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HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION FOR
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**JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL**

on Military Mobility

Joint Communication on Military Mobility

Military Mobility as a crucial enabler of defence readiness and enhanced deterrence

In the rapidly evolving **global security context**, military mobility is a crucial enabler of the defence posture and capabilities that Europe urgently needs to credibly deter its adversaries and to respond to any crisis. It contributes to security and defence and to the Union's preparedness. It is also a cornerstone of EU-NATO cooperation and key to the EU's support to Ukraine.

“World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”, as Schuman declared in 1950. This is today more valid than ever before. To ensure peace through deterrence, EU Member States must be able to move their armed forces and military equipment seamlessly, at speed and at scale across and beyond the EU. This requires a **dual-use transport system** that is able to support military mobility while minimising disruptions and mitigating the impact of such transport on civilian transport and hence for the economy and society as a whole.

While important progress has been made, **significant barriers** persist to effective military mobility in the EU. National rules are often divergent, fragmented and non-harmonised – including when civilian operators are used for military transport services - and not fit for the current security context we live in. We need to better coordinate and speed up military transport to eliminate these issues. Moreover, the EU's transport infrastructure is insufficiently adapted to dual-use needs. The system remains vulnerable to disruptions and ever more frequent cyber and hybrid attacks. In addition, transport capabilities such as flatbed wagons and dual-use ferries - vital for military movements - are scarce. These issues expose critical vulnerabilities for the Union's transport network and thereby undermine the EU's security and defence capacity as well as the capacity of militaries to support civil protection. To this end, Europe must clearly change gear and remove all remaining barriers.

The Joint White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and its translation into the Defence Readiness Roadmap identify military mobility as a priority capability area for a robust European defence. While Member States remain free to decide whether to allow foreign armed forces to cross their territory as part of their national security and defence, the EU must have a framework for military mobility that balances military and civilian needs. To this end, the Commission and the High Representative (HR) propose a comprehensive set of measures to facilitate seamless military mobility with a **360-degree approach**, in close coordination with NATO. It aims to set up an **EU-wide Military Mobility Area by the end of 2027** as a first step towards progressively achieving a ‘**Military Schengen**’ in regulatory, infrastructure and capabilities dimensions.

Progress to date

The upheaval of the European security architecture following Russia's invasion of Crimea, and subsequently its military aggression against Ukraine, mobilised the EU, Member States' and partners' responses. Since 2017, the EU has pursued a dedicated agenda to strengthen military mobility. A series of measures to tackle physical, procedural and regulatory barriers for military movements were identified in two **Action Plans on Military Mobility** in 2018 and 2022. In the 2024 **Military Mobility Pledge**, Member States committed to address the remaining gaps in military mobility.

The revised **Regulation for the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T)** of 2024 commits Member States to integrate military mobility into European transport policy, setting the trans-European transport network on the path of becoming largely a dual-use network. To guide and prioritise future dual-use infrastructure investments on this network, **four priority multi-modal military mobility corridors** for short notice and large-scale military movements, together with shared military infrastructure requirements, were adopted by the Council in March 2025. These Corridors will allow for strengthened cooperation and coherent investment planning between Member States across borders.

Achieving a trans-European transport network that meets both civilian and military needs requires high investments. Under the **Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)** 2021-2027, a budget of EUR 1.69 billion - was dedicated to co-fund dual-use transport infrastructure through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with 95 dual-use transport infrastructure projects selected across 21 Member States. As the demand for EU funding significantly exceeded the available resources and all calls were heavily oversubscribed¹, the Commission proposed in July 2025 a tenfold increase of the military mobility budget under the CEF within the next MFF as of 2028. In addition, until the end of the current MFF period, the reallocation of Cohesion policy funds to defence-related investments – with financial incentives if requested by end 2025 - and the SAFE instrument can be used by Member States to finance dual-use and military mobility infrastructure projects.

Next to infrastructure, transport and logistic capabilities are critical enablers of military mobility. Improving awareness at EU level on available transport assets, optimal use of these capabilities and closing capability gaps across the Union is key. To enhance these enablers, the EU has supported projects on digital information exchange systems, outsized cargo airlift and studies for future air systems through the **European Defence Fund (EDF)**.

While Member States have made significant efforts to achieve alignment, diverging rules result in delays impacting heavily on military mobility. The **European Defence Agency (EDA)** and contributing Member States have developed Technical Arrangements for cross-border

¹ The 3rd and final call of 807 MEUR for dual-use transport infrastructure projects had an oversubscription rate of 4.7: 22 Member States applied with 112 projects (for a total requested EU co-funding of EUR 3.7 billion)

movement permission procedures, with the aim of harmonising and simplifying these rules. However, the implementation of Technical Arrangements is suboptimal, and changes to the EU framework are necessary to achieve harmonisation. Digitalisation is needed to increase speed and efficiency, and to minimise operational risks.

Overall and despite the progress made in these past years, challenges remain. This is also the conclusion of the **European Court of Auditors Special Report on EU military mobility**, which outlines that the EU's approach to military mobility has achieved mixed results, and that it remains fragmented and insufficiently binding.

The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 calls for enhanced dual-use connectivity with our neighbours, in particular Ukraine and Moldova. Four of the nine European Transport Corridors of the TEN-T already extend into Ukraine and one into Moldova, with a first set of important investments in dual-use infrastructure ongoing. For instance, with the help of co-funding from the CEF and the European Investment Bank, a first 22 km long railway stretch connecting Western Ukraine with Slovakia and the rest of Central Europe in European nominal standard railway track gauge opened in September 2025. In parallel, preparatory works are ongoing to deploy European nominal standard track gauge on the European Transport Corridors connecting Moldova and Ukraine to EU Member States.

Streamlining and adapting rules and procedures for swifter military movements

Europe must take decisive action. While progress has been made, the EU remains shackled by fragmented approaches that undermine our ability in moving military equipment and personnel across Europe. The current **state of fragmented and inconsistent national regulations and procedures, and bureaucratic hurdles** creates critical bottlenecks and delays.

Cross-border military transport remains constrained, in particular as EU rules are not applied to military transport or are not applied coherently, national regulations diverge, and military transport is not given sufficient priority. Civilian operators contracted by the military must comply with civilian rules, which are not adapted for military transport needs. Additionally, military transport operations have far more demanding requirements than civilian ones. Military forces also share infrastructure and vehicles with civilian transport operations which creates competing needs. This leads to **delays, operational inefficiencies, critical bottlenecks and capacity constraints**.

Diplomatic clearance procedures are often complex and paper-based with long approval timelines. For example, the time required to obtain **cross-border permissions** for military transport varies significantly, with some Member States requiring 45 days advance notice, far exceeding the **three working days** to grant permissions committed to in the 2024 Military Mobility Pledge. In addition, the application of customs formalities can create delays unless the appropriate customs simplifications are utilised, such as the EU Form 302 or NATO Form 302.

Moreover, military transport often involves **dangerous goods and abnormal loads**, which require adequate planning to ensure safe operation (for example for transport of heavy equipment such as tanks, and of ammunition). However, the EU harmonised rules for dangerous goods do not apply to military transport, while processes for abnormal loads are slow and disparate. Thus working out safe routes and arrangements is done on an *ad hoc* basis between individual Member States, local authorities and infrastructure managers, sometimes taking many weeks.

Responsibility for the processes related to military mobility is fragmented within Member States, and inconsistent between them. The **Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Military Mobility project**, comprising 30 participating countries, has worked to address this, including by creating a network of military mobility Points of Contact at national level.

Addressing these challenges exceeds individual Member State capacities. National efforts and non-binding measures fall short of the urgency and clarity demanded by a volatile geopolitical landscape. Substantial progress is needed to accelerate the pace and scale of EU military mobility.

To address these systemic issues, the EU needs a **unified approach** integrated into the broader transport acquis, tailored to the unique demands of military operations. To this end, the Commission, and the HR, propose a Military Mobility Package.

The Package will encompass a single set of rules for cross-border military transport permission procedures, including diplomatic clearances and the transport of dangerous goods and oversized/overweight military cargo, with shortened lead times and standardised templates for requests and notifications. Currently, permissions between Member States need to be renewed annually, while there is a need for more predictability and stability. This new set of rules will ensure that permissions are valid until revoked and includes a possibility to expand their scope. The enhanced rules and procedures for cross border permissions are also aimed to benefit military movements of non-EU NATO allies, when relevant for our security, and ensuring that the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States are not contravened.

The armed forces need harmonised rules and timelines for the technical and operation arrangements for transport – whether carried out with their own fleet or by civilian operators - providing clarity on the routes they can take, especially for dangerous goods and abnormal cargo, and at the same time flexibility to adjust military transport to the precise nature of any crisis. The Commission and the HR encourage Member States to work together to plan routes, ensuring alignment with the work of the **Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations (NetLogHubs)** PESCO project which aims at improving infrastructure planning and coordination. The harmonised rules proposed by the Commission will support such enhanced and advanced coordination among Member States and relevant actors.

To simplify military transport conducted by civilian operators (“white fleet”) in line with military transport conducted by military forces (“green fleet”), the Commission proposes under

the Regulation within this Military Mobility Package to **exempt military transport from certain civilian rules** such as **holiday traffic bans**, and to include the possibility for Member States to suspend **cabotage** rules in certain situations.

Divergent national implementation of EU customs rules and an **insufficient use** of appropriate customs declaration forms (i.e. EU Form 302 or NATO Form 302) by the operators create avoidable delays in the transport of goods. **The EU and NATO Forms 302** as applicable should be used by default by operators (unless waived by military authorities in favour of the regular customs formalities), to streamline cross-border transport and prioritise customs controls when applicable. To increase legal certainty regarding the use and handling of the Forms 302, the implementation of the new Union Customs Code could further specify data requirements and relevant customs formalities. To enhance the impact of streamlined customs formalities, relevant provisions need to be paired with soft measures, such as giving clear guidance and delivering training for civilian operators, customs and military authorities.

Digitalisation of military mobility processes will help to ensure swift procedures and better coordination. The creation of a single digital tool to handle cross-border military mobility processes should be envisaged. This tool would manage diplomatic clearances, track transport arrangements and include a digitalised EU Form 302, and facilitate the exchange and storage of information. This is a long-term significant project that needs to be built progressively, incorporating customs and military aspects, and would aim to streamline processes, with modalities and technical specifications to be discussed with Member States. The Commission has supported a project on digitalisation of military mobility processes under the EDF which could possibly serve as one of the building blocks. The EDA has also in parallel advanced work on digitalisation of customs requirements for military transport. Under the next MFF, the Commission has proposed a specific component on military mobility within the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF) proposal^[60] including activities related to the digitalisation of military mobility processes.

The rules proposed in the Regulation will **reduce delays and operational risks**, aligning with the EU's three-day processing commitment of cross-border military transport requests and enhancing defence readiness by enabling seamless cross-border movements of military personnel and equipment. It will **increase consistency** and **minimise bureaucratic hurdles** that have long hindered military mobility. This will bring the EU closer to a 'Military Schengen'.

The Commission will review the **Rail Service Facilities Regulation** in 2026 to ensure it meets military transport needs while including the input from EU Military Staff. Similarly, the Commission will revise the **Air Services Regulation** in 2026 to allow greater flexibility in the application of exceptional air traffic restrictions to facilitate military transport in peacetime. In addition, the Commission, in cooperation with the EDA, Eurocontrol acting as network manager and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), will improve civilian-military coordination to facilitate cross-border military flights by promoting a **network of suitable dual-use airports**, predefined cross-border connectivity points, and a digital single

window for authorisation. This will be supported by an evaluation of the **Flexible Use of Airspace Regulation** in 2026.

Stepping up our defence through an emergency framework for cross-border military transport

In crises, when time is crucial to any response, Europe cannot afford to react slowly. In such situations we cannot rely on *ad-hoc* coordination and national goodwill. We must have a clear plan and a fast lane prepared for our military forces. Without it, our deterrence remains theoretical.

The Commission therefore proposes as part of the Regulation an **emergency framework for cross-border military transport, the European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System (EMERS)**, which will activate an enhanced and coordinated response framework for cross-border military transport in case of emergencies where standard procedures fall short. It will enable temporary, extraordinary measures to guarantee enhanced cross border military transport and **priority access for the armed forces to infrastructure, transport assets, and essential services**. It will include unified regulatory procedures and rules, **targeted derogations and exemptions, enhanced preparedness and solidarity measures, and increased infrastructure resilience**.

EMERS will be the Union's emergency framework for military transport, **strengthening its capacity to respond swiftly and effectively** to urgent situations and to minimise disruptions of civilian traffic, contributing to defence readiness where an existing or expected increase in volume, frequency or speed of military transport in the Union cannot be met under normal Union transport rules or due to the capacity of the Union transport network. It may be activated by the Council within 48h, acting on the proposal of the Commission on its own initiative or upon a request initiated by at least one Member State. Where possible, the Commission will consult the Military Mobility Transport Group proposed in the Regulation.

In this process, the Commission in cooperation with the HR will use all expertise available, and engage with NATO through agreed formats, informing it of EMERS' activation, extension, or termination. This collaborative approach ensures consistency and reinforces interoperability between EU and NATO response mechanisms, further supporting EU defence readiness.

When EMERS is activated, special rules will apply. Cross-border military transport will only require a notification with a reduced advance notice of military movement, bypassing standard procedures, with the exception of customs formalities and provisions. Even in an emergency, military transport operations need to be planned to ensure oversized loads fit the infrastructure, dangerous goods are safely transported, and facilities are available to support road transport en route. These arrangements must be simplified and finalised very rapidly, using predetermined routes where possible. **EU-wide priority access to transport networks**, infrastructure and related services will be granted to all military transport operations, whether carried out by the military or by its (civilian) contractors. Moreover, derogations related to **cabotage rules**,

driving time and rest periods for military transport carried out by civilian operators will be provided for. Military transport will be exempt from **traffic restrictions** based on the environmental performance of vehicles or based on air quality and noise control put in place at airports and ports. Rail vehicles may operate more flexibly, beyond their authorised area of use, and enhanced protective measures will safeguard strategic dual-use infrastructure.

The proposed new Union Customs Code could also introduce **faster and specific customs procedures** for crisis situations at the customs frontier of the Union. To support the application of these customs provisions to military transport operations, the European Union Customs Authority, in consultation with the Commission, will develop specific protocols and procedures for expediting customs formalities when the EMERS is activated. Its activation will also trigger the customs crisis management mechanism under the new Union Customs Code, ensuring streamlined procedures in urgent situations. Also the rapid movement of military food supplies from non-EU countries is important for the sustainment of troops and EMERS rules will support this.

Changing gear on infrastructure: making transport infrastructure fit for a dual use

Significant investments at all levels are needed to upgrade Europe's transport infrastructure to dual-use standards for civilian and military purposes. As military convoys are often large in scale and composed of oversized and overweight vehicles, **our infrastructure needs to be adapted to such abnormal military transport**, in particular by reinforcing and enlarging rail and road bridges and tunnels and by significantly increasing transport capacity, notably in ports and airports. The migration to European nominal standard track gauge and other technical enhancements to allow smooth transportation by rail to all parts of Europe will equally be key, as will be the enhancement of the resilience of our communication and energy supply infrastructure.

As a matter of priority, the **four priority military mobility corridors** should be upgraded to the infrastructure standards set by the Council's Military Requirements to create a resilient and operational military mobility network. Spending must be strategic, focusing on major choke points first and based on an assessment of the corridors' functionality.

To this end, **500 'hotspot' projects**, with currently estimated investment needs of around EUR 100 billion for urgent intervention on the four corridors, have already been identified together with Member States. These targeted and particularly short-term investments will lead to quick improvements of the corridors and must be implemented with priority to be operational. By setting up and steering regular corridor meetings, the Commission, supported by the HR and in consultation with NATO will work with Member States - **through the TEN-T Committee**² to ensure that such critical investments are made swiftly and in a coordinated and coherent corridor approach, ensuring a sound and mature pipeline of projects.

² As established in accordance with Article 61 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1679

To support these investments, the Commission's proposal for the **next MFF (2028–2034)** promotes a tenfold increase of the available budget for military mobility, with a proposed budget of EUR 17.65 billion under the future **Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)** for investments in TEN-T dual-use transport infrastructure. National TEN-T dual-use sections could be complemented by investments under the proposed National and Regional Partnership Plans. Moreover, the Commission has proposed, as one of the general objectives of the future **European Competitiveness Fund**, the development of Union cross-border and critical infrastructure key to the Union's competitiveness and strategic independence, in particular energy and transport, digital and security, defence and space infrastructure as well as social infrastructure and related data and services. **ECF InvestEU** instrument can further support dual-use infrastructure investments through loans and guarantees. Furthermore, the Commission MFF proposal outlines that the next **Horizon Europe Framework Programme** may support dual-use actions, including those relevant for military mobility.

Adapting the military mobility transport network to military standards also requires an accurate **mapping of the current state of transport infrastructure** against military needs. This will ensure that investments are well targeted and proportionate to where the real needs are. The Commission will accelerate ongoing studies on the state of tunnels and bridges in the EU and the availability of dual-use capacity at EU ports and airports. In addition, in 2026, the Commission with the support of the HR, European Union Agency for Railways and rail infrastructure managers, will reassess the physical limitations of the rail infrastructure on the priority military mobility corridors to facilitate easier transport of oversized/overweight cargo.

More generally, the HR³, supported by the Commission and in close cooperation with the relevant European transport agencies, and the EDA, and in consultation with NATO, will **re-evaluate the transport infrastructure standards contained in the Council Military Requirements**, and align the EU technical transport requirements as much as possible.

Complementing these efforts, the Commission will work with the HR and industry stakeholders to **optimise the product design and dimensions of military vehicles and equipment**, notably to transport them more easily, in the light of the limitations of the transport network and use its joint procurement and financial tools to support the implementation of these improved product design standards.

Improving the resilience of our infrastructure

To enable and sustain seamless military mobility, Europe's transport network and its assets must be resilient and operational. Our infrastructure must be protected as it is not only the very basis for the functioning of our internal market but also essential for our deterrence, security and defence. Single impacts on critical infrastructure nodes can have widespread effects on the entirety of the network. This requires an all-hazards approach to protect the network.

³ including the European Union Military Staff

While the **Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive**⁴ sets out harmonised requirements for enhancing the resilience of critical entities in the EU, infrastructure that is key for military mobility requires particular safeguarding. In order to further protect them, the Commission proposes to set up a process for Member States to identify **strategic dual-use infrastructure**. Based on a shared **toolbox of resilience and protection measures** that go beyond the instruments of the CER Directive, Member States will be able to ensure that strategic transport, energy and communication infrastructure is resilient against all hazards and remain operational. As announced in the White Paper on Defence Readiness, this includes stronger measures to mitigate risks associated with **foreign ownership or control of strategic dual-use infrastructure**, as well as the possibility for Member States to temporarily take control over important infrastructure, equipment and assets.

It is vital to protect interconnected infrastructure networks which face growing risks from cyberattacks and hybrid threats. Recent incidents like the hybrid attacks on central airports in Germany and Denmark, on the railway system in France have underscored the importance of the EU's unified policy to strengthen resilience and a shared civilian-military situational awareness. Insufficiently maintained and upgraded infrastructure systems increase risks, allowing malicious cyber actors to remotely disrupt train safety, while the maritime sector increasingly faces cyberattacks, jeopardising supply chains and port operations. EU-controlled satellite communications are critical for the provision of secure governmental communications and real-time military coordination when terrestrial networks fail. Maritime assets can also contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure. It is important to ensure that the entities managing strategic dual-use infrastructure take cybersecurity measures as set out in the **NIS2 Directive**.

Over-reliance on high-risk vendors further heightens exposure, emphasising the need to diversify infrastructure components supply to avoid creating uniform attack surfaces for large-scale cyber incidents. The upcoming revision of the Cybersecurity Act will help to strengthen the cyber resilience of supply chains for information and communication technologies in Europe. Furthermore, to combat the threat of radio interference, the Commission, assisted by EASA, the EU Military Staff and the EDA, will assess the need to update relevant EU legislation, to enhance the resilience of air traffic systems, including the communication, navigation and surveillance systems, against unlawful interferences. In addition, the Commission supported by the ERA will work to strengthen the robustness of the rail traffic management system in a harmonised way to ensure continued operations in cases of sabotage or other system failure. **Coordinated stress-testing processes** will be put in place by 2029 to facilitate this.

Lastly, military mobility in Europe depends heavily on reliable access to **liquid fuels and energy infrastructure**, yet projected declining civil fossil fuel demand and refinery closures

⁴ Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC

are creating new risks and import dependencies. The EU is addressing energy supply bottlenecks. As announced in the Affordable Energy Action Plan the Commission will review the energy security framework, including the Oil Stock Directive, to assess adaptations for sustainable fuels, mitigate emerging risks and enhance military mobility readiness through improved energy resilience. The EU and NATO are working closely together to explore synergies between the civil and military sectors in fuel supply, on identifying future fuel trajectories, mapping supply chains, and ensuring access to fuel stocks in emergency situations.

Complementing this, the EU's efforts to promote the production and use of Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) and Sustainable Maritime Fuels (SMF) represent a significant opportunity to boost energy security for both Member States' armed forces and the civil sector. The Commission will promote **increased production of SAF and SMF**, including in **dispersed production capacities** if possible, to improve resilience and energy security. The recently adopted Sustainable Transport Investment Plan will play an important role in further supporting the scale-up of SAF and sustainable maritime fuels.

Enhancing preparedness, solidarity and availability of transport capabilities for military mobility

In a European crisis, a **single Member State cannot move alone**. When Member States face transport capability gaps, their ability to act is hindered. Where availability of transport capabilities is scarce, we need Union-wide **solidarity** mechanisms, sharing EU assets, and ensuring that we know what dual-use transport capabilities are available across the Union.

The EDA is currently working to identify capability gaps in rail and inland waterway transport. We can build on this knowledge when taking concrete steps to address the gaps.

Several Member States have successfully implemented '**pooling and sharing**' initiatives for transport and logistical capacities, notably in the field of strategic air lift, inland surface and sea transport. However, these initiatives are fragmented and limited.

Building on these, the Commission proposes to establish a **“Military Mobility Solidarity Pool”**. It will cover transport capabilities across all transport modes and seek to make them accessible to all Member States. The Commission, supported by the HR and in consultation with Member States, will determine the most suitable way to operationalise, manage and coordinate the pool. The Commission, under the guidance of the Military Mobility Transport Group , will aim to identify the types of transport capabilities to pool and ensure their interoperability.

Under this initiative, Member States will be able to voluntarily register their own capacities for military transport as well as those contracted with civilian operators. The registered capacities will be made available to all Member States, enhancing their ability to conduct military transport operations. Additionally, the Union will be able to **register additional transport and logistic capabilities** in the pool and include contracted capabilities. Complementing this

initiative under the Regulation, a **Strategic Lift Reserve** will enable civilian operators to set aside transport capacities (notably airlift and sealift) for EU or Member State use in exceptional situations.

To expand existing capacities, and to incentivise the sharing and pooling of capacities, the Commission, should also support the **procurement of new military mobility transport and logistic capabilities** and help Member States in sharing the burden of deployment costs, maintenance expenses, and personnel training costs linked to the pool. Moreover, under the next MFF, the Commission has proposed, within the ECF, the possibility to notably incentivise the procurement of transport and logistical equipment and help Member States accessing them.

We will also equip our armed forces with better visibility on existing civilian transport capacities, enhancing their military mobility planning and execution. The Commission will require Member States to **grant their armed forces access to existing registries of vehicles and aircrafts** and also set out new rules to better identify dual-use rail vehicles. The Commission will consider further measures to ensure a comprehensive overview at EU level of available resources and expertise.

In addition, the Commission and the HR will also propose the creation of a "**military mobility catalogue**", where European businesses can display their relevant capacities and services for military transport, giving our armed forces a clear overview of European services they could utilise.

As a result of scarce capacities, a Member State may end up **pre-contracting** those already booked by another Member State. To address risks associated with such possible double booking, we propose that civilian operators be required to keep Member States informed of such cases. To be ready to face the most extreme situations, Member States should all have in place a framework for **taking temporary control of necessary equipment for military transport operations**, also to assist other Member States.

The growing demand for military transport and defence equipment production may strain existing dual-use capacities, risking timely delivery and military transport effectiveness. The Commission proposed under the next MFF, a possibility to **support the expansion of industrial capacities for the production of military mobility equipment** as well as the training, reskilling, and upskilling of personnel to enhance the availability of skilled personnel for the transportation of defence products.

In addition, manufacturing more transport assets on the basis of a "**dual-use by design**" approach, supported by the development of dual-use standards fit for military and civilian applications and simplification of certification procedures, is another way of increasing the transport assets' availability for the armed forces. In complementarity to the Regulation, the Commission, in cooperation with the EDA, will task its relevant Agencies (EASA, EMSA and ERA) and the European standardisation organisations to develop dual-use standards for military mobility critical transport assets, thereby ensuring consistency with NATO standards

for transport assets and the updated dual-use infrastructure requirements. This will ensure EU-wide interoperability and coherence with EU defence capability priorities.

In light of the increased role of drones, we will support the establishment of an **EU network of civil-defence drone testing centres** to boost innovation, leveraging ongoing EU initiatives, such as those outlined under the European Strategy on Research and Technology Infrastructures. In addition, a joint drone framework will be developed for integrating drones into airspace and ensure civil and military operations through common standards and procedures. The Commission has made significant progress in implementing the action's set out in the 2023 Communication on countering threats posed by drones⁵. We will also create a European regulatory framework for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technologies, work on establishing a methodology for assessing AI-based drone systems' trustworthiness and develop a harmonised certification framework for large drones by amending the EASA Basic Regulation.

The Commission also proposes a modification of the EASA Basic Regulation to address the need to introduce the possibility, for the Member States or EASA, to establish **regulatory sandboxes** with a view of enabling the design, development, and testing of innovative aviation products in a real-world environment. In the absence of such opportunities, EU-based development and manufacturing of such products will be severely hampered or slowed down, forcing reliance on third country suppliers.

One of the issues is the urgent need to address the **certification of equipment**, notably the largest drones for the operations with the highest level of risk. Joint work should be conducted between the EASA and the military aviation authorities of Member States to define the requirements.

Ensuring effective coordination and whole-of-government approach with a robust governance

Proper governance, coordination and oversight are indispensable to ensure that when Europe moves, it moves as one. The threats we face are collective and so must be our response. Military mobility is not just about transport, it is about EU's ability to act.

A whole of government approach is an essential enabler of a successful implementation of the measures included in the Commission's proposal of a unique framework for military mobility.

The Commission proposes a **Military Mobility Transport Group** to facilitate the coordination and steering of Member States' efforts and assist the Commission in the implementation of various measures under the Regulation. It will bring together Member States,

⁵ COM/2023/659 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on countering potential threats posed by drones

the European External Action Service (EEAS), including the EU Military Staff and the EDA, and be chaired by the Commission.

In the implementation of provisions related to military mobility dual-use transport network and corridors, as well as identification of strategic dual-use transport infrastructure, the Commission will be supported by the **TEN-T Committee and the EU Military Staff**.

Coordination of military transport at national level is currently done on an ad-hoc basis. Each Member State will be required to designate a '**National Coordinator for Military Transport**'. This Coordinator will be responsible for ensuring seamless internal coordination and cooperation among all relevant national, regional, and local stakeholders involved in military transport operations, particularly during the activation of the EMERS. This Coordinator shall also have the relevant technical expertise and administrative capacity to assist stakeholders with regard to the application of customs formalities.

To ensure the Union's readiness, the Commission proposes a regular assessment through an annual "**Military Transport Readiness Check**" and foresees the possibility to organise "stress tests", focussing on specific issues such as customs formalities or the interplay between civil protection and military mobility, to identify areas for improvement and enhance overall effectiveness. The first stress tests will focus on ensuring fast movements of military assistance towards Ukraine and the Union's Eastern borders.

There are work strands of military mobility that fall outside of the proposed regulation, including the intensive work so far by the EU and Member States on Military Mobility, particularly under PESCO and EDA frameworks. **The Commission and HR VP will take further steps to strengthen this work, including on coordination, and in full respect of the Treaties and of applicable EU legislation.**

Deepening existing partnerships

The EU will continue to further strengthen and expand mutually beneficial partnerships with like-minded partners, based on shared values and interests, through Security and Defence Partnerships. These often cover PESCO, EDA and other defence related frameworks. The EU will enhance engagement through the Military Mobility and Logs Hub PESCO projects with relevant bilateral partners.

The EU will also seek to intensify "flagship" cooperation with NATO on military mobility, in line with the EU-NATO agreed guiding principles, while respecting Member States' prerogatives and competences. Overall, relations with NATO on military mobility matters shall be reinforced and have a mutually beneficial and transformative impact for Member States and non-EU NATO allies. To promote the exchange of information, mutual invitations to working group meetings to provide cross-briefings will be encouraged, particularly focused at EDA and NATO Logistics meetings. The EU will invite NATO to participate in table-top exercises

(TTX) on military mobility, on condition that the principle of reciprocity is respected. As noted, the EU will update its guidance on the use of the EU and NATO Forms 302.

It is also vital for the EU's security interests that the provisions of the Regulation will be applied in accession countries, especially in Ukraine and Moldova. In this context, accession countries' Common Foreign and Security Policy alignment rate should be taken into account.

The Regulation will offer substantial benefits to Ukraine. It will do so by improving dual-use transport infrastructure, streamlining rules for the transport of military equipment and border-crossing procedures across Europe. These measures would support faster movement of military assistance towards Ukraine and the Union's Eastern borders. Together, these efforts could help reinforce the resilience of Ukraine's logistical connections with the Union and contribute to broader objectives of strengthening European security and defence.

Russia's war against Ukraine provides invaluable lessons for the EU, Member States and partners, in military mobility. The Military Mobility Transport Group may invite Ukraine, Moldova and countries of the European Economic Area as observers, with a view to drawing from its valuable experience with military and preparing Ukraine for its future EU membership. Public-private cooperation and civil-military interaction are critical to accommodate effective military mobility through the whole-of society and whole-of-government approach, as envisaged in the Preparedness Union Strategy. Strengthening collaboration—through capacity building, effective communication, preparedness and resilience planning and active involvement in exercises—can significantly enhance readiness and coordination. Ensuring greater awareness and input of civilian operators and authorities can harmonise cross-border movements and procedures for military mobility.

Exercises

Exercises and testing will strengthen EU military mobility by identifying operational, legal, and infrastructural improvement areas. **Exercises will validate procedures, improve coordination among Member States, enhance interoperability with partners, and generate lessons to inform policy, planning, and investment.** Through live exercises, potential vulnerabilities in the logistics process will be identified and solutions subsequently proposed for addressing these obstacles. Such simulations will test the compliance of priority corridors against key military standards for transport infrastructure.

From 2026, the EU together with Member States will conduct annual military mobility exercises. These will be done through exercises such as EU Military Exercises (MILEX), command post exercises (CPX), and military live exercises (LIVEX), linked to the Rapid Deployment Capacity, and by participating in multinational exercises, including through Parallel and Coordinated Exercises organised by the EU and NATO.

Conclusions

The threats we face are shared and so must be our response. The Package marks a decisive step towards removing the remaining barriers to military mobility. It reflects our collective ambition to respond faster and better protect our citizens across the continent. With this Package, we aim to align military mobility efforts at EU and national levels with a view to progressively achieving an EU-wide military mobility area.

The time for decisive action is now. The creation of an EU-wide military mobility area is no longer an option but a necessity. Our peace and security are at stake.

The Council and the European Parliament are invited to support the ambitious objectives set out in this Joint Communication and to work together on their delivery. The implementation of the Package will be closely monitored, with regular updates shared with both the Council and the European Parliament to ensure progress.

The European Commission and the HR invite the **European Council** to endorse the presented framework and to monitor the progress achieved.