



Council of the  
European Union

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#### **PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION**

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of document:	12300/02 DWN 1 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
dated:	11 September 2018
new status:	Public
Subject:	Summary of the terrorist threat in Europe

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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



Council of the  
European Union

ANNEX

Brussels, 11 September 2018  
(OR. en)

12300/02  
DWN 1

RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

ENFOPOL 120

### **DOWNGRADING**

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of document:	ST12300/02 CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL
dated:	25 September 2002
new status:	RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
Subject:	Summary of the terrorist threat in Europe

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Delegations will find attached the downgraded version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 25 September 2002**

**12300/02**

**CONFIDENTIEL UE**

**ENFOPOL 120**

**NOTE**

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from : the Presidency  
to : the Working Party on Terrorism  
Subject : Summary of the terrorist threat in Europe

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Pursuant to the procedure set out in document 14598/01 ENFOPOL 142 the Danish Presidency has prepared a summary of the terrorist threat in Europe. The summary is based on contributions from Member States.

According to document 14598/01 ENFOPOL 142 the summary will be completed by an assessment of the terrorist threat prepared by Europol.

After approval in the Working Party of Terrorism the summary will be forwarded to the CATS/COREPER/Council.

## **SUMMARY OF THE TERRORIST THREAT IN EUROPE**

### **KEY POINTS**

The response to 11 September in Afghanistan and elsewhere materially weakened Al Qaida core structures, but did not destroy Al Qaida or remove its capacity to mount terrorist attacks. Recent events in the Middle East are likely to attract further individuals to terrorism, and linkage to the Palestinian cause may be developed and further extend the acceptance of UBL's aims and methods among sympathising loose networks. Further attacks against 'Western', especially US, Israeli and Coalition allies interests, are therefore probable and may occur anywhere, including Europe.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

## **I. Threat represented by indigenous terrorist groups**

### **A. Basque terrorism**

Between March and August this year, ETA has perpetrated 13 terrorist actions which have resulted in 3 dead and more than 50 persons wounded to a different extent, most of them as a result of the explosion of a car bomb in Madrid on 1 May 2002 and another one in Santa Pola on 4 August 2002.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

### **B. Northern Irish Terrorism**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

### **C. Corsican terrorism/separatism**

The elected members of the Corsica Nazione declared on 22 July 2002 a message of non-confidence in the French Governments policy towards Corsica, especially since the Government did not want to continue the "Matignon-process" towards more self-rule for Corsica.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

#### **D. Extreme right and left wing terrorism/activities**

In **Greece** authorities had a major breakthrough in the investigation of the Greek terrorist group Revolutionary Organization 17 November, which has carried out 23 assassinations over the past 27 years.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

In **Italy** left wing extremists have taken responsibility for numerous attacks using explosive and incendiary devices and most notably for the assassination of Marco Biagi, a Labour Ministry adviser, who was killed in Bologna on 19 March 2002. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

## **II. Threat represented by foreign terrorist groups**

### **A. Islamic extremist terrorism**

The risk of attack by Islamic extreme terrorists in EU Member States is still high in some parts of the Union. The strong reaction after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks – most notably the campaign in Afghanistan, but also measures taken by legislative bodies, law enforcement agencies, intelligence and security services and judicial authorities in Europe and elsewhere – has materially weakened, but not destroyed core Al Qaida structures. Coalition action in Afghanistan has deprived Usama Bin Laden and his supporters of their most important base for training, planning and recruitment and caused the capture of many members or supporters, but the capacity to plan and mount further terrorist attacks still exists.

Defeat in Afghanistan resulted in the relocation of Al Qaida-related individuals in Pakistan and possibly Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The more global threat from pro-UBL networks may lead to more autonomous activities from these groups. Furthermore the campaign in Afghanistan and recent events in the Middle East are likely to attract further individuals to terrorism.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

14 German citizens were killed in a terrorist attack on a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia on 11 April 2002.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

In **Greece** there are no indications that Al Qaida are planning the commission of terrorist attacks, but the network is assessed to remain operational and capable of carrying out unexpected terrorist acts.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

There are no indications that Islamic extremists in **Sweden** plan the commission of terrorist attacks in Sweden or against Swedish interests.

The threat of the commission of terrorist attacks against **Austrian, Finnish** or **Irish** interests is assessed as low

## **B. Other foreign groups**

Kurdistan Workers Party – the PKK – changed its name to KADEK at the congress in Brussels in April 2002. The accession of the PKK to the EU list of terrorist organisation increased the number of protest actions across Europe, which gave party leadership possibilities to test mobilisation capabilities. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

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