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BETWEEN EUROPOL AND THE MEMBER STATES AND AMONG THE  
MEMBER STATES RESPECTIVELY"  
REPORT ON FINLAND

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# RESTREINT UE



COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 6 April 2004

5356/1/04

REV 1

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CRIMORG 5

**EVALUATION REPORT ON THE**  
**THIRD ROUND OF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS**  
**"EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN EUROPOL AND**  
**THE MEMBER STATES AND AMONG THE MEMBER STATES RESPECTIVELY"**  
**REPORT ON FINLAND**

DECLASSIFIED

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. Following the adoption of the Joint Action of 5 December 1997, a mechanism for evaluating the application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organised crime was established.
- 1.2. Following a proposal originating from the Swedish delegation and taken up by the Presidency to evaluate the supply of information and intelligence to Europol and the exchange of information and intelligence between Member States, the MDG adopted the proposal at its meeting on 3 and 4 June 2002.
- 1.3. At its meeting on 3 December 2002 the MDG approved the questionnaire on the third round of mutual evaluations on the topic "exchange of information and intelligence between Europol and the Member States and among the Member States respectively".
- 1.4. Following discussion at the MDG meeting on 9 January 2003, a list showing the order of Member States to be visited was agreed. Finland is the third Member State to be evaluated during the third round of evaluations.
- 1.5. The questionnaires and the objectives of this evaluation are contained in document 11679/3/02 REV 3 CRIMORG 71.
- 1.6. The experts in charge of this evaluation were: Mrs. Elenor GROTH (Sweden), Mrs. Noirín O'SULLIVAN (Ireland), Mr. Evangelos LOUKOUMIS (Greece). Two observers, Mr. Antonio SACCONI (EUROPOL) and Mr. Michael HAUSER (Commission), were also present together with the General Secretariat of the Council.
- 1.7. The evaluation team has prepared the following report with the assistance of the Council Secretariat, on the basis of the observations and conclusions of the experts in the team together with the Finnish authorities' answers to the questionnaire.

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1.8. The report first deals with the general information and structure (2), followed by the internal organisation of the exchange of information (3) and of the external exchange of information (4) and then deals more specifically with Europol (5). In the last chapter, the experts make a global and technical evaluation and then propose some recommendations to enhance cooperation and effectiveness in the exchange of information within Finland and with other Member States and Europol.

## 2. GENERAL INFORMATION AND STRUCTURES<sup>1</sup>

### 2.1. LEGAL BASIS<sup>2</sup>

#### 2.1.1

There is in principle four legal acts governing the handling of police information in Finland. The first one is the police personal data file act (509/1995); the second one is the police act (493/1995); the third one is the pre trial investigation act (499/1987) and the last one is the coercive measures act (450/1987).

In simple terms it can be said that the Finnish police authorities may submit to Interpol, Europol and the Member States such data that are necessary in solving crime and to which the Finnish police authorities themselves have the right of access. This is referred to in the regulations of the Police Personal Data Files Act and its Section 20, which has references to Sections 17 and 18 of the same Act. (Police Personal Data File Act -509/1995- amendments up to 658/1998 included).

There are similar regulations for other law enforcement authorities in their relevant legislation as there are for the police in Act on the Processing of Personal data by the police.

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<sup>1</sup> This part of the report is based partly on the answers to the questionnaire.

<sup>2</sup> After the evaluation visit the personal data file Act (509/1995) was replaced with the "Act on the processing of personal data by the police" (761/2003). For most of the relevant parts, this new legislation has no influence on the content of the report.

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## 2.1.2

However, sensitive data shall be delivered only when it is necessary for:

- ensuring the security of the State.
- preventing an immediate danger for life and health or preventing a notable damage to, and loss of, property.
- preventing and investigating an offence which may lead to imprisonment.
- to prevent and investigate crime falling within the scope of competence of the European Police Office and other forms of serious crime.

## 2.1.3

The National Bureau of Investigation shall have the right to release data from the data system of the European Police Office to a police unit or to unit of an another law enforcement agency or a member of police personnel to prevent and investigate crime falling within the scope of competence of the European Police Office. The police have also the right to use this data for other purposes when it is necessary for:

- ensuring the security of the State.
- preventing an immediate danger for life and health or preventing a notable damage to, and loss of, property.
- preventing and investigating an offence which may lead to at least one years imprisonment (Act on the Processing of Personal Data by the Police 30§).

Identical legislation applies to the other law enforcement bodies.

## 2.1.4

On the conditions referred in the police personal data file act, the police shall have the right to deliver data from a police personal file to the International Criminal Police Organization (I.C.P.O.- Interpol) or to the police authority of a Member State of the International Criminal Police Organization or to another authority of such a State whose duties include securing the judicial and social order, maintaining public order and safety or preventing and investigating offences and forwarding criminal cases for the consideration of charges.

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## 2.1.5

The police shall have the right to deliver data from a police personal data file to an authority other than the authority of a Member State of the International Criminal Police Organization referred to in paragraph 1, if the data are necessary for:

- ensuring the security of the State.
- preventing an immediate danger for health or life or to prevent a notable damage to, or a loss of, property; or preventing and investigating such an offence which, when committed in Finland, may lead to imprisonment.

## 2.1.6

The police shall have the right to deliver data concerning firearms, parts of weapons, cartridges and obtaining, possessing, transferring, importing and exporting of especially dangerous ammunition to such authorities of foreign States who are responsible for firearms control, if the disclosure of data is necessary for the purposes of firearms control.

## 2.1.7

The police shall have the right to release data from a police personal data file to the European Police Office and the national units of the Member States of the European Police Office and for recording it in the data system of the European Police Office to prevent and investigate crime falling within the scope of competence of the European Police Office. The data shall be released via the National Bureau of Investigation. The National Bureau of Investigation may release data to the data system of the European Police Office also with the aid of a technical interface. (9.1.1998/4).

Other law enforcement authorities have the right to release data from their respective data files to Europol through NBI.

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## 2.1.8

The police shall have a right to release information referred to in article 94 of the Schengen Convention necessary for the purposes referred to in articles 95-100 of the Schengen Convention to the competent Schengen authorities and for recording them in the central database of the Schengen Information System. Information must be released via the National Bureau of Investigation. The National Bureau of Investigation may release the information via a technical interface or in a machine-readable form. On transborder delivery of data, it shall also be in force what has been separately decreed or stipulated by international agreements binding Finland.

## 2.1.9

Section 25 a of the Act on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (849/2001) headed Communication of Confidential Data states, that the confidentiality restrictions mentioned in the Act on the Openness of Government Activities (621/1999) or in other regulations do not preclude the authorities executing a request for international legal assistance from submitting documents containing confidential information to be used as evidence in criminal matters, unless the law prohibits or restricts the communication of this information or document to a foreign State or its use as evidence.

## 2.2 STRUCTURES

### 2.2.1

Information exchange between Europol and Finland goes according to Europol convention from the national unit via ELO to Europol and vice versa. Because the Finnish ELO is employed directly by the national unit and thus a part of the national unit, direct contacts from investigation leaders to the ELO are also possible when there is an urgent need for operational assistance. In these situations the national unit in Finland is informed immediately.

In information exchange with other EU-countries Finland uses the Interpol channel, the SIRENE – network, BDL-channel, CIS-network and with countries of the Baltic Sea region also contacts in the framework of the Baltic Sea Task Force. In the EU Finland has one liaison officer stationed in Spain.



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## 2.2.2

In Finland the police have general competence for Europol mandated areas and Customs and the Frontier Guard have limited competencies for these areas. All law enforcement authorities are civil authorities although the Frontier Guard has a military-based organisation. The Police, the Customs and the Frontier Guard do not have a joint central unit for collecting and distributing data, nor a unit co-ordinating intelligence matters. However, in practice the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of Investigation has access to intelligence gathered in investigations by customs and frontier guard authorities. The other law enforcement authorities also have access to intelligence gathered in investigations by the police. The police, customs and frontier guard high officials also hold regular meetings in order to co-ordinate their respective activities.

## 3. INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

### 3.1. STRUCTURES

#### 3.1.1

The police and customs have overlapping mandates mostly in the area of illegal drug trafficking and the police and frontier guard in the area of illegal immigration.

When the question concerns information about organised crime mainly dealing with narcotics, with a target orientated approach the target groups to be investigated by each agency are agreed upon based on all available intelligence on a high level and thereby it is known to all agencies concerned who investigates what.

Considering that mandated are overlapping, depending in some areas of their responsibility, what is generally said about the police also applies to the Customs and the Frontier guards.

#### 3.1.2

The investigators and those in charge of intelligence gathering then hold regular meetings where information about the investigations is exchanged. The investigators and intelligence officials also have unofficial contacts. Finally each agency has access to each others criminal investigations register.

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## 3.1.3

The co-operation between the illegal immigration desk and the Frontier Guard is primarily based on a liaison officer network. The frontier guard has a liaison officer at NBI and the NBI has a liaison officer at Helsinki airport. The illegal immigration desk begins each day with a meeting with the Frontier Guard liaison officer in order to get the new relevant information.

## 3.1.4

When Finland says there is no central unit to collect information that means that the police, customs and frontier guard doesn't have a joint central unit. The Criminal Investigation Division of NBI however is the national centre for criminal intelligence and Board of Customs is the national centre for criminal intelligence and they gather information from other agencies as well, as described previously.

## 3.2. CHOICE OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

### 3.2.1

In a bilateral routine police matter Interpol would normally be employed, inside and outside EU countries. In matters belonging to the scope of the Schengen agreement the Schengen information system is used. The liaison officers in Europol have been very successfully used to relay operative requests of administrative assistance and mutual legal aid requests in urgent matters involving two or more EU-countries in addition to Finland. BDL is primarily used as an information exchange channel for matters falling under the competence of the Security Police in Finland. The choice of channel is finally always depending of the situation at hand.

### 3.2.2

The Europol liaison officers naturally relay the messages between Europol and the national unit, but they have very successfully been employed also to relay operative requests especially in cases involving two or more EU-countries in addition to Finland. The liaison officers have also coordinated and jointly with the investigation leader in Finland led international law enforcement operations.

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## 3.2.3

In operational matters involving two or more EU-countries in addition to Finland and in general in matters that require the urgent attention of a competent authority in another EU-country Finland has got very positive results from using the liaison officers in Europol. Finally the choice of channel is made case by case.

## 4. EXTERNAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

### 4.1. DATA EXCHANGE PROCESS

#### 4.1.1

Finland prefers the Europol channel especially when an operative matter involving several EU-countries is at hand. An example of this would be a situation where a controlled delivery through several EU countries has to be arranged. However the channel is chosen finally always on case to case basis.

Emphasis on certain countries regarding information exchange is based solely on that crime in Finland has connections to these countries.

#### 4.1.2

Finland does not consider its data protection legislation to cause impediments in exchange of information with European bodies or counterparts. They have never caused impediments to the surrender of information from Finland to other EU-countries. In some instances foreign authority have refused to recognise the right of Finnish law enforcement agencies to make international requests of mutual legal assistance.

#### 4.1.3

According to a declaration made by Finland to the 1959 European Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Legal Matters law enforcement authorities in Finland are to be considered a legal authority when performing pre-trial investigation. This has not been recognised in some individual instances and assistance asked by Finnish law enforcement authorities has been denied on the grounds that the request for assistance (a letter rogatory) should be signed by a judge or a prosecutor.

Information requested from other EU-countries is received as a main rule in time.

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## 4.1.4

The joint unit that Finland is involved in with other EU-states is the Baltic Sea Task Force on Organised Crime. Europol is not involved in the communication process of this unit, because it involves Russia and the EU-candidate countries of the Baltic sea region that don't yet have access to Europol as a communication channel.

## 4.2. INFORMATION OWNERSHIP

Referring to the paragraph mentioned above, no internal data legislation causes impediments for delivering information abroad.

## 5. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND EUROPOL

### 5.1. DEFINITION OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

#### 5.1.1

There is no legal definition of what is understood as information and intelligence with regard to an exchange with Europol.

All information necessary to solving or preventing crime falling under the mandate of Europol can be delivered to Europol. In principle information under the competency of Europol could be channelled at the same time to one or more international law agencies.

#### 5.1.2

In principle the national unit can receive all information described in the questionnaire. In practise the national unit has not refused to give Europol information on the above mentioned grounds.

As soon as the national unit receives information that is necessary to be forwarded to Europol such information is forwarded to Europol. The stage of investigation at which the national unit receives such information varies and depends on when the information has been received and fed into the registries.

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## 5.2. EUROPOL NATIONAL UNIT

### 5.2.1

Finland's Europol National Unit is the National Bureau of Investigation, which is a national unit fighting serious and organised crime. The NBI works directly under the Supreme Police Command of the Ministry of the Interior. Within the NBI organisation, it is the Criminal Intelligence Division that takes care of the ENU duties. Out of the 607 staff members of the National Bureau of Investigation, 99 work in the Criminal Intelligence Division (December 2002). The total number of people working for the police in Finland is about 11,000.

### 5.2.2

Information exchange between Europol and Finland goes according Convention from the national unit via the ELO to Europol and vice versa. Because the Finnish ELO is employed directly by the national unit and thus a part of the national unit, direct contacts from investigation leaders to the ELO are also possible when there is an urgent need for operational assistance. In these situations the national unit in Finland is informed immediately.

The role of the NBI as a Europol National Unit is made known in all administrative staff training dealing with international police duties.

### 5.2.3

In addition to taking care of the ENU duties, The Criminal Intelligence Division of the NBI also embraces the National Central Bureau of Interpol and the SIRENE Bureau. The Criminal Intelligence Division of NBI has the overall national responsibility for all international exchange of police information. The unit has access to all national registers in police use, enabling the unit to work independently with data acquisition. The Intelligence Services do not do field work of their own, but the data are entered in the registers by investigating police units.

### 5.2.4

As stated before, the customs and frontier guard, which have independent data systems, both have a limited competency. The methods of information sharing with them vary. The Criminal Intelligence Division has direct access to all police registers.

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The follow-up on crime is organised so that the intelligence employees responsible for the follow-up on different fields of crime are similarly responsible for communicating relevant information to Europol. The management of Criminal Intelligence Division is not able at the moment to follow the transmission of information to Europol in real time. However, measures have been taken in the unit in order to intensify the follow-up on these processes.

### 5.2.5

In principle there is no difference in the handling of information between information transmitted by Finland to the ELO at EUROPOL for bilateral purposes or those transmitted to Europol itself for the Europol feeding. When the information referred is related to an ongoing investigation the permission of the investigation leader is needed for forwarding the information.

### 5.2.6

The current system does not provide a process through which it can be ensured that all relevant information will actually be sent to Europol as soon as it is received. The process of relaying information is based on the professionalism of the officers in charge of the process and can be only controlled retrospectively.

### 5.2.7

The Finnish ENU has contact with liaison officers from all relevant law enforcement authorities: the customs, the frontier guards and the security police. The national unit has not sent contact officers to other law enforcement agencies.

The ENU officials organise regular training for different authorities.

## 5.3. USE OF INFORMATION AND EUROPOL ANALYSIS CAPABILITY

Finland holds a positive view towards AWFs. The aim is to take part in those AWFs that carry national relevance. Finland regards as nationally relevant such AWFs that concern themselves with either phenomena already existing in Finland or phenomena that are feared to be spreading to Finland. When it is a phenomenon that doesn't yet exist inside the territory Finland naturally doesn't have information for the AWF, but still is interested in the analysis produced.

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AWF's, in which Finland is involved with, are considered necessary for national law enforcement agencies.

## 5.4. PERCEPTION OF EUROPOL VALUE

### 5.4.1

The remote geographical situation of Finland as well as its small population causes that many phenomena of international organised crime appear less significant or in different forms than in many other EU-countries and therefore some issues handled by Europol have less significance to Finland than to many other countries. However in those areas that do have greater significance in the scope of criminality inside the territory Finland consider Europol's role, work and results to be good.

### 5.4.2

Europol could develop its functions by concentrating more on organised crime in general as opposed to certain types of criminal behaviour. Finland would like to see a more target orientated view on organised criminal groups.

### 5.4.3

Finnish authorities consider the liaison office in Europol has achieved excellent results in supporting police operations by co-operating with other liaison offices and through them with national law enforcement authorities. They have repeatedly been very successful for instance in helping arrange controlled deliveries and surveillances on a very short notice through several European countries as well as in arranging the necessary permits for various coercive measures.

At the moment authorities are happy with the quality of information flow between Europol and themselves.

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## 6. EVALUATION BY EXPERT TEAM

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

#### 6.1.1

The evaluation of Finland, which took place at the end of September 2003, clearly revealed a country with effective organisation in combating and preventing serious international crime. Finland, with a territory of 338 000 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 5,2 million, also has to be seen in its territorial context in the far north-east of the territories of the European Union, with roughly 1260 km of borders shared with Russia. This point is worth emphasising if one bears in mind that, according to the Finnish authorities, about 90% of international crime originates in the Baltic States and in Russia and/or criminal organisations connected with Russia. It seems important too to note that Finland is accustomed to developing active international cooperation through regional cooperation such as the Baltic Sea Task Force or Nordic cooperation.

#### 6.1.2

Furthermore, within Finnish territory the authorities have created the PTR (Poliisi, Tulli, Rajavartiolaitos) network. The Government has introduced a regulation on police, customs and Frontier Guard (*PTR*) cooperation <sup>1</sup>, which came into force on 25 March 2001, i.e. the same day that Finland and the other Nordic countries began applying the *Schengen* legislation. The regulation aims at promoting cooperation between these services such that the fields of activity and parallel duties assigned to these authorities will be covered in an appropriate, economical and flexible manner. Under the regulation the *PTR* are each responsible for their own part in preserving the internal security of the State in accordance with the legislation covering their respective fields of competence. The regulation requires the *PTR* to agree on the tasks on which they will cooperate, draw up cooperation plans and issue joint instructions and guidelines for the administrations under their control. For all the analyses below, the decisive role of action by police and customs authorities must also be stressed; the judicial authorities (public prosecutors) are informed about cases in progress for information only.

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<sup>1</sup> (257/22.3.2001).



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## 6.1.3

Under Article 15 of the pre-trial investigation act <sup>1</sup>, the police shall inform the prosecutor of a criminal case that has come to the police for investigation when someone can be suspected of committing an offence. However, informing is not necessary if the matter is a simple one. This is a general provision and covers all those with responsibility for enforcement, such as customs services.

## 6.1.4

In general, the evaluators confirmed that international rules were well applied in terms of European cooperation, and emphasised that highly effective technical tools had been set up, such as the communication centre under the authority of the Criminal Intelligence Division. Finland seems to have sufficient structures in place for the fight against international crime, even if some rationalisation of local police districts, currently being examined by the authorities, would undoubtedly facilitate information exchanges. The size of the country combined with still relatively low crime levels and well-established Nordic cooperation practices make information exchanges relatively straightforward. However, the imminent integration into the EU of the accession states and the exporting of new crimes, particularly from the Baltic States, have drawn the Finnish authorities' attention. In the face of these circumstances, the authorities are planning to strengthen regional cooperation, particularly by sending out or redeploying liaison officers, but they also want to see greater Europol involvement.

## 6.2 GENERAL COMMENTS AND STRUCTURES

### 6.2.1

The Finnish police force had a workforce of 10 974 persons in 2002 (of whom 7744 were police officers) and is divided into 90 police districts and 5 regional forces. The Helsinki police can be seen as a *de facto* sixth force on account of its missions and its importance, which is connected to the way the population is concentrated in the capital. This importance is also shown by its organisation chart, which links the Helsinki police directly to the Ministry of the Interior, with responsibility for its own budget.

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<sup>1</sup> Pre-trial investigation act, 449/1987.

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## 6.2.2

In general all criminal inquiries are placed under the authority of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The Pre-trial Investigation Act provides the Finnish Law Enforcement agencies (PTR) a great deal of flexibility in deciding, authorising and circulating requests for assistance to other countries. The NBI is both a law enforcement and a judicial authority according to the 1959 Convention on mutual legal assistance.

## 6.2.3

The money laundering clearing house is located organisationally within the NBI, but NBI agents who do not belong to the money laundering department do not have access to the data recorded by the money laundering clearing house. An indexing system simply enables other NBI agents to find out whether or not the database held by the clearinghouse contains information <sup>1</sup> potentially relevant to the inquiry services. It is interesting to note that money laundering clearing house agents do, on the other hand, have access to all the police's computerised databases for cases in which they are involved.

## 6.2.4

The customs service has a total workforce of about 2500 persons, covers 5 districts nation-wide and is responsible for control of goods and associated customs offences. However, the customs may also investigate offences under ordinary criminal law. This situation frequently leads to close cooperation with police forces, particularly in terms of information exchange (see the chapter on internal exchange of information). To provide actual technical cooperation, customs have seconded liaison officers to most of the regional police district.

## 6.2.5

Finally, the Frontier Guard service, which has a staff of 3 100 persons, is directly linked to the Ministry of the Interior. Unfortunately, the evaluation team had no opportunity to meet directly the senior management of the staff involved in this organisation, whose function is air and sea border control.

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<sup>1</sup> According to information gathered at the NBI, only 5% of cases reported lead to prosecution.

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## 6.3 INTERNAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

### 6.3.1

The lead principle of information exchange in Finland is based on a pragmatic system. Thus, the local police in the 90 districts send information to the regional districts, which may forward information they deem useful to the NBI. Local police may consult the national NBI database but some information is restricted (e.g. the computerised database of suspects, access to which is restricted to a number of authorised officials). Consequently, the information flow from the NBI to local police is less dense than in the opposite direction. Exchanges are principally carried out by means of regular so called target meetings at local, regional and national level. It is at these meetings not only that work priorities are determined but that consistency between investigations and avoidance of any overlap is ensured. These meetings take place twice yearly at regional level and twice yearly at national level. A representative of the NBI always takes part in the regional meetings. Customs and frontier guard also take part. It would be desirable for such strategic and operational meetings to be more frequent, both regionally and locally. The Finnish authorities explained that consideration was currently being given to attempting to identify a better strategy to increase the involvement of district police managers e.g. in improving target definitions.

### 6.3.2

According to the Finnish authorities the main operating principle when dealing with matters concerning illegal immigration is for all police, customs and immigration service authorities to send as much information as possible to the NBI's Criminal Intelligence Division. In general such dispatches are very diverse in form, though e-mail is frequently used.

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That is how all asylum applications formulated on entering or within the country are sent systematically to the CID and how the Frontier Guard systematically submit information on any denial of entry to the country. Not only Customs and police services send their information to the CID but the latter also receives all relevant information from liaison officers posted abroad. Every morning a meeting is held with CID officials to analyse and decide how to respond to information received. This system works well, although the CID Management admits that on occasion information held by the Helsinki police is sent late or that some difficulty occurs in its transmission. The reason for this seems to be essentially the size and partial autonomy of the Helsinki police. This has however caused no practical problems to the overall gathering of intelligence related to illegal immigration.

### 6.3.3

If one takes into account the role and importance of the police districts it would be useful if there were a protocol to fix rules for the transmission of information to the NBI, in order better to define and to avoid non-systematic information transfer, which could be prejudicial, if only by chance, to the success or optimal conduct of investigations in progress. These rules could be detailed through the written orders given by the Supreme Police Command of the ministry of Interior concerning criminal intelligence and surveillance and concerning the target definition in serious crime prevention which contain elements dealing with information exchange.

### 6.3.4

The national police has a register of suspects, known as the RIKI, and an intelligence register containing essentially soft information, known as EPRI. The EPRI register also contains information on organised crime.(register of crime report). Since the registers are different in nature, only a minority of police officers are permitted access to the EPRI database (about 800 officers). It is interesting to note, regarding EPRI, that if there are different inquiries concerning a single person or a single case, the system automatically provides a link so that all the investigators are informed and can have a full view of the case concerned.

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## 6.3.5

Customs services can access and also enter information into the RIKI database, which is a technical part of police's RIKI database, and police has a unlimited technical access to customs RIKI database. The customs authorities have developed their own intelligence database, the VALVIS. This database essentially collates intelligence, and it is not compatible with the police database. Furthermore, the database is not accessible to the police for technical reasons only. Nothing in the current legislation obliges customs to enter information into the RIKI database. Furthermore, the rules do not oblige either the police or customs to check whether the other service is working on a given case, where applicable. It is true that this gap is partly compensated for by the presence of customs liaison officers in regional police districts and also one liaison officer in the NBI. But even for the liaison officers, all requests to consult files require prior police authorisation. According to legislation that came into force 1.10. 2003 customs do have the right to get access to EPRI, technically the access has not yet been arranged.

Although the experts accept that this situation could be justified by the fact that customs and police competencies are not identical, it seems clearly worthwhile, in the context of a reform project in progress at Government level, to investigate the possibility of closer cooperation between customs and police to strengthen cooperation locally, regionally and nationally. Moreover, as the organised criminal gangs are not committing their crimes according to the competencies of law enforcement, some inconsistencies may occur.

## 6.3.6

In the same way, since the customs services are considering a new database for information gathering, it would undoubtedly be opportune for customs and police to work closely together to formulate a protocol format to rationalise intelligence gathering, which at present appears to be done without any specific formal procedure.

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## 6.3.7

The NBI gives working instructions to give an impetus to the fight against crime and since 1992 the system has operated in the form of instructions to be followed. But for some time now the NBI has been setting "target orders". The concept arose from regional meetings at the end of which priorities and choices are defined for the attainment of a certain number of objectives. Subsequently those objectives become national priorities <sup>1</sup>. It seems clear that such pragmatic work could without question achieve still better results if better inter-service (customs and police) file sharing could be developed at the same time.

## 6.4 EXTERNAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

6.4.1 In the police the entire organisation of international information exchange is under the supervisory control of the communication centre under the authority and direct responsibility of the Criminal Intelligence Division. The centre operates as a shared platform through which the channels of cooperation pass to and from Finland <sup>2</sup>. More generally, the Finnish police request access to required intelligence under the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters without having to apply through the public prosecutor. The system works because the police authorities have the required powers as a judicial authority under the Convention. Thus for instance the police will apply directly to the authorities abroad via the appropriate handling desk of the CID with, for instance, a request for telephone tapping or bank information. If it is required by a requested State that the request should come from a judicial authority, the police channel their initial application through the Finnish judicial system. No particular difficulties were mentioned during the visit in this regards.

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<sup>1</sup> These objectives are not unconnected to the priorities set by the Supreme Police Command, in return for which finance is allocated to NBI services.

<sup>2</sup> Interpol, Europol, EJM, BDL, Schengen, Nordic cooperation, PTN, multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements, Baltic Sea Task Force, liaison officers.

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## 6.4.2

As there are no national-level tools making possible all the necessary links between the various databases, requests to other countries for information often occur as an outcome of prior information exchanges between national services, especially through the liaison officers located in regional or central services. This aspect of arrangements was also analysed during the second round of evaluations. In the final report <sup>1</sup> the Finnish authorities were already at that point stressing the difficulties that this situation led to and undertook to revise their legislation so as to give customs services access to the EPRI database. During the present evaluation, the experts could see that this remained a major concern of managers in the administration. It was in fact confirmed during the visit to the NBI that a project was still in hand to make it easier to link up different files, but that it had not been possible to set a timetable for it. However, the intention to complete the project by 2004 was clearly expressed. To improve the quality of international exchanges still further there is also a project to set up Regional Crime Analysis units, modelled on what exists at national level <sup>2</sup>.

## 6.4.3

In parallel to the legal development, the Finnish Customs are updating their intelligence system. The old database called VALVIS will be moved temporarily into the EU Customs Intelligence Database in January 2004, waiting for the implementation of the new Customs intelligence system called TIEDIS in August 2004 which will be compatible with EPRI.

## 6.4.4

It is clear that improved sharing of intelligence sources between enforcement services, and more particularly between customs and police, should improve cost-effectiveness in handling international cases. While it must be recognised that the shared RIKI database is a significant step forward in improved cooperation, the setting up of a more advanced and less rigidly compartmentalised system between customs and police, particularly in connection with the EPRI database, would without doubt bring great added value to the various services involved in processing and using information at an international level.

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<sup>1</sup> 8050/1/02 REV 1 RESTREINT UE CRIMORG 20, 19/9/2002, page 27.

<sup>2</sup> These might be like regional equivalents of the NBI.

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## 6.4.5

Police management acknowledge that the number of region-level cooperation networks is an asset but can also create difficulties for police forces. For example it is sometimes complicated to decide which cooperation channel is the most appropriate. Problems also arise from the fact that different cooperation channels may have competence at the same time, which can also lead to duplication of effort for the services actively involved. Current thinking in the Finnish authorities seems to be in favour of a comprehensive reflection exercise on enhanced rationalisation of types of institutional cooperation. Such an exercise should involve all the major cooperation organisations such as Nordic cooperation, the Baltic Sea Task Force, the PTN and of course Europol.

## 6.4.6

The work could cover all fields of cooperation, therefore including those classified under third-pillar cooperation as a priority. In the short term the Criminal Intelligence Division of the NBI's main role remains information gathering and analysis but it is clear that simplification and clarification of regional cooperation should enable this office to strengthen its essential role as a high-quality information gatherer, analyst and distributor.

## 6.4.7

As explained above about the police on sending and receiving all information goes via the communication centre desk, which serves as a sort of letterbox for the services and particularly for the NBI. Then, on sending and on receiving, the specialised departments select which channel to use. More precisely, the mechanism for distributing information abroad and to national services is the sole responsibility of the CID, which prepares a distribution list in advance, according to what types of messages are to be sent. The experts noted that the communication centre desk therefore has no power of initiative on the subject (the same situation is found as regards Europol).

While this operating principle can be understood and admitted, the Finnish authorities might do well to consider giving a supervisory role to the communication centre desk so that it can react in real time if a risk of duplication becomes apparent and/or if an addressee had been left out or had been inappropriately included. The system has certain rigidities of this sort.



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One example: sometimes urgent messages are directed simultaneously to Europol and Interpol. But the CID management cannot evaluate the number of duplicate messages dispatched in this way. In any case, the communication centre desk cannot redirect a message whose final addressees have been decided in advance by the services responsible for the dossiers concerned. It would certainly be desirable to allow the CID agents to be able at least to propose a procedure, where necessary, to enable them very quickly to propose a redirecting or rerouting of misdirected or pointlessly duplicated messages<sup>1</sup>.

### 6.4.8

The NBI management told the evaluation team that they had a general preference for using the Interpol rather than the Europol channel for international cooperation. The two reasons put forward for this emerge from two observations are; the Interpol channel, information reaches the NCB of the recipient country directly and the geographical network covered is bigger than that covered by Europol. To the experts it seems that this situation does not hinder that development of cooperation with Europol. It is eloquently expressed in the following figures: 35 288 messages exchanged with Interpol in 2002, against 2 164 messages with Europol in the same year<sup>2</sup>.

### 6.4.9

Another major resource for information exchange is that of liaison officers in embassies, to facilitate assistance in criminal investigations for example. However, police authorities feel that they sometimes encounter difficulties in connection with availability of liaison officers on the ground. For instance, mismatches can occasionally occur in the use of liaison officers as a result of differences in priorities between the tasks assigned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.

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<sup>1</sup> Under the present system nothing prohibits the officers of the communications centre to independently contact the sending desk about the chosen channel or distribution list if they notice any duplication or other discrepancies.

<sup>2</sup> The annual increase in the number of messages with Europol is nevertheless steeper than with Interpol – although the flow exchanged with Interpol is also rising significantly: 22 014 in 2000 rising to 35 288 for Interpol, and 859 in 2000 rising to 2 164 for Europol over the same period.

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This type of problem in cooperation should be avoided and the experts believe it necessary for the Finnish authorities to determine clearly the role and missions of liaison officers in embassies so as to avoid disrupting, even briefly, the essential contribution of this source of cooperation, which is necessary for both Finland's investigative services and their European counterparts in cases of requests for assistance from an EU country. It would without doubt be helpful to assign a high priority to the tasks of liaison officers in post in Finnish representations abroad, after prior consultation between the relevant Ministries.

Customs don't have similar problems because customs has decided to send liaison officers abroad as customs officers not as officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### 6.4.10

As for the Baltic Sea Task Force cooperation, its effectiveness must be recognised, resulting as it does from its flexibility and from informal exchanges based on trust. However, during the evaluation it was revealed that the police services were on occasion reluctant to share information when the requesting country wanted information on a case also being handled in the requested country. Consideration is being given to legislation to overcome this hindrance to effective cooperation in this context of the Baltic Sea Task Force cooperation.

### 6.4.11

A positive point in Finland's organisation is the simplification of the entry channel for foreign investigative services. The Criminal Intelligence Division can always be used as an entry channel by all foreign law enforcement and judicial authorities. This situation simplifies the work of third-country or European services, but above all it gives the CID an overall view of requests from abroad.

This single entry point for police and judicial information is an interesting model worth studying for European countries that have numerous entry channels, since the latter situation always renders any information-processing request lengthier and more complex.

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## 6.4.12

On third-pillar subjects involving Europol or Europol Liaison officers, customs services send their requests through the NBI, knowing that joint operations can if necessary be carried out internally between customs and police. On other third-pillar subjects Customs uses its own channels.

Regarding the use of the new CIS database, Finland believes that this system is not yet effective enough as this kind of systems never are in the beginning. The experts took note that the customs services have their own intelligence database and can only recommend that, on the basis of an as yet unspecified protocol, information be shared between the various enforcement services so as to produce information with high added value arising from the pooling of information and of investigation methods. The same holds for the Frontier Guard services insofar as, like the customs services, they have an intelligence processing division.

## 6.5 EUROPOL

### 6.5.1

The Finnish authorities show great interest in Europol. They believe it has potential but would like to see its analysis tools developed. In particular, the Finnish police authorities are looking forward to the introduction of joint investigation teams.<sup>1</sup> The NBI hopes that in the future Finnish analysts will be much more closely involved in criminal analysis with Europol, but to that end it would like its domestic intelligence analysis service to be reinforced and better trained.

NBI currently has 6 analysts to monitor the activities of the major organised crime groups acting in, and impacting on Finland. This is a small number of analysts, when considering the national competence of NBI and the overall number of staff of CDI, even in a relatively low populated country such as Finland. The police have in fact an overall number of about 8,000 police officers, 10% of which is active as intelligence officers, feeding and having access to the different databases. A higher number of analysts would enrich the capacity to exploit and enrich intelligence already available and to foster a focussed collection of data both for operational support and strategic decisions.

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<sup>1</sup> Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, OJ 20.6.2002.

# RESTREINT UE

Customs are continuing to train and recruit analysts.

The size and level of analytical capabilities within the Frontier Guards was not mentioned to the expert team.

## 6.5.2

The criminal investigation services have worked with Europol on the basis of AWFs although Finland has not initiated any on its own.

The NBI is participating in 10 AWFs running at Europol, which are considered relevant for Finland in relation to the impact of the activity of organised crime in the country. The quality of the intelligence contributed to the AWFs is reported by Europol as in general very good and, in some cases outstanding. The relationship between Finland and the Europol AWF team is reported to be very close, with Liaison Officers and experts actively committed to cooperate.

## 6.5.3

In addition, the NBI is using the analytical support provided by Europol for assisting ongoing investigations in co-operation with the Spanish Police, in the so called Member States Operational Project with Europol Support (MSOPES). The support received has led to operational results such as arrests and seizures of drugs, which are considered very valuable by the Finnish Police.

## 6.5.4

However, the use of the MSOPES framework is controversial and some Member States do not participate any longer in such projects. The Joint Supervisory Body of Europol is questioning the legality of handling personal data outside the AWF framework set by the Europol Convention.

## 6.5.5

During the evaluation mission in Finland it emerged that the use of MSOPES is linked to a reluctance to initiate AWFs in case of urgent needs to receive assistance by Europol for an ongoing international investigation. This reluctance is motivated by the fact that AWF's are seen as difficult and bureaucratic to start. However it has been noted that during the last 18 months many of the factors which delayed the decision making process have been removed or improved, speeding up considerably the preparation phase and the initiation of AWFs.

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In addition, at Europol there is a clear trend to narrow the scope of AWF focussing to target groups, with a limited number of participating Member States involved in ongoing investigations.

This should encourage NBI to bring the ongoing cases handled as MSOPES under the AWF framework, either by initiating a new AWF or by participating in an existing AWF and creating a specific target group.

This would solve the legal objections and give the possibility to use the index system, which allows for discovering potential links of the targets investigated in other AWFs.

### 6.5.6

However, the Finnish authorities admit that the lack of enthusiasm for such participation is due mainly to the length of time needed to open an AWF – usually several months. This point needs to be discussed with Europol to see if any practical and regulatory adjustments could be made to reduce the length of time needed to open AWFs; this undoubtedly lessens the enthusiasm of certain Member States. On this point, the experts note that, according to Europol, the average time taken to open an AWF is around two months. In practice, the period that certain countries regard as too long seems to be the period preceding the opening of the file itself, i.e. the preparatory study by the requesting country or countries, and the prior analyses carried out to assess, in particular, the feasibility of the project. Whatever is decided, the Finnish authorities hope that in future AWF projects will concentrate far more on regional projects, in order to work on forms of crime that predominantly affect the geographical areas of the countries participating in these types of AWF.

### 6.5.7

Generally speaking, the main information exchanges with Europol relate to drugs and illegal immigration. To some extent, the main alternative to Nordic cooperation now seems to be Europol, given that increasingly large areas of territory are involved in these spheres.

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## 6.5.8

Thus the NBI's recourse to Europol liaison officers <sup>1</sup> is constantly increasing. The NBI informed that ELOs were encouraged to have direct contacts with the operational services, provided that all initial contacts were made via the Europol National Unit (ENU). This was possible because the Finnish ELO is employed directly by the ENU. Information may even be exchanged directly between ELOs and active services in urgent operationally cases, but this happens fairly rarely, perhaps four or five times a year.

In practice, the Finnish police greatly appreciate Europol's participation in MSOPES operations which, according to the evaluators, seem to provide much added value in investigations.

## 6.5.9

It was noted that the Finnish authorities allow letters rogatory to be channelled through the ELOs based at Europol. The NBI does not understand why certain Member States refuse to use this channel for such communications, and continue to use diplomatic channels. For Finland, the use of this channel in such cases would make it possible to increase exchanges with Europol but would also facilitate the work of the law enforcement agencies. As other Member States have also raised this question, it might be interesting for the Member States to discuss in detail this matter which, while of a practical nature, also raises issues of public international law and questions relating to the rules applicable to Europol.

## 6.5.10

As the replies to the initial questionnaire indicate, Finland uses Europol ELOs for its bilateral relations. This situation means that it is impossible to know how much information is exchanged on a bilateral basis and how much on a multilateral basis with the support of Europol as a European police office.

More generally, no problems seem to have arisen concerning information ownership with one exception that arose in the context of an exchange of data relating to an AWF.

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<sup>1</sup> Finland has two Europol liaison officers (one police officer and one customs official).

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### 6.5.11

In practice, all information exchanged with Europol passes through the communications centre. This office of 30 staff operates around the clock. At nights and weekends it may operate with a reduced staff of 2 to 3 persons. For exchanges with Europol, the operating principle is simple; the communication centre is responsible for forwarding to the ENU information to be passed to Europol and for processing information coming from Europol. An important point to note is that the Europol terminal is situated in a separate office and it is impossible to communicate online between it and the other computers in the communications centre. This means that officials dealing with Europol have to make copies of all information received: nothing can be forwarded online. While the experts fully understand the reasons for this situation, it might be an idea to consider for the future installing the technical capacity to enable centralised communications platforms to have online access to information supplied by Europol, with rules for restricted access depending on the security clearance of officials.

### 6.5.12

The communication centre ascribes the difficulty of processing information coming from Europol mainly to the variety of information which is forwarded. That information might relate to operations, general information, statistics or purely administrative matters such as the holding or preparation of meetings. As the number of messages transmitted via Europol is steadily rising <sup>1</sup>, in future it will doubtless be necessary to define tighter rules for the transfer of information from Europol, in order to avoid information and operational messages being sent without any particular distinction. For example, operational information could be sent online on national databases with the requisite access restrictions.

As mentioned above, the communication centre – the letter box for the entire NBI – is also responsible for passing on information from Europol to the operational services.

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<sup>1</sup> 859 in 2000, 1599 in 2001 and 2164 in 2002.

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## 6.5.13

For actual information processing, the officers in charge of investigations in the relevant departments are responsible for following up requests for information from Europol via the ELOs based in Europol. It was noted that there is no automatic reminder system for reply deadlines or processing of requests. However, there is such a system in Europol, which operates via the ELOs who accordingly send out the necessary reminders via the national communication centre of CID. It may seem paradoxical that there is an alert system in Europol for requests coming from the European Police Office but no automatic reminder system in the other direction – internally – for Finnish police officers dealing with requests from Europol. A more efficient method would probably be to install warning systems to ensure that information is dealt with efficiently and reliably. Finland is aware of this shortcoming in the technical organisation and is considering installing an operational tracking system in the communications centre, which would thus apply not only to the ENU but also to all officers for any requests transiting via other information channels.

## 6.5.14

In operational cases, it is always the officers in charge of the cases in question who take the decision to reply to Europol. If problems arise, it is the head of the Criminal Intelligence Division who decides whether or not to forward any reply/replies to Europol.

## 6.5.15

It should be noted that for customs, all information also passes through the communication centre, thus through the NBI. However, the customs service acknowledges the fact that in practice, customs officers may work in direct contact with the customs ELO at Europol. This could occur where the ELO considers it necessary to send police intelligence to the customs service. That is partly because in Finland cooperation between the different agencies (customs, police, frontier guard) is laid down in agreements between them. As a result, the two ELOs (police and customs) based at Europol work closely together. This cooperation may then result in the direct transmission of operational information to customs headquarters even if one would expect everything to pass through the NBI.



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## 6.5.16

During their visit the experts were not made aware of loss of information to the detriment of the police. There seems to be basically two reasons for this. First, contacts between ministry officials are straightforward, and second there is a liaison officer in the Criminal Intelligence Division. This enables the NBI departments to check whether or not the various customs databases, particularly those relating to information files, contain useful information. However, it is somewhat surprising that the customs liaison officer does not have access online to the CID intelligence file.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, there is no connection by which the CID can access the customs department soft information databases.

## 6.5.17

While the presence of a liaison officer is a real advantage for effective cooperation between departments in different law enforcement agencies, there could be more flexibility in computerised information exchange, for instance as a minimum there could be online consultation of information held by any agency. Mention should be made here of the modern data-processing facilities available to police officers responsible for processing intelligence. From their terminals, they can access all the available databases, e.g. the SIS, vehicle registration records, stolen vehicles, illegally resident aliens etc. Generally speaking, these technical facilities are available to all duly authorised police officers and of course to those on regional postings.

## 6.5.18

Overall, the experts can state that Finland's organisation of information processing to and from Europol seems to be good, particularly since the system put in place seems to be designed to cope with the growing demand for information. However, some faults in the system may appear unless some changes are made to the methods for processing information. For example, the fact that the communication platform deals with all messages manually may lead to delays in passing on information, for example to Europol.

Similarly, as the NBI controls all information coming from outside, this may slow down the system. The Finnish authorities have stated that in the future EIS system, the architecture will be identical as the CID intends to maintain its role as a filter between the police services and Europol.

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<sup>1</sup> The liaison officer cannot access the EPRI file but can find out whether information is held by the police by means of an index system.

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### 6.5.19

The experts considered that the Member States must at this present time clearly define the future protocols for sending and processing information in the planned EIS, to ensure that they use the same system for computerised information processing. The experts noted that the office responsible for dealing with forgery of money and counterfeiting of the Euro also served as a communication centre and had direct links with Europol and the European Central Bank. The link between the Forgery of Money Desk (FOM) and Europol goes via the Communications Centre. The perceived idea is that when EIS is established the FOM desk shall have direct access to EIS inquiries, input is planned to go via national database. At the moment only the NBI Crime Laboratory has direct access to CMS (Currency Monitoring System of ECB).

That seems to be a good solution as it gives access to databases between Europol and Finland directly and eliminates technical stages in information processing.

### 6.5.20

There seems to be no quality control of information sent to Europol.<sup>1</sup> Quality will in fact depend on the quality of staff and their training. There is no specific quality protocol. This is obviously a weakness, as it means that there is a lacking of guarantee of the quality and/or reliability of information sent to another Member State.<sup>2</sup>

### 6.5.21

With a view to creation of EIS files it is clearly vital that the concept of a quality protocol is a key feature of the future specifications.

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<sup>1</sup> Such control operates only for information intended for AWFs and which is therefore checked by Europol.

<sup>2</sup> This problem may also affect information on suspected persons or "intelligence" in the strict sense.

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## 6.5.22

However, Finland hoped that Europol would propose a standard for statistics, so that in the future a common tool could be used to record actual crime statistics which could then be properly analysed at European level. <sup>1</sup>

A deficiency seems to be the lack of a statistical tool common at Member States. At present, there is no way of knowing how many messages are exchanged and the quality of them. According to Finland, quantitative data are more or less meaningless in that there is no standard accounting method used by all Member States. Thus figures appearing in statistics may relate to totally different items of information. For instance, the sending of a photograph, a line of information (with a name) or 50 pages of a report on a specific situation will always be counted as the same information. Although it might be complicated to introduce this type of record-keeping, it would be wise to have measuring tools so that a better analysis of the use and type of information exchanged can be made in future.

## 6.5.23

More generally, the police authorities criticise the lack of feedback provided by Europol in relation to processing or results obtained from information provided by Finland. <sup>2</sup> Discussions should perhaps be opened with Europol to determine the different Member States' expectations and then encourage the development of and motivation for information exchange.

## 6.5.24

Regarding the classification of information, the Finnish authorities generally maintain the same classification as used by the originating country.

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<sup>1</sup> The Dublin conference scheduled for 20 and 21 November 2003 on tackling organised crime in partnership, jointly organised by Ireland and the Netherlands, could serve as a discussion basis for future work..

<sup>2</sup> The experts pointed out that Europol also criticises the Member States for their lack of feedback.

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## 7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT TEAM

As pointed out in the introduction to this report, Finland is very attentive to the information exchange process. It has in place legislation and rules attuned to its requirements and those of its partners. Because of the size of the country and the long-standing tradition of regional cooperation, the competent agencies know how to respond to requests in this field. Work programmes are laid down in each analysis field and, at practical level, the agencies concerned have target meetings twice a year to decide what joint actions to undertake. It should also be pointed out that because of its national intranet information exchange system which links all police services and the integrated system of the Criminal Intelligence Division's communication centre, Finland will most likely be able to adapt swiftly to any necessary developments in the future.

Despite this very positive aspect, Finland will doubtless have to consider improving its information sharing between customs, police and frontier guards, perhaps by means of improvements in the online information sharing. Links between these branches will presumably have to be organised in a more structured fashion. Similarly, the frequency of meetings between central and regional levels must be increased. The experts would like to mention the development at central, regional and local levels of the concept of crime analysis and also the widespread circulation throughout the country of publication and general information concerning Europol activities.

The experts finally noted that it could be useful to develop training for law enforcement officers and particularly for NBI, as regards both increasing awareness of international cooperation structures and the appropriate use of the information exchange channels available to them.

### 7.1 FOR FINLAND

7.1.1 Consider how to enable police units to enhance their capability in information processing and to improve information exchange with regional and national levels. (see 6.3.1)<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The new government proposal 195/2002 should enable Finland to achieve that perspective.

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- 7.1.2 With a view to improving information exchange, constantly evaluate the resources and deployment of liaison officers in post in the Baltic Sea region, to meet the new challenges posed by new forms and/or new source origins of crime. Prioritise the tasks and make use of existing liaison officers, as appropriate posted in embassies. (see 6.1.4 and 6.4.9)
- 7.1.3 Further develop and encourage strategic and operational target meetings between law enforcement services, both regionally and locally, for even clearer definition of aims. (see 6.3.1)
- 7.1.4 When agreeing on a precise protocol for information exchange the NBI and the regional police command should take into account the written orders already given by the Supreme police command of the ministry of Interior. (see 6.3.3)
- 7.1.5 Continue to develop the already close and well-functioning co-operation between frontier guards, customs and police services, particularly by rationalising intelligence gathering intended particularly for international exchange and by developing a criminal intelligence model for internal exchange. (see 6.4.2 and 6.1.2)
- 7.1.6 As far as possible, look into the possibility of creating Regional Crime Analysis units along the lines of the existing systems and plan to recruit and/or train specific dedicated staff in the analytical field. (see 6.5.1)
- 7.1.7 Develop staff training at local, regional and national levels on the role and use of the different channels for international information exchange and raise awareness in particular about Europol's products and services. (see 6.4.5 and 7.2)
- 7.1.8 Introduce a tracking system on relevant databases in order to ensure follow-up of processed information and deadlines for replies to requesting external services. (see 6.5.13)

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## 7.2. FOR EUROPOL

- 7.2.1 Consider, with the Member States, the possibility of authorising a technical gateway between the Europol secure network and the terminals of the central communications platforms. (see 6.5.11)
- 7.2.2 With a view to introduction of the EIS project, define strict protocols to ensure uniformity in the Member States' processing of information to be sent to Europol. (see 6.5.19)
- 7.2.3 In exchanges with Member States, set up without delay a working group to draw up a specification for a quality protocol for information sent to Europol. (see 6.5.20)
- 7.2.4 Propose a common standard for statistical reports on crime, in order to better evaluate exchanges between Europol and the individual Member States, and to improve analysis of Europe-wide crime. (see 6.5.22)
- 7.2.5 Notwithstanding the agreed amendments to the Europol convention, review in consultation with the Member States, procedures for the opening of AWFs, in particular to determine whether more flexibility could be envisaged than under the formal structure laid down by the Europol Convention and to shorten deadlines. (see 6.5.5 and 6.5.6)

## 7.3 FOR THE OTHER MEMBER STATES

- 7.3.1 Consider the possibility to explore a permanent co-operation structure along the lines of the Finnish Police – Customs Frontier guard co-operation between all separate law-enforcement authorities with a view for them to jointly prepare situation reports, make target selections, co-ordinate operative actions, support each other and arrange joint investigations. To enhance this multi agency approach it is recommended to share the intelligence model based upon the relevant intelligence supplied by each agency. (see 6.3.1 and 6.3.2)

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7.3.2 Member States are reminded of their obligation to ?? the competent authorities of other member States in accordance with the requirements of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. (see 4.1.3)

7.3.3 Together with the Member States concerned, consider the possibility of using ELOs to forward letters rogatory. (see 6.5.9)

7.3.4 Examine possibilities for handling personal data outside the AWF framework set by Europol convention to be used within a framework of operational cooperation between Member States. (see 6.5.3 and 6.5.4)

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ANNEX A

## VISITING PROGRAM

- **Monday 29 September 2003**

- 8.45. Transport from the hotel to the Ministry of the Interior.
- 9.00 Visit to the Ministry of the Interior's Supreme Police Command.
- 10.30 Visit to Helsinki City police department
- 12.00 Lunch
- 13.00 Transport to Central Criminal Police
- 13.30 Presentation of the organisation of Central Criminal Police and its Criminal Intelligence Division.  
Presentation of relevant Finnish legislation.  
Discussion.
- 16.15 Transport to the hotel

- **Tuesday 30 September 2003**

- 8.30 Transport from hotel to Central Criminal Police in Vantaa.
- 9.00 Visits to the handling desks of the Criminal Intelligence Division:  
Narcotics  
Illegal Immigration  
Analysis
- 12.00 Lunch
- 13.00 Visits to desks continued:  
Vehicles  
Forgery of money  
Crimes against Persons  
Meeting with Customs liaison to Central Criminal Police
- 16.15 Transport to hotel

- **Wednesday 1 October 2003**

- 8.30 Transport from hotel to Central Criminal Police in Vantaa.
- 9.00 Visit to the Communications Centre of the Criminal Intelligence Division.
- 10.00 Meeting with responsible Customs and Frontier Guard officers.  
Meeting with Frontier Guard liaison officers to Central Criminal Police.  
Chance for supplementary questions for those responsible for information exchange.
- 12.00 Lunch
- 13.00 Final discussion and conclusion.

Transport from Central Criminal Police to Helsinki – Vantaa airport depending on flight schedule.



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ANNEX B

## LIST OF PERSONS MET

- **Ministry of the Interior:**
    - Robin Lardot, Inspector General of the police
    - Stefan Gerkman, Chief Police Inspector
    - Arto Hankilanoja, Chief Inspector
  
  - **Central Criminal Police:**
    - Markku Ryymin, Chief Detective Superintendent, head of division
    - Anssi Kangas, Senior Detective Superintendent
    - Jaakko Sonck, Detective Chief Inspector
    - Lars Henriksson Detective Chief Inspector
  
  - **Helsinki city police department:**
    - Jari Aarnio, Detective Chief Inspector, head of narcotics unit
    - Petri Rainiala, Detective Sergeant
  
  - **Customs:**
    - Esko Hirvonen, Head of Investigation, National Board of Customs
    - Sami Rakshit, Head of Intelligence, National Board of Customs
  
  - **Frontier Guard:**
    - Pasi Tolvanen, lieutenant colonel, criminal intelligence
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ANNEX C

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACRONYM ABBREVIATION TERM	FINNISH	ENGLISH TRANSLATION OR EXPLANATION
AWF	-	Analysis Work File (Europol)
BDL	-	Liaison Bureau
CID	-	Criminal Intelligence Division
CIS	-	Custom Information System
ECB	-	European Central Bank
EIS	-	Europol Information System
EJN	-	European Judicial Network
ELO	-	Europol Liaison Officer
ENU	-	Europol National Unit
EPRI	Epäiltyjen ekisteri	Suspect Data Base
FOM		Forgery of Money Desk
MSOPES	-	Member States Operational Project with Europol Support
NBI	-	National Bureau of Investigation
NCB	-	National Control Bureau of Interpol
PTN	-	Nordic Countries Liaison Officer Network
PTR	Poliisi, Tulli, Rajavartiolaitos	Police, Customs and Frontier Guard
RIKI	-	Crime Reporting System
SIRENE	-	Supplementary Information Requested at National Entry
SIS	-	System Information Schengen
TIEDIS	-	New Custom Information Service
VALVIS	-	Custom Information Service