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NOTE

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| From: | General Secretariat of the Council |
| On: | 24 February 2026 |
| To: | Delegations |

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| Subject: | Presentation by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) |
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Delegations will find attached the presentation in subject delivered at the PROCIV CER WP meeting on 17 February 2026.

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Electricity
Authority
of Cyprus



Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC)

- ▶ Risk Assessment & Business Continuity in Critical Energy Infrastructure.
- ▶ Addressing HILP Risks in a Changing Climate
- ▶ PROCIV CER Working Group



EAC's role

The EAC as a Critical Infrastructure Operator

- ▶ Electricity Transmission and Distribution System Owner (assets) & Distribution System Operator
- ▶ Backbone of societal, economic & security continuity
- ▶ High interdependency with:
 - ▶ Civil Protection
 - ▶ Telecommunications
 - ▶ Water & transport systems
- ▶ Strong public responsibility dimension



Why HILP Risks Matter for Energy

- ▶ **High Impact – Low Probability Risks**
- ▶ Extreme weather events (heatwaves, wildfires, floods)
- ▶ Large-scale outages/blackouts
- ▶ Cyber-physical incidents
- ▶ Geopolitical & supply chain disruptions

Climate Change as a Risk Multiplier

- ▶ Increased frequency & severity of extreme events
- ▶ Stress on generation, transmission & distribution assets
- ▶ Cascading failures across sectors
- ▶ Longer recovery horizons

How Far Does Planning Go?

Limits of Organisational Planning

The EAC:

- ▶ Plans for **credible severe scenarios**
- ▶ Designs **resilience up to defined tolerance thresholds**
- ▶ Recognises that some scenarios:
 - ▶ Exceed organisational control
 - ▶ Become **national emergencies**
- ▶ Clear distinction between:
 - ▶ **Organisational responsibility**
 - ▶ **State-level crisis management when thresholds are crossed**



Policy-Level Reflections for the EU

Key Questions for Policy Discussion

- ▶ Should HILP risks be treated differently at EU level?
- ▶ Is there sufficient clarity on:
 - ▶ State vs operator responsibilities?
 - ▶ Escalation thresholds?
- ▶ Are current requirements proportionate & realistic?

Enablers (1): Governance, Escalation & Coordination

Clarify escalation thresholds for HILP events

Agreed triggers that shift from operator incident management to national crisis management.

Define roles across the chain (Operator–State–EU)

Who leads restoration; who leads public safety/security/logistics; who coordinates cross-border support.

Enable trusted, early sharing (threats & near-misses)

Practical confidentiality and “safe-to-share” mechanisms so learning happens before the next crisis.

Interdependency coordination

Electricity–telecom–transport–fuel–water: common situational awareness and priority-setting during restoration.

Enablers (2): Preparedness, Mutual Assistance & Recovery Finance

Common EU stress scenarios for HILP

Prolonged regional outage; extreme weather + wildfires; widespread telecom disruption; cyber-physical compound events.

Joint exercising and operational playbooks

Cross-sector / cross-border drills; tested procedures for critical spares, emergency logistics corridors, and restoration support.

Mutual assistance mechanisms

Rapid access to specialised crews, critical equipment/spares, mobile generation, and cyber response support.

Recovery finance & risk-transfer mechanism

Instruments to support rapid restoration and reconstruction where impacts exceed what operators can prudently self-insure.

- ✓ Preparedness reduces impact; recovery finance reduces time-to-normal.

Learning & Prevention: Resilience Maturity

Trusted sharing of threats & near-misses

Confidential reporting and analysis across operators and authorities to prevent repeat events (cyber, physical, hybrid).

After-action reviews (AARs) with the State

Structured debriefs after incidents and exercises → corrective actions → tracked closure and accountability.

Resilience maturity path

Baseline → Managed → Integrated → Adaptive (from compliance-driven controls to multi-actor operational readiness).

Practical indicators (examples)

Restoration time targets; black-start readiness; spares/critical inventory; communications redundancy; exercise frequency.

Key Takeaways

HILP resilience is a shared responsibility

For critical electricity services, high-impact/low-probability events exceed what any single operator can manage alone.

Clarity on boundaries and escalation is essential

Pre-agreed triggers and roles ensure a fast shift from operator incident management to national crisis management when thresholds are crossed.

EU enablers turn compliance into real capability

Proportionate requirements, trusted early sharing, mutual assistance, stress scenarios and recovery finance reduce impact and time-to-normal.

- Predictable escalation + shared capability = faster recovery.



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EAC Perspective

- Strong commitment to resilience & preparedness
- Continuous alignment with EU policy
- Willingness to contribute to collective learning



***Resilient energy systems are the
foundation of resilient societies***



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Thank you

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