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#### NOTE

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#### ALGERIA

##### 1. GENERAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

Since 2000, there have been a large number of seizures of **cannabis resin** in Algeria.

The official statistics, provided by the National Anti-Drugs and Drug Addiction Office at the Algerian Ministry of Justice, confirm that during the first seven months of 2018 there was a **40 % drop** in the quantity of cannabis resin seized by the Algerian security forces (the GN and DGSN) and customs officials in comparison with the same period of the previous year. These statistical data can do no more than confirm trends, since it is impossible to compare them with the statistics of every one of the security forces involved in the fight against drug trafficking, but it should be borne in mind that they only include seizures which have given rise to judicial proceedings, and therefore will always be lower than the real figures.

During the reference period, **20 272.430 kg** of cannabis resin was seized, **66.12 %** of which was seized in the **west of the country**. The region with the highest level of drug seizures was the **wilaya of Tlemcen**, which is in north-western Algeria on the border with Morocco, the world's biggest cannabis producer. The region with the next-highest level of seizures is the south of Algeria (26.24 %), where surveillance is much more complicated.

The **Tlemcen route** is the favoured one for bringing drugs into Algeria, although the border remains closed and security there has been strengthened by the Algerian authorities in response to the rise in drug trafficking in that part of the country. Within Algeria, the roads linking **Ghardaïa** with **Ouargla** and Ouargla with **El-Oued** have been seeing a rise in seizures of large quantities of cannabis resin in transit.

The **routes identified** in Algeria by the enforcement authorities involved in fighting the drugs trade run from the west of the country to the borders with Tunisia and Libya.

After cannabis, **psychotropic drugs** form the second largest group by volume of seizures, **up by 25.88 %** compared with the reference period of 2017. By region, the south (31.31 %) and centre (27.83 %) are the most affected. The traffickers move the drugs through the countries of the Sahel, across the country's southern borders, and then onwards to their destination in Europe. The largest seizures take place in the south of Algeria, mainly in Tamanrasset, Adrar and Ghardaïa, although there are also regular seizures in the airports, mainly in connection with flights from France. Of particular concern is the availability of a wide range of pills such as Temesta, Rivotril, Diazepam, Artane, Roxil and, in particular, Sobutex, which causes irreversible damage to both physical and mental health.

Seizures of **cocaine increased** sharply in 2018 in comparison to 2017, mainly as a result of the operation carried out by the coastguard in Oran in May. The amount of **cocaine seized rose by 23 380.30 % (670.179 kg)**, while the amount of **heroin seized fell by 86.07 % (0.131 kg)**.

It is estimated that there are over **300 000 drug addicts in Algeria<sup>1</sup>**, and the number is growing each year. It is therefore becoming increasingly common for some of the drugs entering the country to be destined for domestic consumption.

## **2. STRATEGY AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING**

### **2.1. Institutional framework**

The Algerian authorities have strengthened their mechanisms for combating drug trafficking and smuggling in general by means of the existing legislation. They continue to emphasise the close link between drug-trafficking networks and terrorism in the region and that the former is one of the main sources of funding for the latter; terrorism, arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption and smuggling are all closely connected. At the same time, Algeria appears to be a **transit** zone for sending drugs to the **Middle East and Europe**, though in recent years the number of people consuming drugs in Algeria has risen and there are criminal networks and routes supplying drugs for the country's internal market.

Algeria is part of the MedNET Euro-Mediterranean cooperation network (Pompidou Group, Council of Europe), which was set up in 2006 with the aim of developing north-south cooperation plans and activities in order to combat drugs. Other members include France, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia.

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<sup>1</sup> On 12 March 2017, the newspaper L'Expression reported that according to the President of the National Foundation for the Promotion of Health and the Development of Research (FOREM), Mustapha Khiati, in 2016 the number of drug addicts (regular users) recorded in Algeria reached 600 000; the number of occasional users may, however, be three times as high.

In this respect, the **complexity of the Algerian institutions** involved in combating drugs must be taken into account. On the one hand, control of the borders (border wilayas) is handled mainly by the units of the ANP, including the gendarmerie and its border guard, which are all part of the Ministry of National Defence, as well as the customs service under the Algerian Finance Ministry. Most of the organised crime and smuggling activities affecting Algeria originate in these extensive border areas. In the country's interior, operations are primarily handled by the DGSN and GN through their judicial police units.

## **2.2. Changes in the legal/legislative framework, including money laundering and chemical precursors**

The following laws are in force in Algeria:

- Law No 04-18 of 25 December 2004 on the prevention and suppression of the consumption and unlawful trafficking of drugs.
- Law No 05-01 of 6 February 2005 on the prevention and combating of money laundering and of the funding of terrorism. Supplemented on 13 February 2012.
- Law No 06-01 of 20 February 2006, on the prevention and combating of corruption. Supplemented on 20 August 2011.
- Ordinance No 12-02 of 13 February 2012 amending and supplementing Law No 05-01 of 6 February 2005 on the prevention and combating of money laundering and of the funding of terrorism.

There were no changes to the legislation in this field in 2018.

### **2.3. Assessment of government policy as regards putting in place a comprehensive and effective anti-drugs policy**

The Director-General of the National Anti-Drugs and Drug Addiction Office announced in the Algerian media that a **national anti-drugs strategy (2018-2020)** was being drawn up, based on prevention and raising awareness of the dangers of narcotic drugs, providing care for drug addicts and reducing the supply of and demand for drugs.

### **3. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL COOPERATION AS REGARDS ANTI-DRUGS PROGRAMMES (PERIOD, MAIN ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS)**

In the case of **Spain**, cooperation with the Algerian authorities is organised in the framework of the protocols for cooperation between the Directorates-General of the Police and of the Guardia Civil with the National Security Directorate-General (DGSN – Interior Ministry) and the National Gendarmerie Directorate-General and the National Coastguard Service of Algeria (these last being Defence Ministry bodies).

The protocols address activities related to training and operational information exchange among the signatory bodies. It should be noted that the cocaine seizure operation in Oran (701 kg) occurred as a result of the exchange of information between the security authorities of Spain (Guardia Civil) and those of Algeria (Ministry of National Defence).

Cooperation between Algeria and Portugal takes the form of collaboration between their respective police forces involving the exchange of experience and participation in training initiatives.

For its part, France carries out a large volume of exchanges with the Algerian authorities as part of cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking.

The United States carries out cooperation activities under the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), implemented by the DEA with the DGSN and the National Gendarmerie on the Algerian side.

Since 2011, Canada has co-chaired the GCTF's Capacity-building in the West Africa Region Working Group (formerly the Sahel Working Group). This has led to increased cooperation between Canada and Algeria, primarily between their intelligence services.

#### **4. VENUE AND DATE OF MEETINGS OF THE MINI DUBLIN GROUPS**

The last meeting of the mini Dublin Group in Algeria took place on 8 October 2018 at the Spanish Embassy in Algeria, with the participation of representatives from Spain, Poland, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Switzerland and the European Union.

#### **5. IDENTIFICATION OF PRIORITY EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE NEEDS**

The absence of UNODC representatives in Algeria makes it necessary to be able to obtain a specific report from the UNODC or for one of its experts to attend the meetings of the mini Dublin Group in Algeria.

## **6. ASSESSMENT OF THE NEEDS OF THE MINI DUBLIN GROUP**

### **6.1. Emerging threats**

The scenario in Algeria outlined above has consolidated narco-terrorism as a concept, a view always taken in the official messages transmitted by the Algerian authorities, it being a permanent and secure source of financing for armed groups operating in the Sahel region. Now that there is a clear link between terrorism and organised crime, Algeria has strengthened its legislation on combating money laundering and the funding of terrorism.

As in previous periods, the fact that Europe has been identified as a destination for drugs transiting the country – given their proximity to Algeria, the countries in question are essentially Spain, France, Greece and Italy – means that closer analysis is needed of the foreign currency trafficking generated by this illegal activity and of the way in which such money is returning to the networks involved. In the case of Algeria, the existence of the informal market makes it easier to launder this currency.

### **6.2. Political initiatives**

Seizures of cannabis resin on Algerian territory fell considerably in 2018 compared with the same period in the previous year, presumably owing to the gradual sealing of the border with Morocco through the increased deployment of personnel by the security forces engaged in combating drugs and smuggling, and support from army units. It is necessary to await the implementation of the new strategy against drug trafficking, in particular as regards the concrete measures adopted by the Algerian authorities.

### 6.3. Recommendations

- Increase cooperation on training, operations and prevention to address the use of drugs and psychotropic substances, and step up cooperation on treating addiction. In this cooperation, it is very important to include the Sahel region, of which Algeria is part, through the existing regional cooperation mechanisms.
- Propose amending Algeria's legislation (the code of criminal procedure) to accommodate coordination mechanisms for developing controlled deliveries, in order to identify the structure of the networks operating at the points of departure, transit and final destination of drugs, and thus enable comprehensive action to be taken.
- Boost international coordination mechanisms for anti-drug operations in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on money laundering.
- Propose that the Algerian authorities reinforce the mechanism for collecting data on drug seizures and drug addicts.



## EGYPT

### **1. GENERAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. DRUGS SITUATION IN THE HOST COUNTRY INCLUDING PRODUCTION, TRAFFICKING AND DEMAND RELATED ISSUES**

Since 18<sup>th</sup> April (previous Mini Group Meeting) until October 10<sup>th</sup> (last meeting), the most relevant remarks to be outlined were the seizure of an unusual quantity of heroine that exceeds local consumption amount, according to the local authorities.

The second element to point out was the drafting of a new piece of legislation for a new type of synthetic drug call “Strokes”.

The seizure of heroine will be closely studied during upcoming meetings to confirm whether this amount is a sign of a new transit route for heroine through Egypt.

According to the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics Agency, (ANGA -main Egyptian police body that deals with drug related issues-) Egypt has always been a transit rather than a producer country, a route towards Gulf countries.

Hashish, Marijuana and Tramadol outstand as the most common drugs, having been seized the following quantities in a 9 months’ period (01.01.18 to 30.09.18): 46,778.28 kg of Marijuana; 32,234.246 kg of Hashish; 88,378,701 tablets of Tramadol. This data does not include those seizures carried out by the Army at borders control –leaving consequently a significantly high amount of operations unreported-.

#### Hashish

Egypt is both a destination and transit country for this drug. Hashish, together with Tramadol, is one of the most consumed substances in this country.

Two main routes are to be outlined: by sea from Morocco or Libya, or by land directly from those same countries. The extensive border shared between Egypt and Libya hardens the possibilities for a complete control. Also, transport of hashish from Lebanon by sea is to be noted.

The most important confiscations in the analyzed period were: seizure of 7 tons of hash in December 2017, in collaboration with Greek authorities; in January 2018, the intervention of 1350 kg in Damietta's port; and in March 2018, 3600kg were confiscated in the port Alexandria.

### Cocaine

There is a limited local consumption due to its high price. The most important entry routes are: by land from West Coastal African countries, particularly Nigeria, originally exported from South America by sea; by air from Brazil and Venezuela to Europe, prior to a later transportation from this continent to Egypt using 'mules'.

8 kg 769 gr of Cocaine were intervened at Cairo Airport during the above-mentioned period.

### Heroine and Opium

The very relevant seizure of heroine (2.347 kg) is undoubtedly one of the most important remarks since the last Minigroup meeting, particularly if one bears in mind that the Heroin consumption in Egypt is low. The most significant routes of access are: by the Red Sea, arriving from Afghanistan; by land or sea from Turkey, having previously been exported from Afghanistan to that country.

Particularly relevant was the fact that the confiscation of one ton of Heroin – to be distributed in Egypt and Europe – took place in the port of Safaga. The boat was under the flag of Tanzania, though owned by an Iranian and manned by Pakistanis.

### Psychotropics

Tramadol is one of the most consumed drugs in Egypt. These substances are transported by sea from China and India to Dubai, prior to its later movement to Egypt.

The most relevant seizures have taken place in the ports of Safaga and Port Said, being the operations commanded by the Army in this area.

## **2. SHORT UPDATE ON THE COUNTRY'S DRUGS STRATEGY**

### **2.1 Changes/additions to the drug-related institutional framework**

Since the last meeting took place, it is worth mentioning that a new draft regulation for Strokes will be passed in the Parliament due to increase of its presence in Egypt (296 Kilos were seized in the aforementioned period).

### **2.2 Legal/legislative changes, including money laundering and chemical precursors**

Egypt is part of the various international drug control conventions (the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988) and also adapts its regulations including new narcotic substances such as GHB and Zolbida in 2002, Tramadol in 2012 JWH-18, JWH-073, JWH-200, CP-47,497 and C8 homologue 2014.

Trafficking in Heroin and cocaine is punishable by death and in the case of other substances the penalty can be reduced to life imprisonment.

### **2.3 An assessment of the government's political will to conduct a comprehensive and resolute anti-drugs policy**

Egypt, as a general assessment, carries out a resolute fight against drugs. Nevertheless many issues regarding this policy remain unchecked due to the lack of information and of significant international cooperation. One of the key challenges in this aspect is that global data on drug seizures is not passed into Interpol. There have been certain difficulties in the area of international cooperation in this domain since 2014, due to the fact that drug trafficking is falling under the National Security police agenda.

### **3. RENUMERATION OF MAJOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION DRUGS PROGRAMS (PERIOD, MAIN ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS- INCLUDING THOSE SUPPORTING DEMAND REDUCTION)**

Egypt does not have specific bilateral agreements with any country, although it has general cooperation agreements between the Ministries of the Interior with Spain and Germany, which includes cooperation in the fight against organized crime, including Drugs Trafficking. There are regular punctual bilateral exchanges of information and specific joint operations.

Egypt has traditionally channeled international collaboration with its presence in the International Police Agencies of the MAOC (Maritime Analysis and Operations Center - Narcotics based in Lisbon and CeLAD -M in Paris, although in recent years it has tried to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Egypt is part of the Europol Group that coordinates the so-called “Operation Rose of the Winds” which focuses on the research of ships that transport hashish across the Mediterranean from Morocco to Southern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Medium, in which Italy, France, Spain, and Greece also participate.

### **4. PLACE AND DATE OF MEETINGS OF MINI DUBLIN GROUPS**

The meetings of the Mini Dublin Group in Egypt usually take place at the Spanish Embassy twice a year (in November and April).

The last meeting of the Mini Dublin Group took place at the Spanish Embassy chaired by the First Secretary, Mr. Morales and the Interior Attaché Mr. Sánchez. The meeting took place on October 10<sup>th</sup>, 2018.

The following embassies were also represented in the meeting: Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal and Romania. However, it is worth mentioning that no representatives from UNODC were present.

The Egyptian local authorities were invited to the first part of the meeting, to share information with the group. They were represented by Brigadier Raafat Zaky and Lieutenant Coronel Ahemed Ezzat from the National Anti-Narcotics Agency (ANGA). Afterwards there was an internal discussion by Mini Dublin Group members on the various topics presented by the aforementioned authorities.

## **5. MINI-DUBLIN GROUP ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Emerging threats/trends**

It is worth mentioning that the overall data on the issue is dispersed and not unified among Interior Ministry, Armed Forces and National Security with the latter being the only institution which has the most recent consolidated version of data but that are not willing to share. Consequently, the value of the data to hand is rather limited.

According to UNODC which referred to data presented by the Social Solidarity Ministry, 26% of Egyptian population is hooked on drugs.

In a general context, the top political priority in the region against international illicit acts is the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and only in third place: drug trafficking. Nonetheless, drug production is considerably going up considerably in the MENA countries. Therefore we shall see an increase of the political attention in the near future from the International Community side on these issues.

Regionally speaking the data provided by countries of the Arab region tend to have a higher degree of reliability in comparison with other regions in the world.

## 5.2 Political initiatives

In Egypt there are two strategic plans to combat the drug problem, one of the year 2007 called Comprehensive national strategy to combat drugs problem and one on of the year 2013 National Plan to combat drugs problem in Egypt. ANGA participated in this program with the General Administration of Relations and Information, the national center for social and criminal researches, and the fund of combating and treating addiction to find untraditional ways for general awareness of drugs. ANGA Attend symposiums, seminars, workshops and different initiatives to spread awareness for drugs dangers and organized meetings with schools, universities students with the participation of the fund of combating and treating addiction in this concern.

## 5.3 Recommendations

One recommendation for the Egyptian local authorities would be to not only focus on the drug seizure as the sole objective but to also follow up with an investigation on other aspects that might fall behind such trafficking, such as: financing of terrorism, arms trafficking or illegal immigration.

The involvement of the Egyptian Drug Fund in future Mini Dublin Group meetings is also highly recommendable as they could provide further information on the latest developments in legislative changes as well as consumption prevention. Likewise involving the authorities that fight against money laundering in future meetings might provide valuable information regarding money laundering.

Another final recommendation would be the facilitation of continuous communication between the Egyptian local authorities and the Interior Attachés of foreign embassies, in order to obtain a quick response from the ANGA authorities instead of being redirected to National Security.

## LIBYA

### 1. GENERAL SITUATION

Since the fall of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been mired in political chaos and institutional incompetence, which have prevented it from tackling the whole set of problems and threats facing the country.

The situation is particularly serious in the regions of Tripolitania – where the headquarters of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord is located – and Fezzan, where the state has failed to live up to its responsibilities in the area of public security. The Libyan authorities are quite simply incapable of exercising control over their own territory or borders.

The many areas outside state control have been gradually occupied by parallel organisations, which are providing security or protection for their co-religionists on the basis of ethnic, tribal, religious, local and/or economic interests.

In the east of the country, the region of Cyrenaica (outside the area which can be said to be controlled – nominally at least – by the GNA) is effectively under the command of Field Marshal Haftar, who is seen by some members of the international community as a vital player when it comes to settling the Libya issue.

Although he has greater control over the territory than the GNA, there are many aspects of security which remain outside his scope of action. The territory is controlled by regional tribes with whom Haftar has forged temporary alliances; he is engaged in a delicate political game in which he appears to have influence, rather than outright power.

The sheer technical difficulty of controlling vast borders such as those between Libya and its six neighbouring countries – a problem of the same magnitude as the exercise of State power within the country – is common to all three regions. In a country riven by permanent conflict since 2011, this problem has worsened to the point where it has created absolute incapacity.

As a result, Libya has become fertile ground for the transit of drugs through its territory.

This mainly involves hashish (produced in Morocco) which, after being taken through Libya's non-existent borders and the parts of the country that lie outside any control, is transported to Europe by the eastward overland route or by sea.

These well-established routes are also probably being used as regular transit routes for cocaine (in this case from West Africa, where it will have arrived in shipments from South America), also bound for Europe.

Domestic consumption of heroin, cocaine or hashish is not considered to be very high in Libya. However, there are many signs that domestic consumption of synthetic drugs, especially amphetamines such as Captagon, has increased.

The lack of medicines in Libya and the inability of health establishments to exercise proper control have led to an increase in the smuggling of legal medicinal products, mainly from Tunisia, and the sale of falsified medicines.

## **2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

The incapacity of the authorities, as mentioned earlier, is mirrored in the bodies responsible for combating drug trafficking: the ANGA and the CID, both of which form part of the Ministry of the Interior.

Although the ANGA (Anti-Narcotics General Administration) is the agency responsible for combating drug trafficking in Libya, it is a totally dysfunctional entity and lacks the capacity to carry out investigations in this field.



The CID (Criminal Investigation Department) is a larger body, but also has little, or practically no, capacity. One of its tasks could include dismantling drug trafficking networks.

Anti-narcotics investigations and occasional arrests are therefore carried out by a number of armed para-state groups such as the RADA Special Deterrence Forces (which, on paper at least, come under the Ministry of the Interior of the GNA). These groups effectively perform law enforcement tasks and have dismantled drug trafficking networks that were operating in the capital. However, such operations are often carried out for party political purposes and the standards of transparency leave much to be desired.

Given the circumstances, it is not possible to obtain recent, reliable official statistics on the fight against drug trafficking in Libya; the information is derived mainly from open sources.

### **3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

The lack of any clear institutional structure having executive capacity – since the only structure that exists is basically inoperative or infiltrated by various militia groups – means that it is difficult to undertake international technical cooperation with the entities in question.

Among them, the CID is a candidate for future technical collaboration with various stakeholders (especially EUBAM Libya and the United Kingdom), and talks have been held on strategic planning for the future of the CID. Improving the technical capacities of the department's staff and upgrading its equipment are seen as essential improvements for the future.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Achieving political stability in Libya is vital if the country is to have strong, functioning institutional structures, in particular security-related structures.

During this transitional period, the length of which appears uncertain, it would be advisable to carry on winning the trust of these currently inefficient structures (the ANGA, the CID and other bodies with responsibilities related to this area) by maintaining regular contacts.

Another approach would be to enhance prevention by means of education and awareness-raising campaigns addressing the problems related to drug use.

In the longer term, it will be necessary to support coordination between the agencies and help them to improve their working methods and efficiency and the ways in which information is processed. Even more importantly, it will be necessary to develop a national strategy for combating drugs.

It seems difficult, at the present time, to justify any course of action other than continuing to support the UN Action Plan in order to achieve the crucial goal of political stability, which will provide the basis on which to build and consolidate Libya's administrative structure.

## **MAURITANIA**

The most recent meeting of the mini Dublin Group in Mauritania took place in the Spanish Embassy in Nouakchott on 18 October 2018. The participants were France, Germany, Spain and the EU Delegation. The Group approved the following report:

### **1. GENERAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY**

Mauritania remains a transit country for cannabis resin and cocaine. The country has no tradition of growing or processing drugs. Indian hemp is the only drug consumed on a significant scale, and this is linked to traditional practices.

The main trend observed throughout recent years is an intensification in trafficking in Indian hemp from Senegal via the 'road of hope' – which runs across the south of the country, from west to east, for some 1 100 km – with a considerable increase in domestic consumption, which has raised awareness on the part of the authorities. Against this background, two large recent seizures are to be noted: at the end of December (238 kg) and at the beginning of January (23 kg), of drugs coming primarily from Mali, via the 'road of hope', and in particular from Tintane, where the drugs were loaded.

As regards trafficking in cocaine, it arrives from South America (primarily from Colombia), mainly by sea at ports in the Gulf of Guinea (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo, etc.) and other West African countries such as Senegal and Cape Verde. It is then transported to Mauritania by road or by boat, directly from Guinea, the east of Mali or Senegal. The cocaine is then transported primarily by sea for delivery in Europe via the ports of Nouakchott or Nouadhibou and the surrounding area, including the no-man's land in the south-west of Western Sahara. The issue has attracted more attention recently, since some cases of cocaine use have had an impact on local elite families.

As for cannabis resin, it comes mostly from the Moroccan Rif, bound for Egypt and Libya (via northern Mali and northern Niger) and for countries in the Arabian Peninsula (via Chad and Sudan). Once it has entered Mauritania, two main routes are used, one in northern Mauritania and the Sahara along the border with Algeria, then via northern Mali and northern Niger, bound for Libya and later Maltese ports (which, according to the Group's contacts, are a safer port of entry into Europe), and the other to the south-east via Nouakchott, following the 'road of hope' to the Malian border.

On the northern route, drugs are apparently transported from the Sahara across the area controlled by the Polisario Front, which has allegedly easily bribed [...] along the Mauritanian border. It is believed that convoys cross the Mauritanian border around Bir Moghrein and Ain ben Tili, after which they follow the Algeria-Mali border into Libya. Temporary stores are said to have been set up in Mauritania around Bir Moghrein and Ain ben Tili.

However, since President Abdel Aziz came to power in 2009, the security measures the Mauritanian authorities have put in place as part of the fight against terrorism also benefit the fight against drug trafficking, making it more difficult for drugs to transit. Mention should be made of the arrest of a Senegalese trafficker resident in Mauritania, and the announcement by the Mauritanian army that in August they arrested five individuals belonging to a gang engaged in trafficking and cross-border crime, who had put up opposition to a Mauritanian army patrol in the far north-east of the country.

OCLCTISS and the gendarmerie are beginning to provide more regular and reliable statistics. See the table in Annex 1 for the statistics for the second half of 2017.

## **2. THE COUNTRY'S ANTI-DRUGS STRATEGY**

After observing some increase in domestic consumption of drugs – Indian hemp, in particular – Mauritania began to draw up its anti-drugs strategy at the end of 2015. Since then, some important steps have been taken, such as establishing an anti-drugs office and a specific unit which assists the Mauritanian army in connection with drug trafficking. There has also been a broader response by the authorities, with training activities by gendarmes in schools and the development of a communication strategy.

## **3. MAIN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES ON DRUGS: ANNEX 2.**

### **4. MEETINGS OF THE MINI DUBLIN GROUP**

The mini Dublin Group in Nouakchott meets every six months at the Embassy of Spain (which holds the rotating Presidency of the mini Dublin Group at regional level). The meeting brings together the members of the Dublin Group which are represented in Nouakchott: the EU MS, the EU Delegation, the United States and Japan. Since the UNODC does not have an office in the country, it is not represented in the meetings. At the last mini Dublin Group meeting, the United States representative stated that, since they had no expert on the subject in Mauritania, a regional expert from their embassy in Morocco would attend forthcoming meetings of the Group.

### **5. IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS IN TERMS OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE**

The members of the mini Dublin Group have noted that there is a lack of capacity for following through on police investigations. Although there are regular seizures and arrests, they rarely lead to the dismantling of networks. The authorities do not follow up cases where trafficking is detected, and there is no subsequent analysis of drug seizures. Besides that, there is a significant shortfall in terms of judicial processing and a lack of coordination between the various security bodies involved in fighting this scourge (the national gendarmerie, the national police, customs and, most recently, the road security service).

In addition, the public prosecutor should have a bigger role in supervision and coordination. Magistrates, investigators, the services monitoring the financial system, and the health and pharmaceutical services all need specialist training.

Given the above, Mauritania still has very significant needs in all areas, ranging from basic personnel training to logistical support. Both the Mauritanian police and the gendarmerie have repeatedly stressed the need for technical resources for surveillance, communications, investigation and toxicological analysis. Training is an absolute priority, starting with training for the instructors themselves.

## **6. THE MINI DUBLIN GROUP'S NEEDS ASSESSMENT**

### **6.1. Main threats/trends and political initiatives**

Numerous reports point to a close link between drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism in North Africa. President Abdel Aziz has referred to this link on several occasions, denouncing the fact that traffickers passing through areas controlled by jihadists are forced to supply them with fuel, pay a toll and provide valuable information.

As stated at the beginning of this report, the most marked recent trend is an increase in trafficking in and domestic consumption of Indian hemp, which the authorities have become fully aware of, setting out to reinforce their anti-drugs strategy, and in particular the communication strategy.

A new development is that several African countries have noticed the medicine Tramadol being used as a narcotic, to the extent that Egypt and Tunisia have included it in their lists of controlled medicines and have asked the WHO to do likewise.

## 6.2. Recommendations

Against this background, the mini Dublin Group's main recommendations are as follows:

- Continue to raise the Mauritanian authorities' awareness of the need to step up their commitment to the fight against trafficking and against the laundering of the proceeds of trafficking.
- Promote and support the establishment of a central office to coordinate the fight against trafficking in drugs (to coordinate the security forces) and a national drug-trafficking database with input from the police, the gendarmerie, customs and the army, to coordinate activities and avoid overlaps.
- Improve and optimise the material resources of the Mauritanian security forces with responsibility in the area.
- Ensure continuity in the area of training. Emphasise on-the-spot training for trainers. Encourage agents to specialise from the time they enter into service.
- Promote a regional cooperation framework, and in particular encourage the work of the G5 Sahel security platform, which could open a new avenue for regional cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking between the countries of the Sahel.
- Continue control efforts in the main ports and airports in Mauritania.
- Continue to assist the Directorate-General for National Security and the gendarmerie in replacing its sniffer dogs and refreshing the skills of its dog handlers.
- To make the mini Dublin Group more dynamic, partners/organisations working on the subject could be invited to meetings of the Group on an ad hoc basis to give presentations on specific aspects of the drugs situation in the country or the region.

## **ANNEX 1**

### **Statistics for the second half of 2018 (source: OCLCTISS)**

#### **National police:**

- 278 reports
- 511 arrests: 90 % Mauritians
- 7.5 kg cannabis resin
- 73 kg Indian hemp
- 12 high-end vehicles
- The equivalent of 25 million ouguiyas in assets and property

#### **Gendarmerie:**

In joint operations with the army, the gendarmerie seized:

- 125 kg Indian hemp

#### **Customs**

Not available

#### **GGSR (road security service)**

Not available



## ANNEX 2

### **International cooperation:**

#### **European Union cooperation**

The European Union continues to support the 'integrated border management system' in Mauritania and the training of the security forces, which contributes to the fight against drug trafficking, through support for the country's police and national gendarmerie. This is accomplished mainly under the European Development Fund (EDF), through its security sector support programmes and through the migration project, which is in its final stages.

In addition, under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, technical assistance is being provided with the aim of strengthening the Sahel G5. This project, which has a total budget of EUR 7 million, is intended to reinforce the Sahel G5's security efforts, particularly as regards improved cooperation between its member states on integrated border management. In this regard, the regional Security Cooperation Platform (PCMS) is a key tool in the fight against drug trafficking.

Also financed by the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the West Africa Police Information System (WAPIS) is currently being implemented. Linked to the Interpol system, the aim of WAPIS is to fight organised crime and the threats posed by terrorism through the establishment of a system for exchanging information and intelligence at regional level. Mauritania is behind on the deployment of WAPIS, since the two Decrees intended to make it operational in Mauritania have been waiting to be signed since 2016.

Within the framework of the EUTF-IOM initiative, since June 2017 the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has also been financing a 42-month IOM project, with a budget of EUR 8 million, which aims to construct and equip border posts, train security personnel and involve local communities. This programme also includes a voluntary return component and a qualified diaspora component.

Finally, and still under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the 'Rapid Action Groups - Monitoring and Intervention in the Sahel' (GAR-SI Sahel) project, under the command of the National Gendarmerie and implemented by the Spanish Guardia Civil, the French gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri and the Portuguese gendarmerie, was scheduled to have initial operational capability (IOC) at the beginning of May 2018 for the GAR-SI unit in Mauritania. A GAR-SI unit is to be placed in each of the five countries of the Sahel and Senegal in order to support border control and fight terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. The programme contains a component on interoperability between the six units.

Since January 2017, the EU has been financing the EL KSAR project, implemented by Spain's Guardia Civil, which aims to enhance airport security in Mauritania and strengthen efforts to fight cross-border crime through civil aviation security in the country, and in particular at the new Nouakchott airport. As part of the EL KSAR project, an officer is deployed at the airport in Nouakchott, also covering the airport in Nouadhibou.

Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), at regional level the European Union continues to support the Cocaine Route Programme. A project to support the WAEMU, including Mauritania, in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking is being implemented by the UNODC.

### **Cooperation with Germany**

Since January 2016, the GIZ (German Agency for International Cooperation) has been implementing phase II of the project for capacity building of the national police. This project is part of a programme funded by the German Federal Foreign Office to help improve the national police structures of several African countries (in particular Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Nigeria). One of the programme's main objectives is to improve national and sub-regional (e.g. G5, Afripol) schemes for combating cross-border and organised crime.

In Mauritania, the GIZ's support is built around the following three lines of action: (1) the organisation of the national police training sector and the development of the administrative system and training programmes for the national police academy, including the development of a professional framework, skills and training for police supervisors and officers; (2) the modernisation of the public security police stations in terms of infrastructure and training, e.g. maintenance of police stations; and (3) the strengthening of the capacity of the forensic police. Combating drug trafficking is no longer one of the project's priorities. The aim of the project is rather to reinforce the capacities of the forensic police with regard to better-quality fingerprinting, ballistics and the sharing of experience through regional cooperation. These activities are set to continue until the end of 2018.

### **Cooperation with Spain**

Besides the role of Spain's Guardia Civil in the EU's GAR-SI Sahel and EL KSAR projects (mentioned under 'cooperation with the EU'), it is worth mentioning the Guardia Civil's Blue Sahel project, which began in January 2017. The project's activities include training border patrols in Mauritania – and other countries – to combat all types of cross-border crime, delivering training in monitoring river and sea borders, strengthening cooperation between the relevant security forces, and improving information exchange between neighbouring countries and the EU.

The contingents of the Guardia Civil and Spanish police (ECI) posted to Nouadhibou have access to air, sea and land resources for monitoring the coast and the borders.

### **Cooperation with France**

France is engaged in significant bilateral cooperation in this area, which has been ongoing for a number of years.

On the one hand, it has deployed a permanent liaison officer authorised to exchange operational information and provide training.

On the other, it is providing operational assistance in three areas.

The first is the continued training of front-line police. French trainers regularly travel to the interior of the country, to border areas or to areas affected by the issue, to strengthen the capacities of the police force.

At Mauritania's request, in 2016 and 2017 France carried out an ambitious programme to open regional satellite branches of the anti-drugs office. To date, **four** have been equipped (vehicles and office, IT, telephone and investigative equipment) and their staff trained. A fifth should be opened at the end of November.

Next year, at the request of the local partner, France will begin replacing sniffer dogs.

Through the intermediary of an international technical expert from the gendarmerie, France has trained staff within the Mauritanian gendarmerie responsible for prevention in schools. This work has been greatly appreciated and has been presented in the Mauritanian political institutions (to ministers, MPs, etc.).

### **Cooperation with Japan**

At the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Kenya in August 2016, the Japanese government announced that, from 2016 to 2018, it would invest an overall amount of approximately USD 30 billion in Africa from the public and private sectors.

In the context of TICAD VI, one of the three priority areas of Japanese cooperation in Africa is the 'promotion of social stability for shared prosperity', including issues relating to 'social stability and peace-building' and 'terrorism and violent extremism'.

Last year, the three areas of interest in the Sahel region as regards the budget for cooperation with international organisations are the fight against terrorism (e.g. border management, legislation, strengthening anti-crime capacity and the fight against the financing of terrorism), social stability (education against radicalism, professional training for young people, etc.), and humanitarian aid for refugees and internally displaced persons. All three areas are of relevance to terrorism. Consequently, approval has been given to a bilateral project by the IOM, and three regional projects by the UNODC, on the subject of drugs or illicit trafficking. The bilateral project involves the establishment of a new office to combat terrorist financing, called the BLCFT, within the Economic Crime Department of the Directorate-General for National Security. The three regional projects involve reinforcing the capacities of relevant personnel in the Sahel region (judges, police and customs officers, etc.) through workshops and training.

Finally, Japan has financed training in criminal justice.

## **MOROCCO**

On 27 September 2018, the mini Dublin Group met at the Spanish Embassy in Rabat. The meeting was attended by representatives of the embassies of Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan and the EU Delegation.

The meeting covered the following points, in accordance with the agenda:

### **1. GENERAL SITUATION**

The Spanish Embassy's Home Affairs Counsellor (a National Police Force Commissioner) gave a presentation on the general situation of drugs trafficking between Spain and Morocco, focusing on the following points:

- Spain has the highest number of hashish seizures in Europe (75 % EU). The highest incidence of this type of trafficking is found in the Campo de Gibraltar district, since it is the natural entry point to Europe from Morocco.
- Morocco and Afghanistan are the two largest producers of cannabis in the world. According to the Moroccan authorities, seizures of hashish fell in 2017 compared to 2016 (from 106 tonnes to 60 tonnes).
- There was a rise in seizures of cocaine (from 1 245 kg in 2016 to 2 844 kg in 2017) and heroin (from 16.2 kg in 2016 to 21.8 kg in 2017).
- There was also a rise in seizures of MDMA/Ecstasy (from 481 646 units in 2016 to 549 637 units in 2017). A parallel increase in consumption in Morocco was also reported.

- Figures available up to September 2018 showed that there had been 149 anti-narcotics operations in Morocco: 37 involving cocaine, 50 involving hashish, 3 involving heroin and 59 involving synthetic drugs. The following had been seized: 1 956 kg of cocaine, 20 098 kg of hashish, 0.3 kg of heroin and 25 431 462 units of synthetic drugs.

- It can be seen that hashish and its derivatives continue to be top of the list of drugs seized, but the quantity of cocaine and synthetic drugs seized continues to rise. There has also been a fall in the number of operations involving hashish and a rise in the number of operations involving synthetic drugs.

As regards emerging trends and threats, the following points were highlighted:

- There has been a rise in the use of fishing boats for drug trafficking. Despite reports in the press on the use of aircraft with military technology, there is no evidence of such aircraft having been used.

- There is an ever closer connection between the routes used for drug trafficking and those used for trafficking in human beings, and in some cases irregular migrants are being forced to transport drugs.

- The group cited reports in the Moroccan press about the appearance of a new 'Chinese drug', although none of the members was aware of this drug.

- The United States (DEA) representative spoke about the circular trade routes established between Morocco and South America (mainly Brazil) which involved exporting hashish and importing cocaine. Such routes were highly lucrative and hard to detect, as they did not involve any bank transactions. The US representative also drew attention to the routes for the trafficking of Tramadol from Asia, mainly to the countries of West Africa where the consumption of the drug is linked to terrorist groups affiliated to Da'esh (Boko Haram).

## 2. MOROCCO'S ANTI-DRUGS STRATEGY

There have been no changes in the legislative framework for the fight against drugs or money laundering.

France noted that the letters rogatory it had issued to Morocco were functioning smoothly. It was felt that this smooth functioning was not necessarily related to the recent creation of a Public Prosecutor's Office in Morocco, which had made the Royal Prosecutor independent of the executive.

Italy pointed out that other countries which do not have a liaison magistrate in their embassies have more problems in this respect. It highlighted the difficulties in obtaining information relating to prosecutions and in successfully issuing letters rogatory with a view to carrying out investigations in the country (more especially with regard to telephone tapping).

The Netherlands pointed to the large number of letters rogatory it sent to Morocco, many of which related to settling of scores in the Netherlands. Many of the letters rogatory contained requests for the recovery of assets, resulting in the effective confiscation of those assets; however, the money never actually got sent to the Netherlands.

It was pointed out that the Directorate-General for the Surveillance of National Territory (DGST) had recently created a special anti-narcotics unit in response to the proliferation of criminal networks and groups. However, none of the meeting participants said that they had regular contact with the unit.

The members of the group felt that there was a certain lack of political will when it came to fighting drugs, especially compared to other issues such as combating terrorism or managing migration flows. The most striking example of this was the substantial reduction in seizures of hashish in 2017.



### **3. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION PROGRAMMES BETWEEN MOROCCO AND OTHER COUNTRIES**

Programme financed by Europol in the framework of EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats), led by France (OCRGDF – Central Office for Combating Major Financial Crime), with Spain (Guardia Civil) as co-leader. The aim of the programme is to set up an agency in Morocco and Algeria for the recovery and management of seized and confiscated criminal assets (similar to an Asset Recovery Office). The programme was launched in 2017 and is expected to end in 2018. France said that Moroccan officials were due to travel to Madrid and Paris in the near future for technical training under the programme.

Spain mentioned the meeting that had been held the previous day with the head of the AIRCOP project of the UNODC Regional Office in Cairo, who had provided information on the project to members of the Spanish Embassy's political section and Home Affairs Department. The UNODC Regional Office was hoping to set up the AIRCOP project in Morocco. The project is already operational in Latin America and is in the process of being set up in North Africa, with funding provided mainly by Canada. It involves the creation of police units in the major airports of the participating countries, which are trained in detecting suspect individuals or luggage which may be used for drug trafficking and in identifying potential foreign fighters returning from fighting for IS. All these activities are carried out in conjunction with Interpol's 24/7 network.

### **4. IDENTIFICATION OF PRIORITY EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE NEEDS**

The Moroccan authorities had not submitted any requests in this connection. In any case, members of the group observed that the lack of an anti-money laundering office was a major shortcoming.

Norway asked whether strengthening capacities to combat trafficking in human beings could help boost Morocco's capacity to fight drug trafficking. The meeting participants agreed, and said that the EUR 100 million funding to be mobilised by the EU for border control would ultimately have a beneficial effect on the fight against smuggling and, specifically, on drug trafficking.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Support all forms of border control aid to Morocco which could help boost the country's capacity for combating drug trafficking.
- Keep a close eye on the figures for drugs seizures at future meetings in order to establish whether the quantity of such seizures is continuing to fall.
- Monitor developments in the cooperation project with the EU on setting up an asset recovery office.
- Monitor any new developments in legislation on money laundering, a crucial but highly complicated issue given the size of the informal sector in Morocco.

## TUNIS

### 1. GENERAL SITUATION

In contrast to 2016, this time it was not possible to obtain official statistical data for 2017 and the beginning of 2018 from the Tunisian authorities. Nor did the Tunisian authorities respond to the invitations from the Spanish embassy, representing the mini Dublin Group in Tunisia, to conduct bilateral meetings. Thus the information in this report is derived from a UNODC report and other open sources. The information was revised at the last meeting of the mini Dublin Group.

The available information points to stagnation in drug seizures in Tunisia in 2018, particularly those of cocaine, heroin, ecstasy and Subutex.

As regards cannabis resin (known as *zatla* in Tunisia), Tunisia remains a transit country between the production zones (in Morocco) and Libya. There is also some local production, mainly for consumption. The available data suggest that for 2018 there was a downward trend in cannabis resin trafficking, probably linked to improved border controls. The appearance of hashish balls has also been noted on the Tunisian coast.

The view taken in previous reports, that Tunisia is not a drug-producing country but a cannabis consumer and country of transit, at a moderate level, to Europe, Libya and Egypt, is maintained. Hitherto, four routes (4) for the entry of drugs into the country have been known. However, there is the possibility of a fifth route, from Europe, via France and Italy, for internal consumption.

- Centre route, from El Oued (Algeria) to Tozeur and Kasserine, which provisions local consumption in the centre and south of Tunisia.
- Northern route, to Tunis through Tabarka. It supplies local consumption in the north and around Tunis.
- European route, entering through the Tabarka area. Europe is the final destination, across the sea from the north and north-east coast of Tunisia.

- Libya route, reserved for hard drugs (cocaine and heroin). It takes advantage of the smuggling networks in the south-east.
- Route from France (Marseilles) and Italy (Geneva) in small quantities, in passenger cars on the ferries that cover sea connections with Tunisia.

As regards pills, alongside Subutex and ecstasy consumption, those being historically the most widespread, there is also the problem of tramadol, for which Tunisia seems to be a country of both transit and consumption.

In the absence of adequate statistical data on consumption and on the basis of prices, which show the ease of obtaining drugs, it can be concluded that the return of heroin and cocaine to the local market has continued over recent years.

Another, albeit indirect, indication of the rise in consumption in Tunisia is the rise in common crime (theft, robbery) to obtain the wherewithal to buy doses of drugs for personal consumption.

## **2. TUNISIA'S ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY**

The fight against drugs is not often seen as a priority for the local authorities, which sometimes refuse to admit there is a problem of that nature. There is a very widespread view of drugs, found even among some of those with responsibilities in this area, as a problem from elsewhere, alien to Tunisian society. Even in specialist academic circles, Tunisia is basically depicted as a transit country, and consumption is not addressed in much depth.

Taking into account that combating terrorism and stabilising the security situation in a very complex regional context were much higher priorities, now that security has been re-established, the Tunisian authorities should undertake an analysis of the risks created by drug trafficking. In this context too: in the area of organised crime, over time drug-trafficking networks can branch out into other activities, including terrorism, as the experiences of other countries have shown. As for small-scale consumption, it is linked to a poorer security situation, which can harm the process of regaining citizens' trust in the state apparatus. The rise in petty crime may be an indicator of rising small-scale consumption in Tunisia.

The development and application of a real integrated national strategy in the field remains a priority, and Tunisia's partners could offer to share their experience and work with the authorities. For now, the authorities are taking a gradual and sector-by-sector approach.

In terms of laws and regulations, there is nothing new by comparison with 2017 with its application of the reform of "Law 52", (Article 12 of Law 52/1992), which authorises judges to take account, in the context of fighting drug crime, of attenuating circumstances in the perpetration of certain crimes, and so avoid automaticity in applying heavy prison sentences prescribed by the Criminal Code, which had led to overcrowding of prisons. The decision was positive in that respect, but the Group is not yet in a position to make a more thorough assessment, given the short time the reform has been in effect and the lack of official information.

### 3. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS

The member countries of the Group have a very wide range of experiences and programmes of cooperation with Tunisia in this field. Several have seen progress recently, including the signing of bilateral agreements in the area of organised crime. Others have indicated that in practice, more responsiveness and transparency on the part of the Tunisian authorities would be desirable. For that reason, the representatives who were present undertook to share their experiences in terms of support, whether through training or through provision of equipment, for the Tunisian authorities in the fight against drugs, in order to make it possible to request more transparency from the Tunisians.

Tunisia has ratified all the international conventions in this field. The Drug Addiction Commission was set up in 1969. There is a National Narcotics Bureau, set up in 1983 and attached to the Ministry of Health. There is also a project to establish a National Drugs Observatory, but the members of the Group had nothing to add on its status.

Tunisia belongs to the regional and sub-regional forums active in this field, such as the African Union and the Arab League, the Pompidou Group and the 5+5 Dialogue. Cooperation with the EU's CEPOL is also envisaged.

Group members agreed to urge the Tunisian authorities to organise a meeting with the mini Dublin Group, and the Presidency will initiate a démarche to that end, open to all local competent authorities (Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, Health, Education and others). The purpose would be to establish communication and consider cooperation options.

#### **4. MEETING OF THE MINI DUBLIN GROUP IN TUNISIA**

The mini Dublin Group last met on 14 September 2018.

#### **5. IDENTIFICATION OF PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATION**

The Group identified a number of priorities:

- due appreciation by the Tunisian authorities of the importance of the fight against drugs in a multidisciplinary approach, in line with its commitments and with the consensus of the international community in the field;
- the launching of the National Drugs Observatory;
- the adoption of the national anti-drugs strategy;
- the setting up of the mechanisms and experiences of information-sharing and cooperation with international partners in terms of security and judicial aspects;
- encouraging the principle of sharing among all the parties involved in the subject.

#### **6. THE MINI DUBLIN GROUP'S EVALUATION**

##### **6.1. Trends**

- Gradual change in Tunisia's situation as a country of consumption and transit.
- Reluctance to admit the scale of the problem.
- Difficulty of formulating an overall strategy.

##### **6.2. Policy initiatives**

- Mini-Dublin démarche with local authorities to help raise awareness and offer full cooperation.

### 6.3. Recommendations

- Development of a national strategy for fighting drug addiction, with a multi-sector approach. Spreading of the latter within Tunisian civil society and among international partners.
- Encouraging the involvement of leaders of the Tunisian security forces working in the fight against organised crime, in seminars and activities organised by the international bodies and other countries in the Mediterranean basin.
- Encouraging international police cooperation in combating serious forms of crime, which generally include criminal organisations active in drug trafficking. To that end, it is necessary that structures and procedures in the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior be modernised both in terms of fighting organised crime and in terms of police cooperation.
- Understanding and publicising the importance of civil society participating in the fight against drug addiction.
- Proposing to the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance that Tunisia participate in future mini Dublin Groups of specialists in the field, so as to provide first-hand information on the drugs problem in Tunisia.
- Proposing that the EMPACT drugs project get involved in Tunisia.
- Drafting a twice-yearly mini Dublin Group report in Tunisia, preceded by an additional meeting to underline the importance of cooperation in this field.
- Carrying out awareness raising campaigns with young people, emphasising prevention, assistance and re-education.