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Subject: PSC Report on the way ahead following operation Artemis lessons learned

Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.



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NOTE

From : Political and Security Committee
To : Permanent Representatives Committee / Council
Subject : PSC Report on the way ahead following operation Artemis lessons learned

On 29 September, the Council stated that :

"The Council welcomes the successful outcome of Operation Artemis, which has achieved the objectives assigned it by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484. The situation in Bunia has been stabilised and the United Nations has been able to deploy a reinforced MONUC contingent there. The operation has also created an environment in which the peace process and the establishment of transitional institutions can pass off smoothly in Kinshasa". It asked the Political and Security Committee to report back at an early opportunity on the lessons to be learned from the operation.

On 23 September, the PSC tasked the EUMC to present a report on the military lessons learned, and the Secretariat to present a report on the political and institutional lessons learned. Building upon these two reports, the PSC has agreed a set of actions to be taken to implement the lessons learned from that operation.

In taking forward the implementation of lessons learned from Operation Artemis, account should be taken as appropriate of the European Council agreement on the establishment within the EUMS of a cell with civil/military components.

[Artemis as shown the requirement to further develop the EU's rapid response capabilities, on the basis of these lessons and the initiatives of Member States, such as the recent Battle Group Concept Proposal, which are under consideration in the competent bodies.]

Council is requested to endorse these proposals.

SERIAL NUMBER	LESSONS LEARNED	ACTION
1	<p>RAPID RESPONSE</p> <p>Artemis underscored the need to enhance the capacity of the EU to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. Ways to ensure timely provision of intelligence should be considered. This should include consideration on how the use of the Watch List could be improved.</p>	MS - GSC -COM
2	<p>In the case of Operation Artemis, the early request by the GAERC to start work on a possible EU-led operation permitted the Secretariat and the FN to advance those preparations required for a rapid response. In the case of future operations, a similar approach should be considered.</p>	MS
3	<p>Adaptation of the implementation by PSC of the crisis management procedures in accordance with the demands of each operation should be ensured</p>	MS - GSC
4	<p>National preparatory measures before and during the EU planning process should be carried out</p>	MS
5	<p>Modalities should be elaborated for early multinationalisation of the OHQ. It is also recommended that liaison arrangements for EU Member States at an OHQ be addressed as a matter of priority.</p>	GSC - MS
6	<p>An envisaged Framework Nation should be prepared again to work in close informal co-ordination with the Secretariat even before EU Council decision has been taken.</p>	FN
7	<p>A framework Nation should welcome EU planning assistance teams at the OHQ to help convert national military planning into EU military planning. They should also ensure that decision on Civil-military Co-ordination taken in Brussels are duly taken into account</p>	FN
8	<p>The provision of guidance and support to the EU commanders at very short notice should be ensured. Arrangements to that effect will have to be improved.</p>	MS
9	<p>The possibilities should be investigated of inserting additional flexibility into procedures applicable to some EC instruments in specific crisis management situations, in particular those requiring rapid response, possibly mirroring flexibility existing under ECHO procedures.</p>	COM

OVERALL EU APPROACH TO THE CRISIS		
10	Following an assessment of the crisis, work to prepare modalities for the employment of the right scale and range of measures to help meet the political objective and the military mission should be ensured. NOT DECLASSIFIED	COM – GSC
11	Decision to employ the right scale and range of measures to help meet the political objective and the military mission should be considered by PSC. As stated above, this may include the threat to use economic and financial measures as appropriate.	COM - MS
12	The range and scope for a number of supportive actions (such as Quick Impact Projects) should be identified as early as possible and be implemented within the same timeframe as a military operation. To that effect the Commission should envisage an early inter-service fact finding mission on the spot with the Force HQ.	COM - GSC
13	The Commission should be prepared again to provide the relevant expertise on Community instruments to work with the Secretariat in assisting FN planning.	COM
14	The PSC should be kept informed, from the earliest possible stage, in a regular and timely manner, of all relevant developments during all phases of the operation so that it may perform to the full its role in ensuring the political control and strategic direction.	MS COM

	EU COHERENT ACTION	MS
15	<p>Increased EU commitment needs to be mirrored by an increased level of EU co-ordination. Clear co-ordination mechanisms are to be developed in due course. An EUSR should play the central role in this context, acting under the authority and the operational direction of the SG/HR and receiving strategic guidance and political input from the PSC. He would serve as a focal point for horizontal EU co-ordination on the ground and ensure unity of effort of all EU activities including cross-pillar co-ordination.</p> <p>[PSC will revisit the terms of reference of EUSRs to reinforce its Co-ordinating authority in the field, without prejudice to the Chain of Command. In this regard, PSC will consider :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - whether, where the scope of the competence of the EUSR differs significantly from the scope of the operation, co-ordination should be ensured permanently in theatre by either a representative of the EUSR with all necessary delegated authority or, as appropriate, by the appointment of a specific EUSR for the co-ordination of the operation; - whether a support team covering all aspects and instruments of the operation should be provided to the EUSR in order to ensure the necessary range of expertise in theatre as well as to provide the EUSR with a channel to access Brussels-based expertise] <p>Participation of the EUSR in the Lessons Learned process should continue to be ensured.</p>	MS
16	<p>In Operation Artemis, planning assistance teams were provided to the OHQ to support the military planning done by the Framework Nation HQ, as well as to the EU HQs during the conduct of the operation. Operation Commander has stated that this support was valuable as regards politico-military, geographic desk, press, legal and military expertise. This type of support should also be ensured for future operations. The Commission should have a point of contact in the OHQ from the advance planning stage of the operation onwards.</p>	GSC – FN - COM
17	<p>A Political Advisor to the Operation Commander provides EU politico-military and institutional expertise as well as a channel to allow the Operation Commander to access Brussels-based expertise. Operation Commander has stated that the presence of a POLAD assisted the OHQ in ensuring a close interface with Brussels , hence contributing to the effectiveness of the Co-ordination. [This type of support should also be available for future operations.]</p>	GSC
18	<p>During the operation, a link between the Force Commander and the EUSR or, where there is no EUSR, or the EUSR is not present on a permanent basis, with the HoMs and the Presidency in the region</p>	MS - GSC - COM

	should be ensured.	
19	Political and politico-military expertise should be available to the Force Commander as required.	MS - GSC
20	When necessary, the Commission could also decide to nominate someone as a point of contact to the FHQ.	COM
21	Draft Diplomatic Master Messages should be prepared. For Operation Artemis they were an important tool to communicate the intent of the EU to local actors and ensured that all EU and Member States representatives passed these messages coherently.	GSC - COM – MS
22	NOT DECLASSIFIED	NOT DECLASSIFIED

	OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND CONDUCT	
23	Early involvement of European Airlift Co-ordination Cell (EACC) in the central co-ordination for strategic lift should be considered	MS
24	Possibilities for a better sharing of national intelligence on the strategic and operational levels should be explored. The PSC should in particular consider further how best to improve the acquisition and the use of strategic and operational Intelligence and the roles of SITCEN, national intelligence services, Defence Intelligence (DIOs) and the EUMS and the provision of all required intelligence to the OHQ and the FHQ. A seminar could be organised to prepare PSC's discussions.	MS - GSC
25	Further consideration should be given to the need for and if decided, contributions to a strategic reserve.	MS
26	Nomination by Troop Contributing Nations of direct points of contact to the OHQ from the beginning of the operation should be ensured.	MS
27	Artemis showed the impact of shortfall in military capabilities, notably in strategic air transport, and thus highlights the urgent need to overcome existing shortfalls.	MS
28	Artemis has underlined the importance of defining clear guidelines for the protection of civilians during EU-led Crisis Management Operation. Ongoing work on that subject should be pursued as a matter of urgency.	MS

	EU/UN RELATIONS	
29	Attention should be given to the question of UNSCR cover in the redeployment phase of an operation.	MS - GSC
30	Close consultation with the UN Secretariat should be ensured throughout the decision making process and the conduct of the operation.	GSC
31	Where the UN is present on the ground, close local consultation with them should be ensured during the conduct of the operation.	FHQ - EUSR
32	Modalities for practical co-operation between the UN and EU should be further elaborated, building on the "Joint Declaration on EU/UN Co-operation in Crisis Management", and on lessons learned within the respective organisations from crisis management operations. Rapid Response Capability should be a particular priority.	GSC - MS
33	In accordance with Art. 19 TEU, the PSC should be kept informed on UNSC deliberations, so that it may perform to the full its role in ensuring the political control and strategic direction of the operation. It the decision in the EU is taken early enough, the UNSCR could mention the force as an EU led Force	MS which are members of UNSC

	RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES	
34	Regular exchanges of information with the US and other major partners should be ensured, in particular with a view to having convergent positions, both at the UN and towards local actors.	MS - GSC
35	The utilisation of Draft Public Master Messages should be improved. They were an important tool to ensure key messages were defined and communicated coherently to the press. More attention will be required to communicate these messages in capitals, in Brussels and in New York and in theatre.	MS – GSC
36	More proactive action to ensure the visibility of the EU operation should be ensured, in particular in New York, in Brussels, in capitals and in the region of crisis. To ensure adequate EU visibility on the ground, badges and markings, including flags should be available to the Force Commander right from the outset of the operation	MS- GSC
37	Information at different levels between the EU and NATO should be ensured on EU military operations, assuring appropriate transparency.	MS – GSC

	ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ISSUES	
38	All legislative acts relating to a crisis management operation must accommodate the proper conduct of that operation from launch to completion of the final administrative act. If required, appropriate RoEs should be developed for the redeployment phase.	MS - GSC
39	[Taking into account the serious burden supported by the Framework Nation and the specific requirement related to Rapid Response Relex Counsellors are invited to examine the financing questions raised in the two reports commissioned by PSC on 23 September, consider whether financing procedures meets these needs, and to report to the PSC.]	MS
40	Work should continue to implement the agreed communication and information systems network as soon as possible. Member States should review the extent to which they can assist by making available suitable cleared equipment in the framework of the Council's procurement procedures.	GSC - MS
41	Ways to improve the flow of classified information should be identified.	GSC
42	In order to be prepared to conclude legal agreements with third states in relation to future EU-led crisis management operations, in particular for rapid response operations, pre-agreed framework ¹ or model agreements need to be negotiated within the EU, as well as with certain third states in advance. A "Model SOFA", to be pre-agreed by Council as a mandate for negotiation in the case of future EU-led crisis management operations should be drafted. It should draw, inter alia, on the document agreed by the Council as a mandate for negotiation for the SOFA with DRC in the case of Operation Artemis.	GSC- MS
43	Ratification of EU SOFA should be pursued	MS
44	Certain difficulties arose during Operation Artemis regarding overflight clearances. An information paper from the Secretariat General, addressing the legal questions, could be prepared to inform discussion in PSC.	GCS

¹ RELEX Counsellor group has already completed the work on the draft framework agreement. (DGE VIII)