



Council of the
European Union

032491/EU XXVI. GP
Eingelangt am 02/08/18

Brussels, 2 August 2018
(OR. en)

15526/06
DCL 1

SCH-EVAL 186
COMIX 971

DECLASSIFICATION

of document:	ST15526/06 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
dated:	20 November 2006
new status:	Public
Subject:	Follow-up report to the Schengen evaluation of the Republic of HUNGARY - Information on progress in the implementation of recommendations of the evaluation committees for the correct application of the Schengen acquis – 2006

Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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**SCH-EVAL 186
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NOTE

from :	the Hungarian delegation
to:	the Schengen Evaluation Working Party
Subject :	Follow-up report to the Schengen evaluation of the Republic of HUNGARY - Information on progress in the implementation of recommendations of the evaluation committees for the correct application of the Schengen acquis – 2006

At the meeting of the Schengen Evaluation Working Party on 27-28 September 2006, new Member States were encouraged to provide the Presidency and the General Secretariat of the Council with information on progress achieved since the evaluation visits took place. While drafting the Conclusions for the Justice and Home Affairs Council in December 2006, such additional information should be taken into consideration.

The delegation of the Republic of Hungary hereby submits its interim report to the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation concerning comments and recommendations of the evaluation committees stated in the separate reports. This document provides information on the implementation of recommendations and an up-to-date state of play as of November 2006.

Schengen evaluation missions took place in Hungary as follows:

- Police Cooperation II (15-19 February 2006),
- Data Protection II (5-7 March 2006),
- Land borders I (19-27 May 2006)
- Air borders II (22-25 June 2006)
- Visa II – Kiev (22 June 2006)
- Visa III – Belgrade (18 September 2006)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	POLICE COOPERATION	3
2.	DATA PROTECTION	7
3.	LANDBORDERS	9
4.	AIRBORDERS	17
5.	VISA (Kiev, Belgrade)	21

DECLASSIFIED

1. POLICE COOPERATION

Information on implementation of recommendations included in Report on Police Cooperation

(doc. 8395/1/06 SCHEVAL 61 ENFOPOL 69 COMIX 363 RESTREINT)

Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, Page 15:

The visit to the ILECC has shown that the IT system offers full access to all necessary police databases, including those of the Border Guard and Customs during normal working hours through liaison officers co-located in ILECC. The Evaluation Committee feels that access to these databases is necessary 24/7 and consideration should be given as how this can be facilitated, possibly through the secondment of more liaison officers from Border Guard and Customs.

The ILECC will guarantee operations of the SIRENE Bureau on a 24/7 basis, according to SIRENE principles. At the present time, one liaison officer of the Border Guard and another of the Customs and Finance Guard are seconded to the Bureau. The recommendations of the report will be entirely observed while increasing the number of the staff; as the partner authorities are also interested in increasing the number of LOs, we can expect strong support from and cooperation with them.

Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, Page 16:

Whilst there is good foreign language capacity in the central services responsible for police cooperation - especially at the INTERPOL office - the expected increase of the work load and more complex legal issues they will have to deal with (e.g. European Arrest Warrant) the absence of professional translators might create problems in the future and cause delays in the response capability of these services.

Thanks to the fact that the Police have enrolled 20 officers of NEBEK (International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre) in foreign language courses financed by the Schengen Facility, NEBEK will be able to meet this expectation following the successful completion of these language courses.

Comments and recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, Page 30:

The establishment of the Common Contact Point with Austria (Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf) is a very important step forward in the development of good cross-border police cooperation, although the bilateral agreement between the two countries has not been entered into force yet. The Evaluation Committee encourages the Hungarian authorities to proceed with their intention to perform joint mixed patrols and to involve the CCP into the operational coordination of police activities in the border area.

Before the bilateral agreement on police cooperation between Austria and Hungary entered into force working parties had been working on determining detailed rules related to criminal and public order issues. They of course took into account the recommendations of the SCHeval team and as a result, number of officers on duty was increased from 3 to 5. At present, cooperation at the CCP includes joint investigation with the Austrian partners of concrete cases (criminal offences) just as information exchange on border traffic.

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The Austrian-Hungarian bilateral agreement on police cooperation came into effect on 01.06.2006. For implementing the tasks determined by the agreement a common directive of the National Police Headquarters, the Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard Headquarters and the Border Guard Headquarters was issued on 30.06.2006. On the grounds of these regulations the Vas County Police Headquarters has required joint patrolling with the Austrian partner three times via the Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf CCP.

Cooperation at the Law Enforcement Cooperation Point established on the territory of the Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf border crossing point, promulgated by Government decree No. 110/2001. (VI. 21.), is at present restricted to cooperation between the authorities carrying out border traffic control tasks. A new agreement extending the scope of cooperation so as to cover criminal investigation authorities as well is under way.

6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

In order to ensure that comprehensive analysis and relevant threat assessments are produced from the intelligence and information gathered, the Hungarian authorities may consider the introduction of European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM).

The ECIM formally is not yet part of the acquis, although it was discussed by the EU Police Chiefs Task Force, and forwarded to the CATS for further approval. However, current steps of the Hungarian intelligence process are already in line with the foreseen ones. Any potential amendments resulting from developments of the ECIM will also be taken into due consideration. Our adjustment and support to intelligence-led policing on European level are reflected e.g. in the national contribution to the Organised Crime Threat Assessment of 2007 (to be forwarded to Europol until the end of this month). Furthermore, the OCTA co-ordinator of the Hungarian National Police is involved in the activity of the Europol expert forum in charge of fine-tuning the OCTA methodology, thus continuously providing the respective units on the national level with updated information.

Hungary should accelerate the conclusion of outstanding bilateral agreements and these should, where possible, correspond to the Schengen Convention. This will enable the law enforcement authorities of neighboring countries to perform cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit at the common borders. Taking into consideration, that Hungary will have a very extensive Schengen external border with Ukraine, Romania, Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, the conclusion of bilateral agreements on police cooperation with these countries is of high importance, with the purpose to improve the effectiveness of checks and surveillance at the external borders.

The Treaty concluded at Heiligenbrunn on 6 June 2004 between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Austria on police cooperation in preventing and combating cross-border crime was promulgated by Act No. 37 of 2006.

On 3 October 2006 the following agreements concluded with the Slovak Republic were signed:

- Convention between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic on Preventing Cross-Border Crime and on Cooperation in Combating Organised Crime,
- Protocol on the Implementation of Cross-Border Observation, concluded between the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Hungary as well as the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic,

RESTREINT UE

- Protocol on the Implementation of Establishing a Joint Border Patrol Service, concluded between the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Hungary as well as the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic,
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the Slovak Republic on Cooperation at Joint Liaison Posts.

The Agreement on the Cooperation of the Hungarian and the Slovenian Criminal Investigation Authorities has been signed on 27 October 2006.

At present, Hungary is working on agreements to be concluded with the following states: Romania, the Republic of Croatia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey, Spain and Bulgaria. These conventions will regulate the cooperation of the criminal investigation authorities of the Parties.

Further Police Cooperation Centres should be considered with neighbouring countries. The Common Contact Point Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf can be seen as best practice for enhancing and encouraging the international exchange of information. In order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of such Common Contact Point, their working hours should be extended to a full 24/7 service.

While designing the operations of the Law Enforcement Cooperation Point at Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf inspected during the evaluation visit we have taken into consideration the recommendations of the committee, and ensuring the infrastructure necessary for the 24/7 operation of the Contact Point is underway, 24/7 availability is likely to operate in the near future.

Preparatory work related to the conclusion of a Slovenian-Austrian-Hungarian trilateral agreement on the establishment of Law Enforcement Cooperation Point is also under way.

Special emphasis should be given to a constantly recurring training regime of all officers, including those at management level, seconded to the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre and all police officers involved in police cooperation.

On the one hand, with a view to inform and prepare the management level of the Police, the state of play on Schengen preparation has become a standard item on the agenda of high-level meetings. On the other hand, trainings financed by the Schengen Facility have been extended to the local managerial level of law enforcement.

Preparation of the following groups have been realized or initiated in 2006:

- central staff, heads of departments of county- and local-level Police Headquarters, in charge of operational and investigative duties
- staff of the legal department of the National Police Headquarters, heads of legal bureau of County Police Headquarters;
- commanding officers;
- leaders on duty;
- staff of deployment units of County Police Headquarters;
- leaders of patrols, staff of motorway patrols;
- operational staff of the Operational Support Directorate;
- executive staff of the ILECC (SIRENE Bureau)

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Special trainings centred on practice were or are being provided to dog handlers, driving instructors, staff of common contact points and staff of the Integrated Management Centre. Professional English language courses have been provided to staff in charge of Schengen duties, both at central and county-level since September 2006.

In the framework of trainings financed by the Schengen Facility, practical knowledge of document examination and expertise is being provided to the future staff of the NEKOR-FADO centres, which knowledge they will transmit as tutors to the executive staff.

Schengen-related documents, legal instruments and background information are being uploaded on the Intranet sites of the Police, with a view to assist the police staff in working and resolving problems.

Furthermore, the Police initiated the following actions in connection with this task:

- All students in the graduation year both at the Police Officer Training College and the Law Enforcement Vocational School at Adyliget will be given lectures on the practical aspects of the operations of the Sirene Bureau and the Schengen Information System, respectively;
- „Days of Information” to be held in the counties involved in the execution of Schengen related tasks;
- The “SIRENE Educational Plan” has been approved;
- The procedure related to the publication of the „Schengen-disks” has been launched;
- EU applications (TAIEX) submitted;

Hungary should continue with their strategy to implement cross-border telecommunication structures, especially in the design and deployment of a Digital Trunked Radio Systems (e.g. TETRA) with neighbouring countries. Hungary is invited to examine operational and technical interoperability issues together with its EU partners in the context of the PCWG, in order to meet the Schengen technical, operational and tactical requirements.

Government Decree. 1053/2005. (V.26) decided about the establishment of the unified digital radio system (UDR). Public procurement procedure on the acquisition of the UDR was successfully completed in October with the signing of the contract with the contractor. As a result, unified radio telecommunications infrastructure is established for the Police, Border Guard, Customs and Finance Guard, disaster management services, state security services and life-saving services, which supports the successful and efficient work of standby authorities. The total national system will become operational till 31 January 2007, however, technical equipments are already used by some standby and law enforcement services. After the system became fully operational we will examine interoperability with EU partners.

The Evaluation Committee is of the opinion, that the Hungarian authorities should develop reliable and comparable statistics, in order to be able to follow the evaluation of cross-border cooperation and compare these findings with other Member States. It is felt that the compiling of statistics would at a strategic level help determine the threat assessment and assist in the prioritisation of resources. Such lack of information at the central level can lead to overlaps and even conflicts between different operations and agencies. In the longer term this can influence the threat assessments and the solutions that are defined in response to them.

Evaluation of Hungarian law enforcement statistics has started and is still ongoing. Working groups have recently been created, charged with the duty of examine and review the state of statistical systems in accordance with legal and structural reforms and to meet the EU requirements.

2. DATA PROTECTION

**Information on implementation of recommendations included in Report on Data Protection
(doc. 8400/1/06 SCHEVAL 64 COMIX 366 RESTREINT)**

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the legislation

It is recommended to clarify by the end of 2006 when the work of the Legal committee will be completed that the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection will not be reduced in future with respect to SIS and SIRENE, in comparison with its current prerogatives.

The legal strategy for implementing the SIS II has been elaborated by the legal Committee in April 2006. This strategy has been taken over by the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement after the Ministry of Interior has been merged into the Ministry of Justice.

The situation concerning SIS II has changed significantly, however, at EU level, when it was found out the SIS II will not be ready in 2007 at all. The possibility of applying SIS I temporarily made us to reconsider the strategy. We are ready to prepare our legislation adjusted to SIS I as soon as the decision is made in the EU in December. In this case the relevant part of the Schengen Implementation Convention shall be drafted into our legislation and shall be sent to the Parliament in the spring session of 2007.

By the time SIS II is implemented we shall adjust our legislation that way.

If SIS II remains the only solution, we shall carry on implementing the Legal Strategy on SIS II as provided by the new Community and EU legislation on SIS II as soon as they are adopted.

Whichever is the case the data protection commissioner remains our independent DPA, there have been no changes in this matter since the evaluation took place. In fact, upon your recommendation the commissioner and his office play an active role in our preparation regularly consulting and checking the Police (including SIRENE), Border Guard and the visa issuing authorities.

On the implementation

Experts recommend that the DPA takes a closer interest in the coming months in the preparation of data security in relation to SIS and SIRENE at the National police, especially now that Hungary has already established a SIRENE-bureau which will issue alerts for future use in SIS.

It is recommended that there shall be at the most appropriate time an inspection on site, at the latest before implementation of Schengen.

RESTREINT UE

In April the Data Protection Commissioner visited the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre (ILECC) of the Police where the SIRENE Bureau was also set up.

In July the Data Protection Commissioner met the Chief of Police in order to negotiate the cooperation during implementation of SIS II.

The colleagues working at the SIRENE Bureau and in the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner have met several times. The discussions focused on the elaboration of the Security Manual and the Data Protection Statutes. Furthermore the Hungarian translation of the SIRENE Manual has been checked from a data protection point of view.

The Data Protection Commissioner continuously takes part in the preparation for Schengen.

Hungary is invited to provide additional information on its plan to use WLAN's.

A Local Area Network (LAN) can generally be defined as a broadcast domain. Hubs, bridges or switches in the same physical segment or segments connect all end node devices. End nodes can communicate with each other without the need for a router. Communications with devices on other LAN segments requires the use of a router.

Virtual LANs (VLANs) can be viewed as a group of devices on different physical LAN segments which can communicate with each other as if they were all on the same physical LAN segment. VLAN will serve as an infrastructural background-system of the SIS national part.

The Police initiated to integrate IT related recommendations made by the evaluation committee during the visit in the development project of the national part of the SIS.

As a result, infrastructural equipments and network management software will be acquired in the frames of the Schengen Facility which will be closed in December 2006. As a result, Hungary will be able to meet the requirements.

The DPA should verify during an inspection that the SIS-testing takes place with dummy data.

On testing the system no real data will be used.

The DPA should be involved in the preparatory work at the MFA in relation with visa issuance.

Following the recommendations of the SCHEval team the Data Protection Ombudsman of the Republic of Hungary visited MFA to evaluate the respect of data protection rules during visa issuance at the Hungarian consulates. A visit by the ombudsman took place at the Hungarian Embassy in Kiev on May 29-30, another one at the Consulate General in Uzghorod and at its office in Beregovo on September 19-20. The next visit for Subotica and Belgrade is scheduled for October 24-25, 2006, and other visits to further Hungarian consulates will follow. The evaluation report prepared by the data protection ombudsman after his visit to Ukraine found that processing and protecting data during the visa process took place at all three visa issuing missions according to the relevant Hungarian legislation. The ombudsman made one remarkable recommendation concerning the deletion of data from the Visa Information System: it does not take place automatically after the time period for storing, as provided for by the relevant legal act, has expired. The MFA undertakes to initiate the modification of the visa issuing software taking into consideration the provisions of the new draft of the Aliens' Act. The ombudsman also recommended the insertion of a data protection panel into the training program of the MFA. The Ministry shall make the data protection part of the annual consular training as of next year.

On the functioning

Budgetary means should be adequate considering the fact that new tasks will befall on the DPA in the light of the Schengen implementation, i.e. a public awareness campaign, new inspections will be necessary, training of other public authorities.

Because of the new tasks in connection with the SIS II, the necessary financial resources have been entered in next year's budget proposal of the Office, and the Parliament will decide on the exact figures of next year's Act on Budget.

The DPA should consider providing specific information about the rights of subjects for turned down visa applicants.

Information concerning the accession of Hungary to the Schengen area and the supervisory role of the Data Protection Commissioner in SIS II can be obtained on the Hungarian version of the website of the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (www.obh.hu). Later on information will be available on the English version of the website too.

The Data Protection Commissioner is going to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to have the link of the Office on the website of the MFA on the page informing data subjects on Schengen requirements and on their rights.

On the consulates of the Republic of Hungary visa applicants will be informed concerning their rights both in writing and if necessary orally too.

3. LANDBORDERS

**Information on implementation of recommendations included in Report on Land Borders
(doc. 10470/1/06 REV 1 SCHEVAL 99 FRONT 118 COMIX 537 RESTREINT)**

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VISITED SITES

Page 77 point 2

International cooperation is wide and active, but cooperation with the neighbouring countries at regional level has different approaches. Tools like Common Contact Points, Focal Point Offices and other activities give proof of a cooperation based on border security. With Croatia this cooperation seems to be very fluent at the level of the BCPs and the exchange of information is regular. With Serbia and Montenegro the cooperation is also present and based on an action plan signed between both countries in 2006. With Romania the cooperation seems to be intense. Through the Common Contact Points established between both countries this cooperation is transformed into harmonisation of human and technical resources at both sides of the border what certainly may result in a positive impact in the quality of the border management. With Ukraine the cooperation is based on the concept of "Border Commissioners" who ensure the exchange of information between both countries at regional level.

RESTREINT UE

In this case, the cooperation could be enhanced by the periodical presence of Italian Border Guards to check the traffic of minibuses through Austria to Italy. The Záhoni Focal Point Office is, according to the Hungarian authorities, ready and willing to welcome Italian experts in the future.

Strengthening of local international cooperation is continuously on the agenda, however, the possibility and willingness of the border guard authority of the neighbouring country to implement the practical cooperation system is necessary.

There is daily contact with the Ukrainian border guard offices, however its efficiency can be further developed. This is guaranteed by the cooperation system renewed in 2002 by systematic border meetings and common trainings. In the previous period as a result of the enhanced control mechanism on detection of falsified documents related to guest workers in Italy there was a significant decrease in illegal activities (use of false and forged resident permits).

In order to implement cooperation with the Serbian border police an Action Plan was drawn up which was sent to the Serbian Party. Bilateral meetings (like local confidence-strengthening measures) were already implemented on the basis of this Action Plan.

Meetings held in the previous months or planned for the near future:

- Siófok, 19-22 June 2006: Serbian-Hungarian bilateral border conference where Serbian heads of local, regional and central offices were present.
- Kiskunhalas, 21 July 2006: meeting with the experts of the Serbian regional border police headquarters and heads of local offices concerned in border control. The aim of this meeting was to find the personal contact to them and the overview of possibilities of direct cooperation.
- 25-27 October 2006: as a continuation of the Siófok Border Police Conference held in July the Serbian Party invited its Hungarian partners to a bilateral seminar „Border control – EU standard” to be organised in Subotica (Szabadka). This meeting is supported by the EU as well.

Concerning the cooperation with Romania common activities are determined in common Action Plans since years. The Action Plan of 2006 includes detailed border management, aliens policing, criminal and deployment tasks and as well the operating of the statistical and information exchange system. System of meetings on cooperation is enhanced in order to implement Article 17 of the Schengen Borders Code.

Page 77 point 5

At Rösztke road BCP the premises are also brand new and constructed in a harmonised way with the new premises of the Serbian BCP. As the latter has not yet been opened, the traffic is canalised from the old Serbian BCP to the new Hungarian premises using the old road. This point is considered by the Committee as a risk area from the point of view of the security, due to the limited technical resources available for the surveillance.

The Committee recommends increasing the surveillance at this point until the moment the new motorway is opened.

The new Horgos highway border crossing point was opened on 1 August and the old road BCP was closed by the Serbian Party.

Since traffic is no more canalised between the two BCPs, under the management of the competent Border Guard Directorate introduction of the new control mechanism – aligning the change in the situation of the BCPs – on the territory between the border crossing point and the state border as well as the surroundings of the border crossing point is implemented (organisation of patrols, etc.).

Page 78 point 6

As regards rail traffic, certain shortcomings have been identified, in particular at some railway border crossing points (i.a Röske) where the officers do not have portable equipment for the detection of false or falsified documents and the number of mobile devices available for the consultation of the national databases is very low, resulting in a limited capacity to carry out thorough checks on third-country nationals in line with the Schengen standards. The Committee recommends increasing the availability of this material.

In the frames of the Schengen Facility acquisition of IT equipments – 74 pieces of mobile and stabile document readers – will arrive on 15 December 2006.

The main target – in the frames of this Procedure – is the acquisition of mobile computers which guarantee automatic verification of documents provided with biometric identifiers (and OCR data) during the railway checks.

Development of a software – running in these computers – able to collaborate in GPRS or Wireless data link with the Border Registration System (HERR) of the Border Guard is included in this Procedure as well.

The 74 kits individually include the license of the document reader-software, the case, the backlog accumulator and the network adapter.

As a requirement, by the invitation of the tender, we determined that time for checking a person cannot pass 20 seconds. The checks include takeover and reading the document, comparing the data with those included in the database and indicating the result.

External borders and within this category lines with heavy passenger traffic are preferable to be supported with these technical devices. These lines are the followings:

- Ukrainian border section: Záhony-Csop;
- Romanian border section: Biharkeresztes-Episcopia, Lőkősháza-Curtici;
- Serbian border section: Kelebia-Subotica;
- Croatian border section: Gyékényes-Koprivnica, Murakeresztur-Kotoriba.

The following technical equipments will as well be purchased for the Border Guard from the Schengen Facility some of which will be used to provide Röske railway border crossing point to required extent:

- passport and document reader 21 pc
- table UV 366 pc
- manual UV 482 pc
- portable document reader 207 pc
- retroviewer 111 pc
- comparing microscope 38 pc
- different manual magnifiers 805 pc
- table magnifier 80 pc
- stereomicroscope 22 pc

- planned: portable document reader 100 pc

Page 78 point 7

At Tompa road and Kelebia railway BCP (both at the railway station and in the area situated between the border and the station itself), the surveillance systems available, are very limited.

The Border Guard receives the international train and secures it from the arrival to the departure. Besides securing it, the Border Guard searches the train and checks the passengers. Because of inland train services, the station can not be fenced. During the arrival of an international train, the platform and the train are treated as border area. Before, during and after the arrival of trains, patrols check the railway station. With this method the Border Guard excludes the possibility of avoiding border control and the arrival area can be kept under control.

Moreover, at present the competent Border Guard Directorate and the Hungarian State Railway estimates the possibility, feasibility and costs of a video surveillance system at the station till February 2007.

Page 78 point 8.

The Committee could see that at the borders with Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, (Letenye and Kelebia) Croatian identity cards are accepted as travel documents. This practice means that travel documents cannot be stamped and it is not possible the verification of the period of stay. In addition, in most of the BCPs visited (road and railway border crossing points), border checks on third-country nationals were not carried out fully in line with the Schengen standards, as third-country nationals were not questioned systematically about the purpose of their trip or the means of subsistence, and the technical equipment for the detection of false documents seemed not to be used as a routine.

With regard to the means of subsistence, in particular, the Committee could verify that they are not checked in accordance with the amounts foreseen for the State(s) of destination. In one BCP, (Ártánd) a third-country national with an expired passport was not refused entry. Those practices are not in line with the provisions laid down in the Schengen Borders Code.

Therefore the Committee recommends modifying the control procedures, aligning them with the provisions laid down in the Community legislation.

On the basis of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the abolishment of visas, Croatian as well as Hungarian identity cards are accepted as travel documents. The SchEval team reflected on the present practice. Hungary has started to study what steps are necessary to meet the recommendation of the SchEval team. Finding a solution requires a high level political decision, as the excellent Hungarian-Croatian good-neighbourly relations also have to be taken into account. Following the bilateral discussions with the Croatian partner that is scheduled to 29 November 2006, the MFA will prepare a proposal for the government on this issue. The Council will be informed without delay concerning the results.

The acquisition of technical equipments is ongoing and training on the use of these new equipments is provided continuously. Though it takes a bit of time till the staff becomes experienced, preparedness and efficiency of their work are shown by the statistics which include high numbers of detected false and falsified documents.

Questioning of third country nationals and stamping of their travel documents is regulated by the Schengen Borders Code. The central, regional and local staff was instructed to implement border check including systematic questioning according to the EU Regulation. Regional bodies are continuously checking the implementation of this obligation.

Page 79 point 10

The Committee could verify that the security code of the entry/exit stamps are not modified on a monthly basis, as set out in the SBC, and that documents of third-country nationals having a residence permit issued by Hungary or by a Schengen State are not stamped (Csenger and Beregsurány). The Committee recommends modifying the security codes every month and apply the stamping procedures as mentioned in the Community legislation.

Monthly change of security codes on entry and exit stamps is implemented since July 2006.

Page 80 point 12

Visas are cancelled by means of a stamp affixed to the visa sticker, but none of the security features (i.a. optically variable feature, latent image) are destroyed as foreseen in the Schengen Borders Code. These elements should be destroyed in order to prevent any later misuse.

Since 13 October 2006, the entry into force of the Schengen Borders Code, the Border Guard destroys security features of cancelled visas according to its Annex V. Part A 1.(c).

Page 80 point 13

In some of the road BCPs visited border checks were carried out by one officer in each lane. In some cases, the staff available to carry out border checks seemed to be adequate to the traffic flow observed during the inspection. However, when possible these checks should be carried out by two officers, and specially in peak seasons, where the traffic flow increases considerably. The committee recommends increasing the number of officers deployed at the BCPs (i.a. Letenye, Tompa, Rösztke, Artand) and ensure that document experts and experts on stolen vehicles are present in every shift. With regard to Kelebia and Biharkeresztes railway BCPs, the number of officers should also be increased, in particular in summer season, to ensure that all third-country nationals are subject to thorough checks while the train is stopped at the station.

In the frames of the Schengen Facility, between 9-13 October 2006, 20 persons were trained to document experts in Sopron Training Centre.

9 document examiner courses started from October this year, which last two weeks and 20-20 border guards take part on every course.

This staff is on duty at the border crossing points in order to ensure that document experts are present in every shift.

Concerning vehicle identification courses, in 2005 38 persons were, in 2006 200 persons are and in 2007 80 persons will be trained to vehicle experts. 90 % of this staff is and will be on duty at the border policing offices and by the criminal bodies in order to ensure that experts on stolen vehicles are present in every shift.

The aim of the training is that – in order to being able to detect stolen vehicles – the staff becomes familiar with the main points necessary to identify the vehicle, frequent methods of changing the specific identifiers, basic regulations for certification of authenticity and valid vehicle documents.

Page 81 point 15

Border guards are professional and trained in accordance with the national training programmes. The Committee acknowledges the fact that many training activities are underway and that further training will be provided in the coming months. The Committee however considers that there is room for improvement with regard to training on languages (specially from the neighbouring countries), detection of false documents, the use of the technical equipment available at first line, and the detection of stolen vehicles. Routines for the use of these tools should be put in place at all BCPs.

In the frames of the Schengen Facility language training is provided since September 2006. On central level 102 persons in 16 courses, on regional level (Border Guard Directorates) 768 persons in 72 courses will be trained. Main languages are English and German.

The Border Guard Directorates at the external borders organise language trainings at local level in the languages of the neighbouring countries (Ukrainian, Romanian and Serbian), however, it can be stated, that a significant proportion of local population and staff of the neighbouring countries speaks Hungarian.

In order to assess and ensure continuous utility of the language the Training Departments of the Border Guard perform periodical tests on the level of language knowledge of the staff. According to the proved performance levels further language courses are performed in order to maintain and complete language knowledge. At these courses terminology related to official tasks is emphasised.

The trainings of the designated staff relating to the detection of false documents and stolen vehicles see answer given to recommendation Page 80 point 13 as well.

Page 81 point 16

The Committee noted the fact that a high number of visas were cancelled at both Beregsurany and Záhony BCPs, mainly due to the existence of entry bans and forged documents. The Committee invites the Hungarian authorities to carefully analyse this question and to reconsider the effectiveness of visa issuance procedures at the consulates located near the Ukrainian border.

Upon signs indicating small scale differences between the entry ban lists used by the visa issuing missions and the Border Guard, the MFA, the Office for Immigration and Nationality and the Central Data Handling and Registry Office (CDHRO) coordinated their efforts to detect the reason for this difference. The problem could be identified: there have been small scale losses of data due to communication problems between the system of the MFA and the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) while updating the entry ban list of the visa issuing consulates. Some updates have thus not been transferred to the Consular Information System. The parties concerned have been active to solve the problem and the recommendation of the SchEval team gave a new impulse to this work. The parties agreed in early October to put the entry ban list check on a fundamentally new basis: all visa applications will be sent to the OIN before the issuance of the visa, the OIN will perform the check in the database managed by the CDHRO and send a reply with the next replication to the visa issuing consulate. (The database of the CDHRO is the one that is used by the Border Guard. The Border Guard has access to this system through the OIN.) Besides this, the local check of the entry ban list will remain as a way of orienting the decision making consul until s/he gets an official answer from the central authority. The CDHRO will update the entry ban list on a weekly basis providing the actual full list to the visa issuing consulates. The change for the new way of updating the full entry ban list on a weekly basis will take place no later than the end of 2006.

Moreover, some of the visa applicants entered in the banned persons lists obtain new passports with slightly adjusted names, thus there is no hit. However, many of these persons are recognised by the border guards, who cancel the visa.

Page 81 point 19

Thanks to the impressive human resources, tactics at the green border are very satisfactory. Surveillance is organised in 3 lines. Surveillance at the border in 1st line by human and technical means; surveillance and control in 2nd line in the border zone area by regular patrols and the Mobile Units (4 km inland) and more in-depth controls in 3rd line by the mobile forces of the Border Guard. The close cooperation at the green borders with the neighbouring countries is satisfactory; the cooperation with Serbia can be improved but is not always in hands of the Hungarian authorities.

See answer given to recommendation Page 77 point 2 as well.

Government decree No. 2115/2005 gave authorisation for the conclusion of the Hungarian-Serbian **border traffic agreement**. We have invited the Serbian Party to Budapest for expert level talks on several occasions. Unfortunately, negotiations have not started yet because talks were called off by the Serbian Party (presumably due to the transformation of Serbia and Montenegro into independent states). We hope that Serbia's aspiration to become an EU member state will serve as sufficiently strong motivation to enter into proper contractual relationship with its neighbours.

Government decree No. 2153/2003. (VII. 17.) gave authorisation for the conclusion of the Convention **on the order of the common border and on the prevention, investigation and dispose of border violations**. The Hungarian draft has been transmitted to the Serbian Party via diplomatic channels but Serbia did not provide any reply despite repeatedly having been urged by us.

Decree No. 10/2005. (XI. 25.) of the Prime Minister gave authorisation for the conclusion of the Treaty – to be entered into by the Republic of Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro – **on designating the common border, ensuring its visibility and on the renovation and maintenance of the border signs**. The second round of expert level talks took place on 22-23 May 2006, the next round of talks is under negotiation.

The Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Romania and the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro signed the Agreement on the intersection of the state borders, on the triple border sign designating the border and on its maintenance on 19 April 2006 in Novi Sad (Újvidék).

Page 82 point 23

The availability and permanency of technical resources is less satisfactory because of some malfunctioning, partly outdated material and very costly maintenance. The Hungarian Border Guard considers permanent air support as unnecessary.

In order to replace outdated and high cost equipments more than 700 vehicles are under acquisition in the frames of the modernisation process.

In order to increase the investigation capability development of stabile heat-sensing cameras is ongoing and they will be provided with day-cameras and laser distant measuring equipments. Emphasised is the modernisation of the night vision devices; 860 equipments are under acquisition. These new devices will be more efficient, less failure possibilities and they will be cheaper to maintain.

9. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

Page 83 point 3

The National strategy for border security in Hungary is comprehensive and covers many aspects of the Schengen 4-tier model. The basic idea follows the Schengen approach including activities abroad, good cooperation with transit and neighbouring countries, border management and close cooperation with national law enforcement authorities. This strategy covers necessary actions for the full implementation of the Schengen system till the full Schengen membership and for the following period. The border control and surveillance strategy is part of the broader Border Guard Strategy as developed in the "Strategy of the Border Guard until full accession to the Schengen Convention and for the period immediately following accession". The implementation, however, may have some problems at practical level as the coordination with the consulates seems not to be fully effective, resulting in the cancellation of many visas at the border. The activities in third countries can be improved.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Headquarters of the Border Guard have agreed on a closer, daily cooperation and on a more operative participation of the Border Guard in document training of the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the consulates. The agreement that provides the basis for this cooperation has been prepared, the signing and entry into force of the agreement is envisaged to take place before the end of 2006. According to the agreement:

- contact persons shall be designated at the National Headquarters of the Border Guard, as well as the MFA and the Hungarian missions in the Ukraine and Serbia
- the Border Guard shall directly inform the Hungarian missions in the Ukraine and Serbia and with the mediation of the MFA as regards citizens of other third states on persons, holders of Hungarian visas, whose admission to Hungary was denied
- the foreign missions shall inform the Border Guard on phenomena diverging from the routine, they take notice of during visa issuance, that is supposed to have an effect on the work of the Border Guard
- the Border Guard undertakes at the request of the MFA to send document experts to Hungarian visa issuing missions
- the Border Guard shall inform the MFA, and the latter the visa issuing missions, on new methods of falsifying travel documents and visas.

We are aware of the fact that it would be necessary to deploy liaison officers to the Western-Balkans area and to Ukraine and Russia in order to enhance activities in third countries. Until the financial resources allow the deployment of such liaison officers, the Border Guard contacts liaison officers seconded by partner authorities and the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.

Page 85 point 11

In general border checks are not always carried out fully in line with the Schengen standards. Thorough checks on third-country nationals are not always performed as set out in the Schengen Borders Code. The stamping procedures, the regular modification of the security codes, the inspection of the travel documents to verify their authenticity as well as the destruction of security features when visas are to be cancelled are procedures that should be modified in line with the Community legislation.

See answer given to recommendation page 78 point 8, page 79 point 10, page 80 point 12.

Page 85 point 12

The procedures for border checks on rail traffic should also be revised, in particular by increasing the necessary technical devices, to ensure that all passengers and trains undergo the border checks in line with Schengen standards.

See answer given to recommendation page 78 point 6.

Page 86 point 15

With one exception, (Croatia) border surveillance is not sufficiently and practically implemented on international level in close cooperation with the relevant neighbouring states. This might, however, not always be the full responsibility of the Hungarian authorities.

See answer given to recommendation page 77 point 2.

Page 86 point 16

Border surveillance is carried out using stationary and mobile units, patrolling at places known to be sensitive, supported by technical and electronic means. The operational human resources are in place and up to the job. The technical resources, however, are so far not on the level of the strategic purposes and the possible risks and threats, and should be enhanced. The strategy of protecting the external borders suffers from a lack of sophisticated equipment and maintenance of the existing equipment. The car park is very impressive but exceedingly consuming.

The Committee suggests rationalising the mobile resources and bringing them to a level of utility in accordance with the objectives of the Border Guard strategy. The sophisticated technical resources could be improved, specifically by increasing the use of fixed surveillance systems in combination with mobile units and the replacement of outdated material.

See answer given to recommendation page 82 point 23.

4. AIRBORDERS

Information on implementation of recommendations included in Report on Air Borders

(doc. 12711/06 SCHEVAL 130 FRONT 171 COMIX 740 RESTREINT)

4. BUDAPEST FERIHEGY INTERNATIONAL AIRRPORT

Page 48 Point 4.7.

The weekly and monthly risk-analysis reports and case studies should be provided systematically to border guards at local level.

Weekly and monthly risk analysis reports, case studies prepared by the National Headquarters of the Border Guard, the Border Guard Directorates and of course the Budapest Border Guard Directorate are forwarded through the Risk Analysis Subdivision of the Budapest Border Guard Directorate and the professional management units to the heads of the local bodies. Heads of local bodies process these assessments and studies at the training days for managers and daily briefings for the executive staff.

RESTREINT UE

Border guards at local level, passport controllers are using the results of risk analysis as follows: The main reasons of preparing „Case overviews” are to widen knowledge and sensibility for suspicions of the staff. Case overview means that a case or implemented measure is analysed and forwarded to local level. This analysis is to be read by the passport controller or patrol before entering into service. This way they get an overview on the events of other BPO's, other border sections and as well become familiar with the changes in the tendencies, the characteristics and changes of the perpetrator groups and their methods, itinerary; to which passenger categories and what suspicious circumstances should they pay intensified attention and what procedure or activity is necessary in order to perform work in the most efficient way.

On the other hand, passport controllers perform almost continuous tactical risk analysis during their work in order to select suspicious persons and detect illegal activities. In this procedure they assess the coincidence with the created perpetrator's profile on which basis they decide to which risk category the person or object in question belongs and what measure or activity is necessary.

Although there is language training, language skills were found by the Committee to be inadequate for the anticipated traffic via the airport and should be improved.

At the Budapest Border Guard Directorate language trainings are provided mainly for the executive staff in English, German and French. These language courses always end up with accredited basic language exams. At present 50% of the executive staff have basic language exam. On the basis of this actual training system proportion of staff having language knowledge is expected to grow by 10% yearly.

In order to assess and ensure continuous utility of the language the Training Departments of the Border Guard perform periodical tests on the level of language knowledge of the staff. According to the proved performance levels language courses are performed in order to maintain and complete language knowledge. At these courses terminology related to official tasks is emphasised.

The glass protection of the booths at Terminal Ferihegy-2 should be made in such a way that passengers cannot look at the border guard's screen.

Glass protection of the booths at the Budapest Ferihegy International Airport is the competence of the Budapest Airport Zrt. which is the operator of the Airport. The work will be completed in November 2006.

At terminal Ferihegy-2, Intranet documentation should be updated and IT network should be upgraded to provide faster data flow.

Use of Intranet do not slow down the implementation of border checks, it does not have influence on speed of queries from the data bases. Reason for slowing of Intranet data flow can be caused by the phenomena that parallel more passport controllers ask for data from the server handling the program and so network bandwidth is loaded. Development of the system is continuous.

Full floor-to-ceiling separation according to the Schengen catalogue should be put in place between all future Schengen and non-Schengen areas, especially above the booths.

Building of the partition at the Budapest Ferihegy International Airport is the competence of the Budapest Airport Zrt. which is the operator of the Airport. Plans for the construction is ready and according to the recommendation of the SchEval team full floor-to-ceiling separation will be put in place above the booths as well, upon decision on full Schengen membership.

The Committee wishes to recall that EU citizens are allowed to enter simply upon presentation of their passport or identity card unless there is justified reason to believe that they are a danger to public order and security. Questions on their financial means and on the purpose of their stay should therefore not be asked, unless for justified reasons.

In the previous times suspicion on abuse of EU identity cards arose in more cases and that is why the officer might be asking for a supplementary document. However, we are aware of the relevant regulations and so it can be stated that this case is not the normal practice of the Border Guard.

5. DEBRECEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Page 59 Point 5.7.

The place for queuing in front of the non-Schengen control booth at departures seems too small if bigger planes are to be used for passenger traffic.

Passengers arrive to the departure side intermittent, and not together like to the arrival side. This intermittent arrival of passengers and the three booths placed at the departure side guarantees the procedure of border checks without any difficulties. At the departure side separate waiting rooms and checking points (three-three booths) are operating for intra-Schengen and extra-Schengen passengers which as well serve for sharing the checking in case of a mass. When preparing the conceptual design, the Border Guard consulted with the constructor and it can be stated that plans fulfil the requirements necessary for secure border checks.

The Committee requests that the size of the booths be assessed to take account of the amount and size of the equipment to be mounted in the booths.

By the constructing of the booths physical limits and the possible maximum capacity of admission of passengers was taken into account. There is no standard on the size of the booths however, moving of passengers and their comfortable service, the security and adequate work conditions of passport controllers was taken into account as well. During the planning phase the representative of the Border Guard was always present and so demands of the Border Guard were prevailed. In the course of technical developments the Border Guard aims the acquisition of technical equipments of smaller size but modern and up to date (TFT, LCD monitors).

Although there is language training, the Committee found the language skills of the personnel to be inadequate for the anticipated traffic via the airport. The Committee calls for the implementation of additional measures to improve the knowledge of languages, especially English.

Some border guards at the Debrecen Airport already have basic English knowledge and 12 persons will start their basic English language course on 12 February 2007. This training will be organised at the Border Policing Office, especially for the executive staff.

6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

Page 60 point 1

Border management strategy in Hungary is comprehensive and based on the integrated border security model. Corresponding national legislation seems to comply with the Schengen acquis and provides the necessary legislative basis for border management. However the Committee noted that Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data has not yet been implemented in national legislation. Having assessed the progress of preparation work for implementation of the Directive, the Committee has doubts about the possibility of timely implementation of the Directive.

Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data will be fully implemented with the new amendment of the Act on Entry and Stay of Foreigners, which includes as well the amendment of the Act on Air Transport and the Act on Protecting the Borders and the Border Guard. The draft is at present under coordination and it is planned to enter into force on 1 January 2007.

Page 60 point 4

The Committee found the professionalism and attitude toward the duties of the border police personnel to be of a high level. The system of basic training is regarded by the Committee as well organised and efficient. However, attention should be paid to language training for personnel. Regular special training should be provided to the document experts.

In the frames of the Schengen Facility, between 9-13 October 2006, 20 persons were trained to document experts in Sopron Training Centre.

9 document examiner courses started from October this year, which last two weeks and 20-20 border guards take part on every course. This staff is on duty at the border crossing points.

See as well answer given to recommendation page 48 point 4.7. (language training)

Page 60 point 5

The Committee is of the opinion that existing infrastructure for border checks at Budapest Ferihegy International Airport meet Schengen requirements (except for the separation above the booths). It is ready to separate passengers on Schengen and non-Schengen flights within 48 hours. As for the new terminal at Debrecen International Airport, the Republic of Hungary is invited to inform the Schengen Evaluation Working Party about completion of construction works. The follow-up mission to Debrecen Airport could be considered before October 2007.

Construction works are completed at Debrecen airport, and the new terminal started to operate on 8 September 2006¹.

Page 61 point 6

The Hungarian authorities are well aware of the situation at the borders. The Committee found the risk-analysis system of the Hungarian Border Guard as an exemplary risk-analysis model for border management. However, there is room for improvement in the regular distribution of analysed information to local level for use in border control at the level of the DPO, the shifts and by individual Border Guards performing border checks.

¹ See Annex.

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Public analysis prepared by the Department of Analysis and Assessment are to be found on the Intranet website of the Border Guard. Moreover, the Border Guard prepared the first version of its internal regulation on risk analysis which determines the methods, possibilities and procedures of the assessments at central, regional and local level. The regulation as well disposes about the regular distribution and efficient use of analysed information. The final version of the internal regulation will be prepared till the end of the year.

See as well answer given to recommendation page 48 point 4.7. (risk analysis)

Page 61 point 9

The Committee requests that the security codes of entry and exit stamps be changed on a monthly basis even before entry into force of the SBC. In addition, it should be ensured that the security features of the stamps comply with the respective specifications (Com-ex (94) 16rev).

Monthly change of security codes on entry and exit stamps is implemented since July 2006.

Technical specification was designed according to the remarks of the evaluation committee. Acquisition will be implemented in two phases: the metal body; the metallic plate and the date array. They are aligned to the Schengen requirements.

5. VISA (KIEV, BELGRADE)

Comments of the MFA on the remarks of the SchEval team in its Kiev and Belgrade report (in addition to the comments set out in footnotes in the reports and in the Annex to the Kiev report)

K I E V:

3. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS

Page 7 point 1

EvalCom recalls the importance of the basic rule of personal appearance (set out in the CCI, Part III, section 4 and Part V, 3rd paragraph) and recommends caution when exemptions from this rule are introduced.

According to the Hungarian Visa Manual personal appearance is a basic rule during the process of visa application. In addition to that, after having received the report, the MFA summarized the rules in a circular telegram to call the attention of the consuls to the followings: applications with a power of attorney can be accepted only in exceptional, sufficiently substantiated cases; although major family members are allowed to submit visa applications on behalf of other family members, however it does not mean that the family members are ab ovo exempted from the basic rule of personal appearance. Eventual amending of the Visa Manual is being considered to specify the relevant rules.

Page 9 point 5

When applying the Schengen acquis in full, Hungary should be aware of the rules applying when other Member States do not recognise a given travel document (i.e. issuance of LTV visas).

A separate chapter is dedicated to the recognized and non-recognized travel documents in the Visa Manual and it is going to be an issue to be extensively dealt with at the trainings the MFA regularly organizes for expatriate consular staff members.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXAMINATION OF APPLICATIONS

Page 12 point 1

EvalCom strongly recommends that sufficient attention is paid to the signature on the application form.

The relevant regulation of the Visa Manual strictly underlines the importance of the signature on the application form. In addition to that the MFA has once again called the attention of visa issuing consulates to this issue in a circular instruction.

Page 13 point 3

EvalCom noted that the internal Ukrainian passport, which is a very useful document to verify the situation of an applicant, is not required by the consulate.

A consular instruction has been issued for the concerned Hungarian visa issuing missions in Ukraine to call the attention of the consuls to the necessity of checking the internal Ukrainian passport in case the circumstances of the visa application, i.e. the supporting documents or the intentions of the applicant are doubtful.

Page 14 point 3.3

It is recalled that the proof of being in possession of TMI will have to be verified by the consulate during the processing of the visa application once Hungary will apply the Schengen acquis in full. The TMI will have to be in conformity with the CCI requirements.

A separate chapter is dedicated to the necessity of travel medical insurance in the Visa Manual. After the latest guidelines on TMI had been accepted the MFA informed all the visa issuing consulates on this subject. Moreover it is a main subject at the trainings the MFA regularly organizes for expatriate consular staff members.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VISA STICKER

Page 16 point 2

Attention should be made not to stamp the MRZ of the sticker and to affix the sticker close to the edge of the passport in order to allow for machine reading.

All Hungarian consulates have been informed of the outstanding remarks concerning visa stickers. Among other things consulates anew have been instructed to take good care of stamping so that the stamp would not cover the MRZ zone and that the visa sticker would align with the edge of the passport.

7. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFUSAL

Page 16 point 2

Compared to the average of all Member States, the refusal rate is extremely low.

Hungary is aware of the increased migration risk it will be exposed to once she will have started to fully implement the Schengen acquis. The Hungarian policy aims at preparing both the consulates and the applicants to a gradual strengthening of the visa regime so that Hungary's entry into the Schengen zone would not necessitate a quick change in practices either for our own consular staff or the third country nationals.

The attention of visa issuing consulates - especially in neighbouring countries - has been called by way of a consular instruction to increase the number of in-depth interviews, to more thoroughly examine the visa applications and supporting documents and it has been stressed anew to refuse applications if there is a doubt as to the good faith of the applicant, the authenticity of the supporting documents or information provided. In case of lack of supporting documents the application is to be taken over and the applicant shall be requested to supply the missing documents within a set period of time.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY

Page 19 point 1.3

It is recommended that all local staff members are included in the staff rotation scheme.

Once a bank transfer system will have been introduced at the Hungarian Embassy in Kiev all staff members – including the one who at the moment deals with the collection of the handling fee - will participate in the staff rotation scheme.

BELGRADE:

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS

Page 10

Despite the main rule that applicants must appear in person, a large number of applicants (travel agencies and family members/minors) seem to be systematically exempted from this requirement; this is not in line with the general rule that each applicant should appear in person, as laid down in the CCI ch. III.4 and the Best Practices.

See answer given to recommendation page 7 point 1 in Kiev report.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCESSING THE APPLICATION

Page 14 point 5

Evalcom considered the number of applicants being interviewed low in relation to the relatively large total number of applications submitted.

Having drawn the conclusions from the report the Consular Department of the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade makes every effort to increase the number of in-depth interviews thus trying to minimize the risk of illegal immigration and other forms of misuse of visas. The head of the Consular Section has instructed the consuls to perform more interviews and the number of conducted in-depth interviews has been registered.

Evalcom recommends that only accredited travel agencies should be allowed to submit applications.

A consular instruction has been issued to all Hungarian visa issuing consulates to call the attention of the consular staff to the fact that all travel agencies that are allowed to submit applications should be accredited.

Family members of EU nationals should be exempted from the requirement of having TMI in accordance with the provisions of Council Directive 2004/38/EC.

A separate chapter is dedicated to the special status of the family members of EEA citizens in the Visa Manual. Nevertheless, in addition to that, the MFA once again summarized the rules in a circular telegram to call the attentions of the consuls to this issue.

According to the Acquis, family members of EU citizens should be able to apply for a visa at any Hungarian consulate.

The Visa Manual will shortly be modified accordingly.

The new building



RESTREINT UE

Check-in desks



Area in front of the booth



RESTREINT UE

Main building of the Airport



Schengen internal arrival side



Schengen Internal arrival – Gate 1



Schengen Internal arrival – Gate 2



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Schengen Internal arrival side– rolling luggage



Schengen Internal departure side



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Schengen Internal transit area



Schengen External arrival side



RESTREINT UE

Schengen External arrival side– rolling luggage



Schengen External departure side



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Schengen External departure side – transit area



Service entrance and exit



Informative pictograms



Transit booth



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Area for security checks



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Entrance and exit for passengers



Waiting hall

