51</sup>. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2017 was 569.

<sup>51</sup> Two individuals in Spain and two others in France were each tried twice in 2017 in different proceedings.

► In 2017 there were 66 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences.

► The UK reported the highest number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences (125), followed by France (120) and Belgium (85)<sup>52</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2017 refers only to convictions.

**table /** Number of verdicts in 2017 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust.

Member State	Jihadist	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Not specified	Total
Austria	18	-	-	-	-	18
Belgium	81	4	-	-	-	85
Czech Republic	3	-	5	-	-	8
Denmark	4	-	-	-	-	4
Estonia	2	-	-	-	-	2
Finland	2	-	-	-	-	2
France	114	8	-	-	-	122
Germany	27	3	-	4	-	34
Greece	2	-	17	-	-	19
Italy	23	-	-	-	-	23
Lithuania	-	1	-	-	1	2
Netherlands	37	7	-	-	2	46
Poland	4	-	-	-	-	4
Portugal	1	-	-	-	-	1
Spain	31	26	14	-	-	71
Sweden	3	-	-	-	-	3
United Kingdom*	-	-	-	-	125	125
<b>Total</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>569</b>

\* The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore marked as 'Not specified' and not included in the numbers below.

- › In 2017 the vast majority of verdicts in the Member States (352) concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015.
- › The highest number of verdicts concerning jihadist terrorism in 2017 (114) were rendered in France. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden reported only verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2017.
- › As in previous years, Spanish courts tried the largest number of individuals charged with separatist terrorism offences in the EU in 2017.
- › In 2017 courts in the Czech Republic, Greece and Spain heard left-wing terrorism cases marking an increase in such cases compared to last year. Germany was the only Member State that reported verdicts for right-wing terrorist offences.
- › The majority of the female defendants (42) were tried for jihadist terrorist offences confirming an upward trend from the past couple of years.
- › Left-wing terrorist offences continued to bear the highest average prison sentence (ten years). The average prison sentence for jihadist terrorist offences remained five years, and for separatist and right-wing terrorist offences it was four years.

**table /** Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2017, as reported to Eurojust.

Member State	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Acquittals In %
Austria	17	1	18	6%
Belgium	71	14	85	16%
Czech Republic	2	6	8	75%
Denmark	4	-	4	0%
Estonia	2	-	2	0%
Finland	-	2	2	100%
France	117	5	122	4%
Germany	32	2	34	6%
Greece	15	4	19	21%
Italy	22	1	23	4%
Lithuania	1	1	2	50%
Netherlands	32	14	46	30%
Poland	3	1	4	25%
Portugal	-	1	1	100%
Spain	60	11	71	15%
Sweden	1	2	3	67%
United Kingdom*	125		125	

\* The UK data for 2017 refers only to convictions and is not included in the calculations of percentages.

- › In 2017, Denmark and Estonia were the two Member States that had only convictions and no acquittals for terrorist offences. Also Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain witnessed a vast majority of successful prosecutions resulting in convictions for terrorist offences.
- › The record high conviction rate registered in 2016 across the EU (89%) continued also in 2017<sup>53</sup>.
- › All prosecutions for right-wing terrorist offences resulted in convictions in 2017. The concluded jihadist terrorism cases continued to have a very high conviction rate (89%), similar to 2016 (92%) and 2015 (94%). The acquittal rate among the verdicts related to separatist and left-wing terrorism was higher (29% and 28% respectively)<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Eurojust considers it one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism.

<sup>54</sup> The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate.





## ANNEX 4

# Europol activities in counter-terrorism

### FIRST-LINE INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT: THE EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE

Recent developments that include the terrorist attacks in Barcelona, and a substantial number of failed and foiled attacks, combined with the existence of large numbers of potentially violent jihadist extremists in the EU, indicate that the terrorist threat towards the EU is high. Despite the setback of IS in Iraq and Syria the severity of the threat in the EU may even increase, in relation to returning foreign terrorist fighters and their children and wives who may all pose a danger to the security of Member States, but also as this setback could mean that IS will focus even more on the West. Addressing the challenges and making full use of the available Counter Terrorism opportunities is key to countering terrorism effectively.

To ensure an effective response to the constantly changing developments in terrorism, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was established at Europol, under the authority and direction of the European Council. It builds further on the already existing tools and counter terrorism networks of Europol, but includes a number of new features. These aim at enhancing the counter

terrorism capabilities and at better facilitating information exchange among counter terrorism authorities, to bring cross-border cooperation in this field to a new level.

The ECTC is designed as a central hub in the EU in the fight against terrorism. In fact, it is the single point in the EU where counter terrorism operational information from law enforcement from all EU Member States, but also from third parties, is brought together for analytical purposes. Specialised teams of counter terrorism analysts and experts work on this information to construct the wider EU perspective on counter terrorism phenomena for both operational and strategic goals. To ensure efficient information exchange, the ECTC benefits from an excellent network of counter terrorism officers throughout the EU and beyond.

The principal task of the ECTC is to provide operational support upon Member States' request for ongoing investigations, such as those following the attacks in Paris in 2015. The ECTC can assist by cross-checking live operational data with the already available data at Europol, quickly bringing financial leads to light, and by analysing all available investigative details to assist in compiling a structured picture of the terrorist

network. If a major terrorist event were to occur, the ECTC can contribute to a coordinated response. Different teams are available for this purpose, often combined with counter terrorism experts temporarily seconded from Member States, depending on the nature of the event.

To provide direct operational support, and to also contribute to a coordinated response if major terrorist attacks or threats were to occur, the ECTC applies a scalable approach where other teams can be activated depending on the need. For example: Europol Emergency Response Team (EMRT): This team comprises Europol experts and analysts with relevant backgrounds and experience to support emerging investigations on a 24/7 basis.

### EUROPOL INFORMATION SYSTEM

One of Europol's core databases is the Europol Information System (EIS). Through this system, Member States directly share and retrieve information, including on suspects, means of communication, financial accounts and firearms, etc. connected with serious and organised crime and terrorism.

The EIS offers first-line investigative support, as this reference system allows Member States to quickly

identify whether or not information relevant to them is available in one of the EU Member States or with non-EU countries or organisations.

In cases of a positive hit, more information may then be requested through the contributor's Europol National Unit.

By the end of 2017 the EIS held information on over 46 000 persons linked to terrorism (the majority linked to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon), contributed by 37 countries.

#### **FURTHER IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS: THE COUNTER TERRORISM ANALYSIS WORK FILE AND THE ANALYTICAL PROJECTS**

For a more in-depth analysis, the ECTC works with the counter terrorism analysis work file (AWF). This file provides the framework for operational analytical support with the Member States and non-EU partners. As a result, the number of data categories that are permitted to be stored and processed is broader than in the EIS (within the counter terrorism AWF, there is focused analysis on certain counter terrorism phenomena). Existing and emerging terrorist phenomena are handled within separate, so called Analytical Points. In these highly secure environments the information is collected, cross-matched and analysed. This is done by dedicated teams of counter terrorism analysts and counter terrorism experts. Within counter terrorism a major Analysis Project (AP) is the topic of "travellers", which deals with foreign terrorist fighters. The amount

of data on foreign terrorist fighters within the AP Travellers increased substantially in 2017 as a result of the concerted efforts of Member States with the assistance of Europol. In December 2017 the ECTC opened a new AP on Core International Crimes which is related to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide<sup>55</sup>.

The ECTC uses an integrated approach meaning that data inserted in one system is automatically cross-checked against all other databases at Europol to close intelligence gaps. In addition, regular manual checks are carried out.

#### **INFORMATION EXCHANGE: SIENA**

In an organisation like Europol, with its main focus on information exchange, secure and swift transmission of data is essential, especially when it comes to counter terrorism data. Information from a Member State must reach Europol and vice versa, without the risk of interception. To facilitate this information exchange, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) was designed and has been in use for a number of years by Member States, Europol and third parties that have operational cooperation agreements with Europol.

A dedicated area has been created within SIENA especially for counter terrorism authorities. This means that counter terrorism authorities now have

<sup>55</sup> The AP on Core International Crimes works together closely with the Genocide Network, also known as the European Union Network for Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, hosted by Eurojust.

the possibility to send information directly to Europol or other counter terrorism authorities. Until very recently, countries could only use SIENA to send their contributions on terrorism to Europol indirectly, through the Europol National Unit and Liaison Bureau. The extended infrastructure now also allows counter terrorism authorities from different countries to directly exchange information among themselves, with optional involvement of Europol. Involvement of Europol is recommended to avoid possible links to other Member States and third partners to remain undiscovered as well as potential links between organised crime and terrorism.

In practice, this means that every counter terrorism officer in the Member States can check the EIS from their own computers, and directly send information to, or receive information from, the Analytical Points. The options described for sharing information are at the discretion of the Member State. The dedicated SIENA counter terrorism environment is already operational with 95% of all Member States and 46 counter terrorism authorities are now connected to the system in total.

#### **INTERNET REFERRAL UNIT**

The Internet Referral Unit (IRU) has expanded its activities to counter online radicalisation and recruitment by terrorists, by providing a core internet investigation support capability and increasing partnerships (with the support of the European Commission) towards online service companies (to promote self-regulation activities).



By the end of 2017 it has assessed in total 51 805 pieces of content, which triggered 49 969 decisions for referral, with a success rate of removal of 84.8% since it was setup in July 2015.

### TERRORISM FINANCE TRACKING PROGRAMME

The ECTC uses a number of tools to help detect the financing of terrorism, one of the best known being the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). The TFTP has been established following an EU-US agreement adopted by the European Parliament in 2010.

Relevant information obtained through the TFTP is provided by the US Department of the Treasury to Europol, competent authorities of EU Member States and Eurojust either spontaneously by the US, or upon request, pursuant to Article 9 or Article 10 of the Agreement respectively, with the aim of combatting terrorism and terrorist financing.

TFTP has proven to be a valuable tool in terrorism-related investigations, it enhances the ability to map out terrorist networks, often by filling in missing links in an investigative chain. It is used to track terrorist money flows, allowing authorities to identify and locate operatives and their financiers, and assists in broader efforts to uncover terrorist cells.

### CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR AND EXPLOSIVES

Europol is a key partner in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosives field, working together with the national competent authorities (from EU Member States and non-EU countries), and liaising, assisting and jointly promoting activities and training with the European Commission and other relevant international organisations in these areas of expertise.

The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units Network, with its EOD and CBRN expert working

groups continuous to be facilitated and actively supported by Europol. This network is one of the main achievements stemming from the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives.

A new platform for the European Explosives Ordnance Units Network on the Europol Platform of Experts (EPE) has become a main communication channel enabling already more than 300 European bomb technicians and CBRN experts to swiftly, efficiently and directly share knowledge, best practices and technical information on recent cases and incidents.

The bomb-making process, potential recipes for the harmful use of explosives precursors, as well as potential new threats using CBRN materials, are monitored daily and cross-checked by Europol's ECTC experts. Information is shared with experts and relevant units within the EU Member States and non-EU countries.

Europol assessments, strategic reports and expertise are also timely in detecting security gaps and feeding the EU Policy Cycle through effective cooperation with the European Commission.

In October 2017 the European Commission issued a new Action Plan to enhance preparedness against CBRN security risks, enhancing Europol's role as a key player in CBRN security.

The ECTC – Strategy CBRN and Explosives Team also assists EU Member States operationally, both with counter terrorism and serious and organised crime investigations. This includes having Europol staff appointed as court experts.

### THE COUNTER TERRORISM JOINT LIAISON TEAM

The EU Member States have established the Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team (CT JLT) to work more closely on cross-border investigations, consisting of counter terrorism experts and analysts from the Member States and Europol counter terrorism experts and analysts.

### TEAM OF ROTATING GUEST OFFICERS AT IMMIGRATION HOTSPOTS

The migration flows caused by the situation in conflict zones, mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, declined over 2017 but significant numbers of migrants and refugees continued to attempt to enter the EU. The main entry points were the sea areas in Greece and Italy. Europol provided support to the two EU Member States by deploying short-term Seconded National Experts (Guest Officers) at hotspots on the eastern Aegean islands and in southern Italy. Up to 50 of these Guest Officers are deployed on rotation in order to strengthen the security checks on the inward migration flow, in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals, thus providing additional security checks.

There is no concrete evidence that terrorist travellers systematically use those flows of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed, but it is indisputable that some terrorists have entered the EU posing as a refugee<sup>56</sup>, as was seen in the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015.

To counter this threat, Europol has recently approved the recruitment of up to 200 counter terrorist and other investigators for deployment to migration hotspots in Greece and Italy.

### EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE

Launched in January 2013 the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) delivers high-level technical, analytical and digital forensic expertise to support investigations by EU Member States and non-EU countries in cases of convergence of cyber and terrorism.

<sup>56</sup> Europol, *Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited*, 2016.



## ANNEX 5

## Methodology

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. In 2006 Europol replaced the TWP. The methodology for producing this annual report was developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.

The content of the TE-SAT is based on information supplied by EU Member States, some non-EU countries and the partner organisation Eurojust, as well as information gained from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report also aims to present trends and new developments identified from the information available to Europol.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these.

This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in consultation with the 2018 TE-SAT Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the past, present, and future Presidencies of the Council of the EU, i.e. Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria (the "Troika"), along with permanent members,

representatives from France and Spain, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, and Europol staff.

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU, and data on arrests of people suspected of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by Member States. Similar data were collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside of the EU. As in previous years, Eurojust collected data on the number of court proceedings in each Member State, the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings, the number of convictions and acquittals, the type of terrorism, the gender of defendants, the penalties imposed, as well as the type of verdicts – final or pending judicial remedy. Eurojust contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States and relevant amendments in national legislation on terrorism.

Included as arrests are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact the calculation of the number of arrests.

The definition of the term terrorist offences is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combatting terrorism (2002/475/JHA), which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that

terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Framework Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2018 respects Member States' definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event should be regarded as an act of terrorism or as an act of extremism. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2018 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.

The EU Council Decision of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA), on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, obliges Member States to collect all relevant information

concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the results were cross-checked with the Member States. In cases of divergences or gaps, the results were corrected, complemented and then validated by the Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision. The data used in this report concerns relevant court decisions and legislation amendments in 2017. Due to the specifics of reporting, Member States submit information on both final and non-final decisions. Therefore, reference is also made to those decisions pending judicial remedy. Verdicts from 2017 on which an appeal is pending are included in the reporting as pending judicial remedy. In cases where a verdict pronounced in 2017 was appealed, and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one. Eurojust's contribution was verified with the Member States that provided relevant data.

## Types of terrorism

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. It is worth noting that a categorisation of individuals and terrorist groups based on the ideology or goals they espouse should not be confused with motivating factors and the paths to radicalisation. The underlying causes that lead people to radicalisation and terrorism must be sought in the surroundings (structural factors) and personal interpretations (psychological factors) of the individual. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

### JIHADIST

Jihadist terrorist acts are those that are committed out of a mind-set that rejects democracy on religious grounds and uses the historical comparison with the crusades of the Middle Ages to describe current situations, in which it is believed that Sunni Islam is facing a crusader alliance composed of Shi'is, Christians and Jews.

### RIGHT-WING

Right-wing terrorist organisations seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model. A core concept in right-wing extremism is supremacism, or the idea that a certain group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture, etc.) is superior to all other people. Seeing themselves in a supreme position, the particular group considers it is their natural right to rule over the rest of the population. Racist behaviour, authoritarianism, xenophobia and hostility to immigration are commonly found attitudes in right-wing extremists. Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by

right-wing groups. Variants of right-wing extremist groups are the neo-Nazi, neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist formations.

### LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to replace the entire political, social and economic system of a state by introducing a communist or socialist structure and a classless society. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. A sub-category of left-wing extremism is anarchist terrorism which promotes a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda. Examples of left-wing terrorist groups are the Italian *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades) and the Greek Revolutionary Organisation 17 November.

### ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out a state for themselves from a larger country, or annex a territory from one country to that of another. Left- or right-wing ideological elements are not uncommon in these types of groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque ETA, and the Kurdish PKK organisations fall into this category.

### SINGLE-ISSUE

Single-issue extremist groups aim to change a specific policy or practice, as opposed to replacing the whole political, social, and economic system in a society. The groups within this category are usually concerned with animal rights, environmental protection, anti-abortion campaigns, etc. Examples of groups in this category are the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).



## ANNEX 6

## Acronyms

<b>AN</b>	ammonium nitrate	<b>IS</b>	so-called Islamic State
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia	<b>ISIL</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham
<b>ALF</b>	Animal Liberation Front	<b>JHA</b>	Justice and Home Affairs
<b>ANP</b>	Arm Na Poblachta	<b>JNIM</b>	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
<b>AQAP</b>	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula <i>Tanzim qa'idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-'arab</i>	<b>LNA</b>	Libyan National Army
<b>AQIM</b>	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb <i>Tanzim al-qa'ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami</i>	<b>LTTE</b>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
<b>ASG</b>	Abu Sayyaf Group	<b>MINUSMA</b>	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
<b>CBRN</b>	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear	<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organisation
<b>CIRA</b>	Continuity Irish Republican Army	<b>NPO</b>	non-profit organisation
<b>DHKP/C</b>	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi	<b>OMCG</b>	outlaw motorcycle gang
<b>DR</b>	Dissident Republican	<b>ONH</b>	Warriors of Ireland / Óglaigh ná h'Éireann
<b>EFP</b>	explosively formed projectile	<b>PBIED</b>	person-borne improvised explosive device
<b>EGC</b>	Electronic Ghosts of the Caliphate	<b>PEGIDA</b>	<i>Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes</i> Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident
<b>ELF</b>	Earth Liberation Front	<b>PKK</b>	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> Kurdistan Workers' Party
<b>ERW</b>	explosive remnants of war	<b>RG</b>	<i>Resistencia Galega</i> / Galician Resistance
<b>ETA</b>	Basque Fatherland and Liberty Euskadi ta Askatasuna	<b>RWE</b>	right-wing extremists
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>SDF</b>	Syrian Democratic Forces
<b>FAI/FRI</b>	Federazione Anarchica Informale/Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front	<b>TAP</b>	Trans Adriatic Pipeline
<b>FTF</b>	foreign terrorist fighter	<b>TATP</b>	triacetone triperoxide
<b>GNA</b>	Government of National Accord	<b>TE-SAT</b>	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
<b>GNS</b>	Government of National Salvation	<b>TWP</b>	Terrorism Working Party
<b>HME</b>	home-made explosive	<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>HoGeSa</b>	<i>Hooligans gegen Salafisten</i> Hooligans against Salafists	<b>UAV</b>	unmanned aerial vehicle
<b>HPG</b>	People's Defence Force / Hêzên Parastina Gel	<b>UGC</b>	user generated content
<b>HQN</b>	Haqqani Network	<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>HSM</b>	Mujahid youth movement / Harakat al- Shabab al-Mujahidin	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>IBD</b>	<i>Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland</i> Identitarian Movement Germany	<b>US</b>	United States (of America)
<b>IED</b>	improvised explosive device	<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person	<b>VBIED</b>	vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
<b>IID</b>	improvised incendiary device	<b>VOIED</b>	victim-operated improvised explosive device
<b>INTCEN</b>	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
		<b>YPG</b>	<i>Yekineyen Parastina Gel</i> People's Protection Units



## ANNEX 7

# Amendments in national legislation on terrorism in 2017

### AUSTRIA

An amendment of Section 278c of the Austrian Criminal Code came into force on 1 September 2017. This provision lists the criminal offences which given the respective intention can constitute terrorist offences. The amendment also includes also bodily harm, not only aggravated bodily harm as hitherto.

### FRANCE

Law No.2017-258 of 28 February 2017 on public security introduced several amendments in terrorism-related legal provisions. It restored the offence of regular consultation of terrorist websites (again censured by decision of the Constitutional Council of 15 December 2017), modified the composition of the Special Assize Court in charge of terrorism cases (number of assessors reduced from six to four at first instance and from eight to six on appeal) and established a possibility for the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Paris (or for the investigative Judges of the Counter-Terrorism Section) to communicate elements from terrorist judicial proceedings to intelligence services (Article 706-25-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Law No.2017-1154 of 11 July 2017 extended the application of Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency, which ended on 1

November 2017. Furthermore, Law No.2017-1510 of 30 October 2017 reinforced the internal security and the fight against terrorism. It came into force on 31 October 2017, just before the end of the state of emergency. The law strengthened the administrative police measures (establishment of secure perimeters, possibility of closing places of worship), created new administrative control and surveillance measures and an administrative regime for home visits upon authorisation and under control of the Judge of Liberties and Detention of the Court of Paris (former administrative house searches). The law introduced also a new terrorist offence making it a crime for a person with authority over a minor to involve the latter in a terrorist criminal conspiracy.

### GREECE

Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Greek Law 4478/2017 (A'-91/23-6-2017) amended paragraph 6 of Article 187A *Terrorist Acts* of the Greek Criminal Code in conformity with Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union. It provides for the consideration of irrevocable conviction decisions, issued by courts of other states – members of the Council of Europe Convention on laundering,

search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism when certain provisions of the Greek Criminal Code are applied.

### ITALY

Legislative Decree of 25 May 2017, n. 90 was adopted in Italy implementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC. The Decree implemented also Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006. Among others, the Decree established specific rules concerning the cooperation between the National Antimafia and Counter-Terrorism Directorate (*Direzione nazionale antimafia e antiterrorismo*, DNA) and the Italian FIU in order to track any suspicious transactions, including those made with the purpose to fund terrorist activities.



### LITHUANIA

Amendments of Article 250 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania came into force on 4 May 2017. They amend the definition of financing and support of terrorist activities (Article 250-4) to include also the preparatory stage and provision of support to one or several terrorists, as well as to a group having the aim of committing terrorist crimes, including provision of support to persons or groups which recruit, train terrorists or otherwise participate in terrorist activities. The existing Article 250-5 was extended to include provision of special knowledge necessary for preparation for a terrorist crime, and the persons who with the view to use the acquired knowledge or skills for terrorist purposes systematically collect special knowledge or obtain special skills which are necessary for the preparation for, commission of a terrorist crime or participation in commission of a terrorist crime. Furthermore, a new offence was introduced by Article 250-6 ('Travel for Terrorist Purposes') to be applied to those who go to another State seeking to prepare for or commit a terrorist crime, participate in the commission of a terrorist crime, participate in the activities of a group having the aim of committing terrorist crimes, or seeking to train terrorists or train for terrorist purposes.

In June 2017 a new version of the Law on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention was adopted to implement Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and the Council. The law foresees significant changes in the regulation of prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.

### MALTA

Act No. XXVIII of 2017 was promulgated in order to amend the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Cap.373, whereby Funding of Terrorism is also covered. Moreover, the Asset Recovery Bureau Regulations (particular articles) came into force by virtue of Legal Notice 254 of 2017.

### PORTUGAL

Between May and August 2017 several laws entered into force in Portugal. Law 30/2017 transposed Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union. Law 71/2017 determines restrictions concerning applications for Portuguese nationality in cases when the national security and defence are endangered as a result of a terrorist act. Another act - Law 46/2017 -

adapts the Portuguese legislation to Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA regarding the sharing of cross-border information about vehicles data bases.

Furthermore, the Portuguese Criminal Code and the Industrial Property Code were amended by Law 83/2017 in relation to money laundering, terrorist financing and judicial cooperation on terrorism and cross-border crime, transposing also several EU Directives and Council Decision. Several other acts were also adopted defining terrorist cases as priority investigations (Law 96/2017), referring to approved UN and the EU restrictive measures (Law 96/2017), defining the new legal regime and special procedures on the intelligence officers' access to telecommunications and internet data in terrorism cases (Law 96/2017), and regulating the granting of visas to foreigners entering the national territory and forbidding those visas when terrorist investigations or cases related to the applicant are pending (Law 102/2017).

## UNITED KINGDOM

On 27 April 2017, the Criminal Finances Act received Royal Assent. Among other measures, the Act provided law enforcement agencies with further powers to tackle terrorist financing. It amended existing legislation to:

- › introduce a disclosure order regime within the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000 whereby a court may permit a constable or counter-terrorism financial investigator to answer questions, or produce information or documents, that they consider likely to be of substantial value to the terrorist financing investigation;
- › permit greater information sharing within the regulated sector where several conditions are satisfied, including that disclosing the information may assist in determining whether a person is involved in a terrorist financing offence, or that funds are terrorist financing funds, and allow the court to grant an order to require the provision of further information arising from such a disclosure;
- › expand the definition of terrorist cash within the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) to also include gaming vouchers, fixed-value casino tokens and betting receipts;
- › allow for the seizure and forfeiture of 'listed assets', including precious stones, watches and so forth;
- › permit the forfeiture of terrorist cash by a suitably authorised officer, without the need to go through the courts;
- › allow the freezing, and forfeiting of the contents of, terrorist money held in bank accounts;
- › allow many terrorist financing powers to be exercised not just by a police constable, but by counter terrorist financial investigators as well;
- › increase from two to seven years the maximum sentence for failure to comply with a direction not to enter into or continue to participate in transactions or business relationships with designated individuals which was originally set out under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.

Furthermore, the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (information on the payer) Regulations 2017 implement the Fourth Money Laundering Directive (2015/849/EU). The UK Regulations came into force alongside the Funds Transfer Regulation (2015/847/EU) and bring regulation of industries at risk of facilitating money laundering and terrorist financing in line with international standards. The Regulations also prevent categories of individuals with criminal convictions from holding management functions in or being beneficial owners of regulated entities.

The Policing and Crime Act 2017 introduced a number of powers in relation to financial sanctions, including terrorism sanctions, and in relation to police bail:

- › the Act ensured that UN financial sanctions (including those for the Al Qaeda and Taliban regimes) come into effect in the United Kingdom immediately for a period of up to 30 days, while the EU adopts a regulation to implement them, thereby avoiding delay and the possibility of asset flight. The Act also gave powers for HM Treasury to be able to impose a civil monetary penalty for breaches of UN, EU or United Kingdom financial sanctions; extended the maximum sentence for EU financial sanctions from two to seven years, in line with the domestic sanctions regime; and permitted deferred prosecution agreements and serious crime prevention orders to be used in connection with breaches of financial sanctions;
- › the Act introduced a pre-charge bail limit of 28 days;
- › Schedule 8 of TACT 2000 was amended by Section 71 of the Act to enable DNA profiles and fingerprints to be retained indefinitely where a person has a previous conviction outside the UK (indefinite retention was already provided for where the individual has a conviction within the UK);
- › Section 68 of the 2017 Act creates a new offence of breaching travel-related conditions of pre-charge bail (defined as 'travel restriction conditions') for those arrested on suspicion of committing a terrorist offence.

The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Reviews of Sentencing) Order 2017 added 19 terrorism-related offences to schedule 1 of the Review of Sentencing 2006 Order. Part IV of the Order allows the Attorney General, with leave from the Court of Appeal, to refer certain cases to the Court of Appeal where he considers that a sentence imposed in the Crown Court was unduly lenient, so that the sentence can be reviewed (The Unduly Lenient Sentencing (ULS) scheme). A range of terrorism-related offences were added to the list of specified offences for the ULS scheme in 2017.

The Prison (Amendment) Rules 2017 allow for a separation regime for extremist prisoners. It includes separation centres, to which the Secretary of State may direct that TACT prisoners be allocated for any of the following reasons:

- › in the interests of national security;
- › to prevent the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism, a terrorism offence, or an offence with a terrorist connection, whether in prison or otherwise;
- › to prevent the dissemination of views or beliefs that encourage or induce others to commit any such act of offence, whether in a prison or otherwise, or to protect or safeguard others from such views or beliefs, or;
- › to prevent any political, religious, racial or other views or beliefs being used to undermine good order and discipline in a prison.





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