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10792/24

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### **'I/A' ITEM NOTE**

From:	General Secretariat of the Council		
To:	Permanent Representatives Committee/Council		
No. prev. doc.:	7923/1/24 REV 1		
Subject:	Draft Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook')		
	– Approval		

- The draft Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook') was discussed by the members of the Major Sports Events network affiliated to the Law Enforcement Working Party (Police) during their meeting on 11 April 2024 (7923/24).
- 2. Based on these discussions and written consultations on a text updating a previous Council Resolution from 13 October 2016 (12795/1/16 REV 1), the Presidency prepared a revised version that was presented at the Law Enforcement Working Party (Police) meeting on 3 June 2024 (7923/1/24 REV 1).

- 3. Since no substantial remarks were raised, the text of the draft Council Resolution was considered as endorsed by the Law Enforcement Working Party (Police) and finalised by the Presidency.
- 4. In the light of the above, the Council is invited, subject to confirmation by the Permanent Representatives Committee, to approve the Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook for international police cooperation during football matches with an international dimension, as set out in the Annex to this Note.

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### **DRAFT**

Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook')

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Whereas:

- (1) The European Union's objective is, inter alia, to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice, by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police cooperation as laid down under Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
- (2) On 21 June 1999, the Council adopted a resolution concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches<sup>1</sup>.
- (3) This resolution was first replaced by the Council Resolution of 6 December 2001<sup>2</sup> and subsequently by the Council Resolutions of 4 December 2006<sup>3</sup>, 3 June 2010 and 29 November 2016<sup>4</sup> concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (hereafter the EU Football Handbook).
- (4) The current resolution suggests that amendments to the handbook be made in the light of recent experiences.

OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1.

OJ C 22, 24.1.2002, p. 1.

OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1.

OJ C 165, 24.6.2010, p. 1.

- (5) Taking into account recent experiences in connection with the European Football
  Championship in 2021, the development of established good practice in the framework of
  such tournaments, extensive police cooperation in relation to international and club matches in
  Europe generally and the views of over 300 police practitioners (match commanders, National
  Football Information Point personnel and other football policing specialists) from the
  25 European countries that attended namely the Pan-European Football Policing Training
  delivered under the auspices of CEPOL from 2016 up to present, the EU Football Handbook
  has been revised and updated.
- (6) The changes included in the annexed updated handbook are without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the division of responsibilities among the different authorities and services in the Member States concerned, and to the exercise by the Commission of its powers under the Treaties,

### HEREBY,

- (1) RECOMMENDS that Member States continue to further enhance police cooperation in respect of football matches (and, where appropriate, other sporting events) with an international dimension.
- (2) ENCOURAGES that to that end, the updated handbook annexed hereto, providing examples of strongly recommended working methods, should be made available to, and adopted by, law enforcement authorities involved in policing football matches with an international dimension.
- (3) STATES that, where appropriate, the recommended working methods may be applied to other major international sporting events.
- (4) This Resolution replaces the Council Resolution of 29 November 2016.

Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook')

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# Purpose, Scope and Use of the Handbook

The purpose of this document is to consolidate and enhance policing in connection with football matches with an international dimension, and in particular to maximise the effectiveness of international police cooperation.

The content, which is consistent with the established good practice of adopting an integrated multiagency approach to football safety, security and service, can, where appropriate, be applied to other sporting events with an international dimension if a Member State so decides.

The content is without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the competencies and responsibilities of the different agencies within each Member State.

Although this document is mainly focused on international police cooperation, the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events) is reflected in references to police interaction with other key partners, such as the event organiser, and stakeholders, notably supporters.

International police cooperation and football policing operations must be guided by the principles of legality, proportionality and adequacy. Examples of good practice in relation to dynamic risk assessment and crowd management are detailed in Appendix 4.

Whilst the competent authority in the organising Member State is responsible for providing a safe and secure event, authorities in participating, neighbouring and transit states have a responsibility to assist where appropriate.

This document should be widely disseminated and applied in each Member State and other European countries and beyond in order to minimise safety and security risks and ensure effective international police cooperation.

# Part I International police cooperation

### **CHAPTER 1**

### 1. Information Management and Exchange by the Police

### 1.1. Introduction

The timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in consolidating and enhancing policing in connection with football matches with an international dimension and reducing the likelihood and impact of football-related crime, most commonly violence and disorder.

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, as amended by Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007, each Member State has to establish a National Football Information Point (NFIP) to act as the central national contact point for the exchange of relevant information for football matches with an international dimension, and for facilitating international police cooperation concerning football matches.

Where there is direct contact between organising and visiting police, any information exchanged should be shared simultaneously with the relevant NFIPs. Such contact should not jeopardise the key role of the NFIP in ensuring the quality of the information and wider dissemination to other relevant partners and authorities.

The relationship between the NFIP and the competent national authorities should be subject to the applicable national laws.

In accordance with Article 1(4) of Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, each Member State has to ensure that its NFIP is capable of fulfilling efficiently and promptly the tasks assigned it.

- In order to be effective, NFIP personnel should be trained and equipped to provide a national source of expertise regarding football policing and associated security matters.

#### 1.2. Tasks with an International Dimension

The NFIP supports the competent national authorities. On the basis of information that has been analysed and assessed, the necessary proposals or recommendations are sent to the competent national authorities to assist in developing a multi-agency approach in delivering safe, secure and welcoming football events.

The NFIP works closely with local police with regard to national or international football matches. To be fully effective in the provision of this support, information on the important role of the NFIP should be widely disseminated and understood by all policing agencies in each Member State.

Each Member State should also make arrangements to establish a national network of designated local police personnel tasked to gather and supply the NFIP with all information and intelligence regarding football events in their locality.

For the benefit of other countries' NFIPs, each NFIP is required to maintain an updated risk analysis<sup>5</sup> in relation to its clubs and its national teams. The risk analysis is generally shared with other NFIPs on the EPE-NFIP<sup>6</sup>. It is stressed, however, that risk is variable and dependent upon a range of factors. Accordingly, a dynamic risk assessment needs to be undertaken throughout an event.

Each NFIP should have access to the relevant national police databases. The exchange of personal data is subject to the applicable national and international law, especially the Prüm Decision<sup>7</sup> or binational or multilateral agreements.

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Risk analysis means developing a profile on national and club supporters, including risk-groups and how they relate to other supporters at home and abroad including local population groups and the circumstances which can increase potential risk (including interaction with police and stewards).

The EPE-platform (EUROPOL PLATFORM for EXPERTS) contains a section available for the exclusive use of NFIPs with information relating to football matches with an international dimension (e.g. club overview, pre-match assessments and postmatch reports), see definition on EUROPOL-website.

Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

The NFIPs should be able to exchange personal data related to football security matters in terms of prevention and investigation of football related incidents.

The NFIP is required to ensure that all information is subject to quality control in respect of content.

Information (except personal data) should be exchanged using the EPE-NFIP.

# 1.3. Exchange of Police Information

### 1.3.a General considerations

The transmission of information, including the exchange of personal data, is to take place in accordance with the national, European and international law and data protection provisions applicable to the countries participating in the exchange of such information.

Personal information will solely be used for the purpose of ensuring the security at the event for which this information is shared and remains the ownership of the entity that provided this information

#### 1.3.b Definitions

The term 'event' in this handbook is used to mean a specific football match or tournament in all its aspects. The term 'host police' is used to mean the police in the country in which the match or tournament is being held. The term 'visiting police' is used to describe the police in, or from, a country in which the participating team or teams is located.

## 1.3.c Types of Information

A distinction can be made between general information and personal information.

### (a) General information

General information includes strategic and tactical information designed to inform event preparations and operations in respect of identifying and preventing or reducing security risks, undertaking pre-event and ongoing dynamic risk assessments, and responding appropriately and proportionately to security risks as they emerge during the event.

### (b) Personal information

In this context, personal information refers to information on individuals who are assessed by the police as posing a potential risk to public safety in connection with the event. This may include details of individuals who have evidently caused or contributed to violence or disorder in connection with previous football matches.

## 1.3.d Chronological Sequence of Information Exchange

Three phases may be distinguished: before, during and after the event. These three phases need not always be strictly separated.

Before the event

Information requirements (including a pre-match assessment - PMA) are supplied by the NFIP of the visiting country/countries to the NFIP of the hosting country no later than five working days prior to the event. These requirements include:

- a risk analysis of supporters of the visiting team;
- other relevant information regarding the security of the event, e.g. supporter travel details and other public order threats.

The NFIP of the host country provides information on the applicable legislation and policy of the authorities (e.g. alcohol policy), the organisation of the event and on other key security arrangements.

All relevant information is put at the disposal of the other NFIPs concerned and entered on the EPE-NFIP via the appropriate forms.

The NFIP of the visiting country/countries is requested to provide timely and accurate information regarding the movements of risk and non-risk supporters, the participating team (where there is a threat) and ticket sales, together with any other relevant information.

The NFIP of the host country provides information to the NFIP of the visiting country/countries, particularly on the integration of the visiting police delegation into the host policing operation, as well as information for visiting supporters, etc.

The NFIP of the visiting country/countries should provide updates to the host NFIP up until the event. The host NFIP may also request further information following receiving the pre-match assessment.

# During the event

The host country NFIP should keep the visiting country NFIP informed when relevant incidents occur during the event.

The visiting police delegation (see below), if present, monitors and, where appropriate, provides the designated police contact in the host country with updated information and intelligence regarding the visiting supporters. Useful information concerning event-related incidents in their home country during the matches or tournaments is also provided to the host country and any other relevant NFIP.

During the operational phase the visiting police delegation should be informed by the host authority about all relevant information regarding visiting supporters. This should include refusals of entry, expulsions, arrests and fines or penalties, preventative detentions or other relevant details. The NFIP country/countries should also be informed by their own delegation accordingly.

### After the event

Within five working days of the event, the NFIP of the host country provides the NFIP of the visiting country (via the appropriate forms on the EPE NFIP or bilaterally) with information:

- regarding the behaviour of supporters so that the risk analysis can be updated by the NFIPs of the country/club they support and/or their place of residence;
- on the operational usefulness of the information they have provided and of the support provided by the visiting police delegation(s);
- the description of any incident: information regarding arrests or sanctions is exchanged in accordance with national and international law. Where possible this information should include:
  - personal details of the arrested/convicted offenders;
  - the name of the responsible law enforcement authority;

- a record of events (if available);
- the court decision (if available);
- the available evidence (in particular photo/video material of visiting offenders who have not yet been identified).

Based on the information provided by the host country NFIP and the visiting police delegation, the visiting NFIP then updates its generic risk analysis.

The host and visiting NFIPs will cooperate to assess the effectiveness of the information exchange arrangements and the work of the visiting police delegation.

# 1.3.e Information Exchange with Non-EU Countries

NFIPs are the proper channel for the exchange of information with NFIPs in non-EU countries. If a country does not have an NFIP, the governmental departmental responsible for policing matters should be asked to designate a central police contact point. Contact details should be forwarded to other NFIPs and entered on the EPE NFIP.

### 1.4. Counter-Terrorism and Serious and Organised Criminality

For the exchange of information on matters such as counterterrorism and serious and organised crime, the competent police agency in the host country may communicate through any existing network or specialist liaison officers appointed for that purpose.

#### 1.5. EPE NFIP

The EPE NFIP is hosted by Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) and it is only used for sharing information related to football events with an international dimension.

Personal data or classified information cannot be exchanged between the concerned NFIP's via the EPE NFIP website, but only using other secured channels of communication.

#### 1.5.a. Access to the EPE NFIP website

Only the NFIP's members of the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts have access to the EPE NFIP website.

Other interested third parties can have access to the EPE NFIP website, but only following a formal agreement from the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts.

The European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts will designate a EPE NFIP platform manager who, in conjunction with the Europol platform manager, will be responsible for overseeing management and use of the platform.

In the case of creating new accounts, the head of the concerned NFIP will submit a request to the EPE NFIP platform manager consisting of name and surname of the NFIP member and its business e-mail address.

The process of deleting EPE NFIP accounts is similar to the one referring to the creation and it implies a formal request from the concerned NFIP head.

### 1.5.b. Pre-match assessments (PMA)

In the PMA section, the visiting team/teams NFIP are responsible for providing the PMA for the matches with an international dimension.

The visiting team/teams NFIP should upload the PMA with at least 5 working days before the date of the match.

In the case of knock out stages of the European competitions the aforementioned deadline is reduced to 3 working days.

The PMA is locked for editing only by the NFIP that created it.

The PMA should be regularly refined by the issuing NFIP in case of new information available.

# 1.5.c. Post-match reports (PMR)

In the PMR section, the host NFIP is responsible for providing the PMR for the matches with an international dimension.

The host team NFIP should upload the PMR no later than 5 working days after the date of the match.

After the upload of the PMR, notifications should be sent to all NFIP's concerned (for example future opponents in the same group).

#### 1.5.d. Team overview

Each NFIP is responsible for uploading the overview for their national football teams and clubs.

The information should regularly (at least at the beginning of each season) be reviewed and updated as necessary by the respective NFIPs.

#### 1.5.e. Stadiums

Each NFIP is responsible for uploading stadium information.

The information should regularly be updated by the respective NFIPs.

### 1.5.f. Matches

The host NFIP should register each match on the EPE NFIP as early as possible, preferably as soon as the match is scheduled, to enable the sharing of information in advance of the matches.

After the match is registered, the PMA and PMR can be uploaded.

# 1.5.g. Data analysis

Data uploaded in the EPE NFIP should be used as basis for the annual threat assessment to be issued by the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts in cooperation with Europol.

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### 2. General Guidance on the National Role and Tasks of NFIPs

At a national level, the NFIP should act as a national source of expertise on football policing matters. In fulfilling this role, the NFIP should undertake a range of key football-related tasks, including:

- coordinating the exchange of information regarding football matches played in domestic competitions;
- gathering and analysing data on football-related incidents (inside and outside stadia) along with associated arrests and detentions and the outcome of any judicial or administrative proceedings that ensue;
- gathering and analysing information on the imposition of exclusion measures and, where
   appropriate, manage compliance with such exclusion measures;
- where appropriate, should be responsible for delivering, or at least overseeing, the training and work of intelligence officers and/or spotters.

An NFIP can enter into a formal bilateral agreement with a third party regarding the exchange of certain information in accordance with their own national legislation. This information cannot be further shared without the agreement of the originator.

NFIPs can have a key role to play in assisting police match commanders in the delivery of their strategic and operational priorities at all matches with an international dimension. The key priorities for host policing operations should include:

- providing a safe, secure and welcoming environment for supporters and local communities;
- managing all policing-related aspects of the event;
- determining policing preparations and operational strategies informed by police risk assessments;

- monitoring emerging risk scenarios and responding proportionately, through early targeted intervention, to prevent or reduce escalation of the risk;
- maximising the use of information and advice on visiting supporter dynamics provided by visiting police delegations; and
- facilitating an understanding of how best to accommodate potentially different visiting policing cultures, styles and tactics in the host policing operation.

#### **CHAPTER 3**

# 3. Cooperation between Host Police and Visiting Police Delegations

## 3.1. Key Principles

The vital role played by visiting police delegations in supporting the policing operations of host countries is shown by widespread European experience over the past decades.

It is essential, therefore, for the NFIP responsible for the visiting team to provide assistance to the host NFIP via the deployment of a visiting police delegation composed of specialized officers that can support effectively the host policing operation. The deployment should always be based on a risk assessment and be agreed via the existing protocols.

Countries which have the legal possibility to prevent risk supporters from travelling abroad should take all the necessary measures to achieve this objective effectively and should inform the organising country accordingly. Each country should take all possible measures to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public order disturbances in another country.

# 3.2. Supporting Host Policing Operations

In addition to the comprehensive exchange of information, and in accordance with the principles in chapter 1 of this handbook, the organising NFIP, following close consultation with the competent operational policing agency, should invite a visiting police delegation from the visiting country or countries whenever there is a requirement in respect of a football match with an international dimension. This can also be the case for national matches in which risk supporters from other countries may have interest and attend the match.

To provide added value to the policing operations of the organising country, it is crucial that visiting police delegations comprise personnel with knowledge and experience of the dynamics and behaviour of the visiting supporters.

Before the event, the visiting police delegation should:

- be briefed by their NFIP as regards their tasks and responsibilities during the deployment;
- be in possession of the relevant information (number of fans travelling, associated risks, fan marches, meeting/ticket exchange points, host country national legal framework, travel means and accommodation details if available );
- be provided by their NFIP with the contact details of their counterparts;
- be able to contact the security officer of the club/national association, SLO, supporters' federation/groups etc.

Furthermore, where spotters are to be deployed to fixtures with an international dimension, consideration should be given to them being trained and briefed prior to deployment (or hosting) where appropriate in:

- the role and functions of the NFIP;
- the functions of the Europol Platform Exports (EPE);
- the role of UEFA and UEFA competitions format;
- the EU Handbook provisions and responsibilities in sending and hosting delegations;
- requirement to have knowledge of the laws and cultures of countries to be visited;
- police powers and personal safety;
- crowd safety considerations Appendix 4 of the EU Handbook Dynamic Risk Assessment and Crowd Management;
- overseas delegation roles;
- the role of the cicerone.

During the deployment, the visiting police delegation should be viewed as a primary source of information about visiting supporters, their behaviour and any potential risks. This will provide added value for the host police commander in respect of:

- appropriate crowd management of regular fans;
- obtaining and sharing pre-match and match-day intelligence;
- close monitoring of events in order to provide the organising police with timely and accurate information;
- monitoring and interpreting visiting supporter behaviour and identifying and monitoring risk fans and potential risk scenarios to inform an ongoing dynamic risk assessment (see Appendix 4);
- where agreed with the head of the visiting delegation, and following a police risk assessment,
   proactively intervening to prevent escalation of any misbehaviour by visiting supporters;
- communicating with visiting supporters and acting as a bridge between the supporters and the host police to help address any potential or emerging concerns;
- gathering evidence of any criminality and misbehaviour and criminal offences and identifying visiting offenders.

After the event, the visiting police delegation should provide a feedback report to their NFIP. If some elements can be of interest, this will be referred back to the host NFIP.

### 3.3. Cooperation Arrangements

In accordance with Council Decision 2002/348/JHA, for football matches with an international dimension, the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation should be transmitted via the NFIP in the host country. This should take account of the specific aims of cooperation. The invitation should also indicate the composition of the delegation and clarify their roles and responsibilities. It should also specify the intended duration of the visiting police delegation's stay in the host country.

For international tournaments and one-off matches (if requested by either NFIP) the formal invitation for a visiting police delegation should be sent by the competent authority in the host country, on the advice of the host country NFIP, and can be subject to an inter-governmental agreement.

If a visiting police delegation is not invited by the host NFIP, the NFIP of the visiting country can, if deemed appropriate, submit a proactive proposal to the host NFIP to send a delegation. If the host NFIP does not accept the proposal, any police delegation that travels will be acting in an unofficial capacity outside the scope of this handbook.

The detailed invitation to provide support should be agreed between the NFIPs concerned well in advance of a tournament and/or one-off match to allow the visiting police delegation sufficient preparation time.

For one-off matches with an international dimension the visiting police delegation will require at least three weeks' preparation time. If there is less than three weeks' prior notice of a match (for example in the later stages of a European club competition or due to an increased level of risk) the invitation should be sent immediately. For international tournaments, the visiting police delegation will require at least 16 weeks' preparation time.

The detail of the arrangements (e.g. police powers, equipment, uniforms etc.) for the visiting police delegation are negotiated between the NFIPs, following consultation with the local police for the one-off match.

#### 3.4. Model Protocols for One-Off Matches

Section 3.14 provides a model for negotiating bilateral agreements on the international police cooperation arrangements that will apply in respect of major football tournaments.

However, it is strongly recommended that the arrangements for deploying a visiting police delegation for one-off football matches with an international dimension should be agreed in advance by the host and visiting countries and set out in a protocol. Model protocols are provided in Appendix 1, for use when both countries are party to the Prüm Treaty, and Appendix 2, for use in circumstances when one or both countries are not subject to the Prüm Treaty.

If a bi-national governmental agreement is not in place, these arrangements should comply with Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/616/JHA<sup>8</sup> and the applicable national laws.

The visiting delegation should not exceed the number agreed by the host NFIP and should respect the host police command and control arrangements. If they act in a manner that is not within the terms of the agreement then they are acting outside of the scope of this handbook and the applicable EU Council Decisions and Treaties.

## 3.5. Costs and Financial Arrangements

The costs involved in hosting and deploying a visiting police delegation are modest and represent a sound investment in reducing security risks.

It is strongly recommended that each Member State makes budgetary provision to host and send visiting police delegations for all matches with an international dimension. On each occasion:

- **the host country** should pay for accommodation, meals (or subsistence) and domestic travel required in the host country (airport transfers and operational travel),
- **the visiting country** should pay for international travel, salaries and insurance (medical, travel and life) of the delegation members involved.

The respective NFIPs can exceptionally agree alternative arrangements, following bilateral negotiations, well in advance of the deployment and based on a rationale of why the recommended cost arrangements are not to be met.

These arrangements need to be clarified in the aforementioned visiting police delegation protocol for deployment of visiting police delegations.

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Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12).

#### 3.6. Pre-Visits

It is recommended that in order to facilitate and adopt an effective working relationship with the local police, the visiting police force (along with the NFIP if needed) should undertake pre-visits prior to the respective match. Specific budgetary allocations in this regard should be provided for the NFIPs for this purpose.

Where possible, the pre-visits should be undertaken jointly with the club/National Association representatives to foster an integrated approach to safety, security and service. Consideration should be given to there being representation at meeting from the operational match commanders, supporter's representatives, embassy staff of the visiting country, host NFIP, stadium security staff etc.

The police in the host country should give key members of the visiting police delegation an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the organisation of local police operations and with the stadium location and operating arrangements:

- for international tournaments, this should take place no later than six weeks before the tournament (e.g. by hosting workshops or seminars for key members of visiting police delegations).
- for one-off matches with an international dimension this should be on one of the days prior to the match.

Such pre-visits provide an ideal opportunity for host and visiting police representatives to maximise international cooperation by:

- sharing logistical information on supporter arrangements in the host city/town;
- visiting locations where visiting supporters are expected to gather before and after the match;
- discussing and agreeing on the role of the visiting delegation;

- increasing awareness about host policing preparations and operations;
- planning for the integration of the visiting delegation into the operation;
- identifying relevant legislative provisions and police tolerance levels;
- building trust and effective liaison channels between the two policing agencies and
- where appropriate, identifying measures to separate supporter groups in the host city/town.

# 3.7. Accompanying Visiting Police Delegations

Ensuring the safety of all members of a visiting police delegation is paramount and must be reflected in all host and visiting police risk assessments concerning police deployment.

Visiting members of a police delegation, in particular the intelligence officer (if needed), operations coordinator and operational police officers (see below) should work alongside local police officers (commonly known as cicerones) who themselves should be serving police officers with experience of policing football in their own city or country, including familiarity with the venue area and potential risk areas.

### Cicerones:

- should be integrated into the national/local policing operation and be able to relay information enabling operational police commanders to make key decisions;
- should have knowledge of their police organisation, processes and command structure;
- should not be tasked with monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed
   accompanying members of a visiting police delegation;
- should be thoroughly briefed on the host policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected to be performed by the members of the visiting police delegation;
- should be responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation and provide a channel of communication with the host police;

- should be deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the operation; this
   will assist in developing an effective working relationship;
- should work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand.

## 3.8. Composition of Visiting Police Delegations

The visiting police delegation should be composed in such a way that it is able to support the host country policing operation.

Depending on the exact nature of the support to be provided, the composition of the delegation could be as follows:

- 1. **a head of delegation** who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of the visiting police delegation;
- 2. **an intelligence officer** (or more if agreed by the respective NFIPs) who is responsible in particular for the exchange of information between his/her home country and the organising country;
- 3. **an operations coordinator** who is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting operational police officers;
- 4. **police spotters**<sup>9</sup> with spotting, supporter liaison, accompanying and other duties;
- 5. **a spokesperson/press officer** for media liaison.

During international tournaments the intelligence officer is likely to be based in a single or binational International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC), whilst the operations coordinator may be based in a local information centre in the locality of the venue city. For one-off matches they may be based in the organising country NFIP or another appropriate environment.

For a one-off match the **intelligence** officer/operations coordinator should work closely with the host police in the venue city.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Also known in other countries as Operational Football Police officer.

The host police should provide the **intelligence** officers/operations coordinators with access to the relevant technical equipment so that they can perform their functions effectively.

The visiting police delegation can be deployed in plain clothes or in uniform.

Specific training programmes should be developed by Member States for these positions.

# 3.9. Deployment considerations

The recommended deployment duration is arrival on MD-1 and departure in MD+1. If there is requirement to work during the day before the match, arrival on MD-2 has to be considered. This may vary depending on the host police operation's needs. The visiting police delegation members should be available throughout the entire operation, as agreed with the host police.

The host police should plan to deploy the visiting police delegation members in accordance with their existing national working time legal provisions, unless unforeseen operational circumstances dictate otherwise.

The accommodation for the visiting police delegations should be suitable for the operational needs of local policing operation and if possible in close proximity to the deployment area.

### 3.10. Key Tasks of the Visiting Police Delegation

To provide added value to the policing operations of the organising country, it is crucial that visiting police delegations comprise personnel with knowledge and experience of the dynamics and behaviour of the visiting supporters.

The visiting police delegation should have the following competencies:

- a good working knowledge of this handbook;
- an understanding of the processes required to facilitate the international exchange of information;
- the ability to represent their country and their role effectively when liaising with the organising police services (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand);

 a background knowledge of the situation concerning football-related violence/disorder in their country.

The main tasks of the delegation can be summarised as:

- gathering and transferring information/intelligence within their delegation and to the host police;
- ensuring effective deployment of their operational police officers (in uniform and/or plain clothes) in order to play an integral role in the host police operation for the event;
- providing timely and accurate advice to the host police commander.

The primary role of the head of delegation is to act as a strategic and tactical advisor to the host authorities.

The primary role of a intelligence officer and/or an operations coordinator (which may or may not be the same person depending upon the bilateral police deployment agreement) is to facilitate effective exchange of information between the visiting and host country authorities in connection with a one-off football match or a tournament. If neither an intelligence officer nor an operations coordinator is appointed, their functions should be undertaken by the head of delegation.

Operational police officers deployed within a delegation are known as police spotters.

Police spotters, whether in uniform or plain clothes, can:

- be used by the host police as a means of interacting with visiting supporters in order to assist crowd management;
- assist in reducing the anonymity of risk supporters in a crowd, and their ability to instigate
   and/or participate in acts of violence or disorder without further consequences.

The spotters should have experience in the policing of football matches in their own country.

They should:

have the skills and experience to communicate effectively (where appropriate) in order to

influence the behaviour of supporters; and/or

- be specialists in the behaviour of, and the potential risks posed by their supporters; and

be able to communicate effectively during the event with host police regarding the type of risk

that visiting supporters may or may not pose at any given time and place.

If the visiting police delegation is not able to perform any/some of these tasks, this should be

explicitly communicated to the host NFIP.

Spotters should be able to communicate positive, as well as negative, information concerning their

visiting supporters. This will allow the host country police commanders to make balanced decisions

around the need to intervene or facilitate legitimate supporter behaviour.

Subject to the agreement of the host country, visiting spotters can also be deployed to gather

intelligence/evidence, using agreed equipment, for use by the organising police or for prosecution

purposes in their own country.

3.11. Language

Language arrangements should be made in advance by the countries concerned.

Where possible, visiting police delegations should include personnel skilled in the language of the

host country to facilitate communication between the host and visiting police personnel.

3.12. Cooperation between Host and Visiting Police during the Event

The visiting police delegation should be kept informed about the host police operational plan

(including their crowd management philosophy and behavioural tolerance levels). They should be

fully integrated into the host police operation (and given the possibility to attend and participate in

pre-match briefing and post-match debriefing meetings).

The host police and the visiting police delegation should keep their respective NFIPs informed of developments throughout the operation and submit a post-match report to their NFIP within five working days.

The visiting police delegation should always ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily jeopardise the safety of other persons<sup>10</sup>.

### 3.13. Use of Identification Vests

When it is jointly agreed for tactical reasons, visiting police officer(s) who are not deployed in uniform can use the standard luminous and distinctive visiting police identification vests described in Appendix 3. Each visiting police officer should bring this vest when he/she travels abroad.

#### 3.14. Accreditation

The police force of the organising country, in consultation with the football organisers, should ensure that the visiting police delegation has, when appropriate, stadium access and accreditation (seating is not required) to enable the delegation to carry out their tasks effectively. Stewards and other safety and security personnel should be made aware of this at their briefing(s) prior to the game.

# 3.15. Football Events in Countries without an NFIP

As stressed throughout this handbook and particularly in Chapter 1 above, where a football match or a tournament is played in a State with no NFIP, all information should be exchanged between the designated police contact point in the host country and the NFIP of the visiting country.

During the event, the designated police contact point of the host country should communicate with the NFIP of the visiting country/countries via the designated visiting police delegation intelligence officer, if one has been appointed.

See Articles 21 and 22 of the Prüm Decision on civil and criminal liability.

# 3.15.a. Bilateral Agreements

It is strongly recommended that, at an early stage of the preparations, countries participating in the event should adopt a bilateral agreement with the host authorities setting out the arrangements for information exchange, deployment of visiting police delegations and other police cooperation matters in connection with the event. Such bilateral agreements can also include areas of governmental and judicial cooperation. A template for a bilateral agreement is set out in 12261/16. It includes the list of issues which should be considered and agreed between the two parties. The template is not a model agreement but rather an aid to bilateral negotiations.

## 3.15.b. NFIP Cooperation

When preparing to assist with major tournaments, it is recommended that NFIPs should:

- share information about bilateral discussions/negotiations with the host authorities;
- commence at an early stage and maintain dialogue with the host authorities, using international agencies, notably Interpol, to stress the key role of the European NFIP network; and
- undertake coordinated visits to the relevant venue cities and stadia in the host country in order
   to clarify local arrangements and foster effective dialogue at national and local level.

# 3.16. Role of Interpol and Europol

The NFIP network provides an appropriate and timely channel for the exchange of information regarding crowd management, public safety and public order, and associated risks. It is mandatory under European law for such information to be exchanged between host and visiting policing agencies through the respective NFIPs or the designated host police contact point and the visiting police intelligence officers deployed in the host country during an event.

The EPE NFIP is key factor in the successful exchange of information and resulting operational police deployment. Constant update of the system should be implemented based on the user's feedback and taken into account the best practices identified.

However, NFIPs can liaise with Europol or Interpol regarding any links between the activities of any supporter risk groups and links with serious and organised criminality or other non-football related criminality

Moreover, Europol, Interpol and/or other agencies in the Justice and Home Affairs area, such as Frontex may, in accordance with their legal mandates, play an important role in supporting the competent authorities of countries hosting major international football tournaments. This may include providing various support services, relevant information and analysis, and threat assessments in respect of serious and organised crime and/or terrorism.

For example, during major tournaments:

- an Interpol major events support team may be deployed to support host law enforcement activity during a major tournament;
- Europol may deploy its staff at the host police coordination centre to facilitate information exchange, to provide intelligence and analytical support in respect of serious organised crime and terrorism;
- host and Frontex personnel may have bilateral arrangements in place for cross-border operations.

In such circumstances, the NFIPs of visiting countries, or heads of the visiting police delegations, should seek to ascertain at an early stage the exact functions of these agencies and liaise as appropriate on matters of mutual interest.

## PART II – Interaction with other key partners and stakeholders

The general principles in the next chapters reflect the multi-agency character of managing football (and other sporting events). These principles retain all their importance at football matches with an international dimension.

#### **CHAPTER 4**

### 4. Cooperation between the Police and the Organiser

Close cooperation between the police and stadium authorities/the match organiser (and other parties involved, including any private security companies and stewards operating in stadia) is crucial for the delivery of effective in-stadia safety and security arrangements.

The key partnership at a local level is between the police match commander and the individual appointed by the match organiser as being responsible for safety and crowd management within the stadium (commonly referred to as the stadium safety officer, though the term security officer is used in some countries).

The police commander and stadium safety officer should work together on a complementary basis, without prejudice to their respective responsibilities, competencies, and tasks. These may be set out in national legislation or stadium regulations or specified in a written agreement between the organiser and the police (often described as a statement of intent) specifying the role of the police (if any) in crucial crowd management functions. Such functions include: supporting safety personnel (stewards) in preventing and dealing with any public disorder or other criminality; activating the organiser's emergency procedures; and determining the circumstances in which the police should take control of all or part of the stadium in emergency and major incident scenarios, along with the procedure for doing so and for the eventual return of control to the organiser.

Close cooperation should also ensure that police views on a number of key in-stadia safety considerations are taken into account by the organiser. A number of important issues can be covered in this way, including: the use of CCTV for crowd management and evidence gathering purposes; shared or designated in-stadia communication arrangements; possible use of visiting stewards in a liaison capacity both in stadia and *en route* to and from a stadium; arrangements for a multi-agency control room, incorporating a police command post where appropriate.

Detailed guidance on this matter is set out in Council of Europe Safety and Security Committee Consolidated Recommendation (2021) 1.

### **CHAPTER 5**

### 5. Cooperation between Police and Justice and Prosecuting Agencies

The contents of this chapter should be seen in the context of wide variations in the structure and competencies of justice and prosecuting agencies in Member States.

There can be significant benefits from close cooperation between police and justice and prosecuting agencies in respect of both one-off matches and tournaments.

Whilst the host country has sovereignty and jurisdiction to deal with all alleged event-related offences committed in that country, the police and other authorities in Member States and EU competent bodies (e.g. Eurojust) should support the judicial and law enforcement authorities of the host country where possible and permissible.

All Member States should ensure that it is possible to deal quickly and appropriately with eventrelated offences.

The host police and other authorities should inform visiting police and supporters of relevant domestic legislation and/ or criminal, civil or administrative procedures together with the maximum penalties for the most common football- related offences.

Existing multi-lateral agreements on mutual legal assistance (MLA) should be fully utilised, where appropriate, for all football matches with an international dimension. Additionally, a host country may agree bilateral arrangements with any other country for enhanced MLA before, during and after the event.

The NFIP of the supporting country/countries should inform the organising NFIP:

 of any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders/exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the event;

- what measures can be taken by the visiting police delegation and/or any other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters;
- what offences committed in the host country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender).

The host country may invite any other countries to send a liaison prosecutor/judge to be present during the event.

It is recommended that the host authority, in accordance with the national legislation on data protection, provides the visiting police delegation and/or competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) with information from judicial or court records and police or investigative reports, including arrest records, of their nationals.

Alternatively, a supporting country may agree to have a liaison prosecutor/judge available on call to travel to the host country at its request, or appoint a designated liaison prosecutor/judge for liaison with the designated host authority.

Within the scope of national legislation, the supporting NFIP(s) will attempt to answer promptly any requests for further information on arrested individuals, such as details of previous convictions, including football-related offences.

All costs related to liaison prosecutors/judges being sent to the host country should be subject to bilateral agreement.

The organising country should provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the visiting liaison prosecutors/judges.

#### **CHAPTER 6**

# 6. Cooperation between Police and Supporters

Police liaison with supporter groups at national and local level can have a major impact in minimising safety and security risks at football matches with an international dimension. This cooperation can however be undermined if there is any perception that supporter representatives are working on behalf of the police and, for example, sharing personal data.

Visiting police delegations and supporter representatives can help ensure that host police are aware of the character and culture of the visiting supporters. The host police should take this into account in their dynamic risk assessment.

Home supporters, local communities and visiting supporters should be provided with potentially important information and reassurance in respect of an event. Some of the main means of achieving this are: an effective media handling strategy; use of social media/internet sites; leaflets; and working closely with designated Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), supporter representatives and supporter focused initiatives (such as fan embassies).

Ongoing cooperation and communication between police and supporter groups can help provide a basis for a safe, secure and welcoming atmosphere for all supporters, and can provide a channel for relaying important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The host and visiting police should, therefore, have a strategy in place for communicating with supporters (termed 'dialogue'). Dialogue can either be a task for specialist (and trained) communication officers and/or front line (crowd control/public order) operational units trained in communication and conflict resolution techniques.

This approach has been shown to help promote self-policing amongst supporters and facilitate early and appropriate intervention when security problems or risks emerge.

Detailed guidance on this matter is contained in Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters<sup>11</sup> and the Council Resolution concerning good practice guidance in respect of police liaison with Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) appointed by football clubs and national federations to help prevent and reduce the scale of violence, disturbances and other prohibited behaviour in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved<sup>12</sup>.

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#### **CHAPTER 7**

#### 7. Communication and Media Strategy

#### 7.1. Communication Strategy

An effective and transparent communication strategy is integral to a successful safety and security concept for football matches, tournaments and other sporting events with an international dimension.

Host country policing agencies should, therefore, work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organisers, the media and supporter groups in the preparation and delivery of a comprehensive multi-agency communication strategy.

An effective multi-agency media strategy is a crucial aspect of any communication strategy in terms of providing all parties, notably visiting supporters, with important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels.

The central aim should be to project a positive image of the event among home and visiting supporters, local communities, the general public and individuals participating in the safety and security operations. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and make a major contribution towards minimising safety and security risks.

#### 7.2. Media Strategy

The police (and wider multi-agency) media strategy should at least aim to:

- provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;
- provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner;
- communicate the police's intention to facilitate the legitimate activities of supporters;
- make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police;
- provide authoritative information on any incidents as quickly as possible.

The police should work closely with governmental and local agencies, football authorities/organisers and, where appropriate, supporter groups in establishing and delivering a multi-agency media strategy which:

- proactively promotes a positive image of the event;
- ensures responsibilities are clearly assigned among police and partner agencies in terms of
  who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and
  security (and beyond);
- provides common background and briefing information for all police and partner agency spokespersons (briefing material should be regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events);
- ensures that factual information is released to the media and/or on the internet on a regular basis in the build up, during and after the event;
- provides regular opportunities for press/media briefings;
- takes account of the needs/interests of different categories of journalists/media.

### **Part III – Meetings and documents**

#### **CHAPTER 8**

#### 8. Meetings of the EU Football Safety and Security Experts

It is highly recommended that during each EU Council Presidency, the Presidency holds a meeting of the experts group for major sports events (MSE) and that the Presidency reports to the Law Enforcement Working Party on the result of that meeting and the ongoing work by the expert group.

It is further recommended that each Presidency hosts a meeting of the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP Experts (Think Tank) to:

- prepare relevant documentation for consideration by the experts group for major sports events;
- prepare, and monitor the implementation of, the work programmes of the experts group for major sports;
- monitor new trends/developments in supporter behaviour and associated risks;
- monitor and facilitate the work of the European network of NFIPs;
- share good practice in respect of international police cooperation and policing strategies and tactics for football events;
- work in partnership with partner institutions in promoting the development of an integrated,
   multi-agency approach to football safety, security and service; and
- any other issues of interest and relevance.

#### **CHAPTER 9**

# 9. List of Relevant Documents on Safety and Security at Football Events

# 9.1. Documents previously adopted by the Council of the European Union

- 1. Council Recommendation of 30 November 1993 concerning the responsibility of organisers of sporting events (10550/93).
- 2. Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches, with an annexed standard format for the exchange of police intelligence on football hooligans (OJ C 131, 3.5.1996, p. 1).
- 3. Joint action of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1).
- 4. Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy (OJ C 193, 24.6.1997, p. 1).
- 5. Council Resolution of 21 June 1999 concerning a handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches (OJ C 196, 13.7.1999, p. 1).
- 6. Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 22, 24.1.2002, p. 1).
- 7. Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1).
- 8. Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 on the use by Member States of bans on access to venues of football matches with an international dimension (OJ C 281, 22.11.2003, p. 1).

- 9. Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322, 29.12.2006, p. 1).
- Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension (OJ L 155, 15.6.2007, p. 76).
- 11. Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 amending a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 165, 24.6.2010, p. 1).
- 12. Council Resolution of 29 November 2016 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook'), 444/2016
- 13. Council Resolution concerning the costs of hosting and deploying visiting police delegations in connection with football matches (and other sports events) with an international dimension 12791/16
- 14. Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters 12792/16
- Council Conclusions on sports-related violence approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3799th meeting held on 7 June 2021

- 16. Council Conclusions concerning the need to prevent and counter the use of pyrotechnics in spectator areas of football stadia and other sports venues approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3899th meeting held on 13 October 2022 13370/22
- 17. Council Resolution concerning good practice guidance in respect of police liaison with Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3899th meeting held on 19 October 2022 13371/22

## 9.2. Documents adopted by the Council of Europe

- 1. Council of Europe Convention on an integrated approach to safety, security and service at football matches and other sports events 2016
- 2. Recommendation (2021) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events (Consolidated Recommendation).

# Appendix 1

# PROTOCOL FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF VISITING POLICE DELEGATIONS FOR FOOTBALL MATCHES WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

(For use when both the host and visiting States are party to the Prüm Treaty)

1. Requesting Member State/Country:

In compliance with the Prüm Decisions, in particular Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, this protocol sets out the practical detailed arrangements to be agreed between NFIPs for the deployment of visiting police delegations for football matches with an international dimension.

2. Requesting Organisation/Contact Person:
Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP)
Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:
3. Event (match or tournament)
3a: Place where the operation is to take place
Region, town, area or locality:
Other information:

# 3b: Period covered by the operation

Requested start date	Proposed end date

The end date may be deferred by mutual consent.

3c: Officer(s) responsible<sup>13</sup>

From the host Member State/Country

Name	Rank	Function	Service to which officer belongs	Telephone / email

This is normally the person responsible for the locality/venue where the event will take place.

Joint operation at a football match/tournament with an international dimension Specific assistance requested from the seconding Member State(s)/Countries (if YES please indicate the number of officers requested)<sup>14</sup> Head of Delegation: YES NO Intelligence Officer: YES NO Operational Coordinator: YES NO Operational Police Officers in Uniform: YES NO Operational Police Officers in Plain Clothes: YES NO Press Officer: YES NO

3e: Place of deployment of the visiting police delegation (to include details of likely locations of deployment, i.e. airports, railway stations, city centre, stadium, etc.)

All members of the visiting police delegation, with the exception of officers who are deployed in uniform, should bring with them the EU standard Police Identification Vest.

3f: Requested tasks for the visiting police delegation:

Advising and supporting the host policing operation: YES NO

Liaison and dialogue with visiting supporters: YES NO

Other (please specify): YES NO

3g: Is it planned that any members of the visiting police delegation will have official (executive) powers in the host country?

YES NO

If YES please provide details:

**Executive powers of officers seconded to joint cooperation teams** 

(Article 17(2) of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA)

Executive power shall be exercised only under the guidance of and, as a rule, in the presence of officers from the host Member State. The seconding Member State's officers shall be subject to the host Member State's national law. The host Member State shall assume responsibility for their actions.

If applicable: executive powers of the seconded officers

- 1. Executive powers conferred by the host Member State, in accordance with its national law, on officers seconded by other Member States
- 2. Executive powers which the host Member State allows the seconding Member State(s) officers to exercise in accordance with the seconding Member State(s) national law

3h: Are the visiting police delegation allowed to use technical intelligence/evidence gathering equipment in the host country?

YES NO

If YES please define the purpose:

- to support the local police
- for evidential purposes in the police delegation's own country

And the equipment authorised to be used:

- hand-held video camera
- hand-held stills camera
- Other (please detail)

3i: Does this request include authority for the visiting police delegation to bring them police protective weapons<sup>15</sup>

Firearms	YES	NO
CS Gas	YES	NO
Batons	YES	NO
Tasers	YES	NO
Other (please specify)	YES	NO
If the answer to any of the above is VES please give details of any special conditions which		

If the answer to any of the above is YES please give details of any special conditions which apply:

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ANNEX JAI.1 **EN** 

<sup>15</sup> Item 3i is based on Article 19 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA

3j: Can the visiting police delegation deploy confidential human sources? (commonly known as
Informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources)
YES NO
If VEC also are if and at an initial and an initial are and an initial are and an initial are an
If YES please specify what conditions apply:
3k: Details of accommodation proposed for the visiting police delegation
31: Details of transportation that will be provided for the visiting police delegation during the visit
3m: Information about the arrival and departure of the visiting police delegation
4. Costs (who will pay for what?)
In accordance with Chapter 3 of the EU Football Handbook
or
Exceptional alternative proposals apply
Exceptional alternative proposats apply
If exceptional alternative proposals apply please provide details:

5. Any additional requirements/arrangements (please provide details):		

# Civil Liability (Article 21 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA)

- 1. Where official of a Member State are operating in another Member State pursuant to Article 17 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, their Member State shall be liable for any damage caused by them during their operations, in accordance with the law of the Member State in whose territory they are operating.
- 2. The Member State in whose territory the damage referred to in paragraph 1 was caused shall make good such damage under the conditions applicable to damage caused by its own officials.
- 3. In the case provided for paragraph 1, the Member State whose officials have caused damage to any person in the territory of another Member State shall reimburse the latter in full any sums it has paid to the victims or persons entitled on their behalf.
- 4. Where officials of a Member State are operating in another Member State pursuant to Article 18 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, the latter Member State shall be liable in accordance with its national law for any damage caused by them during their operations.
- 5. Where the damage referred to in paragraph 4 results from gross negligence or willful misconduct, the host Member State may approach the seconding Member State in order to have any sums it has paid to the victims or persons entitled on their behalf reimbursed by the latter.
- 6. Without prejudice to the exercise of its rights vis-à-vis third parties and with the exception of paragraph 3, each Member State shall refrain, in the case provided for paragraph 1, from requesting reimbursement of damages it has sustained from another Member State.

# Criminal liability (Articles 22 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA)

Officers operating within another Member State's territory under Council Decision 2008/615/JHA shall be treated in the same way as officers of the host Member State with regard any criminal offences that might be committed by, or against them, save as otherwise provided in another agreement witch is binding on the Member State concerned.

#### Employment relationship (Articles 23 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA)

Officers operating within another Member State's territory under this Council Decision 2008/615/JHA shall remain subject to the employment law provisions applicable in their own Member State, particularly as regards disciplinary rules.

Done at (place and date)

Signature of the competent authority/person (as Paragraph 2)

# RESPONSE REGARDING VISITING POLICE DELEGATION

1. Responding Country:

2. Responding Organisation & Contact Person:
Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP):
Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:
3. Police Service(s) or other agency (i.e. Government Ministry) that has responsibility for the
visiting police delegation:

3a. Details of members of the visiting police delegation (surname/first name of all members to facilitate booking accommodation + mobile telephone & email of one main contact person)

Surname	First Name	Rank	Function	Service to which belongs
			Head of Delegation	
			Intelligence Officer	
			Operational Coordinator	
			Operational Police Officer - Uniform	
			Operational Police Officer – Plain Clothes	
			Press Officer	

#### Contact Person:

Name of contact person (police commander or other):
Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile phone:
Email:

4a: Agreement to the request YES NO
4b: Please give details of any additional requirements/arrangements:
4c: Information about the arrival and departure of the delegation:
Done at (place and date)
Signature of the competent authority/person (as in Paragraph 3)

# Appendix 2

# PROTOCOL FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF VISITING POLICE DELEGATIONS FOR FOOTBALL MATCHES WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

(Version to be used when either the organising or visiting State is not party to the Prüm Treaty)

This protocol sets out the practical detailed arrangements to be agreed between NFIPs, or the designated police contact in States which do not have an NFIP, for the deployment of visiting police delegations for football matches with an international dimension.

1. Requesting Member State/Country:

2. Requesting Organisation/Contact Person:
Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP)
Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:
3. Event (match or tournament)
3a: Place where the operation is to take place
Region, town, area or locality:
Other information:

# 3b: Period covered by the operation

Requested start date	Proposed end date

The end date may be deferred by mutual consent.

3c: Officer(s) responsible 16

From the host Member State/Country

Name	Rank	Function	Service to which officer belongs	Telephone / email

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This is normally the person responsible for the locality/venue where the event will take place.

Joint operation at a football match/tournament with an international dimension Specific assistance requested from the seconding Member State(s)/Countries (if YES please indicate the number of officers requested)<sup>17</sup> Head of Delegation: YES NO Intelligence Officer: YES NO Operational Coordinator: YES NO Operational Police Officers in Uniform: YES NO Operational Police Officers in Plain Clothes: YES NO Press Officer: YES NO

3e: Place of deployment of the visiting police delegation (to include details of likely locations of deployment, i.e. airports, railway stations, city centre, stadium, etc.)

All members of the visiting police delegation, with the exception of officers who are deployed in uniform, should bring with them the EU standard Police Identification Vest.

-

3f: Requested tasks for the visiting police delegation:

Advising and supporting the host policing operation:		NO
Liaison and dialogue with visiting supporters:		NO
Other (please specify):		

3g: Is it planned that any members of the visiting police delegation will have official (executive) powers in the host country?

If YES please provide details:

3h: Are the visiting police delegation allowed to use technical intelligence/evidence gathering equipment in the host country?

YES NO

If YES please define the purpose:

- to support the local police
- for evidential purposes in the police delegation's own country

And the equipment authorised to be used>

- hand-held video camera
- hand-held stills camera
- Other (please detail)

3i: Does this request include authority for the visiting police delegation to bring them police protective weapons? **Firearms** YES NO YES CS Gas NO **Batons** YES NO **Tasers** YES NO YES NO Other (please specify) If the answer to any of the above is YES please give details of any special conditions which apply: 3j: Can the visiting police delegation deploy confidential human sources? (commonly known as Informants or Covert Human Intelligence Sources) 3k: Details of accommodation proposed for the visiting police delegation 31: Details of transportation that will be provided for the visiting police delegation during the visit 3m: Information about the arrival and departure of the visiting police delegation

4. Costs (who will pay for what?)
In accordance with Chapter 3 of the EU Football Handbook
or
Exceptional alternative proposals apply
If exceptional alternative proposals apply please provide details:
5. Any additional requirements/arrangements (please provide details):
Civil Liability
Statement of policy
Done at (place and date)
Signature of the competent host authority

# RESPONSE REGARDING VISITING POLICE DELEGATION

1. Responding Country:

2. Responding Organisation & Contact Person:
Name of the organisation:
Name of contact person (police commander/NFIP):
Role:
Address:
Phone:
Mobile Phone:
Email:
3. Police Service(s) or other agency (i.e. Government Ministry) that has responsibility for the
visiting police delegation:

3a. Details of members of the visiting police delegation (surname/first name of all members to facilitate booking accommodation + mobile telephone & email of one main contact person)

Surname	First Name	Rank	Function	Service to which belongs
			Head of Delegation	
			Intelligence Officer	
			Operational Coordinator	
			Operational Police Officer - Uniform	
			Operational Police Officer – Plain Clothes	
			Press Officer	

#### Contact Person:

Name of contact person (police commander or other):	
Role:	
Address:	
Phone:	
Mobile phone:	
Email:	

4a: Agreement to the request YES NO
4b: Please give details of any additional requirements/arrangements:
4c: Information about the arrival and departure of the delegation:
Done at (place and date)
Signature of the competent authority/person (as in Paragraph 3)

# Appendix 3

#### SPECIFICATIONS FOR AND SAMPLE OF POLICE IDENTIFICATION VESTS

This is a slip-on (over the head) sleeveless vest.

Colour: NATO BLUE.

Colour code: Pantone 279C.

**Identification Markers:** 

Single word: POLICE (in English only) with a box border — to be positioned in the centre of the vest both front & back.

POLICE letters and border: Nato Blue background.

Both letters and the surrounding box to be luminous silver.

Box measurements =  $25 \text{ cm} \times 9 \text{ cm}$ .

POLICE letters: Width = 1,3 cm per letter.

Height = 7.5 cm.

#### **Vest Front:**

Left Breast (above POLICE box): National Flag 10 cm × 7 cm — embroidered/sewn on or in a plastic sleeve.

Right Breast (above POLICE box): EU Symbol 8 cm × 8 cm.

Below the POLICE box should be a luminous silver band across the front of the vest  $\times$  5 cm wide.

### **Vest Rear:**

National Flag above POLICE box:  $10 \text{ cm} \times 7 \text{ cm}$ .

Vests should be able to be secured by means of either Velcro or popper type fasteners on both sides.

Note: where possible, the specification should describe the material used for the vest, including whether or not it is water resistant, fire resistant, protective capability and other features.



Colour: NATO BLUE.

Colour code: Pantone 279C.

### Appendix 4

#### DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND CROWD MANAGEMENT

## **Key Principles (in accordance with national law)**

Current understanding of effective crowd management highlights the importance of:


- Maintaining perceptions of appropriate policing among crowd participants.
- Avoiding the use of force against crowds as a whole when only a minority are posing a risk to public order.
- Adoption of a 'high visibility but low friction' or a 'graded' tactical approach to policing that enhances police capability for communication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment.

A number of factors can influence police crowd management operations and make predicting supporter behaviour and planning a proportionate policing response a difficult task. These might include the diverse nature/size of a crowd, the importance of the fixture, incidents on the field of play the history and culture of fan groups or rapidly evolving crowd dynamics.

Police crowd management operations have an important role to play in reducing football-related disorder by:

- Excluding (where possible) individuals who are evidenced as previously causing or contributing to football-related violence or disorder.
- Engaging with and communicating with non-risk supporters.
- Influencing the actions of those supporters who are not currently understood to pose a risk but
  who may, under specific circumstances, become involved in behaviour that presents risk(s) to
  public safety, public order or potential criminal activity.

The following diagram seeks to illustrate this strategy in visual format:



In summary, the vast majority of supporters that attend events are there to enjoy the football experience.

A focus on an integrated approach to event safety and security, as opposed to a purely risk-based approach to those engaging in violence or disorder at football, can encourage non-risk supporters to contribute to public order through self-regulation and increase public trust/confidence in football policing.

To support this objective, police are encouraged to proactively invite supporter organisations to pre match planning meetings ahead of matches and facilitate post-match meetings where required. Acquiring the support of recognised fan organisations and use of fan-based social media, may assist in encouraging supporters to recognise the legitimacy of the policing crowd management operations.


On occasions some people attend with the intent of engaging in disorder and criminality. Whether this is expected or unexpected, police have a responsibility to deal with these people effectively.

In order to make effective and proportionate tactical decisions, it is important for police interventions to be based on a valid understanding of the risks that supporters present to the situation.

To assess these risks, officers in key football policing roles should engage with supporters on an ongoing basis by:

- Attending supporter group meetings and/or fans forums
- Use of social media (undertaken in strict accordance with policing policies and procedures)
- Where relevant, adopting or participating in youth intervention and diversion initiatives.

This process of engagement is ongoing across fixtures home and away and football seasons and takes place both on match days and non-match days. Therefore supporter engagement can be viewed as a continual cycle rather than linear.



# **Facilitation**

- The strategic approach should be preventative rather than repressive.
- It is important that at every stage of an operation police strategy and tactics should take
  account of the legitimate intentions of supporters, as far as these are peaceful (e.g. to celebrate
  their identity and culture, travel to and from the fixture in safety).
- Any police interventions should be targeted, proportionate, and based upon information and intelligence derived from an ongoing process of dynamic risk assessment which should be appropriately and adequately resourced and, where appropriate, underpinned by effective international police cooperation.
- If it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, it is important to communicate with those supporters why police action has been taken and what alternative means the police are putting in place through which legitimate aims can still be achieved.

#### **Balance**

- During any crowd event the levels of risk to public order can change rapidly.
- it is important that there is a proportionate balance between the style of police deployment and
   the level, sources and nature of risk at the point of police crowd interaction;
- It is important, therefore, for police deployment and tactics to be capable of changing directly
  in response to the nature and levels of emerging and decreasing risk.
- Where balance or proportionality is achieved and is underpinned by good communication, the majority of the crowd are more likely to perceive the actions of the police as appropriate, are more likely to self-regulate others around them and less likely to support and associate with those seeking confrontation;
- therefore, to help decrease the likelihood and scale of incidents, it is critical that risk assessments are accurate and inform police tactics at all times.

# **Differentiation**

- Given the nature of crowd dynamics, the indiscriminate use of force can inadvertently contribute to a widespread escalation in the levels of public disorder.
- Differentiation between individual supporters who actually pose a danger and those who do
  not should therefore be built into every strategic and tactical decision relating to the
  management of crowds (i.e. training, planning, briefing and operational practice).
- It is inappropriate to act against a whole crowd who happen to be present at a given location,
   unless there is evidence that they are uniformly seeking to provoke disorder.

#### Dialogue

- Effective dynamic risk assessment is underpinned by police capacity to engage in constructive dialogue with crowd participants. It is important for police to communicate proactively with supporters. This is best achieved by specialist police officers with good communication skills;
- The focus of these officers is less on enforcement and more on creating trust and confidence through promoting a welcoming atmosphere and early de-escalation of any emerging potential sources of conflict.
- This approach can assist in the gathering of high quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential threats and risk.
- Dialogue based interventions also allow the police to communicate their concerns regarding supporter behaviour, define tolerance limits and negotiate solutions to any emerging difficulties (i.e. limit setting, see below).

# Models of good practice

Before the event

Risk assessment should take into account:

- The underlying culture of the supporter group to be policed (e.g. characteristic behaviour, legitimate motivations and intentions).
- Any factors likely to have an impact on risk, e.g. the activities of other groups (such as
  opposition supporters and/or local communities), expectations and sensitivities, history, and
  anything else of particular significance (dates, places, forms of action, symbols).
- Any circumstances likely to have an impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, those supporters or groups perceived to pose a risk to public order.

Behavioural tolerance levels should be defined and priority given to communicating these to supporter organisations. Consideration should be given to encouraging and actively facilitating supporters to gather in a safe/controlled environment (e.g. a fan zone).

Based upon this information and intelligence relating to the specific fixture it should be possible to predict and make a distinction between fixtures with normal risk and those posing an increased risk to public order.

It is important to clearly distinguish between risks for specific types of incidents, such as public order, public safety, criminality in relation to mass events, and terrorism.

Initial contact

Since the level of risk to public order is not fixed but highly dynamic it can increase and decrease rapidly in response to circumstances. The levels of risk should therefore be monitored and accurately assessed on an ongoing basis.

#### To achieve this:

- Police should engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with supporters (non-aggressive posture, smiling, deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform, dispersed widely across and within crowds, accommodating requests for photographs, providing information, etc.).
- Where language is not a barrier, officers should try to communicate with supporters to gather
  information about their demeanour, intentions, concerns, sensibilities and any other issues
  relevant to their behaviour.
- Intervention units (i.e. 'riot squads' with protective equipment, vehicles, etc.) should be kept in discreet locations unless the situation determines that a more forceful intervention is required.
  - If resource constraints require intervention unit personnel to adopt a high visibility crowd management presence (as opposed to public order interventions), they should be briefed and trained in verbal and non-verbal communication techniques and be deployed without riot control equipment.

These principals will help the host police gather information and inform command decisions regarding tactical deployment on the basis of continuous and ongoing risk assessment.

#### Increasing risk

Where circumstances posing a risk are identified it is important to:

- Where an incident involves visiting supporters, host police assessments should be validated by the visiting police delegation.
- Drawing upon earlier dialogue based interventions, both the host and visiting police delegations should communicate to those posing the risk that their actions are likely to provoke police intervention (i.e. limit setting, see above).

Should the above measures not resolve the situation, then further use of force by the police may be required. The objective of police deployment at this stage is to minimise further risk and avoid escalation. It is therefore essential that any action does not increase tensions (e.g. through the use of indiscriminate use of force).

Where any potential for an increase in risk is identified:

- it is vital that information about the persons creating the risk and its nature is communicated clearly to the intervention squads being deployed so that any use of force can be appropriately and proportionately targeted;
- those not posing any risk should not be targeted merely because they happen to be present in
  the same physical location and be allowed to leave the vicinity and/or given some time to
  impose 'self-policing'.

#### De-escalation

- Once the incident(s) has been resolved policing levels should return to an appropriate level.

#### After the event

A through debrief should be conducted and any relevant information (e.g. the quality of
information received before and during the event, the behaviour and management of
supporters, police tactics and the enforcement of tolerance levels) should be recorded with the
NFIP.

### **Appendix 5**

#### SPOTTERS TRAINING

Following the findings of the annual threat assessment produced by the European Group of Football Policing and NFIP experts (European Think Tank) edition 2021/2022, which recorded that only 17 of the 35 responding countries (48,57%) reported that they have set up national police spotters training schemes, it has been decided necessary to prepare draft European guidance in this regard in order to enhance and harmonise European wide understanding of the roles and tasks of visiting police delegations and assist those States who have yet to adopt such training schemes.

This objective is imperative given that over the past three decades, the use of police spotters in connection with international and domestic football events (and other sports with comparable risks) has proven to be an effective means for preventing and minimising the impact of security (and safety) incidents associated with such events.

Although the concept of police spotters has a long history, the absence of a uniform approach towards police spotter training needs to be remedied notably in connection with international football events given the extent to which the deployment of visiting (foreign) police spotter teams need to be deployed and integrated within host policing operations.

This is crucial as whereas football policing policies and operational strategies are and must remain the preserve of the host police, the integration (and role and tasks of visiting police spotter personnel) must be agreed between the NFIPs in the respective host and participating States concerned. This is necessary as there are variations in interpretations of the roles and tasks of "police spotters" across Europe. Harmonising training curricula should significantly reduce the scope for extensive discussion and potential misunderstandings between the respective NFIPs and the policing agencies engaged in the event.

In States where police spotter training is already established, a range of approaches have been adopted. The attached appendix, therefore, aims to summarise the good practices identified and provide a model for future implementation of harmonised and comprehensive police spotter training.

However, a key principle remains that the NFIP in each State should be responsible for delivering, or at least overseeing, the police spotters training process. This is consistent with the European guidance which highlights that a primary task of the European network of NFIPs is to coordinate football-related international and national police spotter arrangements.

Where possible, the spotter training should include as well subject matter experts who have relevant experience for each aspect of the course (including experienced spotters).

To that end, the appendix proposes that the training process should incorporate:

- A basic induction training for new police spotters (to enable the personnel to commence duties before being scheduled onto the next available course)
- A comprehensive training (this should be on a fixed date, matching staff turnover and seasons)
- Refresher training to be undertake at least once every 2 years.

The training curricula should include topics related to:

- Relevant (football/sports-related) national and European legal frameworks (including the Saint Denis Convention).
- Football-related operational policing strategies and tactics.
- Football subculture overview.
- Risk assessment process/intelligence.
- Evidence gathering and investigations.
- Use of police databases.
- OSINT.

- Communication and dialogue with supporters/spectators.
- Current crowd management and communications.
- Ongoing and emerging trends.
- Cooperation with other stakeholders.

These elements are subject to national legal and other police training frameworks and arrangements and can be adopted wholly or partially as deemed appropriate by the respective NFIP.

Consideration should also be given to supplement the training by establishing:

- Regional mentoring networks (where new police spotting personnel are paired with more experienced personnel in their region).
- National expert network (where teams from across regions share experience and insights).

It is also recommended that consideration should be given to establishing a police spotter training quality assurance panel (in which the NFIP should play a key role) responsible for trainer selection and for annually reviewing the impact and effectiveness of the training, utilising latest data on incident avoidance and management, together with emerging national and international trends.