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From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Permanent Representatives Committee/Council
Subject:	Council conclusions on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan

Delegations will find in the Annex the above-mentioned Council conclusions, the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan, as approved by the Council (General Affairs) on 24 October 2023.

COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan

The Council of the European Union,

RECALLING:

- the European Union Maritime Security Strategy of 24 June 2014¹ and the first Action Plan of
 17 December 2014²;
- Council conclusions on the revision of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy
 (EUMSS) Action Plan of 26 June 2018³;
- Council conclusions on maritime security of 22 June 2021⁴;
- Council conclusions on International Ocean Governance of 13 December 2022⁵;
- the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security of 21 March 2022⁶;
- the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan: An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats of 10 March 2023⁷;

² 17002/14

¹ 11205/14

³ 10494/18

^{4 9946/21}

^{5 15973/22}

⁶ 7371/22

 $^{^{7}}$ 7311/23 + ADD 1

- 1. Hereby APPROVES a revised EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan as set out in the annexes to these conclusions, which replace the EU Maritime Security Strategy from 2014 and the revised Action Plan from 2018 and build on their achievements; the EUMSS and its Action Plan aim to enhance the EU's regional and international role and further secure the EU's access to an increasingly contested maritime domain, particularly in light of the consequences of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine;
- 2. RECALLS that since 2014, the EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan have provided the framework for addressing security challenges at sea. The strategy has stimulated closer cooperation between civilian and military authorities, in particular through information exchange. It has helped promote rules-based governance at sea and has given a boost to international cooperation. It aims to reinforce the EU's autonomy and capacity to respond to growing maritime security threats, as well as to raise maritime domain awareness at large;
- 3. UNDERLINES that the revised EUMSS lays out the framework for the EU to take further action to safeguard its interests at sea, and to protect its citizens, values and economy, while promoting international rules and full compliance with international instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
- 4. HIGHLIGHTS that the revised EUMSS Action Plan will be implemented by the EU and its Member States in line with their respective competences and in close cooperation with likeminded countries and organisations;

- 5. CALLS on all implementing actors, particularly Member States, the Commission and the High Representative, to work closely together and, where appropriate, with other EU bodies and agencies, to implement the Strategy and its Action Plan, building on the achievements of the EUMSS since 2014, ensuring consistency with other EU sectoral policies and using relevant instruments and policy actions, under the overall guidance of the Strategic Compass; RECALLS that the Action Plan is subject to regular review and update if so required;
- 6. CALLS for focused and regular reporting on the implementation of the Action Plan, including via the Working Party on Maritime Issues EUMSS, in order to facilitate the exchange of best practices, as well as to enhance awareness and follow-up of implementation activities, to monitor progress, assess threats and challenges and address any gaps;
- 7. INVITES the Commission and the High Representative to submit to the Council a joint progress report with contributions from the Member States three years after the Strategy is approved by the Council.

Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy

I. INTRODUCTION

Maritime security is vital to the European Union (EU) and to its Member States. Together, the EU's Member States form the largest combined exclusive economic zone in the world. The EU economy depends greatly on safe and secure oceans: over 80% of global trade is seaborne, about two-thirds of the world's oil and gas supply is either extracted at sea or transported by sea¹, and up to 99% of global data flows are transmitted through undersea cables². To ensure effective ocean governance, to protect our oceans and seabeds, and to unlock the full potential of the sustainable blue economy³, the global maritime domain should be secure.

Since 2014, the European Union maritime security strategy (EUMSS) and action plan⁴ have provided the framework for addressing security challenges at sea. The strategy has stimulated closer cooperation between civilian and military authorities, in particular through information exchange. It has helped promote rules-based governance at sea and has given a boost to international cooperation. It has strengthened the EU's autonomy and capacity to respond to maritime security threats⁵.

This Strategy builds upon and replaces the 2014 EUMSS. It continues to be guided by the principles of the 2014 EUMSS: cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for international rules – international law, human rights and democracy and full compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – and maritime multilateralism.

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¹ 10729/22

² https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/702557/EXPO IDA(2022)702557 EN.pdf

³ 8810/21

^{4 11205/14} and 10494/18

^{5 9946/21}

This Strategy takes particular regard of each of the European sea and subsea basins, namely the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, the Arctic Ocean and the outermost regions. However, the fact that maritime security in any part of the globe inevitably affects the rest of the world means that the scope of EU maritime security interests is global.

The EU plays an increasingly important role as a global maritime security provider, by conducting its own naval operations, e.g. Atalanta⁷ and Irini⁸, implementing the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP)⁹ concept, and promoting maritime situational awareness and cooperating with a wide range of external partners. In addition, the Copernicus maritime and border surveillance operational systems, implemented by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), provide space-based observations, complementing the navigation services of Galileo satellites.

The overall strategic environment is experiencing drastic changes. Given the climate crisis and environmental degradation, the continuous development of various forms of illegal trafficking and plundering of marine resources, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, threats to critical maritime infrastructures and the consequences of Russia's illegal and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, more action is required of the EU as an international security provider.

⁶ The EU maritime domain encompasses the EU Member States' Territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelf as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as all legal uses of the Ocean and the seas provided therein.

⁷ https://eunavfor.eu/

⁸ https://www.operationirini.eu/

⁹ 6256/22 and 6255/22

Based on the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence endorsed by the European Council in March 2022¹⁰ and the Joint Communication on Maritime Security of March 2023¹¹, this revision of the EUMSS and its action plan aims to respond to the new challenges. It is an opportunity to drive forward sustainable solutions to maritime security problems. It is also an opportunity to further enhance the EU's and its Member States' role internationally and further secure the EU's access to an increasingly contested maritime domain.

The revised EUMSS is a framework for the EU to take further action to protect its interests at sea, and to protect its citizens, values and economy. The aim is to promote international peace and security, as well as safeguard free flow of trade and freedom of navigation, while adhering to the principle of sustainability and protecting biodiversity. The EU and its Member States will implement the revised strategy, in line with their respective competences.

II. EVOLVING AND GROWING THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY

Much has changed in the global geopolitical context since the European maritime security strategy was adopted in 2014, requiring new and enhanced action. The EU Threat Analysis demonstrates that the EU is facing an increase in threats and challenges, including in the maritime domain¹². Strategic competition for power and resources is increasing. Threats are becoming increasingly complex and multi-layered, with some countries seeking to re-define the core tenets of the rules-based multilateral order, including through violations of national sovereignty and borders and other revisionist actions, such as acts constituting breaches of the freedom of navigation and maritime claims that are contrary to international law, in particular UNCLOS. Russia's unjustified and unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine has brought war back to Europe. It constitutes a major shift in the European strategic environment, with negative spill-over effects on maritime security and the European economy, impacting European citizens and businesses.

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¹⁰ Strategic Compass doc. 7371/22

¹¹ 7311/23 + ADD 1

¹² The EU Threat Analysis is a comprehensive and intelligence-based analysis of the range of threats and challenges the EU is facing or might face in the future. It is regularly updated and serves as background information to help develop and implement the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.

Maritime security is being challenged in many regions, including territorial and maritime disputes, competition for natural resources and threats to freedom of navigation and rights of innocent and transit passage. Such challenges create tensions and instability in sea basins around the EU.

There has also been an increase in challenges to global maritime security beyond European basins, including the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and in the South China Sea, which could affect the EU Member States' interests and those of their partners. Some non-EU countries are increasing their assertiveness as well as their military capabilities at sea and resorting to unilateral actions, including by using or threatening to use force against other countries. This includes provocations and unilateral actions against EU Member States and violations of sovereign rights in breach of international law. These actions challenge the rule of law and the international order based on the UNCLOS.

The Indo-Pacific region, where the EU has Outermost Regions (Indian Ocean) and Overseas Countries and Territories (Pacific), has become an area of intense geopolitical competition. The display of force and increased tensions in regions such as the South and East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait affect global and European security and prosperity. Maintaining stability and security along key shipping routes - such as the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean - requires the EU and its Member States to step up action in terms of presence, partnership and cooperative initiatives, in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Climate change and marine pollution are expected to have substantial, long-lasting adverse consequences for maritime security. These may include biodiversity loss, depletion of fish stocks, flooding in coastal areas and islands, the loss of coral reefs, mangroves and other wetlands¹³. It is important to better understand the interactions between climate change and environmental degradation of coastal and maritime areas, and to minimise whenever possible their effects on maritime security, including through ongoing and new targeted research. Climate change and environmental degradation act as risk multipliers by increasing instability and inequality, exacerbating transnational crime, piracy and tensions over marine resources. This requires a new prism allowing the EU to make society more climate-resilient, protect nature and reverse the degradation of ecosystems¹⁴. Conversely, gaps in maritime security may result in environmental damage, such as hindered access to contaminated sites, diversion of funds from environmental protection or acts of sabotage against maritime infrastructure. In addition, Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has had devastating human, economic, social and environmental consequences, including loss of biodiversity.

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¹³ IPCC SROCC (2019) and WGII report, AR6 (2022)

^{14 8219/20}

The 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, unauthorised presences around critical maritime infrastructure in the North Sea and the recurrent cyber-attacks targeting maritime infrastructure, including in the context of hybrid campaigns, require the EU to bolster its action and protect its critical infrastructure more effectively, in particular by developing innovative technologies. As the maritime industry undergoes digital transformation, its complexity and potential vulnerabilities have increased. Malicious actors are increasingly likely to use cyber means, including in the context of hybrid campaigns, to target maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines, energy-related installations, as well as ports and ships. The Council Recommendation on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure acknowledges this need for action. Additionally, the Commission recommendation on Union disaster resilience goals set out measures which can contribute to EU's and Member States' better preparedness for and ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters, including at sea 16.

Threats and illicit activities – such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, irregular migration, organised crime, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, trafficking of arms and narcotics, terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities, including unauthorised exploration in the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves of EU Member States, and risks related to unexploded ordnance (UXO)¹⁷ at sea – remain equally critical challenges in multiple regions with some coastal areas and remote territories of the EU being particularly vulnerable. Some of these illicit activities may be facilitated by inadequate port security and poor maritime domain awareness. Malicious actors may also combine these threats and activities as hybrid threats against the EU and its Member States.

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¹⁵ 2023/C 20/01, p.1-11

¹⁶ 6259/23 and 2023/C 56/01, p. 1-11

¹⁷ Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to explosive weapons (bombs, shells, grenades, land mines, naval mines, cluster munition, and other munitions) that did not explode and still pose a risk of detonation, sometimes many decades after they were used or discarded.

III. EU MARITIME SECURITY INTERESTS

In the face of evolving maritime security threats, the EU's fundamental interests are:

- the security of the European Union, its Member States, citizens and partners;
- preserving global peace and stability, and keeping maritime shipping routes free and open for all, and safe from the threats posed by state and non-State actors;
- upholding international law, in particular UNCLOS as the overarching legal framework governing all activities in the ocean, and promoting sound international ocean governance, including through regional sea conventions;
- protecting natural resources and the marine environment, and managing the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation on maritime security;
- improve the resilience of critical entities and the security of networks and information systems;
- ensuring the resilience and protection of critical maritime infrastructure ¹⁸ (onshore and offshore), including by addressing the risks and threats related to climate change, and those that arise from foreign direct investments;

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¹⁸ For example, undersea cables and pipelines, logistical hubs (i.e. ports), offshore renewable energy installations, offshore oil and gas oil platforms, etc.

- strengthening the resilience and protection of logistical hubs, i.e. ports, including addressing risks associated with corruption and illicit activities;
- protecting economic activities at sea, thereby contributing to a sustainable blue economy (both onshore and offshore);
- protecting the EU's external borders, and its internal security, including by addressing the trafficking in human beings, and other illegal activities, including terrorism;
- safeguarding EU Member States' maritime zones from illegal, unauthorised exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons;
- ensuring the capacity to act promptly and effectively in the maritime domain, adopting a multi-domain approach (i.e. land, air, cyber and outer space);
- ensuring the safety and security of seafarers in line with the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention and other relevant conventions of the International Labour Organisation.

www.parlament.gv.at

IV. STRENGTHENING THE EU'S RESPONSE

The revised maritime security strategy will help protect the EU's interests listed above, from the evolving and growing maritime security threats. To do so, the EU will step up action under six strategic objectives:

- 1. step up activities at sea;
- 2. cooperate with partners;
- 3. lead in maritime domain awareness:
- 4. manage risks and threats;
- 5. enhance capabilities;
- 6. educate and train.

The revised EUMSS will be implemented via an Action Plan (in annex) and in the framework of the Integrated Approach¹⁹. To implement the strategy, together with its Member States, the EU will use all relevant civilian and military policies, tools and instruments, and coordinate policies and activities of all relevant players at European, regional and national level, strengthening their synergies and complementarities. The strategy will also promote a more coherent engagement of the EU in external conflicts and crises, to enhance the security of the EU and its citizens.

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¹⁹ The 'integrated approach to external conflicts and crises' draws from the 2016 EU Global Strategy. It was endorsed by the 2018 Council conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises (5413/18). It identifies a framework for a more coherent and holistic engagement by the EU to external conflicts and crises and promotes human security and thereby also increases the security of the EU and its citizens.

The Action Plan features actions specific to each sea basin around the EU. In addition, action under the EUMSS should take into account regional EU strategies²⁰ and capacity building programmes, as well as cooperation with partner countries. Finally, the implementation of the EUMSS should promote the inclusion of maritime security aspects in all relevant regional strategies and initiatives as well as macro-regional strategies, including in particular those for the sea basins around the EU.

1. Step up activities at sea

The EU Strategic Compass calls for further strengthening the EU's engagement on maritime security. Conducting regular deployments contributes to preventing new and managing ongoing crises. Under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework, Operation Atalanta has been operating in the Western Indian Ocean since 2008. Given its successful track record, Operation Atalanta has seen its mandate expanded from the fight against piracy into a broader maritime security operation, with an extended Area of Operations in the North-Western Indian Ocean and further strengthening links and synergies with the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) mission²¹. In the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Irini has as its primary task to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya. This is a direct EU contribution to peace and stability in the Mediterranean, enhancing maritime security. In line with the Integrated Approach, the EU also contributes to enhancing maritime security by providing training and capacity building for partners through CSDP missions, such as the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Somalia, and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya, taking into consideration relevant policies and tools, including the mini-concept on border management and maritime security.

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²⁰ Such as the Comprehensive Strategy with Africa (6703/20), the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (7671/14), the EU Strategy for the Indo-Pacific (11930/21), the EU policy on the Arctic (1287/21), and the Strategy on the Outermost regions (8781/22).

²¹ https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/news/article/european-maritime-awareness-in-the-soh-emasoh-political-statement-by-the

In 2021, the EU introduced the new concept of Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP). This flexible new tool aims to boost the EU's collective engagement on maritime security by making best use of Member States' naval assets in areas that are of strategic interest for the EU. In this context, the EU should step up its support to the fight against illegal and illicit activities at sea, including trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, piracy and IUU fishing. Based on the experience gained through CMP implementation in the Gulf of Guinea and once enough experience is acquired in the North-Western Indian Ocean (including in the Red Sea), the EU may consider new maritime areas of interest where to implement this concept. The establishment of new maritime areas of interest would increase the EU's situational awareness, partnerships, and strategic culture as a maritime security actor.

The EU Strategic Compass also underlines the importance of ensuring readiness and interoperability among EU Member States' naval forces, and calls for the EU to conduct live exercises in all domains. The EU will therefore launch an annual maritime security exercise involving naval assets²² to boost readiness, foster interoperability and tackle the evolving threats to maritime security.

The EU has set up inter-agency cooperation between European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and Frontex via the Tripartite Working Arrangement (TWA) to support national coast guard authorities.

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²² Exercise involving navies and maritime security authorities from as many Member States as possible to boost preparedness and response capabilities to traditional, new and evolving risks and threats.

EFCA conducts joint deployment plans coordinating Member States in all sea basins surrounding the EU, including international waters in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance.

EMSA helps the Commission carry out maritime security inspections in ports, port facilities and ships in the EU, and is exploring ways to enhance maritime security in domains like passenger ships or cyber-security. In line with the strategic guidelines on the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM)²³, the surveillance system should be able to detect, identify and, if necessary, trace and intercept all vessels coming into territorial waters and contribute to ensuring the protection and saving of lives at sea in all weather conditions. Member States should make best use of surveillance capabilities offered by Frontex to upgrade national capabilities and overall situational awareness.

Frontex conducts joint operations such as Indalo, Themis and Poseidon to control the external EU borders to tackle irregular migration, to fight cross border crime and to enhance European cooperation on coast guard functions including search and rescue.

EFCA, EMSA and Frontex conduct multipurpose maritime operations to fight cross-border crime, including the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking in human beings, to detect marine pollution and illegal fishing, and carry out other surveillance tasks in multiple sea basins around the EU. The EU should further develop these important multipurpose operations.

²³ 9528/22

The key EU actions²⁴ to step up activities at sea in this Strategy are:

- organising maritime security exercises, including annual naval exercises of Member States' navies and coast guards25;
- reinforcing existing EU naval operations (Atalanta and Irini) with naval and air assets up to the levels indicated in their combined joined statements of requirements;
- considering new maritime areas of interest (MAI) in which to implement the CMP concept, based on lessons learnt and on proposals from the European External Action Service;
- stepping up the fight against illegal and illicit activities at sea, including drug trafficking, in the MAI:
- maintaining and reinforcing maritime security inspections in the EU and addressing cybersecurity and passenger ship security;
- stepping up EU-level cooperation on coast guard functions by promoting the development of multipurpose maritime operations in multiple sea basins around the EU.

²⁴ The key EU actions listed under each of the six specific objectives summarize prominent elements of actions presented in detail in the action plan.

²⁵ 7371/22 Strategic Compass

2. Cooperate with partners

The EU has already forged relations and synergies on maritime security with multilateral and regional organisations both at global and at regional level (e.g. with the United Nations (UN) including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations (IMO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)²⁶) and with several third countries.

The EU and its Member States have also developed international cooperation through bilateral dialogues, port calls and live exercises, notably in the Indo-Pacific region, e.g. with Australia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Oman and Singapore. Operations Atalanta and Irini participate in mechanisms for sharing awareness and for multilateral engagement, including Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Conferences. The European Union also provides significant support for maritime security under its development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and foreign policy support measures.

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²⁶ Maritime security has long been a shared priority for both the EU and ASEAN. Cooperation between the two regions has focused on responding to transnational maritime threats such as piracy, smuggling, illegal. immigration, disaster risks and the impacts of pollution and climate change. The European Union supports the ASEAN-led process towards an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which is in full compliance with UNCLOS and does not prejudice the interests of third parties.

In the Western Indian Ocean, the EU supports a regional maritime architecture based on information fusion and operation centres in Madagascar and Seychelles, as well as on the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden²⁷.

Similarly, in the Gulf of Guinea, where the CMP concept has been successfully applied, the EU supports regional organisations and coastal states implementing their own maritime security strategies, strengthening maritime law enforcement and justice, enhancing port security and safety, as well as addressing other matters of particular relevance for coastal States, namely IUU fishing²⁸. The EU will continue increasing maritime domain awareness and information sharing, including satellite information, under the Yaoundé Architecture²⁹. In the broader Atlantic Ocean, the EU supports the fight against illicit activities in cooperation with partners, in particular the fight against drug trafficking.

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²⁷ Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (MASE), Port Security and Safety of Navigation Programme, Regional Programme for Maritime Security in the Red Sea Area and CRIMARIO.

²⁸ PESCAO project with EFCA participation.

²⁹ SWAIMS, PASSMAR and GOGIN actions.

In a challenging geopolitical context, the EU should step up cooperation with partners in its neighbourhood and in other strategically important maritime areas. This is particularly relevant in light of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. The EU will intensify its well established mutually reinforcing and beneficial cooperation with NATO on maritime security, building on the results achieved to date in the framework of the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, in line with the third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation of January 2023 and in full respect of the principles of mutual openness and transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations. A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. In the Indo-Pacific, the EU should increase the exchange of experience with partners on maritime security through the project "Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia" (ESIWA) and bilateral dialogues and by seeking to be granted observer status ('Dialogue partner') in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The EU should also deepen its cooperation with like-minded countries and organisations including international and regional fora on maritime affairs.

The key EU actions on international cooperation in this Strategy are:

- encouraging the signature and ratification of international instruments related to maritime security, notably UNCLOS, and promoting compliance, and sharing of best practices with partners, in implementing international law relevant for maritime security, in relevant fora;
- further intensifying EU-NATO staff-to-staff cooperation on maritime security to cover all
 issues of mutual interest in this domain, building on the three Joint Declarations of 2016, 2018
 and 2023, including enhancing operational cooperation, with a view to ensuring coherence,
 deepening our common work on enhancing maritime security and avoiding unnecessary
 duplications;
- deepening cooperation with third countries on maritime security, building on existing
 instruments and initiatives, including information sharing and capacity building actions, with
 coastal States in the sea basins around the EU, including in the Western Balkans, as well as
 the eastern and southern neighbourhood;
- conducting joint maritime security exercises with partners to boost interoperability, in addition to carrying out more frequent EU port calls and patrols, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, in line with the Strategic Compass;

- deploying EU liaison officers to maritime information fusion centres 30 in maritime areas of
 interest to promote information exchange and cooperation, including on law enforcement,
 justice and home affairs, between the EU and its partners and, where appropriate, evaluating
 the feasibility of directly connecting these fusion centres with relevant EU maritime
 surveillance systems;
- seeking Dialogue Partner status for the EU in the Indian Ocean Rim Association to enhance the EU's role as a partner in maritime security in the region;
- promoting international cooperation on information exchange and the surveillance of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines31, as well as on ship and port security32, particularly in the sea basins around EU.

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³⁰ Maritime information fusion centres are national or regional entities that collect information to enhance maritime domain awareness in a given geographical area. In 2022, the EU deployed its first liaison officer to the Information Fusion Centre in Singapore.

³¹ In accordance with the Council Recommendation 2023/C 20/01 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure.

³² In accordance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code; https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx

3. Lead in maritime domain awareness

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of activity associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the EU and its Member States. On the basis of clearly defined user needs and rights, it assists the authorities responsible for monitoring and surveillance activities in preventing and managing in a comprehensive way all such situations, events and actions related to the EU maritime domain.

Sound MDA is vital to ensuring that competent authorities can swiftly detect the growing and evolving threats affecting the EU and respond to them effectively. The EU will lead in MDA by enhancing information collection and exchange among different maritime sectors³³, and facilitating information sharing between Member States, leading to a more precise maritime picture. At the international level, the EU will continue its work of enhancing MDA capacities of partner countries through information sharing and capacity building, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Indo-Pacific.

Since 2014, the EU and its Member States have made significant progress in acquiring and exchanging information in the maritime domain by developing and connecting the sector-specific systems used by different authorities involved in maritime surveillance³⁴. In particular, the EU has developed the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)³⁵. Based on voluntary participation, the CISE will facilitate real-time information sharing between different authorities responsible for coast guard functions, including the military, connecting concerned authorities within and across Member States. On the basis of the EU CISE2020 research project, in April 2019 the Commission launched the transitional phase of CISE, entrusting its coordination to EMSA, in close cooperation with the Member States³⁶. Building on the transitional phase, the Commission intends to launch the operational phase in 2024 with the support of EMSA.

³³ Maritime sectors include safety and security of maritime transport, fisheries control, marine pollution preparedness and response, protection of marine environment, customs, border control, general law enforcement and defence.

³⁴ E.g. Eurosur and SafeSeaNet (operational systems at EU level).

³⁵ 9946/21

^{36 11990/19}

On defence, the maritime surveillance project (MARSUR) supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA) was designed to enable the naval forces of contributing Member States to exchange operational maritime information and services. MARSUR provides operational added value, as attested by the fact that the EU Member States chose to use it to implement the CMP concept in the Gulf of Guinea and in the North-Western Indian Ocean. EDA and participating Member States are currently working on the strengthening of MARSUR through a dedicated programme. In line with the Strategic Compass, which calls on the EU to strengthen its intelligence-based situational awareness and capabilities, the EU should make full use of all state-of-the-art maritime surveillance capabilities (e.g. drones, patrol aircraft, satellites and emerging disruptive technologies). Operation ATALANTA, through the Maritime Security Centre for the Horn of Africa (MSC-HoA), is involved in MDA in close cooperation with the shipping sector. The EU Space programme, through its components like Copernicus, Galileo and IRIS²³⁷, can contribute directly to increasing MDA. The EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) is also involved in MDA through its work with the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, with the Commission on Galileo/Copernicus and through its participation in CISE and MARSUR. In that regard, the resilience and security of relevant space assets is key to ensure continuity of services.

In addition to the relevant work of EFCA, EMSA and Frontex in the framework of the TWA, the European Coast Guard Functions Forum and the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum can contribute to heightening MDA and operational cooperation by exchanging best practices.

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 $^{^{37}\} https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/welcome-iris2-infrastructure-resilience-interconnectivity-and-security-satellite-2022-11-17_en$

In case of disasters or accidents and when national capacities are overwhelmed, EU Member States and third countries can activate the Union Civil Protection Mechanism³⁸. Through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre³⁹, they can seek assistance, expertise or analysis of the situation.

The EU also contributes to enhancing MDA at international level by running dedicated development cooperation capacity-building initiatives. The project 'Critical Maritime Routes in the Indo-Pacific' (CRIMARIO)⁴⁰ has developed specific tools⁴¹ to enhance MDA and strengthen cooperation with and among regional partners. This is coherent with the EU's broader security and defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. In a similar vein, the project 'Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network' (GoGIN)⁴² developed the YARIS platform, an information-sharing tool in support of the 'Yaoundé Architecture'.

The key EU actions on maritime domain awareness in this Strategy are:

• ensuring that the Common Information Sharing Environment becomes operational by mid-2024, enabling secure and structured exchange of classified and unclassified information among authorities from different maritime surveillance sectors (civilian and military);

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³⁸ EU Civil Protection Mechanism (europa.eu)

³⁹ Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) (europa.eu)

⁴⁰ The European Commission is funding CRIMARIO with EUR 23 million between 2015 and 2025.

⁴¹ The IORIS and the SHARE.IT platforms.

⁴² The European Commission is funding GOGIN with EUR 11.5 million (2016-2023), and GOGIN II with EUR 5 million (2023-2025).

- strengthening the defence maritime surveillance information exchange network (MARSUR)
 by launching a dedicated programme through EDA, and enhancing links between MARSUR and CISE;
- capitalising on the investment made through the EU Space Policy and further exploiting the capacities available through Copernicus on maritime surveillance, marine environment monitoring and climate change;
- integrating space-based technologies, remotely piloted aircraft systems and radar stations, maritime patrol aircraft, and manned and unmanned seaborne means through innovative, cyber-resilient tools to boost MDA;
- stepping up coastal and offshore patrol vessel surveillance and complementing it with digitally networked high-end naval platforms, including naval unmanned platforms to enhance prevention and response capabilities;
- strengthening communication and coordination among EU national maritime operation centres through the use of CISE and MARSUR, on a regional basis as appropriate, to pursue and improve an integrated maritime surveillance in the sea basins around the EU;
- strengthening MDA capabilities of partner countries through the GoGIN and CRIMARIO
 projects, including by further operationalising MDA tools (YARIS, IORIS and SHARE.IT) in
 coordination with Copernicus satellite services.

4. Manage risks and threats

In line with the Strategic Compass, the EU and its Member States will improve their collective ability to defend their security and increase their resilience and preparedness for maritime security challenges, including hybrid and cyber threats. The EU and its Member States should be able to react quickly, with coordinated civilian and military capabilities.

Maritime crimes, including piracy, migrant smuggling and armed robbery at sea remain critical challenges in multiple regions and pose a major threat to maritime security, affecting freedom of navigation and endangering major trade routes. As a global maritime security provider, the EU remains committed to addressing these key maritime security challenges including through preventive actions.

Fighting climate change and environmental degradation are among the EU's top political priorities that are reflected in its external action through many thematic or geographical strategies such as Global Gateway or the Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as well as through EU diplomatic outreach and EU Climate Diplomacy.

The EU has already taken significant steps to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, and will take further action on problems interlinked with climate change, environmental degradation and security. The High Representative and the Commission presented a Joint Communication on the nexus between climate change, environmental degradation and security and defence in June 2023⁴³. It includes, inter alia, proposals for tools assessing the causes and consequences of climate change and environmental degradation on the maritime sector, on maritime infrastructure, as well as on natural and man-made features of coastal areas, including as regards early warning, evidence-based research and satellite imagery (e.g. through Copernicus programme). In the Arctic, the ice caps are melting, sea ice is receding, new shipping routes are gradually opening up, and the consequent increase in human activities is expected to generate or aggravate threats to the environment and to local communities. In this regard the Joint Communication on "A stronger EU engagement for a preserved, peaceful and prosperous Arctic"44 should be further operationalised as soon as possible in particular with regard to zero emission shipping in the Arctic Ocean, sustainable mining of critical raw materials, and sustainable development of the Arctic regions. Assets operating in the Arctic area should have sufficient capacities for ice breaking, search and rescue, satellite coverage and protection of off-shore critical infrastructure in extreme winter conditions.

⁴³ 11283/23

^{44 12870/21}

Protecting critical infrastructure in the maritime domain is a key priority. The EU should complement the role of Member States in building up the resilience of critical maritime infrastructure such as pipelines or undersea cables that run across national maritime areas. It should improve current risk and threat assessments on such infrastructure to stay up to date and complement them with response options and mitigating measures building on cross-sectoral expertise and capacities as well as instruments to support development of respective Member States' capabilities. It is imperative to provide continued support to Member States to develop underwater protective assets, counter-drone solutions and repair capabilities. In addition, the EU should continue to explore the possibilities of the coexistence⁴⁵ of offshore renewable energy with defence activities, as advocated in the offshore renewable strategy⁴⁶

Coast guard authorities have a key role in providing for surveillance, monitoring, crime prevention and vessel traffic management capabilities in the maritime domain of the EU. Together with naval assets, their role as a maritime security and safety provider is vital, as coast guard authorities are often able to act in circumstances that do not necessarily allow for military authorities' intervention.

With the Directive on the resilience of critical entities⁴⁷ and the revised Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS 2 Directive)⁴⁸, the EU is at the forefront of relevant developments, with a comprehensive legal framework allowing it to upgrade both the physical and the cyber resilience of critical entities and infrastructure. The EU should step up cooperation in this area with like-minded third countries and with key partners such as NATO through the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Resilience.

⁴⁵ In line with the MSP Directive, 2014/89/EU

^{46 12950/20}

⁴⁷ Directive (EU) 2022/2557

⁴⁸ Directive (EU) 2022/2555

The EU faces the additional challenge posed by large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and chemical ammunitions and oil leaking from shipwrecks originating from the First and Second World Wars lying in sea basins around the EU. This challenge is further exacerbated by Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, resulting in mines present in the Black Sea. The type, location and quantity of this ordnance are poorly documented in some sea basins, which poses risks to the safeguarding of individuals, to maritime safety and security, to national critical infrastructure, to the environment (due to possible release of chemicals) and to blue economy activities (e.g. the construction of offshore renewable energy sites or fishing activities). Building on lessons learned from existing successful projects⁴⁹, the EU should further step up efforts in addressing this issue comprehensively, by increasing situational awareness, tools and instruments that would help mitigate the risks associated with UXO and their disposal. It will also be very important to dispose safely of UXO and mines left in the Black Sea, as soon as security and political conditions allow.

Maritime security can also be undermined by foreign actors, both due to risks related to foreign direct investment in critical infrastructure, and to information manipulation and interference by such actors. These issues will be addressed through relevant instruments and frameworks; e.g. foreign direct investment will be screened in line with the relevant Regulation⁵⁰.

Sharing marine data and information with third countries is a key aspect of cooperation. It should however be contingent on security risk assessments.

⁴⁹ Projects to clean the Baltic Sea from chemical warfare and conventional munitions supported by the Interreg programme financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - 10 years of Interreg cooperation to free the Baltic Sea from dumped munitions - Interreg Baltic Sea Region (interreg-baltic.eu) ⁵⁰ Regulation (EU) 2019/452

The Commission and Member States are carrying out a risk assessment in view of producing guidance to enhance passenger ship security in the EU.

The key EU actions on risk and threat management in this Strategy are:

- strengthening the capacity to contribute to the fight against organised crime and serious international threats and illicit activities, including in the MAIs;
- conducting regular, live maritime security exercises at EU level, focused inter alia on harbour
 protection and on countering threats such as cyber and hybrid ones, in addition to the annual
 naval exercises of Member States' navies and coastguards mentioned above;
- deploying assets and surveillance tools (e.g. RPAS) and ensure the optimal use of current and future space services (such as Earth observation) to patrol and protect critical maritime infrastructure;
- developing EU regional cooperation plans to ensure the surveillance of underwater and offshore infrastructure;
- developing a coherent framework with regional organisations, including concrete actions and funding, to address the threats posed by UXO, active weapons and chemical weapons at sea, active and efficient monitoring and removal with innovative technologies and at a minimal environmental impact;

- improving early warning and strategic foresight, inter alia through the use of space services, on the effects of climate change, particularly sea-level rise, storm surges, and environmental degradation;
- drawing up new and reinforcing existing risk assessments, contingency plans and disaster recovery plans (EU level and national level) for ports, coastal infrastructure, as well as passenger ship security and transport / supply chains;
- encouraging the exchange of best practices between maritime actors on cyber threats, and continue to strengthen the cybersecurity of ships at the level of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO);
- enhancing MDA in the Arctic, including space observation; continued engagement with Arctic coastal States bilaterally and in relevant multilateral fora, as appropriate, to support the implementation of the Arctic Policy51;
- assessing the suitability of the maritime areas reserved or used for military activities for deploying offshore renewable projects;
- assessing investment into maritime infrastructure by non-EU countries and entities in the context of the cooperation mechanism set up by the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments.

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⁵¹ 12870/21

5. Enhance capabilities

To promote its maritime security interests, the EU should accelerate the development of both civilian and military capabilities, involving industry as appropriate. Research &Development (R&D) on civilian aspects of European maritime security is included in the Civil Security for Society cluster of the EU Horizon Europe programme. Current and upcoming R&D will support capability development at the EU level, including protection of critical maritime infrastructure, management of underwater threats, preparedness and response to anthropogenic and natural disasters, security of maritime passenger transport, and management of UXO, involving industry where appropriate.

In the area of security and defence, to ensure a more assertive Union presence at sea as well as the ability to project power, the EU and its Member States should develop a full spectrum of maritime capabilities, making full use of the scope for cooperation under related EU initiatives and instruments⁵². In particular, enhanced maritime capabilities should focus on ensuring the EU's resilience, competitiveness and control in all areas of the maritime domain, in coherence with NATO in line with the Strategic Compass. The ongoing revision of the Capability Development Plan⁵³ draws amongst others on the lessons learnt from Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. For instance, EDA will explore the key technologies required to manage maritime unmanned drone swarms and to protect critical seabed infrastructure.

⁵² The Capability Development Plan, the collaborative opportunities identified under the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Fund.

⁵³ EDA's Steering Board of June 2022 formally launched the revision of the Capability Development Plan.

As called for by the Strategic Compass and in line with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)⁵⁴, national and multinational projects should aim to both overcome fragmentation in critical assets such as corvette-size vessels and on-board systems and improve the operational effectiveness of individual platforms. Several opportunities for cooperation identified in the 2019 – 2022 CARD cycles have led to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects in unmanned maritime systems. The European Defence Fund⁵⁵ will support research and development projects, for example on maritime situational awareness, maritime surveillance capabilities, critical maritime infrastructure protection and underwater capabilities.

The EU and its Member States should seek to strengthen capabilities that allow them to better detect suspicious activities to protect critical underwater infrastructure. The EU and NATO should coordinate efforts in this area as appropriate in order to ensure coherence of output where requirements overlap.

The key EU actions to enhance capabilities in this Strategy are:

- developing common requirements and concepts for technology in security and defence, including for MDA, both at the surface and underwater;
- building interoperable unmanned systems to monitor critical maritime infrastructure, to counter hostile drone swarms etc.:

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⁵⁴ Focus area 'European Patrol Class Surface Ships'

⁵⁵ The aim of the EDF is to strengthen the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the defence industry in the EU. It therefore contributes to developing the military capabilities of the Member States.

- increasing modern mine countermeasures capabilities, e.g. by developing an EU concept of operations;
- supporting the development of joint enhanced maritime patrol aircraft capabilities;
- building up joint testing and experimentation exercises to develop future, state-of-the-art maritime capabilities.

6. Educate and train

A high level of specialised education, skills and training is indispensable for the EU to be equipped to tackle present and future maritime security challenges. Tackling new hybrid and cyber threats requires operators with strong digital skillsets and specific re-skilling and up-skilling programmes. Solutions in the form of exchanges between military training programmes, joint training programmes between the navies of EU Member States and between different institutions will boost interoperability and help the EU respond to new threats in a more effective, coordinated and inclusive way.

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As part of the Practical handbook on European cooperation on coast guard functions, a training catalogue has been created, covering all courses run by EU Agencies across all maritime domains. The handbook will be updated on a rolling basis in line with needs and developments. The successful European Coast Guard Functions Training Academy Network project (ECGFA NET) and the harmonised training course on the coast guard function should continue, especially the exchange programme, which involves neighbouring countries and regional cooperation through a dedicated project implemented by EFCA in close cooperation with EMSA and Frontex. EMSA is also developing a course on maritime cybersecurity. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) organises courses and conferences on hybrid threats affecting the maritime domain. Gender equality and the empowerment of women in the EU maritime security sector should be supported, promoting access to high level technical education and training for women.

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC)⁵⁶ provides EU-level training and education for both civilian and military personnel to promote a common understanding of maritime security challenges and raise awareness about the increasing role of EU in this field. With support from the ESDC, six European naval academies are currently working on the content of a common, international naval semester.

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⁵⁶ The ESDC, in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), provides EU–level training and education, in the field of the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It aims to develop and promote a common understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, good practices in relation to various CSDP issues. By doing so, the ESDC complements the national efforts in the field of training and education.

The key EU actions on education and training⁵⁷ in this Strategy are:

- boosting cyber-, hybrid- and space-related security skills by supporting new and existing training courses offered by various academic institutions and competent national or EU bodies, both in the civilian and military areas;
- conducting dedicated training programmes open to non-EU partners to tackle existing and emerging threats to maritime security;
- developing an 'international naval semester' under the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (EMILYO)58;
- conducting joint civil-military and inter-agency exercises based on scenarios involving shared jurisdiction or shared use of capabilities.

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⁵⁷ Including as part of the Year of Skills.

 $^{^{58}}$ http://www.emilyo.eu/; EMILYO is not linked to the Erasmus+ Programme.

V. TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS TO SUPPORT EU ACTION ON MARITIME SECURITY

The revised strategy should be implemented in the spirit of the integrated approach to maximise synergies and bring in complementary EU tools and instruments. This should include:

- the European Defence Fund R&D defence projects to boost the capabilities of the armed forces of EU Member States;
- the European Peace Facility as an off-budget funding mechanism for EU action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy with military and defence implications;
- EU research and innovation on civilian maritime security capabilities particularly under Cluster 3 'Civil Security for Society' of the EU's Horizon Europe programme.
- the opportunities offered by the Internal Security Fund and Border Management and Visa Instrument to boost the capabilities of Member State coast guard authorities carrying out law enforcement and control tasks at sea;

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- the EU naval operations (Operations ATALANTA and IRINI) and the framework of existing Coordinated Maritime Presences;
- the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in particular through benefiting from analytical and response capacities as well as implementing the Commission recommendation on disaster resilience goals;
- the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument programme supporting international partnerships to enhance maritime security, in particular maritime situational awareness;
- the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (2021-2017), IPA III, given its scope and focus on candidate countries;
- the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget to fund civilian CSDP missions;
- the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) to fund maritime surveillance and cooperation on coast guard function;
- the European Regional Development and Fund (ERDF) and Interreg programmes supporting investments in coastal and outermost regions and territories and in countries sharing maritime borders with the EU.

VI. WAY FORWARD

The Commission and the High Representative will work together with the Council to implement this revised strategy in the areas of action identified above and detailed in the action plan, building on achievements of the EUMSS since 2014, using existing instruments and policies, and following the overall guidance of the Strategic Compass.

Three years after the strategy is endorsed by the Council, the Commission and the High Representative will submit to the Council a joint progress report with contributions from the Member States.

Revised EUMSS Action Plan¹

Strategic Objective 1. Step up activities at sea

Objectives		Actions		Concerned
			Where	Actors ²
			applicable	
1.1. Expand the role and	Strengthen EU	U CSDP naval operations and consolidate the implementation of the Coo	ordinated Maritime	e Presences
actions of the EU in the sea	(CMP) conce	(CMP) concept		
basins around the EU and	1.1.1	Provide EU CSDP naval operations (including Atalanta and Irini)	2025	MS, EEAS
overseas.		with the naval and air assets listed in their respective combined joint		
		statements of requirements.		
	1.1.2	Consider new maritime areas of interest in which to implement the	As of 2023	MS, EEAS
		CMP, based on proposals from the EEAS.		

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¹ The EUMSS will be implemented via this Action Plan and in the framework of the Integrated Approach. It will use all relevant EU civilian and military policies, tools and instruments, and coordinate policies and activities of all relevant players at European, regional and national level, strengthening their synergies and complementarities. It will also promote a more coherent engagement of the EU in external conflicts and crises, to enhance the security of the EU and its citizens.

² Concerned Actors listed in the action plan will contribute in line with their respective competences, responsibilities and mandates. The EU agencies in this action plan are those identified as actors under the various actions of the action plan, and any role assigned to them is without prejudice to the procedures and decisions of their respective administrative boards as regards agencies' contributions to these actions. Other relevant EU agencies may also be invited by the Commission or Member States to collaborate in the implementation of the action plan. Agencies will participate in international work through the respective EU services ('parent DGs').

Develop cooperation and synergies between MS-led and EU initiatives on maritime security							
1.1.3	Promote further synergies between EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta	As of 2023	MS, EEAS				
	and the European Maritime Awareness Mission in the Strait of						
	Hormuz (EMASOH).						
1.1.4	Reinforce coherence and coordination between EU institutions' and	On a rolling	MS, COM,				
	EU MS' actions, including through the CMP.	basis	EEAS				
1.1.5	Support action with EUROSUR Fusion services and information	On a rolling	Frontex,				
	exchange capabilities, such as those available through CISE and	basis	EMSA				
	Integrated Maritime Services (IMS), and coordinate monitoring						
	activities in pre-frontier areas.						
1.1.6	Support the creation of maritime staff operators courses (MSCO) in						
	MS by providing training and access to EUROSUR capabilities and						
	services.						
1.1.7	Ensure that EU action at sea and on land is complementary with the	As of 2023, on	MS, COM,				
	EU Integrated Approach by promoting links with inter-agency	a rolling basis.	EEAS, EFCA,				
	cooperation on coast guard functions (Tripartite Working		EMSA,				
	Arrangement) and a Multipurpose Maritime Operation concept		Frontex				
	developed under the EU cooperation on coast guard functions and						
	implemented by coast guard authorities in the sea basins concerned.						
1.1.8	Promote synergies, where appropriate and legally feasible, between	As of 2023, on	MS, COM,				
	CSDP activities and Multipurpose Maritime Operation concepts	a rolling basis.	EEAS, EFCA,				

		developed in the framework of inter-agency cooperation on coast		EMSA,			
		guard functions.		Frontex			
	In relevant sea basins around the EU						
	1.1.9	Organise maritime security exercises, including annual naval	Annually, as of	MS, COM,			
		exercises of Member States' navies and coast guards, involving	2024.	EEAS (EUMS)			
		navies and maritime security authorities from as many MS as					
		possible to boost preparedness and response capabilities to traditional					
		threats as well as to the risks and threats listed in Strategic Objective					
		4.					
	1.1.10	Promote and include maritime security in the work on strategies and	As of 2023, on	MS, COM,			
		initiatives concerning the sea basins around the EU and on relevant	a rolling basis.	EEAS			
		macro-regional strategies, as appropriate.					
-	Arctic						
-	1.1.11	Ensure sufficient satellite observation and aim towards sufficient	By 2025	MS, COM,			
		SATCOM and PNT services in relation to the new Arctic Sea routes,		EMSA			
		including through Copernicus capabilities (including its marine					
		service – CMEMS and maritime surveillance CMS ³), to enhance					
		situational awareness.					
	1.1.12	Participate in the work of the Arctic Council and related fora, as	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,			
		appropriate.	basis.	COM			

³ https://marine.copernicus.eu/

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		Atlantic			
-	1.1.13	Support anti-drug-trafficking operations by exchanging information	As of 2023, on	MS, COM,	
		and conducting joint operations, including at departing countries/	a rolling basis.	MAOC-N,	
		ports and destination EU ports and port facilities, including the		EMSA,	
		Caribbean Sea.		EUROPOL,	
				Frontex	
	1.1.14	Set up cooperation on maritime security with partners from across the	As of 2023	MS, COM,	
		Atlantic Ocean, including international and regional organizations		EEAS	
		from Africa and the Americas.			
	1.1.15	Identify and promote regional maritime capacity-building activities to	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,	
		expand existing maritime security capacity-building programmes	basis, as of	COM	
		(e.g. the Rabat Process), improve their coordination and develop	2024		
		similar initiatives with partner countries and regional organisations.			
	1.1.16	Conduct joint exercises and port calls with coastal like-minded	On a rolling	MS, COM,	
		Countries, in order to strengthen the EU role as a global maritime	basis	EEAS	
		security provider and enhance cooperation in maritime security.			
		Baltic Sea			
	1.1.17	Set up a mechanism involving the COM, the Council of Baltic Sea	As of 2023	MS, COM,	
		States (CBSS) and HELCOM to coordinate scientific actions,		EEAS	
		operations, and data sharing to implement a plan of action for			
		tackling UXO in the Baltic Sea and possible oil spills from			

	shipwrecks.		
1.1.18	Develop a tool at regional level to allow the sharing of data on	As of 2023	MS, COM
	dumped munitions, conduct a risk assessment and identify the best		EEAS
	ways to remove conventional and chemical munitions from the Baltic		
	Sea.		
1.1.19	Develop and scale up technologies to tackle UXO, also involving	As of 2024, on	MS, COM
	civilian entities, and promoting links with industry.	a rolling basis.	EEAS
1.1.20	Further step up efforts, including by setting up a regular campaign	As of 2024, on	MS, COM
	aiming at cleaning the Baltic Sea Region of dumped munitions as part	a rolling basis.	EEAS
	of an EU comprehensive response to UXO, to protect human life and		
	the marine environment, ensure security of sea lanes and facilitate the		
	development of maritime economic activities.		
	Black Sea		l
1.1.21	Enhance the capacities for coordinated response to marine pollution	As of 2023	MS, COM
	related to armed conflicts, including by developing new training		EMSA
	curricula to tackle pollution from various sources, including e.g.		
	UXO, mines, oil leaks, sunken vessels, etc., which might also affect		
	biodiversity and ecosystems, also utilising Common Maritime		
	Agenda (CMA) for the Black Sea and the Black Sea Strategic		
	Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA).		
1.1.22	Build on the existing capacities of EU SatCen and other EU services	As of 2023	MS, COM

	and enhance current capabilities to detect sea mines, including those		SatCen
	deployed in the context of the Russian war of aggression against		
	Ukraine, posing a risk to shipping and navigation.		
	Mediterranean	<u>l</u>	
1.1.23	Enhance capabilities of like-minded Mediterranean partner countries	On a rolling	MS, COM,
	and share information, where appropriate, to enhance their ability to	basis	EEAS, Frontex
	carry out maritime surveillance tasks, including with the aim of		
	detecting and preventing unauthorised border-crossings and cross-		
	border criminal activities.		
1.1.24	Enhance the coordination and synergies between Operation IRINI,	As of 2023	MS, COM,
	EUBAM LIBYA and relevant EU Agencies, to allow the		EEAS,
	implementation of the full mandate of Operation IRINI.		Frontex,
			EMSA, SatCen
1.1.25	Enhance the coordination between Operation IRINI and relevant	As of 2023	MS, EEAS
	partners, by further utilizing existing fora for exchange (e.g. SHADE		
	MED Conference) and exploring ways to utilize operational		
	synergies.		
1.1.26	Develop training courses and facilitate the exchange of information,	On a rolling	MS, COM,
	expertise, technical assistance, training and best practices among	basis, as of	Frontex,
	Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) countries to tackle illicit	2024	EMSA, EFCA
	activities at sea, including through the MedCGFF and in line with the		

	UfM SBE Declaration ⁴ .			
1.1.27	Identify and promote regional maritime capacity-building activities to	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,	
	expand existing maritime security capacity-building programmes	basis, as of	COM	
	(e.g. the Rabat Process), improve their coordination and develop	2024		
	similar initiatives with partner countries and regional organisations.			
1.1.28	Implement GFCM Recommendations/International Inspection	On a rolling	MS, COM,	
	Scheme/Pilot Projects to improve the sustainability of fisheries	basis	EFCA	
	resources, to support the fight against IUU.			
1.1.29	Conduct joint exercises and port calls with coastal like-minded	On a rolling	MS, COM,	
	Countries, in order to strengthen the EU role as a global maritime	basis	EEAS	
	security provider and enhance cooperation in maritime security.			
	North Sea		1	
1.1.30	Carry out a comprehensive mapping exercise of the North Sea basin	By the end of	COM, MS	
	in order to conduct a risk assessment and identify the best ways to	2025		
	remove conventional and chemical munitions.			
In Maritime Areas of Interest				
1.1.31	Step up the support to the fight against illegal and illicit activities at	On a rolling	MS, COM,	
	sea, including trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, piracy	basis	EEAS	

⁴ Article 71 of UfM SBE Declaration: Ministers welcome the active role taken by the MedCGFF in enhancing regional cooperation and promoting understanding of maritime issues of mutual importance and of common interest related to coast guard functions across borders and sectors, both civil and military, and invite the forum to develop training activities and further facilitate exchange of information, expertise, technical assistance, training and best practices to address illicit activities at sea.

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	and IUU fishing.		
	Gulf of Guinea	1	1
1.1.32	Maintain support to the Yaoundé Architecture for maritime security,	Rolling basis	MS, COM,
	including through the Gulf of Guinea Regional Information Network		EEAS, EMSA
	(GoGIN) programme and improve the rule of law and national legal		
	frameworks in the region, including through the ongoing SWAIMS		
	and PASSMAR programmes, until their completion in 2024, and		
	subsequently through the successor regional programme on maritime		
	security, as well as GoGIN II and the YARIS platform.		
1.1.33	Reinforce coherence between EU institutions and EU MS actions, in	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,
	particular through the consolidation of the CMP in the Gulf of	basis	COM
	Guinea.		
	Indo-Pacific		
1.1.34	Improve information sharing mechanisms and enable connections	On a rolling	MS, COM,
	between maritime information fusion centres by developing and	basis	EEAS
	expanding the use of CRIMARIO's IORIS platform and the		
	SHARE.IT initiative.		
1.1.35	Conduct joint exercises and port calls with Indo-Pacific like-minded	As of 2024	MS, COM,
	partners, preferably using IORIS as a collaborative tool.		EEAS
1.1.36	Reinforce coherence between EU institutions and EU MS actions and	As of 2023	
	between the capacity building programmes, including through the		

		CMP in the North-Western Indian Ocean.		
	1.1.37	Step up cooperation on maritime security with international and	As of 2023	1
		regional organisations, in particular the Association of Southeast		
		Asian Nations (ASEAN), including seeking to obtain the status of		
		Dialogue Partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).		
	1.1.38	Continue supporting the maritime security architecture in the Western	As of 2024	COM, EEAS
		Indian Ocean created under the framework of the MASE programme		
		(until the completion of the action in 2023) and on the Djibouti Code		
		of Conduct through the upcoming regional programme on maritime		
		security in sub-Saharan Africa.		
	1.1.39	Continue promoting Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA as a	On a rolling	MS, EEAS
		framework to provide maritime security within its mandate and to	basis	
		step up activities at sea with like-minded countries and organizations,		
		including by taking into account the CMP NWIO.		
1.2 Promote respect of	Prom	note compliance with the UNCLOS and other international instruments re	elated to maritime	esecurity
International Law and fight	1.2.1	Advocate for compliance with and encourage the signature and	On a rolling	MS, COM,
against illicit activities at		ratification of international instruments related to maritime security,	basis as of	EEAS
sea		notably UNCLOS, and sharing of best practices with coastal states	2023	
		and partners in implementing international law relevant for maritime		
		security in relevant fora.		
	1.2.2	Cooperate with partners countries to share best practices and	On a rolling	MS, COM,

	confidence-building measures to help implement international law in	basis as of	EEAS					
	relations with such partner countries.	2023						
Promote and develop aspects of maritime security under the IMO and EU legal frameworks								
1.2.3	Cooperate with partner countries to tackle maritime security issues by	On a rolling	MS, COM,					
	ensuring, for instance, compliance with IMO legal instruments, in	basis	EMSA					
	particular to implement the International Ship and Port Facility							
	Security (ISPS) Code.							
1.2.4	Promote and develop COM MARSEC guidelines, including	On a rolling	MS, COM,					
	guidelines on cybersecurity, in line with IMO regulations, to promote	basis	EMSA					
	port and ship security control functions.							
1.2.5	Carry out a sufficient number of Commission maritime security	On a rolling	MS, COM,					
	inspections as a regular annual activity to monitor the application of	basis	EMSA					
	EU Maritime Security legislation in MS; continue to explore ways to							
	enhance maritime security, including cybersecurity, especially for							
	maritime transport, including passenger ships.							
Support the fi	ght against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in line with	h the EU consolid	ated approach					
and best pract	tices.							
1.2.6	Continue to support MS in joint and fisheries control operations	Rolling basis,	MS, COM,					
	while implementing EFCA joint deployment plans to enable the	ongoing	EFCA					
	permanent exchange of information and intelligence and control							
	activities, planned on the basis of risk assessment results.							
		1						

1.2.7	Promote inter-agency cooperation, including exchange of data, to	Ongoing	MS, COM,
	improve monitoring, control and surveillance and to support EU and		EFCA, EMSA,
	non-EU fisheries authorities ⁵ (including national and regional		Frontex
	fisheries monitoring centres), in enforcing applicable regional and		
	national legislation.		
1.2.8	Support MS coast guard and naval forces in providing services in	Rolling basis,	MS, COM
	relevant RFMOs convention areas, to ensure the safety and security	as of 2023	
	of seafarers, fishing vessels and fleets (e.g., from piracy), and to		
	better control and eliminate forced and severe labour abuses at sea.		
1.2.9	Take action to control and eliminate forced and severe labour abuses	Rolling basis,	MS, COM
	at sea.	as of 2023	
Strengthening	border controls and combating cross-border criminal activities such as	smuggling migrar	nts or goods, and
trafficking in	human beings, with emphasis on parts of the EU which are particularly	affected by migra	tion pressure, as
well as illega	l, unauthorised exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons		
1.2.10	Develop a coherent and robust response to counter the	As of 2023	MS, COM,
	instrumentalisation of migration by sea and to deter, dismantle and		EEAS,
	prosecute criminal networks smuggling migrants and trafficking		Frontex,
	human beings.		Europol,
			Eurojust

⁵ Fisheries support to EU and non-EU authorities is under the mandate of EFCA with support of the other agencies. Support to non-EU fisheries authorities requires a specific request provided by the European Commission.

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1.2.11	Taking advantage of the full implementation of EBCG Regulation ⁶	As of 2024	MS, COM,
	and the structured cooperation between relevant actors (e.g.		EMSA,
	EUROPOL, INTERPOL, UNODC), and in view of supporting the		Frontex
	activities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), enhance		
	risk analysis to identify maritime areas and ports to be monitored, as		
	well as vessels and aircraft to be tracked, for the purposes of fighting		
	against cross-border illicit activities.		
1.2.12	Create and maintain an EU situational picture including the pre-	As of 2024	MS, Frontex
	frontier area, based on information exchange, risk analysis and pro-		
	active aerial surveillance and patrolling.		
1.2.13	Safeguard EU Member States' maritime zones from illegal,	On a rolling	MS, EEAS
	unauthorised exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons and	basis, as of	
	other resources, in accordance with international law, in particular	2023	
	UNCLOS.		
	1.2.12	and the structured cooperation between relevant actors (e.g. EUROPOL, INTERPOL, UNODC), and in view of supporting the activities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), enhance risk analysis to identify maritime areas and ports to be monitored, as well as vessels and aircraft to be tracked, for the purposes of fighting against cross-border illicit activities. 1.2.12 Create and maintain an EU situational picture including the prefrontier area, based on information exchange, risk analysis and proactive aerial surveillance and patrolling. 1.2.13 Safeguard EU Member States' maritime zones from illegal, unauthorised exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons and other resources, in accordance with international law, in particular	and the structured cooperation between relevant actors (e.g. EUROPOL, INTERPOL, UNODC), and in view of supporting the activities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), enhance risk analysis to identify maritime areas and ports to be monitored, as well as vessels and aircraft to be tracked, for the purposes of fighting against cross-border illicit activities. 1.2.12 Create and maintain an EU situational picture including the pre- frontier area, based on information exchange, risk analysis and pro- active aerial surveillance and patrolling. 1.2.13 Safeguard EU Member States' maritime zones from illegal, unauthorised exploration and drilling activities for hydrocarbons and other resources, in accordance with international law, in particular

Strategic Objective 2. Cooperate with partners

Objectives	Actions	Timeline	Concerned
		Where	Actors

⁶ Regulation (EU) 2019/1896

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EN

			applicable	
2.1 Boost cooperation with	Boost cooper	ation with like-minded and strategic partners		
like-minded and strategic	2.1.1	Increase EU participation in SHADE mechanisms in the maritime	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,
partners		domain, including the subworking groups GOG SHADE. Participate	basis, as of	COM
		in the work of G7++FOGG (Friends of the Gulf of Guinea) and its	2023	
		sub working groups. Participate in the work of Djibouti Code of		
		Conduct and its sub working groups.		
	2.1.2	Enhance dialogue and cooperation with third countries and	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
		international partners on maritime security issues of common interest		COM
		such as surveillance and protection of critical maritime infrastructure.		
	2.1.3	Support partner countries in building their capabilities for maritime	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		governance, rule of law, including legal finish procedures ⁷ , and their		EEAS
		military and naval capabilities, including through the use of the		
		European Peace Facility.		
	2.1.4	Conduct studies to deepen understanding of business and trade	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
		dependencies on key ports and sea lines of communication within the		COM
		EU and abroad and develop exchange formats with key business and		
		industry players relying on import and export as well as shipping		
		companies to foster mutual understanding regarding dependency on		
		maritime security and sea lines of communications.		

⁷ Procedures related to prosecution of suspects involved in maritime crimes, particularly piracy and armed robbery at sea.

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2.1.5	Deploy EU liaison officers in regional maritime information fusion	As of 2023	MS, EEAS
	centres in maritime areas of interest, to facilitate the exchange of		
	information and cooperation between the EU and its partners and,		
	where appropriate, to evaluate the feasibility of a direct connection of		
	these fusion centres with relevant EU maritime surveillance systems		
2.1.6	Promote the use of platforms such as IORIS and YARIS by MS naval	On a rolling	MS, EEAS,
	assets deployed in CMP for external communication and in exercises	basis, as of	EDA
	with coastal states and partners.	2023	
2.1.7	Set up civilian collaborative tools between maritime operations	As of 2024	MS, COM,
	carried out by EU MS and EU Agencies.		EEAS, EDA
			EMSA,
			EUROPOL,
			SatCen,
			Frontex
Include m	aritime security into relations with partner countries and regional organisati	ons	
2.1.8	Develop links with partner countries and regional organisations by	As of 2023	MS, COM,
	engaging in joint projects related to maritime security and safety, as		EEAS
	appropriate.		
2.1.9	Develop coast guard function cooperation in the framework of	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
	existing or upcoming working arrangements and status agreements		Frontex,

		with partner countries, including for strengthening maritime surveillance.		EMSA, EFCA		
2.2 Work with non-EU	Work with no	on-EU partners on interoperability solutions for sharing maritime surveil	 ance information			
partners to step up maritime	2.2.1	.1 Maintain the support to the regional maritime security architecture in On the rolling				
surveillance		the Western Indian Ocean.	basis			
	2.2.2	Improve information exchange with partner countries in the	By the end of	MS, COM,		
		framework of EUROSUR, and via the activation of specific	2024	EEAS, EDA,		
		situational pictures (Article 27 of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation).		Frontex		
	Strengthen m	laritime security architectures and inter-agency cooperation in sea basins	and maritime are	as of strategic		
	interest					
	2.2.3	Support maritime capacity building and enhance maritime domain	On a rolling	COM, EEAS		
		awareness in the Indo-Pacific region through MASE, until its	basis			
		completion in December 2023, and subsequently through the				
		successor regional programme on maritime security, starting in 2024,				
		as well as the CRIMARIO project, including the IORIS platform.				
	2.2.4	Strengthen synergies between Ecofish and PSP programmes,		COM, EEAS		
		CRIMARIO and MASE, until its completion, and subsequently				
		through the successor regional programme on maritime security.				
	2.2.5	Support the implementation of the Yaoundé maritime security		COM, EEAS		
		architecture in the Gulf of Guinea region through the GoGIN, and the				
		YARIS platform and in cooperation with relevant partners.				

2.3 Enhance cooperation at	Enhance coop	peration at bilateral and multilateral levels		
bilateral and multilateral	2.3.1	Deepen cooperation with NATO on maritime security within the	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
level		agreed framework of the Joint Declarations and the common set of		EDA
		proposals, including through the EU-NATO structured dialogue on		
		resilience, in full respect of the principles of mutual openness and		
		transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness as well as the decision-		
		making autonomy of both organisations ⁸ .		
	2.3.2	Strengthen cooperation with the IMO and Regional Sea Conventions	As of 2024	MS, COM,
		to counter threats of intentional, unlawful acts that could affect ships		EMSA,
		and port facilities globally.		HELCOM,
				OSPAR,
				Barcelona
				Convention
	2.3.3	Strengthen cooperation with UNODC in tackling transnational	As of 2024	MS, EEAS,
		organized crime operating at sea or through the sea.		Frontex

Strategic Objective 3. Lead in maritime domain awareness

Objectives	Actions	Timeline	Concerned
		Where	Actors

⁸ For the list of areas of cooperation see the text of the Third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 January 2023 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/)

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			applicable	
3.1. Enhance the EU's	Ensure secure	e and rapid information exchange between all related sectors and systems	s across the EU ar	nd EFTA
maritime domain awareness	3.1.1	Launch the CISE operational phase, including implementation of the	As of 2024	MS, COM,
		CISE classified network.		EMSA ⁹
	3.1.2	Encourage/incentivise Member States specific coast guard and	On a rolling	COM, EMSA
		military authorities to join the CISE community.	basis, as of	
			2023	
	3.1.3	Use CISE to exchange maritime surveillance information, to boost	As of 2024	MS, COM,
		resilience and protect critical maritime infrastructure (e.g. undersea		EDA, SatCen,
		cables, pipelines, and offshore renewable sites).		EMSA
	3.1.4	Consider the use of CISE to exchange information in the context of	On a rolling	MS, EFCA,
		the inter-agency cooperation, in complement to the networks already	basis, once	EMSA and
		in place.	CISE is	Frontex
			operational.	
	3.1.5	Support the setting up of a programme on MSA for defence, whilst	By 2024	MS, EDA
		ensuring synchronisation with relevant civil stakeholders.		
	Strengthening	g information sharing between civil and military maritime authorities		
	3.1.6	Strengthen MARSUR and ensure operational information exchange	End of 2024	COM, EMSA,
		between the MARSUR Network and CISE (including classified and		EDA, SatCen,
		unclassified information).		MS

⁹ The operational phase and the timing of each action listed in this action plan are subject to activation of the task, following EMSA Board approval.

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3.1.7	Strengthen communication and coordination among EU national	On a rolling	MS, COM,
	maritime operation centres through the use of CISE and MARSUR,	basis	EDA, EEAS
	on a regional basis as appropriate, to pursue and improve an		(EUMS),
	integrated maritime surveillance in the sea basins around the EU.		EMSA
3.1.8	Reinforce the MSC-HoA to improve MDA in areas crucial for	On a rolling	MS, EEAS
	maritime traffic.	basis	
Enhance mari	itime surveillance and information exchange, using space-based capabili	ties, RPAS and ot	her emerging
technologies,	including for the protection of external EU borders		
3.1.9	Enable the exchange of relevant information between space-based	End of 2024	MS, COM,
	capabilities and maritime surveillance instruments, including CISE		EMSA, EDA,
	and MARSUR.		ESA, SatCen
3.1.10	Make full use of the existing and future capabilities and services of	As of 2023	MS, COM,
	the EU space programmes, including the Earth Observation		EEAS, EMSA,
	component (Copernicus, including its marine service - CMEMS, and		EFCA, SatCen
	maritime surveillance CMS), Galileo (and its threat response system)		
	and EGNOS, as well as IRIS ¹⁰ , including for the purposes of		
	maritime surveillance, monitoring of the marine environment and		
	climate change.		
3.1.11	Promote space R&I for maritime surveillance applications, including	As of 2023	MS, COM,
	through the participation of key players and industry, along with the		EMSA,

 $^{{\}color{red}^{10}}\ \underline{\text{https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/welcome-iris2-infrastructure-resilience-interconnectivity-and-security-satellite-2022-11-17_en}$

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	EU Satellite Centre and the Copernicus Security Strategic Research		Frontex,
	Agenda.		SatCen
3.1.12	Improve the integration of space-based technology with remotely	On a rolling	MS, EMSA,
	piloted aircraft systems as well as radar stations, maritime patrol	basis as of	Frontex,
	aircraft, and seaborne (manned and unmanned) means by using	2023	SatCen
	innovative, cyber-resilient tools.		
3.1.13	Step up surveillance by coastal and offshore patrol vessels and	Pilot to be	MS, COM,
	complement this with digitally networked high-end naval platforms,	implemented	EEAS, EDA,
	including unmanned platforms, according to national rules.	by 2025	Frontex
3.1.14	Systematically make use of innovative solutions (technology and	As of 2023	MS
	knowledge) resulting from EU civil security R&I on maritime		
	security funded under the Border and External Security calls of		
	Horizon 2020, as well as relevant calls under Horizon Europe.		
3.1.15	Consider deploying stationary radar, optical satellite and	On a rolling	MS, EMSA,
	hyperspectral devices in strategic locations, to better detect and	basis	Frontex
	identify maritime security threats, if so decided.		
3.1.16	In the framework of the European Coast Guard Functions Forum and	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
	the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum, contribute to		COM, EFCA,
	bolstering maritime domain awareness and EU and international		EMSA,
	cooperation through the exchange of best practices.		Frontex
Development	of Maritime Surveillance Capabilities	<u> </u>	<u>I</u>

	3.1.17	Consider the development of the design of equipment and systems	As of 2023	COM, MS
		such as a small satellite mission to be implemented in the frame of a		
		constellation, coastal radar networks, unmanned semi-fixed platforms		
		at sea.		
3.2 Work with relevant non-	Work with re	levant non-EU partners on interoperability solutions for sharing maritime	e surveillance info	ormation
EU partners on	3.2.1	Support maritime capacity building and heighten maritime domain	On a rolling	COM, EEAS
interoperability solutions		awareness in the Indo-Pacifc region through MASE, until its	basis	
for sharing maritime		completion in December 2023, and subsequently through the		
surveillance information		successor regional programme on maritime security, starting in 2024,		
		as well as the CRIMARIO project, including the IORIS platform.		
	3.2.2	Support implementation of the Yaoundé maritime security	Ongoing	COM, EEAS
		architecture in the Gulf of Guinea region through the GoGIN,		
		especially the YARIS platform.		
	3.2.3	Support like-minded non-EU partners with satellite pictures and	Ongoing	COM, EEAS,
		analyses from EU agencies within the context of dedicated projects,		EFCA, SatCen
		including concerning IUU fishing activities.		

Strategic objective 4. Manage risks and threats

Objectives	Actions	Timeline	Concerned
		Where	Actors
		Applicable	

4.1 Further develop	4.1.1	Strengthen coordination and intervention capabilities in the event of	On a rolling	MS, COM,
awareness and preparedness		incidents and disasters at sea, with due consideration for EMSA-	basis	EEAS, EDA,
to tackle threats linked to		hosted systems and for the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, and		EMSA
climate change and		by strengthening and/or developing an integrated approach and rapid		
environmental degradation		reaction to manage maritime incidents.		
	4.1.2	Increase knowledge on the effects of climate change, sea level rise,	On a rolling	COM, EEAS,
		storm surges, and environmental degradation on maritime security	basis, as of	MS, EDA,
		and address related risks and threats.	2023.	SatCen
	4.1.3	Strengthen maritime domain awareness, early warning and strategic	On a rolling	COM, EEAS,
		foresight on the effects of climate change and environmental	basis, as of	MS, EDA,
		degradation on maritime security, including by facilitating the	2023.	Frontex,
		collection and exchange of ocean observation data, after risk		SatCen
		assessment.		
	4.1.4	Expand training and exercises run by competent authorities to train in	On a rolling	MS, COM,
		preparing for and responding to the effects of climate change and	basis, as of	EEAS
		environmental degradation on maritime security.	2024	
	4.1.5	Contribute to the development of the Digital Twin of the Ocean	On a rolling	MS, COM
		(DTO), with the maritime security perspective, to address the mutual	basis, as of	
		impacts of maritime security and of a changing environment and	2024	
		climate.		
	4.1.6	Consider addressing ship-to-ship operations that can represent a	On a rolling	COM, MS,

		hybrid attack.	basis, as of	EEAS
			2023	
4.2 Increase the resilience	Strengthen th	e resilience and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, mindful of	regional specific	ities and threat
and protection of critical	levels.			
maritime infrastructure (e.g.	4.2.1	Promote regional projects in all sea basins around the EU to	On a rolling	MS, COM,
gas pipelines, undersea		strengthen the resilience and protection of critical maritime	basis, as of	EEAS
cables, ports, offshore		infrastructure, in order to safeguard the continuity, availability and	2023	
energy facilities, LNG		confidentiality of processes such as energy distribution and internet		
terminals, and floating		and data traffic.		
storage and regasification	4.2.2	Draw up a risk assessment and contingency plans/disaster recovery	As of 2023	MS, COM,
units)		plans (EU level/national level) for critical maritime infrastructure,		EEAS, EUMS,
		involving all relevant stakeholders, including from the private sector,		EDA, EMSA
		and without prejudice to the Directive on the Resilience of Critical		
		Entities (e.g. on the risk assessment of critical entities in the transport		
		sector and water transport subsector).		
	4.2.3	Conduct stress tests for maritime infrastructure, based on Council	As of 2023	MS, COM
		recommendation 15623/22, using where applicable, the standards on		
		stress test methodology for critical infrastructure (CI) developed		
		under the INFRASTRESS project.		
	4.2.4	Conduct regular, full-scale, live maritime exercises at EU level,	On a rolling	MS, COM,
		focused inter alia on harbour protection, addressing cyber and hybrid	basis, starting	EEAS,

	threats, also involving the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, where	in 2023	ECGFF, EDA,
	appropriate.		Frontex,
			ENISA
4.2.5	Step up cooperation between MS, with the support of relevant EU	As of 2024	MS, COM,
	Agencies, to develop a regional surveillance plan for underwater and		EDA, EMSA
	offshore infrastructure, aiming at deterring hostile action against such		
	infrastructure. Step up cooperation on assessing incidents;		
	cooperation between civil and military authorities, and on sharing		
	assets and exchanging information for the protection of underwater		
	and offshore infrastructure. Step up cooperation in this area with like-		
	minded third countries and key partners such as NATO through the		
	EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Resilience.		
4.2.6	Develop and deploy, as appropriate, specialised vessels and other	Deploy	MS, EDA,
	means (RPAS, satellite imagery) to patrol and protect critical	existing means	SatCen
	maritime infrastructure, including multi-role survey vessels.	by the end of	
		2023.	
		Develop	
		further	
		means/assets	
		by 2025.	
4.2.7	Conduct further research on the protection of critical maritime	By 2025	MS, EDA

		infrastructure, also to support the relevant CARD recommendations.		
	4.2.8	Strengthen the competences of national authorities on ship and port	On a rolling	MS, EMSA
		security, in accordance with SOLAS, the ISPS Code, Regulation	basis, as of	
		725/2004 ¹¹ and 2005/65/EC ¹² .	2023	
	4.2.9	Improve information sharing mechanisms with like-minded partner	On a rolling	MS, COM,
		countries, where appropriate, to enhance the information exchange	basis, as of	EEAS
		and the surveillance of critical maritime infrastructure.	2023	
4.3 Enhance cyber security	Assess cyber	risks and identify suitable security measures	<u> </u>	
	4.3.1	Implement relevant guidance to the maritime sector, particularly on	As of 2024	MS, COM
		ports in the context of the NIS2 Directive.		
	4.3.2	Further develop common cyber-surveillance capabilities for maritime	As of 2024	MS, COM,
		administrations / coast guard authorities.		EMSA,
		Develop the maritime sector's ability to face cyber threats by		ENISA
		encouraging the exchange of best practices and the development of		
		guidance between maritime actors, as well as further addressing		
		cyber issues in the security and safety domains at the level of the		
		International Maritime Organisation (IMO).		
	4.3.3	Develop cooperation on cybersecurity in the maritime domain with	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		like-minded non-EU countries, at bilateral or multilateral level, inter		ENISA

¹¹ Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 ¹² Directive 2005/65/EC

		alia, with the objective of enhancing the digital maritime		
		infrastructure protection.		
	4.3.4	Improve the resilience of maritime administrations by running regular	On a rolling	MS, COM,
		training sessions on cybersecurity crisis management, and develop a	basis, as of	ENISA,
		culture of joint incident reaction.	2024.	EMSA,
				Frontex
	4.3.5	Improve knowledge on cybersecurity and further develop a complete	As of 2024	MS, COM,
		mapping exercise for cybersecurity in shipping to identify		EMSA,
		responsibilities.		ENISA
4.4 Strengthen the EU's	Tackle foreig	n and domestic interference and manipulation of information, and other l	hybrid threats rela	ted to the
resilience and improve	maritime don	nain		
response to interference and	4.4.1	Implement maritime-related counter narratives, including by	As of 2023	MS, EEAS and
manipulation of		providing operational authorities (Ops Commanders) with the		EU naval
information, and other		delegation of powers needed to tackle disinformation and implement		operations
hybrid threats concerning		counteractions.		
maritime security	4.4.2	Promote EU coast guard function cooperation on tackling hybrid	On a rolling	MS, COM,
		threats in the maritime domain, among others.	basis, as of	EMSA,
			2023.	Frontex

4.5 Assess the potential	4.5.1	Assess investment in maritime infrastructure by non-EU entities in	Ongoing	MS, COM
security impacts of foreign		the context of the EU cooperation mechanism on the basis of		
direct investment in		Regulation (EU) 2019/452 ¹³ .		
maritime infrastructure				
4.6 Develop a	4.6.1	Building on UXO-related pilot activities carried out in the Baltic Sea,	As of 2023	MS, COM
comprehensive response to		draw up a comprehensive plan for sea basins around the EU to map		
UXO in the sea basins		the type, location and quantity of UXO from military activities, as		
around the EU		part of the effort to minimise their environmental impact, ensure		
		security of sea lanes and facilitate the development of maritime		
		economic activities. At the same time, identify existing and necessary		
		EU capabilities and appropriate funding mechanisms to tackle UXO		
		in the sea basins around the EU.		
4.7 Step up action to	4.7.1	Implement sufficient maritime security inspections and ensure that	Ongoing on an	MS, COM,
prepare against acts of		ships, ports and port facilities in the EU are properly secured and	annual basis	EMSA
terrorism, unlawful acts and		protected, in accordance with applicable international and EU		
maritime crimes, threats to		legislation.		
freedom of navigation and	4.7.2	Strengthen the capacity to prevent, detect, and combat illicit activities	On a rolling	MS, EEAS
hybrid threats		at sea, including piracy, in the context of the CMP and through	basis	
		cooperation with like-minded and strategic partners.		
	4.7.3	Conclude the COM risk assessment on improving passenger ship	Ongoing	COM

¹³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452

		security, to identify solutions to counter shared risks and threats to passenger ship security in the EU.		
	4.7.4	Conduct a study to map all relevant undersea infrastructures, related capacities and redundancies, vulnerabilities, threats and risks to	As of 2023	MS, COM
		service availability, the impact of downtime of undersea cables for Member States and the Union as a whole, as well as risk mitigation,		
		repair capabilities, and propose recommendations to ensure a higher		
		resilience/redundancy, if needed.		
4.8 Strengthen the capacity	4.8.1	Improve and increase the capacity of MS, with the support of	As of 2023	MS, EFCA,
to contribute to the fight		concerned agencies, to prevent, detect and combat illegal trafficking		EMSA,
against organised and		performed through sea transport, or at sea (such as environmental		Frontex, COM,
serious international threats		crimes, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of migrants and		EUROPOL
and illicit activities to		trafficking of human beings, IUU, etc.), notably by developing		
increase the EU's internal		actions in the framework of EMPACT.		
security	4.8.2	Explore the possibility to further use passenger information provided	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		by maritime transport operators, considering existing international,		Frontex,
		EU and national rules, to enhance security at the external borders and		Europol
		within the EU.		
4.9 Limit the security risks	4.9.1	Assess risks based on the nature of the data shared and identify the	As of 2023	SatCen, EEAS,
associated with sharing		needed resources and procedures to manage these risks.		COM, MS
maritime data with third				

countries		

Strategic Objective 5. Enhance capabilities

Objectives	Actions		Concerned
		Where	Actors
		Applicable	
5.1 Strengthen surface	Strengthen future surface capabilities and tackle the shortfalls in stra	ntegic enablers	
capabilities	5.1.1 Take forward the CARD Focus Area regarding Europ Surface Ships.	pean Patrol Class As of 2023	MS, EDA
	5.1.2 Develop common force protection requirements for E States' naval forces, avoiding unnecessary duplication		MS, EEAS (EUMS), EDA
	5.1.3 Initiate activities to increase the efficiency of propulsi		(EUMS), EDA
	production, storage and management systems and log implementing new technologies.	sistics by	
	Support maritime military mobility by approving a tecarrangement for cross-border movement permission a the maritime domain.		
	Develop common requirements and specifications for unmanned systems, ensuring that the systems are interested.		
	5.1.6 Provide support as requested by MS on PESCO project the European Patrol Corvette.	ects, including	

	5.1.7	Promote actual capability development and obtainment of the First of	As of 2023	MS, COM
		Class ship of a European Patrol Corvette		
	5.1.8	Promote actual capability development of a medium-size semi-	By 2024	MS, COM
		autonomous surface vessel with modular mission payloads		
	5.1.9	Promote the development of future naval capabilities, i.e. a functional	By 2025	MS, COM
		smart system of systems for naval future platforms		
	5.1.10	Promote actual capability development of a Naval Collaborative	By 2026	MS, COM
		Engagement based on the Naval Collaborative Surveillance		
5.2 Strengthen underwater	Enhance EU	underwater capabilities including sea mine countermeasures		
capabilities	5.2.1	Develop an EU concept of operations for mine countermeasures to	By 2025	MS, COM,
		support the decision-making process for the safe navigation and		EDA
		operation of marine vessels and unmanned systems, including		
		utilisation of opportunities from the development and research		
		actions of the European Defence Fund.		
	5.2.2	Continue developing targeted PESCO projects (ATT, DIVEPACK,		
		EUNDDC and MAS MCM), and utilise the support of collaborative		
		and joint research and development from the European Defence Fund		
		and projects in its precursor programme, the European Defence		
		Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP).		
	5.2.3	Improve anti-submarine capabilities, including detection in terms of	By 2025	MS, EDA
		both technology and procedures.		

	5.2.4	Promote the development of technologies related to underwater manned-unmanned teaming swarming and underwater observation, detection, acquisition and communications.	As of 2023	COM, MS
	5.2.5	Promote the technological developments and solutions for a first phase of the mine countermeasures stand-off concept.	By 2024	COM, MS
	5.2.6	Promote the development of capabilities for securing critical seabed infrastructure as well as capabilities for combating underwater	As of 2023	COM, MS
	5.2.7	swarms consisting of heterogeneous unmanned underwater vehicles. Promote actual capability development of a heavy multi-purpose mine sweeping drone.	As of 2023	COM, MS
5.3 Support EU Member	Identify tech	inologies and research activities in response to capability needs, also taki	ng into account the	ne EDA's
States' navies and coast	Overarching	Strategic Agenda		
guards in developing	5.3.1	Promote research into innovative solutions on power generation,	By 2025	MS, COM,
critical technologies and		storage, management and distribution needed to meet high energy		EDA
industrial capabilities		demands required by new systems.		
	5.3.2	Increase autonomous coordination of manned-unmanned teaming,		
		including swarm technologies.		
	5.3.3	Ensure the surveillance and protection of high-speed, resilient and		
		robust underwater communication networks, with the involvement of		
		industry and third countries where appropriate.		
	5.3.4	Research and integrate disruptive technologies including artificial		

	intelligence, big data technologies and quantum technologies.		
5.3.:	Research and develop common ship digital architecture and		
	infrastructure.		
5.3.0	Increase vessel automation by deploying resilient automated		
	platforms and systems with reduced crew and decision support		
	systems.		
Iden	tify and cooperatively address critical dependencies affecting the EU defence tec	hnological and ind	lustrial base
(ED	TIB)		
5.3.	By carrying out work on Key Strategic Activities, raise awareness	Ongoing	MS, EDA
	and promote a common understanding of MS, EU institutions and		
	defence industrial actors about existing shortages and gaps in terms		
	of industrial and technological areas, as well as skills gaps that could		
	undermine the EU's freedom of action.		
5.3.5	Promote cooperation among MS by developing projects funded by	Ongoing	MS, COM,
	the European Defence Fund and promote joint procurement of naval		EDA
	capabilities, including through and supported by EU defence		
	initiatives.		
Alig	n navy and coast guard activities with the objectives of the EU Green Deal.	.I	
5.3.9	Assess the possibility of co-existence between offshore renewable	By 2025	MS, COM,
	energy projects and defence activities by analyzing if deploying		EEAS, EDA
	offshore renewable projects or other sustainable uses in maritime		

	areas reserved or used for military activities could be implemented.	
5.3.10	Develop renewable technologies (renewable fuel, retrofit engines,	
	electrification etc.), suitable for military use in the maritime domain.	

Strategic Objective 6. Educate and train

Objectives	Actions		Timeline	Concerned
			Where	Actors
			Applicable	
6.1 Share education,	6.1.1	Build on the work carried out by the agencies (EFCA, EMSA,	As of 2023	MS, EFCA,
training and skills across		Frontex) to develop capacity and specialised training under the		EMSA,
sectors, MS, and partner		tripartite working arrangement to organise cross-sectoral maritime		Frontex,
countries		security training on law enforcement, military, border control, coast		ECGFF
		guards, cyber security, protection of critical maritime infrastructure		
		etc.		
	6.1.2	Promote the participation of women in educational and training in	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		maritime security.		EEAS
	6.1.3	Foster cooperation and training, including in the context of the	As of 2023	MS, EEAS,
		ECGFF, with MS and NATO-accredited centres, centres of		EFCA, EMSA,
		excellence etc, in full respect of the principles of mutual openness		Frontex
		and transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness as well as the		
		decision-making autonomy of both organisations.		

	6.1.4	Consider the development of a military international naval semester	As of 2023	MS, EEAS
		in the framework of the 'European initiative for the exchange of		(ESDC)
		young officers' (EMILYO – Military Erasmus ¹⁴).		
	6.1.5	Conduct joint exercises with non-EU partners to boost	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		interoperability.		EEAS
6.2 Capitalise on the work	6.2.1	Continue ad hoc participation in the COASTEX exercise based on	Ongoing	MS, EFCA,
carried out by agencies and		MS planning, improve and diversify COASTEX and regularly carry		EMSA,
fora		out relevant activities in the sea basins around the EU.		Frontex,
				ECGFF
	6.2.2	Carry out capacity building activities while implementing MMO in	Ongoing	MS, EFCA,
		selected sea basins around the EU, at the request of MS and building		EMSA,
		on the work of EMSA, EFCA and Frontex.		Frontex
	6.2.3	Share the lessons learnt from running the Sectoral Qualification	On a rolling	MS, EFCA,
		Framework for coast guards and provide guidance, assistance and	basis	EMSA,
		support in implementing good practices, including on cyber security.		Frontex
6.3. Strengthen cyber and	6.3.1	Take advantage of the knowledge and training provided by the HCoE	Ongoing	MS, COM,
hybrid security skills and		Helsinki, including their maritime security work strand, also on the		EEAS, HCoE
curricula in the maritime		basis of the HCoE Handbook on Maritime Hybrid Threats ¹⁵ .		
domain	6.3.2	Strengthen cyber-, hybrid- and space-related security skills by	As of 2023	MS, COM,

http://www.emilyo.eu/; EMILYO is not linked to the Erasmus+ Programme.
 The HCoE handbook is the basis for relevant training events for participating states, EU and NATO operators and policymakers.

		supporting targeted training courses on cyber and digital skills for the		EMSA
		maritime domain.		
	6.3.3	Boost cyber and hybrid security skills through targeted curricula to be	As of 2023	MS, COM,
		developed by competent institutions and/or authorities of the Member		EMSA
		States, mindful that EMSA has been tasked by Member States and		
		the European Commission to develop a course on maritime		
		cybersecurity for 2023.		
6.4 Capacity building	6.4.1	Conduct targeted training programmes, including in the framework of	Ongoing	MS, COM,
		the ECGFF, open to non-EU partners and relevant stakeholders,		EEAS, EMSA,
		including the private sector, as appropriate, to tackle existing and		Frontex,
		emerging threats to maritime security.		EFCA, ECGFF
	6.4.2	Promote educational and training activities in partner countries to	Ongoing	MS, COM,
		attract women to relevant sectors, including coast guard functions,		EEAS, EMSA,
		also involving relevant EU agencies, and relevant stakeholders,		Frontex,
		including the private sector, as appropriate.		ECGFF
	6.4.3	Further develop the military international naval semester, including a	As of 2023	MS, EEAS
		young officers' exchange scheme.		
	6.4.4	Conduct civil-military exercises based on scenarios involving shared	As of 2023	
		jurisdiction or shared use of capabilities.		

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATT: Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (PESCO project)

В

 C

CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CIS: Critical Infrastructure

CISE: Common Information Sharing Environment

COM: European Commission Services

Copernicus: European Earth Observation Programme

CRIMARIO: Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

D

DTO: Digital twin of the ocean

E

EBCG: European Border and Coast Guard

EBCGA/Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency

ECGFA: European Coast Guard Functions Academy

ECGFF: European Coast Guard Functions Forum

EDA: European Defence Agency

EDIRPA: European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act

AH/cma

75

EDTIB: European defence technological and industrial base

EEAS: European External Action Service

EFCA: European Fisheries Control Agency

EGNOS: European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service

EMPACT: European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats

EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency

ENISA: European Union Agency for Cybersecurity

EU: European Union

EUBAM Libya: EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya

EUMS: European Union Military Staff

EUMSS: European Union Maritime Security Strategy

EUNAVFOR: European Union-led naval force

EUROPOL: European Police Agency

EUROSUR: European Border Surveillance System

G

GALILEO: European Satellite Navigation System

Η

HCoE: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Helsinki

HELCOM: Helsinki Commission - Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission

I

IMO: International Maritime Organisation

INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organisation

IORA: Indian Ocean Rim Association

ISPS Code: International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

IUU fishing: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

K

M

MAOC (N): Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics)

MARSUR: Defence project on maritime surveillance

MASE: Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security

MAS MCM: Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures

MDA: maritime domain awareness

MedCGFF: Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum

MS: Member States

MSCO: Maritime Staff Operators Course

N

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NIS2 Directive: Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and

information systems across the Union

NWIO: North-Western Indian Ocean

0

OSPAR: Oslo Paris Commission

OSRA: Overarching Strategic Research Agenda

P

PASSMAR project: The support program for the maritime safety and security strategy in Central Africa

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

PNT: Position, navigation and timing

PSP: Port security and safety of navigation programme

R

RFMOs: Regional Fisheries Management Organisations

RPAS: Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

R&I: research and innovation

S

SAR: search and rescue activities

SatCen: European Union Satellite Centre

SHADE: Shared Awareness and Deconfliction

SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

SWAIMS project: Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security

U

UCPM: Union Civil Protection Mechanism

UfM: Union for the Mediterranean

UN: United Nations

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNFSA: United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UXO: Unexploded ordnance

W

WeCAPS: Strengthening the security and safety of ports in West and Central Africa