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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 15 November 2006

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**SCH-EVAL 185
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NOTE

from : the Slovenian delegation
to: the Schengen Evaluation Working Party

Subject : Follow-up report to the Schengen evaluation of the Republic of SLOVENIA
- Information on progress in the implementation of recommendations of the evaluation committees for the correct application of the Schengen acquis – 2006

Having examined all conclusions and recommendations drafted by the Evaluation Committee in the evaluation reports, presented to and adopted at the meetings of the Schengen Evaluation Working Party, the Slovenian authorities prepared the comments set out in the form of tables bellow.

Slovenian comments refer to the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation reports on Police Cooperation, Data protection, Sea, Land and Air borders, including the Evaluation Committee's mission to the Embassy of Slovenia in Moscow.

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1. POLICE COOPERATION

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations of the Report on the Police Cooperation evaluation of Slovenia, doc. 8396/1/06 REV 1 SCHEVAL 62 ENFOPOL 70 COMIX 364 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 18. 5. 2006.

Chapter 3: COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EVALUATION COMMITTEE:

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>A visit to the International Police Cooperation Section, where the experts could have direct contacts with the officers of such authorities in order to obtain first-hand experience in addition to the management overview that was given, was not included in the program. So the opinion of the Evaluation Committee regarding the central service of Slovenia for international police cooperation was limited to formal presentations by the Slovenian authorities and answers to questions asked by the experts at that occasion.</p>	<p>A visit to the International Police Cooperation Section at the time of harmonising the programme (with the Trojka and the SCHEVAL working group) was not foreseen, no was any such wish expressed at the time of the visit of the evaluation group.</p>
2.	<p>The current lack of a 24/7 service in the International Police Cooperation Section (Interpol, SIRENE) to cover requests for assistance and reply of other MS or national authorities, is not in line with the relevant recommendations and best practices of the Schengen Catalogue, and will not cope with the future increased amount of requests for exchange of information with other Member States and at national level.</p>	<p>The currently vacant posts (8 places) in the International Police Cooperation Section of the Criminal Police Directorate at the General Police Directorate (IPCS CPD GPD), which is the central service, are expected to be filled up by the beginning of 2007. After filling up these posts, the conditions for the provision of a constant 24/7 service will fulfilled.</p> <p>Regarding the necessary translation capacities for the IPCS CPD GPD (outside regular working hours - at night, Sundays, public holidays), a sufficient number of translators will be posted for these purposes.</p>

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3.	<p>Special emphasis should be given to a constantly recurring training regime of all officers, including those at management level, seconded to the International Police Cooperation Section and all police officers involved in police cooperation.</p>	<p>Within the framework of the Twinning Light Project no. SI 04 JH 01-A z entitled »Twinning of the staff for implementing EU acquis and Schengen acquis in which Austrian bid was chosen, the focus will be on the constant training of the staff. This project will be implemented in the first half of 2007.</p>
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Chapter 4: OPERATIONAL COOPERATION

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>In order to enhance the effectiveness of the deployment and use of liaison officers seconded to third States, the possibility of bi- or multilateral agreements, that liaison officers from other Member States shall also represent the interests of Slovenia in accordance with Article 47 (4) of the Schengen Convention and Article 1 of the Council Decision 2003/170/JHA on the common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States, should be promoted.</p>	<p>Slovenia will consider the above recommendation and try to implement it in case any real need arises for that.</p>
2.	<p>The cooperation between police and customs appears to be rather problematic, as customs are not included in any bilateral cooperation agreement. The Evaluation Committee shares the opinion that the custom service should be invited to participate more in international cross-border cooperation, i.e. by seconding customs liaison officers to the cooperation centres and the Schengen central body (IPCS), which will attain higher priority through the Naples II initiative of the EC.</p>	<p>In consultation with the Customs, the needs for cross-border customs cooperation will be identified, determining also the manner of representation of the national customs service in the permanent structures for border cooperation as well as for cooperation in the central service for the implementation of the Schengen provisions.</p>

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3.	<p>The Evaluation Committee is of the opinion, that the Slovenian authorities should develop reliable and comparable statistics, in order to be able to follow the evaluation of cross-border cooperation and compare these findings with other Member States. It is felt that the compiling of statistics would at a strategic level help determine the threat assessment and assist in the prioritisation of resources. Such lack of information at the central level can lead to overlaps and even conflicts between different operations and agencies. In the longer term this can influence the threat assessments and the solutions that are defined in response to them.</p>	<p>On 1 January 2006, the application »SPIS 4« was introduced, which enables the compiling of appropriate comparative statistics in the area of cross-border cooperation.</p>
4.	<p>The introduction of mixed patrols based on bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries (Italy, Austria and Croatia) has to be mentioned as a very important and positive initiative to enhance security in border zones as it improves cross-border cooperation.</p>	

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Chapter 5: REPORTS ON INDIVIDUAL SITES VISITED/CASE STUDIES

A) Tri-lateral Police Cooperation Centre in Vrata-Megvarje/Thörl Maglern

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>In the face of the already high number of request for exchange of information, the introduction of the 24/7 shift service at the CPC should be implemented as soon as possible, in order to cover all possible urgent cases coming up outside the current opening hours. Taking into account that the future workload and the demands will increase in the near future, especially after the abolishment of the internal Schengen borders, further manpower will be needed in order to comply with the higher demands.</p>	<p>On 1 april 2006, a full 24/7 service was introduced in the Centre for Police Cooperation, Thörl Maglern.</p>
2.	<p>The fact, that Slovenia has readjusted its internal communication channels between the CPC and the Police Units right after an obstacle in the flow of information has been identified, gives a good indication for the well functioning of the management system in the General Police Directorate. The procedure of registering all the activities in written and also in electronic form allows a permanent control and follow up of each inquiry proceeded by the CPC. The existence of such a log file, enables an anytime control visit by their own data control units in order to monitor the correct proceedings according to the national data protection law.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
3.	<p>Finally it has to be mentioned, that the participation of the Slovenian Customs in the cooperation centre would allow all three national customs services in the CPC to cooperate in a permanent cooperation structure. The presence of the Slovenian customs could enhance the inter-agency cooperation and would be in compliance with the recommendations and best practices of the Schengen Catalogue on Police Cooperation.</p>	<p>In consultation with the Customs, the needs for cross-border customs cooperation will be identified, determining also the manner of representation of the national customs service in the permanent structures for border cooperation as well as for cooperation in the central service for the implementation of the Schengen provisions.</p>

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B) PD Maribor and PD Murska Sobota

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>The level of the regional police cooperation demonstrated in both Police Directorates can be considered as well established. Although the relevant agreement with Hungary is still pending, joint operations and exchange of information is already a day-to-day routine. This agreement should be ratified as soon as possible, in order to allow mixed patrols, cross border surveillance and hot pursuit and furthermore to establish a bi- or even trilateral Police Cooperation Centre in this area.</p>	
2.	<p>Regarding the lack of interoperability of the communications systems of Slovenia and Hungary, Slovenia should try to find together with the Hungarian Police Authorities a technical solution for this problem, either by a change of the respective frequencies or with technical adoptions of the currently used devices. Slovenia is invited to examine operational and technical interoperability issues together with its EU partners in the context of the PCWG, in order to meet the Schengen technical, operational and tactical requirements.</p>	<p>Slovenia is developing the system TETRA, although the implementation of the recommendation is not dependent solely on our national project</p>
3.	<p>The presence of the custom officers in the presentation at the PD Maribor has shown that the Customs Service is cooperating well with the police on a regional level, mainly because they know each other. It is obvious that the presence of the Customs Services on the more strategic level could enhance their role according to the Naples II convention and extend the performance of the Police Cooperation Centres with the aspect concerning infringements of national and Community Customs Provisions.</p>	<p>In consultation with the Customs, the needs for cross-border customs cooperation will be identified, determining also the manner of representation of the national customs service in the permanent structures for border cooperation as well as for cooperation in the central service for the implementation of the Schengen provisions.</p>

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Chapter 6: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW UP

Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>The Evaluation Committee has gained a comprehensive picture of the current situation in Slovenia regarding international police cooperation. It has been shown, that the main part of the tasks indicated in the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Schengen Standards has already been achieved. It is obvious, that international police cooperation is not only performed on regional and local level, but also within the central authorities, based on the recommendations and best practices of the Schengen Catalogue on Police Cooperation.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
2.	<p>In order to ensure that comprehensive analysis and relevant threat assessments are produced from the intelligence and information gathered, the Slovenian authorities may consider the introduction of European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM).</p>	<p>Slovenia is aware of the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM). We shall try to implement this model through the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) project, in which we are actively participating.</p>
3.	<p>Slovenia should accelerate the conclusion of outstanding bilateral agreements and these should, where possible, correspond to the Schengen Convention. This will enable the law enforcement authorities of neighboring countries to perform cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit at the common borders..</p>	<p>Slovenia forwarded to Italy a concrete inquiry in accordance with bilateral cooperation within the context of the Schengen Convention. The inquiry was submitted in the context of the evaluation report for Italy No. 8805/06 SCHEVAL 76 COMIX 404.</p> <p>On 30 June 2006, Italy responded within the framework of the Schengen-EVAL working group that they will contact Slovenia immediately after examining the proposal for the agreement. On 28 September 2006, Slovenia once again inquired, within the framework of the SCH-EVAL working group, about the conclusion of the agreement with Italy. Italy responded that preparations are intensively under way and that Slovenia will be contacted in the near future.</p>

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4.	<p>The Slovenian authorities should provide full 24/7 service in the central authority with the appropriate number of personnel and professional background for proceeding with the increasing amount of requests for exchange of information both with other Member States and at a national level. Whilst there is good foreign language capacity in the central services responsible for police cooperation, the expected increase of the work load and more complex legal issues they will have to deal with (e.g. European Arrest Warrant) the absence of professional translators might create problems in the future and cause delays in the response capability of these services.</p>	<p>The currently vacant posts (8 places) in the International Police Cooperation Section of the Criminal Police Directorate at the General Police Directorate (IPCS CPD GPD), which is the central service, are expected to be filled up by the beginning of 2007. After filling up these posts, the conditions for the provision of a constant 24/7 service will be fulfilled.</p> <p>Regarding the necessary translation capacities for the IPCS CPD GPD (outside regular working hours - at night, Sundays, public holidays), a sufficient number of translators will be posted for these purposes.</p>
5.	<p>The establishment of further Police Cooperation Centres should be considered, for which the trilateral CPC Vrata-Megvarje/Thörl Maglern can be seen as best practice for enhancing and encouraging the exchange of information of police forces from three countries. In order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of this cooperation centre, their working hours should be extended to a full 24/7 service.</p>	<p>On 1 April 2006, a full 24/7 service was introduced in the Centre for Police Cooperation, Thörl Maglern.</p>
6.	<p>The national Customs Service should be fully represented in the permanent cooperation structures at the borders and the Schengen central authority to allow the emergence of a permanent cooperation with customs services of the neighbouring Member States.</p>	<p>In consultation with the Customs, the needs for cross-border customs cooperation will be identified, determining also the manner of representation of the national customs service in the permanent structures for border cooperation as well as for cooperation in the central service for the implementation of the Schengen provisions.</p>
7.	<p>The Evaluation Committee is of the opinion, that the Slovenian authorities should develop reliable and comparable statistics, in order to be able to follow the evaluation of cross-border cooperation and compare these findings with other Member States. It is felt that the compiling of statistics would at a strategic level help determine the threat assessment and assist in the prioritisation of resources. Such lack of information at the central level can lead to overlaps and even conflicts between different operations and agencies. In the</p>	<p>On 1 January 2006, the application »SPIS 4« was introduced, which enables the compiling of appropriate comparative statistics in the area of cross-border cooperation.</p>

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	longer term this can influence the threat assessments and the solutions that are defined in response to them.	
8.	Slovenia should continue with the strategy to implement cross-border telecommunication structures, especially in the design and deployment of a Digital Trunked Radio Systems (TETRA) with neighbouring countries.	By the year 2010, Slovenia will implement the application of the TETRA over the entire territory

2. DATA PROTECTION

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations of the Report on the Data Protection evaluation of Slovenia, doc 8401/06 SCHEVAL 65 COMIX 367 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 18. 5. 2006.

Chapter 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>General conclusion:</p> <p>Having in mind that the Data protection legislation and in particular the structure of the Information Commissioner's office have only recently been established, the experts are confident that the Data protection rules in Slovenia will comply with the requirements of the Schengen acquis, once a satisfying follow-up has been given to the recommendations mentioned below. Slovenia is invited to confirm this in writing at a later stage, when reporting on the follow up of the current evaluations in the SCH-Eval group.</p>	<p>In addition to the introductory statements the Information Commissioner (hereinafter the Commissioner) adds that the Slovene personal data protection legislation is modern and current and is therefore in line with world standards. The requested standards for the protection of personal data in EU namely only recently began to function, which in turn means that some personal data controllers still lack, the awareness of the importance of personal data protection with regard to the stated standards. The Commissioner will therefore need to invest considerable efforts for promotion, prevention and education of all persons liable to adhere to the</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
		<p>provisions of the Personal Data Protection Act (Official Gazette, no. 86/04 and 113/05, hereinafter: ZVOP-1). Some areas currently still show a considerable unawareness of the personal data protection law; the areas, which will therefore have to be the focus of the Commissioner, have concerted efforts (such as medical care, i.e. the supervision and competencies for inspection of personal data filing systems, where access is still viewed with distrust).</p>
2.	<p><u>On the legislation:</u></p> <p>Experts recommend that the provision on limitation period of three months between requests of access, should be formulated in a more flexible way e.g “...at reasonable intervals...”</p>	<p>The Commissioner already stressed out the stated recommendation relating to Article 31 of ZVOP-1 at meetings with the Ministry of Justice that is also competent for the implementation of ZVOP-1. The recommendations will in further detail be debated at the Ministry of Justice in the next procedure amending ZVOP-1. At that time also the report of the Schengen Evaluation on the proposed Convention 108 wording will be decided on.</p> <p>The Commissioner must, in spite of the aforementioned, point out that in accordance with item 3, paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Information Commissioner Act (Official Gazette, no. 113/05, hereinafter ZInfP), he has the duty to decide on an individual's complaint when the personal data controller refuses the individual's request to consult own personal information. This also means that the Commissioner decides on the grounds of refusing a request, similar as stipulated by the second paragraph on page 6 of the Schengen personal data protection evaluation report. It is within the scope of this goal that the Commissioner understands the time limitation of three months from Article 31 of ZVOP-1, restricting therefore the limitation only to the case at hand, and starting on the date of any modification or revealing of new facts, important to deciding on the individual's right to information, regardless of the</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
	<p>Exceptions to the right of access should be examined and it should be clarified whether exceptions of the right of access will represent any obstacles in the Slovenian legislation concerning the implementation of the Schengen Convention.</p>	<p>time of filing of the last request to consult the data and regardless of the reasons stated in this request. The time limitation of three months is therefore not set as absolute and the individual's request to consult his personal data can therefore not be refused only for being too early, or because the time limit defined in Article 31 of ZVOP-1 has not yet expired. The burden of proof of the existence of the new or changed facts, important for reaching a decision, is not borne by the individual. This standpoint is also in line with the standards of Convention 108 and R87/15, laid out on page 6 of the Schengen evaluation report.</p> <p>In accordance with Article 36 of ZVOP-1, the individual's right to information can be limited only by way of exception, based on a statute, and only for reasons of protection of sovereignty and the defence of the country, protection of national security and the constitutional order, security, political and commercial interests of the country, execution of police competencies, prevention, disclosure, persecution of criminal offences and violations, investigations and persecution of violations of ethical norms in certain professions, due to monetary, budgetary or tax reasons, with regard to supervision over police and protection of the individual to which the personal data relates to. Such limitations can only be defined in scope absolutely necessary to achieve the purpose of the limitation. In accordance with the stated, also the Police Act limited the right of the individual to consult his personal data. However such limitations pertain only to the individual's right to consult his data, but not also to the competencies with regard to supervision over the protection of personal data held by the competent body and its authorised person as defined in Article 53 of ZVOP-1. Taking</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
3.	<p><u>On the implementation:</u></p> <p>Experts recommend that the DPA takes a closer interest in the coming months in the preparation of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the interdepartmental group set up to that end. The DPA should also be involved in the preparatory work at the MFA in relation with visa issuance and access rules in consulates.</p>	<p>into consideration the stated facts with regard to paragraph 2 and items 2 and 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of ZinfP, the ruling on validity of the individual's complaint is sufficiently grounded, when the personal data controller refuses the individual's request for consulting his personal data with regard to Article 109 of the Schengen Convention.</p> <p>From the standpoint of judging the validity of refusal for transmitting information with regards to Article 109 of the Schengen Convention, the stated also holds for all other cases of limiting the rights to access, governed by the field legislation, which in relation to ZVOP-1 represents a <i>lex specialis</i> such as for instance the Aliens Act.</p> <p>The Commissioner emphasises that he obtained the competencies stated in the recommendation from December 31, 2005 with the introduction of the new ZinfP, which established the information Commissioner as an independent and autonomous body for the protection of personal data. From that moment on the Commissioner regularly cooperates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs with Slovene preparations for the implementation of Schengen acquis. The result of such cooperation is also an introduction set up for the Schengen evaluation commission and this report.</p> <p>The Commissioner also established the recommended cooperation with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At a joint meeting on June 27, 2006 the Commissioner presented its opinion on the presently valid legislation concerning personal data protection and issuing of visas. Based on the agreement achieved between the Commissioner and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this meeting, the Ministry issued a</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
		<p>letter dated July 21, 2006 with regard to the protection of personal data, to all the Diplomatic and Consular Offices of the Republic of Slovenia abroad. As additional questions arose which could not be reconciled with a single letter to the Diplomatic and Consular Offices, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began, based on the Commissioner's request, with preparations for amending the Visa Act together with the Commissioner's support on the personal data protection issues. The procedure of proposing and adopting the Visa Act is not yet concluded.</p>
4.	<p><u>On the implementation:</u></p> <p>It is recommended that there shall be at the most appropriate time an inspection on site, at the latest before implementation of Schengen.</p>	<p>With regard to this recommendation and to the facts stated in item 3 of the Schengen evaluation commission report, it needs additionally to be explained that an inspection supervision was conducted at the Police Information and Telecommunications System at the premises of the Ministry for Interior Affairs, Office for Information Technology and Telecommunications, Centre for the Protection of Data in Ljubljana and at the Department of the airport police Brnik. A supervision was performed also on April 26, 2006 at the Diplomatic and Consular Office of the Republic of Slovenia in Budapest, Hungary.</p>
5.	<p><u>On the implementation:</u></p> <p>Strengthen network security in the light of the absence of a physical separation between the internal network and the Internet connection.</p>	<p>In accordance with the recommendation, the existing security network was examined. The existing security network guarantees anti-virus protection and a firewall with additional filters which are in a constant process of advancement with new technology.</p>
6.	<p><u>On the implementation:</u></p> <p>Consider a strengthened authentication method</p>	<p>Regarding the proposal to review the current authentication method, a decision was taken, on the basis of an investigation into technical possibilities, to introduce in the police information telecommunications system, authentication on the bases of a single sign on and smart cards. In the second half of 2006, we examined the possibilities for the introduction of a new authentication</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
7.	<p><u>On the implementation:</u></p> <p>Slovenia is invited to develop plans for a campaign accompanying the implementation of the Schengen acquis in 2007.</p>	<p>procedure and a new authentication method was set up and tested. The introduction of a new authentication method is being continued with a public procurement procedure that is underway, for setting up the single sign on system.</p> <p>With regard to the call of the Schengen evaluation commission to the Republic of Slovenia to prepare plans for the campaign running concurrently with the implementation of Schengen acquis in 2007, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Commissioner will, with regard to personal data protection, prepare a plan to publish brochures in several languages, serving to educate and inform the individuals (also foreign nationals) of their rights with regard to personal data protection in the Schengen system, as well as also prepare for publication and information additional other materials for the citizens of Slovenia.</p>
8.	<p><u>On the functioning:</u></p> <p>Budgetary means are insufficient to meet the requirements of the Schengen acquis as a active supervisory and inspection authority. It should be reconsidered in the light of the new tasks that will befall on the DPA in connection with the Schengen implementation, i.a. public awareness campaign, ex-officio inspections, training of other public authorities.</p>	<p>The Commissioner informed the Ministry of Finance of its needs for an additional employed supervisor for the purposes of executing supervision over the SIS II system.</p>
9.	<p><u>On the functioning:</u></p> <p>The DPA should consider providing DPA specific information about the rights of subjects for turned down visa applicants.</p>	<p>With regard to this see Commissioner's explanation to items 3, 4 and 7.</p>

3. SEA BORDERS

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations of the Report on the Sea Borders evaluation of Slovenia, doc. 8830/06 SCHEVAL 77 FRONT 88 COMIX 407 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 30. 6. 2006.

Chapter 4: REPORT ON THE PORT OF KOPER

Subchapter 4.1: Infrastructure and equipment

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	At the moment of the visit, the infrastructure for border checks at the port of Koper does not live up to the Schengen standards. There are no booths for border checks, no signposting, no separation of flows nor any lanes for checks. The Committee was told that there is no need for this kind of infrastructure because of the frequency and the type of the traffic. According to existing plans on developing the port facilities and estimates of increasing passenger traffic, the existing infrastructure is at the moment not sufficient. The Committee notes that there are plans to develop this infrastructure in the new RoRo terminal in the port of Koper whereby two booths will be constructed. The Committee invites the Slovenian authorities to keep the Schengen Evaluation Working Party updated on the progress in these works and the final result.	Construction works are being carried out at the border crossing facility, in accordance with the set deadlines. Currently, construction is underway on the foundations and outer walls as well as preparatory work for the projecting roof with a booth. Given the present progress we believe that construction work the border crossing will be completed within the deadline, i.e., by the end of 2006.
2.	The Committee considers the equipment as sufficient taking into account the current traffic and low migratory pressure. It, however, recommends that more first line equipment such as UV lamps and document examination suitcases as well as a microscope for the second line check should be purchased for the port of Koper.	At the end of April 2006, Regula magnifying lens with various light sources (10x magnification, UV light with 3 different wavelengths, 3M lamp) were purchased and distributed to police stations. The maritime border crossing at Koper received 7 such glasses, Izola 2 and Piran 2.

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Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
		<p>In May 2006, Dönges document examination suitcases were purchased for the examination of passports (they include a 3M lamp, a 30x magnification hand microscope, a magnifying lens with 10x magnification, a stamp metering scale, an UV lamp, an ordinary lamp and precise pincers. The Marine Police Station in Koper received 6 document examination suitcases.</p> <p>At the end of June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased. The Marine Police Station in Koper received 1 detector. Training was conducted in the use of all the above mentioned equipment.</p> <p>The remaining equipment for the first and second line border check is planned to be purchased in the first half of 2007. The contracts that have not yet been concluded will be concluded by the end of 2006, at the latest. The delivery deadline is 6 months.</p>

Subchapter 4.3: Controls and procedures

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	In general, the experts are satisfied with the application of the procedures. However, the procedure for the following points should be modified:	

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2.	<p>With regard to EU citizens figuring on passenger list, they should not be submitted to systematic administrative checks against the national (and future SIS) data bases.</p>	<p>Within the framework of training programmes for the implementation of the Schengen Borders Code, which were organised in September 2006, police officers were warned that systematic checks must not be carried out on EU citizens in the national databases (FIO records).</p> <p>The recommendation is being implemented.</p>
3.	<p>The Committee also noted that crew and passenger lists are not directly sent to the Police, but to the MARS. However, the Schengen Borders Code sets out that these lists should be sent directly to the Police. This practice should, in this respect, be reconsidered.</p>	<p>Consultations were held with the members of the Association of Maritime Transport Agencies during which it was agreed that agencies should start sending crew and passenger lists directly to Koper Maritime Police Station. The agencies are complying with the agreement and are sending the lists directly to Koper Police Station.</p> <p>The recommendation has been implemented since 18 September 2006.</p>

Chapter 6: BORDER SURVEILLANCE

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>The Committee considers that the blue border surveillance is carried out in accordance with the Schengen standards, taking into consideration the short length of the coast (46,6 km) and the low threat assessment.</p>	

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2.	It underlines, however, that the narrowness of the bay of Piran puts special demands on the border surveillance and the capacity of interception. The Committee therefore recommends that one boat should constantly be kept in the port of Piran or at sea for rapid reaction. It also recommends that the intervention time for crews not on duty should never exceed half an hour.	Under purchasing procedure is a new police rubber boat which, upon delivery (expected by June 2007) will be kept at the moore at the Maritime Border Crossing in Piran. The boat will have a cockpit, will be at least 8 m long and will have a speed of at least 45 knots and modern navigation equipment. Until the delivery of the new police boat, the recommendation will continue to be implemented with a rubber boat P-88, which has a speed of about 40 knots.
3.	The Committee points out that the border surveillance in the Adriatic Sea could be improved by setting up a coordination centre for all countries involved.	The creation of a coordination centre for Adriatic Sea countries is under preparation within the framework of Frontex (a MEDSEA working group). Slovenia is actively participating in these preparations.
4.	The fact that the maritime border between Slovenia and Croatia has not been agreed influences the way blue border surveillance is carried out. Even though Croatia is most likely to join the EU within a few years the Committee would like to encourage Slovenia to make any efforts available in order to reach a border agreement with Croatia.	

Chapter 7: STAFF AND TRAINING

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	The number of personnel is considered as limited, especially in the Summer season. The number (53) is expected to increase to 71 by mid 2007 which will solve the heavy workload the Police currently faces in the Summer Season.	The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.

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2.	<p>The training for police officers is considered to be of a satisfactory level. The provisions of Schengen manuals, catalogues etc. are taken into account in the preparation of the Schengen training Strategy. The Committee points out that in the light of the Twinning light projects further training is foreseen. The language skills of the police officers are also considered as satisfactory.</p>	<p>Training is being conducted in accordance with the annual working programme of the Police.</p> <p>From January 2007, the Twinning Light Project “Border checks and compensatory measures” will be implemented in collaboration with experts from the Republic of Austria (No.SI 04 JH 01-B). Part of the activities of the project will be devoted specially to the performance of police operations at sea.</p>
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Chapter 9: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p>The Committee is of the opinion that the ports of Koper and Piran fulfil the Schengen standards with regard to the number of personnel, the training, the border control procedures, risk analysis and equipment. The infrastructure does, however, not live up to the Schengen standards in the port of Koper. The Committee notes that a new terminal will be built and recommends that the Schengen Evaluation Working Party will be kept informed on the progress of the works and the final result. It is expected that this new infrastructure will be ready by the end of 2006 or beginning of 2007. Only at that moment a correct evaluation can be made of the infrastructure. Controls are currently carried out on board the vessels or on shore which has clearly some disadvantages e.g. in case of bad weather conditions, or when the officer wants to consult the national database.</p>	<p>Construction works are being carried out at the border crossing facility, in accordance with the set deadlines. Currently, construction is underway on the foundations and outer walls as well as preparatory work for the projecting roof with a booth. Given the present progress we believe that construction work the border crossing will be completed within the deadline, i.e., by the end of 2006.</p> <p>Refer also to Slovenia’s follow up document No. 10735/06 SCHEVAL 109.</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
2.	<p>The blue border surveillance is performed by radar surveillance of which the coverage will be extended by linking it to a new additional radar so that it will cover the entire Slovenian coast. The Committee notes that this surveillance is correctly carried out but is faced with one difficulty i.e. the fact that the maritime border between Slovenia and Croatia is not agreed yet.</p> <p>The Committee is aware of the current low migratory pressure but underlines the need to closely monitor this situation. The narrowness of the Bay of Piran put special demands on border surveillance and the interception capacity.</p>	<p>The radar picture covers the entire maritime border with the republic of Croatia, a large part of the maritime border with the republic of Italy and part of the international waters since the radar reaches up to 48 nautical miles.</p> <p>The state border at sea is under maritime radar surveillance for 24 hours a day for 365 days, covering 48 nautical miles.</p> <p>This area is surveilled with police patrol boats and by watching the border from land with the help of thermovision equipment, which provides an optimum means of surveillance, given the configuration of the terrain.</p> <p>There are plans to erect in Krog (an elevation above the Bay of Piran), by the end of June 2007, a stationary thermovision camera with which it will be possible to supervise the entire Bay of Piran.</p> <p>The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.</p> <p>The construction of the border crossing at the RoRo terminal is proceeding in accordance with the timetable. It is expected to be completed by 15 December 2006.</p> <p>At the end of June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased. The Marine Police Station in Koper received 1 detector. Training was conducted in the use of all the above mentioned equipment.</p>
4.	<p>Finally, it recommends the following;</p> <p>to inform SCH-EVAL on the increase of personnel which is expected to be completed in 2007, as well as on the progress realised in the construction of the new facilities for border control in the RoRo terminal,</p>	<p>The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.</p> <p>The construction of the border crossing at the RoRo terminal is proceeding in accordance with the timetable. It is expected to be completed by 15 December 2006.</p>
5.	<p>Finally, it recommends the following;</p> <p>to purchase more equipment for first line control,</p>	<p>At the end of June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased. The Marine Police Station in Koper received 1 detector. Training was conducted in the use of all the above mentioned equipment.</p>

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
		<p>The remaining equipment for the first and second line border check is planned to be purchased in the first half of 2007. The contracts that have not yet been concluded will be concluded by the end of 2006, at the latest. The delivery deadline is 6 months.</p> <p>The equipment that was purchased in the period after the last report to the SCH-EVAL working group is described in Slovenia's follow up document No. 10735/06 SCHEVAL 109.</p>
6.	<p><u>Finally, it recommends the following:</u></p> <p>to keep one Police boat in the port of Piran,</p>	<p>Under purchase procedure is a new police rubber boat which, upon delivery (expected by June 2007) will be kept at the moore at the Maritime Border Crossing in Piran.</p> <p>On the basis of risk assessment we believe that there is no need for the presence of a police boat at the Marine Border Crossing in Piran during the winter period.</p>
7.	<p><u>Finally, it recommends the following:</u></p> <p>to limit the intervention time for the blue border surveillance to a maximum of half an hour,</p>	<p>Under purchase procedure is a new police rubber boat which, upon delivery (expected by June 2007) will be kept at the moore at the Maritime Border Crossing in Piran.</p> <p>Refer also to Slovenia's follow up document No.: 10735/06 SCHEVAL 109.</p>
8.	<p><u>Finally, it recommends the following:</u></p> <p>send crew and passenger lists directly to the Police.</p>	<p>Consultations were held with the members of the Association of Maritime Transport Agencies during which it was agreed that agencies should start sending crew and passenger lists directly to Koper Maritime Police Station. The agencies are complying with the agreement and are sending the lists directly to Koper Police Station. The recommendation has been implemented since 18 September 2006.</p>

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4. LAND BORDERS

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations of the Report on the Land Borders evaluation of Slovenia, doc. 10471/06 SCH-EVAL 100 FRONT 119 COMIX 538 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 27. 9. 2006.

Chapter 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VISITED SITES

Seq. no	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	1. The strategy for border management at the visited sites is in place. There is a system available in order to ensure the analysis of information and the transmission of the relevant data from the central to the regional and local levels and vice versa. However it remains unclear to the Committee what exactly are the investigation capabilities of the investigators deployed at the BCPs.	The criminal investigations officers posted at border crossing points have special skills in the detection and investigation of cross-border criminal activity (stolen vehicles, organised transfer of persons across the state border, smuggling, human trafficking, document abuse for border crossing purposes, etc.).
2.	2. In general the infrastructure and the equipment of the BCPs visited are in place and are close to the Schengen standards. They have the necessary equipment both at first and second lines, the technical equipment shows good quality and the officers know how to use it. At Zavrč, Sečovlje, Dragonja and Sočerga however, certain serious shortcomings have been detected (poor first line premises and temporary second line facilities) as the premises are very close the headquarters, and they do not give the officers the optimal conditions to perform border checks. These shortcomings should be remedied in the near future with the construction of new BCPs. Some necessary technical equipment was still missing.	Technical documentation for the construction of new border crossing points has already been prepared for these border crossings. All border crossing points will be completed in 2007. Construction work has already started at the Dragonja border crossing. Technical documentation has already been prepared for Sočerga and Zavrč border crossing points and are at the tendering stage. A bidder, who will prepare the technical documentation for the Sečovlje border crossing point has already been chosen. In May 2006, Dönges passport examination suitcases were

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3.	<p>3. In general border checks are carried out in line with the Schengen standards. However, the Committee could verify that Croatian nationals, and not only the local residents benefiting from a local border traffic regime, are allowed to cross the border on the basis of their identity cards and, in most cases, without further inquiries about the purpose of the trip or the means of subsistence. The stamping of travel documents and the verification of the period of stay could therefore not be performed. Croatian identity cards were checked on a non-systematic basis in the national databases. Since this procedure is not in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Schengen Borders Code the Committee recommends modifying the checking procedures so that in the future they will be fully in line with the Community legislation.</p>	<p>purchased (a 3M lamp, a pocket microscope with 30-x magnification, a folding magnifying lens with 10x magnification, a stamp metering scale, a UV light, an ordinary lamp and precise pincers.</p> <p>In June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased. Training was conducted in the use of all the above mentioned equipment.</p> <p>In October 2006, the blue-white police cars were purchased for use at the border crossing points.</p> <p>The remaining equipment for the first and second line border check will be purchased in 2007 (with Schengen facility funds).</p> <p>Slovenia has concluded an interstate agreement with the Republic of Croatia on border crossing with valid identity cards.</p> <p>Slovenia is aware that entry of Croatian citizens to the Republic of Slovenia with identity cards in accordance with the agreement between both countries (in force since April 1997) is not in line with the Schengen acquis. It is for this reason that we have undertaken measures to address this problem: experts of the Slovenian-Hungarian and Slovenian-Italian side have met upon Slovenia's initiative in order to adopt a joint position and propose a solution to the problem. Furthermore, experts of the Slovenian and Croatian side have also met in order to study the prepared solution proposal. The prepared proposal will first be transmitted to the governments of the aforementioned Member States and then</p>

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		<p>to the European Commission for consideration. Should the proposed solution, according to the European Commission, provide the necessary standard in line with the Schengen Borders Code, this would ensure further existence of the bilateral agreement with the Republic of Croatia enabling Croatian citizens to cross the border of both countries with identity cards, whereas in the opposite case Slovenia would ensure full implementation of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.</p> <p>Police officers at border crossing points establish the purpose of entry also for Croatian citizens. This was specially stressed during the training courses that were organised for all police officers at all border crossing points in September and October 2006, pursuant to the Schengen Borders Code.</p>
4.	<p>4. Usually border checks are carried out just by one police officer. In case of doubts or any other problem, he or she has to make all the necessary inquiries, causing possible delays. The Committee considers that these checks should be carried out by two police officers, when possible, as stated in the Schengen Borders Code. With regard to Gruškovje (Maribor PD), the second biggest BCP in Slovenia, the Committee considers that taking into account that the majority of travellers (approx. 70 %) are non- EU citizens, the number of staff seems to be very limited to ensure that border checks are performed in accordance with the Schengen standards. In Obrežje, the situation is similar. The Committee recommends increasing the number of officers at the BCPs, particularly in peak seasons or summer time in order to</p>	<p>During the working consultations held with the Inspectors for the State Border and Aliens on 7 July 2006, the Police Directorates were briefed about the initial findings of the evaluation committee. It was decided at the meeting that border checks at the border crossing points with Croatia should, where personnel circumstances allow, be performed by two police officers per line. On 13 July 2006, written guidance to this effect was issued by the Director General of the Police to the Police Directorates.</p> <p>The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.</p>

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	guarantee that border checks are carried out in accordance with the Schengen standards.	
5.	5. The language skills are at high level and most of the officers are able to speak Croatian, English, and some of them also Italian and German, which enables them to carry out their tasks in an effective way. The system of "multipliers" in use to train the officers at local level could be regarded as a best practice.	Comment not necessary.
6.	6. All personnel seem to be highly motivated, well and regular trained. The Committee however considers that in order carry out border checks more effectively, there is room for improvement with regard to training on profiling and risk indicators, as this practice seems not to be in use in some places.	<p>Passenger profiling will constitute part of the training in the performance of border checks and the training for officers-in-charge at border crossing points.</p> <p>The issue of profiling will also be discussed within the framework of the Twinning Light project entitled "Border checks and compensatory measures" which will be implemented from January till June 2007, in collaboration with experts from the Republic of Austria (No.SI 04 JH 01-B). This training will be intended for police officers performing border checks and compensatory measures.</p>
7.	7. In relation to Dobova railway BCP, the Committee considers that, taking into account the information received about the flow of passengers and the time constraints under which the officers have to perform the checks of the trains and the passport control of passengers (normally between 17 and 25 minutes) in peak times and with a high number of passengers per train, the current procedure does not permit an adequate level of control in line with the Schengen standards. Technical solutions should also be explored in order to enable the officers to check the travel documents through the national databases, and in the future in the SIS, from the interior of the trains by means of portable devices.	<p>The head office at Dobova railway BCP adjusts the daily schedules of the work of police officers with respect to the expected number of passenger trains (in accordance with the train timetable) as well as with respect to the anticipated number of passengers on the trains (analyses).</p> <p>In September 2006, the Dobova Border Crossing Police Station obtained additional personnel.</p> <p>A special project group was formed for the purpose of ensuring access to national police information system with the help of</p>

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	<p>The Committee recommends reviewing the control procedures at the railway BCP Dobova by increasing the number of staff and the use of technical equipment for the remote consultation of the databases. This situation may be partially remedied in July 2006 with the adscription of new officers to this BCP. In the longer term and if the technical and practical conditions allow for it, checks on board the train during the transit would seem the most effective solution to carry out checks up to Schengen standards without delays at the station.</p>	<p>mobile terminals. The group will be required to prepare, by July 2007, an appropriate solution which will enable police officers mobile access to the national police information system and, after integration, also to the SIS data.</p>
8.	<p>8. The system of local border traffic, which could be observed at Rakovec and Rakitovec border crossing points, seems to work well in practice and does not seem to cause major problems for the management of the border with Croatia, or to lead to an increase of illegal immigration, also due to the very good cooperation between the two neighbouring countries.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary.</p>
9.	<p>9. With regard to green border surveillance the Evaluation Committee limited its evaluation to 3 Police Stations in 3 Police Directorates. The Slovenian external border is indeed a very homogenous border with only 1 country, already benefiting from the status of candidate Member State, and a very elaborated international cooperation. More of these Directorates and Stations would not have completed the picture of the readiness of the Republic of Slovenia.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary.</p>
10.	<p>10. Tactics applied and situational awareness at the green border are acceptable, based upon risk assessment and benefit above all from the cooperation with the local population and the excellent relations with the Republic of Croatia. Reaction capability is good in routine matters but lacks sufficient back-up possibilities in case of major incidents. Intensive threats can be challenged with the</p>	<p>Comment not necessary.</p>

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11.	<p>help of the Call-up units and the Special Unit.</p> <p>11. The availability of human and technical resources at the green border should be improved. In the absence of an integrated electronic surveillance system that covers the entire border and that detects and identifies targets and enables immediate reaction, human and technical resources should be brought on a level that matches the risks and threats of illegal migration. Specially the use of fixed and mobile thermo vision systems should be elaborated; the air support enhanced.</p>	<p>There are currently 7 thermo vision cameras mounted in vehicles (6 in vans, 1 in an SUV), which are in daily use. By the end of 2006, 6 new vehicles equipped with thermo vision cameras will be purchased (one of them an SUV). The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p> <p>In addition to these, there are two stationary thermo vision systems. One is in Obrežje, the other is expected to be located in Koper (in Krog above Sečovlje) by the end of June 2007.</p> <p>We have 19 portable Sagem Matis thermo vision systems which may be mounted on a tripod and operated remotely (they enable the transfer of images to the operator). Under purchasing procedures are 9 such new portable thermo vision systems. The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p> <p>In accordance with the monthly flight schedules of police helicopters, the number of planned flights along the state border with Croatia is increasing.</p>
12.	<p>12. The Committee, however, is not convinced about the strategy to react on threats which can arise in the immediate vicinity of the BCP's. The reaction capability on forced crossings at the BCP did not seem to be available. The organisation of the surveillance of the immediate surroundings of the BCP's should be increased, based on good cooperation between border control units and border surveillance teams and the use of electronic equipment.</p>	<p>Since the introduction of a state border between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia, there has not been any case of the so-called forced crossing of the state border, which would justify putting in place additional systems for stopping such vehicles.</p> <p>In the event of a forced crossing of the state border occurring by vehicle, the operations and communications centre of the</p>

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		<p>respective Police Directorate, which supervises all patrols within its area of jurisdiction shall immediately send to the site of the incident the available number of police patrols. These shall block the area.</p> <p>The heads of Border Crossing Police Stations and Police Stations conduct daily mutual coordination of the operations of police stations. Cooperation between border crossing points and the police officers performing state border protection proceeds via the operations and communications centres of Police Directorates as well as directly between police officers themselves performing state border protection duties and police officers at border crossing points. This enables police officers at the border crossing points to be kept informed about the location and number of police patrols performing state border protection operations in the border area in the close vicinity to border crossing points.</p>

Chapter 9: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP.

Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	1. The external border of Slovenia is an exclusively Slovenian-Croatian border. In the period before 1991, there was no state border between both countries, which resulted in mixed marriages, property ownership on both sides of the border, common public utility infrastructure, cemeteries and similar. An Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on	

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	<p>border traffic and cooperation came into force to strengthen cross-border cultural and economic cooperation, providing for facilitated crossing of the border for the local population one side and prevention of illegal migration and organised crime on the other. Nevertheless, the authorities should bear in mind that for the next coming years, this border will be the external Schengen border which challenges the responsibility of the State. Slovenia is one of the transit countries for illegal migration towards other EU Member States. The geographical position and the very short distances between external and future internal borders underline the extreme importance of efficient border management.</p>	
2.	<p>2. Slovenia disposes of a solid legislation as a fundamental component of border management.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
3.	<p>3. The general strategy for border management is widely based on the Schengen 4-tier integrated border security model. This means international cooperation with third-countries, activities at the external borders in cooperation with the third countries, border surveillance and border checks at the external borders and inland activities.</p> <p>Border control and border surveillance are part of the Police Border Management Strategy, governing in detail, the fields of border checks and state border surveillance. The strategy even more concretely covers the fields of state border control and cross-border crime.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
4.	<p>4. There is no specialised border police organisation as such in Slovenia but a unique and integrated system, where border police elements are included in general police structures. The solution however seems to be suitable and functional for the Slovenian</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>

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5.	<p>security environment. The structure of the Police involved in border management is clear and guarantees a border management in line with the guidelines of and integrated border management system. The interagency cooperation seems to function well and the exchange of information linked to the risk analyses made at central, regional and local level, seems to work fluently. However, in this kind of special structure there is a continuous need to think how to organise management, planning and how to guarantee unified approach and clear commanding system. Cooperation between the units responsible for border checks and border surveillance should be coordinated at all levels of the organisation.</p> <p>5. Operational effectiveness can be improved; there is an actual shortage in human resources and electronic equipment. The Committee recommends increasing the number of officers at the BCP's and at the green borders in accordance with the recommendations mentioned in the previous chapter.</p>	<p>The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.</p> <p>There are currently 7 thermo vision cameras mounted in vehicles (6 in vans, 1 in an SUV), which are in daily use. By the end of 2006, 6 new vehicles equipped with thermo vision cameras will be purchased (one of them an SUV). The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p> <p>In addition to these, there are two stationary thermo vision systems. One is in Obrežje, the other is expected to be located in Koper (in Krog above Sečovlje) by the end of June 2007.</p> <p>We have 19 portable Sagem Matis thermo vision systems which may be mounted on a tripod and operated remotely (they enable the transfer of images to the operator). Under purchasing</p>

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		<p>procedures are 9 such new portable thermo vision systems. The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p> <p>In May 2006, Dönges passport examination suitcases were purchased (they include a 3M lamp, a 30x magnification hand microscope, a magnifying lens with 10x magnification, a stamp metering scale, an UV lamp, an ordinary lamp and precise pincers.</p> <p>In June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased.</p> <p>The remaining equipment for the first and second line border check is planned to be purchased in 2007 (funded by the Schengen facility). Training was conducted in the use of all the above-mentioned equipment.</p>
6.	6. Interagency cooperation between the Police and the Customs is present and joint operations have been carried out by these organisations. Cooperation is regulated by an agreement on mutual cooperation and it covers all organisational levels. Closer cooperation related to risk analysis and intelligence are recommended. Interoperable means of communication (radio) would also help in practical cooperation.	<p>Talks are currently being held with the Customs about the exchanging of risk analyses and other daily relevant intelligence, important for police operations.</p> <p>The Specialised Unit for State Border Control of the Uniformed Police Directorate at the General Police Directorate and the Specialised Customs Units cooperate in the performance of joint stricter checks, on the basis of monthly work plans.</p>
7.	7. A new strategy was created in May 2006 with regard to the risk analyses and the mechanism of transmission of information from the Central to the Regional and Local levels. Depending of each	Comment not necessary

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	<p>Directorate, this new working procedures seem to be applied in slightly different ways. Since this is a new concept, it is logical considering that certain delay is still necessary in order to extend the new situation to all PD.</p>	
8.	<p>8. Slovenian police officers involved in border management are properly trained through basic and continuous education and show appropriate motivation to perform their duties.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
9.	<p>9. The Committee acknowledges the importance of the cross border traffic between both countries and the existence of a bilateral agreement with Croatia in order to facilitate the cross border traffic between both countries, specially to residents of the border areas. It also recognises the particular situation that Slovenia has in this regard from the geographical point of view, the importance of the regime for the local population at both sides of the border, and the low risk for illegal immigration that this fact represents at the moment.</p> <p>However, the Committee could verify that all Croatian nationals and not only border residents are permitted to cross the border on the basis of the presentation of identity cards at the international border crossing points. This practice does not permit among other things the stamping of passports and subsequently the verification of the period of the stay in the Schengen area. In addition, no thorough checks are usually carried out on Croatian nationals, which are only randomly asked about their purposes of their journey, the possession of means of subsistence, etc¹. These practises are not in line with the provisions laid down in the Schengen Borders Code where it is established that third country nationals should be subject to entry and exit thorough checks as</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p> <p>Slovenia has concluded an interstate agreement with the Republic of Croatia on border crossing with valid identity cards.</p> <p>As it has been pointed out Slovenia is aware that entry of Croatian citizens to the Republic of Slovenia with identity cards in accordance with the agreement between both countries (in force since April 1997) is not in line with the Schengen acquis. It is for this reason that we have undertaken measures to address this problem: experts of the Slovenian-Hungarian and Slovenian-Italian side have met upon Slovenia's initiative in order to adopt a joint position and propose a solution to the problem. Furthermore, experts of the Slovenian and Croatian side have also met in order</p>

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	<p>well as to a systematic stamping of their travel documents. The Code also makes a reference to the possibility to have some exceptions but only for specific categories of persons, including border residents, benefiting of a local border traffic regime. Therefore, the Committee recommends to change the current practices at the international border crossing points, to aligning them in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Schengen Borders Code.</p> <p>Footnote of the Slovenian side in the presented report:</p> <p>¹ SI Between 1.1.2006 and 31.5.2006, 5.014 persons were refused entry at border with the Republic of Croatia. Most of them were Croatian nationals (2.351 -approximately 46%), followed by nationals from Bulgaria (1.179), Serbia and Montenegro (513), Bosnia and Herzegovina (355), Romania (232), etc..</p> <p>Between 1.1.2005 and 31.12.2005, 14.085 persons were refused entry at the border with the Republic of Croatia. Most of them were Croatian nationals (5.043 -approximately 36%), followed by nationals from Bulgaria (4.124), Serbia and Montenegro (1.760), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.098), etc..</p>	<p>to study the prepared solution proposal. The prepared proposal will first be transmitted to the governments of the aforementioned Member States and then to the European Commission for consideration. Should the proposed solution, according to the European Commission, provide the necessary standard in line with the Schengen Borders Code, this would ensure further existence of the bilateral agreement with the Republic of Croatia enabling Croatian citizens to cross the border of both countries with identity cards, whereas in the opposite case Slovenia would ensure full implementation of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.</p> <p>Police officers at border crossing points establish the purpose of entry also for Croatian citizens. This was specially stressed during the training courses that were organised for all police officers at all border crossing points in September and October 2006, pursuant to the Schengen Borders Code.</p>
10.	<p>10. On the basis of a bilateral agreement signed between Slovenia and Croatia it has been established a regime for the Local Border Traffic for those persons living in the neighbouring border areas that seems to work correctly. The new Regulation on Local Border Traffic that will be published within the following months should be taken into account By the Slovenian authorities, which should ensure compatibility of their agreement with future Community rules.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>

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11.	<p>11. With regard to border checks on railway traffic, the Committee considers that the procedure followed for the control of international traffic may lead in the future to problems, specially linked to the use of the SIS. At the moment it seems that, with the current number of staff and the technical devices available, the border checks on international trains with high number of passengers cannot be performed fully in line with the Schengen standards. The Committee recommends to explore new procedures and to solve the technical problems linked to the consultation of the databases from portable equipments and to ensure that the number of officers is adequate to the passenger flows.</p>	<p>In September 2006, the Dobova Border Crossing Police Station obtained additional personnel.</p> <p>The project for the investigation of technical and practical conditions for the introduction of equipment that will enable the direct consultation of databases during the performance of border checks on trains commenced in October 2006. A special project group was formed for the purpose of ensuring access to national police information system with the help of mobile terminals. The group will be required to prepare, by July 2007, an appropriate solution which will enable police officers mobile access to the national police information system and, after integration, also to the SIS data.</p>
12.	<p>12. Border surveillance is organised according the main purpose of preventing unauthorised border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. Border surveillance is implemented at national and international level in close cooperation with the relevant neighbouring state.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
13.	<p>13. The tactics applied in border surveillance are adapted to foreseen risk and threats, involving periodical changes to maintain the level of detection.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
14.	<p>14. Border surveillance is carried out using stationary and mobile units, patrolling at places known to be sensitive, supported by technical and electronic means. The operational human and technical resources however are so far not on the level of the strategic purposes and the possible risks and threats and should be enhanced. The Slovenian authorities are invited to continue the process of increasing the specialised training of staff performing</p>	<p>The rate at which the number of police officers is to be increased depends on the decision on the time on the abolition of controls at internal borders.</p> <p>The training of police officers continues according to the annual plans of the General Police Directorate and the plans of Police Directorates.</p> <p>From January till June 2007, the Twinning Light project entitled</p>

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	border surveillance.	<p>“Border checks and compensatory measures” will be implemented in collaboration with experts from the Republic of Austria (No. SI 04 JH 01-B). This training will be intended for police officers performing border checks and compensatory measures.</p> <p>In May 2006, Dönges passport examination suitcases were purchased (they include a 3M lamp, a 30x magnification hand microscope, a magnifying lens with 10x magnification, a stamp metering scale, an UV lamp, an ordinary lamp and precise pincers).</p> <p>In June 2006, Sabre 4000 explosives and narcotics detectors (they detect picogramme (10⁻⁹g) quantities of classic narcotics, explosives and combat poisons) were purchased. Training was conducted in the use of all the above-mentioned equipment.</p> <p>In October 2006, blue-white police cars were purchased for use at the border crossing points.</p> <p>The remaining equipment for the first and second line border check will be purchased in 2007 (with Schengen facility funds).</p> <p>There are currently 7 thermo vision cameras mounted in vehicles (6 in vans, 1 in an SUV), which are in daily use. By the end of 2006, 6 new vehicles equipped with thermo vision cameras will be purchased (one of them an SUV). The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p> <p>In addition to these, there are two stationary thermo vision systems. One is in Obrežje, the other is expected to be located in</p>

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		<p>Koper (in Krog above Sečovlje) by the end of June 2007.</p> <p>We have 19 portable Sagem Matis thermo vision equipment which may be mounted on a tripod and operated remotely (they enable the transfer of images to the operator). Under purchasing procedures are 9 such new portable thermo vision systems. The purchase contract has already been signed, the delivery deadline is the end of 2006.</p>
15.	15. The cooperation with the local population at the border region is considered as outstanding and as important element in order to enable a rapid reaction of the authorities in cases of illegal crossings of the border.	Comment not necessary
16.	16. In addition the cooperation between the Slovenian and the Croatian border police, one of the elements of the 4 tiers of the integrated border management system, could be regarded as fluid and permanent, helping to ensure the level of security at the external border. The Slovenian authorities must be aware of the new role of the Border Police in cross-border cooperation after the accession of Slovenia to the Schengen area.	Comment not necessary
17.	17. The Slovenian authorities are invited to study carefully these conclusions and recommendations and to report in due time to the SCH-EVAL Working Group.	

5. AIR BORDERS

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations of the Report on the Air Border evaluation of Slovenia, doc. 12712/06 SCH-EVAL 131 FRONT 172 COMIX 741 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 27. 9. 2006.

Chapter 3: GENERAL INFORMATION

Subchapter 3.8 Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee:

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The border management strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, described at national level in the Police Border Management Strategy, is based on the integrated border security model. Corresponding national legislation seems to conform to the Schengen Acquis and to provide the necessary legislative basis for border management.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
2.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> Several elements of the border security system meet the recommendations of the Schengen Catalogue, such as streamlined and functional ministerial competences for border management, the method performing risk analysis and managing data-flow, planning on the basis of the risk assessment, cooperation with the law enforcement agencies of neighbouring states and allocation of an adequate technical equipment at the BCPs.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>

3.	<u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The professionalism of the Border Police personnel and positive attitude towards duties and threats to be tackled.	Comment not necessary
4.	<u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The personnel of the Border Police (from high-ranking officers to lower employees) are well trained in different languages. The Committee would particularly draw attention to the high level of English language skills.	Comment not necessary
5.	<u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The Committee regards the system of basic training as well organised and efficient.	Comment not necessary

Chapter 4: LJUBLJANA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Subchapter 4.7: Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The personnel of the BPS seemed to be motivated and to have good knowledge of procedures. The Committee highlights the professional attitude of personnel to interviewing (interrogating) the passengers.	Comment not necessary
2.	<u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> Access to a full range of databases.	Comment not necessary

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3.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> Taking into account the size of the airport and the number of persons refused entry the committee appreciated the existence and the infrastructure of the international location for refused aliens.</p>	Comment not necessary
4.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The location of the main second-line office, which is situated next to the first line and allows queuing passengers to be viewed.</p>	Comment not necessary
5.	<p><u>The experts took particular note of the following items:</u> The Committee was shown plans of the extension of the current building. The plans envisage a separation of passenger flows. It should be noted that no indications were given to the Committee as to the type of vertical separation planned, the type of booths or the planned signposting. It should be ensured that the new infrastructure fully respects the recommendations of the Schengen Catalogue - External borders control, Removal and readmission.</p>	<p>The first phase will involve the renovation of the existing passenger terminal (T1). Renovation work proceeds in accordance with the presented plan and Schengen standards. Construction work has completed by May 2007. The testing of the operation of the renovated passenger terminal is planned for the period May 2007 till end of June 2007, when the facility ought to be technically accepted and handed over for use.</p>
6.	<p><u>The experts took particular note of the following items:</u> The Committee recommends that locks be installed on the current booths. It should be possible to close the space between the booths, and the protection film on the glass walls of the current booths should be mounted in such a way as to protect the information on the screen of the computer used for the border checks.</p>	<p>Within the framework of renovation work at the passenger terminal (T1), the checking booths will also be redesigned in accordance with the recommendations.</p>
7.	<p><u>The experts took particular note of the following items:</u> The speed of network connection should be increased, considering the rise in the data flow after full accession to Schengen (SIS, VIS, FADO).</p>	<p>The Slovenian Police is preparing the project for the modification of the network for increasing the speed of flow of data. The network technology project “virtual private network” will enable the transfer of data at speeds of 10 to 100 Mb/s.</p> <p>The fast-network connection will be installed at Brnik Airport Police Station in the first half of 2007.</p>

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8.	<p>The experts took particular note of the following items:</p> <p>The Committee calls attention to the rules of the Common Manual on affixing entry stamps on visas in the passports of third-country nationals⁴.</p> <p>Footnote of the Slovenian side in the presented report:</p> <p>⁴ see Footnote 3</p> <p>Footnote 3:</p> <p>SI: The national instructions on stamping are in accordance with Schengen acquis.</p>	<p>This matter was once again pointed out to the police officers performing border checks during training courses on the Schengen Borders Code which were organised at all border crossing points (including airports) in September and October 2006.</p> <p>The subject of passport stamping was also included in other training courses for border checks police officers and officers-in-charge, which were organised in the second half of 2006.</p>
9.	<p>The experts consider that there is room for improvement on the following points:</p> <p>The Committee invites the Slovenian authorities to reconsider the absence of the concept of separation of passenger flows in the general aviation hangar to be constructed. This concept should take into account the number of movements and passengers, as well as the general size of the airport and the overall amount of flights handled.</p>	<p>Ljubljana Airport has prepared a preliminary concept for the transfer of general aviation to a new hangar. The Slovenian Police gave its comments on the concept, which the airport operator will take into account during the future planning of the hangar. The transfer of the general aviation traffic is planned for the end of this year.</p>
10.	<p>The experts consider that there is room for improvement on the following points:</p> <p>The Committee is of the opinion that the number of border police personnel used for border checks at the APS Brnik does not correspond to the numbers and character of current as well as future passengers flows and destinations and it invites the responsible authorities of the Slovenian Police to assess whether the number of staff deployed to carry out border checks at Ljubljana International Airport is fully in line with Schengen standards.</p>	<p>Pursuant to the amendments to Article 127 of the Aviation Act, the basic security checks of passengers, luggage and goods will, from November 2006, be performed entirely by the airport operator. The police will, henceforth, perform only special security checks.</p> <p>From November 2006, 17 police officers from the security operations group will be reallocated to the border control group. After these personnel changes, the border control group will have 39 police officers (6 officers-in-charge, 12 senior police officers and 21 police officers).</p>

Chapter 5: PORTOROŽ INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Subchapter 5.7: Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> Taking into consideration the size of the airport and the number of passengers, the Committee appreciates the equipment and the general compliance with the Schengen Catalogue.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
2.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The CCTV system is modern and the police make good use of it.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
3.	<p><u>The experts were appreciative of the following facts:</u> The number of staff is sufficient, taking into account annual passenger numbers. Staff are well trained to carry out border checks.</p>	<p>Comment not necessary</p>
4.	<p><u>The experts took particular note of the following items:</u> The lock of the booth at departures should be replaced with a more secure system.</p>	<p>The ordinary (previous) lock on the booth has already been replaced with a more secure cylindrical lock.</p>
5.	<p>The experts consider that there is room for improvement on the following points: Upon entry into force of the Schengen Borders Code, the Slovenian authorities must ensure that relevant information on private flights from third countries is provided to the Border Crossing Point prior to take-off of the aircraft.</p>	<p>The Republic of Slovenia complies with the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code. For the purposes of the implementation of point 2.3.2 of Appendix VI of Directive No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and Council of 15 March 2006 on the Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across the border (Schengen Borders Code), a request was made during the meeting of the Frontiers Working Group of the Council of the EU which was</p>

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Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
		held on 13 October 2006, to Member States to provide information on how they implemented in their national legislation and practices the above-mentioned provision of the Schengen Borders Code.
6.	<p>The experts consider that there is room for improvement on the <u>following points</u>:</p> <p>The booth at arrivals should be renovated in order to allow it to be fully locked up when not in use. The window at the side of the booth should be covered with mirrored glass or a special film protecting the screen of the computer from being viewed by passengers.</p>	<p>The booth at arrivals at Portorož Airport will, by the end of March 2007, at the latest, be renovated such that a door with an appropriate security lock will be mounted.</p> <p>The glazing on the arrival booth will be covered by a special film preventing the screen of the computer from being viewed by passengers.</p>

Chapter 6: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP.

Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	Border management strategy in the Republic of Slovenia, described at national level in the Police Border Management Strategy, is based on an integrated border security model. The relevant national legislation seems to conform to the Schengen acquis and to provide the necessary legislative basis for border management.	Comment not necessary
2.	The Committee found the professionalism of the border police and attitude towards their duties to be at a good level. The personnel are well trained in various languages and the Committee draws particular attention to the high level of Serbo-Croatian and English language skills.	Comment not necessary

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Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
3.	<p>The system of basic training is regarded by the Committee as well organised and efficient. However, there is room for improvement concerning profiling. Additional training will be needed on this subject in order to provide a higher standard of border checks at the Slovenian borders.</p>	<p>Passenger profiling will constitute part of the training in the performance of border checks and the training of officers-in-charge at border crossing points.</p> <p>The subject of profiling will also be discussed within the framework of the Twinning Light project entitled "Border checks and compensatory measures" which will be implemented from January till June 2007, in collaboration with experts from the Republic of Austria (No.SI 04 JH 01-B). Part of the activity of this project will be intended specially for the performance of police tasks at airports.</p>
4.	<p>The Committee is of the opinion that the number of border police personnel used for border checks at APS Brnik does not correspond to passenger flows. It welcomes the decision of the Slovenian Police to increase the number of personnel and invites the responsible authorities of the Slovenian Police to assess the number of staff deployed to carry out border controls at the APS Brnik.</p>	<p>Pursuant to the amendments to Article 127 of the Aviation Act, which entered into force on 11 August 2006, basic security checks of passengers, luggage and goods will, from November 2006, be performed entirely by the airport operator. The police will, henceforth, perform only special security checks.</p> <p>From November 2006, 17 police officers from the security operations group will be reallocated to the border control group. After these personnel changes, the border control group will have 39 police officers (6 officers-in-charge, 12 senior police officers and 21 police officers).</p>
5.	<p>The Committee is of the opinion that the existing infrastructure for border checks at Ljubljana Airport does not fully meet the Schengen requirements. It is not yet prepared for separation of passengers on Schengen and non-Schengen flights. The Committee invites the responsible authorities of the Republic of Slovenia to remove existing infrastructure gaps and to implement separation of passengers. Follow-up will be necessary.</p>	<p>The first phase will involve the renovation of the existing passenger terminal (T1). Renovation work proceeds in accordance with the presented plan. Preparatory construction work started on 2 June 2006 and renovation work started on 13 June 2006. All construction and installation works are expected to be completed by May 2007.</p> <p>The testing of the operation of the renovated passenger terminal is</p>

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		planned for the period of May 2007 till end of June 2007, when the facility ought to be technically accepted and handed over for use. The required passenger separation between Schengen and non-Schengen will also be guaranteed then.

6. VISA I - EMBASSY OF SLOVENIA IN MOSCOW

Comments from Slovenia on the general conclusions including recommendations on the Evaluation Committee's mission to the Embassy of Slovenia in Moscow, doc. 12664/06 SCH-EVAL 124 FRONT 218 COMIX 732 RESTREINT, adopted on SCHEVAL 28. 9. 2006.

Chapter 6: PROCESSING THE APPLICATION

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	With regard to the non-acceptance of an incomplete application, i.e. the application is not processed, not paid for and the application stamp is not affixed in the passport, the EvalCom recommends that once fully implementing the Schengen acquis, this practice should be abolished, since not processing and/or stamping the passport could lead to 'visa shopping'. Other than that, the existing procedures regarding processing of applications are adequate.	Immediately after the evaluation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued instructions, to the Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Moscow and all diplomatic and consular representations, stating that all visa applications must be consistently processed. In the case of an incomplete application, the applicant must be handed written information or an invitation to complete their application with the data that is marked in the information itself. Each application that is accepted is recorded also in the applicant's passport.

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Chapter 11: EQUIPMENT FOR DETECTING FALSE DOCUMENTS

Seq. no	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	The EvalCom recommends that the Embassy be equipped with a retro-viewer and a magnifying lens.	In September 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs purchased 50 additional sets for detecting falsified documents. Each set includes a magnifying lens, retro-viewer, UV lamp and pincers. The sets are currently being distributed to all diplomatic and consular representations.

Chapter 13: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

Seq. no	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - EVALCOM	COMMENTS FROM SLOVENIA IN THE FOLLOW UP REPORT
1.	At the end of its mission, the EvalCom considers, on the basis of the checks carried out and the information gathered, that the Slovene Embassy in Moscow will be in a position to implement the Schengen Acquis in the near future. No serious shortcomings were noted at any time in the daily work of the Embassy.	
2.	However, the EvalCom wishes to comment on a few points which, in its view, merit special attention by the Slovene authorities, at the time of full implementation of the Schengen Acquis:	
3.	1) Regarding the security situation, the strong room in the office of the consul is weak (gypsum board) and it is recommended to construct a strong room with solid walls. Iron bars at some ground level windows are attached to the outer wall only with screws which could be easily removed from outside.	The visa stickers are stored in the strongbox kept in the office of the consul. Only the consul, vice-consul and security guard have access to the office. Apart from the ambassador, other members of staff do not have access to this office. The keys to the strongbox in which the visa stickers are stored are kept by the consul and by the vice-consul, whenever the later deputises for the consul.

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		<p>Space has been additionally constructed in the office of the consul to which the strongbox with stickers has been transferred and in which the processed visa applications are kept. Slovenia accepts the findings of the Committee that the walls of the additionally constructed space are not massive but points out that the office itself in which the consul performs his duties is situated in an area of such high level security as allows the location of a strongbox with visa stickers. Despite this, Slovenia responded to the observation of the Committee and mounted additional steel bars in the inner walls of the space. This ensures a higher level of security of visa stickers.</p> <p>Regarding the iron bars in the windows facing the embassy courtyard, it should be pointed out that the courtyard is protected by a security guard and security camera while all the windows are protected by a security film which is pasted on all the glazing. Slovenia does, however, agree with the Committee's finding regarding the insufficient security of the bars themselves and this deficiency has already been remedied.</p>
4.	<p>2) The EvalCom noted that minors under 18 are exempted from appearing in person, which is not in accordance with the CCI (chapter III, point 4) (not a standard category in the CCI) and should be implemented correctly in the light of Best practices. Otherwise, the existing procedures regarding processing of applications are carried out adequately and in accordance with the CCI.</p>	<p>The Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia requires the permission of parents for minors to be able travel abroad.</p> <p>Such permission is not required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If a minor is travelling with the father or mother; - if travelling with the father, the mother's permission is required, and vice versa; - If travelling with a third person, the permission of the father and mother is required; - In case one of the parents is deceased, proof of death is

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		<p>required – in place of his signature;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If the mother is a single parent and the identity of the father is unknown or if the father has lost parental rights and obligations, certification from the social service is required. <p>The Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Moscow does not demand personal appearances of minors in all cases since the Russian border authorities examine very thoroughly the documents of minors (parents' permission must be presented on the prescribed form and verified by a public notary), and are very consistent (sometimes even bureaucratic). The Russian border authorities also always have personal contacts with the minors and always assess the quality of personal relations between the minor and the adult person with whom the minor is travelling. In the event of doubts arising regarding the authenticity of documents or the genuineness of the relation (child-adult), they have in place special verification procedures (for combating child trafficking).</p> <p>Upon the full implementation of the Schengen Implementation Agreement, Slovenia will, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, alter current practice such that it will be entirely in conformity with the provisions of the Common Consular Instructions.</p>

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