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Brussels, 29 September 2022  
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EUTM RCA 29

#### **PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION**

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of document: 13802/16  
dated: 27 October 2016  
new status: Public

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Subject: Amended Mission Plan EUTM RCA

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Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



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RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

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**NOTE**

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from:	General Secretariat of the Council
to:	Delegations
Subject:	Amended Mission Plan EUTM RCA

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Delegations will find attached the amended Mission Plan EUTM RCA<sup>1</sup>, as approved by the Political and Security Committee on 14 October 2016.

Annex D – Appendix D-1 to the Mission Plan is set out in document 12214/16 ADD 1 (classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL).

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<sup>1</sup> The amendment relates to paragraph 103.

# European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)

## Mission Plan (MPLAN)

### 1. SITUATION

#### a. Political situation

1. After a long history of political, ethnical and religious unrest, the instability in CAR peaked in 2013. In March 2013, the seizure of power by the Seleka insurgent group (predominantly Muslim) marked the collapse of the Central African Republic (CAR) state. It plunged the country into a crisis that is likely to take a long time to resolve. Periodic coups were overtaken by a civil war, the disintegration of state institutions, return to a subsistence economy and intercommunal conflict that has resulted in the de facto division of the country. In western CAR, persecution of Muslims by anti-balaka militias (Christian/animists) has forced them out, provoked a desire for vengeance and prompted talk of partition in eastern CAR. Since 2014 and 2015, conflict manifests itself in deadly intercommunal reprisals, the establishment of Muslim enclaves in the west of the country, a combat zone in the centre of the country and the emergence of chronic banditry. Moreover, the development of the conflict along communal lines has revived the question about the right to live and own land in CAR. Muslims are labelled as foreigners, revealing deep social fractures that are expressed in religious terms but cannot simply be reduced to religious differences. This situation created a huge number of refugees (displaced persons).
2. In this context of high intercommunal tension and the lack of national cohesion, the BANGUI Forum, held in May 2015, aimed to be the first stage in a genuine process of reconciliation. This initiative sent out a positive call for unity by inviting more than 600 participants from prefectures throughout the country and from followers of different religions, but there is a danger that some of the forum's recommendations are not implemented.
3. The new constitution was adopted through a referendum held on 13-14 December 2015 with a 93% yes vote and a turnout of 33%.
4. The two rounds of the presidential and legislative elections took place in a peaceful environment and no major incident occurred. The turnout was estimated by the National Elections Authority (Autorité Nationale des Elections, ANE) at 79%.
5. Following the second round of the presidential elections on 14 February 2016, Faustin Archange Toudera (Christian) was elected new President. His promises are to address the urgent need for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the security sector

reform (SSR), the formation and employment of the youth, the re-launching of the economy and the exit of the humanitarian crisis. The new Parliament was constituted on 03 May 2016.

6. While being essential to restore constitutional order, the elections as such are not sufficient for a recovery from crisis. Further efforts are notably needed to restore social cohesion. In order to put the country back on track towards a sustainable recovery from crisis, it will be crucial that the new authorities start engaging in necessary reforms (SSR, DDR, economic recovery, governance, and reconciliation).
7. Some encouraging signs point to a positive development of the situation, such as the Papal visit which was well organised and provided a favourable environment for an inter-confessional reconciliation process among CAR population. At the same time the roundtable on security on 3-6 December 2015 and the creation of the strategic committee to develop a National Security Policy on 28 December 2015 paved the way for a future commitment of the new government towards its attributions and the international community as regards the SSR.
8. The security situation in the capital BANGUI has improved since the last unrest at the end of September 2015, but a resurgence of violence remains possible at any time. The religious leaders together with other key players keep encouraging the population to not fall back into sectarian violence, successfully advocating the need for reconciliation and a peaceful future. Throughout the country, various armed groups continue ransacking, looting or robbing the civil population on a daily basis, mainly motivated by ensuring their criminality related revenues. The security situation on the main supply route (MSR) to and from Cameroon, but also towards the North and the East is better than in 2015, mainly due to the more robust course of action by the international security forces (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) and SANGARIS).
9. CAR is facing the lack of security, as the Government has no armed security forces able to enforce the law and neutralize the different armed groups. The communities retain weapons in order to have self-defence capabilities against political/criminal oriented armed gangs. This lack of security led to the collapse of trade, as in the Ubangi River, forcing most of the population to revert to an economy of subsistence, resulting in widespread poverty.

#### **b. Economic situation**

10. CAR is a fragile, land-locked, low-income country (ranked 185th out of 187 on the 2014 Human Development Index), dependent on international assistance for economic, social, and security purposes. Its economic base is not diversified and human capital is weak. In addition, in 2013 CAR suffered extensive damage as a result of an insurgency and counter-insurgency that led to civil war and a humanitarian crisis. Almost two years into transition, and with support from the international community, CAR is slowly emerging from this conflict.

#### **c. Humanitarian situation**

11. The humanitarian situation in CAR remains extremely dire. As of November 2015, 2.7 million people (out of the country's total population of 4.6 million) are estimated to be in need of assistance. 26 IDP sites have been affected by the latest waves of displacement and new refugees have also fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
12. Insecurity highlights the issue of the extremely challenging environment for humanitarian actors to operate in. The possibility of new outbreaks of violence (with subsequent grave humanitarian consequences) is a credible scenario for the months to come.
13. The provision of health, nutrition, education, protection and shelter remains very challenging. The crisis has dismantled the already very fragile health structures, bringing the government's service delivery capacity to a complete stop.

**d. Human rights situation**

14. Grave violations of human rights are widespread across the country. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
15. In 2007 the International criminal court (ICC) opened its first investigation in the country for crimes committed during the 2002-2003 civil war. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

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### **CAR Security forces**

30. CAR security forces (FACA, Gendarmerie and Police) are gaining effectiveness, especially the units of the Gendarmerie and the police **NOT DECLASSIFIED** who have been directly benefiting from an EU program which provided training and equipment in 2014 and 2015. However, CAR security forces continue to suffer from a lack of organization, command and control (C2), weapons and equipment.

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**k. Political objective**

38. In close cooperation with the UN and other international partners, the EU seeks to contribute to peace- and state-building in CAR. A recovery from crisis and lasting stability will depend on the restoration of social cohesion, the rule of law, the respect for human rights, international law and inclusive and sustainable development, notably through the strengthening of the state authority.

**l. EU Strategic Objective**

39. The restoration of the justice system, including the fight against impunity, and the reform of the security forces (Interior Security Forces – police and gendarmerie – and FACA) are key prerequisites for stability. The effective presence of professional security forces throughout the territory will enable the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees as well as the redeployment of administrative services and the re-launch of economic activities.

### **m. Political guidance**

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41. The EU is engaged in a political dialogue with the newly elected authorities, jointly with the international partners present on the ground. The EU will continue to liaise closely with international partners on ways to engage with the new government and how best to contribute to a lasting stabilisation of the country.

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**r. Legal framework**

75. The legal framework for EUTM RCA mission is based upon the Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 of the 19th April 2016 adopted by the Council by virtue of Articles 42 and 43 TEU following the invitation by the host country. With his letter dated 30 March 2016, CAR President has invited the EU to deploy a Union CSDP military training mission in CAR.
76. A new SOMA with CAR is being concluded. Pending the conclusion of this SOMA, CAR has unilaterally granted privileges and immunities to EUTM RCA on the basis of the SOMA concluded for the benefit of EUMAM RCA.

**2. MISSION**

77. The EU Training Mission in CAR (EUTM RCA) will contribute to the defence sector Reform (DSR) within an overall locally owned SSR process coordinated by MINUSCA. EUTM RCA will provide strategic advice to CAR MOD and EMA, education of non-commissioned officers (NCO's) and officers as well as specialists and collective training to FACA units. EUTM RCA will contribute to develop self-sustainable FACA capabilities necessary to fulfil their respective assignments in the security sector and to allow them a proper progressive

development of credible, accountable, and ethnically balanced FACA that is under democratic control. A close coordination between EUTM RCA and the EU delegation on SSR aspects and with the international community especially with MINUSCA will be ensured.

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**g. Mission Area and Area of Interest**

**i. Mission Area (MA)**

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**ii. Area of Interest (AOI)**

104. The regional situation could influence the security situation in RCA and have a direct impact on the mission, hampering the possibility to achieve the strategic objectives and the mission operability. To assess the regional threats is important to analyze the regional situation. **NOT**

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#### 4. EXECUTION

##### a. Strategic Advice concept

105. Advice will be conducted from the outset of the Mission, maintaining the momentum reached by EUMAM, and will be performed in a steady way during all mission phases.

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**ANNEX X**  
**MEDIA POLICY**

**1. SITUATION**

588. Military Public Relations / Public Information (Mil PR/PI) activities will be planned and conducted within the framework of the EU Information Strategy and Public Master Messages. The fragile and evolving situation on the field will likely lead to adapt the narrative to the changing reality, without implying a necessary change of the Mission Plan or this Annex.

**2. MISSION**

589. Press and Public Information Office (PPIO) will contribute to the achievement of EUTM RCA Mission Commander's objectives in its advisory, educational and training nature, by using all available means to achieve and maintain a high visibility of EUTM RCA activities in CAR and international media, including social media.

**3. EXECUTION**

**a. Comanders' Mil PR/PI intent:**

590. **As part of the EU's comprehensive** approach to the situation in CAR, EUTM RCA will build up a robust core of a new professional, multiethnic and democratically accountable FACA. Their successful performance will guide EUTM RCA activities, which will contribute to the Defence Sector Reform and to the global effort of reconciliation in CAR. Key for success is to highlight EUTM RCA neutrality, its impartiality towards other actors in CAR and its legitimacy in accordance with the UNSCR 2134 (2014), while conducting activities in coordination with MINUSCA and CAR authorities. Local and international audiences will be accurately informed on the development of FACA and EUTM CAR activities in due time.

**b. Concept of operations**

591. Throughout all phases of the operation an active Mil PR/PI policy will be adopted. A complete, timely and accurate information posture will be taken, updating external and internal news media regularly and networking with professionals related to the information domain. Every Mil PR/PPI activity will take into consideration local cultures, religions, social structures and traditions, avoiding any negative misinterpretation of the messages.

**i. Priorities of effort**

592. Be recognized as a trustful source of information.

593. Integrate the EUTM RCA activities in the EU long term commitment to CAR.



594. Highlight the legitimacy, impartiality and neutrality of EUTM RCA.

595. Underline the FACA achievements.

596. Counter any effort to undermine the EUTM RCA objectives.

ii. Desired effects

597. FACA chain of command well considered and respected by political authorities.

598. FACA trusted by the population and seen as a reliable state instrument of stability.

599. FACA consists of an appropriately balanced and representative composition.

600. EUTM RCA recognised as an EU actor.

iii. Key tasks

601. Network and engage media representatives to spread messages.

602. Promote public understanding and support of EUTM RCA and FACA.

603. Liaise with Press and Public Information officials of other actors in Bangui.

604. Liaise and coordinate with EUMS, EEAS Strategic communication staff and Spokesperson's Office of the High Representative.

605. Conduct media monitoring and analysis in accordance with the EU Mission Commander requirements.

606. Advise EU Mission Commander and EUFOR RCA staff on all press and public information issues, especially in regional and international media affairs.

607. Promote and attend any request from media representatives and use it to help achieve own objectives.

#### **4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

##### **a. Master messages**

608. In close cooperation with the UN and other international partners, the EU seeks to support the return of CAR to peace, stability and sustainable development by contributing to strengthen the state authority, its accountability and its instruments.

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**b. Target audiences**

i. In CAR:

614. International and local media.

615. Professional media associations.

616. CAR administration, International Organizations and Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations.

617. The general public in CAR.

ii. Outside CAR:

618. These target audiences will be addressed in close coordination with the Spokesperson's Office of the High Representative and EEAS Strategic Communications.

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## ANNEX AA

### APPENDIX AA-1

#### CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUTM RCA

##### 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

643. This Code of Conduct sets forth the framework and standards for the personal and professional conduct which is expected of all EUTM RCA personnel at all times, bearing in mind that the credibility and reputation of EUTM RCA is shaped by the collective conduct of individuals within EUTM RCA.
644. EUTM RCA personnel shall be committed to maintaining the highest possible standards of professional and personal conduct both on and off duty, in their relations within the force and in their relations with the local population.
645. Without exception, everybody in the EUTM RCA must be familiar with, and follow this Code of Conduct.
646. This Code of Conduct is not an exhaustive articulation of the standards governing ethical and professional behaviour of EUTM RCA. Any conduct that is not specifically addressed by this Code of Conduct is not necessarily ethical or unethical.
647. If any EUTM RCA personnel are ever in doubt about the propriety of their actions, they should forward their questions or concerns to EUTM RCA LEGAD.
648. Any violation of this Code of Conduct will be considered as a serious misconduct and may result in disciplinary measures. This is independent of possible criminal procedures in accordance with TCNs` national law.
649. EUTM RCA personnel are obliged to report any violation of this Code of Conduct through the established reporting mechanisms.

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## **2. HUMAN RIGHTS CORE POINTS**

651. All EUTM RCA personnel are personally responsible for respecting and promoting Human Rights.

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## ANNEX FF

### FINANCIAL SUPPORT

#### **1. GENERAL**

662. The financing and contracting arrangements for EUTM RCA will be administered through the ATHENA mechanism.. ATHENA will provide funding, as approved by the Special Committee, to meet expenditure requirements associated with the MHQ and Forces as a whole. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

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## ANNEX YY

### MISCELLANEOUS

#### APPENDIX YY-1

### DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

#### i. DEFINITIONS

696. **Chain of Command:** The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.
697. **Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC):** is the coordination and cooperation at all levels between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors external to the EU, including the local population and authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies in support of the achievement of the military mission along with all other military functions.
698. **CIS Architecture:** System architecture is the logical structure and operating principles of a system. The operating principles include those services, functions and interface standards against performance required and constraints imposed. Physical architecture is the identification and arrangement of the physical components of a system architecture into an orderly framework that describes the physical structure, the technical functions, design features and technical attributes that can be achieved by each component and by the system within specified constraints.
699. **CIS Security:** See “Information Security” and “Security.”
700. **Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO):** covers internal EU coordination of EU's own civil and military crisis management instruments, executed under the responsibility of the Council.
701. **Command:**
- a. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces.
  - b. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
  - c. A unit, or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual.
702. **Command and Control (C2):** The authority, responsibilities and activities of military commander in the direction and coordination of military forces. This includes the implementation of orders related to the execution of operations.



703. **Command and Control Communication System:** A communication system, which conveys information between military authorities for command and control purposes (**Note:** Command and control communication system is complementary to Command and control information system and contrasts with C3 system).
704. **Command and Control Information System:** An information system, which provides military authorities with support for command and control purposes (**Note:** Command and control information system is complementary to command and control communication system).
705. **Command and Control System:** An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, that enables commanders and their staff to conduct command and control. (**Note:** command and control systems encompass command and control communications systems, command and control information systems, sensors systems and communication facilities.)
706. **Common Resources:** Logistic resources, suitable for multinational logistic support such as fuel, water, food, and services such as engineering, transportation, catering, recovery, medical services, hospitalisation, laundry and bath and material handling support.
707. **Communication and Information Systems (CIS):** Assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions.
708. **Concept of Operations (CONOPS):** A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission.
709. **Conduct of an operation:** It is the art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives.
710. **Confidentiality:** The prevention of the unauthorised disclosure of information.
711. **Contracting:** Contracting is the commercial acquisition of materials and civil services by EU Member States and/ or EU for their forces in support of an EU- led CMO. It is one of the elements logistic planning should take into consideration.
712. **Contributing States:** Term for states having confirmed their participation to solve a crisis; here: take part in a specific EU crisis management.
713. **Control:** That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. This authority may be partially or fully delegated.
714. **Crisis Management:** The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.

715. **Crisis Management Concept (CMC):** The CMC is the conceptual framework describing the overall approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis.
716. **Desired Order of Arrival (DOA):** The chronological order in which the Commander desires his force elements to arrive.
717. **Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs):** Information critical to the Mission that need to be protected throughout their lifecycle and the range of military operations.
718. **EUMS Lessons Management Application (ELMA):** Lessons application that supports ELPRO and allows users to treat data digitally.
719. **Force Generation:** Force Generation is the process where the military assets and capabilities required for an EU-led military operation are designated by TCN and/or International Organisations and made available to the MCdr to meet the requirements of the operation. It comprises the identification and the activation of the required assets and/or capabilities and ends with their TOA by TCN to the MCdr.
720. **Full Operational Capability (FOC):** The attainment of full capability to employ effectively a force element or force elements of approved specific characteristics that is manned and/or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, supported and integrated military unit or force.
721. **Host Nation Support (HNS):** The civil and military assistance rendered by a HN to another state and/or organisation which has forces located on or in transit through the HN's territory. The basis of such assistance is arising from bi- and/or multilateral agreements. The term "Nation" is used with the only purpose of maintaining a widely recognised military terminology.
722. **Host Nation Support Arrangements (HNSA):** Those documents which detail the support, political, legal and/or financial arrangements agreed upon by national authorities and/or military Commanders of EU-led CMO and which are necessary to provide HNS to EU-led CMO. These documents may include, but are not limited to, MOUs and their subordinate technical and implementing arrangements.
723. **Initial Operational Capability (IOC):** The attainment of initial capability to employ effectively a force element or force elements of approved specific characteristics that is manned and/or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, supported and integrated military unit or force.
724. **Information Activities:** Actions designed to affect information and/or systems, performed by any actor.
725. **Information Campaign:** Set of information activities planned and conducted within a given time and a geographical area in support of the basic objectives of the Crisis Information Strategy approved for EU-led operations and / or missions.

726. **Information Environment:** It is the virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and the information systems.
727. **Information Security:** The protection of information against unauthorised disclosure, transfer, modification or destruction, whether accidental or intentional. (see also “Security”).
728. **Infrastructure:** A term generally applicable for all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities for the support and control of military forces.
729. **Intelligence (INTEL):** Intelligence as a product contains facts and assessments about potential adversaries’ abilities, resources, conditions of living, motivations, intentions and the surrounding environment. It is based on the knowledge of specialists and thus fuses multiple pieces of information into intelligence. Intelligence is achieved through the process that converts information from a wide range of sources into a predictive assessment of conflict parties and/or any adversary’s capabilities and intentions. The whole process follows a cyclic course of action, which is known as the “Intelligence Cycle” consisting of direction, collection, processing and dissemination of tailored products meeting the commanders and decision makers requirements. Intelligence is a distinct functional area, which depends on specialised personnel, equipment and infrastructure.
730. **Lesson Identified (LI):** A Lesson Observation (which has been entered into ELMA), validated and accepted as a Lesson.
731. **Liaison:** That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.
732. **Medical Advisor:** The attainment of full capability to employ effectively a force element or force elements of approved specific characteristics that is manned and/or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, supported and integrated military unit or force.
733. **Medical Support:** **Medical** support encompasses the full range of medical planning and provision of medical health services to maintain the force strength through disease prevention, evacuation, a rapid treatment of the diseases, injured and wounded.
734. **Non-executive mission:** a **mission**, which does not entail the right to take authoritative action independently from the consent of the Host Nation or Host Organisation.
735. **Political Control:** The **setting** of political objectives and the balancing of aims and means to achieve these objectives. It provides the framework within which military operations can take place and defines their nature and scope.
736. **Political Strategy:** The **coordinated** and systematic development and use of economic, diplomatic, psychological, military and other political means of power of a state, alliance or coalition to safeguard its interests. It concerns the relationship between nations and within alliances and the determination of security policy. Political Strategy defines security

objectives, determines the means of achieving these objectives and indicates limitations in the use of such means.

737. **Port of Debarkation (POD):** A seaport, airport or railhead where force elements and their materiel are unloaded from a means of transport.

738. **Risk:** Risk is the **association** of a threat and its correspondent vulnerabilities and the likelihood of its realisation.

739. **Rules Of Engagement (ROE):** ROE are directives to military commanders and forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or other actions which might be construed as provocative, may, or may not, be applied. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. ROE do not affect the right to self-defence under national law.

Definition used here differs from the one in Guidelines for Military Command and Control Aspects of EU-led Crisis Management Operations (EUMC Meeting document No 11/01, 10 May 2001), Annex A, originating from NATO AAP-6. Moreover, even the NATO MC 362/1 (FINAL) document has a different approach, which may be adopted in this document.

740. **Security:** **Security** is achieved, when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorised disclosure.

741. **Secure Area:** A designated location or area within which EU/EU-led forces accept a specified degree of responsibility for persons or property and may impose restrictions on movement (**Note:** The use of force may be authorised to establish and protect a secure area).

742. **Self-defence:** Self-defence is a universally recognised inherent right of individuals to defend themselves using necessary and proportional force against attack or imminent attack.

743. **Provisional Statement of Requirement (PSOR):**

a. The Statement of Requirements lists force capabilities required to perform each military task, including an initial Commander Required Date (CRD) window and required locations for force elements in the theatre. This is continually refined along with the CONOPS. The Provisional SOR provides TCN, as appropriate, an indication of the type and scale of forces, assets and capabilities required.

b. A subordinate document to an HNS Technical Arrangement and the most detailed document on HNS. It includes information on the support required and offered and on its financial implications.

744. **Strategic Concept:** The **course** of action accepted as a result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit

its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, psychological and other measures which stem from it.

745. **Strategic Level of Operations:** The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
746. **Territory:** The extent of land, airspace and interior of the earth above and below of this extent of land, and waters adjacent to a coastal state.
747. **Transfer of Authority (TOA):** Transfer of Authority (TOA) is the act by which national authorities officially transfer the command and/or control of their national forces to the MCdr. The TOA may be subject to national caveats.
748. **Transportation:** Transportation is the means of conveyance to move forces, equipment, personnel, and stocks, and includes the requisite materials handling equipment.
749. **Troop Contributing Nations:** Troop Contributing Nations are those MS and, after a Council decision, third States providing military assets or capabilities for a particular operation.
750. **Use of Force:** An act or the threat of an act meant to deprive someone of the possibility of exercising one's own will (Note: See the source document)

ii. **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AIRMEDEVAC</b>	Air medical Evacuation
<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>AII</b>	Area of Intelligence Interest
<b>AIR</b>	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
<b>AOI</b>	Area of Interest
<b>APOD</b>	Airport of Debarkation
<b>APOE</b>	Airport of Embarkation
<b>ASAP</b>	As Soon As Possible
<b>ASSESREP</b>	Assessment Report
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BBV</b>	Blood Borne Virus
<b>BH</b>	Boko Haram (NIGERIA)
<b>BINUCA</b>	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR
<b>BPT</b>	Be Prepared To
<b>C2</b>	Command and Control
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>CASREP</b>	Casualty Report
<b>CBRN</b>	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
<b>CCIRM</b>	Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
<b>CEMGA</b>	Chef d'etat Major General des Armees (Army Chief of Staff)
<b>CEUMC</b>	Chairman of the European Union Military Committee
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CHOD</b>	Chief Of Defence
<b>CI</b>	Counter Intelligence
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Cooperation
<b>CIS</b>	Communications and Information Systems
<b>CMC</b>	Crisis Management Concepts
<b>CMCO</b>	Civic Military Coordination
<b>CMPD</b>	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
<b>CNT</b>	Conseil Nationale de Transition

<b>COC</b>	Centre Opérationnel Commun
<b>CoG</b>	Centre of Gravity
<b>COMPUSEC</b>	Computer Security
<b>COMSEC</b>	Communications Security
<b>COMSITE</b>	Commander Site
<b>CONOPS</b>	Concept of Operations
<b>CONPLAN</b>	Contingency Plan
<b>COS</b>	Chief of Staff
<b>CRD</b>	Commander's Required Date
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>CSO</b>	Contractor Support to Operations
<b>DAC</b>	Defence Advisory and Coordination
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DE</b>	Desired Effect
<b>DG ECHO</b>	Directorate General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
<b>DMCdr</b>	Deputy Mission Commander
<b>DOA</b>	Desired Order of Arrival
<b>DOS</b>	Day of Supply
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>EAA</b>	Evacuation Assembly Area
<b>EC</b>	Evacuation Coordination
<b>ECHO</b>	European Community Humanitarian Office
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ECP</b>	Evacuation Coordination Point
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EGL</b>	Evacuation Group Leader
<b>EEP</b>	Emergency Evacuation Plan
<b>EMA</b>	Etat-Major Général des Armées
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union

<b>EUCI</b>	EU Classified Information
<b>EUDEL</b>	EU Delegation
<b>EUMC</b>	European Union Military Committee
<b>EUMS</b>	European Union Military Staff
<b>EUTM</b>	European Union Training Mission
<b>EW</b>	Electronic Warfare
<b>FACA</b>	Force Armees Centrafricaine
<b>FG</b>	Force Generation
<b>FOC</b>	Full Operational Capability
<b>FP</b>	Force Protection
<b>FRAGO</b>	Fragmentary Order
<b>GO</b>	Governmental Organisation
<b>GSC</b>	General Secretariat of the Council
<b>GSM</b>	Global System for Mobile Communications
<b>H&amp;M</b>	Health and Medical Support
<b>HIV</b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
<b>HN</b>	Host Nation
<b>HNS</b>	Host Nation Support
<b>HoD</b>	Head of Delegation
<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters
<b>HR</b>	High Representative
<b>HUMINT</b>	Human Intelligence
<b>IC</b>	International Community
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>ICCW</b>	In Close Coordination With
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>ICU</b>	Intensive Care Unit
<b>ID</b>	Identification Card
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IER</b>	International Evaluation Report / Information Exchange Request
<b>IF</b>	International Forces
<b>IM</b>	Information Management



<b>IMC</b>	Information Management Cell
<b>IMD</b>	Initiating Military Directive
<b>IMINT</b>	Imagery Intelligence
<b>INFOSEC</b>	Information Security (electronic)
<b>INTEL</b>	Intelligence
<b>IO</b>	International Organization
<b>IOC</b>	Initial Operational Capability
<b>IOT</b>	In Order To
<b>IPE</b>	Individual Protective Equipment
<b>ISF</b>	Interior Security Forces
<b>ISH</b>	International Safe Haven
<b>ISTAR</b>	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>IVO</b>	In Vicinity of
<b>JIP</b>	Joint Intelligence Picture
<b>JMA</b>	Joint Mission Area
<b>KLE</b>	Key Leader Engagement
<b>LAN</b>	Local Area Network
<b>LEGAD</b>	Legal Advisor
<b>LIP</b>	Locally Employed Personnel
<b>LI</b>	Lesson Identified
<b>LL</b>	Lesson Learned
<b>LMG</b>	Lessons Management Group
<b>LN</b>	Lead Nation
<b>LN</b>	Local National
<b>LNO</b>	Liaison Officer
<b>LO</b>	Lessons Observed
<b>LOC</b>	Lines of Communication
<b>LPC</b>	Logistic Planning Conference
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>LSO</b>	Local Security Officer
<b>M&amp;T</b>	Movements and Transportation

<b>MA</b>	Mission Area
<b>MASCAL</b>	Mass Casualty
<b>MCdr</b>	Mission Commander
<b>MCCE</b>	Movement Coordination Centre Europe
<b>MEDEVAC</b>	Medical Evacuation
<b>MHQ</b>	Mission Headquarters
<b>Mil Info Ops</b>	Military Information Operations
<b>Mil PR/PI</b>	Military Public Relations/Public Information
<b>MilRep</b>	Military Representative
<b>MINUSCA</b>	UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission in CAR
<b>MISCA</b>	AU-led International Support Mission to CAR
<b>MN</b>	Multinational
<b>MNDDP</b>	Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan
<b>MoD</b>	Minister of Defence
<b>MOE</b>	Measures of Effectiveness
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MPLAN</b>	Mission Plan
<b>MRE</b>	Meal Ready to Eat
<b>MS</b>	Member States/Mission secret
<b>MSR</b>	Main Supply Road
<b>MSC</b>	Mission Support Cell
<b>MU</b>	Mission Unclassified
<b>NBC</b>	Nation Borne Costs/Nuclear Biological Chemical
<b>NCO</b>	Non Commissioned Officer
<b>NDDP</b>	National Detailed Deployment Plans
<b>NEO</b>	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NIC</b>	National Intelligence Cell
<b>NILO</b>	National Intelligence Liaison Officer
<b>NIST</b>	National Intelligence Support Team
<b>NLT</b>	No Later Than
<b>NOE</b>	Nation-Owned Equipment
<b>NSE</b>	National Support Element

<b>OC</b>	Organized Crime
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODMA</b>	Officer for Documents Management and Archiving
<b>OHQ</b>	Operational Headquarters
<b>OPCON</b>	Operational Control
<b>OSINT</b>	Open Source Intelligence
<b>PECC</b>	Patient Evacuation Coordination Centre
<b>PEP</b>	Post Exposure Prophylaxis
<b>PHC</b>	Primary Healthcare
<b>PIR</b>	Priority Intelligence Requirement
<b>PLCE</b>	Personal Load Carrying Equipment
<b>PM</b>	Prime Minister
<b>PMR</b>	Post Mission Report
<b>PMR</b>	Private Mobile Radio
<b>POC</b>	Point of Contact
<b>POD</b>	Point of Debarkation
<b>POE</b>	Point of Embarkation/Point of Entry
<b>POI</b>	Person of Interest
<b>POL</b>	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
<b>POLAD</b>	Political Adviser
<b>PPP</b>	Presence Posture Profile
<b>PR/PI</b>	Public Relations /Public information
<b>PSC</b>	Political and Security Committee
<b>PSOR</b>	Provisional Statement of Requirements
<b>PSYOPS</b>	Psychological Operations
<b>QRF</b>	Quick Reaction Force
<b>R2</b>	Report and Return
<b>RFI</b>	Request For Information
<b>RLS</b>	Real Life Support
<b>ROE</b>	Rules of Engagement
<b>ROEAUTH</b>	ROE Authorized Message
<b>ROEIMPL</b>	ROE Implementation Message
<b>ROEREQ</b>	ROE request

<b>RoL</b>	Rule of Law
<b>Role 2 E</b>	Medical Role 2 Enhanced
<b>RPG</b>	Rocket Propelled Grenade
<b>RSOM</b>	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
<b>RTA</b>	Road Traffic Accident
<b>RTF</b>	Regional Task Force
<b>RW</b>	Rotary Wing
<b>SA</b>	Situational Awareness
<b>SAA</b>	Security Accreditation Authority
<b>SASE</b>	Safe And Secure Environment
<b>SATCOM</b>	Satellite Communication
<b>SATCEN</b>	Satellite Centre
<b>SC</b>	Special Committee
<b>STD</b>	Sexually Transmitted Disease
<b>SIAC</b>	Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity
<b>SIR</b>	Specific Intelligence Requirement
<b>SITCEN</b>	Situation Centre
<b>SITREP</b>	Situation Report
<b>SNR</b>	Senior National Representative
<b>SOF</b>	Special Operations Forces
<b>SOFA</b>	Status of Force Agreement
<b>SOMA</b>	Status of Mission Agreement
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure
<b>SOR</b>	Statement of Requirement
<b>SOS</b>	Struck off Strength
<b>SPOD</b>	Seaport of Debarkation
<b>SR</b>	Special Representative/Special Report
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary General
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>STD</b>	Sexually Transmitted Disease
<b>STRATAIRMEDEVAC</b>	Strategic Air Medical Evacuation
<b>TA</b>	Technical Arrangement/Target Audience/Threat Assessment
<b>TACOM</b>	Tactical Command

<b>TACON</b>	Tactical Control
<b>TBC</b>	To Be Confirmed
<b>TBD</b>	To Be Determined
<b>TCN</b>	Troops Contributing Nations
<b>TESSOC</b>	Terrorism, Espionage (intelligence gathering), Sabotage and Subversion (propaganda) and Organized Crime
<b>TOA</b>	Transfer of Authority
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNOCHA</b>	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UNSC</b>	UN Security Council
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance
<b>VIP</b>	Very Important Person
<b>VP</b>	Vulnerable Point
<b>WASH</b>	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WKC</b>	Watch Keeping Capability
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>WoW</b>	Ways of Working

## ANNEX YY

### APPENDIX YY-2

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