Council of the European Union

**Brussels, 10 June 2025**
**(OR. en)**

**9988/25**
**ADD 1**

**PROCIV 68**

**COVER NOTE**

| | |
|---|---|
| From: | Secretary-General of the European Commission, signed by Ms Martine DEPREZ, Director |
| date of receipt: | 6 June 2025 |
| To: | Ms Thérèse BLANCHET, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union |
| No. Cion doc.: | SWD(2025) 146 final |
| Subject: | COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Union Civil Protection Mechanism Capacity Development and Gaps Overview Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Capacity Progress Report on the Response Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism |

Delegations will find attached document SWD(2025) 146 final.

Encl.: SWD(2025) 146 final

EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Brussels, 6.6.2025
SWD(2025) 146 final

# COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

## Union Civil Protection Mechanism Capacity Development and Gaps Overview

***Accompanying the document***

**Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council**

**Capacity Progress Report on the Response Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism**

{COM(2025) 286 final}

# Contents

## 1) Executive Summary

This Staff Working Document represents the descriptive portion of the reporting obligation regarding the response capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) foreseen under Article 34.2 of Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

The UCPM faces a dynamic and evolving risk and threat landscape, with increasingly frequent and intense natural hazards, as well as new and protracted emergencies. The analysis of risk assessments[1] conducted by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre highlights the interconnected nature of risks, with climate change, technological instability and geopolitical tensions as key drivers.

As part of its efforts to prepare for future emergencies, the UCPM has undertaken a scenario-building initiative, analysing the consequences of 16 key hazards and threats by drawing up 10 Europe-wide disaster scenarios. The results of the scenario-building initiative have served to guide UCPM policy, particularly in its approach to response capacity development. The development of new European Civil Protection Pool capacity goals, as well as the broader Disaster Resilience Goals, was supported in part by the scenario work. In calling for the strengthening of capacities providing emergency medical support, critical infrastructure repair, CBRN response, aerial extinction and specialised search and rescue, the scenarios underlined the importance of ongoing capacity development initiatives and called for further reinforcement. Taking a broader view of how Europe can tackle changes in the risk and threat landscape, the scenarios also highlighted the need for cross-sectoral coordination and the involvement of a wider range of stakeholders, including critical entities, private sector actors, and security and defence stakeholders.

Since 2017, the legal framework of the UCPM has undergone significant changes, including the introduction of rescEU, the EU strategic reserve, as an integral part of the UCPM. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704 has introduced new capacity goals and expanded the types of capacities specified in the configuration of the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP). The Union Disaster Resilience Goals (DRG), specifically DRG No 4 - Respond - Enhancing the Union Civil Protection Mechanism's response capacity, aim to reinforce the UCPM's response capacity in key areas, such as wildfires, floods, search and rescue, CBRN events and health emergency situations. Combined, DRG 4 and the ECPP capacity goals serve as a benchmark for measuring the UCPM's response capacity development.

The ECPP is a key component of the UCPM, providing a standing response reserve of national capacities primed for coordinated and efficient UCPM deployments. As of the end of 2024, the ECPP has registered 101 capacities, with an additional 47 capacities undergoing certification and registration. The ECPP has undergone significant developments, with the introduction of new capacity goals and an expanded configuration, including the registration of experts as a separate capacity type. The ECPP has consistently contributed to UCPM deployments, with roughly 23% of deployed capacities between 2017 and 2024 coming from the ECPP (excluding in-kind assistance). The Pool's coverage of the new capacity

[1] European Commission, Joint Research Centre, "Analysis of Risks Europe is facing. An analysis of current and emerging risks", Publications Office of the European Union (Upcoming), Luxembourg, 2025, JRC14167

goals is still evolving, with some areas, such as medical or specialised search and rescue, as well as logistics capacities, requiring further development to meet the desired configuration. Despite this, the ECPP remains a crucial element of the UCPM, providing a platform for Member States to enhance the preparedness and performance of their national response capacities, and enhancing the Mechanism's overall response capacity.

The introduction of rescEU represents a major shift in how the UCPM supports Member States during large-scale emergencies. Established in 2019, rescEU is the UCPM's own response capacity, providing a complementary layer of response capacities at EU level beyond those available through national systems and the ECPP. The rescEU strategic reserve consists of capacities that have emerged as critical needs in different crisis scenarios, including aerial forest firefighting, medical and CBRN stockpiles, and emergency energy generation. Every category of rescEU capacity has been deployed within one year of its establishment, providing support in a wide range of emergencies, including wildfires, earthquakes, the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. With a budget of approximately EUR 3.2 billion committed between 2019 and 2024, rescEU represents a large investment in collective preparedness across the EU. Its aerial forest firefighting capacities are consistently deployed during the European wildfire season, and its stockpiles of medical, shelter and emergency energy capacities have provided assistance totalling approximately EUR 215 million since it was established. Ongoing capacity developments will expand the rescEU to also include a permanent aerial firefighting fleet, multi-purpose transport and logistics capacities, specialised emergency medical teams, and CBRN detection and decontamination capacities.

While gaps remain, particularly in areas such as multi-purpose capacities and emergency health response, the combined efforts of the ECPP and rescEU have brought the UCPM closer to achieving the targets set in DRG 4 and the ECPP capacity goals. Overall, the UCPM's response capacity has evolved significantly, with a focus on enhancing its ability to respond to complex and high-impact emergencies.

## List of acronyms

AFFF - Aerial Forest Firefighting

BAT - Burns Assessment Teams

CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNDET - CBRN Detection

CBRNUSAR - Urban Search and Rescue in CBRN conditions

CHP - Cultural Heritage Protection

EES - Emergency Energy Supply

EMT - Emergency Medical Team

ERCC - Emergency Response Coordination Centre

ES - Emergency Shelter

ESTP - Earth System Tipping Points

EU - European Union

FC - Flood Containment

FFFP - Aerial Forest Firefighting using Planes

FFFH - Aerial Forest Firefighting using Helicopters

FRB - Flood Rescue using Boats

GFFF - Ground Forest Firefighting

GFFF-V - Ground Forest Firefighting using Vehicles

GSS - Global Situation System

HCP - High-Capacity Pumping

HUSAR - Heavy Urban Search and Rescue

LUSAR - Light Urban Search and Rescue

MEDEVAC - Medical Evacuation

MFF - Multiannual Financial Framework

MIRG - Maritime Incident Response Group

MS - Member States

MUSAR - Medium Urban Search and Rescue

Natech - Natural-hazard triggered technological accident

NGEU - Next Generation

EU PPE - Personal Protective Equipment

PS - Participating States

RPAS - Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

SAR - Search and Rescue

SWD - Staff Working Document

TAST - Technical Assistance and Support Team

UCPM - Union Civil Protection Mechanism

USAR - Urban Search and Rescue

WP - Water Purification

## 2) Introduction

Under Article 34.2 of Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), the Commission is required to report on progress made towards disaster resilience goals and capacity goals considering the development of the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) and the established rescEU capacities. An overview of budgetary and cost developments relating to response capacities and an assessment of further capacity development needs also form part of the reporting obligation.

Article 34.2 ties the reporting on response capacity gaps to the capacity goals described in Article11 and to the Disaster Resilience Goals described in Article 6 of the aforementioned Decision. While the ECPP capacity goals are input-oriented, the Union Disaster Resilience Goals (DRGs) under its Goal No 4 and thematic sub-goals take a performance-based approach, aimed at enhancing the overall UCPM response capability. Combined, these two sets of goals provide guidance on capacity development as well as a starting point for assessing the progress made in closing UCPM capacity gaps.

In this Staff Working Document (SWD), the Commission **provides an overview of the major developments related to UCPM response capacities since 2017**, including an overview of the current state of the Mechanism's response capacities as of the end of 2024. This SWD accompanies the capacity progress report, which provides recommendations for further capacity development based on the analysis in this document. Combined, the SWD and the progress report fulfil the reporting obligation on response capacities laid down in Article 34.2 of Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

Since its last publication in 2017[2], a multitude of factors led to a **disruption in the periodic reporting cycle of the capacity progress report**. The scheduled 2019 capacity progress report coincided with the introduction of rescEU as a new response capacity reserve in the same year. Any publication on developments in UCPM capacity at that time would have been of limited informative value, as the available data would have been insufficient to properly report on the newly established rescEU reserve. During the subsequent years, the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 not only placed an unprecedented operational strain on the UCPM, but also advanced the development of several new rescEU capacities. In parallel, the Commission launched a significant revision and expansion of the capacity options made available under the ECPP. In light of the progress achieved to date, it is now timely to present a comprehensive analysis of the capacity development that has taken place between 2017 and 2024.

In line with the recently adopted cross-sectoral preparedness approach via the Preparedness Union Strategy[3][4], the analysis below can also feed into the **broader developments in EU-wide preparedness.** In this context, it also explores how the UCPM can look beyond its own capacities and, by working with other sectors, harness capabilities and expertise outside of its realm to better support Member States (MS) in disaster management.

[2] REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on progress made and gaps remaining in the European Emergency Response Capacity

[3] European Preparedness Union Strategy.

[4] Annex to the European Preparedness Union Strategy

To provide context for the recommendations made in the related capacity progress report, this SWD begins by reviewing the changes in the risk and threat landscape that Europe is currently facing. From the overview of risks, the document moves to the more concrete implications of UCPM response capacities. An exploration of the capacity-relevant outputs of the UCPM scenario-building initiative and a review of the recent history of UCPM activations, including the lessons drawn from them, provides the context for a consideration of the legal developments that have shaped the UCPM response capacity since 2017. Finally, a review of the status of each capacity type currently available to the UCPM provides the necessary background for the recommendations set out in the capacity progress report.

## 3) Confronted with a changing risk and threat landscape

### a) Overview of Risks: A dynamic and evolving risk and threat landscape

In today's world, risks are complex and interconnected, with underlying risk drivers, cascading hazards and impacts, compound relationships and shared vulnerabilities. This is illustrated in the recent analysis[5] by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), which presents the diverse range of risks in the EU, from natural hazards to biological risks, armed conflicts, hybrid threats and technological failures.

The implications of these risks, which are often of a cross-border nature, and their connection to various risk drivers, such as climate change and technological and/or geopolitical instability, highlight the **need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to risk management**. This is particularly relevant for the UCPM, which is most likely to be activated in response to large-scale, cross-border crises with cascading impacts on health, infrastructure and essential services.

**Risk drivers** are precipitating factors for several disaster types and may aggravate others indirectly. According to the study, the primary risk drivers across 47 hazards analysed include geopolitical instability, which is linked to 21 hazards, weak governance (19 hazards), climate change (17 hazards), urbanisation (17 hazards), environmental degradation (14 hazards), and technological developments (10 hazards). **Climate change emerges as a cross-cutting driver** and, together with **environmental degradation**, is a significant factor in natural hazards such as heatwaves, tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, wildfires, tsunamis and food insecurity. Urbanisation may increase vulnerability to earthquakes, air pollution, eutrophication and Natech, especially if poorly planned, due to possible increasing stress on infrastructure and the environment. Cities are hotspots for cascading disasters. Increased population density and reliance on interconnected infrastructure networks in hazard-prone areas means that disasters such as earthquakes, floods and pandemics have more severe societal and economic consequences.

Common drivers, such as **weak governance and geopolitical instability, can exacerbate a range of risks**, including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity (cyber-attacks, data breaches, algorithm bias, disinformation, etc.), risks triggered by natural hazards, and conflicts. Weak governance can also amplify crisis situations. Ineffective policy responses to early warning systems, poor infrastructure resilience and

[5] European Commission, Joint Research Centre, "Analysis of Risks Europe is facing. An analysis of current and emerging risks", Publications Office of the European Union (Upcoming), Luxembourg, 2025, JRC14167

inadequate emergency planning increase the likelihood of cascading failures in disaster response. Addressing these drivers through improved governance frameworks and institutional capacities, resilient structures, industry standards and strengthened international cooperation can mitigate the impact of several risks arising simultaneously.

By using foresight, we can better understand what triggers the above-mentioned risk drivers and anticipate and prepare for future risks in a systemic way. **Megatrends analysis**, one of the foresight methods, investigates the long-term driving forces of change that are already observable and can have a significant influence over the subsequent decades. The Megatrends Hub[6] hosted by the JRC lists and regularly updates 14 megatrends. Three of them are identified as the most prominent: **climate change and environmental degradation**, accelerating **technological change and hyperconnectivity**, and the **expanding influence shift from Western societies towards the East and South**.

When considering losses and impacts, the JRC's scientific analysis provides a comprehensive view of past trends and future impact projections over a span of 10 years, looking both backward and forward. The analysis highlights a **consistent trend of increasing potential impacts across all risk categories**. **Indirect or cascading consequences** (the subsequent or secondary results of the initial destruction, such as business interruption losses) **are often shown to have a wider range of potential impacts than immediate damages**, especially in cyber threats, biological, environmental, technological and extra-terrestrial risks. This underscores the urgency of adapting current governance models to address not just traditional hazards, but also systemic and intangible risks that may manifest across borders and sectors. The analysis of losses and potential direct and indirect impacts produces the following findings for specific categories of risks and threats:

- **Biological risks**, including pathogens, antimicrobial resistance and pollution-driven health effects, exhibit sharp increases in both direct and indirect potential impacts, with distinct events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, having exceptionally high direct impacts, while the combined effect of the widespread societal consequences drives higher indirect impacts overall.

- **Cyber threat** impacts are expected to be significantly higher than past losses, with indirect impacts being more pronounced due to cascading effects on technology-reliant systems.

- **Environmental risks**, such as air pollution, marine pollution and eutrophication, are likely to remain high, but stable in comparison with past events. The indirect impacts are dominant due to cascading effects on ecosystems and human health.

- **Extra-terrestrial risks** such as major meteorite impact and uncontrolled re-entry or launch, are not expected to increase significantly, while others, including damage from solar storms, space debris, Kessler Syndrome, attacks on satellites, attacks on space-related ground infrastructure and technological over-dependence, are expected to rise due to various factors, including the growing number of objects in orbit, geopolitical tensions and reliance on external technologies.

[6] The Megatrends Hub | Knowledge for policy

The indirect impacts will dominate due to disruptions to global communications and critical infrastructure.

- **Geophysical risks** such as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes show high direct potential impacts, with substantial indirect impacts due to long-term disruptions to economies and societal stability. The impacts of these risks are localised in certain areas of Europe.

- **Geopolitical and societal risks** including armed conflicts, terrorism and food insecurity in Europe show significant increases in terms of both potential direct and indirect impacts, with indirect impacts being more substantial due to long-term effects on societal stability and economic systems. Hybrid threats and illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological material may also escalate, depending on global security dynamics.

- **Hydrological risk** impacts are expected to be significantly higher than past losses, with indirect impacts being particularly severe due to disruptions to critical infrastructure and communities.

- **Meteorological and climatological risks** such as heatwaves, cold waves and tropical cyclones are escalating due to factors driven by climate change, in terms of both direct and indirect potential impacts, with indirect impacts being more significant in the case of prolonged events.

- **Technological risks** such as nuclear/radiological risks, disruptions of essential services and Natech show notable rises in both their direct and indirect potential impacts, due to factors such as technological advancements and increased demand for energy and materials. The indirect impacts are expected to be particularly severe due to their influence on interconnected systems.

Most risks under these categories have the **potential to significantly impact the UCPM response**, including disruption of communication and coordination systems, impacts on transportation and logistics, damage to critical infrastructure, and risks to human health and safety.

Several recurring patterns of potential impacts demonstrate that **different risks** – whether related to natural, technological or societal hazards – **often lead to similar disruptions**. **Economic disruption** is a pervasive consequence, affecting supply chains, industries and livelihoods across a range of natural hazards, technological failures and geopolitical risks. Enhancing financial preparedness and fostering economic resilience is therefore essential to mitigating the impacts of such disruptions. **Impacts on human health** and **overload of healthcare systems** are triggered by air pollution, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, drug abuse and food insecurity, highlighting the need for stronger healthcare systems and environmental health policies. **Human displacement** results from climate disasters, conflicts and economic crises, emphasising the importance of disaster risk reduction and migration policies. **Disruption of essential services**, including energy shortages and infrastructure failures, is caused by cybersecurity threats, extreme weather and nuclear risks, stressing the need for resilient infrastructure and emergency preparedness. Since these impacts cut across multiple risks, the focus should be on solutions that address several threats at once, such as economic resilience, public health investments and infrastructure adaptation, to maximise risk reduction and optimise resources.

Understanding how the potential impacts are expected to evolve over time can help with **risk comparability and prioritisation**. Effective risk management and resource allocation requires the prioritisation of risks that have the potential to cause systemic disruption due to their frequency and the severity of the impacts they produce. It also helps to identify the sectors that are most vulnerable to the cascading effects of risks and require targeted risk management and mitigation efforts.

It is also important to **prioritise areas with higher compounded risks** for targeted interventions. Multi-hazard or overlapping exposure analysis captures the dynamics of one hazard triggering or exacerbating another (e.g. earthquakes causing dam failures, which lead to floods). It makes it possible to plan in a way that takes account of cascading impacts and identifies regions or assets simultaneously exposed to multiple hazards.

A new methodology[7] makes it possible to identify regions with multi-hazard exposure at pan-European level (EU27+UK). The study revealed that approximately 87 million people, or almost one fifth of the European population, is exposed to multiple natural hazards, such as river flooding, landslides, wildfires, coastal inundation and earthquakes. Almost half of this population lives in 'hotspots' exposed to three or more hazards. Multi-hazard risk exposure is high in both urban and rural areas, indicating that there is a nearly even distribution of risk between these contrasting environments.

These are identified by means of the meta-analysis approach to identifying regions with multi-hazard exposure. The graphic shows local administrative units with:

a) absolute population exposure:

[7] https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/around-87-million-europeans-are-exposed-multiple-natural-hazards-2025-02-21_en




*Figure 1: a) multi-hazard exposure*

b) absolute residential built-up exposure to multiple hazard hotspots:




*Figure 2: b) absolute residential built-up exposure to multiple hazard hotspots*

Earth System Tipping Points[8] (ESTP) pose a further significant challenge. At least five of the 16 tipping points identified are at risk of crossing irreversible destabilising barriers at global mean temperatures above 1.5 °C. Therefore, these tipping points can no longer be considered as low-likelihood events and require targeted risk assessment.

The **interconnected nature of risks and impacts requires the preparedness of the UCPM to be built according to an all-hazard approach**, recognising the potential of compound relationships and cascading effects across sectors. Moreover, the whole-of-society approach is crucial, involving collaboration between EU institutions and services, government bodies and agencies, industries, communities and individuals. The effective mitigation of risks requires shared information, resources and expertise. This can be best achieved by means of multi-hazard policies, common preparedness measures and joint response mechanisms, as demonstrated in the scenarios discussed below.

[8] https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/earth-system-tipping-points-are-threat-europe-how-get-prepared-2025-02-28_en

.

### b) Scenarios: The reasonable worst case

Europe's rapidly changing risk and threat landscape needs to be reflected in updated planning assumptions under the UCPM in order to provide a better understanding and agreement on the evolving gaps in its prevention, preparedness and response arrangements. Under Article 10 of Decision No 1313/2013/EU[9] the Commission therefore launched a scenario-building exercise at Union level to support disaster prevention, preparedness and response. This work specifically analysed cross-sectoral and cross-border disaster scenarios with cascading effects, taking into account the increasingly interconnected nature of risks according to an all-hazard approach.

The development of Europe-wide disaster scenarios involved experts from Member States (MS), Participating States (PS), the Commission's Joint Research Centre and a broad range of other Commission services. In 2024, this work resulted in the completion of 10 Europe-wide disaster scenarios combining the following 16 hazards and threats, all designed as worst-case situations to challenge and strengthen preparedness and prevention under the UCPM:




*Figure 3: 16 hazards and threats covered in the 10 Europe-wide disaster scenarios, all designed as worst-case situations to challenge and strengthen preparedness and prevention under the UCPM*

Based on their deterministic and exploratory nature, the relevance of these complex disaster scenarios to capacity development at UCPM level lies primarily in the identification of relevant response capacities, as well as broad estimated ranges for the quantities required to respond to a scenario occurring under the assumptions made during the scenario design. To be generally applicable, the scenarios do not focus on national-level response, but focus instead on the response machinery put in motion at EU level to support affected MS.

[9] Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.185.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2021:185:TOC.

On response capacities specifically, the scenario work has directly contributed to the formulation of the latest ECPP capacity goals published with the most recent **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704**. The scenarios generated a list of the response capacities relevant to the large-scale emergencies explored in the 10 scenarios. In particular it highlights and confirms three main elements to be considered in further response capacity developments.

First, **several capacities can be considered 'multi-purpose'**, meaning that they are deemed relevant for response operations in the majority of the scenarios drawn up. These capacities consist of capabilities that responders can deploy in their response operations to multiple emergencies, or capabilities that aim to support affected populations whose critical services have been disrupted. The capacities identified as 'multi-purpose' include **emergency power supply, critical infrastructure repair, broadband and secured communication, shelter, transport-related assets (e.g. bridges)** and **medical support capabilities** such as emergency medical teams, MEDEVAC and medical stockpiles. The ability of these capacities to provide support during many different disaster scenarios indicates that developing these types of capacities at EU level in preparation for large-scale events is a cause worth pursuing.

Second, while broadly deployable 'multi-purpose' capacities are one category of capacities that the scenario initiative highlights for further strengthening at EU level, **the scenarios examined also revealed certain single-scenario capacities that are also of critical importance**. While specialised capacities may only be useful during a specific scenario type, their relative specialisation, prohibitive cost or the level of preparedness at MS level may also warrant the development of single-purpose capacities at EU level. The suitability of this development should be explored on a case-by-case basis, as was the case with the expansion of specialised medical and CBRN capacities currently under development through the rescEU initiative to strengthen the capacities provided by the modules already registered in the ECPP.

Third, the 10 disaster scenarios developed also broadly highlight the **need for cross-sectoral coordination** throughout the prevention, preparedness and response phases, particularly in view of the increasingly interconnected nature of risks and impacts, as discussed above. More specifically, for response capacities, this translates into the need to involve a **broader range of stakeholders, particularly critical entities, private sector actors, security and defence stakeholders, vulnerable groups and, where relevant, non-EU countries**. Ensuring operators of critical infrastructure are more closely integrated into civil protection planning will encourage an increased risk awareness and smoother integration into civil protection response measures. Strengthening partnerships with private-sector actors is expected to support key tasks such as procurement, donations and logistical operations. Improved coordination between civil, security and defence authorities to address disaster scenarios involving security or defence aspects, such as armed conflicts or terrorist attacks, will be essential to enabling UCPM response operations to tackle the emerging set of challenges.

## 4) UCPM activations: Learning from experience

This document will next analyse the operational UCPM experience gathered by means of the regular lessons-learnt exercises based on deployments and data from UCPM activations and operations. A review of the requests for assistance received by the UCPM between 2017 and 2024 confirms the trend observed in the overview of risks and the scenario initiative. While the UCPM continues to respond to

the types of emergencies it was first primarily established for, the **frequency and intensity of these mostly natural events is typically increasing**. However, at the same time the UCPM has been confronted with a new set of challenge due to additional **longer and more complex emergencies** such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

### a) Emergencies 2017-2024

The data available on the number and type of requests for assistance made to the UCPM reveal a general upward trend over the years. While the period 2017-2019 was roughly in line with the preceding years, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 marks a significant increase in requests made to the UCPM, which has continued until the present day. As the requests related to COVID-19, primarily consisting of medical assistance and consular support to repatriate citizens trapped abroad during the pandemic, gradually decreased in 2022, Russia's unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, with medical assistance security-related requests continuing to add to the UCPM's workload, in addition to the persisting challenges and requests for assistance related to more traditional and common civil protection disaster events.




*Figure 4: Emergencies per year measured by number of requests for assistance made to the UCPM 2007-2024*[10]

Closer inspection of the requests for assistance made to the UCPM that relate to natural events reveals that forest fires are consistently the main source of requests. The only exception to this trend is the relatively low number of forest fires experienced in 2020 due to the lockdown restrictions in place at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Other severe weather events and floods (as a separate category) occupy the second and third place, with earthquakes also remaining a consistent source of requests for assistance to the UCPM.

[10] Internal reporting tool: Civil Protection Data repository (CPDR) accessed 02 April 2025.




*Figure 5: Distribution of natural events by type measured in requests for assistance made to UCPM 2017-2024*[11]

A review of the health-related requests to the Mechanism highlights the multi-year strain that a pandemic such as COVID-19 can place on the UCPM and its stakeholders. These types of emergencies are marked by a prolonged timeline spanning several years. Their timelines are in stark contrast to the typical operational timeline of responses related to natural events such as earthquakes, floods and forest fires, where the duration of the typical response phase is well below one month. From an operational standpoint, these developments are significant as they **require response mechanisms and capacities that can sustain prolonged engagement during protracted emergencies at times occurring concurrently.** With Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine entering its fourth year, scenarios demanding prolonged UCPM engagement are becoming a separate category of activation rather than an exception. In line with the above analysis of Europe's increasingly complex risk and threat landscape and the UCPM's recent operational experiences in complex response scenarios, more comprehensive and/or flexible response modalities need to be considered in order to remain effective in offering support and at the same time sustain the functioning of the UCPM over longer activation periods in such scenarios.

[11] Internal reporting tool: CPDR accessed 02 April 2025.




*Figure 6: Type of health emergencies per year measured in requests for assistance made to UCPM 2017-2024*[12]




*Figure 7: Type of security crisis per year measured in requests for assistance made to UCPM 2017-2024*[13]

### b) Lessons learned

The activation of the UCPM leads to a process of reviewing and learning from past operations, which occurs either annually or on specific subjects, such as the review of the European forest fire season. These lessons learned are crucial to refining operational processes and enhancing future response efforts. While many of the lessons are specific to certain capacities, hazards or activations, an analysis of

[12] Internal reporting tool: CPDR accessed 02 April 2025.
[13] Internal reporting tool: CPDR accessed 02 April 2025.

existing **lessons-learned documentation also reveals recurring themes that are broadly applicable to the UCPM and could be used to inform capacity development**. The period between 2017 and 2024 has highlighted certain key policy and strategic insights, particularly focusing on harmonisation, integration and flexibility, which could enhance the efficiency of UCPM responses.

On a policy and strategic level, the **improvement of the operational framework** is a critical outcome of these lessons. **Simplifying existing procedures and arrangements** for activating and deploying capacities while **strengthening current initiatives** are seen as essential steps towards increasing the overall effectiveness of the UCPM.

At operational level, lessons suggest that self-sufficiency in response capacities should be further developed, particularly regarding medical care and communication tools, to **ensure that response teams are well-equipped and can operate seamlessly and safely in remote and difficult conditions**. These lessons also underline the importance of strengthening the capabilities of new teams working in challenging environments, such as high-temperature conditions. Harmonisation of response capacities, such as fire response team sizes and **improvements in equipment compatibility**, are other examples of operational-level recommendations for improved effectiveness.

Finally, the lessons learned also point to the **benefits of remote support and expert deployments when direct on-the-ground operations are not feasible**. The integration of private capacities into operations in specific cases, and the importance of quickly deploying trained personnel for situational assessments (e.g. bridge inspections or wildfire assessments) have also been identified as potential avenues for strengthening response operations.

Other insights include the need for dedicated points for private donations and a focus on anticipation, business continuity and prepositioning of resources in order to ensure rapid and efficient responses in future operations. The lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine, for instance, have increased the understanding of new threats and the need to adapt response capabilities accordingly.

## 5) Evolution of the legal and policy framework regarding UCPM capacities

Since the publication of the previous capacity gaps report in 2017, the UCPM has undergone a series of changes in the form of legal revisions and updated implementing acts. These changes reflect a UCPM adapting to the changing risk and threat landscape and the insights gained through activations and initiatives such as the scenario work, as discussed above. The most impactful changes in terms of shaping the Mechanism's response capacity include:

- the **introduction of rescEU** as the UCPM's strategic reserve of response capacities;
- the most recent consolidation of Implementing Decisions with a **significantly enlarged ECPP,** including new types of ECPP capacities, revised capacity goals and the inclusion of experts as part of the Pool;
- the definition of the **Union Disaster Resilience Goals**, DRG No 4 specifically aimed at reinforcing the UCPM's response capacity in five key areas.

These changes create new capabilities for the UCPM to deploy in support of MS and also expand the mechanism's ability to follow an agreed path when strengthening its response capacity, while at the same time tracking its progress.

### a) Introduction of rescEU

In its communication of November 2017[14] following a devastating European wildfire season, the Commission made the case for an additional response tool to strengthen the readiness of the UCPM when responding to overwhelming situations. The deadly 2017 forest fires in Portugal, for which the necessary aerial forest firefighting capacities were not available in time via the ECPP, served as a trigger for developing EU-level response capacities which are not subject to the availability of national capacities.

Decision No 1313/2013/EU was amended in 2019 by Decision (EU) 2019/420[15], which introduced rescEU as an additional tool in the UCPM's response quiver, **providing an additional layer of capacities established at EU level**. These capacities are deployed in cases where existing capacities at national level and those pre-committed by MS to the ECPP are not able to respond effectively to a MS/PS request for assistance. While hosted within MS/PS, the rescEU capacities are not part of the national response capacity and must be available for deployment within the EU upon activation by the Commission.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/570 introduced aerial forest firefighting as the first rescEU capacity to be established[16]. Additional capacity categories were introduced by means of subsequent amendments, resulting in **13 capacity categories being foreseen**[17] **as of the end of 2024**. The capacity types provided for in the legislation include:

- aerial forest firefighting capacities using airplanes or helicopters;
- medical aerial evacuation capacities for disaster victims[18] and highly infectious disease patients;
- emergency medical teams type 2 (inpatient surgical emergency care) and emergency medical team type 3 (inpatient referral care) capacities[19];
- stockpiling of medical countermeasures and/or personal protective equipment aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health[20];
- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) detection[21], decontamination and stockpiling capacities[22][23];
- temporary shelter capacities[24];
- transport and logistics capacity[25];
- mobile laboratory capacities[26];
- emergency energy supply capacities[27].

[14] COM/2017/0773 final
[15] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2019/420/OJ
[16] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2019/570/OJ
[17] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2019/570/2022-07-12.
[18] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2019/1930/OJ.
[19] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/461/OJ
[20] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2020/414/OJ
[21] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/465/OJ
[22] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2021/1886/OJ.
[23] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/288/OJ.
[24] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/288/OJ
[25] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/461/OJ.
[26] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2019/570/2022-07-12
[27] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/1198/OJ

In support of the rescEU capacity described above, Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU **enabled the Commission,** in extreme cases of urgency, **also to directly acquire rent, lease or otherwise contract capacities or equipment** by means of implementing acts adopted under an urgency procedure. While the primary intention has been to support UCPM deployments through the facilitation of pooled transport and logistics services, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how the MS could benefit from pooled procurement of critical items such as vaccines in times of high global demand. This direct procurement clause established the legal framework for the Commission to act faster and respond better to the needs of the MS/PS in times of need. In practice, this mechanism has not been used, as the complicated implementation procedure requiring an implementing decision to be adopted before procurement can take place undermines the objective of direct procurement in urgent situations.

### b) Disaster Resilience Goals

The political commitment to further strengthen the UCPM response capacity in selected critical areas was further reflected in the new UCPM resilience agenda – the Union Disaster Resilience Goals, adopted in 2023[28]. Among these voluntary goals**, Goal No 4 'Respond'** focuses specifically on the following key areas of response capacities[29]:

- Wildfires
- Floods
- Search and rescue
- CBRN events
- Emergency health situations.

The definition of specific objectives under each of these thematic response areas represents a **shift from the goals defined under the ECPP**, focused on the number of response capacities to be available, **to an overall performance-based approach for all response capacities available to both ECPP and rescEU** (according to their operational readiness at the time). This performance-based approach reflects the progress in capacity development under the UCPM. It was defined as a target for joint capabilities to be reached by ECPP and rescEU capacities in each of the above areas to address needs in this specific area (e.g. number of patients with basic needs to be treated by emergency medical response capacities under the ECPP and rescEU).

### c) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704

In parallel with building up the new type of rescEU response capacities and the work towards the achieving the Disaster Resilience Goals in the area of civil protection, work was also undertaken to considerably strengthen the ECPP. Adopted on 10 April 2025, the new **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704** introduced the first significant **overhaul of the ECPP capacity types and the corresponding capacity goals** since the establishment of the Pool.

[28] C (2023) 400 final.

[29] Additionally, temporary shelter, emergency energy supplies and transport were highlighted as areas for future attention.

Between the previous report 'on progress made and gaps remaining in the European Emergency Response Capacity' published in February 2017[30] and the adoption of new **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704**, the UCPM capacity goals were defined in Annex III of EU Implementing Decision 2014/762/EU[31]. The annex entitled 'startup configuration of the EERC (European Emergency Response Capacity)' set out the capacity goals for establishing a pre-committed pool of MS and PS 'Modules and Other Response Capacities' foreseen for deployment under the UCPM.

The revised capacity goals and the expansion of the types of capacities specified in the new ECPP configuration introduced by **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704** are the product of a several-year-long consultation process between the Commission, MS and PS that was enriched with diverse input, including lessons learned, the scenario-building initiative, and broader risk assessments conducted at EU level. Changes to the ECCP include a net **increase from 37 to 50 different** types of response capacities **defined, including an increase from 18 to 29 types of modules**, a change reflecting the increased need for specialised response capacities during UCPM activations. For the majority of existing modules defined in the previous legislation, the new capacity goals reflect an increase in the number of capacities to be registered to the Pool[32]. The newly-revised Implementing Decision also defines how experts can be registered in the ECPP.

## 6) Measuring Progress: Disaster Resilience Goal No 4 and ECPP Capacity Goals

With the common objective of strengthening the UCPM's response capacity, both DRG No 4 and the ECPP capacity goals aim to provide guidance on the capacity gaps to be addressed by the UPCM. The capacity goals lay out an ideal configuration for the ECPP, composed of MS response capacities and experts, which are established according to the minimum requirements specified in the relevant legislation. DRG No 4 provides overall capability targets across all UCPM capacities and provides areas to focus capacity development on collectively. Both sets of goals are closely linked, with the capacities registered in the ECPP directly counting towards the performance targets laid out in DRG No 4.

### a) ECPP Capacity Goals

The table in annex 1 compares the currently (as of the end of 2024) registered Modules in the ECPP to the former Implementing Decision 2014/762/EU and current capacity goals **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704**, while indicating the level of completion of the respective capacity goal in per cent.

For each type of ECPP capacity, the capacity gap is defined as the difference between Member States' registered capacities in the ECPP and the capacity goal[33]. However, in the assessment, it can be relevant to factor in response capacities that have been formally committed to the ECPP, but not yet certified, and hence not yet registered in the ECPP.

As a result of the recent modifications to the ECPP capacity goals, the Pool coverage of the goals must be viewed within the correct context, comparing current goal gaps with previous goal gaps and taking

[30] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2017:78:FIN.
[31] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2014/762/OJ
[32] Annex III, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704.
[33] Article 21, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704.

account of the fact that the ECPP is now in a catch-up phase in terms of meeting the newly-agreed capacity goals.

Despite this state of flux, persistent trends in capacity gaps can be identified where individual capacity did not meet the capacity gaps of the old and new capacity goals.

**Wildfire extinction capacities** involving ground teams are well represented in the ECPP, while in the case of aerial extinction, helicopter-based modules are still completely absent. Certain types of **medical capacities** pose a particular challenge for the Pool. Of the four EMT categories specified in the goals, currently only the EMT two capacity surpasses the 30% completion mark (83.3%). MEDEVAC and MEDEVAC of highly infectious patients also represents a consistent gap for the ECPP. For **CBRN** response capacities, taking account of those under certification, and while the need for specialised capacity for CBRN scenarios has increased following the results of the scenario initiative, the capacity goals are broadly met. The ECPP is well-equipped with **water-related** response capacities to respond to floods. This is also the case with **search and rescue (SAR)** capacities, though more CBRN, mountain, cave or water SAR teams are needed. More response capacities should be committed to the ECPP to respond to **maritime, coastal and inland waters pollution incidents**. The ECPP has enough registered **TASTs (technical assistance and support teams)** to support the operations of EU Civil Protection Teams (EUCPTs).

The definition of new module types and the increased quantities for many of the existing module types highlight the newly identified needs for **infrastructure-related capacities such as bridges and electricity generation, as well as the clear need for logistics and transport capacities**.

Search and rescue capacity needs are undergoing a fundamental shift. While Heavy USAR teams continue to be featured in the Pool as a standard response capacity in large earthquakes, the previous MUSAR capacity goal has been cut back in favour of **lighter and more easily deployed LUSAR teams.** The new capacity goals also highlight the need to have **specialised SAR capacities available for deployments.**

### b) DRG Nr.4: Progress across all UCPM Capacities

The DRGs were introduced during a very dynamic time for the UCPM, when it was grappling simultaneously with the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. These factors contributed significantly to the UCPM's ability to reinforce its response capacities using the existing legal framework provided by Decision No 1313/2013/EU. Additional funding to finance this expansion was made available due to the large-scale crises to be addressed in Europe. As a result, a significant portion of the capability goals contained in the DRG are in the process of being covered by capacities that are currently under development, as indicated in the table below.

| Goals | | Capacities | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Disaster Resilience Goal No 4** | **DRG Status** | **ECPP** | **rescEU** |
| **4.1 Wildfire response**[34] | | | |

[34] EUR-Lex - 32023.0215(01) - EN - EUR-Lex

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aerial Forest Firefighting (A-FFF): Simultaneously respond to needs in 5 MS (duration 1-7 days) | Annually procured transition rescEU covered goal during 2024 fire season | 2 A-FFF Planes registered | 2024 FF season: 4x A-FFF Helicopters, 24 AFFF Planes |
| Ground Forest Firefighting (GFFF): Simultaneously respond to needs 4 MS | Simultaneous deployment covered through ECPP | 5 GFFF, 9 GFFF-Vehicle Modules registered | |
| Firefighting advisory and assessment teams: 2 simultaneous requests for assistance | 1 FAST registered in ECPP | 1 FAST registered, forest fire expert profile created | |

There has been an intense focus on wildfire response within the UCPM. The annually reoccurring and persistent threat of wildfire is no longer a subject of concern reserved for the traditionally dryer regions of Europe. As Europe grapples with the changing climate, wildfire response has become the posterchild of the UCPM's response capacity. Ground-based wildfire capacity and a portion of the aerial component of DRG 4.1 has been covered through MS/PS commitments to the ECPP. The bulk of aerial extinction has most recently been covered through heavy EU investment in transition rescEU capacities to cover the annual wildfire season (green cells under ECPP column heading). rescEU made 24 aircraft available for MS to call upon during the 2024 wildfire season, the majority of which were deployed to MS/PS (green cell under rescEU column heading). **Contingent on the continued availability of transition rescEU for future seasons until the permanent fleet is established, the UCPM has been able to meet the bulk of DRG 4.1.**

The UCPM is still lagging behind in achieving the capability to simultaneously deploy two firefighting advisory teams, with only one being registered in the ECPP (orange cell under ECPP column heading) and rescEU not contributing any (grey cells under rescEU column heading).

| **Goals** | | **Capacities** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Disaster Resilience Goal No 4** | **DRG Status** | **ECPP** | **rescEU** |
| **4.2 Flood response**[35] | | | |
| High-Capacity Pumps (HCP): Simultaneously respond to needs in 3 MS | Simultaneous deployment covered through ECPP | 16 registered HCP Modules + 1 extreme HCP registered | |
| HCP: total capability to pump at least 20 000 $m^3$ water/hour | Pumping capacity 95% reached through the ECPP | 16 registered HCP Modules + 1 extreme HCP registered | |

[35] EUR-Lex - 32023.0215(01) - EN - EUR-Lex

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capable of ensuring flood containment, waste management, dam assessment and search and rescue operations in a flood situation | Capacities except for dedicated waste management, dam assessment capacities available through ECPP | 4 flood rescue modules using boats, 2 Flood containment, 1 structural engineering team registered, waste management, dam assessment expert profile created | |

Of natural hazards, floods are the second most frequent source of requests for assistance to the UCPM. Sufficient countries have registered high-capacity pumping (HCP) Modules with the ECPP to cover the theoretical pumping needs of DRG 4.2. (green cells under ECPP). An increase in pluvial flooding tied to severe weather events is changing the picture for floods in Europe, with a corresponding impact on flood response capacity needs. While high-capacity pump (HCP) Modules remain an important asset during fluvial flooding that affects slower-moving larger rivers, the intensity and speed associated with flash floods leaves responders with no means to effectively combat the flood itself. Response operations tend to focus on search and rescue, as well as recovery operations, after the flood wave has passed. **The ECPP is still lacking several of the relevant capacities for these types of operations**, although the need for expertise has clearly been identified in the new capacity goals (orange cells under ECPP). No rescEU capacities are foreseen for flood response (grey cells).

| **Goals** | | **Capacities** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Disaster Resilience Goal No 4** | **DRG Status** | **ECPP** | **rescEU** |
| **4.3 Search and Rescue response**[36] | | | |
| Search and Rescue response (SAR): Simultaneously respond to needs in 4 MS including Medium Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Heavy Search and Rescue (HUSAR) | Goal covered through ECPP registrations | 17 USAR Modules registered | |
| in different environments and types of disasters | 1 MUSAR module for cold conditions, 0 Modules for CBRN conditions registered | 1 MUSAR module for cold conditions | |
| specific mountain and cave search and | 2 mountain SAR module, 2 cave | 1 mountain SAR module, 2 cave SAR | |

[36] EUR-Lex - 32023.0215(01) - EN - EUR-Lex

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| rescue operations | SAR Modules registered in ECPP | Modules registered in ECPP | |
| experts in the areas of volcanology, seismology, dam assessment and structural engineering | 1 structural engineering team registered in ECPP | 1 structural engineering team registered, vulcanology, structural engineering and dam assessment expert profile created | |

Urban search and rescue (USAR) capacities are typically one of the first capacities national systems develop for international deployment. As a result, USAR capacities have been well represented in the ECPP. A total of 17 light, heavy and medium USAR capacities registered to the Pool enable the UCPM to cover the several simultaneous deployments foreseen by DRG 4.3 (green cells under ECPP column). **Specialised search and rescue capacities are underrepresented in the ECPP**. One registered medium search and rescue (MUSAR) team in cold conditions, two cave SAR teams and one mountain SAR team make up the entirety of the specialised SAR capacities in the Pool. The other listed capacities and expertise are completely vacant (orange cells under ECPP column). No rescEU capacities are foreseen for SAR response (grey cells).

| **Goals** | | **Capacities** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Disaster Resilience Goal No 4** | **DRG Status** | **ECPP** | **rescEU** |
| **4.4 CBRN response**[37] | | | |
| CBRN Decontamination: Simultaneously respond to needs in 3 MS to decontaminate; | Currently only one capacity can be deployed | 1 CBRN decontamination module registered, CBRN expert profile created | 3 CRBN decontamination capacities under development |
| 500 persons, | overall decontamination capacity covered by ECPP registered module, but limited to single response unit | registered module decontamination capacity 11 760 (70/hr.*7days) | |
| 50 injured persons, | | registered module decontamination capacity (10/hr.*7days) | |
| 15 000 $m^2$ of outdoor surfaces, and 200 $m^2$ of indoor surfaces per hour | | registered module: 16 000 $m^2$ terrain or roads per hour 1 000 $m^2$ | |

[37] EUR-Lex - 32023.0215(01) - EN - EUR-Lex

CBRN is another area where a blended approach between national capacities committed to the ECPP and EU-funded rescEU capacities will cover the performance goals set in DRG 4.4. While the registered CBRN capacity in the ECPP can theoretically cover the overall decontamination targets (green cells under ECPP), a single capacity cannot be expected to deploy to multiple MS simultaneously, limiting the impact of the available CBRN capacities in the UCPM (orange cells under ECPP). A significant investment in CBRN decontamination capacities is underway through the rescEU initiative (yellow cells under rescEU). **After its completion, rescEU with 3 CBRN decontamination capacities and the existing ECPP capacity combined will meet the minimum requirements established under DRG 4.4.** to address defined basic CBRN needs in three countries simultaneously.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Goals</th><th colspan="2">Capacities</th></tr>
<tr><th>Disaster Resilience Goal No 4</th><th>DRG Status</th><th>ECPP</th><th>rescEU</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">4.5 emergency health response[38]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Simultaneously respond to<br>needs in 3 MS: treat total of 800 outpatients per day</td><td>Goal covered trough ECPP registrations</td><td>9 EMT Modules registered in ECPP</td><td rowspan="3">3 EMT 2s + 18 specialised care team capacity under development for modular deployment of specific capabilities such as burn rapid response teams, dialysis for chronic care patients and a specialised cell for oxygen supply</td></tr>
<tr><td>via Emergency medical team type 1 (EMT1): Outpatient emergency care Modules, establish operating theatres for a total of 60 inpatients,</td><td>Goal covered trough ECPP registrations</td><td>4 EMT 1 Modules registered</td></tr>
<tr><td>via Emergency medical team type 2 (EMT2): Inpatient surgical emergency Modules including minimum 45 minor surgical operations a day for two weeks</td><td>Goal covered trough ECPP registrations</td><td>5 EMT 2 Modules registered with a daily surgical capacity of 35/day</td></tr>
<tr><td>Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC): Simultaneously respond to<br>needs in 5 MS including;</td><td rowspan="3">Goals only partially covered through a combination of ECPP and rescEU capacity available and foreseen</td><td rowspan="3">2 Medical evacuation capacities undergoing certification process</td><td rowspan="3">1 Medical evacuation capacity available</td></tr>
<tr><td>total capacity of 24 intensive care patients,</td></tr>
<tr><td>200 non-intensive care</td></tr>
</table>

[38] EUR-Lex - 32023.0215(01) - EN - EUR-Lex

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| patients a day<br>6 highly infectious disease patients a day | | | |
| Mobile Laboratory: Simultaneously respond to needs in 3 MS including; with a total capacity of 150 samples a day for a maximum period of 14 days | ECPP can cover the sampling capacity, single capacity cannot deploy to three requests simultaneously | 1 Mobile biosafety laboratory capacity registered | 3 CBRN detection capacities under development with laboratory components |
| Access to critical medical countermeasures | Goal covered through rescEU | | Stockpiles of medical devices, therapeutics and PPE established |
| Experts/reach back expertise: provide specific public health and epidemiological advice | Existing pool of health experts reinforced through the establishment of EUHTF with ECDC.<br><br>New expert category of health experts defined under the revised ECPP | Health coordinator, epidemiology/public health expert profiles created, EU Health Task Force established in conjunction with ECDC | 3 EMT 2s + 18 specialised care teams (including public health) capacity under development for modular deployment |

The UCPM's capability to support emergency health response operations is provided through a combination of MS capacities registered to the ECPP and existing rescEU capacities. A significant portion of the envisioned capacities under rescEU are still under development. While the EMTs registered in the ECPP are able to cover the number of simultaneous deployments and the associated performance targets under DRG 4.5 (green cells under ECPP), scenario initiative outputs and experiences gained during recent activations have not only demonstrated a need for a further increase in EMT capacities, but also the **need for specialised care teams that can be deployed in conjunction with EMTs to provide more specialised care** corresponding to the disaster scenario in question. These expanded needs will be covered through the 3 EMT2 and the specialised care teams under development within rescEU (yellow cells under rescEU).

**MEDEVAC and MEDEVAC of highly infectious patients represent a key capacity gap in the UCPM.** Without any completed registration of relevant capacities in the ECPP (orange cell under ECPP), only the single MEDEVAC capacity established under rescEU currently contributes towards meeting this aspect of DRG 4.5 (orange cell under rescEU). The UCPM is not currently developing any additional MEDEVAC capacities through rescEU to close the persistent gap in MEDEVAC capability. Even counting the 2 ECPP Modules undergoing the certification process, the UCPM falls short of the MEDEVAC capacity deemed necessary by the DRG.

A further gap in the medical response capacity are the **mobile laboratories**, of which there is only one registered to the ECPP (orange cell under ECPP). While the CBRN detection capacities under development under rescEU will be able to contribute some laboratory capacity towards this

performance goal, these laboratory components are not specialised for medical response operations (yellow cell under rescEU).

**Medical stockpiles** are entirely covered by rescEU (green cell under rescEU), with experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic resulting in significant budgetary resources (EUR 1.65 billion) being made available for relevant stockpiling.

Access to **health experts** is being mainly provided through cooperation between the UCPM and the ECDC within the EU Health Task Force, which enables health experts from across the EU to be deployed using the UCPM's expert deployment infrastructure (green cell under ECPP), while the newly defined health expert categories under the ECPP and the public health component of the specialised care teams under development through the rescEU EMT are also expected to facilitate access to appropriate expertise (yellow cell under rescEU).

## 7) Overview of response capacity resources

### a) European civil response capacity (ECPP)

As of the end of 2024, a total of 101 capacities have been registered in the Pool, with an additional 47 capacities offered but still undergoing the certification and registration procedure to be fully committed to the ECPP. This snapshot is **in line with the overall positive trend in ECPP registrations** over recent years.

At any given point, there is a stock of capacities formally offered to the Pool but not yet registered, as the time needed to complete the certification and registration procedure depends on a multitude of factors. The certification **procedure is regulated by the 'Certification and Registration guidelines'** and includes the formal application, a consultative visit by Commission experts, and participation in exercises[39]. The average duration of the certification procedure cannot be used as a metric to define registration efficiency as the completion of the procedure depends on numerous factors and varies significantly between capacity types. The current number of offered capacities undergoing certification does not differ significantly from that of previous years and reflects the status quo of a functioning system over the years.

[39] Certification Guidelines - November 2023.pdf




*Figure 8: ECPP offers and registrations between 2021 and 2024*

After the 5-year certification period, the first batch of 23 ECPP capacities were due for re-certification in 2023. All 23 capacities complied with the re-certification requirements and were issued with a renewed 5-year ECPP certificate enabling them to remain registered in the ECPP. If the currently registered ECPP capacities extend their status, the **ECPP planning indicates a significant increase in re-certifications over the coming years, with a peak in re-certification requests expected in 2028**. These procedures will have implications on the continued need for UCPM exercises to support the certification process. An efficient certification and re-certification process fine-tuned to ensure quality while minimising the administrative burden for the capacities offered is also essential to maintaining a deployable ECPP.

### i. Status of ECPP

With the recent adoption of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704 and the included update of the ECPP capacity goals, a significant number of the capacity goals currently not covered by corresponding ECPP registrations are related to the overall expansion of the desired ECPP configuration. MS/PS are still in the process of offering and registering capacities in accordance with the previous capacity goals. With the process from offering to registration taking between several months and multiple years, **the newly created goals will take time to be achieved**. Nonetheless, a consistent imbalance in registered capacities could already be observed before the new implementing act, with some persistent shortages and over-representations of registered capacities in the pool. The introduction of the ECPP in its initial configuration in 2014, and the subsequent commitment of capacities by MS/PS, have served to **create a standing response** reserve **primed for a coordinated and efficient UCPM deployment**, while also strengthening national preparedness. These systemic benefits also had a positive impact on the individual capacities and their staff through opportunities to work together with other modules, while exchanging good practices and experiences. Participation in exercises, workshops, training courses and exchanges have contributed to the interoperability of capacities, while establishing a network of response personnel from throughout the MS/PS who have a common understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the context of UCPM deployment. This has profound implications for the interoperability of UCPM deployed response capacities beyond the ECPP, as well as a net positive effect on the national preparedness of the offering country. This effect has been

documented via the interviews conducted in the interim evaluation of the UCPM 2017-2022[40]. Registered ECPP capacities often act as a reference capacity specialised for international deployments within a given national civil protection system.

The map below illustrates the geographical distribution of the capacities registered to the ECPP, showing broad MS engagement in the initiative, with only very few countries not participating.




*Figure 9: Geographical distribution of response capacities registered to the ECPP as of February 2025*

### ii. Deployments

Since its introduction, the ECPP has constituted a significant portion of the capacities deployed through the Mechanism. **Between 2017 and 2024, ECPP deployments represented roughly 23% of deployed capacities (excluding in-kind assistance)**, despite rescEU being introduced as a new capacity type within the time period.

[40] Interim Evaluation of the implementation of Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 2017-2022




*Figure 10: Distribution of deployed capacity categories 2014-2024*[41]

Although the overall quantities are too small to infer statistical trends, an overview of the deployed ECPP capacities between 2017 and 2023 provides a snapshot of the most frequently deployed capacities. Grouping the deployed capacities by primary purpose shows that certain capacities, especially those focusing on **forest fire response, are generally deployed each year**. This correlates with the reoccurring forest fire season experienced in Europe and the significant commitment in specialised resources a response requires.

Numerical analysis of capacity deployments in response to reoccurring events is not a reliable predictor of future needs. The 2020 port explosion in Beirut and the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria in 2023 demonstrated how sudden-onset non-seasonal events can dramatically alter the deployment statistics for a given period. While wildfire-related capacity made up the majority of the ECPP deployments between 2017 and 2024, in part due to one of the worst wildfire seasons in Europe[42], SAR deployments come in a close second as a result of two singular events. This highlights **the need for systems to prepare both for seasonal hazards and for infrequent sudden-onset events**.

[41] Internal reporting document European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) Snapshot report 2023.
[42] JRC Publications Repository - Advance Report on Forest Fires in Europe, Middle East and North Africa 2022




*Figure 11: ECPP capacity deployments grouped by primary task/function 2017-2023*

### iii. Budget of ECPP

While the financial burden of establishing and maintaining an ECPP capacity falls on the MS/PS offering the capacity, MS/PS can apply for adaptation grants that support their efforts in upgrading or repairing existing national capacities to enhance their readiness for international response operations.

**From 2017 to 2024, approximately EUR 33 million have been awarded to MS/PS in the form of ECPP adaptation grants for the adaptation of response capacities**, the average annual expenditure being around EUR 4 million. To improve transparency and optimise grant management, in 2019 the Commission moved from a rolling call for grant proposals to a single annual call for adaptation grants. This approach requires all proposals for a given year to be submitted by one deadline, enabling the award process to better allocate budget to the ECPP's priority areas. There was an increase in the number of requests for adaptation grants during the year following this change to the application procedure.

The value of these grants does not represent the full amount actually committed to the response capacity offered to the UCPM. **Each grant only accounts for a fraction of the actual cost of developing and maintaining an ECPP capacity, with the bulk of the cost being borne by the MS/PS committing the capacity to the ECPP**. In accordance with Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 75% of the costs related to adaptation, such as interoperability, self-sufficiency and transportability, are eligible for adaptation grants and, in the case of an upgrade, the EU contribution cannot exceed 50% of the capacity's development costs. Every euro spent on strengthening the ECPP through adaptation grants generates a higher net benefit for the UCPM, as it is backed by a much larger MS/PS commitment to EU solidarity.

During UCPM activations, capacities registered to the ECPP can benefit from a co-financing rate of up to 75% for their transport and operations, while non-registered capacities can only co-finance their transport through the UCPM. **The costs associated with the co-financing of ECPP capacity operations form part of the response costs covered by the European Commission under the UCPM response.** The

expansion of eligible co-financing to include operational costs for ECPP capacities encourages MS/PS to register capacities in the ECPP, thereby strengthening the UCPM's overall response capacity.




*Figure 12: Annual ECPP adaptation grants expenditure 2017-2024*

### b) Experts

Experts deployed by MS/PS to provide a country with expertise before, during or after an emergency are another capacity type the UCPM can deploy upon request. As a result of the latest Implementing Act passed in April 2025, it will be **possible to register experts as a separate capacity type in the ECPP.**

Expert teams are typically deployed as 'EU Civil Protection Teams' to liaise between the authorities of the affected countries and the UCPM response capacities arriving to assist them. However, **experts are also increasingly deployed on their own in the form of advisory missions**, with technical experts being selected for deployments due to their subject-specific knowledge. Missions focusing on technical expertise rather than the coordination of incoming assistance lend themselves for deployment during all phases of the disaster management cycle.




*Figure 13 Annually deployed experts through the UCPM*

The demand for experts is closely linked to broader deployments of UCPM capacities and shows a generally upwards trend, as illustrated in the graph above, while the versatility of additional advisory missions contributes to the overall demand for UCPM experts.

An analysis of the distribution of the roles of deployed expert reveals that **well over half of the deployed experts are technical experts**, with requests for forest fire, CBRN, USAR and geological experts being particularly frequent. Roles such as team leader, operations, safety and security and information management experts fall into the category of experts typically deployed to coordinate larger UCPM deployments.




*Figure 14: Distribution of roles for the 261 experts deployed through the UCPM 2017-2024*

As a result of this demand for technical experts that can be deployed in support of UPCM activations, **Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704** not only expands the Pool of experts as a separate capacity type, but also identifies 16 types of technical experts, enabling MS to register technical expert capacity, resulting in greater efficiency during future deployments. The 16 expert types are grouped into five clusters: environmental cluster, health/CBRN cluster, horizontal cluster, geological cluster and shelter cluster

### c) rescEU

rescEU represents a major shift in how the UCPM supports MS during large-scale emergencies. While the basis of the UCPM response is still based on MS solidarity, with national-level capacities being offered to help neighbouring countries in need, the UCPM and its stakeholders have recognised the added value of strategic-level capacities that can provide assistance to MS on a scale that surpasses reasonable national preparedness measures.

The **deployment history of established rescEU capacities confirms the need for EU-level capacities**, with every rescEU capacity created being deployed within one year of its establishment.

### i. Status of rescEU

Aerial forest firefighting was the first rescEU capacity to be established. While negotiations began to purchase 12 Canadair 515 aircraft as part of a permanent aerial firefighting fleet, transition rescEU capacities were established to meet the immediate seasonal needs of the UCPM until the establishment of the permanent fleet was completed. Since 2019, preparations for the annual forest fire season in Europe include making aerial extinction means available through a transitional rescEU capacity. The number of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft foreseen for the fire season began with two aircraft in 2019 and most recently increased to a total of 28 aircraft hired for the 2024 season. This arrangement enabled the UCPM to fully meet the performance targets set in DRG Nr. 4 for the duration of the 2024 forest fire season.




*Figure 15: Distribution of transition rescEU established for the 2024 forest fire season*

Further progress on the establishment of rescEU capacities was driven in particular by the recent large-scale crises affecting Europe. The COVID-19 pandemic finally resulted in budgetary allocations being made available to establish medical and CBRN capacities. Funding for the UCPM enabled the **strategic CBRN and medical stockpiles to be established**, including PPE, therapeutics, medical devices, and CBRN decontamination and monitoring supplies. The medical response capacity of the UCPM has been further reinforced through the creation of one MEDEVAC capacity able to transport highly infectious patients.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine had a similar effect on the funding and establishment of rescEU capacities. The acquisition of **shelter stockpiles, including tents, beds and other related items to support displaced persons was reinforced**. Two **stockpiles of generators for emergency energy generation were also established**, ranging from a large number of household-sized generators to large generators with capacities above 100kVA to supply electricity to critical infrastructure such as hospitals and pumping stations.

The ongoing development of additional rescEU capacities includes the establishment of permanent aerial firefighting capacities to replace the transition rescEU arrangements, with a total of 19 aircraft being financed through the EU.


*Figure 16: Illustrations of aerial extinction aircraft being procured under the rescEU initiative*

The medical and CBRN capacity and the shelter capacity of the UCPM is being further reinforced with additional stockpiles, particularly focusing on water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), CBRN detection, monitoring and decontamination supplies, and PPE and therapeutics. Beyond stockpiles, the establishment of three EMT2 teams with additional specialised care teams will provide the capability to simultaneously deploy medical care to multiple emergencies using a **modular approach to supplement EMT2 deployments with key specialisations** including burn rapid response teams, mother and child specialised care teams, and a specialised ICU cell. CBRN detection, sampling and monitoring response capacities will also provide the capability to deploy technical expertise and equipment as a rescEU capacity, beyond simple access to stockpiled materials. The UCPM's response capacity will be further reinforced through the acquisition of two aircraft to support transport and logistics, as well as a dedicated medical evacuation plane, during a variety of UCPM activation scenarios.

As of 2024, the majority of MS/PS have participated in the rescEU initiative, in most cases hosting several capacities. This broad approach aims to establish a geographical distribution providing regional coverage by the most relevant response capacities, where possible.




*Figure 17: distribution of rescEU capacities available and under development as of 2024*

### ii. Deployments

The deployment of every rescEU capacity within one year of its establishment highlights the added value of investing in EU-level response capacities to support MS during extreme emergencies. These investments do not call into question the level of national preparedness in MS, but rather **provide a complement to national preparedness** in instances where the relevant type of capacity or the scale of the need is more efficiently covered at European level.




*Figure 18: rescEU activations by Capacity Type*

**Aerial forest fire extinction has been the most consistently and significantly deployed rescue capacity** in the 231 rescEU activations that took place between 2019 and 2024. This regularity is due to the seasonally reoccurring forest fire risk in Europe. While most of the deployments occur in the dryer and warmer parts of Europe where forest fires have traditionally been a problem, it is notable that countries outside of those areas have also drawn upon EU-level capacity in times of need as the risk threat has shifted towards other areas of the continent.

Strategic stockpiles were heavily drawn upon during both the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's continued war of aggression against the Ukraine. The items released included PPE, medical devices, therapeutics, and shelter items and generators. The earthquake in Türkiye and Syria in 2023 and the storm endured by Ireland in 2025 also highlighted the versatility of the stockpiles, as shelter materials were distributed to Türkiye and generators to Ireland following requests for assistance to complement national response efforts. While Figure 18 shows a relatively high number of strategic stockpile activations, it should be noted that the graph shows the number of instances of deployment, without considering the value or size of each activation. This partially accounts for the overall over-representation of stockpile deployments when compared to other more complex rescEU deployments, such as the deployment of aerial forest fire capacities.

To support the 'Stand Up for Ukraine' campaign in March 2022, the UCPM, via rescEU, strengthened its cooperation with the private sector and third countries to deliver additional donations from across the EU and abroad. In March 2022, the EU established a 'rescEU medical hub', tasked with channelling

donations of medicines, medical equipment and CBRN assistance. In December of the same year, the EU established a 'rescEU energy hub' to support Ukraine in delivering critical energy assistance to provide basic energy supplies and to help the country repair its energy infrastructure. The hub channels energy items such as generators and high-voltage equipment from private donors and third countries, but also serves to streamline the delivery of thousands of generators from the rescEU strategic energy reserves developed to support Ukraine's energy sector. These hubs are in addition to the UCPM logistics hubs that centralise the national assistance sent by MS and PS.

As of the end of 2024, the donation hubs have served to channel over EUR 10 million in assistance to the authorities in Ukraine. Over 90% of this aid originated from the private sector, demonstrating the **potential of the hubs to expand aid beyond in-kind assistance made available through MS governments**. The establishment of the donation hubs opened the door for the private sector to help meet the needs in Ukraine, while avoiding the establishment of parallel channels. The hubs also support donating entities with vetted information on needs, existing logistics channels, as well as the assurance that aid will reach the relevant authorities in Ukraine. MS/PS can choose to reduce their involvement in private donations originating from their own country by directing private donors directly to dedicated UCPM hubs, thereby reducing their own workload.

### iii. Budget of rescEU

The rescEU strategic reserve consists of capacities that have emerged as critical needs in different crisis scenarios, including, but not limited to, wildfires, floods, earthquakes, conflicts, critical infrastructure failures and hybrid threats. As the EU's own capacities to supplement national response capacities, the budget for the establishment of rescEU has been provided exclusively from EU funding sources. Between 2019 and 2024, approximately EUR 3.2 billion in EU funding has been committed to rescEU capacities.

**Between 2019 and 2024, the Multiannual Financial Framework provided approximately EUR 800 million in funding that has been committed for the provision of aerial extinction means**. From this budget, approximately EUR 700 million has been committed for the purchase of aircraft, i.e. planes and helicopters, for the permanent rescEU fleet, while approximately EUR 100 million has been allocated to the provision of a transitional fleet until the completion of the permanent fleet.

As the COVID-19 pandemic raged on, rescEU was provided with a reinforcement of approximately EUR 380 million to establish medical stockpiles for MS and PS to draw upon in their efforts to combat the pandemic. In this case, the legal framework initially established to enable the creation of aerial extinction capacities at EU level proved useful for the establishment of EU-level medical stockpiles.

**Further capacities were procured using approximately EUR 2 billion of Next Generation EU funding** with the intention of increasing Europe's preparedness against future health-related crises. The NGEU funding was split between the establishment of further stockpiles, including medical devices, therapeutics, shelter items, generators and CBRN, and the establishment of response capacities that include CBRN detection, sampling and monitoring as well as decontamination capacities. Additionally, EMTs and logistical transport support in the form of multi-purpose aircraft are being funded with the available NGEU funding.

An overview of the rescEU grants awarded reveals that slightly over 50% of the budget committed through the award of rescEU grants has gone towards the establishment of medical and CBRN stockpiles, while 25% of the budget awarded has been committed to aerial wildfire extinction.

**EUR 3 206 710 603 awarded from 2019 to 2024**
**113 grant agreements signed**




*Figure 19: Distribution of EUR value of rescEU grant agreements signed 2019-2024*

**Since its establishment, rescEU has provided assistance totalling approximately EUR 215 million from its stockpiles and donation hubs**. Close to three quarters of this assistance has been in the form of items originating from the medical/CBRN and energy stockpiles. The overall figure of assistance excludes deployments of aerial forest firefighting capacities through rescEU, which are the most deployed rescEU capacity. Quantifying the value of assistance provided through aerial forest firefighting means provided by rescEU poses a challenge due to the difficulties in determining the value of the land, property and lives saved as a result of a rescEU deployment.




*Figure 20: Distribution of approx. EUR 215 million in assistance delivered through rescEU 2019-2024*[43]

## 8) Conclusion

Since 2017, the response capacities of the UCPM have undergone significant changes that were triggered by a dynamic risk and threat landscape and a corresponding evolution of needs within MS and PS. These changes are reflected in a series of revisions of the legislation governing the establishment and management of UCPM capacities, new budget allocations to response capacity development, and updated goals that are used to direct this capacity development.

The **ECPP continues to embody MS and PS commitment to solidarity during disasters, with an ever-increasing number of national response capacities configured for international deployment** and registered to the pool. With the introduction of new types of response capacities and some revised capacity goals under Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704, the intended configuration of the pool has undergone a significant development that aligns with the overall increase in UCPM activations and the increasing complexity of the missions that the UCPM is requested to fulfil. Despite the introduction of rescEU as the EU's own response capacity, ECPP deployments have not declined and have remained closely tied to the frequency of UCPM activations.

[43] This graph excludes the assistance delivered through the aerial forest firefighting capacities deployed through transition rescEU within the given timeframe.

rescEU introduced an additional layer of response capacities at EU level beyond those available through national systems and the ECPP. **rescEU represents an unprecedented level of commitment on behalf of MS/PS and the Commission to collectively tackling large-scale disasters in Europe**. Since its establishment, rescEU has consistently delivered a return on investment, from making specialised aerial extinction capacities available during annual fire seasons to providing access to critical equipment from its stockpiles of generators, shelter components and medical/CBRN items. There is an evident need to leverage the potential of a strategic European relief capacity given its particular value in increasingly likely complex high-impact emergencies, the frequent rescEU deployments since its creation, and the related high number of MS and PS actively developing and hosting this type of response capacity.

The progress made under the ECPP and rescEU does not only concern direct response capacity developments and deployments but also the evolution of modalities enabling the effective and efficient use and functioning of these capacities. During the period analysed, 2017 to 2024, the UCPM continued to live up to its reputation as a well-functioning and flexible emergency management instrument made possible by committed engagement from MS/PS and the Commission. It is characterised by pragmatism and innovation, introducing new approaches when needed to tackle unprecedented challenges in the highly volatile crisis management environment that Europe is facing. While the UCPM's response capacities have grown considerably in strength and adaptability since their respective introduction, the above analysis shows that **the UCPM will need to continue to evolve.** Up-to-date risk and threat analysis, reviewed planning assumptions based on disaster scenarios, as well as analysis of systematic gaps analysis and the learning of lessons from every deployment of response capacities must therefore continue to feed this analysis of capacity progress under the UCPM.

## Annex 1: Coverage of former and current capacity goals through modules registered in the ECPP as of end 2024

The table below compares the Modules and Other Response Capacities (ORCs) currently registered in the ECPP to the previous Commission Implementing Decision 2014/762/EU and the current capacity goals in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/704. The column to the right of the goal column indicates the degree of attainment of the respective capacity goal by the modules currently registered in the ECPP. Capacity types for which the goals have been at least 90% achieved are highlighted in green, while modules for which the goals have not been, or have only partially been, covered are marked in orange (darker tone for an attainment level below 60%). Newly defined capacity types that were not part of the initial capacity goals are greyed out for the columns related to the earlier goals. The column 'current capacity goal' is colour-coded to provide an overview of the relative change in the desired ECPP configuration compared to the former set of capacity goals. Green indicates an increase compared to the former goal, while yellow indicates a decrease and blue marks no change.

Observations on the ECPP should be viewed as a snapshot of an ongoing process, as there are nearly 50 response capacities currently committed to the ECPP, but not yet certified, and therefore not counted as registered ECPP capacities. Most of them have a defined certification timetable and will become registered ECPP capacities within one to two years.



<table>
<tr><th colspan="6">Legend</th></tr>
<tr><th>Capacity Name</th><th>ECPP reg.</th><th>Former capacity goal</th><th>Goal completion</th><th>Current capacity goal</th><th>Goal completion</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Capacity name as in legislation listed in alphabetical order</td><td rowspan="4">Number of capacities registered in ECPP as of end 2024</td><td rowspan="2">Number indicating former capacity goal for capacity</td><td>0.00%-60.00%</td><td>Increased goal in new legislation</td><td>0.00%-60.00%</td></tr>
<tr><td>60.01%-90.00%</td><td>Unchanged goal</td><td>60.01%-90.00%</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">n/a (goal did not exist in previous legislation)</td><td>90.01-100.00%</td><td rowspan="2">Decreased goal in legislation</td><td>90.01-100.00%</td></tr>
<tr><td>>100.01%</td><td>>100.01%</td></tr>
</table>

# Modules

| Capacity Name | ECPP reg. | Former capacity goal | Goal completion | Current capacity goal | Goal completion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bridge capacity | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| Cave search & rescue | 2 | 2 | 100% | 3 | 66.67% |
| CBRN (Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) decontamination | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| CBRNDET (CBRN detection and sampling) | 7 | 2 | 350.00% | 6 | 116.67% |
| CBRNUSAR (Urban search and rescue in CBRN conditions) | 0 | 1 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |
| CHP (Cultural heritage protection) | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| Coastal and freshwater pollution response | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| EES (Emergency energy supply) | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| EMT type 1 fixed (Emergency medical team type 1: Outpatient emergency care – fixed) | 3 | 5 | 60.00% | 15 | 20.00% |
| EMT type 1 mobile (Emergency medical team type 1: Outpatient emergency care – mobile) | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 6 | 16.67% |
| EMT type 2 (Emergency medical team type 2: Inpatient surgical emergency care) | 5 | 3 | 166.67% | 6 | 83.33% |
| EMT type 3 (Emergency medical team type 3: Inpatient referral care) | 0 | 1 | 0.00% | 1 | 0.00% |
| ES (Emergency shelter) | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 4 | 25.00% |
| FC (Flood containment) | 2 | 2 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |
| FFFH (Aerial forest firefighting module using helicopters) | 0 | 2 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |
| FFFP (Aerial forest firefighting module using planes) | 2 | 2 | 100.00% | 2 | 100.00% |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRB (Flood rescue using boats) | 5 | 2 | 250.00% | 2 | 250.00% |
| GFFF (Ground forest firefighting) | 5 | 2 | 250.00% | 4 | 125.00% |
| GFFF-V (Ground forest firefighting using vehicles) | 9 | 2 | 450.00% | 15 | 60.00% |
| HCP (High-capacity pumping) | 16 | 6 | 266.67% | 20 | 80.00% |
| HUSAR (Heavy urban search and rescue) | 11 | 2 | 550.00% | 4 | 275.00% |
| LIGHT USAR (Light urban search and rescue) | 1 | n/a | n/a | 3 | 33.33% |
| MEDEVAC HID (Medical aerial evacuation of highly infectious disease patients) | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| MEVAC (Medical aerial evacuation of disaster victims) | 0 | 1 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |
| Mountain search and rescue | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 3 | 33.33% |
| MUSAR (Medium urban search and rescue – one for cold conditions) | 5 | 6 | 83.33% | 4 | 125.00% |
| T&L (Transport and logistics) | 0 | n/a | n/a | 2 | 0.00% |
| WP (Water purification) | 4 | 2 | 200.00% | 6 | 66.67% |



## Other Response Capacities

| Former capacity goal | Goal completion | Current capacity goal | Goal completion | Current capacity goal | Goal completion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Additional shelter capacity: units for 250 persons (50 tents); incl. self-sufficiency unit for the handling staff | 1 | 100 | 1.00% | 100 | 1.00% |
| At-sea pollution response (offshore, heavy equipment, recovery vessels) | 1 | n/a | | 2 | 50.00% |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burns assessment teams (BAT) | | n/a | | 2 | 0.00% |
| Communication teams or platforms to quickly re-establish communications in remote areas | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Emergency medical teams for specialised care | 0 | 8 | 0.00% | 8 | 0.00% |
| Evacuation support: including teams for information management and logistics | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Firefighting: advisory/assessment teams | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Medical evacuation jets, air ambulance and medical evacuation helicopter separately for inside Europe or worldwide | 0 | 2 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |
| Mobile biosafety laboratories | 1 | 4 | 25.00% | 4 | 25.00% |
| Mobile laboratories for environmental emergencies | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Other response capacities necessary to address identified risks | | as necessary | | as necessary | |
| Pollution detection (at-sea, shoreline, inland) | | n/a | | 2 | 0.00% |
| Relief items and other types of in-kind assistance | | as necessary | | As necessary | |
| Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) | 3 | 2 | 150.00% | 2 | 150.00% |
| Shoreline and inland pollution response (on-land pollution recovery, waste management and oiled wildlife response) | | n/a | | 2 | 0.00% |
| Standing engineering capacity | | 2 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Structural engineering teams, to carry out damage and safety assessments, appraisal of buildings to be demolished/repaired, assessment of infrastructure, short-term shoring | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| TAST (Technical Assistance and Support Team) | 6 | 2 | 300.00% | 2 | 300.00% |
| Teams for maritime incident response (MIRG) | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Teams for water search and rescue | 1 | 2 | 50.00% | 2 | 50.00% |
| Teams with specialised search and rescue equipment, e.g. search robots | | 2 | 0.00% | 2 | 0.00% |
| Transport and Logistics (non-aerial configurations) | | n/a | | 2 | 0.00% |