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From:	General Secretariat of the Council
On:	12 December 2024
To:	Delegations
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Subject:	Council conclusions concerning a handbook for European States hosting major international football tournaments with recommended good practice in respect of embedding international police cooperation within host police tournament planning and operations – Council conclusions (12 December 2024)

Delegations will find in the annex the Council conclusions concerning a handbook for European States hosting major international football tournaments with recommended good practice in respect of embedding international police cooperation within host police tournament planning and operations, approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 4068th meeting held on 12 December 2024.

Council conclusions concerning a handbook for European States hosting major international football tournaments with recommended good practice in respect of embedding international police cooperation within host police tournament planning and operations.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

- (1) Having regard to the European Union's objective of providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police cooperation.
- (2) Having regard to a history of serious and significant public order incidents in connection with major international football tournaments hosted in Europe.
- (3) Having regard to the health, safety and security of the millions of football supporters who traverse Europe and beyond in connection with European-hosted major international football tournaments.
- (4) Having regard to the health, safety and security of millions of European citizens who reside or work in the vicinity of stadia and city centres hosting football matches played in European-hosted major international football tournaments.
- (5) Having regard to these Conclusions being complementary to other Council Decisions, Resolutions and Conclusions in connection with football events with an international dimension, in particular:
 - (5a) Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook') (11160/24);

- (5b) Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters (12792/16);
- (5c) Council Resolution concerning the costs of hosting and deploying visiting police delegations in connection with football matches (and other sports events) with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (12791/16); and,
- (5d) Council Conclusions on sports-related violence, approved by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at its 3799th meeting held on 7 June 2021 (8648/21).
- (6) Having regard to the unique dynamic of football related criminality, and the highly specialist and distinctive character of international police cooperation and the role of the European network of National Football Information Points (NFIPs) in connection with major international football tournaments and other European football events.
- (7) Having regard to extensive European experience which evidence that international police cooperation is integral to, and a key component of, application of a comprehensive and integrated approach to minimising the risks associated with European-hosted major international football tournaments.
- (8) Having regard to variations among Member States regarding (i) their constitutional, judicial, cultural and historical circumstances and (ii) the character and severity of safety and security problems associated with football events.
- (9) Having regard to experience in connection with recent European-hosted major international football tournaments, including the multi-hosted European Football Championship EURO 2020, and the development of established good practice in the framework of those tournaments.

- (10) Having regard to the potential for transnational criminal and terrorist threats in connection with major international football tournaments.
- (11) Having regard to the EU Security Union Strategy 2021-2025 which stresses the need to tackle terrorism and prevent radicalisation, disrupt organised crime and fight cybercrime.
- (12) Having regard to the important role of EUROPOL in supporting law enforcement agencies in Member States hosting major international football tournaments to prevent and counter transnational terrorist and organised crime threats.

HEREBY,

- (1) URGES Member States hosting major international football tournaments to take account of the recommended good practices annexed hereto.
- (2) STRESSES that the recommendations proposed within are without prejudice to existing national provisions, in particular the division of responsibilities among the different authorities and services in the Member States concerned and the exercise by the Commission of its powers under the Treaties.
- (3) STATES that, whilst the measures contained in the annexed handbook are intended primarily for hosting major international football tournaments events, Member States may, where they consider it appropriate, apply the measures in respect of other major international sports events.

EUROPEAN HANDBOOK ON HOSTING MAJOR INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL TOURNAMENTS

HOST STATE POLICE PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

Introduction and Summary

Aim of Handbook

1. The aim of this handbook is to inform and support host police planning and operations in European States selected by UEFA or FIFA to host (or co-host) major international football tournaments.
2. The guidance within is based on European and global experience over recent decades and the associated emergence and evolution of a range of good practices in connection with recent tournaments, and, where applicable, experience in respect of the extensive annual calendar of football matches with an international dimension.

International Police Cooperation

3. International police cooperation has long been an integral part of host tournament policing strategies and the associated tournament policing infra-structural framework.
4. Thus, whilst the focus of this handbook is on international police cooperation, this important component of hosting a major tournament cannot be considered in isolation from the challenges and planning issues confronting the host police at national, regional, and venue city level.

5. All European States have experience in hosting one-off matches in connection with European club or national competitions, however there is a profound difference between hosting a one-off football match with an international dimension and hosting a high-profile international football tournament extending over a period of around one month.
6. This difference is highlighted throughout the handbook, notably in respect of the:
 - key policy and structural imperatives which the host authorities need to consider and resolve in the first phase of the tournament planning process;
 - strategic and operational planning on both the national and venue city level; and, importantly,
 - integrating international police cooperation, including the tournament International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC), within a comprehensive and multi-faceted tournament policing strategy.
7. Experience in hosting major international football tournaments varies across Europe. Some States will already have previous experience in hosting such tournaments, however for other States, it will be their first opportunity to do so.
8. In recognition of the need to cater for this this variation in tournament experience, this handbook is necessarily based on the assumption that the host police (at national, regional, and venue city level) will be engaged in hosting tournament matches for the first time.
9. Moreover, even in States with prior experience, personnel changes and the evolution of good practice will necessitate the need for a fundamental review of existing points of reference.
10. In such cases, the guidance within this handbook can provide an aide-memoire designed to inform and support policing policy makers, strategists, and senior practitioners in determining and defining the role of international police cooperation within the planning and delivery of a comprehensive, multi-faceted, and flexible host tournament policing strategy.

11. It is also recognised that national, regional and local constitutional arrangements vary significantly across Europe in terms of management/oversight of police planning and operations that will apply in cities designated to host tournament matches.
12. For example, in some States, regional or local authorities, or mayors, may play a key role in determining the policing, and associated safety and security, strategies to be adopted in venue cities. The term used within this handbook is “*venue city police authorities*” which should be interpreted to mean who is designated with responsibility for determining policing strategies and operational planning considerations in the venue city.
13. Thus, the content of Part One (Tournament International Police Cooperation), Part Two (High Level Policy and Structural Imperatives) and Part Four (Tournament IPCC Preparatory and Operational Arrangements) of this handbook is focused on established planning and structural considerations at a national level.
14. However, in view of the aforementioned variations in constitutional, legal, and administrative arrangements at regional and local level, the content of Part Three (Tournament Police Operational Planning in Venue Cities) and Part Five (Supporting and Advisory Roles of Visiting Police Delegations) is primarily focused on key police operational planning considerations and good practice.
15. In essence, the onus throughout is on recognition that each host State will need to customise their planning and operational arrangements to reflect specific constitutional and legal framework imperatives along with a range of national, regional and local needs and circumstances.

State Sovereignty

16. It must be stressed, therefore, that the guidance within this handbook, fully recognises, and in no way undermines, the core principle that responsibility for policing international football tournaments is, and must remain, the preserve of the host State.

17. This principle of State sovereignty also applies in respect of each State selected by UEFA or FIFA for joint or multi-hosted tournaments.
18. This is imperative given the obligations accepted by the host State (including a governmental guarantee) when bidding to host the tournament and, in particular a reflection of wide variations in: national constitutions and cultures; policing structures and strategies; crowd management-related legislative and regulatory, and administrative frameworks; along with a range of other national and local factors.
19. Such variations may also manifest in respect of key tournament decisions on policing policy, and strategic and operational planning. For example, it could be decided that the national police should lead on some of the planning and operational activities which traditionally rest on the police authorities in venue cities. Similarly, in accordance with national constitutions and/or legal frameworks, local or regional authorities (or mayors) may have responsibility for determining venue city policing strategies and operational planning.
20. Such matters are solely for the host authorities to determine. In accordance with this principle, the content within this handbook endeavours to provide established good practice which, at the very least, will support and inform the host authorities in considering a range of key issues which need to be resolved at an early stage of the host planning and preparatory phases of the tournament.

Format of Handbook

21. For ease of reference, the guidance within is presented in five parts:

Part One: Tournament International Police Cooperation.

22. Part One provides background and explanation in respect of the planning required by host governmental and policing policy makers, strategists, and planners in respect of determining and defining the various components of international police cooperation.

23. This includes consideration of the role and remit of what has become known as the tournament International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC).
24. In so doing, it explains why the high-profile status and importance of the IPCC role is appropriate given the sheer volume of information exchange necessary to support the host police prepare for and counter the challenges associated:
- with tens of thousands of supporters drawn from across Europe, and beyond, visiting the host state during the event; and,
 - well-documented history of significant and high-profile public disorder in connection with a number of European-hosted major football tournaments.
25. However, it also considers a current anomaly in nomenclature whereby the core functions of the IPCC are centred on information exchange and analysis in respect of what is but one, albeit crucial, element of a wider framework of event international police cooperation.
26. In essence, the role of the IPCC is to gather, assess, and analyse information drawn from across Europe or the globe (depending upon the character of the event), notably (but not exclusively) from States participating in the tournament, for the purpose of informing and supporting host police crowd management (“public order and public safety”) operations in venue cities and elsewhere as appropriate.
27. This process is distinct from the role and remit of other international police cooperation agencies, such as Interpol, Europol, and, if applicable, Frontex, whose specialist remits are focused on preventing and responding to a range of transnational terrorist, organised crime, and border control challenges.
28. These issues are considered in Part Two, along with possible options for host States to provide structural clarity on, and enhance coordination between, the various components of the tournament policing strategy with an international police cooperation dimension.

29. Part One also highlights the importance of the host governmental and policing authorities agreeing bilateral arrangements with:
- (i) each international policing partner agency, along with defining their respective roles and support services in a joint action plan; and
 - (ii) each national States participating in the tournament, setting out the support to be provided to the host police and other authorities.

Part Two: High Level Policy and Structural Imperatives

30. Part Two describes a range of key high-level and inter-related policy imperatives which need to be resolved and defined at a governmental and national policing level in advance of the preparatory phase of tournament planning.
31. This includes determining a tournament policing infrastructure designed to provide an integrated approach to delivery of a comprehensive, multi-faceted, yet flexible, tournament policing strategy.
32. This also includes a strategy which embeds international policing partners and ensures effective arrangements for coordinating the exchange of information and threats analyses between the various components of the host tournament policing strategy.
33. This is crucial given the extent to which the impact of challenges and threats to the tournament, and the associated police response, can and will overlap. The need for a holistic policing approach is stressed throughout this handbook.
34. Part Two also considers a range of other policy and structural planning imperatives, including:
- Tournament Emergency Planning and Operations Coordination;
 - Review of Legal and Administrative Framework; and, importantly,
 - International Police Cooperation Budgets.

Part Three: Tournament Police Operational Planning in Venue Cities

35. Part Three sets out a series of operational planning considerations which need to be resolved by local and/or regional policing policy makers and strategists well before the start of the tournament in order to be prepared for an array of predictable and potential challenges when the focus of tournament policing operations centres on events in venue cities.
36. The recommended good practice contained in Part Three reflects the traditional practice whereby the venue city police (or the applicable local or regional authority with a constitutional role in police planning and operations within their respective and designated area of authority) are expected to develop and deliver policing arrangements in connection with tournament matches played in their city, taking account of guidance and instruction issued by the police at a national level.
37. National guidance or instruction is important given the need for a harmonised approach towards delivery of policing operations in each venue city. However, each venue city policing plan will also need to take account of local circumstances, much of which may be unique to that city.
38. The content within Part Three, therefore, makes the necessary assumption that venue city police policy makers and strategists will have to design and deliver a comprehensive and customised city-focused tournament policing strategy. This will involve a wide range of core considerations which are considered in this part of the handbook.
39. Also highlighted is the relationship between the venue city police authorities and their national and international partners, and the need to establish new, and build upon existing, local and regional partnerships as part of the operational planning process.

Part Four: Tournament IPCC Preparatory and Operational Arrangements

40. Part Four is based on the traditional role the tournament International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC) and the good practices that have emerged and evolved in connection with recent European hosted international football tournaments.
41. It provides host states with detailed information in respect of the planning, preparatory, and operational arrangements required to ensure that the tournament IPCC can fulfil its remit of providing an integrated approach to informing and supporting host police crowd management operations.

Part Five: Supporting and Advisory Roles of Visiting Police Delegations

42. Part Five centres on the supporting role of visiting police delegations (sometimes described as “spotter or spotting teams” for one-off football matches with an international dimension). It is similarly based on decades of experience and good practice developed in connection with international football tournaments hosted in Europe and beyond, and, where applicable, in connection with the extensive annual calendar of European club and country competition matches.
43. For ease of reference, the recommended good practice in Part Five is based on, and pulls together, established guidance contained in various sections of the Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (‘EU Football Handbook’) (11160/24)
44. In essence, it provides a range of information on the composition, roles and deployment of visiting police delegations, along with the important contribution which they can play in supporting venue city policing operations.

45. It highlights the role which visiting police delegations can play in monitoring the behaviour of supporters of their national team, identifying any emerging risks, and informing venue city policing operations. It also explains the role which they can play in communicating with visiting supporters on behalf of the host police.

Additional Reading

46. In addition to the good practice which has emerged and evolved in connection with recent tournaments, where applicable and for ease of reference, this handbook also takes account of the content of pre-existing documentation which may impact on host State police planning and operational considerations at a national, regional and local level, notably:
- Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook') (11160/24); and,
 - Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters (12792/16); and,
 - Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015 (as revised in 2019 and issued in 2020), which provides additional and more detailed guidance on matters that could impact on host State police planning and operations such as tournament signage and traffic management considerations.

47. These documents do refer to major international football tournaments, but the references are spread across various thematic chapters and largely presented in the context of one-off football matches with an international dimension and/or wider multi-agency safety, security, and service considerations.
48. Nevertheless, host police tournament policy makers, strategists and senior practitioners can consider the above documents as providing sources of further information. Indeed, where it is considered that further reading might be of particular value, an indication is provided in the relevant section of this handbook.

Application of Handbook

49. In conclusion, it stressed that whilst this handbook centres on international football tournaments, which traditionally pose the most challenges for host states, the principles and practices contained within can be adapted and applied to other major sports events if and when considered appropriate by the host authorities.
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EUROPEAN HANDBOOK ON HOSTING MAJOR INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL TOURNAMENTS

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PART ONE – TOURNAMENT INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

Section 1.1. Host Police Tournament Planning and International Police Cooperation

1.1.1. Hosting a major international football tournament will require extensive planning. This includes consideration of a range of key high-level policy imperatives (described in Part Two of this handbook) which need to be resolved at an early stage of the planning process in order to provide a framework for a wide range of inter-related tournament preparations and operations.

1.1.2. Integral to tournament police planning is the need for governmental and policing decision makers and strategists to:

- determine and define the role of international policing partners and the support and services they will provide; and,
- incorporate the role of international police cooperation within a comprehensive and multi-faceted (yet flexible) host tournament policing strategy.

1.1.3. Once these matters have been resolved, the focus should be on determining the tournament policing infrastructure necessary to deliver the host tournament policing strategy and, importantly, embed international policing partners. The aim being to ensure effective arrangements are put in place for:

- exchanging and analysing national and international police information; and,
- coordinating the measures necessary to prevent and counter a range of tournament specific threats.

1.1.4. This crucial tournament policing objective reflects the extent to which the impact of threats to the tournament, and the associated police response, can and will overlap. The need for a holistic policing approach is essential.

1.1.5. The following two Sections outline the sources and character of the various components of tournament international police cooperation.

Section 1.2. Role of the Tournament International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC)

1.2.1. The support provided by international partners comprises a number of components, the highest profile of which is the role and remit of the tournament International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC), described in previous European documentation as the Police Information Coordination Centre (PICC).

1.2.2. In recent decades, the IPCC has become a key feature of European-hosted major international football tournaments, where the status and importance of the IPCC is wholly appropriate given the:

- prospect of tens of thousands of supporters drawn from across Europe, and beyond, visiting the host State during the tournament;
- well-documented history of significant and high-profile public disorder in connection with a number of European-hosted major football tournaments; and,
- sheer volume of information exchange necessary to support host police crowd management operations.

1.2.3. The core remit of an IPCC is to act as a central hub for the exchange, assessment, and analysis of tournament-related international police information in order to support, among other structures, the commanding structures of the host police deliver effective risk-based crowd management (public order and public safety) operations in venue cities, and elsewhere as appropriate, for the duration of the tournament.

1.2.4. To achieve this objective the IPCC remit traditionally comprises three inter-related functions, namely:

- exchanging, managing, and analysing information on crowd management issues, provided by the European network of National Football Information Points (NFIPs) or (in participating States which fall outside of the NFIP umbrella) designated police single points of contact (SPOCs): a process facilitated by the deployment in the IPCC of liaison officers from States participating in the tournament, and others as appropriate (see Part Four of this handbook);
- acting as a conduit for sharing international police information, risk assessments and other analyses on crowd management issues with the designated SPOCs in venue cities and the wider national policing network in the host State; and,
- coordinating the arrangements for deploying visiting police delegations (sometimes described as “spotter” or “spotting” teams) from participating States to provide advice and support to the police in venue cities and other locations as appropriate.

1.2.5. This three-prong approach enables the tournament IPCC to provide a comprehensive and integrated approach in respect of the international support for host police crowd management operations.

1.2.6. In so doing, the IPCC also provides an enabling mechanism for the European NFIP network to fulfil its obligation under European law to act as *the direct and central contact point for exchanging relevant information and for facilitating international police cooperation in connection with football matches with an international dimension*¹.

1.2.7. Detailed guidance on the planning, preparatory, and operating arrangements of the IPCC is provided in Part Four of this handbook

¹ Council Decision of 25 April 2002 (2002/348/JHA) – as amended by Council Decision 2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007.

Section 1.3. Wider Framework of Tournament International Police Cooperation

1.3.1. As highlighted above, the IPCC provides the highest profile element of tournament international police cooperation and provides the hub for the greatest amount of police information exchange.

1.3.2. However, tournament-related risks extend beyond crowd management challenges (and the remit of NFIPs). Thus, the IPCC is but one component of a broader framework of tournament-specific international police cooperation.

1.3.3. All major high-profile events, including international football tournaments, provide opportunity for, and an increased risk of, terrorist groups and/or organised crime using the tournament to pursue their own criminal objectives. Such transnational activities require an international response from agencies and institutions dedicated to preventing and combatting the threats involved.

1.3.4. Europol, Interpol and/or other agencies in the Justice and Home Affairs area, such as Frontex can, in accordance with their legal mandates, play an important role in supporting the competent authorities of States hosting major international football tournaments. This role typically incorporates the provision of:

- access to data on terrorist groups and transnational crime and criminals;
- specialist support services;
- training programmes;
- fixed and/or mobile intelligence coordination centres;
- deployment of liaison officers and additional personnel and resources; and,
- threat assessments in respect of terrorism, a range of organised criminality, and enhanced border controls.

1.3.5. The host police authorities will have pre-existing experience in dealing with both Europol and Interpol (and Frontex if they are an EU Member State) and knowledge of the core services which they can provide. The initial task for the host police, therefore, will be to engage with these agencies to consider the scope and character of their potential role in supporting host police preparations and operations.

1.3.6. It is important to note that since 2001, Europol and Interpol have a cooperation agreement in place, one key purpose of which is:

- *“the exchange of operational, strategic, and technical information, the coordination of activities, including the development of common standards, action plans, training and scientific research and the secondment of liaison officers.”*

1.3.7. The host police, therefore, may wish to consider inviting the two agencies to agree on their respective roles in connection with the tournament and prepare a draft joint action plan for consideration by the host authorities.

1.3.8. It is likely that both Europol and Interpol will have an important and complementary role to play before and during the tournament.

1.3.9. As the European Union established Europol with a primary aim of achieving a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens in the fight against terrorism, cybercrime and other serious and organised forms of crime, it is likely that they will have a higher-profile role to play in connection with a European-hosted tournament (notably, but not exclusively, if the host State is an EU member). In this regard, it is also relevant that Europol also works with many non-EU partner States and international organisations.

1.3.10. The role of Interpol is global and one factor in determining the exact character, role and extent of the international police support necessary will centre on whether the tournament is purely European or global in character.

1.3.11. For example, a World Cup, organised under the auspices of FIFA, will involve participating States from all continents and provide enhanced challenges for host law enforcement, such as organised illegal immigration considerations. Similarly, a European tournament, organised under the auspices of UEFA, may include participating States who fall outside of what is generally considered to be the geographical and political boundaries of “Europe”.

1.3.12. In essence, a key outcome of high-level police and governmental tournament planning should be a clear indication of the support required from international policing institutions possessing specialist expertise in preventing and combatting transnational terrorism and organised crime and enhancing border controls.

1.3.13. For ease of reference, an outline summary of the role and services available from these agencies is appended to this part of the handbook in respect of Europol (Appendix 1.A), Interpol (Appendix 1.B), and Frontex (Appendix 1.C).

1.3.14. It is again stressed, however, that in each case, the support required should be the subject of detailed discussion in the first phase of the tournament planning process and subsequent bilateral agreements with the agencies concerned (*see* Section 1.4 below).

1.3.15. Thus, the four core components of the host policing strategy, embedding support from international partners, can be summarised accordingly:

- (i) Border control and entry arrangements, incorporating host border police and any other host immigration related law enforcement agencies, along with Europol, Interpol’s IMEST, and (if requested by a host EU Member State) Frontex as their main sources of international police support;
- (ii) Counter-terrorist (CT) and political extremist analyses and preventative and impact mitigation measures, incorporating specialist host CT police and intelligence agencies, along with Europol and Interpol experts and liaison officers as their main sources of international police support;

(iii) Risk analyses and preventing and countering tournament-specific organised criminality (such as cybercrime, intellectual property crime, counterfeit tickets, match fixing, etc.) incorporating a range of host criminal police experts specialising in the various threats identified prior to and during the tournament, along with Europol and Interpol experts as their main source of international police support; and, as outlined above,

(iv) Crowd management arrangements, the focus of which is on international police support located in a dedicated tournament IPCC (*see* Part Four of this handbook) and visiting police delegations in venue cities (*see* Part Five of this handbook).

1.3.16. Taken together, these four specialist areas provide a framework of tournament-specific international police cooperation.

1.3.17. However, it is important for host police planners and strategists to recognise that the remits of these four core components can and will overlap both in terms of threats and the associated preventative measures intended to counter malicious and other major disruptions to the tournament.

1.3.18. For example, a cyber-related incident may have either organised criminal or terrorist motivations. Similarly, measures adopted to counter a terrorist threat, or other significant disruption to the tournament, will inevitably have a major impact on host police crowd management operations and the role of visiting police delegations.

1.3.19. The need to ensure effective coordination and information exchange between the four components should, therefore, be a high priority for tournament police planners and strategists (*see* Section 2.5 of this handbook).

Section 1.4. Bilateral Arrangements on International Police Cooperation

(a) Bilateral Agreements with International Policing Agencies

1.4.1. As indicated above, the support provided by Europol, Interpol, and Frontex will need to be subject to bilateral discussions and mutual agreement or confirmed in a memorandum of understanding between the host police and each of the agencies concerned.

1.4.2. These agreements will vary in accordance with host requirements and the constitutions, expertise and operating arrangements of the respective agencies. However, in each case, the agreements should incorporate the arrangements for:

- liaison with designated host law enforcement personnel;
- information gathering and exchange;
- access to databases;
- use and retention of data;
- declarations of discretion and confidentiality;
- establishing specialist operational cells/centres;
- deployment of mobile liaison officers;
- possession and use of equipment and technical aids;
- provision of threat analyses;
- any training to be provided;
- international and domestic travel; and,
- deployment and operating costs.

(b) Bilateral Arrangements with National States

1.4.3. The government-led policing planning group (*see* Section 2.2 of this handbook) will also need to commission bilateral discussions with each participating State (and other States if deemed necessary or appropriate) as soon as possible during the preparatory phase of the tournament.

1.4.4. The purpose of these discussions will be to inform tournament international police cooperation preparations and provide mutual clarity on a range of key preparatory, logistical, and operational arrangements that will apply before, during, and after the tournament, notably (but not exclusively) in respect of:

- bilateral police cooperation and information exchange arrangements, including personal data;
- available measures and criteria for preventing the exit of banned persons from their country of residence and controls on the entry of known risk supporters into the host State;
- logistical and operational matters associated with the size, composition, and functions of visiting police delegations to be mutually agreed based on a pre-tournament risk assessment (*see* Part Five of this handbook); and,
- deployment of liaison officers in the host IPCC (*see* Part Four of this handbook).

1.4.5. The need for mutual clarity on such issues is self-evident, however the actual arrangements set out in each bilateral agreement are likely to vary in accordance with a range of factors, including:

- the number of visiting supporters expected to travel to the host State from each participating State in connection with the tournament;
- preliminary assessments on the potential risks posed by the supporters of each participating national team; and,
- the experience, expertise, working practices, and preferences of each visiting police delegation.

1.4.6. Notwithstanding such variations, each bilateral agreement should provide clarity in respect of:

- composition of visiting police delegation;

- core tasks of delegation;
- executive powers of delegation (if any);
- possession and use of technical equipment to gather intelligence and evidence (for example, handheld video and stills cameras);
- deployment with protective equipment (firearms, CS gas, batons, tasers, other);
- use of covert human intelligence sources;
- wearing of uniforms or high visibility identification;
- media handling arrangements; and,
- costs and logistical arrangements.

1.4.7. Consideration can also be given to the merits of selected (or all) visiting police delegations incorporating personnel to be deployed in uniform at international and key national transit hubs in the host State to support border control and entry arrangements in terms of facilitating communication with arriving supporters of their respective national teams.

1.4.8. Such deployments will also evidence to visiting supporters that host and participating police are working in close cooperation regarding public safety and security in connection with the tournament.

1.4.9. Supplementary discussions and agreements will be required in respect of on the more detailed arrangements regarding IPCC logistical and operating arrangements (*see* Part Four below).

1.4.10. It is stressed that the outcome of these bilateral discussions and agreements are not intended to be international treaties, but rather an aid to mutual understanding and a tangible (though not legally binding) commitment on the part of the participating or other State to support host State policing and other safety and security arrangements.

1.4.11. Once negotiations are complete, the agreed arrangements should be signed by both parties at either governmental or policing level in accordance with the arrangements set out in their respective national laws.

EUROPOL ROLE AND SUPPORT SERVICES

1. Europol is the European Union's law enforcement agency, the main aim of which is to achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all the EU citizens in the fight against terrorism, cybercrime, and other serious and organised forms of crime. Europol also works with many non-EU partner States and international organisations.
2. Europol's mandate is to support European law enforcement authorities in preventing and responding to a range of transnational organised criminality and terrorism, including:
 - terrorism;
 - trafficking in human beings;
 - facilitated illegal immigration;
 - cybercrime;
 - currency counterfeiting;
 - mobile organised-crime groups; and,
 - intellectual property crime.
3. Europol delivers this mandate through the provision of a range of support services, including:
 - hosting databases and communication channels that offer fast and secure facilities to member States for storing, searching, visualising, analysing and linking key information;

- hosting an Operational Centre, which runs 24/7, for the exchange of data among Europol, EU Member States and third parties on criminal activity;
- European Cybercrime Centre (EC3);
- Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT);
- European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC);
- European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC);
- Intellectual Property Crime Coordinated Coalition (IPC3);
- illicit immigration networks;
- illicit vehicle trafficking networks;
- money laundering networks; and,
- currency forgery networks.

4. Europol also has a wide range of crime specific Analysis Projects (APs).

- 4a. AP Copy supports the prevention and combating of crimes involving intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement. This covers organised crime networks engaged in manufacturing and trading counterfeit products: a crime that is often associated with major football tournaments.
- 4b. AP Cyborg supports investigations into cyber criminality affecting critical computer and network infrastructures in the EU. Its particular focus is on cybercrimes by organised groups that generate large criminal profits. This covers a broad range of high-tech crimes such as malware (code creation and distribution), ransomware, hacking, phishing, intrusion, identity theft and internet-related fraud.

- 4c. AP Hydra is to support the prevention and combating of terrorism-related crimes against life, limb, personal freedom, or property, and related criminal offences, perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks, or organisations.
- 4d. AP Migrant Smuggling supports the targeting and dismantling of organised criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling, focusing on geographical criminal hubs and hotspots.
- 4e. AP Soya supports the fight against currency counterfeiting. Counterfeiting of the euro is the main priority of the Analysis Project, but it also supports law enforcement agencies in targeting forgeries of other currencies such as the US dollar and pound sterling. This includes supporting the dismantling of distribution networks and identifying illegal currency print shops.
- 4f. AP Sports Corruption supports current investigations into sports corruption, including fraud and swindling, and associated criminal activities.
5. In terms of major events, including international football tournaments, Europol can provide a range of support services (on request), to inform and support host policing operations in preventing and countering tournament-related organised criminal and terrorist threats, including:
- deploying experts and mobile offices to support host law enforcement agencies;
 - working with the host State, international partners, and agencies in preparing operational plans for coordination of cross border operations;
 - define criminal or terrorist threats, scope of cross-border operations (CBOs) and the measures required to disrupt the criminality and identify and act against the perpetrators; and,
 - provide standard arrangements for coordinating of CBOs at Europol headquarters involving the deployment of representatives from participating States and partner agencies.

6. Host States will need to have detailed agreements with Europol and sign declarations of Discretions and Confidentially.

Source: Europol's website at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol>.

Timing of Requests for Europol Support Services

Major International Sporting Tournaments (Europol file number 2570-50r1)	
Support Service	Official request to Europol
Initial General Threat Assessment on Organised Crime Related to the Tournament (GTA)	12 months prior to the Tournament
Initial General Terrorism Threat Assessment Related to the Tournament (GTТА)	12 months prior to the Tournament
Updates to the GTA and or GTТА	6 months prior to the Tournament
Specific (crime area) Threat Assessment(s)	6 months prior to the Tournament
Operational Analytical Support within the framework of the existing Europol Analysis Work Files	6 months prior to the Tournament
Training Course in Strategic Analysis	8 months prior to the Tournament
Training Course in Operational Analysis	8 months prior to the Tournament
Specialist (specific crime area) Training Courses	6 months prior to the Tournament
Deployment of Europol Liaison Officer(s) in the host State	12 months prior to the Tournament

[Note this version appeared in an earlier edition of the EU handbook and may be obsolete or in need of updating]

INTERPOL ROLE AND SUPPORT SERVICES

1. Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) is the world's largest international police organisation with 192 member countries. It was established to help the police forces around the globe cooperate in tackling transnational crime by providing them with shared databases and specialist expertise.
2. Each member country hosts an Interpol National Bureau which connects their national law enforcement with counterparts in other countries and with the Interpol General Secretariat (headquarters) through a secure communications network which enables law enforcement agencies in member countries to safely obtain and communicate data related to crime and criminals.
3. The core function of Interpol is to enable the police in member countries to prevent and counter international crime in respect of three key areas:
 - (i) **Counter terrorism**, including CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives) threats. Interpol can assist law enforcement agencies in member countries through sharing intelligence on transnational terrorist networks gathered from member States around the globe and assisting in developing threats analyses in connection with high profile tournaments and facilitating the identification and arrest of suspects.
 - (ii) **Organised crime**. Interpol can enhance the capacity of law enforcement in member countries to effectively combat serious transnational crime through the provision of (a) focused police training initiatives and of (b) on-demand advice, guidance, and support in building dedicated crime-fighting components with national police forces. The latter includes the sharing of knowledge, skills and best practices in policing through Interpol channels and the establishment of global standards on how to combat specific forms of crimes.

- (iii) **Cybercrime.** Interpol can assist law enforcement authorities in member countries by coordinating a global response to transnational cyber threats and attacks by gathering and sharing up to date information on threats, trends; and risks to assist host countries in developing prevention and disruption strategies in respect of, and a coordinated multi-agency response to, existing and any emerging cyberthreats.

4. In pursuit of these goals, Interpol provides a range of services.

- (i) **Secure global police communication services.** This includes disseminating critical crime-related data through a system of international notices in all of the organisation's four official languages: Arabic, English, French and Spanish. For example, **Blue Notices** to collect additional information about a person's identity or activities in relation to a crime and **Green Notices** to provide warnings and criminal intelligence about persons who have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in other countries.
- (ii) **Operational data services and databases for police.** Interpol provides a database that the police can access globally. This database allows the police all over the world to access information designed to assist in the prevention and investigation of crimes. The database also holds criminal data such as criminal profiles, criminal records, theft records, stolen passports, vehicles, artwork and forgeries, etc.
- (iii) **Operational police support services.** Interpol supports law enforcement officials in the field with emergency support and operational activities, especially in its priority crime areas of fugitives, public safety and terrorism, drugs and organized crime, trafficking in human beings and financial and high-tech crime. A Command and Co-ordination Centre operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
- (iv) **Police training and development.** Interpol's Global Learning Centre is a Learning Management System composed of a directory of experts, e-learning packages, and a depository of research papers and best practices. Together with regular training programmes, the organisation ultimately aims at enhancing member countries' capacity in combatting transnational crime and terrorism.

5. Interpol also provides investigative support, expertise, and training to law enforcement worldwide in respect of these three major areas of transnational crime. Its broad mandate covers virtually every kind of crime, including intellectual property infringement.
6. On request from a member country, Interpol can also deploy Incident Response Teams and/or Major Tournament Support Teams, each made up of experts in the relevant fields. The deployment of these teams is managed by the Interpol Command and Coordination Centre at their HQ.
7. The **Interpol Major Events Support Team (IMEST)** assists national police authorities hosting major international events by being integrated within the tournament's security infrastructure, in order to work with the lead host policing agency to prepare, coordinate, and implement security arrangements to prevent and address any terrorist threats and/or serious criminal offences.
8. IMEST can provide instant access to vital data to assist the national and foreign liaison officers of participating countries to make the best use of Interpol's databases. They facilitate real-time exchange of messages and vital police data between countries. This data includes fingerprints, photos, wanted person notices, and data relating to stolen and lost travel documents and stolen motor vehicles

Source: <https://www.interpol.int/>

FRONTEX: ROLE AND SUPPORT SERVICES

1. Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) was established in its current form in 2016 with a mandate to promote, coordinate, and develop European Border Management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter and the concept of EU-integrated border management.
2. On request of a Member State, Frontex also provides technical and operational assistance through joint operations and rapid border interventions.
3. While regular border control is the exclusive responsibility of Member States, the support role of Frontex focuses on the coordination of deployment of additional experts and technical equipment to those border areas which find themselves under significant pressure.
4. Such pressures can include supporting Member States hosting major Tournaments, such as international football tournaments. The focus of such operations can focus on preventing smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and cross-border crimes.
5. Together with the host authorities, Frontex develops an operational plan, incorporating an assessment of the number of officers with specific expertise and the quantity and type of technical equipment required and the rules of engagement for personnel deployed in the border operation.
6. Frontex then directs a request to all Member States and Schengen Associated Countries for the necessary officers, clearly specifying the required expertise and competencies (such as document experts, border checks, surveillance experts, dog handlers) as well as specific equipment needed for the operation (such as helicopters, planes, patrol cars, thermo-vision equipment, heart-beat detectors). Each Member State then decides on the level of contribution it can make to the joint operation.

7. During the operational phase, border guards and technical equipment are deployed to designated border areas to carry out their duties according to the operational plan. The deployed officers (known as guest officers) work under the command and control of the authorities of the country hosting the operation.
8. During deployment, guest officers may perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with Schengen Borders Code. These tasks include border checks, border surveillance, stamping, interviewing undocumented persons, consultation of databases.
9. Guest officers wear their national uniforms and a blue armband with the insignia of the EU and Frontex. For the purposes of identification vis-à-vis national authorities and citizens, guest officers carry an accreditation document, provided by Frontex, which they must present on request.
10. Intelligence and other relevant information gathered during the operations is shared with the relevant national authorities and Europol.

Source: <https://frontex.europa.eu/>

Part Two - High Level Policy and Structural Imperatives

Section 2.1. Tournament Multi-Agency Planning Arrangements

2.1.1. Prior to, or on being selected by, the organising international associations (UEFA or FIFA) to host (or co-host) a major European or global football tournament, the host authorities will need to develop a multi-agency tournament-specific safety, security, and service concept covering the many overlapping arrangements for delivering a safe, secure, and successful tournament.

2.1.2. This will necessitate establishing:

- government led multi-agency organising committee, comprising all of the key agencies engaged in the tournament, to oversee and coordinate the tournament planning, preparatory, and delivery arrangements in accordance with national constitutional provisions; and,
- local/regional venue city multi-agency coordination groups.

2.1.3. The over-arching objective of government-led national preparations will be to develop a tournament-specific integrated, multi-agency safety, security, and service approach.

2.1.4. This is crucial given the over-lapping character of each element of the tournament safety and security arrangements. For example, experience evidence that a safety measure can have a direct impact on security and vice versa. Similarly, the service measures experienced by supporters in a venue stadium, or on the transport network, can have a direct impact on the crowd management dynamic in public places.

2.1.5. The host police will have a key role to play at every stage of this process and it is essential that they are represented at a senior level by individuals able to influence key policy and strategic decisions in respect of both a national and venue city arrangements.

2.1.6. It is also crucial that the host police policy makers and strategists determine and define a tournament policing strategy designed to ensure harmonised and integrated policing arrangements in each venue city, albeit customised to reflect venue city needs and circumstances (*see* Part Three of this handbook).

Section 2.2. National Police Planning Arrangements

2.2.1. It is important, therefore, for the host police to supplement the tournament multi-agency coordination arrangements by establishing (in the first phase of tournament planning) a tournament police planning group (traditionally headed by the Ministry of Interior).

2.2.2. The group should comprise national policing specialists in border controls, counter terrorist, various serious and organised criminal threats, crowd management, including the head of the National Football Information Point (NFIP), and venue city police authority representatives.

2.2.3. In determining the tournament policing strategy, and associated threats, the planning group will be aware that high-profile international tournaments not only pose significant and resource intensive crowd management challenges but, also attract the malicious interest of national and international organised crime and/or national and international terrorist or political extremist groups.

2.2.4. The remit of the police planning group should, therefore, include:

- (i) identifying, determining, and defining a range of important and inter-related tournament-specific policing/law enforcement planning and operational imperatives;
- (ii) ensuring that the tournament policing strategy is comprehensive and multi-faceted, incorporating all components of host policing/law enforcement operations and designed to cater for, and minimise the impact of, a range of projected and possible disruptions to the tournament;
- (iii) reviewing existing national policing strategic, structural and operational arrangements to determine the extent to which they need to be supplemented or adjusted to cater for the specific challenges associated with hosting a major international football tournament extending over a period of weeks; and, in the light of this review,
- (iv) designing and defining a tournament-specific host policing infrastructure.

2.2.5. Experience also evidence the need to embed international police cooperation at an early stage of the planning process. To that end, it is recommended that host police policy makers and strategists engage with key international partners, such as:

- experienced IPCC officers and other crowd management experts in policing international football tournaments; and,
- Europol, Interpol and (if applicable) Frontex representatives regarding the support and services available for identifying and preparing strategies for preventing and countering tournament-related terrorist and criminal threats (see sections 1.3 and 1.4a of this handbook).

2.2.6. As with all tournament planning processes, an action plan setting out aims and objectives, with timelines and target dates, will facilitate host police planning, including national and international police cooperation and coordination preparations.

2.2.7. Part Three of this handbook considers tournament police operational planning in venue cities and the integration of these operations within local (or regional) multi-agency safety and security arrangements.

Section 2.3. National and International Tournament Police Infrastructure

2.3.1. An over-arching aim of the host police planning group will be to develop a carefully planned tournament policing infrastructure, commencing with a review of existing policing structures as soon as possible after being selected to host the tournament by the relevant international body.

2.3.2. This process will require consideration of a range of inter-related policy imperatives and structural issues and the need to embed the IPCC and other international police cooperation arrangements within the tournament policing infrastructure.

2.3.3. The outcome will typically pivot on appraisal of the existing host police coordination and information exchange infrastructure, notably in respect of two key questions, namely:

- Can the existing infrastructure accommodate the demands and challenges associated with hosting a major international tournament over an extended period (typically one month)?

- Would there be benefit in creating a temporary tournament-specific police coordination infrastructure to ensure timely exchange of information and threats analyses?

2.3.4. Once determined, inter-related infrastructural issues need to be resolved, namely the location and structure of the:

- IPCC and tournament command and operational centers;
- other components of the tournament policing strategy incorporating advisory and supporting roles of international policing partners (often described as “specialist police cells or centres”); and,
- the tournament policing coordination and oversight arrangements (often described as a “fusion centre”).

Section 2.4. Structure and Location of Specialist Police Operational Cells/Centre

2.4.1. There is a self-evident need for each of these specialist police operational cells/centres to maintain their established national and international information and intelligence exchange channels and analysis arrangements, and to maintain a distinct and separate operating profile.

2.4.2. However, a key consideration for the host authorities will centre on the scope and merits of co-locating a management, coordination and analytical team for each of the specialist operational police cells/centres in the tournament IPCC, notably in respect of whether such an approach would:

- facilitate the management and deployment of specialist investigative and operational policing personnel;
- ensure timely exchange of information on emerging developments and threat analyses;
- provide a coordinated and harmonised tournament policing infrastructure; and,
- enhance awareness of the need for a joined-up / holistic approach.

2.4.3. As indicated above, the focus of such a co-location would centre upon deploying a core group of national and international experts and analysts to provide a management and coordination role designed to:

- (i) liaise with the respective headquarters in Europol and Interpol regarding all related information gathered from across Europe, around the globe, and from mobile operational units deployed in the host State at border points, venue cities and elsewhere as appropriate;
- (ii) provide a central point for assessing and analysing the information, and preparing threats analyses;
- (iii) consult with co-located IPCC management team and other specialist police cells regarding any potential overlap in interest, the character of the threats concerned, and the wider impact of proposed preventative and counter or mitigation measures; and,
- (iv) ensure an integrated and harmonised approach across all components of the tournament policing strategy.

2.4.4. If the host authorities determine that co-location is inappropriate or logistically not feasible, then the deployment of liaison officers in the tournament IPCC from the specialist criminal police cells/centres, and their international partners, will be necessary to partially achieve the above objectives

2.4.5. Appendix 2.A provides an illustrative model of a tournament IPCC structure and information flows.

2.4.6. Appendix 2.B provides an illustrative model of the tournament police information exchange and analyses structure if the IPCC and the specialist tournament policing cells/centres (with an international dimension) are co-located.

2.4.7. Appendix 2.C does likewise if the co-location option is not pursued.

Section 2.5. Structure and Location of Tournament Policing Coordination Arrangements

2.5.1. A related issue to be resolved centres on the arrangements for ensuring effective oversight and coordination of the various elements of the host tournament policing strategy, including those with an international police dimension, in order to deliver an integrated policing approach.

2.5.2. For host planners, the initial decision will need to be whether an existing host governmental or police structure or group can be designated as responsible for delivering the tournament policing coordination (“fusion”) remit or, alternatively, whether it is desirable to establish a tournament-specific dedicated group to undertake this crucial role.

2.5.3. If tournament-specific police coordination arrangements are deemed appropriate, then consideration needs to be given to the location of coordination group meetings. One option would be to host the meetings at the IPCC. This approach would be especially beneficial if it is decided that key management and analyses personnel of the four primary components of national policing arrangements with an international dimension are to be co-located, albeit as separate and distinct entities.

2.5.4. Irrespective of location and nomenclature, the tournament policing coordination process should be headed by the government agency (traditionally the Interior Ministry) responsible for host policing arrangements.

2.5.5. Membership of the group would typically comprise senior representatives of the leading national law enforcement agencies, IPCC management team, and aforementioned three specialist police cells/centres (border police, CT police, criminal police), along with host transit and venue city police authorities.

2.5.6. This core membership can be augmented by representatives of Europol, Interpol, and (if applicable) Frontex, and, if and when considered appropriate, representatives of the tournament organising committee and/or the relevant international sports authority (usually UEFA or FIFA).

2.5.7. As stressed above, the aim would be to ensure that information and threats analyses regarding existing or emerging risks are shared as soon as possible in order to determine an appropriate and joined-up host police response.

Section 2.6. Tournament Emergency Planning and Operations Coordination Group

2.6.1. In addition to the tournament police-specific infrastructure, it will be necessary for the government-led multi-agency coordination group to setup a high-level tournament-related emergency planning and operations group headed by the Ministry of Interior, or the designated national governmental department or agency with lead responsibility for emergency planning, response, and recovery.

2.6.2. The aim should be to build upon existing national and local/regional emergency planning arrangements in determining and defining enhanced preparations for responding to emergency incidents and other disruptions during the tournament, taking account of the impact on local communities and associated policing arrangements;

2.6.3 The host police and IPCC management team will have a key role to play in any emergency, or other major disruption during the tournament, and should be represented accordingly.

2.6.4. However, whereas the police would be a lead agency in respect of, say, a terrorist incident, other potentially major disruptions are likely to extend beyond the remit and expertise of the police.

2.6.5. Thus, in addition to the host police and IPCC representatives, it will be necessary for membership of the emergency planning group to include governmental and other designated specialists in non-security-related scenarios, such as climatic events, disruption to the critical national infrastructure, industrial action, major disruption to national and international transport, political or civil protest, and emerging pandemics or other health risks, etc.

2.6.6. Again, regional and/or local (venue city) emergency planners should be represented along with, where appropriate, representatives of the tournament organising committee and the international sports authority (usually UEFA or FIFA).

2.6.7. Prior to the tournament, the remit of the group should also incorporate organising national and venue city multi-agency sessions on a range of emergency planning scenarios, taking account of the supporting role of visiting police delegations in emergency situations.

Section 2.7. Review of Legal and Administrative Framework.

2.7.1. In addition to determining and defining the tournament policing infrastructure, the government-led multi-agency coordination group will also need to review the existing national legal and administrative framework to identify if any additional provisions are required (possibly on a temporary basis) for meeting host State safety, security, and other guarantees and commitments provided when bidding to host the tournament.

2.7.2. This process should also encompass a review of whether additional provisions are required to accommodate tournament-specific policing measures, notably in respect of dealing with criminality, other prohibited activity, and facilitating the hosting and role of visiting police delegations, and other elements of international police cooperation.

2.7.3. Inter-related to this review will be the need to determine if any additional and enhanced border entry control arrangements are required for the duration of the tournament in order to develop a strategy for denying entry to visiting persons who are known to pose tournament-related safety and security or other risks.

2.7.4. Where applicable, this process may incorporate consideration of enacting a partial suspension of the Schengen freedom of movement arrangements and negotiations with neighbouring States in cases of there being land borders.

2.7.5. The aim throughout the legal review will be to: minimise malicious disruption to delivery of the tournament; ensure that the host police, and other law enforcement agencies, are empowered to prevent and respond effectively to, tournament-related challenges; and ensure that visiting police delegations are able to provide the support requested by the host authorities.

Section 2.8. International Police Cooperation Budgets

2.8.1. An equally crucial function of the government-led group will be to allocate at an early stage a budget for all aspects of tournament specific international police cooperation, including the cost of deploying visiting police delegations, tournament IPCC operating arrangements, and other specialist international policing agencies.

Section 2.9. Embedding International Police Cooperation in Host Preparations

2.9.1. The foregoing sections highlight the importance of considering and resolving at an early-stage issues associated with the national policing structure and coordination arrangements and the need to embed the supporting role of international police partners.

2.9.2. Importantly, international police cooperation should also be embedded in venue city and/or regional policing strategies. This process can be further enhanced by:

- (i) tournament policing strategists delivering a programme of pre-tournament seminars/conferences to a joint audience of venue city police commanders and representatives of visiting police delegations (and others as appropriate) to share key elements of the tournament policing strategy and international police cooperation and coordination arrangements;
- (ii) arranging pre-tournament visits by the heads of visiting police delegations to venue cities: this will be mutually beneficial and help inform and facilitate local police preparation of logistical arrangements and preliminary, developing and dynamic safety and security risk assessments refined to reflect venue city circumstances; and,
- (iii) embedding international police cooperation arrangements in tournament national and venue city multi-agency communication and media handling strategies to commence well in advance of the tournament.

2.9.3. The tournament communication strategy should also incorporate clear and consistent messages on tolerance levels for, and the response to, any criminal or other prohibited behaviour by visiting supporters. These messages can be regularly echoed and highlighted in the tournament communication strategy of participating States to help ensure that no visiting supporter can be in no doubt of the consequences of engaging in violent or other prohibited misbehaviour.

2.9.4. Additional information on communication and media handling is provided in sections 3.18-20, and 4.14 of this handbook.

Section 2.10. Joint or Multi Hosted Tournaments

2.10.1. In the case of tournaments being jointly hosted with one or more States, experience and established good practice recommends that each co-hosting State determines its own international police cooperation and coordination arrangements.

2.10.2. This established good practice is based on a range key of imperatives, including:


- (i) respect for the sovereignty of each host State and their obligation to provide a safe and secure environment for those elements of the tournament held in their national State;
- (ii) wide variations in the legal frameworks, policing structures and a wide range of other national variables which are likely to exist among States co-hosting the tournament;
- (iii) coordination and integration of national and venue city tournament policing imperatives; and,
- (iv) national character of information-led threats analyses and associated management of national and local/regional emergency planning and operational arrangements, etc.

2.10.3. The good practice also reflects the benefits to be derived from each host State providing its IPCC with a remit to deliver the integrated three-function role highlighted in Parts One and Four of this handbook.


2.10.4. Thus, aside from the unique Euro 2020 multi-hosted Tournament, when the international police information exchange arrangements (but not the other IPCC functions) were necessarily centralised, and in view of the need for a customised response in each host State to potential threats to the tournament, joint hosts have traditionally opted to put in place parallel tournament policing and information exchange strategies and structures. This approach has worked well and remains the recommended option.

2.10.5. There will be a self-evident need, therefore, for States co-hosting a tournament to agree a protocol setting communication and information exchange arrangements between their respective contact points.


ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL: IPCC STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION FLOWS



ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL POLICE COORDINATION STRUCTURE (if co-located)



ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL POLICE COORDINATION STRUCTURE (if not co-located)



Part Three - Tournament Police Operational Planning in Venue Cities

Section 3.1. Venue City Police Planning and Preparations

3.1.1. Parts One and Two of this handbook have focused on the crucial role of the police and other authorities at a national level, in terms of providing a policy, structural, and enabling framework for delivery of a comprehensive and coordinated tournament policing strategy incorporating international police cooperation.

3.1.2. This Part of the handbook takes this process a step further by focusing on the operational planning and preparatory challenges confronting the designated policy makers and strategists responsible for police planning and operations in venue cities hosting tournament matches.

3.1.3. Policing structures and remits vary across Europe, and it is recognised that responsibility for much or some of the considerations set out below may rest with the head of the police in the venue city or a local or regional authority if so empowered in the national constitution or national legal framework.

3.1.4. However, for ease of presentation and reference, the nomenclature used in this Part of the handbook is “*venue city police authorities*”. This can be interpreted to mean the specific circumstances which apply in each venue city in terms of responsibility for determining policing strategies and planning and delivering policing operations in connection with tournament matches.

Section 3.2. Venue City Police Liaison with National Authorities

3.2.1. As indicated above, the policy, structural, and enabling tournament policing framework provides the basis for the strategic elements of operational police planning and preparations in venue cities.

3.2.2. It is desirable, therefore, for the venue city police authorities to participate in the national decision-making process before and during the tournament.

3.2.3. This includes deploying liaison officers in the IPCC, and in the counter-terrorism and organised crime operational cells/centres highlighted in sections one and two above.

3.2.4. This is crucial as planning for, and delivery of, the operational response to any criminal and/or terrorist threats will largely be the responsibility of the venue city police authorities, albeit supported by national and international policing experts and agencies.

3.2.5. To prepare for this challenge, and delivery of other elements of the host policing strategy, the venue city police authorities should commence their own planning arrangements well in advance of the tournament and have a comprehensive and flexible venue city policing strategy in place (subject to minor refinement) at least six months before the start of the tournament.

Section 3.3. Venue City Police Planning and Operational Structural Arrangements

3.3.1. To achieve this objective, the venue city police authorities should determine and define its own structural arrangements for the tournament, taking account of instructions and guidance issued at a national level.

3.3.2. These arrangements should be additional to, and designed to inform, venue city police authority participation in the designated local or regional tournament multi-agency organising/coordinating committee/group.

3.3.3. The venue city policing structure should include establishing a tournament police planning group at least one year prior to the tournament.

3.3.4. This group should be headed by the head of the venue city police authority or a representative designated with responsibility for venue city tournament policing strategies and operational planning.

3.3.5. In addition, the group should comprise representatives of crowd management (public order and public safety) specialists, specialists at local level (if available and following the proper national cooperation channels), NFIP representative, criminal police (to cover tournament-specific organised and spontaneous criminal threats), CT police (to cover any terrorist and political extremists threats), traffic police, transport police, community liaison police, and other policing disciplines which may have a role to play in the tournament planning process, or who may have their operational remits adjusted/refined during the period of the tournament.

3.3.6. As the tournament approaches, and the focus of the venue city policing arrangements transforms from a planning to operational phase, a tournament-specific police operations centre should be established.

3.3.7. In addition to the policing units engaged in the planning and preparatory arrangements, the operations centre should incorporate liaison officers from the national policing specialist operational cells responsible for tournament-related organised crime and CT.

3.3.8. The operations centre should also embed, the operations coordinator of the visiting police delegations (*see* Part Five) for periods when their respective national team is participation in matches hosted in the venue city.

3.3.9. The venue city police operations centre should have staff designated with responsibility for analysing the various sources of information received from the IPCC, visiting police delegations, border police, transport police, traffic police, and the national criminal and CT operational cells. Staff will also be required to deal with media handling, logistical, IT, and other infrastructural arrangements and services.

Section 3.4. Role of Venue City Police Tournament Planning Group

3.4.1. The primary role of the venue city tournament police planning group will centre on preparing comprehensive policing arrangements covering a wide range of important components, including:

- tournament-specific crowd management operations in public places;
- in-stadia role and liaison with tournament organisers;
- terrorist threats, other disruptions, or emergency incidents;
- community reassurance;
- traffic and public transport issues; and,
- media handling.

3.4.2. For the most part, venue city police planning will primarily centre on what can be described as crowd management (public order and public safety) arrangements and all the factors which can influence or impact on tournament policing operations.

3.4.3. This is consistent with crowd management being the highest profile component of the local/regional tournament policing strategy. It is also the component which necessitates a multi-faceted and prolonged approach covering the period leading up to the tournament and concluding when the venue city has hosted its last match in the tournament.

3.4.4. Moreover, aside from a major terrorist or other emergency, crowd management is also the element of the venue city policing strategy which will impact to the greatest extent on resident communities and businesses.

3.4.5. The starting point for preparing and developing venue city crowd management arrangements will centre on the strategic, tactical and operational criteria enshrined in the host national tournament policing strategy.

3.4.6. This is important as it is highly desirable for the police in all venue cities to have a harmonised approach towards managing home and visiting supporters.

3.4.7. However, venue city policing preparations, and subsequent operations, will also need to cater for local circumstances, some aspects of which could be unique to the city.

3.4.8. The venue city police authorities will also need to engage closely with a range of local authorities and stakeholders before and during the tournament, including:

- municipal authorities and highway authorities (if different);
- fire and health emergency services;
- national and local (venue city) multi-agency tournament organising/coordinating committees;
- venue stadium management and stadium security officer;
- public transport authorities/companies;
- city centre service providers (e.g., bars, restaurants, accommodation and tourist bureaus);
- local (or regional) emergency planners;
- local resident and business communities; and,
- local resident (and, where possible, visiting) supporter groups.

3.4.9. This is crucial given the over-lapping character of each local agency plan, and the need for a joined-up, multi-agency approach in respect of each tournament match held in the host city.

3.4.10. Extensive local liaison is also a pre-requisite for ensuring that the tournament planning phase identifies projected or potential scenarios which could impact on policing operations throughout the period of each *“match cycle”*.

3.4.11. The match cycle is based on the established “event cycle” concept recommended to States when hosting high profile one-off matches, such as UEFA club competition finals.

3.4.12. In essence, the match cycle for each tournament fixture commences when visiting supporters embark upon their journey to the venue city and concludes when they have departed the city.

3.4.13. The aim throughout should be to ensure that the venue city tournament policing strategy is comprehensive yet sufficiently flexible to respond effectively to whatever scenarios might be confronted during the tournament.

3.4.14. The following sections outline a range of key venue city police planning considerations and the associated liaison with partners and stakeholders necessary to meet this objective.

Section 3.5. Venue City Police Liaison with Organised Crime and Counter Terrorist Police Operational Cells/Centres

3.5.1. Information on the support provided to national police authorities by international policing agencies such as Europol and Interpol is covered in Part One of this handbook.

3.5.2. The role and remit of international police agencies does not extend to crowd management functions, although Europol, for example, does provide information to the European NFIP network in respect of some issues which can impact on the tournament the crowd dynamic, notably, links between some risk supporters and extremist political and/or organised crime groups.

3.5.3. However, such intelligence, and/or other information which could impact on venue city police planning and operations, should be reflected in reports submitted by the relevant NFIP (or SPOC in States not falling under the NFIP umbrella) in their preliminary reports to the tournament IPCC.

3.5.4. Thereafter, it should be relayed to the designated police contacts in the venue cities, both directly and/or via venue city police liaison officers deployed in IPCC (*see* Part Four of this handbook).

3.5.5. As stressed in section 1.4 (a) of this report, the role of international police cooperation in respect of tournament specific organised crime or terrorist threats, should be enshrined in bilateral agreements at a national level with the agencies concerned.

3.5.6. To ensure effective delivery of these arrangements (*see* Section 2.4 above), consideration should be given to establishing at a national level specialist policing operational cells (informed and supported by international policing partners) to:

- gather and analyse information obtained from established national and international police intelligence channels;
- prepare threats analyses; and,
- determine the policing measures necessary to prevent and respond to any tournament-specific national or international organised crime or terrorist threats.

3.5.7. In terms of tournament planning, the venue city police authorities should, therefore, establish effective (24 x 7) liaison arrangements with the tournament organised crime and counter terrorist operational cells.

3.5.8. This will ensure the provision of timely advice on any emerging or established risks which will (i) require a venue city (or regional) police response, and (ii) impact on venue police crowd management operations.

3.5.9. It is also highly desirable for the venue city police to be represented at a senior level in Tournament Police Coordination (Fusion) Group meetings (*see* Section 2.6 of this handbook).

Section 3.6. Role of Venue City Police in Planning and Responding to Terrorist Threats

3.6.1 Whereas the tournament organiser and stadium management are responsible for enacting the measures necessary to minimise the risk and potential impact of an in-stadia terrorist attack, the venue city police authorities, informed and supported by national, regional and local CT specialists, will have lead responsibility for planning and responding to any terrorist threats in the venue city per se.

3.6.2. The venue city police authorities will also have a key role in responding to in-stadia terrorist scenarios. Their role should be determined and defined in stadium and municipal emergency planning protocols.

3.6.3. During the planning phase, the venue city police authorities will rely heavily on advice received from policing CT experts, and/or national counter terrorism agency, regarding a range of important matters, including:

- generic threat levels;
- character of possible terrorist attacks;
- prevention, deterrent and response measures;
- advice on equipment or technical aids;
- provision of hostile reconnaissance training for front line police personnel;
- physical measures in city centres and public areas in the vicinity of the stadium, including traffic and parking controls and physical barriers; and,
- role of the venue city police (and visiting police delegations) in the Tournament in the case of an attack in the venue stadium.

3.6.4. During the operational phase of the tournament, this advice should be augmented by information and expert guidance from the designated police tournament CT operational cell.

3.6.5. Additional and more detailed information on CT prevention and mitigation measures can be found in Annex A of Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015, as revised in 2019 and adopted in 2020.

Section 3.7. Role of Venue City Police in Planning and Responding to Politically Extremist and Discriminatory Behaviour

3.7.1. The venue city police authorities should also liaise with specialists regarding preventing and countering criminal or prohibited behaviour in respect of politically or religiously extremist, and/or discriminatory behaviour, including “hate crimes”, in public places.

3.7.2. Venue city police planning will also need to take account of the need to support stadium management in responding to such behaviour within the venue complex.

3.7.3. Venue city police planning for countering extremism and discrimination should include a range of inter-related strategic objectives, including:

- publicising intention to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to related behaviour prohibited in the national criminal and administrative legal framework;
- briefing policing personnel on what constitutes, and how to recognise, extremist and/or discriminatory activities;
- ascertaining from the NFIPs in States participating in tournament matches in the venue city any links between supporters of their national teams and politically extremist groups;
- developing an operational policing strategy for preventing and countering extremist or discriminatory behaviour focused on early and targeted interventions against individuals or groups committing related criminal or administrative offences; and,

- engaging with resident supporter groups and visiting supporter fan-embassies and/or SLOs, regarding the importance of implementing the countering extremism and discrimination strategy.

Section 3.8. Venue City Police Planning Role in Local (or Regional) Emergency Planning Arrangements

3.8.1. Section 2.6 of this handbook outlines the importance and role of the Tournament Emergency Planning and Operations Coordination Group and the desirability of that group organising pre-tournament national and venue city multi-agency sessions on a range of emergency planning scenarios.

3.8.2. A key planning objective of the venue city police authorities, therefore, will be to liaise with local or regional emergency planners and a range of local partners, including municipal authorities, emergency services, venue stadium management and other representatives with relevant expertise to identify and prepare for a wide and diverse range of emergencies.

3.8.3. Whilst emergency plans will draw upon a range of European good practice, venue city emergency plans will also need to reflect local needs and circumstances. The plans will need to be customised, therefore, to reflect the character and location of the emergency or threat concerned.

3.8.4. As set out in Section 2.6 above, major disruptions to the tournament can centre on a range of possible scenarios, including terrorist threats, climatic events, disruption to the critical national infrastructure, industrial action, major disruption to national and international transport, political or civil protest, or emerging pandemics or other health risks etc.

3.8.5. Each local (or regional) emergency plan, therefore, will similarly need to set out comprehensive (and flexible) guidance on the role of the venue city police authorities in respect of an extensive array of potential emergency scenarios, including the projected impact on tournament crowd management operations.

3.8.6. Thus, each emergency scenario plan should set out the actions to be taken in respect of, for example:

- organisation and structure of the emergency arrangements;
- procedures for alerts and activation of the emergency plan;
- procedures for the deployment of specialists and additional resources;
- procedures for partial or total evacuation of residents and businesses in the vicinity of the threat concerned;
- particular procedures for vulnerable and disabled people and other target groups;
- the designated route and assembly location for emergency service vehicles; and,
- multi-agency emergency communication procedures.

3.8.7. It is crucial that the designated venue city police and other personnel are trained and equipped to undertake their specific tasks when confronting emergencies and major disruptions.

3.8.8. It is also highly desirable for the venue city police authorities to rehearse, and participate in, multi-agency venue city emergency planning exercises well before the tournament commences and for the venue city police authorities and other local emergency planners to participate in national emergency planning exercises.

3.8.9. Additional and more detailed information on emergency and contingency planning considerations can be found in Annex A of Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015, as revised in 2019 and adopted in 2020.

Section 3.9. Venue City Police Tournament Crowd Management Planning

3.9.1. The character of existing operational policing strategies, tactics and deployments in connection with domestic and international football tournaments vary significantly across Europe in accordance with a range of historical, constitutional, legal, experience-related and preference factors.

3.9.2. This reality reflects the core principle that policing operations are and must remain the preserve of each national State. However, international football tournaments pose an array of distinctive characteristics and challenges, including the expectations of the international organisers (UEFA and FIFA) under who's auspicious the tournament is being hosted and delivered.

3.9.3. Extensive European experience (good or otherwise) has resulted in a range of good practices, customised to reflect national and/or local/regional circumstances, which have proven to be effective approach (when applied).

3.9.4. Central to these good practices is the need to ensure that venue city police crowd management operations in connection with tournament fixtures held in the city are intelligence-led.

3.9.5. In practice, this means that each match should be governed by a specific risk assessment based initially on information provided by the tournament IPCC (once established) and prior to that on information provided by the NFIP (or SPOC) in the participating States concerned.

3.9.6. Such information should include a preliminary assessment of some potentially important risk-associated considerations, such as:

- number of visiting supporters expected to travel to the venue city;
- number of visiting supporters expected to travel without match tickets;
- travel preferences of visiting supporters (independent or organised travel);
- pre-match preferences (travel direct to stadia or city centres);
- post-match preferences (travel direct to departure point or to city centre);

- anticipated reaction of resident (home) risk groups to visiting supporters;
- possible tensions between visiting supporters and local community groups;
- patterns of alcohol consumption or drug use in connection with football tournaments; and,
- use of pyrotechnics in public places (and stadia).

3.9.7. In parallel with the risk assessment process is the need for the venue city police authorities to determine and define tournament tolerance levels regarding an array of supporter behaviour and an associated arrest and/or preventative detention policy.

3.9.8. However, European experience also evidence that the behaviour of supporters generally, including risk groups, can be variable.

3.9.9. It is important, therefore, to ensure that venue city police crowd management planning (and operational strategies) are flexible and not based on either positive or negative assumptions about the risks posed by home and/or visiting supporters based solely on historical trends or preliminary risk assessments.

3.9.10. The reality is that each policing operation may need to be modified in the light of what actually occurs once visiting and home supporters start to arrive and gather in the venue city.

3.9.11. Venue city police planning, therefore, needs to incorporate a dynamic risk assessment ethos to enable policing operations to be governed by whatever is actually occurring before, during and after the match concerned.

3.9.12. During the operational phase, the advice of visiting police delegations will be crucial. Each delegation should be expert in the behaviour of the supporters of their national team and able to inform and support venue police dynamic risk assessments throughout the duration of their deployment in the host city (see sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this handbook).

3.9.13. This includes identifying emerging tensions and minor incidents requiring early and targeted police intervention to prevent escalation of risk and marginalise the influence of any supporters seeking confrontation.

Section 3.10. Dynamic Risk Assessment and Crowd Management

3.10.1. Continuing this theme, and as stressed above, the essence of dynamic risk assessment is to ensure that policing tactics reflect the crowd dynamic they are managing.

3.10.2. During any crowd event, that dynamic and associated levels of risk to public order can change rapidly.

3.10.3. It is essential, therefore, that policing operational deployments and tactics can also be readily adapted to manage the crowd in an effective manner which is proportionate to the scale and character of emerging or decreasing risk levels.

3.10.4. Host policing operations remain the preserve of national and local law enforcement at all times, however European experience evidence that planning to implement either a “graded” or “high profile: low friction” host city police deployment strategy can provide an effective means for facilitating any refinements to the policing operations as events unfold on the arrival of visiting supporters, especially in city centres or other supporter gathering points.

3.10.5. The essence of both the “graded” or “high profile: low friction” approach is to provide visiting and home supporters, and resident or business communities in the vicinity, with reassurance that the policing are deployed in close proximity (graded approach) or present throughout (high profile: low friction) in sufficient numbers to protect their safety if circumstances deteriorate.

3.10.6. Such deployment tactics also provide opportunity to make it clear to any supporters tempted to misbehave that the police will be able to intervene in a targeted manner in the event of any provocative or threatening behaviour.

3.10.7. The advantage of the ‘high profile: low friction’ option is that it potentially enhances the capability of host police, usually with the support of visiting police delegation personnel, to communicate with visiting supporters in order to create a welcoming environment and demonstrate that all supporters will be treated in accordance with their behaviour not reputation.

3.10.8. Moreover, if it is necessary to impose limits on supporter behaviour, or intervene in a targeted manner, communication with supporters can help to prevent misunderstanding and escalation of minor incidents, as well as helping to marginalise the influence of any individuals or groups seeking confrontation.

3.10.9. Such dialogue can also assist in the gathering of high-quality information regarding supporter intentions, perspectives, concerns and sensitivities and any other information regarding potential risk.

3.10.10. Appendix 4 of Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (‘EU Football Handbook’) (11160/24) provides an academic model of application of the dynamic risk process and the importance of supporter communication.

3.10.11. However, it should be recognised throughout the preparatory and operational phase that communication with home and visiting supporters is but one element of (and not an alternative to) a balanced crowd management approach designed to ensure that the police are able to effectively manage supporter behaviour at all times.

3.10.12. Venue city operational planning should reflect this reality and recognise that whilst effective communication with supporters can reduce tensions, it is extremely difficult to implement effectively once the police are having to respond to any significant or major crowd disturbances.

Section 3.11. Venue City Police Planning for Operations in Public Places

3.11.1. Most major or significant public disorder committed in connection with football tournaments occurs in public places, notably, but not exclusively, in either organised or, in particular, spontaneous tournament related supporter gathering locations in the venue city. The venue city police authorities should, therefore, plan accordingly.

a. Organised Supporter Events

3.11.2. The police planning process for organised fan zones and public viewing events should centre on working closely with the local municipality, emergency services and other partner agencies, and ensuring that every aspect of the event is subject to a police risk assessment.

3.11.3. The aim throughout should centre on providing a location and facilities which can be managed effectively and incorporate measures that will mitigate against any significant misbehaviour.

3.11.4. Annex A of the Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015 (revised in 2019 and issued in 2020) provides detailed guidance on the role of the police, and partner authorities and agencies, in respect of official fan zones and public viewing events organised either by the tournament organiser, private company, or the municipality.

b. Spontaneous Supporter Gatherings

3.11.5. Venue city police planning for incidents in connection with the spontaneous gathering of resident and/or visiting supporters, such as city squares and/or other locations containing bars and refreshment outlets, is more challenging given the character of such events.

3.11.6. However, the location of spontaneous supporter gathering locations can usually be predicted at an early stage of the planning process. Once the locations have been identified, it is essential that the venue city police authorities undertake a comprehensive risk assessment process which takes account of a number of factors, including:

- risk that elements of the local community might confront and provoke visiting supporters or vice versa;
- intelligence and information provided by the IPCC and, on arrival, visiting police delegations, regarding the potential threat, if any, posed by visiting supporters;
- absence of effective means for enforcing the separation of rival supporters; and,
- views of local resident and business communities.

3.11.7. The venue city police authorities should, therefore, encourage the municipality, emergency services, local businesses to work with the police in designing safety and security preparations, as far as the location permits, including:

- comprehensive policing plan;
- fire and medical strategies;
- measures to ensure control of the number of supporters able to gather in the location, through installing effective management of location entry and exit points (for example use of barriers and deployment of police units at roads leading to the location);
- designating police access points and supporter dispersal routes; and,
- incident and emergency plans.

Section 3.12. Venue City Signage

3.12.1. The venue city police authorities should also work closely with the municipal authorities in the provision of high profile and easily understood signage in city centres, and along routes to and from the venue stadium, identifying the location of the stadium, designated or recommended transit routes and options, organised fan zones, and public conveniences etc.

3.12.2. Signage should be well-lit, and symbols should be used to complement written signage so that signage can be more easily understood by spectators without local language skills.

3.12.3. Police and municipal signage should be designed with sufficient colour contrast between text and background and between the colour of the sign and the surface on which it is mounted in view of the volume of people with colour vision deficiencies.

3.12.4. Annex A of Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015 (revised in 2019 and issued in 2020) provides additional and more detailed guidance on tournament related signage considerations.

Section 3.13. Venue Police Liaison with Tournament Organiser/Stadium Management

3.13.1. The venue city police authorities will have existing arrangements in place regarding:

- liaison with stadium management and designated stadium security officer in the tournament venue;
- police deployment and functions in-stadia; and the
- role of the police in supporting stadium security personnel respond to public order and public safety incidents and criminal and other prohibited activity by spectators.

3.13.2. Whilst these pre-existing arrangements will provide a starting point for venue city police tournament planning discussions with venue stadium management, other tournament-specific factors, will also impact on the planning process.

3.13.3. Venue city policing planning in connection with venue stadium safety and security arrangements will need to take account of the expectations and requirements of the tournament organiser (UEFA or FIFA and tournament national organising committee).

3.13.4. For the most part, the organiser will oblige venue stadium management to be (and seen by a global television audience as being) responsible for in-stadia safety and security arrangements with the venue city police being responsible for safety and security in public places.

3.13.5. In essence, the organiser may insist on high profile in-stadia stewarding operations rather than on a high visibility police presence.

3.13.6. In many States this will reflect pre-existing national practice and preference. However, there are wide variations across Europe regarding the role of the police in stadia, and this will also need to be reflected in venue stadia police planning.

3.13.7. The key issues centre on the effectiveness of stadium crowd management operations in all spectator areas of the stadium and the competence and training of stadium security personnel (whether directly employed or contracted from private security companies).

3.13.8. The central planning issue for the venue city police authorities, therefore, is to determine and define their role in-stadia. The options centre on finding a balance between avoiding a high profile in-stadia policing presence whilst still being able to fulfil their obligation to prevent and respond effectively to any criminal behaviour, irrespective of where it takes place.

3.13.9. In some recent tournaments, and high-profile UEFA competition finals, the police have determined that the approach to be adopted is to deploy low profile policing personnel and units, deployed in high visibility identification vests rather than police uniforms, to work alongside safety focused stewards in order to communicate with supporters, and respond quickly to any minor incidents of criminal behaviour to prevent escalation.

3.13.10. However, this is but one option, and it may be considered preferably for venue city police stadium operations to centre on deploying police units out of sight in, or in close proximity to, the stadium complex. This decision is for the host police at national and venue city levels to determine on the basis of a risk assessment undertaken in partnership with the tournament organiser and venue stadium management.

3.13.11. Police deployment arrangements in-stadia or in the venue complex for dealing with criminality is but one (albeit important) component in connection with the need for close liaison between the venue city police authorities and venue stadium management regarding safety and security operations.

3.13.12. An underlying and crucial factor regarding venue city police tournament planning centres on European experience which evidence that events in-stadia can have a major impact on what occurs outside of stadia, and vice versa. For that reason alone, the need for close cooperation with the stadium and the delivery of a harmonised approach to crowd management arrangements inside and outside of venue stadia will be of importance to both parties.

3.13.13. Venue city police authorities and stadium policy and operational representatives should work together with a view to obtaining a written agreement between the organiser and the police (often described as a statement of intent), incorporating, where appropriate, the role of visiting police delegations (*see* Part Five of this handbook).

3.13.14. Such agreements should set out the role of the police in:

- supporting stadium management in preventing and dealing with any public disorder or other criminality;
- activating emergency procedures in the event of a significant incident or disruption to the match; and,
- determining the circumstances in which the police should take control of all or part of the stadium in emergency and major incident scenarios, along with the procedure for doing so and for the subsequent return of control to the organiser.

3.13.15. Close cooperation should also ensure that police views on a number of important issues can be considered by venue stadium management, including:

- in-stadia crowd management principles and operations;
- use of CCTV for crowd management and evidence gathering purposes;
- arrangements for a multi-agency control room, incorporating a police command post;
- shared or designated in-stadia communication arrangements;
- strategy for preventing and combatting the use of pyrotechnics;
- strategy for preventing and combatting extremist, hate crime, or discriminatory behaviour; and,
- possible use of visiting stewards in a liaison capacity, both in stadia and on route to and from a stadium.

Section 3.14. Venue City Police Liaison with Judicial and Administrative Authorities and Prosecuting Agencies

3.14.1. The contents of this Section recognise (i) wide variations in the structure, competencies, nomenclature of judicial and administrative arrangements across Europe, and (ii) the sovereignty and jurisdiction of host judicial and administrative arrangements.

3.14.2. However, a key venue city police tournament planning objective should be to develop close cooperation, and mutual understanding, with agencies engaged in venue city (or regional) judicial and administrative processes that will be put in place for dealing with supporters (resident or visiting) who are alleged to have committed criminal or administrative offences in connection with the tournament.

3.14.3. This process can be aided by simultaneously developing close and ongoing liaison with relevant judicial and administrative prosecuting agencies.

3.14.4. Ideally, one aim should centre on obtaining agreement for fast-track arrangements, capable of dealing quickly and appropriately with all but the most serious of tournament-related offences, for the duration of the tournament.

3.14.5. The venue city police authorities will also need to take account of any temporary legal provisions put in place for the tournament (*see* Section 2.7 of this handbook).

3.14.6. The primary aim of the liaison is to ensure that, as far as possible, in each venue city there is clarity of understanding and purpose between police, prosecutors and judicial and administrative authorities regarding the measures (and, where applicable, and subject to each case being treated on its merits, the penalties) to be imposed on any visiting supporters adjudged to have acted in a criminal or prohibited manner whilst in the venue city or region.

4.14.7. Venue city police authorities and local or regional prosecutors should also be fully aware of existing multi-lateral agreements on mutual legal assistance (MLA) which the host authorities at a national level can fully utilise in connection with the tournament. Additionally, the host authorities may agree bilateral arrangements with a participating or other State for enhanced MLA before, during and after the tournament.

3.14.8. The bilateral arrangements (*see* Section 1.4 (b) of this handbook) should also incorporate the measures which each participating and other States can do to support the host police nationally and in venue cities in respect of alleged offenders' resident in their State, such as:

- any legal possibilities (e.g. football banning orders/exit bans) they have to prevent risk supporters attending the tournament;
- what measures can be taken by the visiting police delegation and/or any other competent agency (e.g. visiting liaison prosecutors) to gather evidence of any football-related offences committed by visiting supporters; and,
- what offences committed in the host country could be prosecuted in the supporting country (upon the return of the offender) in accordance with extra-territorial jurisdiction arrangements.

3.14.9. The host authorities and participating States can also mutually consider the need for, and merits of, deploying a visiting prosecutor to be present in each venue city where their national team is competing in order to liaise with the designated host authority and obtain information from judicial or court records and host police or investigative reports, including arrest records, of their nationals or residents.

Section 3.15. Venue City Police Liaison with the Tournament IPCC

3.15.1. As highlighted in Part Four of this Handbook, the Tournament IPCC will act as a conduit for ensuring that all tournament-related crowd management information is gathered from across Europe (and beyond in the case of FIFA tournaments), assessed and analysed and submitted to venue city police and other relevant national and local policing agencies.

3.15.2. To that end, it is desirable for the police in each venue city to deploy a liaison officer in the IPCC to facilitate:

- information exchange between the IPCC and the local or regional venue police operations centre;
- IPCC management of visiting police delegation deployments; and,
- policing operations through the liaison officer being able to monitor (on an ongoing basis) events in other venue cities, national and international transit hubs; and elsewhere.

Section 3.16. Venue City Police Liaison with National Transport Police

3.16.1. A key venue city police planning objective should centre on their working relationship with their counterparts responsible for policing international, national and/or regional public transport networks serving the venue city, and public transport authorities or companies.

3.16.2. The aim is to enhance arrangements for monitoring the arrival and departure of visiting supporters on route to and from the venue city. This will provide a source of key logistical and behavioural information prior to and after the match.

3.16.3. It will also assist in identifying the arrival of supporters from diaspora communities who reside in host, neighbouring and/or other States. This will provide important and timely information for venue city police commanders which might otherwise be missed (*see* Section 4.5 in Part Four of this handbook).

3.16.4. Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015 (revised in 2019 and issued in 2020) provides further guidance on tournament venue city transport planning and operating arrangements.

Section 3.17. Venue City Police Traffic Management Arrangements

4.17.1. Venue City police planning should incorporate a tournament traffic management plan developed in partnership with the:

- stadium authorities (who will be responsible for traffic management in respect of the stadium complex);
- local or regional municipal and/or highways authority; and,
- relevant local, regional, and national public transport authorities (to take account of the arrival and departure of both home and visiting supporters and, importantly, the transport needs of local residents).

3.17.2. The traffic plan will play an important safety, security and service function in connection with tournament matches hosted in the venue city and will need to be carefully designed and managed by the venue city traffic police.

3.17.3. The traffic plan should also take account of any public order risks. For example, if the risk assessment indicates that rival supporters should have or use different public transport routes to and from the venue stadium.

3.17.4. Importantly, the traffic plan will also need to identify and maintain police and other emergency vehicle access routes.

3.17.5. The venue city police authorities should also stress the importance of:

- relevant local authority preparing and displaying high visibility road traffic and pedestrian signage for resident communities and visiting supporters alike in areas covered by the tournament traffic management plan; and,
- stadium management using the venue’s public address and other communication systems to highlight any unexpected or planned disruption to traffic or public transport on match days.

3.17.6. Annex A of Council of Europe Consolidated Recommendation 1/2015 (revised in 2019 and issued in 2020) provides further guidance on tournament venue city traffic management planning and operating arrangements.

Section 3.18. Venue City Police Communication with Local Communities

3.18.1. A key objective of a venue city police authorities should centre on developing a tournament communication strategy commencing during the planning phase which should focus on providing reassurance to local communities, notably those who reside or work in close proximity to the venue stadia and/or in city centres, regarding the priority that will be placed on their safety and security.

3.18.2. A related objective will be to encourage a sense of pride and ownership in “their” city hosting a major high-profile sporting event and encourage local communities to provide visiting supporters with a welcoming environment. Experience at previous tournaments demonstrates that this can have a major impact on the behaviour of home and visiting supporters alike.

Section 3.19. Venue City Police Liaison with Supporter Representatives

3.19.1. The venue city police authorities should also develop and implement a strategy for communicating with supporters (termed ‘dialogue’) in the build up to and during the tournament.

3.19.2. Pre-tournament dialogue between venue city police authorities and resident supporter groups, and those in participating States (via their national and policing authorities), can provide a channel for relaying important information such as travel advice, access routes to the stadium, applicable legislation and behavioural tolerance levels, etc.

3.19.3. It can also help provide a basis for helping to generate a safe, secure and welcoming atmosphere for all supporters from among the host population and beyond.

3.19.4. In addition to an effective media handling strategy (*see* Section 3.20 below), the venue police should consider using social media/internet sites, liaising with designated National Team Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), supporter group representatives, and visiting supporter focused initiatives like fan embassies.

3.19.5. A key preparatory component of adopting a dialogue-approach centres on venue city police authorities ensuring that specialist communication officers and/or, during the operational phase, selected front line operational units are trained in communication and conflict resolution techniques.

3.19.6. Two established and effective visiting supporter communication planning options for venue city police centre on initiating dialogue with fan embassies and SLOs.

3.19.7. In pursuance of this objective, venue city police authorities should encourage the tournament national and local or regional authorities to adopt a policy of hosting “fan-embassies” staffed by supporters of each national team participating in tournament matches hosted in the venue city.

3.19.8. Appendix 3.A provides information on, and outlines the benefits of, embracing the fan embassy concept.

3.19.9. In parallel, venue city police authorities should identify which national teams competing in tournament matches in their city have appointed national team Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) to act, amongst other functions, as an interface between the venue city police and visiting supporters.

3.19.10. Appendix 3.B provides information on, and outlines the potential and mutual benefits to be derived from, effective communication arrangements between the venue city police and visiting SLOs.

3.19.11. It is stressed, however, that adopting a dialogue-focused ethos is complementary to effective crowd management arrangements inside and outside stadia. It is neither a soft option nor an alternative to tackling misbehaviour.

3.19.12. Additional and detailed information on police liaison with supporters is provided in EU Council Resolution of 13 October 2016 concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters.

Section 3.20. Venue City Police Media Strategy

3.20.1. European experience evidence that an effective multi-agency media strategy is integral to successful delivery of the tournament safety and security concept, both at national and venue city levels.

3.20.2. Initially, it is likely that national and international media interest will be focused on tournament preparations at a national level. It is important, therefore, for the government-led national organising committee to develop a comprehensive multi-agency media handling strategy.

3.20.3. This is crucial as it is possible that there may be negative media speculation regarding the threats and risks associated hosting the tournament.

3.20.4. A holistic and carefully orchestrated multi-agency host police media strategy can provide a highly effective means for and countering such media speculation and providing reassurance to resident communities and within participating European States.

3.20.5. However, international, national and local media attention will also focus on the potential impact of the tournament on venue cities.

3.20.6. It is crucial, therefore, for the venue city police authorities to work closely with other key local and regional stakeholders, including municipal authorities, football authorities, stadium management, and other partner agencies in developing and implementing a comprehensive venue city multi-agency media strategy.

3.20.7. The core aim should be to project a positive image of the tournament and venue city among home and visiting supporters, local resident and business communities, and individuals participating in the safety and security operations.

3.20.8. This can help generate a welcoming environment for all involved and, in so doing, contribute towards minimising safety and security risks by influencing perceptions among supporters who will travel to the venue city during the tournament.

3.20.9. In terms of the venue city policing component of the wider multi-agency media strategy, it should aim to:

- provide information in a proactive, open and transparent manner;
- provide information on safety and security preparations in a reassuring and positive manner;
- communicate the police's intention to facilitate the legitimate activities of supporters;
- make clear what kinds of behaviour will not be tolerated by the police; and,
- provide authoritative information on any incidents as quickly as possible.

3.20.10. To that end, the venue city police authorities should work closely with other local partners in delivering a venue city multi-agency media strategy which:

- ensures responsibilities are clearly assigned among police and partner agencies in terms of who has the lead in communicating with the media on the various aspects of safety and security (and beyond);

- provides briefing material (regularly updated to take account of recurring themes or questions and emerging risks or events) for all police and partner agency spokespersons;
 - ensures that factual information is released to the media and/or on the internet on a regular basis in the build-up, during and after the tournament; and,
 - provides regular opportunities for press/media briefings.
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Venue City Police Liaison with Visiting Supporter Fan Embassies

1. Fan embassies provide visiting supporters with a focal point in the host city centre for obtaining a wide range of information and assistance including the location of areas designated for use and refreshment for visiting supporters, local travel and transport arrangements, ticket availability, accommodation, local leisure activities, any planned screenings of matches, theft or loss of documents health care and, importantly, policing strategies and tolerance levels, etc.
2. Fan embassies also provide a channel of communication between supporters and venue city police (and other authorities) and are a potentially effective means for rapidly and efficiently relaying up-to-date information on any emerging or changing situations.
3. Fan embassies can also represent the views of the supporters to the venue city police and other city authorities if problems arise and take proactive initiatives to build goodwill between different supporter groups and with local minority ethnic communities.
4. The personnel of the visiting fan embassy should possess an understanding of the fan culture of their national team's visiting supporters; access to detailed local knowledge; and close contact with all relevant local agencies, including the police.
5. Fan embassies should be accessible and contactable by telephone throughout the period of the tournament and must be open for as long as possible on the day before, the day of and the day after each match. One of the advantages of fan embassies is their accessibility and flexibility, enabling them to adapt to the situations that arise and also to tailor their activities to the needs of visiting supporters.

6. Choosing a location is a critical part of the preparation for fan embassies. The location should be accessible and visible. The question of location needs to be the subject of close consultation between supporter representatives, police and the municipal authorities. Ideally, it is useful for fan embassies to be located in city centres, enabling a considerable amount of work to be done in advance of the match and making the embassies accessible to the greatest possible numbers. This is especially important for supporters that traditionally gather in city centres and only go to the stadium an hour or two before kick-off.
7. Fan embassies are sometimes set up by the public authorities in the host city or alternatively by the supporters themselves. In either case, the venue city police can assist in identifying appropriate locations for fan embassies.
8. It can also be useful to set up a fan embassy near the ground, so that supporters have an alternative point of reference during the periods immediately before and after each match.
9. Information distributed to visiting supporters before the tournament should give the location and other details of the fan embassy. The distribution of city maps to visiting supporters, showing the location of the fan embassy and other useful information such as the location of bus stops, cash dispensers, etc. will also be of assistance to, and appreciated by, these visiting supporters.
10. As fan embassy staff are in constant touch with the organiser, local and national authorities, the police and the safety and security services, they are able to provide supporters with up-to-date and accurate information. They must make sure that this information is definite and reliable and constantly check its accuracy, so that no misleading information is provided to supporters.

11. An associated aim is to avoid the spread of rumours. The widest variety of quite fantastic rumours can circulate among supporters which may create difficulties. As fan embassies combine an official position at the heart of the network of organising bodies with special and immediate relationships with supporters on the spot, they are able rapidly and definitively to help prevent the dissemination of rumours.
12. A fan embassy can make use of social media (e.g., X, Facebook, etc.) to inform supporters on all issues relevant to them.
13. Fan embassies can distribute brochures containing information about football stadia, their location, access to them, local public transport and match specific information. This information should include legislation of the host country and regulations relating to venue city police crowd management arrangements, and stadium entry regulations, including any items that are prohibited and forms of behaviour which are regarded as anti-social.
14. In addition to information on public transport timetables (for trains, buses, trams and underground railways), fan embassies can also provide information to supporters on public and privately owned parking areas in the city or near the stadium, along with any park-and-ride facilities and the timetables of shuttles to the ground (ideally with a stop at the “fan embassy”).
15. Official documents, such as identity cards, passports and social security documents, as well as travel and match tickets, among other things, are frequently lost or stolen during football Tournaments, causing dismay to the supporters concerned who may feel lost in an unknown environment. In such scenarios, a fan embassy can be of great assistance in terms of dealing with the problem in respect of being able to provide access to the relevant authorities.
16. Fan embassies need to be able to supply information about hospitals, ordinary or emergency medical services, emergency dentists and social welfare systems, so that supporters can be pointed in the right direction.

17. Fan embassies are a major source of information about leisure, sports and cultural activities organised for local people, or specifically for visiting supporters, in the city as well as details of how to get there. Such activities can sometimes even be organised by the fan embassy in partnership with club or national SLOs or home supporter groups.
18. It is important that all information made available to a fan embassy is up to date in order to ensure that the very latest news can be relayed to visiting supporters. This is important as some activities may be organised and not be publicised in official supporter information packs/leaflets.

Source: Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters (12792/16).

Venue City Police Liaison with Visiting Supporter SLOs

1. This appendix provides guidance on the potentially important role which Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs), appointed by the national football federations in host and participating States, can play in providing effective liaison between the venue city police and supporters and in helping to prevent football related violence and other criminal and prohibited behaviour.
2. SLOs may be paid employees or volunteers who have been selected on the basis of possession of the character, skills, and resources to undertake their role effectively.
3. In essence, the work performed by national team SLOs incorporates an extensive and demanding range of functions, including during tournaments:
 - acting as an interface and communicating between supporters and venue city police, etc. before, during and after matches;
 - providing detailed information for supporters attending matches to facilitate match day travel and logistics and removing the potential for misunderstandings;
 - providing input at security meetings before home games and high-risk away games;
 - explaining the actions of supporters to police and vice-versa to break down barriers and misconceptions;
 - working to prevent disorder by exerting a calming and de-escalating influence on supporters and other stakeholders, mediating in conflict situations, and encouraging a positive supporter culture;
 - attending debriefing meetings after matches;
 - contributing to police training;

- acting as an ongoing interface and communication link between supporters and the venue city police, before, during and after matches;
- providing detailed information for supporters attending matches to facilitate match day travel and logistics and removing the potential for misunderstandings; and,
- identifying potential solutions to existing or emerging safety and security challenges/problems.

Source: Council Resolution concerning a handbook with recommendations for preventing and managing violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, through the adoption of good practice in respect of police liaison with supporters (12792/16).

Part Four – Tournament IPCC Preparatory and Operating Arrangements

Section 4.1. IPCC Planning

4.1.1. The preparation and operation of the IPCC must be consistent and compatible with the national operational structure of police units.

4.1.3. The high-profile status and importance of the IPCC role in supporting host police crowd management operations is highlighted in Section 1.2 of this handbook.

4.1.3. The following guidance is focused on the established remit of a crowd management (public order and public safety) role of the tournament IPCC.

4.1.4. Additional and separate arrangements will be required if it has been decided to co-locate in the IPCC the management, coordination and analyses teams of other specialist tournament policing cells/centres with an international dimension.

4.1.5. Clearly, therefore, the IPCC planning and preparatory process (and operating arrangements) will need to reflect, and be customised to accommodate, the high-level policy and structural (and budgetary) decisions discussed above.

4.1.6. Once the role of the IPCC has been determined, planning and preparations for the IPCC should commence as soon as possible.

4.1.7. It is recommended that the planning process should be led by host policing personnel with relevant experience and competence in respect of international police cooperation in connection with major football tournaments. In many States, this profile will be met by the head of the NFIP in the host State.

4.1.8. In order to support the planning process, the host State should consider setting-up an advisory planning group comprising international NFIP representatives and others with relevant experience in hosting football and other major sports events.

4.1.9. Once the designated roles and responsibilities of the IPCC have been defined, the planning group should prepare associated implementation actions plans to be updated and shared on a regular basis with the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP network Experts.

4.1.10. For global tournaments, and for European States falling outside of the NFIP umbrella network, the IPCC planning group should request the police in each participating State to designate a police single point of contact (SPOC) with whom the planning group can liaise regarding IPCC preparations and other relevant matters.

Section 4.2. IPCC Infrastructure

4.2.1. A primary task will be to determine the geographical location of the IPCC and, thereafter, identify an appropriate policing, or other, facility that can accommodate the IPCC.

4.2.2. As indicated above, this task will need to reflect any policy decisions regarding the location of other tournament international police cooperation cells/centres (such as border, organised crime and CT cells/centres) and the Tournament Policing Coordination “Fusion” arrangements.

4.2.3. If it has been decided to co-locate these centres in the IPCC, then this will need to be reflected in IPCC facility and accommodation planning.

4.2.4. It is essential to ensure that the IPCC facility incorporates an auditorium capable of hosting all IPCC liaison officers and appropriate conference and meeting rooms. If any other tournament specialist policing cells/centres are to be co-located in the IPCC, then separate on-site facilities will be required.

4.2.5. It will also be necessary to ensure that IPCC personnel and liaison officers (and the personnel of any other co-located international police centres) can be accommodated either on-site or in suitable hotel accommodation in close proximity to the IPCC.

4.2.6. A further consideration centres on determining whether visiting police delegations will either be accommodated in the IPCC facility between deployment to venue cities or, preferably, travel between the venue cities in which their relevant national team will compete in the tournament.

Section 4.3. IPCC Management Arrangements

4.3.1. The IPCC chain of command should be defined, and a management team appointed to coordinate IPCC preparations and, thereafter, manage IPCC operating arrangements.

4.3.2. Experience evidence that the IPCC management team should comprise:

- (i) chief of staff (depending upon experience and competence, this role can be undertaken either by the head of the NFIP in the host State or a senior police officer with extensive experience in the international police cooperation arena);
- (ii) managers (deployed on a rota and shift basis) to deliver IPCC management functions (ideally experienced members of the host NFIP or senior police officers with experience in the international police cooperation area preferably related to football tournaments); and,
- (iii) operational coordinators (deployed on a rota and shift basis) to assist IPCC officers deliver their roles and responsibilities (again either NFIP members or police officers with experience in the international police cooperation area related to football Tournaments).

4.3.3. The number of personnel in the management team will need to reflect a detailed analysis of the projected scale, character and volume of the IPCC workload.

4.3.4. It will be crucial to ensure from the outset that the management team comprises personnel competent to deliver an effective IPCC on a 24 x 7 basis throughout the duration of its operations.

4.3.5. A further issue to define centres on management team participation in meetings of the host police tournament coordination (“fusion”) group (or whatever nomenclature has been designated by the host authorities), irrespective of whether or not it is co-located in the IPCC.

Section 4.4. IPCC Support Team Arrangements

4.4.1. It will also be necessary to define the roles, functions and size of the IPCC support team, taking account the need for:

- police information analysts, preferably experienced NFIP personnel if available, including analysts focused on diaspora issues (*see* Section 4.5);
- information technology personnel, tasked to guarantee effective 24 x 7 coverage;
- communication and media handling personnel;
- logistical support team to oversee accommodation, catering and other services;
- travel coordinator to arrange the domestic transport arrangements of visiting police delegations; and,
- finance (budget) manager.

Section 4.5. Role of IPCC Diaspora Analysts

4.5.1. The presence of large diasporas in many European States can generate significant logistical and risk assessment uncertainties in respect of host police preparations and operations.

4.5.2. Whilst host police commanders will be aware of the phenomenon, and whilst the presence of supporters' resident in diaspora communities do not inherently present a security risk, the absence of substantive information will inevitably pose significant logistical, safety and security concerns and impact on venue city police planning, deployment and operational strategies.

4.5.3. The role of the recommended IPCC diaspora analyst, therefore, should be to commission and obtain available information in respect of States participating in the tournament whose national team may attract a significant number of supporters' resident in diaspora communities across Europe. There are a number of sources of information at the analyst's disposal, including:

- NFIP National Team Overview and Supporter Profiles;
- Online data on diaspora communities in European States;

- NFIPs in those States with significant resident diaspora communities;
- Information on Tournament ticket sales; and,
- National experts on diaspora issues and data.

Section 4.6. IPCC Liaison Officer Arrangements

4.6.1. A fundamental IPCC planning objective will be to determine and define a range of important issues regarding the deployment of IPCC liaison officers. These include:

- (i) defining the roles, responsibilities, and required competencies of IPCC liaison officers, taking account of the desirability of NFIP operatives (or officers experienced in policing international football or other major events) fulfilling this role.
- (ii) defining the number of IPCC liaison officers to be deployed by each:
 - participating State (for the duration of their national team's participation in the tournament);
 - transit hub-States; and
 - venue city.
- (iii) determine the number of liaison officers to be deployed in the IPCC by other national and international law enforcement agencies, such as:
 - Europol;
 - Interpol;
 - National Border Police and Frontex (if deployed by the host State);
 - National Transport Police;
 - Railpol; and
 - Airpol.
- (iv) determine if liaison officers should also be deployed by an tournament organising representative and applicable international body (e.g. UEFA or FIFA).
- (v) prepare job descriptions and a code of conduct for all IPCC personnel, including liaison officers.

4.6.2. The period of deployment of IPCC liaison officers is usually concluded two days after the relevant national team is eliminated from the tournament. In the light of a risk assessment, the IPCC chief of staff can extend the date of departure.

Section 4.7. IPCC Logistical Arrangements

4.7.1. IPCC preparations should include determining a range of necessary logistical support services to ensure the effectiveness and smooth running of the IPCC.

4.7.2. In accordance with the good practice contained in this handbook, the arrangements for, and cost of, international travel, salaries, and travel and health insurance for IPCC liaison officers (and visiting police delegations) should be the responsibility of their home State.

4.7.3. However, it is the responsibility of the host State to arrange and meet the cost of suitable accommodation, internal transport, meals and other services necessary for the liaison officers (laundry services, internet and telephone access etc.).

Section 4.8. IPCC Communication and IT Services

4.8.1. A key planning objective centres on determining the information exchange arrangements for the IPCC.

4.8.2. For the exchange of international police information on crowd management issues, this should be a dedicated tournament facility on the EPE hosted NFIP website.

4.8.3. Information exchange with designated police single points of contact (SPOCs) in States outside of Europe, or not part of the European NFIP network, should be integrated by providing temporary and limited access to the EPE hosted NFIP website facility, once agreed jointly by the NFIP network and Europol.

4.8.4. Separate secure international communication arrangements should be put in place to meet the needs of any other international police cells/centres co-located in the IPCC.

4.8.5. For co-hosted tournaments, secure communication arrangements should be established to ensure effective 24 x 7 liaison between the designated IPCC in each host State.

4.8.6. In addition, provision should be made for liaison officers to have 24 x 7 access to the internet to facilitate bilateral communications with national and international partners, including venue city police contacts, liaison officers deployed as part of each visiting police delegations, and the NFIP in their home State.

4.8.7. The communication arrangements should be tested on a regular basis during the preparatory phase to ensure reliability during the tournament.

Section 4.9. IPCC Bilateral Arrangements

4.9.1. As indicated above in Section 1.4(b), the bi-lateral discussions and subsequent agreements with participating States should include a provision confirming the deployment of liaison officers in the IPCC.

4.9.2. However, the IPCC management team will need to supplement the agreements by providing participating States, and others deploying IPCC liaison officers, with details of IPCC logistical and operating arrangements that will apply during the tournament, including:

- structure and location of IPCC;
- role and tasks of IPCC management team;
- role and tasks of liaison officers;
- period of operation;
- schedule of information exchange arrangements
- liaison officer briefing arrangements
- liaison officer training

- IPCC accreditation arrangements; and,
- logistical arrangements (liaison officer accommodation and meals etc.)

4.9.3. In parallel, the European network of NFIPs and SPOCs should be advised of their crucial role in providing the IPCC with tournament-related information gathered within their national State, including information on travel to the host State of resident supporters from diaspora communities.

4.9.4. To support preparation of preliminary logistical, and associated risk assessments, the NFIPs in States participating in the tournament should be requested to update their national team (supporter profile) overview in the dedicated facility in the EPE hosted NFIP website at least 6 months prior to the tournament.

Section 4.10. IPCC Familiarisation Training

4.10.1. As stressed above, effective communication between host police and their international partners is crucial throughout the period of the tournament.

4.10.2. However, this liaison should commence during the preparatory phase to ensure that both parties approach the tournament in full knowledge of host police expectations and IPCC operating arrangements.

4.10.3. A programme of events designed to achieve this objective can include:

- highlighting the IPCC and visiting police delegation arrangements in international police cooperation briefing conferences organised by the host police or relevant governmental authority;
- IPCC management team hosting an on-site seminar to familiarise liaison officers with the IPCC logistical and operating arrangements: this could also include sessions on the impact and response to a range of potentially disruptive scenarios; and,

- IPCC management team hosting a pre-tournament final briefing for liaison officers and others as appropriate.

4.10.4. These events can be supplemented by a programme of pre-tournament visits by police representatives of participating States to the IPCC facility and to venue cities to discuss visiting police delegation logistics with local police commanders.

Section 4.11. IPCC Information Exchange Operational Arrangements

4.11.1. Any pandemic and other health protection measures should be incorporated in the design and operating arrangements of the IPCC (*see* Appendix 5.A).

4.11.2. The IPCC working auditorium should be arranged with national or agency desks, each one provided with at least one telephone landline with international access and one desktop with internet access.

4.11.3. In addition to the deployment of liaison officers from key hub-transit States, a generic transit desk should be established in the IPCC to analyse information received from the NFIP network and designated police SPOCs (in States with no NFIP) regarding the movements of visiting supporters on route to the host State, including supporters from European resident diaspora communities and any supporters temporarily based in neighbouring States.

4.11.4. The IPCC should become operational at least 2 days prior to the start of the tournament. A formal opening can be arranged with all liaison officers in attendance.

4.11.5. On tournament match days (MD), liaison officers from the States with teams competing on the day should remain in the IPCC until two hours after completion of the match.

4.11.6. The management team will need to determine and provide NFIPs and SPOCs based in participating and other States with details of the daily schedule for submitting reports via the dedicated tournament-specific facility on EPE hosted NFIP website, including the provision of:

- pre-match assessments (PMA) two days prior to the relevant match (MD-2), with supplementary updates and assessments up to and including the day of the match; and,
- post-match reports (PMR) on a specified time on the day following the match (MD+1).

4.11.7. Liaison officer briefings should be held by the IPCC duty manager, supported by the duty operational coordinator, at least twice a day (morning and afternoon).

4.11.8. Dynamic risk assessments provided by the host police, and by visiting police delegations deployed in venue cities, should be shared with the IPCC (via the relevant liaison officers) to ensure that the IPCC is kept informed of any emerging incidents and developing risk assessments.

4.11.9. Daily briefing reports should be prepared by the management team and shared with IPCC liaison officers and issued to the wider network of NFIPs and SPOCs at a designated time each day.

4.11.10. Personal data of individuals arrested in connection with the tournament should be provided to the NFIP or SPOC in the State in which the individual is a citizen or resident, along with details of the offending behaviour and any penalties or other sanctions imposed and by whom.

Section 4.12. IPCC Coordination of Deployment Arrangements for Visiting Police Delegations

4.12.1. The composition and roles of visiting police delegations (“spotter teams”) is set out in Parts Three and Five of this handbook.

4.12.2. The role of the IPCC travel coordinator is to liaise with police in venue cities to arrange, or ensure that arrangements are in place for, the travel, accommodation, communication and other logistical arrangements for visiting police delegations (pre-booking travel and accommodation arrangements prior to the tournament).

4.12.3. The IPCC travel coordinator should also ensure that local arrangements are in place for venue police to host, accompany and maintain the safety of visiting police delegations. Additional information on the role of accompanying host police officers (“cicerones”) is provided in Section 5.4 of this handbook along with good practice recommendations regarding a range of visiting police deployment issues.

Section 4.13. IPCC Recording and Use of Tournament Statistics

4.13.1. A key role of the IPCC will be to gather and record a range of tournament-related statistics (based on host police reports) provided by venue city and transport police, including:

- number, character and seriousness of any public order incidents;
- number and circumstances of any arrests for criminal or prohibited behaviour and the judicial or administrative response/outcome; and,
- number and circumstances of any preventative detentions in connection with the tournament.

4.13.2. It is recommended that a record of other tournament statistics (police and steward deployments, number of spectators, in-stadia safety incidents etc.) should be collected by the relevant host authority/agency.

4.13.3. Tournament data should be presented in a form of a report to the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts. The data should be incorporated in annual threat assessment based on NFIP network statistics and assist in identifying the scale and character of existing threats and the emergence of any new or evolving trends.

4.13.4. In view of the potential impact of serious and organised criminality and terrorist threats on crowd management operation, a contribution supplied by Europol will add value to the annual threat assessment.

Section 4.14. IPCC Media Handling and Communications

4.14.1. Section 3.20 of this handbook highlights the important role of national and venue city media handling strategies. Also stressed is the need to:

- ensure that factual information is released to the media;
- provide regular opportunities for press/media briefings; and,
- provide information on preparations in a reassuring and positive manner.

4.14.2. Whilst it is not appropriate for the IPCC to comment on high profile incidents or host police operations etc., it can play a “reassuring and positive” role in highlighting the importance of international police cooperation in demonstrating a European-wide commitment to supporting host policing operations.

4.14.3. On that basis, the role of the IPCC should be integrated into the host State multi-agency communication and media handling strategy. This is likely to attract both domestic and international media attention. It is important, therefore, for the IPCC support team to include (or have access to) one or more media officers to assist in developing an IPCC media strategy, manage media requests, and organise any IPCC media briefings.

4.14.4. The presence of visiting police delegations can also attract national and local media interest. That is why some experienced delegations include a spokesperson (often the head of delegation) or press officer among their number. For those delegations who do not, it is desirable for the NFIP in participating State to have access to a designated governmental or police media officer during the tournament.

4.14.5. The key objective throughout must be to ensure a harmonised approach with shared and uniform messages, and clarity on who can comment on what issues and when and what they should say! This is important as the core task must be to provide the media with factual information and to avoid different and conflicting messages becoming the focus of media attention.

Section 4.15. Legacy and Feedback

4.15.1. At an early stage following the tournament, liaison officers and NFIPs should be invited to provide feedback on their experience in the IPCC to assist in capturing good practices and challenges encountered in connection with IPCC operations.

4.15.2. The results of the feedback initiatives should be presented in a report to the European Group of Policing Football and NFIP experts and considered in planning for subsequent international football tournaments (and in connection with other major international sports events if considered appropriate by the designated host authorities).

PART FIVE – Tournament Police Crowd Management Strategy:

Supporting and Advisory Roles of Visiting Police Delegations

Note: for ease of reference, this part of the handbook incorporates, and expands upon, guidance contained in Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (‘EU Football Handbook’) (11160/24)

Section 5.1. Bilateral Negotiations and Agreements on Visiting Police Delegations

5.1.1. As stressed in Section 1.4 (b) of this handbook, a key and mutual objective of host and participating States alike should centre on obtaining pre-tournament clarification in respect of (amongst other things) the composition, role, and operating arrangements of the visiting police delegation deployed by each participating State.

5.1.2. Section 1.4 (b) also highlights that the bilateral arrangements are likely to vary in accordance a range of risk-based factors, but should provide clarity in respect of:

- composition of visiting police delegation;
- core tasks of delegation;
- executive powers of delegation (if any);
- possession and use of technical intelligence and evidence gathering equipment (for example, handheld video and stills cameras);
- deployment with protective equipment (firearms, CS gas, batons, tasers, other);
- use of covert human intelligence sources;
- wearing of uniforms or high visibility identification;
- media handling arrangements; and,
- costs and logistical arrangements.

Section 5.2. Composition of Visiting Police Delegations

5.2.1. In determining and defining the bilateral arrangements for each visiting police delegation, and notwithstanding recognition that each delegation is likely to vary in accordance with a joint risk assessment, it is recommended that the host and participating States should take account of established good practice in respect of the composition of a tournament visiting police delegation.

5.2.2. A tournament visiting police delegation (sometimes described as “spotting” or “spotter” team for one-off matches with an international dimension) should be constituted in such a way to support host State tournament policing operations over an extended period of time and in more challenging circumstances than a typical one-off match.

5.2.3. In addition to the deployment of liaison officers in the tournament IPCC (*see* Section 4.9 of this handbook), a visiting police delegation for a tournament would usually comprise personnel with a range of designated functions.

Head of Delegation

5.2.4. The head of delegation is hierarchically in charge of, and responsible for, the visiting police delegation and should act as a strategic and tactical advisor to the venue city police in respect of managing supporters of their national team.

Operations Coordinator

5.2.5. The operations coordinator, who should be based in the relevant venue city tournament police operations centre, is responsible for coordinating the work of the visiting police delegation and facilitating effective exchange of information between the visiting police delegation and the host police.

Police Spotters

5.2.6. Police spotters should be experienced and capable of:

- (i) monitoring, assessing and interpreting the behaviour of their national team's supporters;
- (ii) spotting any emerging tensions, risks or minor incidents in order to inform the head of delegation, operational coordinator and the venue city police accordingly;
- (iii) identifying offenders;
- (iv) recommending to the head of delegation and/or operations coordinator if any targeted preventative or mitigation measures are required to prevent escalation of the misbehaviour or incident; and,
- (v) appropriately equipped to gather evidence of any criminal or prohibited behaviour committed by supporters of their national team.

5.2.7. The number of spotters required will vary in accordance with the anticipated number and character of the relevant visiting supporters and the associated risk assessment.

Police Communication (or dialogue) Officers

5.2.8. Police communication officers should be trained and experienced in communicating with supporters of their national team generally, and/or with the national team Supporter Liaison Officer (if appointed), their fan embassy, and/or other known supporter representatives.

5.2.9. Again, the number of communication personnel will vary in accordance with the anticipated number of visiting national team supporters travelling to the tournament.

5.2.10. In some visiting police delegations, the spotting and communication roles might be undertaken by the same personnel.

Visiting Police Spokesperson/Media Officer

5.2.11. The police spokesperson should be responsible for handling media requests for interviews and information.

5.2.12. Depending upon an assessment of the anticipated volume of media interest, the head of delegation will sometimes be designated to fulfil this role.

Section 5.3. Core Tasks of Visiting Police Delegations

5.3.1. At all times, the principal role of each visiting police delegation is to provide expert advice intended to inform national and venue city tournament policing operations and to support the host police authorities in managing visiting supporters of their respective national team.

5.3.2. To deliver this objective, it is crucial that visiting police delegations comprise personnel with the knowledge and experience outlined in Section 5.2 above.

5.3.3. In essence, each visiting police delegation should be equipped to provide the host police with the following competences:

- expert knowledge concerning national team supporter dynamics, notably when present in significant numbers in States hosting (or co-hosting) major international football tournaments and the character of football-related violence/disorder involving national team supporters;
- ability to represent their State and their role effectively and appropriately when supporting the host police (i.e. be diplomatic, self-confident, independent and able to communicate in a common language agreed beforehand); and,
- ability to share information with, and provide advice to, the host police in a clear and timely manner.

5.3.4. In operational settings, the primary inter-action between the host police and visiting police delegations will centre on the role of visiting police supporter communication (dialogue) personnel and visiting police spotting teams. As indicated above, in some visiting police delegations, the communication and spotting roles may be delivered by the same personnel.

5.3.5. The aim and role of visiting police supporter communication personnel is to act as an interface between the host police and supporters of their national team in order to relay important information, dispel speculative rumours, provide clarity on the consequences of anti-social, provocative or other prohibited behaviour, and help promote self-policing amongst supporters.

5.3.6. Visiting police supporter communication personnel can also gather information from visiting supporters regarding any perceived concerns about inappropriate or provocative behaviour by fellow supporters, or threatening behaviour by rival supporters.

5.3.7. The core roles of visiting police spotting teams are set out in Section 5.2.6 above. In essence they are deployed to assist the police in venue cities (and/or elsewhere if required or appropriate) in monitoring the behaviour of the supporters of their respective national teams and identifying the perpetrators of any criminal, prohibited, or provocative behaviour.

5.3.8. The relationship between visiting police spotting teams and visiting supporters can and does vary across Europe. Irrespective of whether they are deployed in plain clothes, uniform, or identification vests (see section 5.7 below) visiting police spotters will be known to many of the visiting supporters, especially those who travel regularly to international matches abroad. The response of visiting supporters to the visiting spotter personnel can either be positive or negative depending upon a range of factors.

5.3.9. Amongst most visiting supporters, especially those from States with no history of causing or contributing to significant problems, the presence of visiting spotter personnel will most likely be welcomed.

5.3.10. However, if a core and high-profile task of the visiting spotters is traditionally to gather evidence of any criminal or other prohibited behaviour for exclusion or other purposes when the supporters return to their home State, their presence may generate a mixed, or even hostile, response from some elements of the visiting support, especially among known or potential risk supporter groups or individuals.

5.3.11. Such factors should be considered by the venue city or other police when determining the role of visiting police spotting teams. If spotters are asked either to act as intermediaries between the visiting supporters and host police, or otherwise engage in dialogue with visiting supporters, it is imperative that such tasks are first agreed by the head of delegation in the light of a risk assessment.

5.3.12. In practice, much will depend upon the circumstances at the scene. For example, if the aim of the dialogue is to enhance or protect the safety of visiting supporters, then dialogue with visiting spotters is likely to be appreciated by the overwhelming majority of visiting supporters,

5.3.13. However, irrespective of the purpose of the communication, the host police should at all times ensure the safety of visiting police spotting and supporter dialogue personnel.

5.3.14. In the event of a significant emergency, or other threat or disruption, requiring increased safety and security measures, the primary role of the visiting police delegation may need to be adjusted to assist the host police in communicating the need for additional security arrangements in order to enhance the safety of visiting supporters as well as resident or business communities in the location(s) concerned.

Section 5.4. Accompanying Visiting Police Delegations (“Cicerones”)

5.4.1. As stressed above, the host police authorities are responsible for ensuring the safety of all members of visiting police delegations. This is imperative and must be reflected in all host and visiting police risk assessments concerning visiting police deployment.

5.4.2. At all times, visiting police personnel should work alongside local police officers (commonly known as cicerones) who themselves should be serving police officers with experience of policing football in their own city or country, including familiarity with the venue area and potential risk areas.

5.4.3 The venue city police authorities should ensure that the cicerones are:

- integrated into the venue city (or other) policing operation and be able to relay information designed to inform the decisions of operational police commanders;
- knowledgeable of their police organisation, processes and command structure;
- not distracted by monitoring their own risk supporters whilst they are deployed accompanying members of a visiting police delegation;
- thoroughly briefed on the host policing operation, their responsibilities, and on the tasks expected to be performed by the members of the visiting police delegation;
- responsible for the safety of visiting police delegation;
- deployed with the visiting police delegation for the duration of the venue city police operation in order to develop an effective working relationship; and,
- able to work with the visiting police delegation in a common language agreed beforehand.

Section 5.5. Language Arrangements

5.5.1. Language arrangements should be made in advance between the host national or venue city police authorities and the head of the visiting police delegation concerned.

5.5.2. Where possible, visiting police delegations should include personnel skilled in the language of the host country to facilitate communication between host and visiting police personnel.

5.2.3. If this is not possible, the host police authorities should identify policing personnel from within their ranks with the necessary linguistic skills, or who are at least able to converse in English as this is the most common second language of many visiting supporters.

Section 5.6. Cooperation between Host and Visiting Police during the Tournament

5.6.1. Continuing this theme, the host police authorities should ensure that visiting police delegations, via their head of delegation or operations coordinator, are kept informed about venue city policing operations (including their crowd management philosophy and behavioural tolerance levels).

5.6.2. In effect, the head of delegation and/or the operations coordinator should be fully integrated into the host police operation (and given the possibility to attend and participate in pre-match briefing and post-match debriefing meetings).

5.6.3. The host police authorities and the visiting police delegation should both keep their respective IPCC liaison officers informed of developments throughout each tournament venue city policing operation.

5.6.4. The visiting police delegation should always ensure that their actions do not unnecessarily jeopardise the safety of other persons.

Section 5.7. Use of Identification Vests by Visiting Police Delegations

5.7.1. Most European host States will be familiar with the European police identification vest from experience in hosting one-off football matches with an international dimension.

5.7.2. During a tournament, the host police authorities and head of visiting police delegation should jointly determine for tactical reasons if visiting police delegation (or part thereof) will be deployed in plain clothes or in uniform.

5.7.3. If the visiting police delegation is from a European State, and if the host and head of delegation have jointly agreed, visiting police personnel who are not deployed in uniform can use standard luminous and distinctive visiting police identification vests which each member of the delegation should be in possession of when deployed during the tournament.

5.7.4. Appendix 3 of Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and security management of football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved ('EU Football Handbook') (11160/24).

Section 5.8. Stadium Accreditation for Visiting Police Delegations

5.8.1. In the absence of any centralised arrangements for providing tournament accreditation for visiting police delegations, the venue city police authorities, in consultation with venue stadium management, should ensure that visiting police delegations have stadium access and accreditation (seating is not required) to enable the delegation to carry out their in-stadia spotting and/or communication tasks effectively.

5.8.2. Stadium stewards and other safety and security personnel should be made aware of the presence of accredited visiting police personnel at their briefing(s) prior to the game.

Section 5.9. Costs and Financial Arrangements

5.9.1. It is strongly recommended that each participating State should make budgetary provision to deploy their visiting police delegation to the host State (or States).

5.9.2. The costs involved in hosting and deploying a visiting police delegation will vary in accordance with a number of factors, including size of delegation, distance and means of travel etc., but, on average, the costs are modest and represent a sound investment in reducing safety and security risks.

5.9.3. The established practice is for the host State (or States) to meet the cost of visiting police delegation accommodation, meals (or subsistence) and domestic travel required in the host country, whilst the participating State should pay for international travel, salaries, travel and health insurance of the visiting police delegation (unless bi-lateral arrangements set out an alternative arrangement).

Section 5.10. Pre-Visits to Venue Cities by the Head and Operations Coordinator of Visiting Police Delegations

5.10.1. The host police authorities should give key members of the visiting police delegation (usually the head of delegation and/or the operations coordinator) an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the tournament policing strategy and, in particular, the tournament policing arrangements in venue cities.

5.10.2. Such visits should take place no later than six weeks before the tournament and should be arranged to also include hosting workshops or seminars setting out the host tournament policing strategy for a combined audience of venue city police commanders and key members of visiting police delegations.

5.10.3. The aim of such visits should be to familiarise the visiting police delegations with the stadium location, and to get to know the operational commander(s) in each venue city on tournament match days.

5.10.4. Such pre-visits also provide an ideal opportunity for national and, in particular, venue city police commanders to maximise international cooperation by:

- sharing logistical information on supporter arrangements in the venue city;
- visiting locations where visiting supporters can be expected to gather before and after the match, incorporating any organised “fan zones” and spontaneous unofficial supporter gathering locations, usually city centre areas with bars and restaurants;
- discussing and agreeing on the role of the visiting delegation;
- increasing awareness about venue city police policing preparations and operations;
- planning for the integration of the visiting delegation into the operation;
- identifying relevant legislative provisions and police tolerance levels;
- building trust and effective liaison channels between the two policing agencies; and,
- where appropriate, identifying measures to separate supporter groups in the venue city.

Health Protection and Mitigation Measures

1. The impact of the covid pandemic on the Euro 2020 experience highlighted the importance of providing visiting police delegations with the health and safety measures necessary to provide the individuals with maximum protection from any significant health risks associated with their deployment.
 2. Deployment arrangements should, therefore, clearly identify any potential health risks and provide guidance on pre-deployment vaccinations, along with the use of sanitary and protective masks or other equipment to be applied during the period of deployment at the tournament.
 3. It should also be made clear that members of visiting police delegations will be subject to any national health-related preventative measures in place at that time.
 4. If there is any risk of hospitalisation or quarantine on infection, the home State of each delegation should make pre-deployment arrangements to cover any costs arising for the individual(s) concerned (or, if available, provide the individuals with medical insurance covering such risks).
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