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**NOTE**

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From: General Secretariat of the Council  
To: Delegations

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Subject: Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union  
Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2018)

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Delegations will find in the Annex the Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2018).

**ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF  
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2018)**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. This Progress Report on the implementation of the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (doc. 15708/03) covers activities carried out in 2018. The Report is non-exhaustive and focuses on the main developments. All activities were undertaken within the broader context of EU security policy and conflict-prevention.
  
2. Based on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (doc. 10715/16), the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD and the New Lines for Action (doc. 17172/08), the guiding principles of the European Union continue to be:
  - a. effective multilateralism, including safeguarding the centrality and the promotion of the universality of global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, through diplomatic action and financial assistance to third countries and international organisations;
  - b. close cooperation with countries to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime;
  - c. addressing non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral political and non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings and in more informal contacts;

- d. the effective and complementary use of all available instruments and financial resources – the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), other instruments – in order to maximise the impact of the EU's activities in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.
3. The European External Action Service (EEAS), in particular the Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation represented the EU in a number of key international meetings in 2018:
- the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors' Group meetings in Ottawa, Banff and Québec City;
  - the Conference launching the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (Paris, 23 January 2018)
  - the Second Preparatory Committee Session to the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Geneva, 23 April – 4 May 2018);
  - the 62 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference (Vienna, 17 – 21 September 2018);
  - the 73 UN General Assembly First Committee (New York, 5 October – 8 November 2018);
  - the 23 Conference of States Parties and the 4<sup>th</sup> Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Hague, 21-30 November 2018)

The Special Envoy focused on:

- a. promoting the preservation and strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a fundamental multilateral instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability;

- b. promoting universal adherence to and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and enhancing the visibility of the EU's commitment;
  - c. upholding the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, including by preventing impunity for such use;
  - d. promoting the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against ballistic missile proliferation as a confidence and transparency-building measure;
  - e. initiating and maintaining non-proliferation dialogue with major partners and mainstreaming non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral relations;
4. The EU Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation convened 11 times in 2018, including at director level, to discuss EU positions and future activities. The EU delegations in Vienna, Geneva and New York prepared and coordinated a number of EU statements for multilateral fora and contributed actively to policy-making through regular EU coordination meetings.

## **NUCLEAR ISSUES**

5. The EU is fully committed to promoting the universalisation and the full, complete and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. The start and early conclusion of negotiations, at the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains an EU priority.

## **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency**

6. The NPT review cycle continued with the Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT taking place in Geneva from 23 April until 4 May 2018. The EU delivered four statements: one in the general debate and three in the debates on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses respectively; a specific statement in support of the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East was also made. In addition, the EU organised two side events: on the EU support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its Organization, and a second one on the benefits of the NPT focusing on the international cooperation in radioactive sources throughout their lifecycle. The EU also submitted working papers on nuclear disarmament verification and on a fissile material cut-off treaty. All EU Member States supported the statement addressing North Korea's nuclear challenge. At the 73<sup>rd</sup> session of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, the EU contributed to all relevant debates, including to the thematic debate on nuclear weapons.
7. EU support for the core responsibilities of the IAEA regarding non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and technical cooperation continued.

8. The EU contributes to the implementation of the 2018-2021 IAEA Nuclear Security Plan through Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 which funds IAEA activities towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments; assisting States in the establishment of indigenous technical, scientific and human capacity, necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security; strengthening capacities to prevent, detect, respond and protect people, property, environment and society from criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control; strengthening the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material; contributing to computer security in the nuclear field; strengthening the security of radioactive sources, to bring them to a safe and secure storage in the countries in need of support, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier; strengthening physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material.
9. The European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) continued to support the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) by providing training and development for ITDB Points of Contact from European Union Member States and from countries of the Balkan region.

10. In the margins of the 5th EU-IAEA Senior Officials Meeting (15 February 2017), the JRC and the IAEA signed 'Practical Arrangements on Cooperation on Nuclear Science Applications' aimed at developing joint activities and avoiding duplication of efforts. One of the activities included in these practical arrangements is the environmental monitoring of radioactivity, measured across Europe and a number of other global locations in the form of gamma dose rate averages and maxima for the last 24 hours. These measurements originate from some 5500 monitoring sites operated by competent national authorities in 39 countries which report latest radiological values to the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP). The notification of a radiological accident or emergency is done through early notification networks such as ECURIE or EMERCON, operated by the European Commission and the IAEA respectively, after consultation with the competent national authorities. The activities conducted in 2018 include the development of harmonised Emergency Preparedness and Response procedures, participation in exercises (ConvEx, ECUREX), support to the International Radiation Monitoring Information System (testing of data exchange with extra European countries, regional monitoring data exchange).
11. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and an achievement of multilateral diplomacy. The continued full and effective implementation of the agreement is essential for European security. The EU continues to contribute to the implementation of the JCPOA by coordinating the Joint Commission and a number of expert-level working groups established under the JCPOA. The EU also continues to fully support the IAEA's long-term mission to verify and monitor Iran's nuclear-related commitments. Since 2016, the EU has engaged in implementing Annex III of the JCPOA in particular through projects to improve nuclear safety. EUR 15 million have already been allocated for civil-nuclear cooperation with Iran and three projects contracted supporting both the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the nuclear power plant operator at Bushehr.

12. Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Iran is a key pillar of the JCPOA and centrepiece to the EU's engagement with Iran. It helps get a better understanding of Iran's civil nuclear needs and gradually build confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. EU-Iran cooperation in 2018 included frequent high-level exchanges on policy matters with a particular focus on nuclear governance; a joint workshop on civil nuclear liability and insurance; projects that support the efforts of Iran's Nuclear Regulatory Authority to align with international standards in the legislative and regulatory field; scientific seminars and technical visits to nuclear sites and laboratories of the EU Joint Research Centre; international conferences with stakeholders in the nuclear field; projects in support of the modernisation of the Arak research reactor (Khondab), and the conversion of the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre. Iran remained the EU's top beneficiary in the field of nuclear safety.
13. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols constitute the current verification standard and the EU continues to call for them to be made universally adhered to without delay. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA allows for effective and efficient safeguards. The EU actively supports the IAEA's safeguards system through the European Commission Safeguards Support Programme, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and through Member States' Support Programmes.
14. The EU and its Member States attach the utmost importance to the worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of nuclear safety. The EU has given legal force to the objectives of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety through its amended Nuclear Safety Directive that entered into force in 2017. A key element of the amended directive is the introduction of a safety objective for all operators to prevent accidents and avoid significant radioactive releases. The amended directives also added Topical Peer Reviews in EURATOM law. A first European Topical Peer Review was already conducted successfully. All EU Member States have transposed the new requirements into their national laws.



15. To further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the EU has allocated EUR 325 million over the period 2014-2020 to promote nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards in third countries. The European Commission, working with the IAEA and other partners, is supporting the implementation of the strategic master plan for environmental remediation in Central Asia and promoted together with the Kyrgyz Republic the venue of an international donors' conference on 8 November 2018 where more than EUR 17 million were pledged by the participants to implement the master plan.
16. The EU and its Member States continue to be strong supporters of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through substantial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and the Peaceful Uses Initiative. The EU and its Member States rank second as contributors to the Technical Cooperation Programme which is an important tool to enable the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology and to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
17. The EU and the IAEA hold an annual Senior Officials Meeting to review and plan their broad-range cooperation. The last meeting was hosted by the IAEA on 8 February 2018 in Vienna. The discussions focused on strengthening collaboration on nuclear safety, security, safeguards, sustainable development, nuclear energy, research and increasing innovation. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP) held discussions with the IAEA Director-General in March.

### **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

18. The early entry into force and universality of the CTBT are important objectives of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All EU Member States have demonstrated their commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it and by applying its basic obligations. The CTBT is a strong confidence- and security building measure. The EU promotes consistently the benefits and added value of the Treaty to peace, security, disarmament and non-proliferation, including in its civil applications and supports financially the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation (CTBTO).

19. On 26 February 2018 the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/ 298 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities. The financial support of over EUR 4.5 million over a two-year period is for: certified auxiliary seismic stations part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System; the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon; continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world; the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations; the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools; the development of new software; enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection; enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box; integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories. The EU and its Member States also contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of the CTBT verification regime through the provision of technical support and advice at CTBTO Working Group B and other workshops and seminars.
20. At the invitation of the Group of the Friends of the CTBT comprising Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands the EU HRVP participated in the Ninth Ministerial Meeting held in New York on 27 September 2018 where she delivered an agreed EU statement. On her behalf the EEAS Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation participated, together with the CTBTO Executive-Secretary and the Foreign Minister in the high-level conference "Towards a world without nuclear tests: fulfilling the promise" organized by Belgium on 22 May 2018. The Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Dr. Lassina Zerbo delivered the keynote speech at the event, hosted by the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Didier Reynders. The EU participated in the May 2018 CTBTO Science and Diplomacy Symposium.

21. The EU uses every opportunity to advocate CTBT ratification in international fora and meetings with countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, and continues to use diplomatic means to promote the entry into force of the CTBT in those countries. EU expertise and funds can help countries that lack resources to deal with implementing the provisions of the Treaty. The EU welcomed warmly the ratification in 2018 by Thailand. The CTBT was raised bilaterally in the EU political and NPD dialogues with India, Pakistan and the US.

### **Initiatives related to nuclear security**

22. In 2018 the EU decided to support also financially one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building: to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. On 10 December the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of ICSANT. The EU will provide nearly EUR five million over a period of three years to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism. The Council Decision will promote the universalization and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity building of relevant stakeholders including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection and dissemination of good practices.

23. The EU continued to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The EU participated in the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group meeting (11-12 June 2018) hosted by Finland; the Nuclear Detection Working Group hosted a two-day experts meeting in Bilthoven, the Netherlands, on 25-26 January 2018. The EU and its Member States are actively involved in the work of the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group, in all areas: nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation. The EU has actively contributed to the substance of all reference documents of the IAG working groups. The European Union and its Member States organise and participate in events to help foster international awareness and commitment to nuclear security such as the Blue Lion: Recovery and Consequence Management Workshop and Experts Meeting hosted by the United Kingdom on 6-8 February 2018; the Fierce Falcon: Radiological Source Security and Theft Response Workshop organized by Hungary, in cooperation with the GICNT and the US Department of Energy on 10-12 April 2018; and the Sentinel II workshop: Developing National Nuclear Security Exercise Programmes hosted by Lithuania, in collaboration with the United Kingdom on 9-11 October 2018.
24. The EU Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials (EUSECTRA) has been fully operational since 2013 for the benefit of European Union Member States and partner countries, among them several GICNT members. The Centre is operated by the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) at its sites in Karlsruhe (Germany) and Ispra (Italy), in close co-operation with other international initiatives promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and several GICNT partner countries. The Centre is also used for practical exercises mainly related to countering nuclear smuggling. EUSECTRA is active in addressing the training needs of the EU Member States and EU partners, including highly appreciated coordinated trainings for the Member States delegates in customs and law enforcement already implemented and planned for 2019-2021 (in direct collaboration with EC DG HOME and EC DG TAXUD), and also provides assessment of equipment performance on request of MS

25. The European Commission and the EU Member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterisation of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the JRC site in Karlsruhe (Germany). Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined thus providing support to competent authorities in EU Member States and beyond.

### **Initiatives related to nuclear verification**

26. The EU and its Member States supported the 2016 UNGA resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Verification on the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and the subsequent decision of the First Committee in 2017 to keep that item on the agenda. The EU is supportive of the work of broader partnerships and cooperative verification arrangements and has participated in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) since its inauguration in 2015. The active EU engagement has continued during Phase II of the IPNDV with the EU (the EEAS, the European Commission Joint Research Centre and DG ENER) taking part in the Working Groups meetings in Stockholm 26-28 March 2018 and in Seoul on 10-12 July, as well as in the London Plenary Meeting, 3-7 December. Substantive support to the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are defined as main goals.

### **Regional issues**

27. The ongoing diplomatic efforts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are a positive development that contributes to easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The EU urges the DPRK to engage seriously in the follow-on negotiations and abandon its nuclear, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, immediately cease all related activities and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards at an early date and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay.

28. Until the DPRK takes concrete steps towards denuclearisation, the EU will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions and encourage all States to do the same. The EU has transposed all DPRK-related UNSC Resolutions and has, in addition introduced its own autonomous sanctions regime towards the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN restrictive measures. The total number of persons listed autonomously by the EU is 59. The EU has frozen the assets of 9 entities as part of its own sanctions regime. In addition, the EU has engaged in extensive diplomatic outreach to emphasise the need for a robust implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions by all UN member states. Where needed, the EU stands ready to provide concrete support for capacity building on sanctions enforcement.

### **The Conference on Disarmament (CD)/ Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or other Nuclear Explosive Devices**

29. The EU remains united and committed to verifiable treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control and stresses the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The EU welcomes the substantive work, in accordance with the agreed mandate of the subsidiary bodies, to reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities, deepen technical discussions and broaden areas of agreement and consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations and the adoption of four substantive reports that could provide a solid basis to build on in 2019.

30. The EU's longstanding priority in the Conference on Disarmament is to immediately commence negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The EU commends Canada for bringing the work of the High Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group into a consensual outcome and welcomes the inclusive consultative process set up General Assembly Resolution 71/259 to take into account the views of the broader UN membership. The EU is providing significant financial support to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to facilitate the participation of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries in FMCT related consultations and other activities. The EU calls on all CD members to start negotiations on a FMCT without delay and to begin work on the other issues on the agenda. The EU encourages all countries possessing nuclear weapons that have not done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, if they have not already done so. The two European nuclear weapon States have declared relevant moratoria and dismantled or converted such facilities.

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS

31. The EU continued to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to ensure the full and effective implementation of and universal adherence to Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On 16 April 2018, the Council adopted Conclusions reiterating the EU's strong support for chemical disarmament and non-proliferation and laying down the EU positions for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the CWC on 21-30 November 2018. In this framework, the EU engaged actively and constructively in the preparation and the work of the CWC Fourth Review Conference with a view to ensuring the relevance and increase the effectiveness and capacity of the Convention, including addressing current and future challenges. Despite the lack of a consensual final outcome document of the Review Conference the EU remained committed to strongly supporting the mandate and work of the OPCW. In this respect, the EU welcomed the Decisions on the OPCW Programme and Budget for 2019 that give a firm and solid basis to the OPCW Technical Secretariat to tackle the manifold tasks and challenges ahead.
32. The EU furthermore strongly supported the initiative to convene the Special Session of the Conference of States Parties (CSP) to the CWC on 26-27 June 2018 in order to preserve and uphold the CWC and the global prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. The conference was the appropriate response to repeated use of these weapons since 2012 in Syria, Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The EU welcomed therefore the adoption of OPCW Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 dated 27 June 2018 entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons". The European Council in its conclusions of 28 June committed the EU to supporting the implementation of the Decision of the Special Conference. In this context, the EU carried out a demarche to a large number of CWC States Parties asking for their constructive approach to the implementation of the OPCW Decision and support for successful outcome of the CWC Fourth Review Conference.



33. On 26 February 2018, the Council adopted Decision 2018/294/CFSP which extends the duration of EU Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP until the end of 2018 in order to allow for the full implementation of the activities beyond the latter's expire date. In parallel, the Council discussed new, seventh consecutive draft Council Decision in support of the OPCW with a view to its adoption in the beginning of 2019. The new Decision will extend the EU support to OPCW core activities (such as national implementation, international cooperation, universalisation, the Africa Programme) over the period 2019-2022. It will also provide substantial contribution to the upgrading of the OPCW Laboratory into Centre for Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the OPCW Decision "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons".
34. The EU continued its firm support for the work of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission and the Declaration Assessment Team in investigating reports of chemical weapons use in Syria and seeking to verify Syria's declaration. In this context, on 10 December 2018, the Council adopted decision 2018/1943/CFSP extending the implementation period of Decision 2017/2303/CFSP for the provision of satellite imagery in support of the OPCW operations in Syria by twelve months.
35. In October 2018, the EU adopted a new regime of restrictive measures to address the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542.

## BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

36. Following the agreement at the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) held on 4-8 December 2017 on an intersessional work programme the EU continued its strong political and financial support for the full and effective implementation and universalisation of the Convention, including through comprehensive implementation by the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the EU's fourth assistance programme laid down in Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP. Two regional workshops supporting the universal adherence to the Convention in Africa and four regional workshops fostering dialogue on science and technology among countries from Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa were organised. Seven more workshops and trainings took place in the countries benefiting from extended assistance programmes on the national implementation of the Convention.
37. The EU was also actively and constructively engaged in the discussions during the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention held on 4-7 December 2018. While reaffirming its strong support to the BTWC as a key pillar of the rules-based international system the EU expressed its deep concern over the critical financial situation of the Convention and urged for urgent measures in order to guarantee financial stability and ensure proper implementation of the intersessional programme. The EU welcomed the start of the intersessional process and the technical and substantive discussions during the BTWC Meetings of Experts conducted on 7-16 August 2018 and supported taking follow-up actions by the MSP. It is therefore encouraging that the BTWC MSP in December was able to reach consensus on measures to help ensure financial stability and predictability over the next year. Nevertheless, the EU will keep under close scrutiny the financial situation in the BTWC which will be reviewed by the MSP in 2019. At the same time, it is regrettable that no consensus was reached on substantial issues to reflect the outcomes of the BTWC Meeting of Experts held in August 2018. The EU supported the work of the BTWC meetings in 2018 by submitting a working paper and organising several side-events.

38. Since 2006 the EU has provided substantive support to BTWC core activities through four consecutive assistance programmes. A fifth Decision in support of the BTWC covering the period 2019-2022 was adopted by the Council in January 2019. Thus, the overall financial amount of the EU support to the BTWC will increase to almost EUR 10 million. This also includes funding for the UNSGM thereby enabling UNODA to send rostered qualified experts to training courses organised by member States.

## **BALLISTIC MISSILES**

### **Hague Code of Conduct**

39. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is the result of efforts by the international community to regulate the area of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The HCoC is the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument relating to the spread of ballistic missiles. The EU has strongly supported the Code since its inception. All EU Member States have subscribed to it.

40. By subscribing to the HCoC, members voluntarily commit themselves politically to provide pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. Subscribing countries also commit themselves to submitting an annual declaration of their country's policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.

41. Since the signing and entry into force of the politically-binding HCoC in November 2002 in The Hague, Netherlands, the number of signatories has increased from 93 to 139.

42. The EU plays a leading role in promoting and supporting the universality, full implementation and enhanced functioning, which are the three main objectives of the Code. During more than a decade, the EU Council has adopted, in the CFSP framework, a series of Decisions/ Joint Actions that have provided the means for continued EU support to the Hague Code of Conduct and to missile non-proliferation, in general. Through these Council Decisions, the EU finances HCoC outreach activities, including side-events, research papers, expert meetings and regional awareness seminars. These activities are carried out by the Paris-based *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, usually also involving the rotating HCoC Chair.
43. With Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017, the EU continues to promote the subscription to the Code and ultimately its universality; support the full implementation of the Code; promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all; reinforce the Code's visibility and raise public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; and to explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.

### **Missile Technology Control Regime**

44. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among countries that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, including categorising those commonly accepted as being capable of delivering WMD. The MTCR guidelines and control lists constitute an international best practices benchmark for controlling exports of missile-related items and technologies.

45. The EU supports the adoption of a stronger Public Statement to reflect international concerns about the ballistic missile launches and significant missile technology development by Iran and the DPRK. An important issue in the MTCR context for the EU remains the blocked accession to the regime of Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Moreover, the prolonged lack of chairmanship of the Regime constitutes an issue of particular concern.

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND CBRN RISK MITIGATION**

46. The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture. It is the first international instrument to deal in an integrated and comprehensive manner with weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. UNSCR 1540 (2004) establishes binding obligations on all countries. These aim to prevent and deter non-state actors from obtaining access to such weapons and weapon-related materials. Adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Resolution requires all countries to adopt the necessary legislation barring non-state actors from getting nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and to establish appropriate domestic controls for related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. The 2016 comprehensive review process of UNSCR 1540 reaffirmed its centrality, importance and authority as reflected in UNSCR 2325.

47. In order to help implement the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review and to support the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, on 11 May 2017 the European Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809, in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Council Decision covers a period of 36 months and is being implemented by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in New York which has sub-contracted some of the implementation to the OSCE in Vienna. The EU shares the objectives of assisting countries in identifying specific technical assistance, of raising awareness of relevant technical assistance programmes, as well as of enhancing cooperation with international and regional Organisations, in support of national capacity building efforts.
48. The EU CBRN risk mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative is a worldwide capacity building programme, gathering 61 partner countries grouped around 8 regional Secretariats, located in the following regions: African Atlantic Façade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; Gulf Cooperation Council Countries; Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; South East Asia; South East and Eastern Europe.
49. The CBRN CoE is financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN materials, strengthen partner countries' preparedness, and nurture security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a bottom-up, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. These platforms develop policy proposals and capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported through several regional cooperation projects funded under the initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 66 regional projects have been financed. The budget for the initiative for the 10 –year period starting in 2010 amounts to EUR 250 million.

50. The Centres of Excellence network is now well developed, and allowed the EU to undertake training table-top and field cross-border exercises on matters including civil protection, incident response, bio-security, and waste management in the framework of CoE projects, in order to enhance visibility and concretely assess their impact. Moreover, the Initiative is mature enough to support further actions addressing security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructures, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, as well as to further develop cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual use items. The CoE model has also been welcomed by the EU Court of Auditors<sup>1</sup>, followed by Council Conclusions on 26 October 2015<sup>2</sup>.

51. In October 2017, the Commission presented – as a part of wider Counterterrorism Package – an Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risk. The new Action Plan, building on the achievements of the EU CBRN Action Plan 2010-2015, proposes a wide range of measures to improve preparedness, resilience and coordination at EU level. It proposes creation of a more security-focused CBRN architecture at the EU level, emphasising the need to better use existing resources and to pool together existing expertise. The Action Plan calls also for strengthening EU CBRN preparedness and response through cross-border and cross-sectoral training and exercises. It underlines the need to include whenever relevant border and customs authorities and military partners. The Action Plan underlines also the importance of close links between internal and external CBRN security-related activities as well as cooperation with specialised multilateral organisations such as IAEA, OPCW or Interpol. Implementation of the Action Plan will be supported financially via the Internal Security Fund – Police.

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<sup>1</sup> Court of Auditors Special Report 17/2014

<sup>2</sup> Council conclusions 12747/15 from 8 October 2015

52. The CBRN Action Plan has received scientific and technical support from a range of research projects funded by the Secure Society Programme under the 7th Framework Programme. The research covers the entire crisis management cycle from prevention to recovery. Activities to identify standardisation needs could lead to ‘European Norms’ standards. The Horizon 2020 programme will strengthen on-going work in CBRN research through focused topics.

## THINK TANKS

53. Based on Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July 2010, the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been actively supported by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium which started its activities in January 2011. On 26 February 2018 the Council adopted Decision 2018/299/CFSP which further extends the EU support for the activities of the Consortium for the period 2018-2021 by building on the achievements to date and by adding new projects.



54. The Consortium's activities increased EU visibility vis-à-vis third countries and civil society and contributed substantially to EU policy shaping in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament. The Consortium provides a platform for informal contacts among practitioners and stimulates dialogue between different stakeholders. Its activities have helped raise awareness of the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. It has an extensive network of more than 70 think tanks across Europe.
55. The Seventh EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, organised by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, took place on 18-19 December 2018 in Brussels.

## EXPORT CONTROLS

56. In 2018 the EU continued to regularly update its regulations to reflect developments in multilateral export control regimes. Thus, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation on 10 October 2018<sup>3</sup> updating the EU control list in line with decisions taken in multilateral export control regimes in 2017, and introduced changes to e.g. the control of genetic elements and genetically-modified organisms, dimensional inspection or measuring systems, high energy cells, intrusion software and space launch vehicles.
57. The Dual-Use Coordination Group continued to support the effective and consistent implementation of export controls in the EU. New functionalities were introduced to the 'Dual-Use Electronic System' which improved information and technical exchanges within the EU. The EU initiated a process to define industry compliance guidelines and conducted a public consultation on the subject in Oct. –Nov. 2018. The EU also kicked off an "electronic licensing" project to support the use of electronic licensing systems by competent authorities. An annual report<sup>4</sup> was published to ensure transparency regarding export control and licensing activities, and an Export Control Forum was organised on 13 December 2018, bringing together stakeholders from Member States, industry and civil society<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> See OJ No L319 of 14 December 2018, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc\\_157592.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157592.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/events/index.cfm?id=1951>

58. The review of EU export control policy continued. The Council and the European Parliament actively discussed the Commission's legislative proposal for modernising EU export controls and their adaptation to rapidly changing technological, economic and political circumstances. The European Parliament adopted a 1st reading position on 17 January 2018 while discussions in the Council continued. Moreover, the Commission adopted a “Brexit contingency” legislative proposal on 19 December 2018 to mitigate the potential effects of Brexit in case no Withdrawal Agreement can be agreed upon (COM(2018)891).
59. EU positions and statements were coordinated as appropriate in preparation for the relevant meetings of the export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary meeting in Jurmala (11-15 June 2018) and the Australia Group Plenary meeting in Paris (7-8 June 2018).
60. The implementation of the EU P2P Export Control Programme to enhance the effectiveness of export control systems of dual-use items and related materials, equipment and technologies continued. The Programme currently covers 36 countries from six regions. In 2017 it was extended to enable cooperation with Lebanon. . Two new regional initiatives, the Export Control Targeted Initiatives, were launched in 2017 and 2018 with the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine and the International Science and Technology Centre in Kazakhstan, which cover 12 countries.

61. Intensive coordination of the EU P2P Export Control Programme with the US Department of State Export Control and related Border Security Programme continued. Joint EU-US seminars were organised to define common impact indicators and coordinate field assistance. In 2018, the EU organised the Second Dialogue on Export Control Governance, a conference that reunited the four export control regimes with partner organisations and countries. An annual EU P2P Summer University is organised for partners of the EU export control outreach programmes. The EU P2P portal (<https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>) continued to serve as a platform for all EU outreach programmes on export control of military and dual-use goods, with the aim of customising information exchange with the EU partner countries. The programme is funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

## **SPACE**

62. The EU encouraged the continuation of work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), on principles of responsible behaviour in outer space and on transparency and confidence building measures. The EU supported the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) Working Group on Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. Since the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities were not adopted in 2018, the EU will continue to work with all partners to conclude the negotiations.

63. In June, the EU successfully participated in the UNISPACE+50 High-level Segment of COPUOS in Vienna. In its statement the EU underlined the importance of transparency and confidence building measures and of promoting principles of responsible behaviour in outer space in the framework of the United Nations. The EU pointed to the value in agreeing a non-legally binding instrument as a way to achieve those objectives. The EU and its Member States also promoted space security and safety at the GGE on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the Conference on Disarmament including its Subsidiary Body 3, the UN Disarmament Commission and the UN General Assembly. The EU will strive to ensure that the Council Conclusions of December 2017 and February 2018 on UNISPACE + 50 are reflected in the 2030 Space Agenda and its implementation plan, which are to be presented to the UNGA in 2020-2021.

## **WMD NON-PROLIFERATION CLAUSES**

64. In accordance with its WMD non-proliferation policy, and in line with the 2003 Council Conclusions, the EU continued to work on the mainstreaming of WMD non-proliferation commitments in agreements with 3rd countries. Hence, negotiations were finalised in 2018 with MERCOSUR on a WMD clause in the new Agreements with this group of countries. Furthermore, negotiations continued on a WMD clause for new Agreements with Azerbaijan, Chile and Kirgizstan.

## **OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA**

### **G7**

65. The EU continued to participate actively in the meetings of the G7 Non-proliferation Directors' Group (NPDG). In 2018 the EU took part in the meetings under the presidency of Canada which focused on topical non-proliferation and disarmament issues as well as on achieving further progress in the coordination of the work of NPDG and the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, in particular by establishing a closer link between policy priorities and project activities.

66. The EU is also committed to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, in particular through the technical assistance (threat assessment, national action plans) provided worldwide by the EU Centres of Excellence Initiative on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation.

## **POLITICAL DIALOGUE MEETINGS**

67. The EEAS Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation held non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings with Brazil, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US. He conducted numerous bilateral consultations with various stakeholders in the margins of major fora such as the UNGA First Committee, the meeting of the second Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the IAEA General Conference. Bilateral consultations were held with the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, among others.