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**Georgia 2026 Report**

***Accompanying the document***

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS**

**2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy**

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# I. INTRODUCTION[1]

## 1.1. CONTEXT

In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 were taken. In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June, October and December 2024 that the authorities' course of action jeopardised Georgia's EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. In December 2024, the European Council regretted the Georgian government's decision to suspend the country's EU accession process until 2028. In the 2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, the Commission concluded that the actions taken by the Georgian authorities fall short of the expectations of an EU candidate country. Furthermore, it called on Georgia to urgently reverse the democratic backsliding and make comprehensive and tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms supported by cross-party cooperation and civic engagement, in line with EU values and the principles upon which the European Union is founded.

As Georgia's accession process remains halted, as in 2025, this report focuses on the fundamentals of the accession process that underpin its candidate status and the related recommendations. Given the continued backsliding observed in this year's report and the need to address the steps identified by the Commission in 2023 as a matter of priority, it does not set recommendations for the chapters beyond the fundamentals.

## 1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT

### CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS

### Democracy

The state of democracy continued to deteriorate during the reporting period due to a growing erosion of democratic institutions, increased concentration of power, an escalating crackdown on civil and political liberties, further shrinking of the civic space, as well as hostile anti-EU rhetoric and disinformation. Attempts to ban main opposition parties through a Constitutional Court case threaten the foundations of the country's democracy.

The authorities have not taken steps to reform the general **electoral** framework according to longstanding recommendations. Municipal elections were held in October 2025 in a highly polarised and repressive environment which severely undermined the competitiveness and transparency of the process. These included legislative amendments favouring the ruling party, a boycott by most opposition parties, the lack of impartial election administration, voter intimidation and the lack of OSCE/ODIHR and credible domestic observers. New severe restrictions on political activity and political participation of citizens were adopted during the reporting period, in contradiction of international standards on pluralism and democracy.

**Parliamentary** oversight remains limited and the executive's power further increased. Political polarisation deepened and democratic pluralism deteriorated further. Most

[1] This report covers the period from 1 September 2025 to 1 September 2026. It is based on input from a variety of sources, including contributions from the government of Georgia, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.

The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.



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opposition leaders are now either facing criminal charges, in exile or imprisoned. Women are increasingly under-represented in public office.

On **EU integration,** the authorities' declared aspiration to join the EU is contradicted by their systematic engagement in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, undermining of fundamental values and failure to address key EU-related reforms.

On **governance**, Georgia continued the trend of centralising and concentrating political power within the ruling party and executive institutions. State authorities exercised political, administrative and financial pressure on local decision-making.

**Civil society**, including human rights defenders (HRDs), operates in a repressive environment, which continues to deteriorate. The role of civil society as a democratic watchdog has been compromised and organisations and HRDs are facing increasing threats. The cumulative effect of a frequently changing repressive legal framework and intimidation practices threatens the survival of independent civil society and has resulted in a further shrinking of the civic space. An additional concern is the application of criminal law against civil society actors, including criminal investigations into 'sabotage', 'assisting foreign organisations in hostile activities', 'financing activities directed against the constitutional order, and 'damage to state interests'. These actions are coercive and ultimately inconsistent with democratic pluralism. They are incompatible with the EU integration process.

## Public administration reform

Georgia **is between having some and a moderate level of preparation** in the area of public administration reform (PAR). There was **no progress** during the reporting period. The civil service reform was not realigned with EU principles, and the legal framework does not provide for a merit-based civil service free from undue political interference. Participatory policy making has been considerably further weakened reducing opportunities for meaningful stakeholder engagement and for civil society participation.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ realign the public administration reform agenda with European public administration principles and standards, and ensure an open, participatory and evidence-based process for public policy development, monitoring and evaluation;

→ restore civil service legal protection by reintroducing sufficient guarantees and protection from undue political interference and other interference;

→ ensure the right to access public information and re-engage with the Open Government Partnership.

## Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

In the area of judiciary and fundamental rights, Georgia **is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation.** For the third consecutive year, there was **backsliding**.

### *Functioning of the judiciary*

Georgia remains at an **early stage of preparation** and there was **backsliding** during the reporting period. No reforms were undertaken to address the European Commission and Venice Commission recommendations regarding a thorough and comprehensive reform of the judiciary. In particular, Georgia has yet to carry out a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court (SC) in line with the recommendations. The independence, impartiality and integrity of the judicial system remain seriously undermined. The amendments to the judiciary's legal framework adopted in December 2025 further undermine the independence and integrity of the judicial system and exacerbate risks of



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judicial capture. The harsh and disproportionate sentences inflicted on protesters raise concerns that the judiciary is being instrumentalised to enforce a system of repression.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia needs to:

→ align the Law on common courts with Venice Commission recommendations on the powers of the HCJ concerning transfers of judges, as well as the evaluation and selection process for Supreme Court judges (including effective appeal, qualifications of Supreme Court judges and an anti-deadlock mechanism);

→ initiate a broader reform of the judiciary, in particular to reform the HCJ in line with Venice Commission recommendations, addressing restrictions on the reappointment of its members, notably by fixed non-renewable terms. Moreover, establish a system of extraordinary integrity checks, with the involvement of international experts with a decisive role in the process, for candidates and for people currently appointed to all leading positions in the judiciary, in particular the HCJ, the Supreme Court and Common Court presidents;

→ align the Law on the Prosecutor General's Office with European standards following the recommendations of the Venice Commission, OECD and the EU-funded Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) peer review on the functioning of the justice sector and the fight against organised crime carried out in May 2023.

### *Fight against corruption*

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of the fight against corruption. There was however, **no progress** in the reporting period. The legal framework does not provide for an independent advisory institution, and further alignment is needed on whistle-blower protection. An anti-corruption strategy and action plan have been missing since 2020, while targeted risk assessments to address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors remain to be developed and implemented. The Anti-Corruption Bureau was abolished and its preventive functions transferred to the State Audit Office (SAO) without addressing the recommendations issues by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and by the Venice Commission on effectiveness or institutional independence and risks rendering these functions ineffective.

There was a significant increase in the monitoring of asset declarations in 2025. The number of cases in the track record on the fight against corruption has increased. However, there are concerns about a selective approach, in a context where longstanding recommendations concerning guarantees for prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence remain unaddressed. No steps were taken to address de-oligarchisation, while entrenched oligarchic influence contributes to state capture and hinders democratic consolidation.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. Georgia should in particular:

→ align the legislation to the ODIHR/Venice Commission/GRECO recommendations and ensure that the relevant preventive and enforcement agencies operate independently and effectively, avoiding a selective approach; adopt an anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and ensure that it is comprehensively implemented with realistic timelines, adequate funding and appropriate monitoring mechanisms; the SAO should continue to consistently monitor, verify and publish officials' asset declarations in line with Venice Commission recommendations;

→ repeal the decision of February 2023 to withdraw from the OECD/Anti-Corruption Network Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan monitoring programme and fully implement recommendations from the 2022 pilot report, including on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions;



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→ implement a systemic approach on de-oligarchisation in line with the recommendations by the Venice Commission (opinions of March 2023 and June 2023).

***Fundamental rights***

Human rights have been severely curtailed and undermined by increasingly repressive laws that infringe upon fundamental rights, in particular freedoms of expression, assembly and association, as well as equality and non-discrimination. Legislative amendments adopted in October 2025 and March 2026 to the Law on political associations of citizens, the Law on grants, the Criminal Code and related legislation significantly expanded the restrictive legal framework governing civil society, political participation and foreign funding in Georgia. In successive opinions[2], the Venice Commission held that these amendments, combined with previously adopted restrictive measures, impose disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the fundamental rights and political freedoms of the Georgian citizens, concerning in particular freedom of association and expression, and is contrary to international standards. The Prosecutor General brought charges in May 2026 against five police officers for abuse of power involving the use of violence during the 2024 demonstrations. However, the large majority of reported cases of torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement have yet to be investigated. In August, a few individuals who had been arbitrarily detained in relation to the 2024-2025 protests were pardoned by the President, after admitting guilt. However, many more remain in custody. The excessive use of pre-trial detention and disproportionate sentencing deeply affect the right to a fair trial. The level of implementation of the Public Defender's recommendations to state authorities is still very low. Implementation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments is inadequate, including systemic and structural issues regarding the justice system, penitentiary and law enforcement systems, and protection from discrimination.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the current context, Georgia should take urgent action to:

→ release all arbitrarily detained people, including politicians, journalists and activists;

→ repeal legislation that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms in breach of European and international standards, in particular the Law on transparency of foreign influence, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, amendments to the Law on grants, to the Law on assemblies and demonstrations, to the Law on political associations and related amendments to the Administrative Offences Code and Criminal Code, as well as the legislative package on family values and protection of minors;

→ comprehensively investigate allegations of excessive use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by law enforcement and bring the perpetrators to justice.

***Freedom of expression and media freedom***

Georgia is at **an early stage of preparation** in the area of freedom of expression, which was marked by **backsliding** for a third consecutive year. The safety of journalists and the operating environment for media have continued to be adversely affected by persistent acts of harassment, intimidation and attacks against independent and critical media outlets and journalists, including sustained online attacks amplified by pro-government media outlets. The wide-ranging restrictions on foreign funding affecting media endanger media pluralism.

[2] Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 13 October 2026 on the amendments of 4 March 2026 to the Law on Grants, the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, the Criminal Code and related legislation; Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 13 October 2026 on the amendments of 16 October 2025 to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, Article 381 of the Criminal Code and related legislation; Georgia – Venice Commission Opinion of 15 October 2025 on the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents, the amendments to the Law on Grants and other Laws relating to "foreign influence".

Serious concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Communications Commission (ComCom), combined with the expansion of its mandate into content regulation, pose a significant risk to media editorial freedom. New amendments to the Criminal Code and the Administrative Offences Code, in conjunction with the expanded legal definition of political activity, further curtail freedom of expression of both natural and legal persons. A newly established Division for Combating Hate Speech within the Ministry of Internal Affairs raises freedom of expression concerns.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. Georgia should take urgent action to:

→ ensure the safety of journalists and provide prompt, impartial and due legal follow-up to all cases of attacks against and intimidation of journalists;

→ repeal legislation restricting freedom of the press and expression, including the 2025 revisions to the Law on broadcasting and other recent legislation related to 'foreign influence';

→ ensure an open, safe and pluralistic environment for media workers and media organisations, free from government censorship, retaliation, dismissals or legal punishment in all forms of expression, including online.

## Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the field of justice, freedom and security. There was **no progress** during the reporting period. The conduct of law enforcement authorities continued to show signs of undue political interference. The lack of comprehensive judicial follow-up to acts of excessive use of force by law enforcement authorities underscores serious shortcomings. Legal acts addressing irregular migration and international protection complemented efforts to strengthen migration management and border management procedures. The enhanced dialogue related to the temporary suspension of the visa exemption for Georgian holders of diplomatic, service and official passports did not lead to progress when it comes to the Commission's recommendations underpinning the suspension. Visa policy still diverges substantially from the EU *acquis*.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ ensure fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks and address the recommendations of the seventh and eight Visa Suspension Mechanism reports;

→ continue to strengthen institutional and operational capacities to fight serious and organised crime and improve international police cooperation;

→ address the issues of Georgian nationals illegally staying and filing unfounded asylum claims in the EU, which require continuous monitoring and action by the Georgian authorities.

### *Fight against serious and organised crime*

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in fighting serious and organised crime. **Limited progress** was made during the reporting period. The amended Law on weapons contributes to more effective crime prevention. The volume of seized and confiscated assets, especially assets from money laundering, increased substantially. Georgia set up a dedicated asset recovery office in June 2026. The country maintains a good level of cooperation with the EU Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:



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→ further increase international law enforcement cooperation in particular on high-risk organised criminal networks, drug and trafficking in human beings;

→ continue addressing the recommendations set out in MONEYVAL's Fourth Enhanced Follow-up Report and Technical Compliance Re-Rating;

→ adopt legislation on the separation of powers between criminal prosecution and investigation bodies and create a register of ultimate beneficial owners.

## ECONOMIC CRITERIA

### The existence of a functioning market economy

Georgia is **moderately prepared** and made **some progress** in establishing a functioning market economy. While economic growth remained very strong for several consecutive years, the economic outlook remains subject to some uncertainty, not least linked to the volatile global geopolitical context and the standstill in the EU accession process. The macroeconomic policy mix was broadly appropriate, with strong fiscal performance and sound monetary policy. Despite strong economic growth, job creation was limited and significant structural weaknesses remain. Wage expansion and the recent surge in inflation require close monitoring. The authorities made progress on some economic reforms, especially on public finances, but the reform of state-owned enterprises advanced slowly.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ continue the reform of public finances and public investment management, including by streamlining tax expenditures and further improving the governance and fiscal oversight of state-owned enterprises, and continue strengthening the legislation towards ensuring the independence of the central bank;

→ address the main weaknesses of the labour market, such as the low employment rate and significant regional differences, adopt and start implementing the new Labour Market Strategy, and step-up efforts to reduce the informal economy in a comprehensive manner;

→ further develop the non-banking segments of the financial sector, including the capital market and the insurance sector.

### The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Georgia has **some level of preparation** and has made **limited progress** in coping with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. It continued to upgrade its vocational education system. However, the recent reform of higher education could affect the quality of academic education and raises questions about the autonomy of universities. Spending on research and innovation remains very low. Investment in public infrastructure, especially in transport and broadband internet networks, continued to be high, although lower than in the previous year. The level of economic integration with the EU remains limited, with a low value of exports from Georgia to the EU.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ further improve the quality of education and training to ensure that their outcomes align with labour market needs, in particular through further vocational education and training reforms and by maintaining the institutional and financial autonomy of universities;



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→ continue efforts to develop the necessary transport, connectivity and energy infrastructure and to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix;

→ stimulate innovation and make efforts to increase exports of higher value-added goods and services.

### Chapter 5 – Public procurement

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of public procurement. **Limited progress** was made during the reporting period due to the establishment of the Central Purchasing Body and changes to the legislative framework regarding the procurement procedures available and strengthening participation for SMEs.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ further align its legislative framework with the EU public procurement *acquis*, including on utilities and concessions and public-private partnerships, as well as in the field of defence and security;

→ ensure alignment of its legislation on the right to legal remedy with the Remedies Directives;

→ further strengthen the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council, in particular by safeguarding its independence and extending its jurisdiction to cover public procurement processes that are implemented according to the rules of international financial institutions.

### Chapter 18 – Statistics

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of statistics and made **limited progress** during the reporting period. It strengthened coordination of the national statistical system and made progress in increasing the production and dissemination of data and in preparing new classifications. Georgia needs to further align with the principles of the European statistics Code of Practice.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ strengthen the work of the inter-agency working group and continue to improve cooperation with data providers from line ministries and agencies;

→ improve the human resources and technical capacity of the National Statistics Office (Geostat);

→ increase the production and dissemination of timely and high-quality data and prepare new versions of classifications based on the action plan.

### Chapter 32 – Financial control

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of financial control. **No progress** was made during the reporting period.

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:

→ implement financial management and control arrangements and strengthen managerial accountability;

→ consolidate the capacity of the central harmonisation unit within the Ministry of Finance in terms of human and financial resources;

→ increase the implementation rate of State Audit Office recommendations by the



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government.

## CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET

### Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of free movement of goods. There was **limited progress** during the reporting period by further aligning with the EU *acquis* on standardisation.

### Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers

Georgia is at an **early stage of preparation** in the area of freedom of movement for workers. **No progress** was made during the reporting period.

### Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. There was **no progress** during the reporting period.

### Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of free movement of capital. There was **limited progress** over the reporting period primarily by amending the Law on payment systems and payment services and the Law on facilitating the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

### Chapter 6 – Company law

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of company law. There was **no progress** during the reporting period, although work continued on alignment with the EU *acquis* in the areas of digital tools and company registration.

### Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of intellectual property law. **Limited progress** was made during the reporting period, notably by amending the Law on copyright and related rights and the Law on design.

### Chapter 8 – Competition policy

Georgia is **between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation** in the area of competition policy. There was **no progress** during the reporting period.

### Chapter 9 – Financial services

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of financial services. Georgia made **limited progress** during the reporting period particularly by amending the Law on the National Bank of Georgia designating it as the prudential supervisor for crypto-asset service providers.

### Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of consumer and health protection. There was **no progress** in the reporting period.

## CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

### Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of digital transformation and media. **No progress** was made during the reporting period. Amendments to the Law on broadcasting



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critically restrict media freedom. Georgia continued to implement the Law on e-commerce by adopting e-commerce guidelines.

### Chapter 16 – Taxation

Georgia is **between having some and a moderate level of preparation** in the area of taxation. There was **limited progress** during the reporting period, notably by amending the Tax Code and the implementing legislation on tax administration.

### Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy

Georgia **is moderately prepared** in the area of economic and monetary policy. **Limited progress** was made in the reporting period by reallocating responsibilities among members of the board of the central bank and by gradually improving fiscal oversight of state-owned enterprises.

### Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the field of social policy and employment. There was **no progress** in the reporting period.

### Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. There was **no progress** in the reporting period.

### Chapter 25 – Science and research

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of science and research. There was **limited progress** in the implementation of the EU science and research *acquis*. As regards innovation, limited progress was observed in enhancing innovation in line with the European Innovation Agenda, including boosting cooperation between research and industry. Universities and research centres continued to increase their participation in the Horizon Europe programme.

### Chapter 26 – Education and culture

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of education and culture. There was **no progress** during the reporting period. The Georgian higher education reform raises serious concerns regarding insufficient stakeholder participation, rapid and centralised implementation, and risks to fundamental values. This concerns in particular equal access to quality education and respect for institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

### Chapter 29 – Customs union

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of the customs union. **Limited progress** was made during the reporting period by amending the Customs Code.

## CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY

### Chapter 14 – Transport policy

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in transport policy. There was **some progress** during the reporting period by amending the Railway Code, achieving further alignment on the certification of air traffic controllers and the adoption of the new road safety strategy and action plan.

### Chapter 15 – Energy

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of energy. There was **no progress** during the reporting period.



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### Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of trans-European networks. There was **some progress** during the reporting period, with the finalisation of the railway modernisation project and further advancement of the East-West Highway.

### Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change

Georgia is at an **early stage of preparation** in the area of environment and climate change. There was **limited progress** in the reporting period, notably on transboundary water management, air quality, the adoption of regulations on single-use plastics, and on climate change with the set-up of the monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation (MRVA) framework.

## CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION

### Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development

Georgia is at an **early stage of preparation** in the area of agriculture and rural development. **Limited progress** was made in the reporting period with the launch of the state co-financing support programme, including a digitalised registry of farms and rural enterprises.

### Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. **Limited progress** was made in the reporting period, notably on alignment with the EU Regulation on Official Controls.

### Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture

Georgia has **some level of preparation** in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. There was **limited progress** during the reporting period, notably on the initial preparation of a fisheries development concept, on scientific capacity building for stock assessment and on monitoring fishing activities.

### Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments

Georgia continues to be **between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation** in the area of regional policy. **No progress** was made during the reporting period.

### Chapter 33 – Financial and budgetary provisions

Georgia is **at an early stage of preparation** in the area of own resources. There was **no progress** during the reporting period.

## CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### Chapter 30 – External relations

Georgia is **moderately prepared** in the area of external relations. **No progress** was made during the reporting period.

### Chapter 31 – Foreign, security and defence policy

Georgia is **between having some and a moderate level of preparation** in this area. There was **backsliding** during the reporting period. Georgia reduced its alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on EU restrictive measures during the reporting period and remains at a low level of alignment, with an



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alignment rate of 38%. Georgia has not fully aligned with the majority of EU restrictive measures against Russia, Belarus and Iran.

### 1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS

In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 were taken. The nine steps primarily relate to reforms in the area of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights.

During the reporting period, the Georgian authorities have failed to take action to address the nine steps set out in the Commission's recommendations and further backsliding occurred.

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## 2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS

### 2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM

#### 2.1.1 Democracy

The state of democracy further deteriorated due to actions by the authorities against democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms. This included new severe restrictions on political activity and political participation of citizens.

In September 2026, parliamentarians from the ruling party filed a new lawsuit to the Constitutional Court seeking to ban five opposition parties, including the four parties which crossed the electoral threshold in the 2024 elections, for alleged unconstitutional actions. The Court accepted the claim for a review on merits, and hearings took place in October 2026. One of the Court's members resigned after their own request for recusal from the case was denied. These developments further erode political pluralism in Georgia and give rise to serious concerns about the instrumentalisation of the judiciary.

**Elections**

Municipal elections were held in October 2025. The ruling party won the mayoral race in all 64 municipalities and secured overwhelming majorities in every local council. The pre-election period was marked by intense polarisation, intimidation and the jailing of several opposition leaders. Only two opposition parties participated in the elections; the other parties boycotted them. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/ODIHR was unable to deploy an observation mission as the authorities' invitation arrived less than a month before election day. Credible domestic observer organisations refrained from participating due to the repressive environment.


Several legislative measures further restricted political participation. Parliament fast-tracked amendments to the Law on political associations, criminal code and other related laws barring individuals linked to parties banned by the Constitutional Court from political membership, public office and electoral candidacy (in October 2025) and abolished out-of-country voting in parliamentary elections (December 2025). In March 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on grants, the Law on political associations of citizens, the Criminal Code and related legislation, introducing an eight-year ban on party membership for people having received income from organisations receiving foreign funding and broadly restricting businesses from engaging in political activity. In its opinions on the above-mentioned legal amendments adopted by the Georgian parliament in October 2025 and March 2026, the Venice Commission concluded that the legislation contradicts international standards on pluralism and democracy. It assessed that the measures impose



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disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the political freedom of the Georgian citizens, in particular preventing the formation and survival of a political opposition and that the measures risk undermining electoral processes and political pluralism. The State Audit Office assumed responsibility for monitoring party and campaign financing following the abolition of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Its powers were subsequently expanded to include substantive monitoring of individuals.

Georgia has yet to address the longstanding OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations on the impartiality of election administration, including on the appointment process for election commission members. Georgia needs to ensure alignment with all relevant EU *acquis* in this area, including Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, and taking into account European and international democratic standards.




Women representation in politics continued to decline. Notably as a result of the 2024 repeal of mandatory gender quotas, the share of women in municipal councils fell to 16.8%, down 7.7 percentage points compared with the 2021 local elections. The share increased in only five municipalities, remained unchanged in six and decreased in 53 out of 64. Only two of the 64 mayors are women.

**Parliament**

One of the four opposition parties that crossed the electoral threshold in October 2024 ended its year-long boycott in October 2025, taking up its 12 seats. The remaining three elected opposition parties had requested their mandates to be revoked, leaving 49 of 150 seats empty.

Parliament continued to make excessive use of expedited procedures to pass legislation, including on significant subjects such as amendments to the Administrative Offences Code, the Criminal Code, the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Law on assemblies and demonstrations. Civil society participation in the legislative process was non-existent, following the annulment of mandatory consultation requirements and persistent hostility towards CSOs from state officials and ruling party representatives. Parliamentary oversight of the executive and of security services remained limited.

Criminal charges were brought against 10 opposition leaders, including from parties that crossed the 2024 electoral threshold, with most charges grouped under the treason clause of the Criminal Code, which carries sentences of up to 15 years. The leader of the party that ended its boycott remained in exile and was sentenced to pre-trial detention in absentia, facing up to 13 years' imprisonment if convicted.

**EU integration**

The authorities' declared aspiration to join the EU continued to be fundamentally contradicted by their systematic engagement in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, manipulative narratives and conspiracy theories, the undermining of EU values and failure to address key

EU-related reforms.

The Prime Minister's announcement in November 2024 that the government would not pursue the opening of accession negotiations until 2028 contradicts the priorities set out in the Constitution and the government programme for 2025-2028. It also stands in stark contrast with Georgian citizens' broad support for EU membership.

EU integration formally remained under the coordination of the Directorate-General on European Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The EU Integration Committee within Parliament retained its oversight function. No high-level political meeting between the EU and Georgia took place in the reporting period.

**Governance**

The increasing concentration of political power within the ruling party and executive institutions continued. Parliamentary oversight of the executive and security services remains limited. Recent legislative and institutional changes have further centralised decision-making and regulatory functions in key areas within the government administration, including public administration, the judiciary and security. This has resulted in weakened institutional independence and fewer checks and balances. Conditions for participatory decision-making remain inadequate, as mechanisms for involving civil society and the public in policy and decision-making are still lacking.

State authorities continue to exercise political, administrative and financial pressure on local decision-making, with supervision and coordination mechanisms between the national and local levels remaining underdeveloped. The decentralisation strategy for 2020-2025 expired and a new strategy is not yet in place. During the reporting period, 885 units of properties were transferred from central government to municipalities, contributing to a further decentralisation of local assets and powers.

**Civil society**

Civil society, including human rights defenders (HRD), operates in a repressive environment that has continued to deteriorate. The cumulative effect of the recent legal amendments and intimidation tactics has weakened civil society's democratic function, threatening its independence, sustainability and the broader foundations of democracy in Georgia.

Restrictive legislation related to 'foreign influence' (including the Law on transparency of foreign influence, Foreign Agents Registration Act, amendments to the Law on grants, relevant amendments to the Criminal Code) subjugates the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) to undue state scrutiny and enables the suppression of dissent. The legal framework is inconsistent with international human rights standards. The October 2025 and October 2026 Venice Commission Opinion on laws relating to 'foreign influence' concluded that these laws impose extensive and overlapping obligations combined with harsh liability rules that disproportionately burden and subject to control democratic watchdogs and HRDs. The Venice Commission found that their cumulative effect is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately threatens democratic pluralism.

The financial stability of CSOs has been severely impacted by these cumulative legislative measures taking effect. In addition, the bank accounts of several leading NGOs have been frozen in a preventive measure linked to an ongoing criminal investigation. The March 2026 amendments to the Law on grants and parallel amendments to the Criminal Code tighten the operating framework and severely restrict civil society's access to foreign funding. The rules broaden the definition of a grant to cover virtually all forms of foreign support, mandate prior authorisation from the government and expand the application to foreign-registered legal entities with a focus on Georgia under a threat of criminal liability with up to 6-12 years' imprisonment for non-compliance.

Following the abolition of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in March 2026, Georgia transferred the mandate to monitor application of legislation governing civil society activities to the State



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Audit Office. This monitoring contributes to the intimidation of civil society organisations.

The key mechanisms for policy dialogue and civic participation in policymaking and lawmaking have not been restored.

### 2.1.2. Public administration reform

Strategic framework for public administration reform

Georgia has a **strategic framework** for public administration reform (PAR) in place but it remains significantly undermined by the legal amendments that reversed the PAR reform.

Policy development and coordination

A framework for **evidence-based policymaking** is also in place, including unified procedures for policy development, monitoring and evaluation. However, efforts are needed to ensure the systematic use of data, impact assessments and evaluation in policy making, as data management and analytical capacity remain limited.

Participatory policy making has been considerably weakened, reducing opportunities for meaningful stakeholder engagement and for civil society participation. The mandatory participation of civil society in public policy and decision-making processes should be restored, in line with the core principles of public administration. This requires that all key external and internal stakeholders and the general public are actively consulted during policy development and the decision-making processes. Georgia needs to restore the ability of independent civil society organisations to effectively conduct PAR monitoring and research.

Public financial management

Public financial management (PFM) is broadly in place but needs to be further improved. Implementation of the strategic **framework**, notably the 2023-2026 PFM strategy and annual action plans, continued to contribute to the stable management of public finances. Budgetary control policies are keeping the budget deficit (1.2% of the GDP) and public debt (34.4% of the GDP) within the limits set by fiscal rules. The medium-term revenue strategy is being implemented.

On **budget management**, alignment between budget programmes and sub-programmes with different key policies, including gender equality and climate change, was reflected in the 2026 state budget as a first tangible result of the process to make eBudget operational.

Deployment of the electronic **public investment management** system (ePIM) progressed, resulting in new reporting formats and access rights within the system. Georgia continues to initiate and assess new investment projects using the PIM methodology, before they are included in the corresponding budget.

Progress was made in public assets inventory and valuation.

**Budget transparency** is broadly ensured but improvements are needed in public engagement in budget processes and in publicising citizens' budget needs.

Public service and human resources management

The December 2024 legal amendments to the Law on public service have seriously affected public service and **human resources management** as they reversed key elements of earlier reforms, weakened the rights and legal safeguards of public servants (including access to legal remedies) and increased the risk of politicisation of the public administration. In 2025, mass dismissals of civil servants were carried out, or their contracts were terminated or not renewed. Civil servants submitted several hundreds of court cases against the employers for their dismissal from public sector positions. The Public Defender's Office received dozens of related complaints and issued specific recommendations concerning due process guarantees, labour rights, and protection against politically motivated dismissal.

On **gender balance**, women are still underrepresented in senior management positions in



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the civil service in Georgia.

Accountability of administration

The **accountability** of administration needs to be significantly improved. The expanding mandate of the State Audit Office will require additional safeguards to ensure operational independence, adequate resources and separation between audit, anti-corruption and personal data protection functions. Legal gaps in freedom of information and the lack of recognition of the Council of Europe Convention on access to official documentation remain problematic. Legal entities of public law are not bound by the current legislation on access to public information.

The right to **access public information** is not properly enforced. Georgia made no progress on legislative reforms or on setting up an independent supervisory body to uphold the right to access public information, in line with international standards.

The rate of implementation of the recommendations issued by oversight bodies, including the Public Defender's Office and the State Audit Office, remains low. In 2025, out of 306 recommendations issued by the Public Defender to central authorities, only 7% were fully implemented by authorities, 16% were partially implemented and 64% were not implemented. Only 46% of the recommendations by the State Audit Office were fully implemented and 28% were partially implemented. As regards **administrative justice,** the right to seek compensation is not enforced systematically and long judicial proceedings hinder the efficient processing of administrative disputes.

In April 2026, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) permanently suspended Georgia from the partnership. In the absence of corrective measures to address concerns related to civic space, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, it concluded that Georgia no longer fulfils the conditions necessary for participation in the OGP – including an enabling environment for government and civil society collaboration.

Service delivery to citizens and businesses

Georgia began to implement the digital governance strategy 2025-2030 and its 2025-2026 action plan, but **service delivery** for the public and for businesses needs further strategic development and investment. The country made sustained progress in areas such as digital service provision, digital identity, interoperability infrastructure, service quality management and expansion of public-facing service networks. It continued to expand the service delivery infrastructure by opening new public service halls in the capital and in regions and by expanding the coverage of the mobile service centre for public service halls.

## 2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

### 2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

*The EU's founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.*


**Functioning of the judiciary**

Strategic documents

Georgia has not yet adopted the strategic documents needed in view of a comprehensive reform of the judiciary.




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No reforms were undertaken to address the European Commission and Venice Commission recommendations. In particular, Georgia has yet to undertake a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court (SC) in line with the recommendations and conducted in a thorough and inclusive consultation process. It lacks a strategy on the functioning of the HCJ and the judiciary.

The judiciary's legal framework, further amended in 2025, undermines the independence and integrity of the judicial system and reverses earlier positive reform steps. The judiciary amendments of December 2025 further concentrated powers with the HCJ and continued to weaken judicial independence and transparency.




There was no progress to align the legislative framework for the Prosecutor General's Office with European standards, including the appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General and disciplinary proceedings of prosecutors. There has been no follow-up to address the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the OECD or the EU-funded Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) peer review on the functioning of the justice sector and the fight against organised crime carried out in May 2023.

Management bodies

The management bodies, the HCJ and the Prosecutorial Council are in place. However, they do not meet EU and Council of Europe standards on independence, impartiality and on the transparency of judiciary.

No reforms were undertaken to align these judicial institutions with European standards, including in relation to outstanding issues with the composition, functioning and powers of both management bodies outlined in the Venice Commission recommendations.

Georgia has not taken any steps to put in place a system of integrity checks, with the involvement of international experts with a decisive role in the process, for candidates and those currently appointed to all leading positions in the judiciary, in particular the HCJ, the Supreme Court and presidents of common courts.

In the reporting period, Parliament confirmed three new lifetime judges of the Supreme Court of Georgia.


Independence and impartiality

The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is inadequate in the higher-level courts and in the courts of first instance. No progress was made regarding a thorough and comprehensive reform of the judiciary, as recommended by the Venice Commission. In

particular, reforms are needed to ensure integrity in the HCJ and the SC, to improve independence and impartiality and to increase public trust in the judicial system. Georgia has not addressed the Venice Commission's recommendations for the evaluation of candidate judges and judges either.

No progress was noted in terms of strengthening safeguards to protect the independence and autonomy of prosecutors and the Prosecutor General's Office, in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations. The recommendation by the EU and the Venice Commission to adopt constitutional amendments that would require a qualified majority in the appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General has not been addressed.

The December 2025 legislative amendments to the Law on common courts contributed to a further concentration of powers within the High Council of Justice and to weaken the independence of the judiciary. The amended legislation abolished the obligation of HCJ members to publish evaluations of judicial candidates for the Supreme Court. Voting on judicial appointments will now be conducted by secret ballot in closed sessions, instead of open hearings. This significantly reduces the transparency of judicial appointments. The amendments further increased the number of judges holding administrative positions in the HCJ from six to seven.




The right of appeal of judges was reduced, which significantly undermines transparency and impartiality. Moreover, legal amendments to the transfer of judges further increase the discretionary powers of the HCJ and undermine judicial independence, in particular given the lack of safeguards. The right to a minimum 10% additional remuneration for a seconded judge was abolished. The removal of allowance benchmarks for the transfer of judges risks weakening judicial independence by concentrating powers within the High Council of Justice in the absence of effective institutional checks.

Accountability

The accountability of the judiciary is insufficient.

No steps were taken to address challenges in the effective implementation of the legislative framework and the rules on the accountability of judges and prosecutors.

The accountability of the judiciary was significantly weakened following the abolishment of the Independent Inspector's Service in September 2025. Disciplinary proceedings against judges, including the preliminary examination and assessment of cases, are initiated by the Secretary of the HCJ. Final decisions are also taken by the unreformed HCJ.

In 2025, the number of initiated disciplinary procedures against judges and prosecutors increased significantly while the number of sanctions pronounced remained unchanged.


There has been no improvement in the transparency of the HCJ. Decisions or minutes of meetings were not published during the reporting period. The transparency of the selection of Supreme Court judges by the HCJ is undermined by the December 2025 legislative amendments to the Law on common courts. These amendments abolished the obligation for Council members to publish their evaluations and the possibility for candidates to individually challenge interim decisions.



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Quality of justice

The quality of justice needs to be improved.





More efforts are still needed to further align the quality of justice with European standards and with best practices on effective and efficient administration of justice, including the use of European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) tools (Council of Europe).

There was no improvement on increasing the number of judges but the number of prosecutors increased by 10%. The recruitment of judges and prosecutors is constrained by the number of applicants. In 2025, there were 121 open positions and 45 judges and prosecutors were recruited out of 52 applicants. The quality of justice is still undermined by the high caseload, causing delays in cases and ineffective management of backlogs in the common courts system. The effective implementation of transparency standards declined. Open access to reasoned court decisions was not systematically provided. Access to court decisions via freedom of information requests and the transparency of HCJ sessions and decisions further deteriorated during the reporting period. However, the Supreme Court provided proactive access to anonymised texts of its decisions.

The Public Defender Office highlights concerns, including on convictions issued without neutral evidence, denial of participation of lawyers in investigative cases and delays in the consideration of cases.

The number of cases with a mediation settlement agreements and finalised court-related mediations decreased (from 154/597 in 2024 to 82/367 in 2025) while the number of accredited mediators increased (by 6.8% from 2024). The mediation system is implemented in line with the strategic development plan for 2020-2025. Further efforts are needed to provide mediation as the preferred method to resolve civil disputes in all regions.




The number of cases for which legal aid was granted per 100 000 inhabitants is still low (at 0.63 in 2025).


The judicial training system needs further improvements. The total budget for training covered by training institutions, court and prosecution budget decreased by 51.4% in 2025 from 2024. The total budget for training per inhabitant covered by training institutions, court and prosecution budget was EUR 0.15 in 2025. Training and exchanges of best practices should be further developed with new training modules and integrated into professional development. The capacity of the High School of Justice requires improvement. Further progress is needed on the scope, participation rate and budget for the judicial training system.

Efficiency



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The efficiency of justice improved slightly while further efforts are needed to address the existing challenges.





The number of incoming non-criminal cases increased by 1.4% for first instance courts and by 5.8% for second instance courts in comparison to 2024, exacerbating the high caseload.

The clearance rates for non-criminal cases in first instance courts remained high in 2025 (at 94%), and the clearance rate for criminal cases in first instance courts was 100%. The average length of proceedings, at all instances, for civil and commercial litigious cases was lower in 2025 than in 2024 (-4.9%). The disposition time remained high at 386 days for non-criminal cases in first instance courts and 161 days in second instance courts. It is comparatively lower for criminal cases at 59 days in first instance courts and 58 days in second instance courts. The backlogs are declining but remain high overall. The backlog of pending criminal cases decreased to 7 812 in 2025 (7 841 in 2024) at first instance and to 715 in 2025 (716 in 2024) at second instance courts. For non-criminal cases, the number of pending cases at first instance decreased to 97 612 in 2025 (97 899 in 2024) and increased to 4 336 (4 097in 2024) at second instance courts.

The number of decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court increased to 31 in 2025 (from 18 in 2024).


The high number of vacancies in judicial positions remains a challenge for the efficiency of the judicial system. The modernisation of court management needs to be addressed, including by implementing new IT justice tools and by fully rolling out the court case management system for automatic/randomised case allocation. The number of cases allocated by the system remains high (95-100%). More efforts are needed to digitalise the justice system. There is still a need to improve the interoperability of IT platforms across the criminal case chain.





The judicial system budget per inhabitant has steadily increased in recent years (5.1% higher in 2025 than in 2024), remained overall stable as a percentage of GDP (0.22% in 2025), but is still below the EU average. The overall budget of the Georgian judiciary increased. Georgia spent EUR 77 million on its judicial system in 2025, increasing the budget for courts (+5.1%), for legal aid (+2.4%) and for the Prosecution Services (+5.4%).

**Fight against corruption**

Track record




*New investigations correspond to the number of new investigation cases opened and not to the number of individuals investigated.

On the fight against corruption, the number of cases in the track record has increased. However, there are concerns about a selective approach, in a context where longstanding recommendations concerning guarantees for prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence remain unaddressed. The investigation, prosecution and final conviction of high-level corruption cases increased substantially in 2025. GRECO recommendations should be fully implemented.

Legal framework

The legal framework on the fight against corruption is in place but is not adequate regarding preventive measures and needs to be improved regarding law enforcement.

Amendments of November 2025 to the Law on the fight against corruption require public officials convicted of offences related to abuse of office or the unlawful receipt of financial benefit to submit annual property status declarations for 30 years.

No progress was made on a legal framework for an independent advisory institution on anti-corruption since the advisory Anti-Corruption Council was abolished in May 2024.

Further alignment is needed on whistle-blower protection.

Strategic documents

Georgia has yet to put in place strategic documents. It has not drawn up a national anti-corruption strategy or action plan since 2020, and no updated anti-corruption sectoral risk assessment was conducted in the reporting period. Following the amendments to the Law on the fight against corruption adopted in December 2025, the responsibility for the general anti-corruption policy framework, including the mandate to develop a national anti-corruption strategy and action plan, were transferred to the government.

Georgia should follow up on all recommendations issued in GRECO's fifth evaluation round, including on a targeted and comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, a code of conduct for top executive functions, the extension of the list of people subject to asset declarations and the investigation of corruption crimes. It should draw up strategic documents on risk assessment and the prevention of conflicts of interest, an anti-corruption strategy for the police and a targeted corruption risk approach for law enforcement agencies.

There has been no progress on implementing the de-oligarchisation action plan adopted in November 2023. The Venice Commission's recommendations also remain to be addressed.

Institutional framework

The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place but is not fully adequate in terms of preventive measures or in terms of law enforcement. The national legal and

institutional anti-corruption framework was substantially revised in December 2025 redistributing key functions between the government and the State Audit Office and abolishing the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in March 2026. Operational and oversight functions were transferred to the SAO including in the areas of asset declaration, whistleblowing, political party financing and integrity control. Procedures and reporting mechanisms related to whistle-blower protection are integrated into an online platform set up under the responsibility of the State Audit Office.

Although the State Audit Office is an independent institution accountable to Parliament, concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary and the limitations affecting the functioning of democratic checks and balances significantly constrain control and effective oversight. Georgia has yet to fully address the Venice Commission and GRECO recommendations related to effectiveness and institutional independence including political neutrality, the transparent verification of officials' assets and interest declarations, and investigative functions in high-level corruption cases.

The number of asset declarations checked by the now abolished ACB increased in 2025.

More efforts are needed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the relevant law enforcement investigation units. They still lack autonomous powers and safeguards to ensure their independence and to prevent risks of undue political influence.

The transparency and public access to the former ACB's asset declaration system were affected by periods of restricted access and delayed publication.

Georgia should rejoin the OECD anti-corruption monitoring network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It should also follow up on the recommendations of the Fourth Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan.

Georgia is furthermore expected to finalise the second cycle of the Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

**Fundamental rights**

General framework

The general framework on fundamental rights is insufficient and has undergone a marked structural deterioration, as a result of the cumulative effect of legislative, institutional and enforcement developments.

Multiple restrictive laws adopted during the previous reporting period remained in force, imposing extensive and overlapping obligations and stringent liability provisions on individuals engaged in democratic oversight and rights advocacy. According to the October 2025 Venice Commission Opinion on the laws related to 'foreign influence', their cumulative effect is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately inconsistent with democratic pluralism.

The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of new restrictive laws that contradict Georgia's international human rights obligations and infringe in particular upon civil and political rights (freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and the right to stand for election/seek public positions). In successive opinions, the Venice Commission held that this legislation imposes disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on the fundamental rights and political freedoms of the Georgian citizens, concerning in particular freedom of association and expression, and is contrary to international standards. It found that the cumulative effect of the adopted measures is coercive, stigmatising and ultimately threatens democratic pluralism.

Significant gaps persist in the national strategy for the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and its 2024-2026 action plan, particularly with regards to addressing discrimination, hate crimes, judicial independence, data protection, media freedom, protection of journalists and gender equality.

International human rights instruments

Cooperation with international human rights monitoring bodies and the follow-up to their recommendations need to be improved.

In January 2026, 23 participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) invoked the Moscow Mechanism to assess the human rights situation in Georgia. The OSCE Moscow Mechanism report[3], issued in March 2026, concludes that Georgia is experiencing marked democratic backsliding. The report identifies a pattern of violence and other abuses against protesters, political opponents and journalists, combined with almost complete impunity of perpetrators, restrictive legislative actions, pressure on civil society and threats to the existence of political pluralism. Taken together, these developments undermine human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law to which Georgia has committed as an OSCE participating state.

Georgian authorities did not cooperate with the Venice Commission on preparations of its opinions delivered during the reporting period. .

Georgia underwent its United Nation's Universal Periodic Review in 2026, during which it received 307 recommendations. Georgia supported 159 recommendations (51.8%) that addressed mainly women's and children's rights, the rights of persons with disabilities, economic and social rights, and institutional and treaty-related measures, including the ratification of United Nations treaties. Georgia noted the remaining 148 recommendations (48.2%), largely concerning civic space, media and fundamental freedoms, justice, accountability and the rule of law, equality, including the rights of LGBTI persons, and arbitrarily detained individuals.


Georgia has ratified most European and international human rights instruments. However, it has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

European Court of Human Rights

The level of cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and implementation of its judgments are inadequate.

In the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered 10 judgments concerning 16 applications, of which eight found at least one violation by Georgia of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR found Georgia in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights in cases relating mainly to the lack of effective investigations into allegations of ill-treatment or violations of the right to life, excessive use of force by the police in the course of arrest and/or while detaining suspects, lack of legislation governing procedures for legal gender recognition, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association.

Currently, 77 court cases remain pending. Georgia needs to address the systemic and structural issues raised by the Court, in particular regarding the justice system, penitentiary and law enforcement systems, and protection from discrimination. It must also ensure that ECtHR judgments are enforced





[3] Report on developments in Georgia in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms since Spring 2024 | OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

systematically.

Promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights

The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights is incomplete and needs to be improved.


The Public Defender's Office (PDO) (Ombudsperson's Office) is a key institution for upholding Georgia's human rights obligations. The PDO continues to carry out its mandate satisfactorily, despite the increasing restrictions on independent institutions. The PDO's impartiality and independence must be safeguarded, and it must have adequate resources to continue fulfilling its mission effectively. Currently, the PDO draws on a dedicated network of central and regional offices and specialised departments and staff. In 2025, the PDO issued 306 recommendations to state authorities, 13 special reports, 18 *amicus curiae* briefs, and two communications to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Out of 306 recommendations issued by the PDO, 196 remain unimplemented by the state authorities. According to the 2025 annual report, Georgia has fully implemented only 21 (6.86%) of the 306 recommendations addressed to state authorities.




Prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment

Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The follow-up to cases is insufficient. Georgia has yet to take steps to close the gaps in protection in the Administrative Offences Code, including with respect to the legal safeguards, the lack of clarity about standards of proof and the absence of a meaningful right to appeal against detention decisions.

Georgia does not fully implement ECtHR judgments concerning Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, key cases under the Tsintsabadze group are still supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, with persistent concerns regarding the effectiveness of investigations into allegations of ill-treatment, excessive use of force and deaths in custody.





Participants in peaceful assemblies, detainees and journalists who reportedly suffered torture and other ill-treatment by law enforcement officers in the 2024 and 2025 demonstrations, have yet to see proper judicial follow-up to their cases. Although the Prosecutor General brought charges in May 2026 against five

police officers for excessive use of force during the 2024 demonstrations, this response remains limited in scope and insufficient. Independent investigations into the alleged use of chemical substances in water cannons deployed against protesters in the 2024 demonstrations have not yet been carried out.

The follow-up to the recommendations issued by the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) remains inadequate. In 2025, the NPM conducted 132 preventive visits across 104 facilities. Patients in psychiatric institutions are still not fully protected from violence and inhumane or degrading treatment. The NPM received reports of both physical and psychological violence at the hands of members of staff.

Execution of criminal sanctions


The system for applying criminal sanctions (including probation) is inadequate and requires significant reform.




According to Council of Europe SPACE I 2025 data, Georgia continues to record one of the highest incarceration rates in Europe, at approximately 232 per 100 000 inhabitants, the fourth highest in Europe. Prison occupancy is at around 90%, indicating that overcrowding is not systemic, although localised overcrowding persists. The prison population consisted of 8 592 men and 377 women held in dedicated facilities separate from adult men, and one child held in prison with his mother.

According to the 2026 report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, detention conditions in Georgia were generally adequate and have improved in recent years. Prison healthcare services were satisfactory, despite persistent challenges regarding mental healthcare provision, rehabilitation programmes and the treatment of vulnerable detainees. Prison regimes remain underdeveloped, with a notable lack of out-of-cell activities, the use of solitary confinement, and excessive camera surveillance.


The generally satisfactory detention conditions also contrasted with the disproportionate application of prison sentencing and credible allegations of excessive force and ill-treatment of people detained in connection with the 2024 and 2025 protests. The 2025 Public Defender report also identifies alarming pre-detention practices: around half of interviewed detainees, including women and minors, alleged that they were ordered to completely undress and perform squats after being transferred to temporary detention facilities. The use of de-escalation and safety rooms remains a concern, particularly when applied for more than 72 hours or in a punitive manner. The PDO stressed that, in the absence of adequate safeguards, effective oversight and insufficient staff, such practices may breach international human rights standards.




Protection of personal data

The legal framework for the protection of personal data is still insufficient, and data protection capacities still need to be improved.

No progress was made on aligning the Law on personal data protection with the EU's General Data Protection Regulation and the Law Enforcement Directive. Georgia has not signed the Council of Europe Convention 108+. It has yet to address the key recommendations made by the Venice Commission.




In March 2026, the Personal Data Protection Service was abolished and its functions transferred to the State Audit Office. Although the latter is an independent institution accountable to Parliament, concerns have been raised regarding the effective independence of the supervisory authority, including its ability to exercise independent oversight over sensitive data-processing activities, in line with European standards.

Recent legislative developments raise concerns about a potential rollback in equality protection, with particular implications for data protection and the privacy of groups in vulnerable situations. Following the June 2025 Anti-Corruption Bureau request to civil society organisations to disclose information on their beneficiaries, including sensitive personal data, in July 2025 the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of the Child issued interim measures in a case involving a minor beneficiary of assistance. They called on the state to refrain from requesting, disclosing or transferring the child's personal data to any third party, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau. In a similar vein, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted temporary measures to protect the personal data of another beneficiary of assistance.

These developments highlight broader concerns regarding safeguards for the processing of sensitive personal data by public authorities and the availability of effective and independent oversight mechanisms.

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Georgia provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief. However, Georgia's Law on transparency of foreign influence and the Foreign Agents Registration Act undermine religious freedom by exempting the Georgian Orthodox Church while targeting minority faiths. Groups receiving over 20% of foreign funding must register as 'foreign agents' without clear criteria, risking criminalisation of activities. The law allows state oversight of finances and personal religious data, violating constitutional and international protections. Minority religious charities and social programmes are especially at risk of stigmatisation on registration.

Georgia has not yet implemented the 2023 ECtHR judgment (Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v Georgia), which found that Georgia violated the European Convention on Human Rights regarding freedom of religion. During the reporting period, the mayor of Khashuri issued an order prohibiting the construction of a religious building intended for use by Jehovah's Witnesses. According to the PDO, this decision reflects a disregard for the principles of freedom of religion and equality. The case has been appealed and is currently pending before the Khashuri District Court.

During 2025, the PDO conducted proceedings in seven cases concerning alleged

discrimination on religious grounds.

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**Freedom of expression and media freedom**

Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees on the freedom of expression and the enabling environment for media freedom. The independent and professional operation of media professionals is constrained. There was a marked deterioration during the reporting period. Russian-style disinformation, primarily targeting the EU, via television and various media outlets is widespread.

Intimidation of journalists

The safety of journalists is a persistent and serious concern. Throughout the reporting period, the safety of journalists deteriorated further. Harassment, intimidation and violence against independent and critical media outlets and journalists, including the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), also increased further. In the context of public demonstrations, journalists and media outlets, notably those critical to the authorities, were subjected to verbal assaults, threats, physical violence, unlawful detention, interrogations, filming bans, denial of access to administrative buildings, disproportional fines and other forms of mistreatment. Several documented cases reveal a sustained pattern of coordinated online attacks against journalists and the media by state officials and/or amplified by government-leaning media. Over the reporting period, Georgia continued to deny entry to some foreign journalists.

Despite the launch of a limited number of investigations, reported cases of violence against journalists by police and state security forces cases have remained unpunished. According to the Prosecutor General's Office, in 2025, investigations were launched into 10 offences committed against media representatives. The offences included unlawful interference with their professional activities, violence and violent abuse of official authority by law enforcement officials. One police officer was charged in May 2026 for abuse of power with the use of violence against a journalist.

Legislative environment

The October 2025 Venice Commission Opinion on the laws related to 'foreign influence' raised substantial concerns regarding the blanket prohibition on foreign funding for broadcasters. It called on the authorities to repeal these provisions, noting in particular the absence of a clear distinction between funding that may threaten democratic processes and funding that supports legitimate journalistic activities and civic engagement. The Venice Commission considers that the measures undermine media pluralism and do not comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Further legislative changes introduced in March 2026 have imposed ever more stringent and wider restrictions on foreign funding, adversely affecting the operating environment for independent journalism and posing additional risk to an already shrinking media space. Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia of March 2026 introduced a new offence establishing criminal liability with up to three years' imprisonment for *'systematic acts'* directed at non-recognition of the government's legitimacy. Such amendments seriously restrict freedom of expression, insofar as they could be invoked to arbitrarily criminalise opinions voiced by individuals critical of the authorities.

No steps were taken during the reporting period to align Georgian legislation with the EU Anti-SLAPP legal framework. The use of SLAPPs has continued.

Implementation of legislation/institutions

The Law on transparency of foreign influence, the Law on broadcasting and repeated amendments to the Law on grants continue to have a chilling effect on the media space, stigmatising, restricting and criminalising journalistic work.

Following the amendments to the Law on common courts adopted in June 2025, the coverage of court proceedings has been effectively restricted and reporting both inside the court building and its courtyard has been prohibited. This significantly undermines public scrutiny and has had a negative effect on the transparency of the judiciary during the reporting period.

In June 2026, amendments to the Parliament's accreditation rules introduced the possibility of suspending individual journalists' accreditation for up to one year in cases of repeated breaches of accreditation rules. Depending on the severity and frequency of the violations, sanctions may be extended to an entire media outlet for up to a year. To date, the accreditations of four journalists critical of the government have been suspended for durations up to one year. In May, two independent media outlets were also suspended for the rest of 2026.

Concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Georgian media regulator, the Communications Commission (ComCom), increased following the election of its new chair in July 2025, who has held party-affiliated positions over an extended period. Such concerns were amplified by the expansion of ComCom's powers under the 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, which authorised the regulator to oversee broadcast content. In the reporting period, ComCom started enforcing its new content regulation prerogatives, notably by imposing fines on three media in May, June and August 2026 over language used in their reporting, allegedly in breach of principles of impartiality and balance. These steps confirm concern over respect for editorial independence and risks of selective application of the law.

In June 2026, a newly established Division for Combating Hate Speech began operating within the Human Rights Protection Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, raising freedom of expression concerns. The department is tasked with monitoring and detecting publicly disseminated statements considered to violate human dignity and constitute hate speech, in breach of the Administrative Offences Code. The division identifies alleged offenders, collects evidence and prepares administrative case file for submission to the courts. The legal grounds for the division's operation are defined broadly, with the risk of arbitrary interpretation and application. Dozens of cases have already been referred to the courts, with a number of fines imposed. In one case, in July 2026, a journalist was placed in a 14-day administrative detention over statements made in social media, after being fined for similar comments the month before.

In July, a broadcaster was fined for allegedly causing 'moral harm' to a person featured in an investigative media report. The Prosecutor General's Office also opened a judicial investigation under the Criminal Code provision of 'false denunciation', concerning allegedly false information presented in the same report. Media freedom organisations have raised concerns about the use of criminal law against media and called on authorities to respect the confidentiality of journalistic sources.

Public service broadcaster

The Georgian Public Broadcaster, whose Board of Trustees is chaired by a former high-ranking politician from the ruling party, continues to lack institutional independence and to display a biased editorial policy. In July, the Public Broadcaster's Director-General, who held this post since 2020, was re-elected to a second six-year term following the two-staged selection process in which she was the sole candidate. From March 2026, all programmes except news digests were suspended on the Public Broadcaster's Ajara TV citing the safety of the premises as a reason and 14 employees were dismissed. This leaves the autonomous region with no local news points.

Economic factors

Concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of major media networks persisted, as political affiliations continued to influence media ownership, despite the legal prohibition on political party ownership of media. Audit reports noted that it was not possible to obtain

needed information and funding sources were untraceable, including the identity of the lenders.

The advertising market in Georgia is underdeveloped. Many media outlets, in particular independent online outlets, remain highly dependent on donor funding, which is targeted by repressive legislation. The shrinking media market, restrictive government policies and increasing risks associated with receiving donor support make it increasingly difficult to secure sustainable funding. Small-scale broadcasters reported unfair treatment in relation to requests for debt restructuring, leading to a freeze of their banking accounts.

Internet

Due to excessive media regulation and restrictions on foreign funding in the media, the number of internet-based media sources and innovative internet media platforms has increased, alongside the volumes of content produced and distributed by them.

Professional organisations and working conditions

Employment conditions of media professionals deteriorated during the reporting period. This decline was largely due to intensified pressure on the media sector, financial difficulties of media outlets resulting in staff reductions and increased pressure on remaining staff, as well as rising verbal, online and physical attacks on journalists. Downsizing and delays in salary payments are frequent. Staff turnover is high across newsrooms, especially among regional media.

Georgian journalists and media outlets are represented by several membership-based professional associations and organisations. There is no dialogue between the government and media professional bodies.

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**Freedom of assembly and association**

Georgia provides insufficient legal guarantees to freedom of assembly and association, and the regulation of assemblies remains restrictive.

Developments during the reporting period indicate a consolidating pattern of restrictive policing of assemblies, both in law and in practice. Legislative amendments to the Administrative Offences Code and the Criminal Code in October 2025 have expanded police powers and penalties for assembly-related offences. These changes have brought in administrative detention for certain acts, including covering one's face during protests, and establishing criminal liability for repeated violations. These legislative changes raise concerns regarding compliance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality and effectively risk criminalising the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly, as highlighted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).

Following amendments to the Law on assemblies and demonstrations in December 2025, public protests, including protests held on pedestrian areas, became punishable by administrative detention, with repeat actions subject to criminal prosecution. Several protesters were fined, administratively detained or otherwise penalised for demonstrating on pavements, reportedly on the grounds of 'obstructing pedestrian movement'. The PDO called for the repeal of provisions that unjustifiably restrict freedom of assembly. This was followed by a negative assessment of the ODIHR on the amendments.

In August, a few individuals who were arbitrarily detained in relation to the 2024-2025 protests were pardoned by the President, after admitting guilt. However, many more remain in custody.

Freedom of association remained severely curtailed by the cumulative effects of multiple restrictive laws and amendments (adopted prior and during the reporting period), as noted in the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report of March 2026 and the Venice Commission opinions

of October 2025 and October 2026. The introduction of criminal liability, including imprisonment, and the link with money laundering laws further exacerbates these concerns by increasing the risk of criminalisation of civil society actors and human rights defenders. These legislative developments have increased administrative pressure, financial uncertainty and have had a chilling effect on advocacy activities. In addition to imposing restrictions on access to foreign funding, the latest amendments to the Law on grants prohibit anyone employed by an organisation largely funded from abroad from holding membership of a political party for eight years. The Venice Commission and UN human rights mechanisms have consistently emphasised that restrictions on NGO funding must be narrowly defined, necessary and proportionate.

Labour and trade union rights are covered in *Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment*.

Property rights

The legal and institutional framework for enforcing property rights is broadly in place. The process for initial land registration through the cadastral system has not been completed. During the reporting period, persistent challenges were identified, including the non-fulfilment of domestic state debt obligations, and excessively long enforcement proceedings in cases concerning the recovery of unlawfully held real estate.

Non-discrimination


The legal and institutional framework on non-discrimination is incomplete and capacities of equality bodies are insufficient. Better enforcement of the Law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination is needed, as are more tangible actions to improve the conditions of persons in vulnerable situations.

Anti-racism and hate offences

The legal and institutional framework on anti-racism and hate offences is incomplete, and implementation and enforcement are insufficient. Legislation on anti-racism, hate crime and hate speech is not aligned with the EU *acquis.* Specifically, this includes the Racial Equality Directive, the Directives on standards for equality bodies, and the Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia.


In May 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established the Hate Speech Enforcement Unit to investigate hate speech and other hate-motivated offences. Although the unit has reportedly already initiated its first investigations, concerns persist regarding its potential impact on freedom of expression. Hate offences, including by politicians, are widespread and remain largely unaddressed. Cases of hate crime are not investigated and not prosecuted effectively.

Gender equality




The legal and institutional framework on gender equality and combating gender-based violence is incomplete and implementation and enforcement is insufficient. Anti-rights narratives, particularly targeting gender equality, have continued to be pursued.

Georgia has previously adopted legislation that has led to regression in this area, for example by replacing the term 'gender equality' with 'equality between women and men' in key legislation and replacing specialised gender equality institutions with narrower 'women's and children's issues' frameworks. No steps have been taken to improve alignment with EU gender equality *acquis* and international standards. National action plan on combating violence against women and domestic violence expired in 2024, and Georgia has yet to draw up a new action plan. Progress in aligning with the Istanbul Convention and implementing the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) recommendations has stalled. Following GREVIO's first thematic evaluation visit in February 2026, and the adoption of the preliminary first thematic evaluation report in July, the final report is currently under preparation. In 2025, the General Prosecutor's Office identified 5 cases of femicide and 3 cases of attempted femicide.




The procedure for determining and awarding compensation to victims of violence against women and domestic violence remains problematic. The utilisation rate of electronic surveillance in cases of violence against women and domestic violence remains low (37 cases), as does the number of victims awarded compensation (six people received compensation for five cases of violence). These challenges persist in a broader context of gender stereotypes and social norms that contribute to the tolerance and underreporting of gender-based violence and domestic violence. Women in vulnerable or marginalised situations face heightened risks. While prevention and awareness-raising measures exist, further efforts are needed to challenge harmful stereotypes and improve access to protection and justice.

No progress was made in promoting the European Charter for Equality of Women and Men in Local Life, with legislative changes removing references to gender and gender equality. This further hinders adoption of the Charter at local level.

Rights of the child

The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is incomplete and implementation and enforcement are insufficient.

Although the Permanent Council on the Protection of the Rights of the Child was set up already in 2019, its work has not yet started. Implementation of the Code of the rights of the child remains a challenge. There was no progress on an integrated child protection system, including for children deprived of parental care, while progress on deinstitutionalisation remained limited. In particular, stronger coordination is needed between social services, education, healthcare, law enforcement and the judiciary, with clear procedures for early identification, referral and follow-up of children at risk. Comprehensive data on violence against children is lacking, making it difficult to assess the scale of the problem. According to State Care Agency data, there were 1 560 cases of violence against children in 2025 compared to 2 055 in 2024. Georgia should ensure comprehensive, disaggregated and interoperable date covering all forms of violence against children. The PDO's 2025 Annual Report called for stronger preventive mechanisms, enhanced inter-agency coordination and greater capacity to ensure the effective protection of children's rights.

The situation deteriorated in the area of child-friendly justice, notably as a result of the adoption in December 2025 of the Law on rehabilitation and support of minors in conflict with the law. The law contradicts European and international standards on the use of deprivation of liberty only as a measure of last resort, for the shortest appropriate period, and within a system primarily oriented to the child's best interests, reintegration and non-custodial



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responses. The Public Defender publicly expressed concern following the law's adoption.

There are still challenges to overcome to eliminate child marriage. Due to insufficient legislative regulation, cases of child marriage initiated by parents often go unrecorded in statistics with no proper response.

Persons with disabilities

The legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete and implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Georgia has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and its Optional Protocol, but no progress has been made to implement the Convention and Georgia has not designated an agency to coordinate that process.

Persons with disabilities continue to face systemic barriers to the enjoyment of their rights. Limited progress was made in 2025 on disability inclusion reform, with no meaningful systemic changes made to the disability status determination framework. The 2023-2025 action plan for implementing the biopsychosocial (BPS) model expired with most measures left unimplemented. This leaves the predominantly medical model of disability assessment largely in place, in contravention of the UNCRPD. The 2025 Public Defender report noted that the state was unable to ensure access to rehabilitation services for adults with disabilities.

Public services for persons with disabilities remain limited, with insufficient geographic coverage and persistent waiting lists, including for children on the autism spectrum. Access remains inadequate, both in the built environment and in access to information. Although Georgia increased the budget for the state programme for social rehabilitation and childcare in 2025, waiting lists have persisted due to uneven regional coverage and shortages of qualified personnel. The PDO 2025 annual parliamentary report highlights shortcomings in the protection of the rights of children with disabilities.

Progress on deinstitutionalisation remained limited during the reporting period. According to the PDO, significant delays persist in the transition from large residential institutions to community-based services, particularly for persons with disabilities and for persons living in mental health facilities.

LGBTIQ+ persons

The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons is insufficient, and LGBTIQ+ persons face serious discrimination, intolerance and systemic violence. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Council of Europe monitoring bodies raised concerns that recent legislation may undermine the equal enjoyment of rights on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity and contribute to discrimination and the stigmatisation of LGBTI+ persons. Civil society organisations report increasing levels of hate speech, social exclusion and reduced institutional protection, indicating an alarming deterioration in the equality framework.

The legislative framework, amended in 2024 by the legislative package on family values, has led to significant limitations in the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons. It prohibits legal recognition and protection of same-sex couples, adoption and foster care by non-heterosexual persons, gender-affirming healthcare, and restricts public gatherings and the dissemination of information concerning LGBTIQ+ persons in educational settings and in the media. The Venice Commission found the legislation to be incompatible with European and international standards. Moreover, these restrictions raise serious concerns as regards relevant ECtHR and CJEU case-law. Georgia has systematically failed to implement ECtHR rulings, including in the *A.D and others v. Georgia* case.

The national strategy for the protection of human rights and its action plan for 2024-2026 does not cover the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons



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Hate crimes, homophobic and transphobic rhetoric - including messages incited and amplified by high-level officials – increased. At the same time, barriers limiting LGBTIQ+ persons' access to health services, education, and employment were reported. As a result of the increased discriminatory legal framework and the anti-LGBTIQ+ rhetoric, no events in the public space were held to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, Interphobia, and Transphobia in 2026.

Instigators and organisers of violence targeting LGBTIQ+ persons, including at Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023, continue to face impunity.

Procedural rights of suspects and accused persons and rights of victims of crime

The legal framework on procedural rights is incomplete, and its protection of victims' rights is insufficient. Significant challenges persist with regard to the effective implementation of procedural safeguards for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings, and effective access to justice and the protection of victims throughout judicial proceedings. During the reporting period, the Public Defender's Office (PDO) identified several shortcomings that undermine the fairness of criminal proceedings. They include convictions based on evidence lacking neutrality, the excessive use of pre-trial detention, limitations on the defence's ability to obtain and present evidence, the exclusion of legal counsel from investigative actions, excessive delays in court proceedings and breaches of the presumption of innocence. The PDO also expressed concerns regarding unlawful detention practices, insufficient procedural safeguards during detention and delayed access to legal assistance. Significant reforms of law and practice are therefore still necessary to ensure alignment with the *EU acquis*.

The excessive use of pre-trial detention continues to significantly undermine the right to a fair trial, raising concerns about the integrity of judicial proceedings. These violations have been particularly pronounced in cases involving individuals detained during the 2024 and 2025 demonstrations, which have been disproportionately subjected to pre-trial detention immediately after arrest without adequate justification or an individualised assessment of necessity. Reliable data on the average duration of pre-trial detention are not systematically collected, undermining transparency and accountability. Georgia is encouraged to align with EU *acquis* and European standards on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-trial detention and on material conditions.

The situation of vulnerable groups remains especially problematic. Concerns persist regarding persons with disabilities, who continue to encounter substantial barriers in accessing justice, as well as in understanding and effectively exercising their procedural rights.

Protection of minorities

The legal and institutional framework for the protection of persons belonging to minorities is incomplete and persons belonging to minorities face discrimination. Access for ethnic minorities to quality education, public services, civic engagement and employment within the civil service has remained constrained. Persistent structural barriers – including language and information deficits and the absence of consultative bodies at both national and local levels – continue to limit the social and political representation of minorities. Georgia has not addressed the significant gaps in the strategic framework, including the national strategy for the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and the state strategy for civic equality and integration 2021-2030. The amended Law on broadcasting and the Law on grants risk further restricting access for minority-language media to funding and sustainability.



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Roma[4]

There is no specific legislative framework to ensure the rights of Roma people. Roma communities continue to face discrimination, including in respect to access to housing, education and other government services.

Citizenship rights

In 2025, 2 333 persons, mostly from Russia (1 393), Germany (296) and Ukraine (114) were granted Georgian citizenship. Georgia does not currently offer a formal, guaranteed citizenship-by-investment or 'golden passport' programme, however, the country allows foreigners to acquire temporary or permanent residence permits via investment.

### 2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security

*The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies.*

**Fight against serious and organised crime**

The legal framework on serious and organised crime is partially aligned with the EU *acquis.* The capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.

General framework

*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks*

The strategic framework for the fight against organised crime is broadly in place. The national strategy for combating organised crime 2025-2028 is implemented. A comprehensive threat analysis aligned with EU SOCTA remains outstanding. Gaps remain in the legal framework to fight against organised crime. A dedicated asset recovery office was established in June 2026. The management of confiscated assets falls within the competence of the National Agency of State Property.

Georgia should further strengthen the use of extended confiscation and confiscation of equivalent value as the norm in all cases involving income-generating serious crimes as well as on the financing of terrorism.

Amendments to a legislative package, including the Criminal Procedure Code, were adopted in September and October 2025. The amendments ban individuals convicted of financial and economic crimes from leaving the country and order them to repay damages to victims. The Public Defender noted that a court is not able to assess the proportionality and necessity of the ban on leaving the country and pointed to the necessity to harmonise the regulations with international standards.

The separation of functions between criminal prosecution and investigation bodies has still not been addressed. No progress was made on increasing the possibilities for law enforcement agencies to conduct independent investigations without the prior authorisation of the Prosecutor General's Office for the initial investigative steps.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*


The number of investigations and prosecutions into serious and organised crime cases and the number of convictions for serious crime cases increased. Convictions remained overall stable for organised crime cases. Investigations and prosecutions of 'thief-in law' crimes increased.

[4] In line with the terminology used by European institutions, the umbrella term 'Roma' is used here to refer to a number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.

Georgia needs to step up efforts to combat the smuggling of goods and illicit substances.


Prosecutors and investigators need to collaborate better at operational level.

Georgia should fully implement a comprehensive and intelligence-led approach to combating serious and organised crime by forming a better intelligence picture on high-risk criminal networks and by supporting community-oriented policing in line with the European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA) of March 2025. The current strategy formally aligns with EU SOCTA priorities and methodology, but Georgia needs to implement it.




The Ministry of Internal Affairs' inter-agency working group on the development of community-oriented policing (COP) continued monitoring implementation of the COP 2024-2027 strategy. COP efforts are undermined by the lack of accountability of law enforcement officers for their repressive action and the brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in late November 2024 and early 2025.

Georgia continued work to set up a unified DNA database. Further progress has been made in the Forensic-Criminalistics Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the establishment of a chemical triage laboratory, the provision of a mobile chemical laboratory and two mobile forensic laboratories.




* Serious crime cases stems from the aggregated data of cases of money laundering, cybercrime, production and trafficking of drugs, firearms related offenses, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of persons. Corruption cases are showcased in Chapter 23.
** New investigations correspond to the number of new cases opened and not to the number of individuals investigated.
** Individuals being investigated, prosecuted or convicted for several offences are counted multiple times, for each offence.

Law enforcement agencies (police investigators and prosecutors) continue to apply the 'double rail' method of conducting criminal and financial investigations in parallel.

The volume of seized and confiscated assets from money laundering and organised crime increased substantially in 2025. The Prosecutor General's Office strengthened the extended confiscation mechanism for serious crimes.

Human resources management and professional development in law enforcement agencies need to be strengthened in line with transparent, professional and merit-based criteria. This includes the implementation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MIA) 2026-2030 institutional development strategy on combatting corruption.

The percentage of female police officers in the police force slightly increased to 15.5% (from 14.7% in 2024). Further efforts are needed to improve the gender balance in law enforcement agencies.



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*Law enforcement cooperation*

The level of cooperation with EU Member States' law enforcement bodies remains good. Georgia should continue to increase participation in international police cooperation on drug trafficking and high-risk organised criminal networks and share more proactively intelligence on high-risk criminal networks. Cooperation on organised property crime and intellectual property crime remains good.

The information exchanged by the Georgian competent authorities with Europol and EU Member States has shown a slight decrease compared to 2024. Georgia joined one Europol analytical project (migrant smuggling) reaching a total of nine. Georgia needs to fully implement the Europol-aligned threat assessments to identify emerging criminal trends.

The MIA continued cooperation with Interpol. Georgia was actively involved in seven working groups. Cooperation with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) is suspended.


The MIA deployed 22 police officers to partner countries (including 14 EU Member States) covering 39 countries (including 27 EU/Schengen countries).

Georgia participated in the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). In the EMPACT cycle 2026-2027, the MIA participates in 11 operational action plans, including 142 operational actions.

Georgia should address the issue of impunity of law enforcement officers and ensure that it upholds applicable international conventions and standards.

*Judicial cooperation in criminal matters*

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is broadly satisfactory. The legal framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is mostly aligned with the EU *acquis* to the extent that alignment is already possible. The total number of incoming and outgoing requests with EU Member States for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters under the responsibility of the Prosecutor General's Office increased in 2025. Georgia has also participated in the negotiations on the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention, which focuses on money laundering and the confiscation of proceeds from crime.




The handling of judicial cooperation requests in criminal matters is still subject to significant delays.

Cooperation with Eurojust continued. Between September 2025 and March 2026, Georgia was involved in 19 new cases at Eurojust, most related to money laundering, fraud and forgery of administrative documents. Georgia continued to participate in three ongoing joint investigation teams.

Georgia appointed a new Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust.

Georgia has working arrangements in place with the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO). In 2025, the EPPO did not send any MLA requests to Georgia, neither did it have any active cases with links to Georgia at the end of 2025.

In 2025, the Prosecution Service of Georgia exchanged information with the European



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Public Prosecutor's Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in relation to one ongoing investigation.

Georgia actively contributed to a major international operation – supported by Europol and Eurojust – which dismantled the so-called Audi A6 platform. This platform was used by criminal groups to launder cryptocurrency for an estimated amount of EUR 336 million between 2022 and 2025.

Crime areas

*Investigation and criminalisation of money laundering*

The number of investigations and prosecutions of money laundering cases decreased in 2025 (73/72 down from 110/99 in 2024). The number of convictions of natural persons remained stable (79 cases) and increased for legal persons (from 10 in 2024 to 23 in 2025).

*Cybercrime*

Georgia needs to strengthen its capacities to address cybercrime and to cooperate with EU law enforcement in this area. In particular, it should provide further training to agency employees involved in fighting cybercrime, including on the dark net. The number of convictions for cybercrime cases was higher in 2025 (208) than in 2024 (152), while fewer cases were investigated (608 in 2025 down from 749 in 2024).

*Child sexual abuse*


To combat online child sexual abuse, Georgia still needs to develop a national action plan for combating violence against children in the digital environment, aligned with the Lanzarote Convention.

The number of child sexual abuse cases prosecuted that resulted in convictions increased in 2025, with 164 cases prosecuted (143 in 2024) and 148 convictions secured (up from 94 in 2024). National legislation on sexual violence against children remains substantially inconsistent with international standards and institutional capacities need to be strengthened.

*Trafficking in human beings*

Georgia should continue its efforts to align its legislation on trafficking in human beings with Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims as amended by Directive 2024/1712. This was included in the 2025-2026 national action plan. Georgia continues to cooperate with EU Member States quite actively in the field of trafficking in human beings.

**Graph 16: Georgia - Victims of trafficking in human beings***




n/a: not available

Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform

* Number of victims recognised through prosecutorial decrees

Gaps persist in the implementation of protection measures, proactive investigations and intelligence-led policing. Georgia needs to continue to improve the effectiveness of criminal investigation capacities and to strengthen interinstitutional cooperation on investigations and referral mechanisms within the framework of the implementation of the 2025-2026 national action plan on combating trafficking in human beings. Public services for victims and presumed victims of trafficking in human beings are implemented. The referral system needs to be further improved. In 2025, there were six indictments, five convictions secured and five people were granted victim status (19 in 2024). Georgia initiated procedures to join the

Europol analytical project Phoenix on combating human trafficking. Georgia should increase its efforts to detect and identify victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of exploitative surrogacy.

*Migrant smuggling*

Georgia is increasingly a destination and hub for migrant smuggling. The legal framework is partly aligned with the EU *acquis* but it needs to build more capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict migrant smugglers. Georgia participates in 184 EMPACT OAs on migrant smuggling however actual interaction in migrant smuggling investigations remains low. Georgia needs to increase international cooperation on migrant smuggling and strengthen capacities, institutional cooperation and investments. In 2025, 13 investigations into crimes were conducted, 11 cases were concluded with convictions (compared with 14 indictments in 2024, all leading to convictions).

*Trafficking in firearms*


Amendments to the Law on weapons adopted in December 2025 extend the control for the verification of holders and applicants' health conditions and restrict the use and circulation of specific weapons.

On arms control, 1 096 crimes were investigated in 2025 (up from 797 in 2024), of which 940 were solved (up from 688 in 2024) and 540 convictions were secured (up from 391 in 2024). Under the EMPACT Firearms and Explosives operational action plan, Georgia participates in 16 Operational Actions targeting firearms and explosives trafficking.

*Cooperation in the field of drugs*

The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs remains largely aligned with the EU *acquis*. Rules on minimum sentences and penalties for drug-related criminal offences need to be further aligned with the EU *acquis*. The national drug strategy 2023-2030 and the 2022-2026 national action plan need to bet updated to reflect the 2025 EU drugs strategy, and the legislative framework needs further alignment with the policy priorities. Interinstitutional cooperation and institutional capacities were strengthened following amendments to the Customs Code of December 2025. The Southern Caucasus/Black Sea corridor is an emerging trafficking route of concern for heroin and other substances. Georgia needs to step up enforcement and strengthen its institutional capacity and international cooperation on drug trafficking.

**Graph 17.1: Georgia - Cases related to production and trafficking of drugs- Data on number of individuals/legal entities involved**




n/a: not available

Source: National data collected via the organised crime and corruption track record (OCCTR) e-platform


* New investigations correspond to the number of new cases opened and not to the number of individuals investigated.

The number of investigations and final convictions of cases related to the production and trafficking of drugs increased in 2025. The volume of drugs seized and destructed increased in 2025. International police cooperation on drug trafficking prevention expanded. Georgia initiated procedures to join a Europol analytical project on drugs. Cooperation between the National Drugs Observatory and civil society remains severely limited given the repressive



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legislation on CSOs. The national early warning system on new psychoactive substances still needs to be further strengthened, in particular as regards information exchange.




*Counterfeiting of the euro*

Georgia's legislation governing the suppression of counterfeit currency remains partially aligned with the EU *acquis*. The National Bank of Georgia further integrated its reporting systems with Europol's Central Office for Combating Euro Counterfeiting and introduced new regulations for stablecoins and virtual asset service providers to align with the applicable rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto assets.

The 1929 International (Geneva) Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, which Georgia signed in 2000, has not yet been ratified.

**Counter-terrorism, prevention and resilience**

Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation

*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks*

The legal framework for the fight against terrorism is largely aligned with the EU *acquis*.

The legal framework for countering violent extremism is also largely aligned with the EU *acquis*. In November 2025, amendments were adopted to the anti-money laundering/CFT law requiring all natural and legal persons to comply with the restrictions set by the United Nations Sanctions Committees.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*

The national counter-terrorism strategy for 2022-2026 and the corresponding action plan are being implemented and monitored by the Permanent Interagency Commission. The supervisory framework for anti-money laundering and the fight against terrorism was improved. In December 2025, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application in counter-terrorism matters (CT SIENA) became operational between Georgia and Europol.

The terrorist threat level remains low. The government undertook several counter-terrorism operations leading to arrests, seizure of weapons and illegal substances, and convictions. In 2025, the number of indictment and conviction cases on terrorism charges remained overall stable compared with 2024 (six indictments and three convictions compared with four cases each in 2024). Georgia continued to cooperate on counter-terrorism activities with Europol, Interpol and the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism. It also participated in preventive counter-terrorism activities with international organisations including NATO and the UN.

Critical infrastructure protection

*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional framework*

There was no significant progress to further align the legal framework for critical infrastructure protection on cybersecurity and it remains partially aligned with the EU *acquis.* The legal framework on the protection of physical critical infrastructure and the resilience of



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critical entities remains to be aligned with the EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities as well as with the Terrorist Content Online regulation.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*

The protection of critical infrastructure needs to be improved.

Georgia's critical infrastructure is exposed to vulnerabilities, in particular in the sectors of energy, transport and cybersecurity, including geopolitical tensions, ageing infrastructure, cyber threats and natural hazards. Some progress has been made with investments in transport and digitalisation. Georgia needs to draw up a strategy and legal framework on physical critical infrastructure protection.

**Migration and asylum**


Legal and irregular migration and returns

The legal framework for the management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the EU *acquis*. The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.

*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks*

Further to the 2025 legal amendments on labour migration, additional regulations to counter irregular migration were adopted in November and December 2025, and in March 2026, in part to align with the Return Directive. The regulations strengthen legal provisions on irregular stay for foreign nationals, including higher administrative fines and the introduction of temporary entry bans and require interinstitutional consultations on return proceedings.

The migration strategy 2021-2030 and integrated border management strategy 2023-2027 are being implemented. Further efforts are needed to achieve the set targets and improve data collection, analyses and evidence-based policymaking.




The institutional framework for migration and border management remains well established. Overall, the migration policy coordination framework is in line with effective international practice, and the State Commission on Migration Issues continues to efficiently fulfil its role. The institutional set-up of migration management needs greater capacity and budgetary resources. Closer cooperation with international organisations and NGOs is also needed.

Georgia has a readmission agreement with the EU and bilateral implementing protocols with 13 EU Member States. It also has a bilateral agreement with Denmark, as well as with the UK, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Montenegro, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia and Ukraine.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*

Implementation of the readmission agreement with the EU is very good. In 2025, 10 445 Georgians effectively returned following an order to leave the territory (12 095 in 2024) ranking Georgia second for the number of its nationals returned from the EU. In 2025, the MIA participated in 27 return operations organised by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency ('Frontex'). Georgia is one of the visa-free countries whose citizens apply for asylum in the EU in greatest numbers, with 15 130 asylum applications in 2025.



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The majority of returnees from Georgia did not receive any reintegration support from sending European countries, partly due to Georgia's restrictive legislation on donor funding. The budget for the State Reintegration Assistance Programme has remained stable in 2026 (GEL 1.5 million). A unified policy approach to reintegration remains pending.

Georgia is increasingly a destination country for migration. The number of return decisions by the government increased substantially following a stricter model of checks and streamlined processes for returns introduced in revised labour migration regulations in 2025. In 2025, the MIA issued 1 311 return decisions (up from 363 in 2024), with the top three nationalities being India (269), Türkiye (169) and Iran (157). At the end of 2025, there were 1 060 beneficiaries of international protection in Georgia including 386 refugees and 674 persons with humanitarian status.

Georgia still needs to increase its service capacities connected to increased migration flows, also in cooperation with the service providers. There is only one temporary accommodation centre in Tbilisi, which mainly functions as a migration detention centre with a current capacity of around 60 people at a time. Shortcomings in rights protection and accountability remain, including in cases involving children. The Public Defender raised concerns about the detention of minors, in particular allegations of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, which have been referred to the now-abolished Special Investigation Service. The procedures for unaccompanied minors were revised. The practical application of the legal framework for 'Alternative Measures to Detention' remains limited. In early 2025, an electronic mechanism for delivering return decisions was introduced.

Asylum


While the legal framework on asylum in Georgia is partially aligned with the EU *acquis* as it was in force until 12 June 2026, Georgia should focus on developing its national legal framework and operational capacities on migration and asylum to align with the Pact.


*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks*

In October 2025, the Law on international protection entered into force, which further aligns national legislation with the EU *acquis*. The rules include procedures for examining applications at the state border and procedures in penitentiary institutions. Georgia has not made progress on a mechanism for detecting and addressing cases of refoulment and for protecting the rights of applicants of international protection through procedural safeguards.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*

In 2025, 1 325 individuals applied for asylum in Georgia (against 1 641 in 2024), the majority from Türkiye, India, Ukraine and Iran. The total recognition rate in 2025 was 7.2%. 1 318 applications for asylum were rejected, 14 people were granted refugee status and 89 were granted humanitarian status. Proceedings on international protection were terminated in 52 cases due to the departure of the applicants for international protection. Asylum decisions are issued within 4.4 months on average.






There are presently an estimated 33 800 Ukrainian citizens staying visa-free in Georgia. Visa-free stay for Ukrainian citizens who entered Georgia before 24 February 2025 is currently valid until 24 February 2027. The reception centre for applicants for international protection can accommodate up to 132 people. Georgia needs to strengthen the provision of services for applicants.

Visa policy

Georgia's visa policy is not fully aligned with EU policy, in particular the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU. Georgia's list of visa free countries continues to considerably diverge from the EU list, as it still contains 26 countries which are visa-required in EU. No steps have been taken towards further alignment. In addition, Georgia continues to pursue a visa policy that diverges substantially from the EU by granting entry to nationals of 17 countries that require a visa both in the EU and in Georgia, solely on the basis of a visa or residence permit issued by one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait or Oman). However, the security features of visas and travel documents continue to be broadly aligned with EU standards.

The eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism (VSM) report of December 2025 noted that Georgia failed to implement nearly all recommendations issued in the seventh VSM report. Despite repeated requests, it backtracked further, in particular on key governance and rule-of-law benchmarks that form the basis for granting visa-free travel.

Due to Georgia's deliberate and persisting violation of its commitments made under its visa-free regime, the European Commission has activated the revised VSM for Georgia, temporarily suspending visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports across the EU, as of 6 March 2026 and for an initial period of one year. On 11 June 2026, the Commission met with a Georgian government delegation, in accordance with the Visa Regulation, to discuss this temporary suspension with a view to remedying the circumstances that led to its adoption. This enhanced dialogue did not lead to progress when it comes to the Commission's recommendations underpinning the suspension.

Schengen governance and external borders

The legislative and strategic framework for the management of external borders is partially aligned with the EU *acquis*. The management of borders is broadly satisfactory.

*Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks*

Georgia continued strategic engagement under the integrated border management (IBM) framework. The IBM strategy and its five-year action plan (2023-2027) are broadly based on the EU concept of IBM. The 2026 action plan was approved in December 2025. Strategic decision-making remains a challenge, and implementation of key reforms is still constrained. Some progress was made, however, in addressing institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination and resources. Institutional and human resource capacity needs to be further strengthened.

*Implementation and enforcement capacity*

The IBM strategy and the annual action plan are being implemented. Several infrastructure and IT improvements were recorded in 2025, including implementation of a 'smart border' concept. The smart border concept is based on full implementation of the unified migration

data analytical system, the advance passenger information system, the computerised transit system and installation of technical equipment along green and blue border segments.


Substantial further investments are still required to address critical gaps in surveillance and monitoring, particularly along green and blue borders.

Institutional and inter-agency coordination improved in 2025. Border crossing points (BCPs) take a one-stop-shop approach supported by shared access to multiple information systems. Cybersecurity and IT infrastructure facilitates real-time intelligence sharing between the police, customs and justice departments. Georgia needs to further strengthen the capacities of the border guard services and border police.

Cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) remains downgraded in the context of EU measures taken in response to the country's democratic backsliding but remains effective, particularly in the field of returns, data and risk analysis and smuggling. Frontex-deployed standing corps officers are present at selected BCPs including Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and the Batumi international airports and the Port of Batumi in an advisory capacity. Georgia deployed observers to selected EU Member State BCPs.

Cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries remains satisfactory. Measures to fight corruption remain to be strengthened.

**Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters**




Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters is broadly satisfactory. Georgia has still not acceded to two key instruments under the Hague conference on private international law: the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults and the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.

The number of incoming requests in civil matters under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice increased substantially in 2025.

## 2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA[5]

| *Table:* **Georgia - Key economic figures** | **2017-22 average** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **GDP per capita** (%of EU-27 in PPS) | 34.9 | 41.2 | 45.3 | 48.0 |
| **Real GDP growth** | 5.3 | 7.8 | 9.7 | 7.5 |
| **Economic activity rate of the population aged 20-64** (%), total | 62.9 | 68.7 | 70.8 | 70.9 |
| **Unemployment rate of the population aged over 15** (%), total | 19.2 | 16.4 | 13.9 | 13.9 |
| **Employment of the population aged 20-64** (annual growth %) | 1.8 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 0.1 |
| **Nominal wages** (annual growth %) | 8.4 | 14.5 | 11.5 | 15.8 |
| **Consumer price index** (annual growth %) | 6.7 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 3.9 |
| **Exchange rate against EUR** | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
| **Current account balance** (%of GDP) | -8.0 | -5.5 | -5.3 | -2.6 |
| **Net foreign direct investment, FDI** (%of GDP) | 6.4 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 3.6 |
| **General government balance** (%of GDP) | -3.3 | -1.9 | -2.0 | -1.2 |
| **General government debt** (%of GDP) | 44.9 | 38.9 | 35.7 | 34.4 |


*Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia, IMF, National Bank of Georgia, Ministry of Finance of Georgia, Eurostat, own calculations*

### 2.3.1 The existence of a functioning market economy

Economic governance

**The authorities made progress on some economic reforms, notably in public finances.** The electronic public investment management system (ePIM) has been developed and has been fully operational since 2025, with all new public investment projects initiated and assessed through this system resulting in better project screening and budget credibility. In 2025 the authorities prepared a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) self-assessment report, which suggests further improvements in the public financial management system, and submitted it to the World Bank for their review. Climate- and gender-responsive public financial management assessment reports are being prepared, with support from international partners. The latest fiscal risks statement contains expanded information on long-term fiscal risks, including those related to climate change, demographic pressures, natural disasters, legal claims, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships. Regarding independence of the central bank, responsibilities among members of the board of the central bank were reallocated in line with the IMF recommendations. More progress is

**Graph 21: Georgia - Real GDP growth and contributions**




*Source:* National Statistics Office of Georgia

[5] Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section are taken from the relevant national sources (the statistical office, Ministry of Finance and central bank).

needed to enhance board member qualification criteria and adopting a collegial decision-making model. The three-year stand-by arrangement with the IMF expired in 2025. Annual Article IV consultations with the IMF continued, the latest one was approved by the IMF Board and published in June 2026. The latest IMF Article IV report provides some recommendations for improvement of economic governance, including streamlining tax expenditures, enhancing spending efficiency and advancing SOE governance reform.


Macroeconomic stability

**In 2025, Georgia recorded strong economic growth of 7.5%,** though down from nearly double-digit expansion in 2024. Private and government consumption remained the main contributors, supported by rising wages, spending by high-skilled Russian migrants and high inflows of remittances. In contrast to previous years, investment decreased in real terms in 2025, due to delays in public investment projects. On the supply side, growth was driven by services (mainly information technology, financial services and education) as well as by manufacturing, while agricultural and mining output contracted. The tourism sector further expanded with the number of tourist arrivals reaching a record-high in 2025. Services (IT and financial) and manufacturing were also among the key economic drivers in the first half of 2026, fuelling GDP growth to 7.9% year-on-year in the first seven months of the year.

**The external position improved in 2025.** The current account deficit narrowed to a record low of 2.6% of GDP from 5.3% of GDP in 2024, despite a slight increase of the trade deficit. Exports of goods rose by 11.6% year-on-year in USD terms thanks to, among others, a surge in exports of precious metal ores (nearly 60%) and continued growth in re-exported cars. The latter accounted for nearly 39% of all exports of goods in 2025. Imports increased by 8.2% as a result of high demand for investment and consumer goods as well as growing car purchases. The resulting slight increase of the merchandise trade deficit in 2025 was completely offset by a rising surplus in services, especially exports of computers services as well as revenue from tourism, mainly due to growing arrivals from Russia, the EU, and Israel. The inflow of remittances also rose despite a significant drop in transfers from Russia. In the first eight months of 2026, exports of goods increased sharply due to favourable terms of trade and the launch of exports from a newly-built oil refinery. This led to a reduction of the still sizeable trade deficit.

**The current account deficit was entirely covered by foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2025.** While net FDI rose to 3.6% of GDP from 3.3% of GDP a year earlier, it remained relatively low in historical terms (averaging 6.5% of GDP a year in 2013-2024). As a result, Georgia continues to have a strongly negative net international investment position (NIIP) and relatively high external debt. However, both ratios have decreased substantially since 2020 thanks to the sharp increase in the nominal GDP. As of December 2025, the NIIP stood at -84.5%, while gross external debt amounted to 70.4% of GDP. The level of gross official reserves increased sharply in 2025 and continued its upward trend in the first eight months of 2026. At USD 8.1 billion, or 128% of the IMF's Assessing Reserve Adequacy metric, they were at a historically high level at the end of July 2026. The sharp increase in reserves reflected deposit de-dollarisation and strong current account inflows boosted by robust exports in services and remittances that have enabled the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) to step up foreign exchange purchases. The rise in gold prices gave a further boost.

**Graph 22: Georgia - Current account selected components and FDI**





**Inflation accelerated in 2025 from low levels in the previous year.** It peaked at 5.2% in



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October 2025, well above the 3% target of the National Bank of Georgia, before easing by end-2025. The average annual inflation came in at 3.9% as compared to 1.1% in 2024. It was mainly driven by domestic food prices. Other factors that contributed to price growth included the pass-through from wage increases and base effects. Inflation accelerated ostensibly in 2026, to 5.6% in August, because of the surge in global energy prices following the start of the war against Iran, a hike of electricity prices, as well as the continuing pass-through from the ongoing high wage growth. Core inflation, while remaining significantly below the headline rate, also picked up in the course of 2026, suggesting that inflationary dynamics is relatively broad-based. In view of the mounting price pressures and amid expectations for second-round effects from the global energy price shock, the NBG raised in May 2026 its key policy rate by 25 basis points to 8.25%, the first increase in two years.

**General government deficit narrowed in 2025 to 1.2% of GDP and was lower than in the previous years.** Revenues increased by 13%, broadly in line with the nominal GDP growth (12%). Current expenditure rose by 16% over the same period, mainly due to a strong increase in public sector salaries and higher social benefits and subsidies. By contrast, capital expenditure fell by 20%, reflecting procurement and implementation delays and the postponement of some large public investment projects. This under-execution of capital expenditure contributed to the lower-than-budgeted overall fiscal deficit. The general government debt decreased from 35.7% of GDP in 2024 to 34.4% in 2025. In this context, the country benefits from a favourable access to financial markets. In January 2026 Georgia placed, amid strong investor demand, a USD 500 million five-year Eurobond that was used to repay a bond issuance of a similar amount issued in 2021.




**Georgia implemented an overall appropriate macroeconomic policy mix**. The monetary policy of the central bank was appropriate, with the recent acceleration of inflation largely due to the surge in global energy prices and other supply shocks. Georgia's external position has strengthened, with the current account deficit narrowing and gross international reserves increasing. Fiscal performance was strong with general government deficit declining to close to 1% of GDP, although this was partially due to under-execution of capital spending. While the global economic outlook has become more challenging following the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, the country seems well positioned to absorb shocks, supported by fairly sound macroeconomic fundamentals and fiscal and external buffers. Yet, wage and inflation dynamics require close monitoring.

Functioning of product markets

**Georgia has a fairly dynamic business fabric, but many weaknesses still hamper the business environment, and there was very limited progress in addressing them last year.** Georgia's business environment has been liberalised and the administrative barriers to market entry are low. Nonetheless, many structural obstacles constraint business' activity including political instability, an inadequately educated workforce, reduced independence and integrity of the judicial system, and court inefficiency. Georgia was ranked 56$^{th}$ out of 182 countries in the 2025 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, as against 41$^{st}$ position in 2022.

**The authorities continued to address the issue of informal economy.** Informality in



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Georgia is closely linked to the country's economic structure, with a high share of agriculture, construction, transport, logistics and tourism, a lack of unemployment benefits and a substantial share of self-employment. In the reporting period, an inter-ministerial working group, established in 2024, continued to work with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on a policy plan to address the informal economy in a holistic, government-wide manner, encompassing tax, labour, social and financial policies. In September 2025, the working group defined a set of actions to be taken by the institutions, including an informal economy assessment to be elaborated by the National Statistics Office.

**Despite some steps taken, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remains incomplete, while the financial oversight has continued to improve.** The state footprint in the economy remains limited and is concentrated in strategic sectors such as energy infrastructure, transport and utilities, with SOEs generating 4% of Georgia's value added and 8% of employment. The authorities appointed independent supervisory boards at several SOEs, piloted a shared ownership of three SOEs by ministries of finance and some other ministries, and improved separation of the state's roles as owner, policymaker, and regulator. However, the Corporate Governance Code for SOEs remains unimplemented and the draft SOE law has been on hold. Political interference and the absence of formalized processes for SOE board selection and dismissal undermines the professionalism and independence of SOE governance bodies. In parallel, the Ministry of Finance continued to gradually enhance financial oversight by bringing the accounts of 176 SOEs into the single treasury account to strengthen liquidity management. It has also improved the transparency by including quarterly information on SOEs in the quarterly and annual budget execution reports. Revenues from privatisation and sales of state property amounted to 0.21% of GDP in 2025. The total amount of state aid issued by public bodies in Georgia was very low at 0.01% of GDP in 2024, but the reporting methodology is not aligned with the EU *acquis* requirements. The extent of price regulations remains very limited in Georgia. The agency providing public funds for business development, Enterprise Georgia, made changes to its main business universal programme in September 2025, with a stronger focus on SMEs and loans for green expenditure. In April 2026, Enterprise Georgia and the Georgian Development Fund were consolidated into the Georgian Economic Development Corporation, aimed to become a larger development institution supporting investment and attracting equity capital. The national strategy for SMEs expired at the end of 2025, and the new strategy has not been adopted yet.

Functioning of the financial market

**Georgia's banking sector remains sound, although it is exposed to foreign exchange risks.** According to data from the National Bank of Georgia, the banking system's capital adequacy ratio stood at 22.2% in April 2026. Most lenders remained very profitable, reaching an aggregate 21.9% return on equity. The asset quality of the sector as a whole remains strong, with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans broadly unchanged at a low 2.6%. The high dollarisation of both assets and liabilities remains a structural weakness of the banking system although, from a financial stability perspective, banks have ample foreign exchange buffers. The share of loans in foreign currencies remained broadly stable in the reporting period and amounted to 39.4% in April 2026. The level of dollarisation for deposits is higher than for loans but decreased over the last twelve months by 3 percentage points to 48.6%. Credit growth remained strong at 13.6% in April 2026 and was stronger for households than for corporate loans. Access to finance is still perceived as a major obstacle for many small businesses, although the situation has recently improved.

**The non-banking part of the financial sector remains small, despite recent growth.** In the reporting period, Georgia's corporate bond market expanded with 13 public corporate bonds issued by 7 local issuers, which pushed their outstanding value to about 2.5% of GDP. Nevertheless, the size of the corporate bond market and market capitalisation of the Tbilisi Stock Exchange remain nevertheless small, with Georgia's largest firms utilising a dual-listing architecture in Georgia and abroad or listing exclusively abroad. In March 2026,




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a new Law on factoring was adopted to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with an additional instrument for access to finance. The law will support the development of a new segment of factoring companies in the financial market. The insurance market grew by 15% on average over the last years but remains relatively small with gross written premiums below 1.5% of GDP, and with health insurance being the largest segment. One of the obstacles in its development is the still pending adoption of legislation on mandatory domestic motor third party liability insurance.

Functioning of the labour market

**Labour market indicators remained almost unchanged in 2025, after several years of gradual improvement, indicating a growth poor in job creation and structural weaknesses.** The employment rate increased marginally by 0.1 pp in comparison to the previous year to 60.5%, with employment falling among self-employed workers. The unemployment rate remained high in comparison to the other candidate countries at 13.9%, unchanged from 2024, despite the high GDP growth rate. Significant structural labour market weaknesses persist, including the persistent mismatch between labour skills and business needs, high youth unemployment, significant gender disparities and regional differences. Georgia has yet to adopt a new national strategy of labour and employment policy. Following a dynamic rise in 2023 and in 2024, wages increased even stronger in 2025, by 16% in nominal terms. They were driven by pay rises in the public sector and in sectors experiencing labour shortages, such as construction.




### 2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Education and innovation

**Georgia continued to upgrade its vocational education system and introduced a reform of higher and general education with the announced objective to improve resource allocation, but which could affect the quality of education.** Government expenditure on education in 2025 amounted to almost 4% of GDP as in 2024 and is still below the EU average (4.7%). In the 2025 PISA assessment that measured outcomes in secondary education, Georgia's scores have improved in comparison to the 2022 PISA assessment, although the country was ranked only 58$^{th}$ on science and 67$^{th}$ on reading out of 91 countries. In the area of vocational education and training, one new state vocational college became operational in 2025, and integrated vocational programmes were expanded to 63 additional public schools. The Vocational Skills Agency was abolished in October 2025, and its functions were integrated into other institutions including the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth. In February 2026, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Laws on general education and on higher education, which, according to the authorities, aim to better focus limited financial resources provided to this sector. However, this reform raises serious concerns regarding the respect for institutional autonomy of universities and academic freedom, equity and equality of access to quality education and compatibility of Georgia's higher education system with the European Higher Education standards. The authorities intend also to reduce the school cycle from 12 to 11 years, effective from 2027–2028, which also raises concerns as it may adversely affect the quality of education.

**Gross domestic expenditure on R&D remained broadly unchanged since 2023 and remains low** at around 0.26% of GDP, which is significantly below the EU-27 average (at 2.1% of GDP) and the EU target of 3% of GDP. Georgia continues to modernise its research



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and innovation policy framework. Research and innovation policy remains integrated into the Unified National Strategy for Education and Science 2022–2030. The Georgia Innovation and Technology Agency continued to support innovative start-ups and training, with a focus on the ICT sector. The Kutaisi Technological Hub, a regional innovation centre, was inaugurated in July 2026.

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure


**Public investment continued with a focus on transport infrastructure, although it slowed down in comparison to previous years** (to 5.1% of GDP in 2025 from 8.5% of GDP in 2024). In December 2025, a 52 km cross-mountain Rikoti section of the East-West Highway (part of the TEN-T core network) was opened. Over 74% of the planned 430-kilometre highway is now fully operational. The recent railway modernisation project was completed in December 2025, but large parts of the rail network and rolling stock are still obsolete. In June 2026, Georgia signed a new loan agreement with the World Bank to fund transport infrastructure and rolling stock as part of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, including an already launched international tender for new electric locomotives. The construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port started with dredging works and construction of the breakwater. However, during the reporting period, the state budget allocation for development of the port was reduced by more than half and works were stalled for several months. The government's approach to Anaklia port has changed again with the decision to retain full ownership in the future port instead of a joint investment with the Chinese-led consortium for the construction and operation of the port. In air transport, an international consulting firm has been selected to conduct an economic feasibility study of the new Tbilisi International Airport. The authorities have also extended a concession agreement for the operation of the current Tbilisi airport until the end of 2031, to be accompanied by investment in modernising the airport. In the energy sector, preparations continued for the Black Sea submarine cable project, intended to link Georgia with Romania by electricity and fibre-optic submarine cable interconnections. The project was granted Project of Mutual Interest status in December 2025. In the area of information and communications technology, the coverage rate of fixed broadband internet subscribers among households reached 99%. Thanks to the log-in-Georgia project, the national fibre network expanded to 4 000 km, ensuring high-speed internet availability for 76% of rural communities.


Sectoral and enterprise structure

**The economy is increasingly based on services, with a diminishing role of agriculture and a stable share of manufacturing.** Services increased their share in GDP to 72.8% in 2025, with the biggest gains recorded last year by the information and communication technology and education sectors. The share of manufacturing, at 9.1%, is relatively low in Georgia compared with peer countries. The share of construction is relatively high at 8.0% and rising with a residential construction boom in big cities and substantial investment in public infrastructure. Agriculture, a traditionally important sector but characterised by low productivity, declined to 5.9% of GDP in 2025, but still accounts for 16% of total employment. SMEs accounted in 2025 for 54% of the value added of the business sector.

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness

**Economic integration with the EU is limited**. Georgia's trade turnover with the EU increased by 9% in 2025. However, the EU share in Georgia's exports was low at 12%, against 69% of exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although partially




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due to re-export of cars and other products. Georgia's imports from the EU amounted to 25.4% of total imports. Georgia's trade deficit with the EU amounted to USD 3.9 billion, or 10.1% of GDP. In 2025, the EU remained the biggest source of remittances to Georgia (45% of the total, or 4.3% of GDP), with the highest inflows from Italy, Germany and Greece. The EU was also the first source of foreign direct investment (34% of the total, or 1.4% of GDP).

**The real effective exchange rate of the lari appreciated by 3% in the twelve months until July 2026, leading to a small deterioration of the country's price competitiveness.** The real exchange rate of Georgia's currency strengthened against the euro and US dollar, while it weakened against the Turkish lira. As regards nominal exchange rates, the lari strengthened over the last twelve months by 5% against the euro and by 3% against the US dollar.

### 2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL

### Chapter 5 - Public procurement

*EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State is transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment.*

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

Georgia's **legal framework** remains partially aligned with the EU *acquis* on public procurement. The current Law on public procurement (PPL) was amended in May 2026 using an expedited procedure, introducing framework agreements and e-catalogues to strengthen efficiency and transparency, as well as formalised subcontracting rules to boost SME participation. The amendment strengthened the blacklisting mechanism and increased the threshold set for low-value procurement procedures for law enforcement. The postponed effective date of the new PPL is January 2030. Further progress needs to be done regarding utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and on defence and security procurement, in order to align with the EU *acquis*.

The Central Purchasing Body became operational in June 2026, completing the restructuring of the State Procurement Agency (SPA) into three independent entities, including the SPA and the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council. As of January 2026, market research is mandatory for contracting authorities. Amendments to the time limits for conducting electronic tenders and the prevention of artificial contract splitting also entered into force.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

In 2025, Georgia's **public procurement market** amounted to approximately 6.1% of GDP. 27 796 tenders were announced (30 014 in 2024). Of these, 89.5% were NAT (tender with no auction) tenders (88.6% in 2024), 10% were SPA (with auction) tenders and 0.5% were all other electronic procurement procedures. In 2025, 12.5% of the cases (12% in 2024), procuring entities used direct award procedure. The share of contracts awarded based on open electronic procedures price-quality criteria decreased in 2025 to 82.5% (GEL 5.2 billion) compared with 85.5% in 2024 (GEL 7 billion).

The SPA continued to provide training to contracting authorities at central and local levels, with 341 participants in 2025, against 273 officials in 2024.

The legal and institutional framework regarding **integrity and conflicts of interest** is broadly in place. Georgia needs to strengthen its risk assessment mechanisms and internal and external control systems within contracting authorities. The SPA continued to fulfil its mandate to monitor procurement procedures, to issue administrative orders and to refer irregularity related cases to court. In 2025, the SPA participated in 209 court proceedings of which 29 decisions were related to blacklisting, four to consolidated tenders, and two related to decisions on whitelist registration were appealed, with most cases still under review.



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Monitoring results are published annually.

Efficient remedy system

Georgia still needs to align its legislation with the EU *acquis* on the **right to legal remedy**. In 2025, 1 146 complaints were submitted to the Dispute Resolution Board (1 164 in 2024), while 59% of cases were resolved in favour of the complainants.

### Chapter 18 - Statistics

*European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the principles and quality criteria elaborated in the Regulation on European statistic, such as professional independence, impartiality, reliability, accessibility and statistical confidentiality. Common rules are provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information, which are further specified in sectoral legislation that constitute the EU acquis on statistics.*

As regards the **statistical infrastructure**, the legal framework remains partially aligned with the principles in the European statistics Code of Practice. Amendments to the Law on official statistics adopted in March 2026 removed the limitation to two terms of office of the Executive Director of the National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat). Furthermore, the Executive Director of Geostat is now appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister following an open competition; the Director remains accountable to Parliament and the government. Compliance with the principle of professional independence enshrined in the European statistics Code of Practice should be ensured.

The national strategy for the development of statistics (2024-2027) remains the main strategic document. The 2026-2027 action plan approved in January 2026 includes the development and introduction of an updated version of the national classification of economic activities based on NACE Rev. 2.1. It also includes the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), for which preparatory work started; and actions to strengthen gender statistics, such as greater use of sex-disaggregated indicators. The operation of the inter-agency working group contributes to strengthen coordination and improve cooperation with data providers. Geostat started transmitting data to Eurostat through the EDAMIS portal.

On **classifications and registers**, a register-based census roadmap was developed to establish a statistical population register and work was carried out to prepare to bring in population projections.

On **social statistics**, the final results of the 2024 population census were published in April 2026 and the population size and related data was recalculated as of 1 January 2025. Progress was made towards more accurate and internationally comparable data on the gender pay gap. In 2025, Geostat conducted the first full-scale structure of the earnings survey aligned with Eurostat guidelines. On child statistics, new indicators were added to the web portal for child and youth statistics and a score card tracking child well-being indicators was created, including indicators from SDGs and the child rights monitoring framework.

A new interactive **environmental statistics** portal was launched in October 2025 with regional-level disaggregation for waste statistics. In addition, in 2025, physical energy flow accounts, forest physical asset accounts, and water physical flow accounts were introduced to data users and stakeholders.

Progress was also achieved in aligning **price statistics** with the EU *acquis* with a Georgian harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP). Since 2026, Georgian HICP data is published on Eurostat's website.

As regards **agricultural statistics**, the final results of the 2024 agriculture census were published in April 2026.

There were no relevant developments on **business and trade statistics**, as well as



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**transport and energy statistics**.

## Chapter 32 - Financial control

*The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU's financial interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.*

Public internal financial control (PIFC)

The strategic **framework** for PIFC is in place. The 2025-2028 strategy for the development of the PIFC system and the 2025-2026 action plan are being implemented. The central harmonisation unit within the Ministry of Finance remains understaffed. It continues to lack sufficient capacity to effectively implement PIFC reform.

On the **internal control** system, no progress was made during the reporting period.

On **managerial accountability,** managers in line ministries report on progress with some elements on performance.

In the field of **internal audit**, capacities were strengthened by launching a certification programme for internal auditors, and risk management methodologies improved. The operationalisation of the internal auditor certification programme led to an increased number (from 19 in 2025 to 31 in 2026) of auditors from ministries and municipalities being certified.

External audit

The constitution includes guarantees for the State Audit Office's (SAO) **independence** but does not explicitly guarantee the Auditor General's independence in decision-making, which is regulated by the Law on the SAO. The Auditor General, appointed for a five-year term, lacks constitutional protection to ensure a sufficiently long and fixed term allowing them to carry out the mandate independently. The mandate for auditing tax revenues remains insufficiently defined. The financial audit of the government's consolidated financial statements approved in December 2025 has been successfully conducted as a practice introduced in 2025 and was submitted to Parliament. The coverage of the consolidated budget increased to 95% (from 91% in 2024).

On **administrative capacity**, the SAO has overall a relatively well-developed administrative and institutional capacity.

**Parliamentary scrutiny** of public finances in Georgia is exercised through the review of the state budget, budget execution reports, and audit reports submitted by the SAO. While cooperation between Parliament and the SAO was strengthened, challenges remain in ensuring systematic follow-up to audit recommendations and enhancing the analytical capacity of parliamentary committees to effectively monitor government performance and financial management.

The expanding mandate of the SAO will require additional safeguards to ensure operational independence, adequate resources and separation between audit, anti-corruption and personal data protection functions.

The rate of **implementation of recommendations** remains moderate, with 48% fully implemented and 33% partially implemented in 2025.

Protection of the EU's financial interests

The legislation continues to be partially aligned with the EU *acquis* requirements in the area, including the **PIF Directive**. There is no **anti-fraud coordination service** (AFCOS) or corresponding **AFCOS network** There is also no **anti-fraud strategy** in place. The Prosecution Service continues to act as the focal point for **cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office** (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecution Office. Georgia is encouraged to build up a track record of cooperation with the Commission on investigations.



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Protection of the Euro against counterfeiting

No developments took place regarding further alignment with the EU *acquis*. Despite accession occurred in 2000, the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency has not been ratified yet.

## 3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Georgia participates in various **regional cooperation** platforms, including the Eastern Partnership, the Central European Initiative, the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, the South-East European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council.

Georgia generally maintains good **bilateral relations** with its neighbours and other enlargement countries. In 2025, it strengthened its engagement with **Serbia,** through increased high-level meetings and greater parliamentary cooperation. Negotiations of a free trade agreement between Serbia and Georgia were launched in December 2025. Following the appointment of Albania's non-resident Ambassador to Georgia, Georgia appointed a non-resident Ambassador to **Albania** in December 2025. In December 2025, Georgia also appointed a non-resident Ambassador to **North Macedonia**, **Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo**[*].

Georgia and **Türkiye** pursue a strategic partnership with increased contacts at high-level, including an official presidential visit to Türkiye in August 2025. Türkiye is Georgia's largest trading partner after the EU and a key investor. The two countries cooperate on major energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor. Active cooperation takes place in the framework of the development of the Middle Corridor, notably by expanding traffic on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line. The trilateral regional cooperation format between Georgia, Türkiye and Azerbaijan continued at a high level in view of greater regional energy and transport connectivity as well as security cooperation.

Georgia and **Ukraine** have a strategic partnership since 2017. Bilateral relations have been strained over the past years; however, some diplomatic channels were recently reopened. Georgia supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it broadly aligns with related EU statements and UN resolutions, including by co-sponsoring and voting in favour of the UN General Assembly Resolution of February 2026 on 'Support to Lasting Peace in Ukraine'. In December 2025, Georgia signed the convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine. However, in May 2025, Georgia announced that it will not join the agreement establishing a Special Tribunal for investigating the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine's sanctions on Georgian Dream honorary chairman and 19 other officials remain in place. In October 2025, the Georgian government allocated EUR 500 000 for energy support to Ukraine.

Georgia and the **Republic of Moldova** continue neighbourly relations based on mutual support for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

## 4. RESILIENCE, SECURITY, DEFENCE

Democratic resilience

Georgia's democratic resilience is under growing pressure. There are serious concerns that effective checks and balances of a democratic system have been eroded through the

[*] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

concentration of political and economic powers.

A vibrant civil society has historically been one of Georgia's principal democratic strengths. However, restrictive legislation affecting foreign-funded organisations, increased administrative burden, discreditation campaigns against NGOs and activists have significantly constrained the civic space. Media networks and professionals engaged in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and disinformation have been seriously undermined. The plurality and independence of the media have deteriorated, increasing societal vulnerabilities and contributing to deepening polarisation. On the other hand, democratic aspirations and support for European integration among Georgian citizens remain resilient (71% of the public support Georgia's accession to the EU) despite a more restrictive political environment and the authorities' active disinformation narratives targeting the EU.

Economic security and resilience

Georgia is located along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), with existing infrastructure in place. Further development of this corridor could contribute to the diversification of EU supply chains and trade routes, and to regional integration in the South Caucasus.

Georgia has the potential to contribute to regional electricity connectivity and renewable energy development and export, provided that critical infrastructure and domestic and regional integration capacities are strengthened. The recent approval of the Black Sea Submarine Cable project as a Project of Mutual Interest is relevant in this context, as it provides a framework for a potential future enhanced electricity interconnection. Georgia also has the potential to play a role on critical raw materials - as a transit country along the TCTC, as a regional processing hub, and as a supplier of some strategic raw materials, mainly copper and manganese. To realise this potential, limitations in local exploration, process capacities and technology would need to be addressed, compliance with EU standards would need to be ensured, and logistics bottlenecks along the TCTC reduced.

At the same time, Georgia's growing economic ties with Russia and heavy dependence for certain commodities (in particular oil, gas, grain), as well as an increasingly close relationship with China, risk further distancing Georgia from EU standards, *acquis*, and governance models. While the largest part of foreign direct investment (FDI) originates from the EU, there are increasing investments from a broader range of countries in strategically important sectors, notably transport, logistics, energy, and digital connectivity. This raises economic security considerations related to market transparency, ownership structures, and potential strategic dependencies on third-country operators, particularly when it comes to critical infrastructures.

Defence capacity building and defence industrial dimension

As a result of the democratic backsliding, EU support under the European Peace Facility (EPF) has been suspended since 2024 and no new EPF assistance was provided to Georgia in 2025. Between 2021 and 2023, the EU had contributed EUR 62.75 million under the EPF to strengthen the Georgian Defence Force's medical, engineering, logistics, and cyber-defence capabilities.

Georgia developed in the recent years an approach of total defence optimised for asymmetrical resistance, high operational readiness, and deep civilian-military cooperation with the declared aim to deter external territorial aggression. The domestic defence industry focuses primarily on the development and production of light armoured vehicles, UAVs, mortars, and personal protective equipment. While these domestic manufacturing capabilities provide essential light equipment and localised logistics, the defence sector remains heavily dependent on external supply chains for high-tech components, heavy weaponry, and advanced electronic systems. Georgia is currently reviewing its defence development strategy.



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Civil protection and disaster resilience

Georgia has continued to develop its civil protection, but progress remains uneven. Further efforts are needed to ensure effective implementation of crisis management across both natural and human-induced risks, including though enhanced local preparedness. The country also needs to continue reinforcing disaster prevention and preparedness, especially population awareness and institutional coordination.

## 5. ABILITY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

### CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement of capital (Chapter 4); company law (Chapter 6); intellectual property law (Chapter 7); competition policy (Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9); and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28).

### Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods

*The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade.*

General principles

Some elements of the EU legislative and institutional framework for the free movement of goods are in place. No progress was made to further align with the EU *acquis* in the harmonised area, although Georgia has committed to this under the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

Non-harmonised areas

No progress was made to further align legislation and administrative practices in accordance with articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure

On **standardisation**, Georgia's National Standards Organisation has met the technical requirements defined in the guide on the organisational structure and processes for the assessment of the membership criteria of the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CEN/CENELEC Guide), making it eligible for full membership to these organisations. In April 2026, amendments to the Law on product safety and free movement code were adopted and entered into force in June 2026.

Georgia's 'pre-notification' system of **market surveillance** is not aligned with the EU *acquis*. The Market Surveillance Agency ensured 452 market surveillance controls in the reporting period and imposed penalties on 80 economic operators. In April 2026, amendments to the technical regulation on construction products were adopted extending the scope of market surveillance to 125 additional types of construction products.

Georgia made no progress on **conformity assessment**. On **accreditation** and **metrology**, the Georgian Accreditation Centre continued cooperation with the Mutual Recognition Arrangement of European Accreditation and the Georgian National Agency for Standards and Metrology increased cooperation with EURAMET and further strengthened capacities.

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation



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On the EU **new and global approach** product *acquis*, there was no progress in the reporting period. There was no progress on the EU **old approach** product *acquis* and **procedural measures**.

The Georgian market surveillance processes and procedures do not provide for measures related to anti-corruption.

### Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers

*Nationals of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the same working and social conditions as other worker nationals of that Member State.*

Georgia's legal framework is not yet aligned with the EU *acquis.*

Regarding **access to the labour market,** the amendments to the Law on labour migration introducing a work permit as of March 2026 entered into force. In February 2026, the procedure for a special labour permit for immigrants and self-employed foreigners was approved by the government. EU citizens and other visa-free foreigners are no longer exempted. Exceptions include project-based and temporary activities that do not result in long-term integration into the domestic labour market. In February 2026, Georgia created the department of Labour Migration in the State Agency for Employment Promotion.

There was no progress to carry out any preparatory work to join the **European Network of Employment Services** and **the European Labour Authority** nor on the **coordination of social security systems.** No new agreements for bilateral **coordination of social security systems** were concluded. Georgia has three bilateral agreements with EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria and France).

There have been no developments on the introduction of the **European Health Insurance Card** over the reporting period.

### Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services

*EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on the mutual recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator.*

There was no progress on the **right of establishment**, the **freedom to provide services** and on **postal services.**

An inter-agency working group was established to oversee the alignment process with the EU Service Directive.

Work on the update of the Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area annex on the rules applicable to postal and courier services remains on hold.

Georgia is not aligned with the EU *acquis* on postal services or on **mutual recognition of professional qualifications**.

### Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital

*In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.*

There was no progress on **capital movements**. Restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land by EU nationals remain in place.

On **payments**, in December 2025 Georgia amended the Law on payment systems and payment services to reinforce the framework for payment initiation services and alternative dispute resolution provisions. In December 2025, the Law on the National Bank of Georgia



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(NBG) was amended, granting it the authority to have accounts of non-bank payment service providers that are participants of important payment systems.

Concerning the **fight against money laundering and terrorism financing**, Georgia amended its law on facilitating the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism in November 2025 aiming to address recommendations by Moneyval. The NBG also adopted guidelines for off-site supervision of commercial banks and microbanks in December 2025. Georgia still does not have a beneficial ownership register. Georgia should continue strengthening the administrative capacity of competent authorities, including for addressing increasing challenges such as the circulation of cryptocurrencies.

### Chapter 6 - Company law

*The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit.*

On **company law and corporate governance**, Georgia is partially aligned with the EU *acquis.* The Ministry of Justice and the National Agency of Public Registry continued work on aligning administrative practices with Directive (EU) 2019/1151 on the use of digital tools and processes in company law. Certain categories of company registration information are publicly available through the registration portal. Georgia maintains a fully digital business registration system and, as of July 2026, more than 405 000 business entities had been registered under the Law on entrepreneurs adopted in line with relevant EU directives. Georgia should also complete alignment with the Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDDD), as amended by the Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I). The amendments simplified some of the obligations and postponed the transposition deadline to July 2028 and the application deadline to July 2029.

On **company reporting and statutory audit**, secondary acts governing the review of IFRS compliance of companies' reports entered into force in February 2026. They apply to all enterprises whose financial statements are publicly disclosed, except for micro-enterprises. The Service for Accounting, Reporting and Auditing Supervision continued activities aimed at strengthening reporting transparency and improving the quality of financial reporting.

The NBG amended several regulatory acts on the publication of management reports and on fines for breaches of transparency legislation.

### Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law

*The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of copyright and related rights, as well as of industrial property rights, including trademarks, designs, patents and related supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), geographical indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs.*

In December 2025, amendments to the Law on **copyright and related rights** were adopted towards further harmonisation with Directive 2019/790/EC (Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM) Directive). The amendments regulate the determination of liability of intermediary service providers for infringements of copyright, related rights, and database maker's rights, as well as the grounds for exemption from liability.

Regarding **industrial property rights**, in November 2025 amendments to the Law on design were adopted.

The validation requests recorded in the electronic system of the Chamber of Appeal of the National Intellectual Property Centre of Georgia (Sakpatenti) increased as of March 2026, based on the validation agreement between the government and the European Patent Organisation concerning the validation of European patents. Two European patents have also been validated in Georgia.

In December 2025, Georgia expressed interest in acceding to the European Patent



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Convention to the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation.

In the reporting period, certificates were awarded to 28 candidates of the qualification examinations of patent attorneys, following an eleven-year gap of not holding the examination.

In the area of **enforcement**, no progress can be reported.

## Chapter 8 - Competition policy

*EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules on restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position and also include rules on concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition.*

Antitrust and mergers

Georgia's **legislative framework** is partially aligned with the EU *acquis* on antitrust and mergers. In December 2025, the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency (GCCA) amended the rules for calculating fines associated with competition law violations to ensure a more rigorous and standardised approach in line with the relevant EU guidelines and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. Legislative amendments were made towards greater alignment with Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 for the purpose of calculating the combined turnover of the entities participating in a concentration and taking into account the combined turnover of economic agents under the control of a participating entity's controlling entity. On **implementation**, the GCCA concluded two antitrust investigations, with no infringements established in either case, and formally rendered eleven complaint inadmissibility decisions. Two new investigations are currently ongoing.

The GCCA assessed sixteen **merger (concentration) notifications**. All mergers were approved, in one case with remedies and one still ongoing. The Agency also strictly enforced mandatory notification rules, identifying seven instances of unlawful concentrations implemented without prior clearance. The respective undertakings were fined a total of GEL 115 000. The GCCA proactively monitors completed mergers in cooperation with the National Agency of Public Registry and the Revenue Service.

State aid

No progress was made to align the **legal framework** on State aid with the EU *acquis*. The **institutional framework** and enforcement capacity of the GCCA remain to be strengthened. On **implementation**, no decisions were taken during the reporting period on State aid issues, only information on *de minimis* State aid was collected.

Liberalisation

Georgia's competition and State aid legislation is applicable to public undertakings and those with special or exclusive rights. No progress was made in the reporting period on aligning the rules on financing services of general economic interest with the EU *acquis*.

## Chapter 9 - Financial services

*EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity of financial markets, namely in the field of banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities. They include rules on the authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.*

As regards **banks and financial conglomerates**, in March 2026, amendments were introduced to the 'rule on developing and assessment of recovery plan of a commercial bank' according to which the NBG assesses the compliance of a recovery plan within six months.

A phased minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities framework continued to



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be implemented. For systemic commercial banks, the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities increased from 10% to 15%.

Commercial banks started contributing to the resolution fund from 2025.

As regards **insurance and occupational pensions**, there were no developments in the reporting period. Georgia should work towards aligning with the EU *acquis*, including the solvency II framework. The adoption and implementation of legislation on domestic motor third party liability (MTPL) insurance is still pending. Georgia is one of the few countries in the world that does not yet have mandatory domestic MTPL.

There was no progress on aligning Georgia's **financial market infrastructure** legislation and **securities markets and investment services** legislation with the EU *acquis*.

Concerning **sustainable and digital finance**, in January 2026, the NBG launched its green loan data dashboard and in September 2025, it introduced green collateral provisions. In February 2026, the NBG launched an updated environmental, social and governance reporting and disclosure form and amended the disclosure regulation for commercial and micro banks. Several legislative amendments were made to the regulatory framework for crypto asset service providers (CASPs), expanding the supervisory framework and broadening the supervisory mandate of the NBG, granting it the authority to exercise full prudential supervision over such entities.

### Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection

*EU rules protect consumers' economic interests and also ensure product safety, prevent dangerous imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also guarantees a high level of protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules for upholding patients' rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases.*

Consumer protection

On **horizontal aspects** and **non-safety-related issues**, consumer protection laws remain partially in line with the EU *acquis.* The institutional framework on consumer protection is in place. With regard to enforcement and redress, the main consumer protection authority, the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency (GCCA) continued its active role in the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network.

In the reporting period, the GCCA received a total of 1 868 consumer complaints along with 6 552 calls received through the consumer hotline. As a result of the GCCA's investigations, 157 traders were sanctioned for failing to comply with obligations set out in consumer protection law. 90% of all resolved cases were decided in favour of consumers (90% in the previous reporting period).

There was some progress in aligning Georgia's legal framework on **product safety-related issues** with the EU *acquis*. In April 2026, the Law on product safety and free movement code was amended to align with Regulation No 1025/2012 on European Standardisation. The amendments define the legal basis and functions of the Standardisation Council, the harmonisation of key definitions, and the introduction of safeguards to ensure impartiality and independence. National market surveillance legislation and processes are not aligned with the EU *acquis.*

Public health

As regards **public health**, Georgia continues to implement its national health strategy for 2022-2030 with the aim to achieve universal health coverage. Approximately 95% of the population is currently covered under the universal healthcare programme (total expenditures amounting to GEL 8 billion).



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On **eHealth**, the government adopted a national digital health strategy and action plan in September 2026. On **blood,** Georgia is not aligned with the EU *acquis* and is partially operationally compliant as the transition of blood establishments from profit-oriented to non-profit organisations continues. The central blood establishment was set up in September 2025 for ensuring the availability of blood and of its components throughout the country. On **tissues, cells and organs**, Georgia's legal framework is not aligned with the EU *acquis*, and significant gaps still remain in implementation, systems, and institutional capacity.

Georgia is partly aligned with the EU *acquis* on **tobacco control** and with the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Despite progress on reducing tobacco consumption, the positive trend remains fragile.

Access to **cancer treatment** for adults and children, including access to medicines, continues to improve, and a unified cancer screening registry and programme became fully operational in 2025. This contributed to a 143% increase in screening bookings compared with 2024 and an increase in screening participation rates to 41% (from 39% in 2024).

There was no progress on alignment with the EU *acquis* on **non-communicable diseases**. Georgia needs to continue to bolster its efforts on antimicrobial resistance.

**On communicable diseases***,* the national guideline for syphilis and congenital syphilis surveillance was approved in October 2025.

On **medical products,** pharmaceutical products placed on the Georgian market require as of October 2025 compliance with good manufacturing practice standards.

There was no progress on **health technology** assessment, cross-border healthcare or on **drug abuse prevention and harm reduction.**

On **mental health**, relevant services are being integrated into the primary healthcare system.

As regards **anti-corruption measures**, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Health, Labour and Social Affairs' budget has been subject to increased state audit and internal control mechanisms.

## CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17); social policy and employment (Chapter 19); industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and the customs union (Chapter 29).

### Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media

*The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the 83 universal availability of modern services.*

On **media regulation**, following the April 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, broadcasters and their online platforms remain prohibited from receiving financial and material support from foreign sources. Concerns about the independence, impartiality and expanded powers of the Georgian media regulator, the Communications Commission (ComCom), have increased. During the reporting period, the ComCom has started enforcement of its new regulatory prerogatives, expanded under the 2025 amendments to the Law on broadcasting, notably by overseeing broadcasters' content, finding three of them guilty of breach of impartiality, and imposing fines on them.

On **digital services**, Georgia started implementing the digital governance strategy 2025-2030, approved in April 2024, which focuses on data-driven governance, interoperability,



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and the modernisation of e-service. The national strategy for the development of the digital economy and information society 2025-2030 adopted in February 2025 aims to promote the integration of digital technologies across sectors. Responsibility for implementing the latter was transferred to the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. The strategy should pay due attention to compliance with accessibility standards and ensure barrier-free access to digital public services.

Georgia advanced the implementation of the Law on e-commerce through the adoption of e-commerce guidelines by the Georgian Competition and Consumer Agency, further contributing to alignment with the E-Commerce Directive and Consumer Rights Directive. Georgia made progress on digital inclusion, in particular by reducing gender and regional disparities in internet access. Women and men use internet at equal rates while regional disparities still remain. However, gender disparities remain significant in STEM education and professional pathways. Georgia has not yet established a national interoperability framework to align with the European Interoperability Framework and the Interoperable Europe Act.

On **electronic communications**, Georgia has not yet aligned with EU rules on geo-blocking and the platform-to-business relations. Alignment with the European Electronic Communications Code also remains pending. On 5G, 11 auctions were announced in the 700 MHz, 3 400-3 800 MHz, and 2 600 MHz frequency bands. Georgia has not yet aligned with the 5G cybersecurity toolbox to ensure that 5G roll-out is not based on high-risk suppliers.

On **digital trust and cybersecurity**, no progress was made.

On **artificial intelligence (AI)**, Georgia does not yet have a dedicated national AI strategy, although AI is included as a component of the strategy for the developments of the digital economy and information society 2025-2030. Existing national frameworks indirectly regulate or influence AI-related activities. Georgia should develop AI regulation and the necessary governance and enforcement structures in line with the EU AI Act.

### Chapter 16 - Taxation

*EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent tax evasion.*

Concerning **indirect taxation**, the Georgian Tax Code is partially aligned with the EU *acquis* on value added tax. As of January 2026, the import of investment gold is exempt from VAT, as well as the supply of investment gold with the right to deduct input tax.

There was no progress on alignment on **excise duties** on alcohol and alcoholic beverages and energy products. Amendments to the Tax Code were adopted and entered into force in April 2026 increasing excise duties on imported cars, discouraging imports of high-emission cars and encouraging newer, more efficient vehicles. Systems to inspect and monitor the movement of excisable products are in place. The Revenue Service continues to participate in the EU tax administration cooperation.

On **direct taxation**, rules on retained or reinvested profits, mergers, subsidiaries, interest and royalties remain not fully aligned with the EU *acquis*. Amendments to the implementing legislation on tax administration were adopted and entered into force in February 2026 adding new reporting requirements for international controlled transactions.

Concerning **administrative cooperation and mutual assistance**, amendments were introduced to the legislation regulating country-by-country reporting to ensure filing deadlines are within 12 months of the reporting fiscal year-end, in line with recommendations of the latest OECD peer review. Georgia has in place Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with all EU Member States.



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As regards **operational capacity and digitalisation**, the Revenue Service maintains a relatively strong staffing capacity and recruitment remained active, with 3 876 established positions and over 90% average occupancy, while the significant use of internal recruitment and internships indicates an established personnel pipeline. Georgia continued participating in the **EU Fiscalis** programme 2021-2027. The country continues cooperation on technical level with EU Member States' tax administrations on tax policy and digital initiatives, such as AI in taxation, also on anti-fraud tax measures.

### Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy

*EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic and financial surveillance.*

The primary objective of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) is to ensure price stability, which is in line with the EU **monetary policy** legislative framework. In March 2026, implementing legislation was adopted, in line with the IMF recommendations, to reallocate the powers and responsibilities among the Governor, the First Vice-Governor, the Vice-Governors, and the Executive Director of the Bank. The respective areas of supervision have also been redefined, and the procedures for appointing the NBG Governor have been enhanced. However, to strengthen the NBG's independence in line with the EU *acquis*, more progress should be done in enhancing board member qualification criteria and by adopting a collegial decision-making model.

On **economic policy**, the budgetary framework is considered overall strong and transparent. The Parliamentary Budget Office's independence needs to be further strengthened, in particular, by clarifying its mandate, qualification criteria and financial autonomy. The fiscal oversight over the general government sector continued to improve, in particular, over non-commercial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by gradually bringing their cash management under the single treasury account (STA). As of July 2026, 176 SOEs were covered under the STA.

### Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment

*EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality and non-discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and social dialogue at EU level.*

On **labour law**, major gaps remain in aligning the legal framework with the EU *acquis* and Georgia has not yet accepted to include several labour rights provisions under the European Charter of Social Rights. Georgia has still not ratified several ILO conventions, including those on labour inspections, occupational safety and health at work, maternity protection, minimum wage, social security and violence and harassment at work. The institutional framework is in place and should be further strengthened. The budget of the Labour Inspection Office and the number of employees increased by 8% and 14% respectively in 2026 against 2025. The Labour Inspection Office's mandate was extended with regard to the detection of illegal labour migration. The December 2024 amendments to the Law on public service had significant effects in 2025, substantially weakening their labour rights and facilitating the mass dismissal of civil servants. These developments are inconsistent with the principles of ILO Convention No. 158, particularly with respect to protection against arbitrary dismissal, job security and procedural fairness.

On occupational **health and safety at work,** there was limited progress to further align with the EU occupational safety and health *acquis* and 19 EU directives are yet to be aligned with. During 2025, 32 people died (33 in 2024) and 179 were injured (260 in 2024) as a result of accidents in the workplace. The number of incidents in general decreased by 28% (208 incidents in 2025; 290 incidents in 2024). Although the number of occupational accidents declined steadily, the incidence of fatal occupational accidents remains higher than the EU average.


On **social dialogue**, while the tripartite structures exist at the national level, the collective bargaining remains limited in practice mainly at enterprise level and it remains largely absent in the regions. There was no progress related to collective bargaining.

On **employment policy**, the national strategy of labour and employment policy remains to be adopted and employment-support measures continue to be implemented through annual state programmes. To improve the regulation of labour immigration, a dedicated department within the State Employment Support Agency has been established.

Regarding **labour force participation and unemployment rate** *see the statistical annex and the section on the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria.*

On **social protection and inclusion,** Georgia still lacks a comprehensive and targeted social protection system that supports employment policies. In 2025, the share of the population under the absolute poverty line reached its lowest level on record at 7.1% (down from 9.4% in 2024). The Gini coefficient decreased slightly in 2025, indicating a modest reduction in income and consumption inequality, although inequalities remain significant. A national strategy on the deinstitutionalisation of children and provision of alternative care is not in place. The de-institutionalisation of large-scale boarding homes for persons with disabilities is ongoing. The European Commission Guidance on independent living for persons with disabilities should be taken into account.

There remain important gaps in the legal, policy and strategic frameworks on **non-discrimination in employment and social policy.** There is no progress on the alignment with the Employment Equality Directive nor the Racial Equality Directive. Moreover, the enforcement of the national Law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination remains weak. The participation of persons with disabilities in the labour market remains a challenge.




As regards **equality between women and men in employment and social policy** only the basic principles and general provisions exist in current legislation. Women still face structural and institutional barriers that hinder the full realisation of their rights. Georgia made no progress on the legislative alignment with the EU gender equality *acquis*. Women's segregation by industry, occupation and degree concentration in humanities, education and healthcare confines them to economic activity with lower earnings. Unpaid household and care work by women is five times higher than that by men, mainly due to prevailing stereotypes and limited availability and accessibility of care and support services and local transportation, which are also the main reasons for women's limited participation in the labour market. Women are more likely to be the beneficiaries of state social assistance than men, and the gender pay gap shows women earn 32.1% less than men.

As regards the **European Social Fund (ESF)**, Georgia is not a participant or beneficiary of the ESF. *(See also Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments).*

## Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy

*EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change, and encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises.*

Regarding **industrial policy and competitiveness**, the industrial policy of Georgia is outlined in the development strategy 'Georgia-Vision 2030' and substantiated in the annual

government programmes, but without a dedicated industrial strategy nor annual implementation reports covering industry-targeting measures. There has been some limited progress on competitiveness, however, the relevant governance performance have declined.

In order to reduce global dependencies of sectors, including food and beverage processing, fertiliser, pharmaceutical and certain metal industries, investments are needed in infrastructure development and logistics, and anti-corruption measures should be strengthened.

The SME development strategy 2021-2025 has expired and a final evaluation was conducted.

As of April 2026, LEPL Enterprise Georgia, the state agency in charge of facilitating private sector and SME development, has been transformed into the Georgian Economic Development Corporation (GDEC). In parallel, the LEPL Public Private Partnership Agency has been renamed as LEPL Investment Agency and placed under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia. Its mandate has been expanded with additional responsibilities for investment and export support.

Enteprise Georgia and GDEC continued to implement the business universal programme. Changes to the programme were introduced in September 2025 including an increase in the co-financing of loan and leasing interest rates and new grant components in areas such as mountainous regions, agro-tourism, green initiatives, digitalisation, and research and development. New programmes on international trade and investment funds support were launched in July 2026. In November 2025, amendments to the Law on entrepreneurs were adopted that introduced provisions that were detrimental to the business and investment environment. In December 2025, the law establishing the Business Ombudsman was repealed, dissolving the Business Ombudsman Office, annulling the positions of the Business Ombudsman and Deputies, and weakening the government-enterprise consultation process.

On **enterprise policy and instruments regarding small and medium-sized enterprises**, there was no progress on aligning with the Late Payment Directive. Amendments on the application of special taxation regimes were adopted in February 2026, with impact on the rules for granting and administering the special tax regimes of taxpayers holding microbusiness and fixed taxpayer statuses.

In April 2026, a new Law on factoring was adopted, effective as of January 2027, to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with an additional instrument for access to finance.

Regarding sectoral policies, consultations on an action plan for the development of a circular economy have begun. In the tourism sector, no significant policy developments were reported during the reporting period.

## Chapter 25 - Science and research

*The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate in the EU's research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.*

Georgia continues to modernise its **research and innovation policy** framework as redefined by the national strategy of education and science 2022-2030, where among others Open Science principles including promotion of FAIR data practices, enhancing digital repositories, and creating EOSC-aligned infrastructures are embedded. While challenges remain – particularly in developing open data services and sustaining digital infrastructures– Georgia has made notable progress in aligning its national research and innovation system with EU Open Science *acquis,* while strengthening its engagement with the European Open Science Cloud (EOSC).



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Georgia progressed in enhancing innovation in line with the New European Innovation Agenda, however cooperation between research and industry, remains limited due to the lack of collaborative culture among research organisations, universities and private companies. Cooperation between universities, research centres and private companies is fragmented and often project-based. Industry demand for academic R&D is limited, universities have varying levels of capacity to support applied research and commercialisation, and mechanisms such as technology transfer, proof-of-concept funding, IP services and structured university-industry cooperation remain underdeveloped. On the design of smart specialisation strategies, there has been no progress regarding the extension to additional regions.

Georgia was included for the first time in the 2026 edition of the European Innovation Scoreboard, however it ranks 39th among EU and neighbouring countries out of 40. Georgia is an Emerging Innovator, performing at 20.7% of the EU average in 2026.

As regards the EU **framework programmes for research and innovation**, Georgia remains associated to Horizon Europe (since 2021) and participation of universities and research centres in this programme further increased in 2026. Universities and research centres continued to increase their participation in the Horizon Europe programme. In the reporting period, 17 grants with participation from Georgia were signed with a total EU net contribution of EUR 3.4 million.

Researchers from Georgia participated in 49,30% of actions of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST).

Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP remained broadly unchanged since 2023 and stood at 0.26% in 2026, which is significantly below the EU-27 average of 2.1% and the EU target of 3% of GDP.

### Chapter 26 - Education and culture

*The EU supports cooperation in education and culture by funding programmes and the coordination of Member State policy through the open method of coordination. The EU and its Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.*

Government expenditure on education in 2025 amounted to 3.9% of GDP, as in 2024, and is still below the EU average (4.7% of GDP in 2023). In February 2026, Parliament adopted amendments to the Laws on general education and on higher education. The Georgian higher education reform raises serious concerns regarding limited evidence, insufficient stakeholder participation, rapid and centralised implementation, and risks to fundamental values in particular academic freedom and institutional autonomy.

On **early childhood education and care** there was a slight decrease in enrolment of children aged two to three from 50.91% in 2024/2025 to 48.91% in 2025/2026 and a slight increase for children aged three to six from 79.26% in 2024/2025 to 80.76% in 2025/2026. In 2025, Georgia began implementation of the 2025-2030 authorisation process for early childhood and preschool institutions. In October 2025, a new curriculum for children aged two to six was introduced and capacity building for preschool education staff was implemented.

Regarding **school education**, in line with the broader education reform that Georgia introduced in early 2026, general school education was changed to eleven compulsory years of schooling and an optional twelfth grade.

Concerning **international assessments of school education**, according to the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2025 results, in Georgia, 55% of students attained at least basic proficiency (Level 2 or higher) in science, 47% in mathematics and 39% in reading. While results remain below the OECD average, they have improved when compared to PISA 2022. Georgia also took part to the Progress in International Reading



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Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2026.

On **vocational education and training** (VET), one new public vocational institution became operational in 2025. The number of VET programmes increased from 29 to 182 and their delivery was expanded to 63 additional public schools. The number of admitted VET students increased to 19 700 in 2025 (from 17 083 in 2024). The Vocational Skills Agency was abolished in October 2025 and its functions integrated in institutions including the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth.

On **higher education**, enrolment increased in 2025 from 2024 according to "The European Higher Education Area in 2024" Bologna Process Implementation Report. The membership of the National Centre for Educational Quality Enhancement in the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) remains suspended and has been given action points by the partial review panel.

Regarding **inclusive education**, the Ministry has not yet adopted the 2026-2027 inclusive education action plan. Budgetary support increased by 13% in 2026 from 2025. In October 2025, the strategic and Inclusive Development Department was set up following the abolition of the department of inclusive education in April 2025.

Georgia continues to benefit from the international dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme, yet, in response to political developments in the country, as of 2026 Georgian authorities are not eligible under any Erasmus+ actions. The political developments further precluded any preparation for full association to Erasmus+.

The 2026 **youth** strategy action plan of the 2023-2026 youth strategy was adopted in June 2026, including 130 activities with a total budget of approximately GEL 30 million. A national survey of youth needs was conducted, covering all regions of Georgia.

Georgia continues to take part in the European Week of **Sport**.

The dialogue on **cultural** policy between the government and civil society remains halted. Georgia continues to participate in the Culture and Cross-Sectoral strands of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 programme and partially in the MEDIA strand.

### Chapter 29 - Customs union

*All EU Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and procedures. This requires legislative alignment, as well as adequate implementing and enforcement capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment.*

Georgia took some steps to align its **customs legislation** with the Union Customs Code (UCC). In December 2025, amendments to the Customs Code were adopted and entered into force in January 2026. The amendments introduced simplified customs formalities for members of the WTO Golden List when importing goods and/or exporting personal belongings, and the enactment of Book X not before 1 January 2028. Georgia should continue aligning along progressive application of the new UCC.

The joint centre for the prevention, detection and suppression of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and related joint working groups were established in January 2026.

On **administrative and operational capacity** of the customs service, Georgia improved its customs digitalisation and risk management. However, the customs service needs to strengthen its capacity regarding customs IT and interoperability, advanced risk analysis, operational controls and integrity, to align with the Union Customs Code and the EU electronic customs environment.

Smuggling of tobacco products and other illicit activities in the regions close to the occupied breakaway regions remains a concern. There was little reported progress on strengthening measures to combat customs fraud and on acceding to the WHO FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.



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Georgia should strengthen its efforts to combat customs fraud, in particular the smuggling of tobacco products and by cooperating with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

As a member of the Common Transit Convention, Georgia is preparing for the next stage of the New Computerised Transit System Phase 6 Opt-in to combine transit declaration with safety and security data. Georgia is also finalising the acceptance of the administrative arrangement on Anti-Fraud Transit Information System.

Concerning the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) system, as of April 2026, 30 companies have an AEO status.

## CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY


The cluster on Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity covers: transport policy (Chapter 14); energy (Chapter 15); trans-European networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).

### Chapter 14 - Transport policy

*The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, multimodal transport, aviation and maritime transport.*

On **general transport**, the national transport and logistics strategy is being implemented. Improvements are needed in harmonising legislation and strengthening sustainability and multimodal integration.

Regarding **road transport**, Georgia had a higher fatality rate than the EU average. In 2025, there were 5 969 crashes with 469 fatalities (against 5 866 crashes with 444 fatalities in 2024). Legislation to prevent road fatalities and injuries came into force in May 2026. A new road safety strategy and action plan were adopted in August 2026.




Georgian legislation is not fully aligned with the EU *acquis*, especially on regulations on driving and rest times, regarding legislation on the social and market *acquis* in road transport, and intelligent transport systems.

On **rail transport,** amendments to the Railway Code on the protection of cargo and rail transport facilities were adopted in March 2026. The legal framework on transport of dangerous goods, certification of train drivers, interoperability of the rail system and safety on railways remains partially aligned with the EU *acquis*. Amendments to align the Railway Code with European standards on railway interoperability have not been adopted yet.

On **maritime transport**, the maritime single window system is operational across all ports but is not yet aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/1239. The Maritime Code of Georgia was further aligned with the updated regulatory framework of the International Maritime Organization.

Legislative amendments related to **inland waterway transport** during the reporting period facilitated a new inland waterway register, introduced rules for the registration of inland water vessels, and strengthened the safety rules governing inland waterway transport. On **civil aviation,** Georgia has further aligned with Regulation (EU) 2015/340 on certification of air traffic controllers. Georgia's accession to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile



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Equipment as Applied to Aircraft Objects entered into force in December 2025.

No progress was made on **multimodal transport**. Georgia has not yet aligned with the Combined Transport Directive.

### Chapter 15 - Energy

*EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards.*

Regarding **security of supply**, the adoption of a preventive action plan and emergency plan, to align with the requirements of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, is pending. In the electricity sector, Georgia transposed the Risk-preparedness Regulation (2019/941) and prepared its risk-preparedness plan.

Regarding **internal energy market**, Georgia has not yet aligned with the Electricity Integration Package. While provisions on unbundling and market opening have been partially implemented, the 2024 amendments to the Law on state property necessary for unbundling the transmission system operator of electricity and gas (TSO) need to be strengthened by secondary legislation. Further progress has been made in 2026 with the electricity TSO completing the divestment of its shares in a trading company.

**On oil security of supply,** Georgia remains largely non-compliant with the requirements of Directive 2009/119/EC, with no effective system of mandatory emergency oil stocks in place. Since 2024, domestic refining capacity has become one of the key elements of the country's energy security and energy independence strategy, leading to increasing mineral fuel export. This has been driven predominantly by the newly commissioned Kulevi refinery, where Russian crude oil became the largest import source. As part of the 21st package of EU restrictive measures against Russia, the Council imposed a transaction ban on the Kulevi refinery. The measure will take effect after a six-month wind-down period, unless the Kulevi refinery demonstrates it has shifted to alternative crude supplies, subject to monitoring. It remains uncertain whether the oil trading flow volume can be sustained. Despite commercial growth, Georgia still needs to develop a balanced oil security policy.

In the **electricity** sector, the retail electricity market is not yet fully aligned with the EU *acquis.* Electricity production is still largely regulated, with some limited progress made in May 2026, with deregulation of hydropower plants commissioned before August 2008 and with a design capacity not exceeding 90 MW. Further deregulation is scheduled until 2027 for hydro power plants with a capacity below 120 MW.

On **renewable energy**, the national energy and climate plan (NECP) adopted in 2024 includes 2030 renewable targets in line with Energy Community 2030 targets. Alignment with the Renewable Energy Directive (REDII) is pending. Provisions related to the sustainability and greenhouse gas emission saving criteria for biofuels, bioliquids and biomass from REDII have not been introduced yet.

No progress was made regarding **energy efficiency**, including in the area of energy performance of buildings. Georgia should adopt a long-term national building renovation plan.

All 14 implementing legislations to align with the EU *acquis* on **energy labelling** entered into force on 1 January 2026. According to the Law on energy labelling, the Georgian Market Surveillance Agency under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development is the implementing entity responsible for inspecting and monitoring the given law and technical regulation.

On **governance**, the 2024 NECP is in line with EU requirements. No further progress was made during the reporting period.



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On **nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection,** Georgia still has to align with and implement the Directives on nuclear safety; the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste; basic safety standards and drinking water. Georgia also still has to consider accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

On **nuclear safeguards**, no further alignment with the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty or its secondary legislation was done, instead Georgia aligned with the safeguards provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

### Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks

*The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment.*

The **trans-European transport networks** (TEN-T) are extended to Georgia. The Georgian indicative network consists of 714 km of railways (of which 585 km are on the core network), 855 km of motorways (of which 768 km are on the core network), three ports (one of which is core) and one core airport. Georgia has not aligned its framework with TEN-T regulation (EU) 2024/1679. Its national transport strategy does not include clear priorities to align with the regulation.

Georgia continued to upgrade its road infrastructure in line with TEN-T compliance standards. The road infrastructure quality of the core network is satisfactory, but significant work is still needed to ensure compliance with TEN-T standards in view of the 2030 deadline for the completion of the core network. The E 60 Chumateleti - Khevi section was opened in December 2025. Construction of the Grigoleti - Kobuleti road section of the E-70 highway is not yet finalised.

On railways, bottlenecks identified on the core network have been addressed via the railway modernisation project, which was completed end 2025. No progress was made during the reporting period with regard to the TEN-T railway compliance indicators on line speed, train length or track gauge. Georgian Railways has not implemented the European Rail Traffic Management System. Around half of the core rail network is reported to be in average condition with the rest in poor condition. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (cargo) resumed operations after modernisation works. Passenger services between Tbilisi and Baku have also resumed.

The construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port continued including dredging works and construction of the breakwater. During the reporting period, the state budget allocation for the development of the port was substantially reduced by 60% and works were stalled for several months. In July 2026, the development model was changed to a landlord port model with full ownership of the government. Digitalisation of maritime transport continued.

On energy networks, Georgia has not aligned with the old TEN-E Regulation (EU) 347/2013. The revised TEN-E is currently not applicable to Georgia. However, Georgia is working on the transposition of the TEN-E Regulation, also to support the implementation of the interconnection between Anaklia (GE) and Constanta Sud (RO), which received the status of Project of Mutual Interest (PMI) in the Second PCI and PMI list (EU) 2026/764.

### Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change

*The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing horizontal environmental issues, climate change, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection.*

Environment

On **horizontal legislation,** Georgia is partially aligned with the EU *acquis*. Limited and unstable administrative capacity continue to impact the **implementation, monitoring and**



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**enforcement** of the environmental policy. During the reporting period, the Law on environmental liability was amended to strengthen the administrative compliance mechanism. No progress was achieved to improve the quality of the preparation and implementation of environmental investments, including the transparency of procedures, compliance with the environment impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment. The Espoo Convention Protocol on strategic environmental assessment has not been ratified yet.

On **air quality,** the capacity to assess the health impact of air pollution was strengthened by moving towards an integrated system linking air quality data with public health analysis. As of April 2026, the initial and temporary registration of M1 category vehicles older than six years is prohibited. The restriction does not apply to electric vehicles. Ten new air quality monitoring stations have been installed, increasing the availability of air quality data for modelling and forecasting purposes.

On **waste management** and circular **economy,** alignment with EU legislation is low. The majority of municipalities have developed waste management plans. Regulations to prohibit the import, production and use of certain single-use plastics in the food industry were adopted during the reporting period. Further amendments to the Waste Management Code, include responsibilities to establish a hazardous waste landfill, but remove the obligation to draft a strategy for the management of biodegrable waste.

On **water quality**, two pieces of implementing legislation of the Law on water resource management were adopted during the reporting period, further aligning the national legislative framework with the Water Framework Directive. Georgia is moving on with the implementation regarding the boundaries of river basins and river basin districts as well as the establishment and operation of river basin management advisory and coordination councils. The river basin management plan for the Kura River is not finalised. The monitoring network for surface water and groundwater has been further expanded. In December 2025, Armenia and Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation on transboundary water monitoring for the Khrami-Debed river basin, taking a step forward to coordinate water protection efforts.

On **nature protection,** Georgia's legislation is partially aligned with the *acquis***.** The Emerald Network covers 18% of national territory which is on track to reach the 30.8% target by 2030. Pre-designated sites that will be covered by the Natura 2000 network have not been identified. Protected areas currently cover 14.26% of the national territory. The Forest Code was amended in June 2026, with provisions to strengthen forest protection. Georgia needs to update its national biodiversity strategy and action plan. The draft Law on biodiversity is not adopted yet. The national forestry inventory covers 55% of forests. The introduction of a new timber production system was postponed until 2027.

In the area of **industrial pollution control and risk management**, implementing acts of the Law on industrial pollution have been adopted during the reporing period, creating an integrated environmental permit. Work towards the creation of a single national pollutant release and transfer register needs to be accelerated.

On **chemicals**, including also biocidal products, the level of alignment with the *acquis* remains low. A national action plan on peristent pollutants was adopted during the reporting period, and amendments to the rules for the export and import of certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides further aligned the national legislation with international conventions. Georgia is at a low level of alignment with the EU **noise** legislation. Amendments laying down the noise norms have not been implemented. Strategic noise maps and action plans have not been prepared.

On **civil protection**, no progress was made as regards to Georgia's cooperation with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. However, the country continued to strengthen its system. Georgia has developed an integrated wildfire risk map for the Kvemo Kartli region.



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Additionally, Georgia, in cooperation with Armenia, has created a strategy for shared climate-security risks and future emergencies. The national hydro meteorological observation network was expanded by two new monitoring stations reaching a total of 275 active monitoring stations.

Climate change

On **climate change**, some progress was registered over the reporting period. Georgia amended its law on environmental protection in May 2026, introducing the regulatory framework for monitoring, reporting, verification of greenhouse gas emissions at installation level and accreditation of verifiers (MRVA). The framework still needs to be operationalised by January 2028. In March 2026, Georgia submitted its third nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement for the period up to 2035.

However, administrative capacity and human and financial resources remain low, affecting Georgia's ability to implement the climate *acquis*. Georgia is still working on a climate change law as well as a national adaptation plan.

## CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION

Cluster 5 on resources, agriculture and cohesion covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 33).

### Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development

*The EU's common agricultural policy supports farmers and contributes to ensuring Europe's food security. It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming.*

**On horizontal issues**, the budget allocated to the implementation of the rural development and agriculture strategy was increased by 12% from 2024 to 2025, amounting to EUR 426 million and including 13 state support programmes for a total of EUR 100 million.

Implementation of the agricultural and rural development strategy of Georgia for 2021-2027 advanced as reported by the new strategic coordination and analytics department of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture.

The state co-financing support programme, launched in July 2026 and managed by the Rural Development Agency, aims to modernise strategic value chains for primary production, storage and processing. The programme provides for the mandatory registration of applicants in the digitalised registry of farms and rural enterprises.

As of July 2026, the digitalised registry is operational and the procedure for the management of the registry and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) has been approved. However, the resulting unified database may not necessarily reflect the diversity of the households' agricultural activities.

An initial data collection was conducted among state support programme beneficiaries to elaborate a Farm Sustainability Data Network.

On **agricultural markets - common market organisation**, alignment with the EU *acquis* remains limited and is mostly related to certain marketing standards, including spirit drinks as of December 2025. In June 2026, amendments to the Law on vine and wine were adopted, ensuring traceability and quality control under the supervision of the National Wine Agency. Georgia has yet to adopt legislation on producer organisations.



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On **rural development**, the integrated data management department within the Rural Development Agency includes two new divisions: the agricultural land parcels registry management and the farmers and rural enterprises registry management divisions.

As regards **quality policy**, no progress was made during the reporting period except for the applicable measures for wine market standards in the amended Law on vine and wine.

On **organic farming**, no progress was made during the reporting period.

On the **fight against corruption**, the agricultural parcels registry management division conducts field inspections, in line with the approved standard operating procedures, focusing on the monitoring of the efficiency of the implementation of the state agricultural co-financing programme.

## Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy

*The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers' interests. Animal health and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with plant health, the quality of seeds, plant reproductive material, animal nutrition and the use of plant protection products.*

In the area of **general food safety,** Georgia has yet to put in place a comprehensive range of food safety laboratory analysis. Georgia has still to clarify the scope of methods and analysis covered by the State Laboratory of Agriculture as a national reference laboratory, in order to align with the EU *acquis* on official checks. Five out of ten border inspection posts need to be upgraded with infrastructure and equipment to equally conduct the risk-based control system for food importers in each border control post. Georgia has yet to put in place a food consumption database to assess the exposure of various population groups to food additives, contaminants and other substances in food supply and to address risks regarding food-borne diseases.

On **veterinary policy**, Georgia has to increase efforts to align its animal health legislation with the EU's animal health policy and *acquis,* as well as ensure its implementation. The effectiveness of the one health national action plan on antimicrobial resistance is hampered by the regulatory gaps in veterinary medicinal product management and oversight. Georgia's animal welfare practices and legislation are not yet aligned with the EU's animal welfare policy and *acquis*. The compensation system for anthrax control was extended to rabies contracted by large ruminants. The national animal identification system (NAITS) for domestic animals now expands to include aquaculture functionality.

As regards the **placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products**, the National Food Agency continued to carry out risk-based official checks. The traceability system engaging the primary responsibility of food business operators (FBOs) for food safety and quality is to be strengthened to ensure comprehensive coverage of registered FBOs throughout the food chains. Further efforts are necessary to improve private sector awareness and self-monitoring of food safety. The implementation of the control system for monitoring salmonella started in 2026.

An EU compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products is not yet in place and has to be developed. In December 2025, Georgia adopted legislation on health requirements for animal by-products.

On **food safety rules** and its **specific rules for feed**, Georgia has yet to complete the revision of its hazard analysis and critical control points requirements, to introduce simplified food safety rules for low-risks FBOs in consistency with risk analysis and EU *acquis*.

On **phytosanitary policy,** further work remains necessary to improve the implementation of the use of pesticides. While the list of authorised pesticides is automatically aligned with EU regulation updates, the recognition of pesticide professionals and their certification remain



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pending, subject to the adoption of new regulations in alignment with the EU plant health *acquis*. There was no significant progress on plant health legislation and substantial further work remains necessary on **genetically modified organisms** risk assessment and market authorisation processes.

On the **marketing of seed and other plant reproductive material**, the country still needs to fully align its national legislation with the EU acquis on the rules plant (PRM) and forest reproductive material (FRM). Georgia should as a next step focus on establishing the necessary institutional frameworks and capacities to implement and enforce functioning systems for the certification of seed and other PRM and FRM.

### Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture

*The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.*

Existing legislation sets out basic requirements such as the obligation of the flag state, coastal state, port state and market state. An initial fisheries development concept has been prepared in 2025 focusing on socio-economic development of coastal and rural areas.

On **fisheries resources,** the National Environment Agency (NEA) strengthened its capacities with additional human resources and equipment to assess stocks and support sustainable demersal fishing and pelagic fisheries management. NEA has not yet issued catch certificates. Regarding **data collection**, the NEA fisheries and aquaculture division has to improve its reporting on coastal fisheries and aquaculture to fulfil its obligations under the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (GFCM), where Georgia participates as a cooperating non-contracting party.

A **fleet management** system is in place for the anchovy fishery, with a fishing vessel register in place, as well as monitoring of fishing activities. Five anchovy licence holders are closely monitored under a licensing agreement and quota management system. The fisheries control system of their activities is based on a comprehensive **inspection and control** system instead of a risk assessment and real-time recording of catches is ensured through electronic logbooks, tracking router, and online video surveillance. However, traceability of the catches and monitoring of the fishing activities of the small-scale coastal fleet not targeting anchovy is not ensured. Georgia needs to step up its efforts to implement the GFCM recommendations on compliance.

Georgia has no specific **structural action** for fisheries. There has been no uptake by fishing license holders of available measures providing credit loans to modernise the fleet.

On **market policy**, no progress was made during the reporting period. Fishing and aquaculture associations remain fragmented and are not yet engaged in production planning or marketing.

On **aquaculture,** the implementation of the Law on aquaculture is ongoing but challenges remain. In 2025, more than 130 permits were delivered to registered farms (35% of the estimated total number of farms). Export authorisation to the EU was requested by the National Food Agency (NFA) in March 2025. In 2026, the NFA resubmitted to the Commission the results of its annual residue control plan.

On international agreements, Georgia continued to participate in GFCM meetings and other international relevant meetings and should aim for a full membership.

### Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments

*Regional policy is the EU's main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through shared*

*management between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public procurement legislation.*

Georgia has not yet established a comprehensive **legislative framework** for regional development or cohesion policy. Implementation of the high mountain settlements development strategy 2024-2030 and its 2024-2026 action plan continued during the reporting period. Progress was reported in planning, coordination mechanisms and stakeholder engagement, as well as in local infrastructure and service delivery. However, evidence of a sustained reduction in regional disparities remains limited. Monitoring and evaluation systems, the use of performance indicators and institutional implementation capacity require further strengthening to ensure measurable policy impact.

Regarding the **institutional framework,** following its establishment as a separate ministry in April 2025, the Ministry of Regional Development focused primarily on institutional consolidation, coordination with regional authorities and municipal planning initiatives. Tangible policy outcomes and measurable improvements in regional development implementation remain low. Public reporting and access to documents is limited with lack of transparency.

On **administrative capacity,** the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure and the state representatives in the regions have basic financial and administrative resources to coordinate and monitor the policy implementation.

On **programming, there has been no advancement in the** implementation of 2024-2030 smart specialisation strategy for the Imereti region. Georgia continued to participate constructively in the Interreg 2021-2027 NEXT Black Sea Basin programme.

On **monitoring and evaluation**, the Ministry of Regional Development prepared a semi-annual monitoring report for 2025 and a yearly consolidated monitoring report for the NUTS 2025 action plan. However, public access to monitoring documents remains limited, affecting transparency and accountability.

On **financial management, control and audit**, no progress was recorded in the reporting period.

On the **fight against corruption**, the Law on the prevention of corruption applies to regional development programmes. Procedures for reporting and handling irregularities are in place, including the designation of an irregularity officer within the relevant authority.

## Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions

*This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget ('own resources'). These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value added tax. EU Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.*

On **traditional own resources**, Georgia has structures in place to levy customs duties at the point of import. It operates a national VAT system *(Information on Revenue Administration and taxes is provided in Chapter 16)*. Georgia's 2019 Law on customs is not fully aligned with the Union Customs Code.

On **administrative infrastructure**, the Ministry of Finance has the overall responsibility for financial and budgetary issues, with the Revenue Service in charge of tax and customs issues as a legal entity of public law under the Ministry. The Revenue Service should strengthen its operational capacity.



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The legal and institutional framework is not aligned with the EU's own resources system. There is a lack of administrative and IT capacity, and a need for establishing effective mechanisms for the calculation, control, and reporting of own resources.

## CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS

There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30); foreign, security and defence policy (Chapter 31).

### Chapter 30 - External relations

*The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy.*

On the **common commercial policy**, Georgia continued to demonstrate good administrative capacity to manage its commitments in external commercial relations, as a World Trade Organisation member. DCFTA implementation has continued. In November 2025, Georgia signed the Ministerial Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Trade and Investment Facilitation Partnership Agreement that aims at improving market access and economic diversification in the region.

In the area of **dual-use goods**, the 2013 Law on the control of military and dual-use goods, amended in 2019, continues to regulate the export of dual-use goods. A draft national control list 'On the Establishment of an EU Control Regime for the Export, Brokering, Technical Assistance, Transit and Transfer of Dual-Use Items' has been prepared in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/821 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2547, and legal procedures are underway to adopt it as a normative act. As regards export controls of goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, Georgia is yet to develop its legislation in line with the EU *acquis* on anti-torture. Georgia is a member of the Alliance for Torture-Free Trade. Georgia is not a member of multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Georgia has yet to align with the EU *acquis* on the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI).

Regarding **bilateral trade agreements with third countries**, Georgia is a party to 16 free trade agreements, including with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Preferential agreements are in place with some countries with whom the EU does not have preferential agreements: Azerbaijan, China, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates. In December 2025, Georgia and Serbia signed the Joint Statement on the initiation of Free Trade Agreement negotiations. In April 2026, Georgia and China signed a formal protocol to amend and upgrade the existing 2018 Free Trade Agreement, adding new cooperation areas in e-commerce, investment, and sanitary measures.

Georgia has **bilateral investment treaties** with 35 third countries, out of which 16 treaties with 17 EU Member States. The regulatory framework for international cooperation in **development policy and humanitarian aid** remains to be developed. Georgia remains primarily a recipient of aid programmes rather than a donor. A legislative framework on humanitarian aid and the allocation of dedicated funds remains to be set up. Dedicated administrative structures are still not in place. Georgia has still not developed legislation on development policy nor an administrative structure for it.

### Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy

*Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU action, and apply agreed restrictive*

*measures.*

There was no **political dialogue** between the EU and Georgia on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) during the reporting period due to downgraded political contacts by the EU in response to the serious democratic backsliding undertaken by the Georgian authorities.

Georgia's alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on **restrictive measures** (sanctions) continued to decrease during the reporting period and remains low, with an alignment rate of **38% as of 1 September 2026,** against 40% in 2025. Georgia has not fully aligned with the majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, and not fully aligned with EU statements, notably those related to Iran, Russia's malicious cyber ecosystem, or Israel/Lebanon.

In November 2025, Georgia committed to stop the re-export of Economically Critical Goods, a list of 30 items crucial to Russia's war effort. Georgia's commitment to prevent circumvention of EU sanctions through its territory is monitored closely. The number of direct flights with Russia continued to increase significantly.

As part of the 21st package of EU restrictive measures against Russia, the Council listed three entities based, or recently based, in Georgia providing crypto-assets services. It also imposed a transaction ban on the Kulevi refinery for its involvement in the trading and processing of Russian oil. This measure will take effect after a six-month wind-down period, unless the Kulevi refinery demonstrates it has shifted to alternative crude supplies, subject to monitoring. In addition, the EU Sanction Envoy reiterated with the Georgian authorities the need to prevent circumvention of sanctions against Russia, notably with respect to energy and the financial sector.

Georgia broadly aligned with a number of international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the United Nation's Human Rights Council, and the Council of Europe.

Notably, in December 2025, Georgia signed the convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine regarding claims for damages, loss, or injury caused by Russia's invasion. On 24 February 2026, Georgia voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution 'Support for Lasting Peace in Ukraine' and the General Assembly Resolution on 'Return of Ukrainian Children'. However, Georgia did not join the Enlarged Partial Agreement establishing the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

Georgia is a member of various **international organisations**, including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and has formally put forward its candidacy for OSCE Chairmanship in 2027. Georgia also successfully campaigned for a World Health Organisation Executive Board Seat. For the second year in a row, Georgia did not participate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Georgia was a member of the Human Rights Council until the end of 2025.

While defence cooperation with NATO continues, some aspects of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package have been partially reduced. Overall, Georgia continues to aspire to NATO membership but did not contribute troops directly to active NATO-led combat or peacekeeping operations during the reporting period. Georgia should still develop a new national action plan on Women, Peace and Security.

Georgia engages in **disarmament and non-proliferation** at international, regional, and bilateral levels. It aligned with certain EU statements at the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and regularly aligns with the EU at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, particularly on nuclear



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safety, security, and safeguards. At the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meetings, its alignment with the EU has been inconsistent. On Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Georgia showed commitment to the UN Programme of Action on SALW and collaborates with the EU to combat illicit proliferation. It is also a party to the Arms Trade Treaty, where it aligns with EU positions. Georgia has not joined the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. On arms export control, Georgia largely aligns with the EU Common Position 2008/944.

On **security measures**, the necessary procedures to make the agreement on security procedures for the exchange and protection of classified information operational were concluded in 2024.

As regards the **common security and defence policy (CSDP),** Georgia did not participate in **EU CSDP missions and operations** since its last participation in 2023. Security and defence cooperation has not progressed, due to the political developments in the country.

Cooperation with the EU on **hybrid threats** as well as on countering foreign information manipulation and interference with the authorities is on hold. Georgian authorities continued to actively spread disinformation narratives and conspiracy theories, primarily targeting the EU, its Member States, EU enlargement process and EU officials.

## ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND GEORGIA

Georgia applied for EU membership on 3 March 2022. The European Council recognised the European perspective for Georgia in June 2022. Georgia was granted candidate status in December 2023, on the understanding that it takes the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023. On 27 June 2024, the European Council concluded that the Georgian government's course of action jeopardised Georgia's EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. This was reiterated by the European Council on 17 October 2024 and 19 December 2024.

There was no political dialogue between the EU and Georgia during the reporting period due to the serious democratic backsliding in the country.

The EU and Georgia signed an **Association Agreement** (AA) in June 2014, which entered into force in July 2016. The **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)** is an integral part of the Agreement. The Agreement provides the foundations for political association and economic integration. Yearly political and economic dialogue between the EU and Georgia, as well as subcommittee meetings under the AA/DCFTA structure remained halted. The Association Council last met in February 2024, the Association Committee in Trade Configuration in December 2023, and the Association Committee in July 2023. The Parliamentary Association Committee last met in June 2023.

The EU is Georgia's first trading partner. In 2025, total EU-Georgia trade in goods reached approximately EUR 5.18 billion, with Georgia exporting EUR 873 million to the EU and importing EUR 4.3 billion. The EU accounts for approximately 12% of Georgia's total exports and 25.4% of its imports.

In addition to the AA/DCFTA structures, a **Human Rights Dialogue** with Georgia has been in place since 2009 and usually convenes annually. The Human Rights Dialogue was not held in the reporting period. The High-Level Strategic and Security Dialogue, taking forward cooperation on foreign and security policy, was last held in January 2024.

Since its launch in 2009, Georgia has participated in the **Eastern Partnership (EaP)**.

The Georgian government does not exercise effective control over the **occupied breakaway regions** of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and has been engaged since 2008 in peaceful conflict resolution efforts, including through the EU Monitoring Mission and the work of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EU Monitoring Mission is the only international presence on the ground.

Citizens of Georgia have enjoyed **visa-free travel to the Schengen** area since March 2017. A **readmission agreement** between the European Union and Georgia has been in place since 2011. As part of the visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism, the Commission has been regularly assessing the progress made by the country in implementing reforms introduced under the visa roadmap. In its 7th and 8th reports under the visa suspension mechanism, published in December 2024 and December 2025, the Commission urged Georgia to take urgent action to address its recommendations, particularly related to fundamental rights, anti-discrimination and anti-corruption. Following a formal inquiry in July 2025, the European Commission determined that the Georgian authorities failed to implement necessary corrective actions and instead enacted further restrictive legislative acts contradicting Georgia's commitments on fundamental freedoms. In light of Georgia's continued breach of the benchmarks underpinning the visa-free regime granted by the EU, the Commission activated the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism for an initial period of 12 months, as of 6 March 2026. The first phase of this enforcement targets holders of diplomatic, service, and official passports, effectively ending their visa-free travel across all EU Member States. An enhanced dialogue with Georgia took place in June 2026, with a view to remedying the circumstances that led to the suspension. This enhanced dialogue did not lead to progress with regard to the Commission's concerns underpinning the suspension.

**Bilateral financial assistance** was further reviewed following the continued democratic backsliding. Since 2024, the EU has withheld EUR 121.3 million of bilateral funds directly benefiting the Georgian authorities under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument – Global Europe 2021-2027 (NDICI-GE).

Since 2014, Georgia has **participated in EU programmes**. It currently takes part in Horizon Europe, Creative Europe, EU4Youth, the Customs Programme, Fiscalis and the transnational cooperation Interreg programme Black Sea Basin. Since 2024, Georgia's association to new EU programmes has been paused. Organisations and individuals from Georgia can also benefit from certain actions of the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps Programme.

## ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX

**STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026)**

**Georgia****

| **Basic data** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population (thousand) | | : | 3 729 i | 3 689 i | 3 736 i | 3 695 i | 3 705 i |
| Total area of the country (km²) | | 69 700 w | 69 700 w | 69 700 w | 69 700 w | 69 700 w | 69 700 w |

| **National accounts** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) | 1) | 29 138 w | 60 724 w | 72 860 w | 80 883 w | 93 022 w | 104 598 pw |
| Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) | 1) | 13 188 w | 15 921 w | 23 662 w | 28 464 w | 31 597 w | 33 785 pw |
| GDP per capita (euro) | 1) | 3 547 w | 4 293 w | 6 374 w | 7 661 w | 8 541 w | 9 120 pw |
| GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) | 1) | 5.1 w | 10.6 w | 11.0 w | 7.8 w | 9.7 w | 7.5 pw |
| Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) | | - 1 iw | - 2 iw | 5 iw | 4 iw | 5 iw | : |
| Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the previous year (%) | 1) | 6 w | 13 w | 5 w | 4 w | 4 w | 8 pw |
| Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) | 1) | 7 w | - 3 w | 2 w | 4 w | 2 w | - 3 pw |
| Nominal unit labour cost index based on persons (3 year % change) | 1) | 18.9 iw | 23.0 iw | 37.7 iw | 44.9 iw | 56.8 piw | : |
| Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU average (EU-27 = 100) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| **Gross value added by main sectors** | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) | 1) 2) | 10.4 w | 8.3 w | 7.6 w | 6.9 w | 6.3 w | 5.9 pw |
| Industry (%) | 1) 2) | 13.7 w | 16.9 w | 16.5 w | 14.1 w | 14.0 w | 13.2 pw |
| Construction (%) | 1) 2) | 6.5 w | 7.3 w | 8.0 w | 7.6 w | 8.5 w | 8.0 pw |
| Services (%) | 1) 2) | 69.4 w | 67.5 w | 67.9 w | 71.4 w | 71.2 w | 72.9 pw |
| Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) | 1) | 90.2 w | 95.6 w | 85.7 w | 83.6 w | 83.3 w | 84.5 pw |
| Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) | 1) | 18.4 w | 20.8 w | 19.8 w | 21.5 w | 21.3 w | 19.0 pw |
| Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 40.9 w | 42.7 w | 52.5 w | 49.3 w | 47.8 w | 47.4 pw |
| Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 52.9 w | 58.9 w | 62.2 w | 57.9 w | 55.6 w | 53.2 pw |
| Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) | 1) | 4 w | 6 w | 6 w | 7 w | 7 w | : |

| **Business** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Number of active enterprises (number) | | 59 028 w | 139 741 w | 149 110 w | 162 891 w | 182 894 w | : |
| Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%) | 3) | 22.4 w | 21.2 w | 29.5 w | 25.2 w | 22.3 w | : |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%) | 3) | 21.6 w | 17.5 w | 17.9 w | 12.8 w | 12.3 w | : |
| People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial business economy) (%) | | 68.1 iw | 63.4 iw | 61.9 iw | 61.4 iw | 62.4 iw | : |
| Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) | | 3 542 iw | 4 647 iw | 7 199 iw | 8 866 iw | 10 154 iw | : |
| Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) | | 5 494 w | 7 300 w | 11 741 w | 14 016 w | 15 802 w | : |

| **Inflation rate and house prices** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) | | | : | : | 11.8 w | 2.1 w | 1.7 w |

| **Balance of payments** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) | | - 715.3 w | - 1 642.7 w | - 1 013.7 w | - 1 576.6 w | - 1 684.7 w | - 933.1 w |
| Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) | | - 2 638.0 w | - 3 211.4 w | - 4 873.7 w | - 5 620.1 w | - 6 069.7 w | - 6 068.0 w |
| Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) | | 1 068.8 w | 618.9 w | 2 595.1 w | 3 179.4 w | 3 588.9 w | 4 082.4 w |
| Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) | | - 239.2 w | - 1 002.1 w | - 1 659.1 w | - 2 213.5 w | - 2 321.1 w | - 2 102.6 w |
| Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) | | 1 093.1 w | 1 952.0 w | 2 924.0 w | 3 077.5 w | 3 117.1 w | 3 155.2 w |
| Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) | | 740.7 w | 816.5 w | 1 142.4 w | 766.3 w | 737.7 w | 971.7 w |
| *3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) | | - 9.5 iw | - 9.6 iw | - 9.0 iw | - 6.7 iw | - 5.1 iw | - 5.4 iw |
| *Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) | | 65.6 w | - 2.3 w | 27.5 w | 38.5 w | 31.5 w | 111.1 w |
| Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) | | 695.8 w | 802.4 w | 1 809.0 w | 1 515.7 w | 1 058.7 w | 1 211.0 w |
| Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) | | 89.6 w | 271.7 w | 312.4 w | 267.6 w | 394.9 w | 268.3 w |
| of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) | | 26.3 w | 110.1 w | 179.0 w | 143.0 w | 147.1 w | 103.9 w |
| Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) | | 785.4 w | 1 074.2 w | 2 121.4 w | 1 783.3 w | 1 453.6 w | 1 479.3 w |
| of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) | | 278.6 w | 319.1 w | 803.5 w | 623.9 w | 409.7 w | 464.6 w |
| *Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) | | - 93.6 w | - 141.5 w | - 113.8 w | - 98.1 w | - 87.1 w | - 84.7 w |
| Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant workers (%) | 1) | 4.5 iw | 8.5 iw | 9.2 iw | 6.7 iw | 2.5 iw | : |

| **Public finance** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) | 1) | - 1.0 w | - 6.2 w | - 2.4 w | - 2.3 w | - 2.2 w | - 1.4 pw |
| General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 31.3 w | 49.0 w | 39.1 w | 38.8 w | 35.6 w | 38.5 pw |
| Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) | 1) | 25.5 w | 24.9 w | 26.6 w | 27.4 w | 27.7 w | 30.6 pw |
| Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) | 1) | 23.1 w | 25.3 w | 23.0 w | 22.9 w | 23.4 w | 26.7 pw |

| **Financial indicators** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 74.0 iw | 122.9 iw | 94.8 iw | 77.7 iw | 76.3 iw | : |
| Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) | | 180.8 w | 285.4 w | 176.8 w | 157.6 w | 159.6 w | 151.3 w |
| Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) | | 1 803.0 w | 2 970.3 w | 4 341.2 w | 6 205.2 w | 5 853.0 w | 6 706.9 w |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) | | 4 380.9 w | : | : | : | : | : |
| *Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| *Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 36.9 w | 71.5 w | 61.9 w | 65.3 w | 67.1 w | 76.0 w |
| Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) | 4) | 5.73 w | 9.50 w | 10.89 w | 10.43 w | 8.29 w | 8.08 w |
| Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) | | 2.210 | 3.806 | 3.071 | 2.843 | 2.946 | 3.099 |
| Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) | | 97.9 w | 97.3 w | 123.7 w | 152.6 w | 159.9 w | 160.2 w |
| *3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) | | 0.1 iw | - 0.1 iw | 0.2 iw | 0.6 iw | 0.6 iw | 0.3 iw |
| Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) | | 2 052.2 w | 3 777.0 w | 4 591.6 w | 4 528.2 w | 4 260.6 w | 5 230.4 w |

| **External trade in goods** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) | | 4 380 iw | 8 539 iw | 12 858 iw | 14 437 iw | 15 603 iw | 16 471 iw |
| Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) | | 1 589 iw | 3 587 iw | 5 302 iw | 5 629 iw | 6 059 iw | 6 452 iw |
| Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) | | - 2 791 iw | - 4 952 iw | - 7 557 iw | - 8 809 iw | - 9 544 iw | : |
| Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) | | 19.8 iw | 16.9 iw | 15.5 iw | 11.6 iw | 8.7 iw | : |
| Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) | | 27.1 iw | 22.9 iw | 22.6 iw | 24.5 iw | 27.1 iw | : |

| **Demography** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants) | | : | - 3.8 | - 1.8 | - 0.7 | - 1.2 | - 1.7 |
| Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) | | 11.1 | : | 7.6 | 8.2 | 7.4 | : |
| Life expectancy at birth: male (years) | | : | : | 69.4 | 69.9 | 70.5 b | : |
| Life expectancy at birth: female (years) | | : | : | 78.1 | 77.5 | 79.3 b | : |

| **Labour market** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%) | | 76.9 w | 64.5 w | 65.9 w | 68.7 w | 70.8 w | 70.9 w |
| Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are in employment (%) | | 62.9 w | 50.6 w | 54.0 w | 56.9 w | 60.4 w | 60.5 w |
| Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) | | 70.8 w | 58.1 w | 62.2 w | 64.9 w | 67.8 w | 68.5 w |
| Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) | | 55.8 w | 43.5 w | 46.4 w | 49.4 w | 53.3 w | 52.7 w |
| Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are in employment (%) | | 69.0 w | 47.3 w | 50.6 w | 52.3 w | 55.9 w | 55.6 w |
| **Employment by main sectors** | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) | 5) | 47.1 w | 18.9 w | 17.9 w | 16.5 w | 16.0 w | 15.7 w |
| Industry (%) | 5) | 7.4 w | 11.3 w | 11.9 w | 12.2 w | 12.9 w | 13.2 w |
| Construction (%) | 5) | : | 7.8 w | 8.5 w | 8.8 w | 8.9 w | 8.8 w |
| Services (%) | 5) 6) | 45.5 w | 62.1 w | 61.8 w | 62.4 w | 62.2 w | 62.2 w |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%) | | 16.7 w | 24.3 w | 23.4 w | 23.3 w | 22.0 w | 22.9 w |
| People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 (%) | | 83.3 w | 75.7 w | 76.6 w | 76.7 w | 78.0 w | 77.1 w |
| Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) | 7) | 16.9 w | 20.6 w | 17.3 w | 16.4 w | 13.9 w | 13.9 w |
| Male unemployment rate (%) | 7) | 19.0 w | 22.7 w | 19.3 w | 18.3 w | 16.1 w | 15.8 w |
| Female unemployment rate (%) | 7) | 14.6 w | 17.8 w | 14.6 w | 14.0 w | 11.1 w | 11.4 w |
| Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) | | 38.9 w | 42.9 w | 39.4 w | 34.5 w | 28.9 w | 32.0 w |
| Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 12 months or more (%) | 7) | 7.3 w | 7.2 w | 6.6 w | 6.5 w | 5.0 w | 4.9 w |
| Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) | 8) | 12.3 w | 32.1 w | 24.8 w | 20.8 w | 16.0 w | 15.3 w |
| Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%) | | 20.4 w | 15.3 w | 13.0 w | 13.1 w | 11.0 w | 10.8 w |

| **Social cohesion** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) | | 773 w | 1 305 w | 1 543 w | 1 767 w | 1 971 w | : |
| Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the inflation index) (2016 = 100) | | 85 w | 100 w | 106 w | 118 w | 130 w | : |
| Gini coefficient | | 42 w | 36 w | 36 w | 36 w | 34 w | 33 w |
| Poverty gap | 9) | 6.3 w | 5.5 w | 5.8 w | 5.6 w | 5.1 w | 4.4 w |

| **Standard of living** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) | | 165.0 | 343.0 | 357.0 | 389.0 | 414.0 | 419.0 |

| **Infrastructure** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) | | 23.2 iw | 16.0 iw | 16.0 iw | 16.0 iw | 16.0 iw | : |
| Length of motorways (kilometres) | | 80 | 263 | 263 | 271 | 358 | : |

| **Education, Innovation and Research** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) | | 42.1 w | 35.5 w | 35.2 w | 35.6 w | 38.8 w | 36.8 w |
| Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), males | | 40.3 w | 32.3 w | 30.4 w | 31.2 w | 33.3 w | 31.8 w |
| Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), females | | 44.0 w | 38.9 w | 40.1 w | 40.3 w | 44.5 w | 42.0 w |
| Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) | | : | 154.5 dw | 148.7 dw | 141.3 dw | 137.1 dw | : |
| Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading (%) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics (%) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Low achieving 15-year-olds in science (%) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training | | 5.8 w | 7.3 w | 6.0 w | 5.3 w | 6.4 w | 4.3 w |
| Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training | | 6.5 w | 7.6 w | 6.1 w | 5.1 w | 6.4 w | 4.1 w |
| Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training | | 5.2 w | 7.0 w | 5.9 w | 5.4 w | 6.5 w | 4.5 w |
| Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks) | | : | 1.2 w | 1.6 w | 1.7 w | 1.6 w | : |
| Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men | | : | 1.1 w | 1.3 w | 1.6 w | 1.4 w | : |
| Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women | | : | 1.3 w | 1.8 w | 1.8 w | 1.7 w | : |
| Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) | | : | 31.5 w | 32.4 w | 34.5 w | 36.3 w | 20.7 w |
| Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males | | : | 29.4 w | 30.5 w | 33.5 w | 35.9 w | 21.0 w |
| Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females | | : | 33.4 w | 34.1 w | 35.4 w | 36.6 w | 20.4 w |
| Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 2.8 iw | 3.6 iw | 3.2 iw | 3.7 iw | 3.9 iw | : |
| Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) | 1) | 0.09 iw | : | : | : | : | : |
| Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP (%) | 1) | 0.26 w | 0.20 w | 0.17 w | 0.18 w | 0.16 w | 0.17 pw |
| Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) | 10) | 38.2 w | 86.1 w | 88.4 w | 89.0 w | 91.5 w | 92.0 w |

| **Environment** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Index of greenhouse gas emissions, $CO_2$ equivalent (1990 = 100) | | 34.9 w | 40.4 w | 43.2 w | : | : | : |
| Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant prices) | | 271.4 w | 439.5 w | 346.6 w | 293.0 w | 289.5 w | : |
| Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) | | : | 51.3 | 55.5 | 66.3 | 68.4 | : |
| Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) | 11) | 10.5 ew | 17.8 ew | 14.8 ew | 16.1 ew | 15.8 ew | : |

| **Energy** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) | | 1 429 | 1 248 | 1 272 | 1 285 | 1 319 | : |
| Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) | | 49 | 36 | 37 | 39 | 36 | : |
| Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) | | 168 | 60 | 59 | 60 | 72 | : |
| Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) | | 4 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 14 | : |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) | | 2 824 i | 4 133 i | 4 561 i | 4 544 i | 4 797 i | : |
| Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) | | 4 248 | 5 385 | 5 867 | 5 823 | 6 114 | : |
| Gross electricity generation (GWh) | | 10 059 | 12 645 | 14 247 | 14 396 | 14 234 | : |

| **Agriculture** | Note | 2013 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) | | 101.1 w | 111.8 w | 109.9 w | 106.1 w | 120.4 w | 113.6 pw |
| Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) | | 1 229.7 w | 928.6 w | 853.7 w | 837.7 w | 811.5 w | : |
| Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) | | 191.2 w | 152.9 w | 150.2 w | 141.6 w | 138.4 w | : |
| Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) | | 856.8 iw | 956.8 iw | 914.0 iw | 761.7 iw | 740.4 iw | : |
| Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) | | 604.7 w | 587.9 w | 564.8 w | 584.3 w | 574.4 w | : |
| Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) | | 483.3 iw | 430.2 iw | 370.5 iw | 392.5 iw | 411.3 iw | : |
| Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) | | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) | 12) | 271.2 w | 226.9 w | 201.1 w | 187.5 w | 175.9 w | : |

**Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Georgia****

: = not available
b = break in time series
d = definition differs
e = estimated
p = provisional
i = Eurostat estimate
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
** = Data shown for Georgia exclude the occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over which the government of Georgia does not exercise control.

Footnotes:
1) Based on 2008 SNA.
2) Calculations are made according to NACE Rev. 2.
3) Includes: limited liability companies, joint stock companies, joint liability companies, cooperatives, limited partnerships, individual enterprises, foreign enterprise branches. Excludes: NACE Rev. 2 Sections K, O, T and U.
4) TIBR 1 Day.
5) Since 2020 - NACE Rev.2, before 2020 - NACE Rev.1.1.
6) Including construction.
7) Persons aged 15 years and older.
8) Persons without education are excluded.
9) Consumption based relative poverty.
10) Percentage of households having fixed internet connections at

home (therefore excluding mobile phone network).
11) Does not follow the 'territorial principle'; including the performance of all resident carriers on the national territory and abroad.
12) Including kitchen gardens.