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## OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
On:	12 June 2025
To:	Delegations
No. prev. doc.:	8123/25
Subject:	Council conclusions on countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRN-E) risks at mass events, in particular mass sport events - Council conclusions (12 June 2025)

Delegations will find in the annex the Council conclusions on countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRN-E) risks at mass events, in particular mass sport events, approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 4102nd meeting held on 12 June 2025.

**Council conclusions**  
**on countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRN-E) risks**  
**at mass events, in particular mass sport events**

**General considerations**

1. One of the objectives of the European Union is the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police cooperation and countering threats in public places, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union.
2. The escalation of armed conflicts, violent extremism, the evolving criminal landscape, and the polarisation of European societies may lead to an intensification of threats in public places and during mass events in EU countries.
3. Malicious actors, including criminal organisations and lone individuals, are making full use of technological advances, thereby posing many evolving challenges to law enforcement agencies, in particular through attempts to acquire, synthesise and use dangerous chemical and biological agents to harm people, animals and the environment or to disrupt our way of life.
4. There is a particular need to monitor the level of risk and threats at mass events, including sports, to the potentially significant damage to persons or property that a CBRN-E incident or attack can cause during such an event.

5. Multi-agency and multi-institution coordination and cooperation are essential for effective investigations. Law enforcement agencies, as well as all relevant national and local agencies and services, need to better understand the challenges and have greater insight into the key issues related to CBRN-E threats, in accordance with the applicable national laws.
6. The resilience of the private sector concerning CBRN-E threats could be strengthened through awareness raising and cooperation with public institutions.
7. These conclusions aim at countering CBRN-E threats at mass events by establishing a limited number of specific objectives concerning the maintenance of CBRN-E countermeasures equipment (excluding issues of quality, availability and geographical distribution of European stocks of medical countermeasures for the affected populations) and the development of the necessary expertise in the Member States, with the support of the EU Commission where relevant, and by considering collaboration with the private sector.
8. The conclusions support the Union's efforts to further develop technological leadership and promote excellence in CBRN-E risk management, in particular by promoting, in accordance with the objectives set out in these conclusions, the highest level of protection from CBRN-E materials and an effective post-incident response.
9. These conclusions should aim to be consistent with the work carried out by the United Nations, the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the International Atomic Energy Agency and its relevant implementing guide.
10. These conclusions aim to enhance and support the research and development of technologies and of competencies needed to design CBRN-E incident response plans and procedures to better ensure the safety of mass events.

**The Council invites the Commission and Member States to:**

11. While respecting the principle of subsidiarity and Member States' competencies, consider evaluating the need to update European guidelines and national policies, legislation or best practices concerning mass events (including sports events) to establish clear standards or define minimum requirements (including for infrastructure and equipment) for multidisciplinary plans, procedures and measures regarding the prevention, preparedness, response to and recovery from CBRN-E incidents and attacks at mass events before, during and after the organisation of mass events. Standards and minimum requirements should take into account the different types of facilities for mass events and should be based on international best practices and the specific security needs of each country or region.
12. Encourage the development of multidisciplinary policies and capacity building measures, including the use of national and EU training facilities, plans and procedures to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from CBRN-E incidents and attacks, in accordance with intelligence-led threat assessment, and to deal with the effects of such CBRN-E incidents and attacks at mass events (including sports events), while respecting the principle of subsidiarity and Member States' competencies regarding national security.

**The Council encourages Member States to:**

13. Identify possible threats, conduct vulnerability assessments of facilities for mass events considered as high risk in order to identify points of vulnerability to a CBRN-E incident or attack. Based on this assessment, actions should be implemented to improve the ability to anticipate, prevent, protect and respond to CBRN-E incidents and attacks.
14. Monitor (and, when appropriate, assess) areas and facilities that can be used for mass events, including sports events (e.g. stadiums, sports halls, etc.), to resist CBRN-E incidents and attacks.

15. Support cross-border and cross-sectoral exchanges of experience to enhance knowledge sharing, promote best practices and foster a deeper understanding of the mutual tasks and responsibilities of institutions managing CBRN-E threats at national level by considering among others creating an EU platform.
16. Promote collaboration with academia, scientists and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) to gain science- and evidence-based knowledge. Leverage research findings to simulate scenarios involving various substances, enhancing preparedness and response strategies for CBRN-E incidents and attacks.
17. Ensure that in all plans, procedures and measures there is coordination before and during the mass event with law enforcement authorities and other public and private stakeholders, including national and local authorities responsible for the safety and protection of facilities for mass events in the CBRN-E area (e.g. police, fire brigade, medical personnel, municipal emergency personnel, sports associations, etc.).
18. To the extent possible, avoid storing any CBRN-E materials in facilities for mass events. When storage is unavoidable, ensure adequate and effective security measures (e.g. CCTV, security personnel, appropriate signage, or labels).

19. Develop appropriate CBRN-E training while taking into account existing training (e.g. the Melody project), for organisers and infrastructure operators of mass events, as well as for relevant sports facility staff (all target groups, e.g. managers, security and non-security staff, stewards and tenants). Where possible, training should be organised on a regular basis (e.g. once a year), with the involvement of relevant EU and national training centres (e.g. the Central European CBRN-E Training Centre), in cooperation with local authorities responsible for safety and protection in the CBRN-E area (e.g. police, fire brigade, medical personnel, municipal emergency personnel, sports associations, etc.) and coordinated by the national competent authorities. In addition, it is advisable for training to be practical and oriented towards real-life scenarios, with exercises and simulations to ensure a quick and effective response in the event of a CBRN-E incident or attack. Training could cover the following topics:

- 1) evacuation and crowd management procedures;
- 2) basic knowledge of CBRN-E measures;
- 3) recognition of CBRN-E threats;
- 4) incident response protocols or procedures, where appropriate in cooperation with the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) or the European Medicines Agency (EMA);
- 5) development of security plans, including CBRN-E;
- 6) examples, scenarios, case studies, if appropriate in cooperation with HERA, UCPM or Joint Action TERROR;
- 7) personal protective equipment and its proper use;

- 8) managing the recovery of data after an incident or attack, respecting the sensitivity or classification of information and the ‘need-to-know’ principle;
  - 9) CBRN-E vulnerability assessment of the site;
  - 10) decontamination procedures;
  - 11) implementing protective measures for the public and managing consequences (post event).
20. Develop or improve evacuation and crowd management procedures during mass events, including sport events, to include CBRN-E incidents and attacks.
  21. Consider requesting the Commission’s Protective Security Advisory Programme to identify security gaps and to prepare recommendations for improvements.

**The Council invites the Commission to:**

22. Analyse and provide information on potential financial and technical support for national and international projects related to the implementation of these conclusions, particularly if the above-mentioned actions are undertaken.
  23. Consider the possibility of using expired CBRN-E stocks or CBRN-E stocks that are close to expiration for training purposes.
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