

Brussels, 7 May 2026  
(OR. en)

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INF 127

**NOTE**

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From: General Secretariat of the Council  
To: Delegations  
Subject: Public access to documents - Confirmatory application N° 22/c/01/26  
- Information to delegations

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Delegations will find attached:

- the request for access to documents sent to the General Secretariat of the Council on 13 March 2026 and registered on 16 March 2026 (Annex 1);
- the reply from the General Secretariat of the Council dated 30 April 2026 (Annex 2);
- the confirmatory application dated 5 May 2026 and registered on 6 May 2026 (Annex 3).

**From:** document-request@cis.consilium.europa.eu <document-request@cis.consilium.europa.eu>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2026 8:56 PM  
**To:** TRANSPARENCY Access to documents (COMM) <Access@consilium.europa.eu>  
**Subject:** Consilium - Electronic Request for Access to documents [ENGLISH]

This e-mail has been sent to [access@consilium.europa.eu](mailto:access@consilium.europa.eu) using the electronic form available in the Register application.

This electronic form has been submitted in ENGLISH.

**Title**

**DELETED**

**First name**

**DELETED**

**Family name**

**DELETED**

**E-mail**

**DELETED**

**Occupation**

NGO

I submit this request as a representative of an organisation.

**Name of the organisation**

International Peace Information Service vzw

**Full postal address**

Italielei 98a, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium

**Telephone**

**Requested document(s)**

(1) WK 7935 2025 INIT - MEETING DOCUMENT (17/06/2025)

EPF Presentation - post delivery monitoring

Date of meeting 12/06/2025

(2) WK 7679 2025 INIT - WORKING DOCUMENT (10/06/2025)

Council Conclusions of 14 April 2025 on arms export control – implementation: Food-for-thought paper by COARM chair

Date of meeting 12/06/2025

(3) WK 7495 2025 INIT - WORKING DOCUMENT (05/06/2025)

Concept note by UNODA for Council Decision in support of UN PoA on SALW and Global Framework on Ammunition

Date of meeting 11/06/2025

**1st option**

EN

**2nd option**

FR



**Council of the European Union**  
General Secretariat  
Directorate-General Communication and Information - COMM  
Directorate Information and Outreach  
Information Services Unit / Transparency  
*Head of Unit*

Brussels, 30 April 2026

**DELETED**

Email: **DELETED**

Ref. 26/1066

Request made on: 13.03.2026

Registered on: 16.03.2026

Deadline extension: 09.04.2026

Dear **DELETED**

Thank you for your request for access to documents of the Council of the European Union.<sup>1</sup>

I regret to inform you that access to documents **WK 7495/2025 INIT**, **WK 7679/2025 INIT** and **WK 7935/2025 INIT** cannot be given for the reasons set out below.

Document **WK 7495/2025 INIT**, dated 5 June 2025, is a note from the EEAS to the Working Party on Non-Proliferation and the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, with the subject: “Concept note by UNODA for Council Decision in support of UN PoA on SALW and Global Framework on Ammunition”.

Document **WK 7679/2025 INIT**, dated 10 June 2025, is a note from the EEAS to the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports with the subject “Council Conclusions of 14 April 2025 on arms export control – implementation: Food-for-thought paper by COARM chair”.

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<sup>1</sup> The General Secretariat of the Council has examined your request on the basis of the applicable rules: Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43) and the specific provisions concerning public access to Council documents set out in Annex II to the Council's Rules of Procedure (Council Decision No 2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35).

Document **WK 7935/2025 INIT**, dated 17 June 2025, is a note from the EEAS to the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, with the subject :” EPF Presentation - post-delivery monitoring”. Having duly consulted the originator of the documents, the EEAS<sup>2</sup>, and based on the information received from this body, the General Secretariat has come to the conclusion that access cannot be granted to these documents at this stage, for the reasons below.

Document **WK 7495/2025 INIT** is a preparatory document that was superseded by **WK 10128/2025 INIT**: “Project document by UNODA for a Council Decision in support of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Global Framework on Ammunition”, that was eventually incorporated into the [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2565 of 15 December 2025 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects and the Global Framework on Ammunition](#), as an annex.

Document **WK 7495/2025 INIT** contains opinions that were put forward for internal use only, as part of initial deliberations within the Council. Release of this information would harm future decision-making on this and similar issues.

Disclosure of the document would therefore seriously undermine the decision-making process of the Council, even after the specific decision has been adopted.

Having examined the context in which the document was drafted, on balance the General Secretariat could not identify any evidence suggesting an overriding public interest in its disclosure.

As a consequence, the General Secretariat has to refuse access to this document.<sup>3</sup>

Document **WK 7679/2025 INIT** is intended to guide COARM’s internal organization and scheduling of work.

Release of the information contained in this document would disclose confidential information exchange tools that cannot be shared with the general public.

Disclosure of the document would therefore undermine the protection of the public interest as regards the European Union’s defence and military matters. As a consequence, the General Secretariat has to refuse access to this document.<sup>4</sup>

Document **WK 7935/2025 INIT** includes politically and militarily sensitive content linked to lethal equipment provided to EU’s partners. Release of such content to the general public would have the effect of revealing sensitive information about military cooperation between the EU, its Member States and their partners. Moreover, this information could be used by adverse actors against the interests of the Union, its Member States and their partners.

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<sup>2</sup> Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

<sup>3</sup> Article 4(3), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

<sup>4</sup> Article 4(1)(a), second indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Disclosure of this information would therefore undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, defence and military matters, and international relations of the EU and its Member States. As a consequence, the General Secretariat has to refuse access to this document.<sup>5</sup>

We have also looked into the possibility of releasing parts of the documents.<sup>6</sup> However, as the exceptions to the right of access apply to their entire content, the General Secretariat is unable to give partial access at this stage.

Pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, you may ask the Council to review this decision within 15 working days of receiving this reply. Should you see the need for such a review, you are invited to indicate the reasons thereof.

Yours sincerely,

Fernando FLORINDO

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<sup>5</sup> Article 4(1)(a), first, second and third indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

<sup>6</sup> Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

To the General Secretariat of the Council  
Directorate-General Communication and Information  
Directorate Information and Outreach  
Information Services Unit / Transparency

By email: [access@consilium.europa.eu](mailto:access@consilium.europa.eu)

5 May 2026

**Subject: Confirmatory application under Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001  
Ref. 26/1066 – Request for access to document WK 7935/2025 INIT**

Dear Sir/Madam,

Pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, I hereby submit a confirmatory application requesting a review of the Council's decision to refuse access to document WK 7935/2025 INIT (dated 17 June 2025), entitled “EPF Presentation – post-delivery monitoring”.

The Council refused access on the basis of Article 4(1)(a), first, second and third indents, of Regulation 1049/2001, arguing that disclosure would undermine public security, defence and military matters, and international relations, on the ground that the document contains politically and militarily sensitive information.

I respectfully submit that the refusal does not satisfy the strict requirements established by Regulation 1049/2001 and the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the interpretation of exceptions to the principle of the widest possible public access to EU documents.

### **Failure to demonstrate specific and actual harm**

1. The Council has not demonstrated concretely and specifically how disclosure of the entirety of the requested document would reasonably and foreseeably undermine the protected interests invoked. The reasoning provided remains general and abstract.
2. According to settled case law, the institution must explain how access to a document could specifically and actually undermine the protected interest and establish that the risk is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical (Case C-350/12 P, Council v in 't Veld).
3. While the Council may enjoy a margin of discretion in sensitive areas, such discretion cannot substitute for a sufficiently reasoned, document-specific assessment. General references to the sensitivity of EPF-related matters are not sufficient to justify a blanket refusal.

### **No inherent or presumed risk linked to the subject matter**

4. Any assertion that disclosure would inherently undermine defence or international relations would amount to establishing a de facto general presumption of confidentiality. No such recognised presumption exists for EPF monitoring documents.
5. The Council must therefore demonstrate how disclosure of this specific document—rather than documents of that type in general—would give rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk. Assertions that even high-level or structural information could indirectly reveal operational details remain speculative unless supported by concrete explanations.

## **Distinction between operational sensitivity and accountability frameworks**

6. The requested document concerns post-delivery monitoring under the European Peace Facility (EPF), including issues such as diversion prevention, end-use monitoring, and oversight mechanisms. These are matters of clear democratic relevance, particularly given that the EPF finances military assistance through public funds in sensitive contexts.

7. The applicant does not seek access to tactical military information, intelligence sources, inspection schedules, or operational vulnerabilities. Rather, the request concerns monitoring architecture, institutional safeguards, and accountability arrangements.

8. General descriptions of governance structures, methodologies, legal frameworks, and oversight mechanisms are, by their nature, distinguishable from operationally sensitive content. The Council has not demonstrated why such elements could not be separated from genuinely sensitive information.

## **Public interest and proportionality considerations**

9. EU institutions and agencies have already publicly acknowledged diversion risks, illicit weapons circulation, and the importance of monitoring mechanisms in the context of military assistance.

10. For example, Europol and Ukrainian authorities have publicly reported significant instances of lost, stolen, or illicitly trafficked weapons, as well as law enforcement operations targeting illegal arms networks. (See enclosed addenda 1-3.) These publicly documented risks reinforce the need for transparency regarding the robustness and effectiveness of EU monitoring systems.

11. While Article 4(1)(a) does not provide for a balancing test, the principle of strict interpretation still requires that refusal be limited to what is strictly necessary. A blanket refusal preventing any public scrutiny of monitoring safeguards risks undermining the objective of accountability inherent in Regulation 1049/2001.

## **Failure to comply with the obligation of partial access (Article 4(6))**

12. The Council has not adequately justified why partial access would be impossible. Article 4(6) imposes a genuine obligation to assess whether non-sensitive portions can be disclosed.

13. The refusal merely asserts that the exceptions apply to the document as a whole, without demonstrating that a line-by-line assessment was carried out or explaining why redactions could not protect any sensitive elements.

14. It is difficult to accept that all components of a presentation on post-delivery monitoring are exclusively sensitive. Introductory material, structural descriptions, policy frameworks, and general methodologies could likely be disclosed without undermining the protected interests.

15. A mere assertion that partial disclosure would result in meaningless fragments does not satisfy the requirements of the Regulation unless supported by concrete, document-specific reasoning.

## International relations considerations

16. Any claim that disclosure would undermine relations with third countries must be substantiated. The Council must explain how the release of the specific information requested would concretely affect such relations.

17. General references to confidentiality in international cooperation are insufficient. Information relating to accountability structures and monitoring frameworks, particularly where linked to the use of EU public funds, cannot be presumed to fall within the core of diplomatic secrecy absent specific justification.

## Conclusion

In light of the above, the applicant submits that the refusal is based on generalized assertions, an implicit presumption of confidentiality, and an insufficient examination of partial access.

The Council is therefore invited to carry out a genuine, document-specific assessment and to grant access, at minimum partial access pursuant to Article 4(6), to document WK 7935/2025 INIT.

Yours faithfully,

**DELETED**

International Peace Information Service vzw

Italiëlei 98a

2000 Antwerp

Belgium

**DELETED**

## Addenda

- (1).Europol answer to written question from the MEP of Poland, Mr Smiszek... (2 December 2025)
- (2).National Police of Ukraine: Оперативники Нацполіції провели міжрегіональну спецоперацію з ліквідації каналу нелегального збуту зброї (<https://npu.gov.ua/news/operatyvnyky-natspolitsii-provely-mizhrehionalnu-spetsoperatsiiuz-likvidatsii-kanalu-nelehalnoho-zbutu-zbroi>) (12 January 2026)
- (3).National Police of Ukraine: Виявили 20 схронів та вилучили з незаконного обігу понад 1000 одиниць зброї та боєприпасів, - ДСР Нацполіції (<https://cv.npu.gov.ua/news/vyiavyly-20-skhroniv-ta-vyluchyly-z-nezakonnoho-obihuponad-1000-odynyts-zbroi-ta-boieprypasiv-dsr-natspolitsii>) (1 May 2026)

The Hague, 02 December 2025

Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) Secretariat

To the attention of the JPSG Co-Chairs

*By email only:*

[jpsg.libesecretariat@europarl.europa.eu](mailto:jpsg.libesecretariat@europarl.europa.eu)

**Europol answer to written question from the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) of Poland, Mr Smiszek, to the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG)**

Dear Co-Chairs,

In accordance with Article 4.2 of the JPSG Rules of Procedure and Article 51 of the Europol Regulation, Europol would like to respond to the question raised by Member of the European Parliament, Mr Smiszek, to the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol, received by Europol on **30 September, 2025**, as follows:

The questions are answered in English, as follows:

- 1. Session on the future of Europol: What measures is Europol taking to strengthen analytical and technological support for Member States with limited capabilities, in particular through the development of interoperability and the further roll-out of the SIENA system? Which past initiatives in this field has Europol considered most effective in reducing disparities among Member States?**

**Europol's reply:**

Europol remains committed to implementing the new tasks and responsibilities stemming from the EU Interoperability agenda, while making every effort to reduce the gap between the significantly higher demand on Europol's ICT developments and services and the resources available. Europol sees great value in the new operational opportunities these tools offer to make Europe safer and drive Europol to fulfil the operational expectation for Europol to be EU Criminal Information Hub.

Sharing data seamlessly among Member States and with Europol by maximising the use of its products and services is a prerequisite for keeping the pace with the growth and the dynamic of the organised crime landscape. Therefore, while the exchange of data is based on the principle of voluntariness, a principle enshrined in the Europol Regulation, Europol is currently implementing an initiative aimed at strengthening the dialogue on opportunities to maximise the potential of collaboration in the area of Information Management. Individualised overviews illustrating the collaboration between Member States and Europol in the area of information management are being prepared, with a twofold aim: primarily to make it easier for individual Member States to identify "quick-wins" where limited resources can create a big return on investment, but also to allow for the identification of areas that would require more

Page 1 of 4

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investment, but have the potential to introduce a "next level" of sharing information, mainly via automation.

Europol is supporting Member States in the implementation of the Information Exchange Directive (IED). Europol plays an important role in the newly established flows of information, which will be further reinforced from June 2027, when SIENA will become the backbone of EU information exchange.

Efforts are being invested to ensure that future SIENA developments are properly coordinated with Member States, all the more important considering the foreseen integration of SIENA into the national Case Management Systems (CMS). Furthermore, the IED recommends that SIENA should be rolled out beyond the national unites / Single Point of Contact (SPOC).

Additionally, Europol will start to use the Joint Operational Analysis Case (JOAC). This is a collaborative digital environment in which MS and Europol will jointly perform analysis, this will increase the quality and the speed of the operational and data driven support.

**2. Data protection: In light of the planned introduction of risk assessment procedures for sensitive data processing from 2026, which categories of data will be covered, what methodology will be used, which oversight bodies will verify compliance, and in what manner?**

**Europol's reply:**

Europol takes note of the recently reached political agreement on the amendments to the Europol Regulation and will implement the new legal framework in close consultation with the Data Protection Officer and the EDPS as relevant.

In particular, reference is made to recitals 12a and 12b as well as Article 4(1)(v)(za) of the legal text expanding on the effective use of biometric data in combatting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings in line with the existing safeguards set out in the Europol Regulation and the EUDPR (Regulation 2018/1725) and subject to the principles of strict necessity and proportionality. The legal requirement to have appropriate quality standards established applicable to the processing and storage of biometric data is duly noted in this context.

**3. Update on Europol Activities linked to the war in Ukraine: How many cases of arms smuggling or illicit transfer of military materials linked to the conflict in Ukraine have been identified with Europol's support since 2022?**

**Europol's reply:**

In 2024, Europol supported 72 investigations into weapons trafficking. In 2025, by the end of September, Europol supported 91 investigations into weapons trafficking.

Since December 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have shared information and intelligence regarding data on lost and stolen weapons and seized firearms. Europol's Analysis Project on Weapons & Explosives received information on nearly 666.000 lost and stolen weapons, and more than 14.000 seized weapons (overview till end September 2025).

Europol is taking steps to develop an EU Digital Firearms Hub to improve the sharing of ballistic and other information related to weapons and weapons trafficking.

**4. Lawful access to data for law enforcement- necessity and proportionality: Between 2022 and 2025, how many times did Member States deny Europol access to data on the grounds of proportionality, and are there plans to harmonise the criteria for such assessments across the EU?**

**Europol's reply:**

Within its mandate, Europol is supporting EU Member States and its partners in investigations of serious and organised crime and terrorism. Europol itself is not directly requesting the access to the data, this is done by national law enforcement authorities.

**5. From waste trafficking to trade in protected species- organised environmental crime: How does Europol plan to deepen cooperation with third-country law enforcement authorities and international organisations, such as CITES, in tackling environmental crime and trafficking of protected species?**

**Europol's reply:**

Environmental crime-including illegal waste trafficking and trade in wildlife-remains a significant and growing threat to the European Union.

Europol addresses this threat through its dedicated Analysis Project (AP) on Environmental Crime, which provides operational and analytical support to EU Member States and partner countries. In 2024 alone, Europol supported over 60 investigations, with the number of requests for assistance continuing to rise each year.

A key example is Operation Lake, one of the longest running and most impactful global operations against environmental crime. Across several coordinated actions, more than 850 suspects were arrested. The operation extends beyond EU borders, engaging countries of origin, transit, and destination to ensure a comprehensive response to environmental offences.

Under the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), cooperation with third countries, EU agencies, and international organisations—including INTERPOL—is further strengthened. With Europol's support, this coordinated framework enhances intelligence sharing, operational capacity, and collective response in the fight against environmental crime.

**6. Fundamental Rights Protection: How does Europol use its operational capabilities and cooperation with online service providers to identify and remove extremist content, in particular related to right-wing extremism? What concrete results have the Internet Referral Unit's activities delivered so far in this regard?**

**Europol's reply:**

The EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU), part of the European Counter Terrorism Centre, provides operational support to MSs/TPs by performing OSINT investigations and support to MS investigations.

In 2024, the Unit supported 467 operations and delivered more than 700 operational reports. So far in 2025, the Unit has supported more than 430 operations.

The EU IRU provides two key tasks: 1) Knowledge sharing; 2) Terrorist online content assessment and deconfliction.

## Europol Public Information


In May, Europol coordinated a Referral Action Day (RAD) on minors' exploitation and radicalisation online. More than 2 000 links pointing to jihadist and right-wing violent extremist and terrorist propaganda targeting minors were referred during the action day.

Since the Terrorist Content Online (TCO) Regulation (EU)2021/784 has become applicable in the EU (2022) Hosting Service Providers (HSP) offering services in the EU are required to establish legal representation in the EU and respond swiftly –within an hour upon receipt – to any removal orders for the takedown of illegal terrorist content online.

Therefore, Europol developed PERCI – the central solution for referrals and removal orders within the EU – as the technical platform to facilitate the implementation of the TCO Regulation. PERCI is developed as a state-of-the-art solution that accommodates the operational needs of MS while ensuring security and data protection in the cloud.

I hope that this answer will prove satisfactory. Europol remains available for further clarifications.

Yours sincerely,



Jürgen Ebner  
Deputy Executive Director of Europol  
Governance Directorate

Оперативники Нацполіції провели міжрегіональну спецоперацію з ліквідації каналу нелегального збуту зброї

National Police operatives conducted an interregional special operation to eliminate the illegal arms sales channel

Source: <https://npu.gov.ua/news/operatyvnyky-natspolitsii-provely-mizhrehionalnu-spetsoperatsiiu-z-likvidatsii-kanalu-nelehalnoho-zbutu-zbroi>

## Оперативники Нацполіції провели міжрегіональну спецоперацію з ліквідації каналу нелегального збуту зброї

Опубліковано 12 січня 2026 року о 11:00

**Поліцейські вийшли на слід злочинної групи, яка налагодила реалізацію вогнепальної та переробленої під таку зброї і боеприпасів на території країни. Незаконну діяльність задокументовано, речові докази вилучено, фігуранти затримані у процесуальному порядку.**

Як встановили оперативники Департаменту кримінального розшуку НПУ, кримінальний бізнес із продажу вогнепальної та переробленої під неї зброї організував мешканець Київщини. «Бізнесмен» залучив до справи знайомих – мешканців Дніпропетровської області.

За цим фактом слідчі СУ ГУНП у Київській області, під процесуальним керівництвом Київської обласної прокуратури, внесли відомості до ЄРДР за ст.263 (Незаконне поводження зі зброєю, бойовими припасами або вибуховими речовинами) Кримінального кодексу України.

Поліцейські задокументували учасників злочинної групи на збуті 8 одиниць зброї, серед яких: три автомати Калашникова, три пістолети-кулемети СА-24 з ознаками переробки, пістолет-кулемет Судасва-43 та пістолет ТТ. За проданим «товаром» ділки отримали майже 500 000 гривень.

Зібравши достатню доказову базу, працівники кримінального розшуку Нацполіції, слідчі, вибухотехніки, кінологи та поліція особливого призначення Київщини у взаємодії з СБУ провели спільну міжрегіональну спецоперацію. За місцем проживання учасників групи та в їхніх транспортних засобах під час санкціонованих обшуків вилучено підліпну зброярню. Обсяги вилученого:

- 11 одиниць автоматичної зброї,
- 15 одиниць нарізної,
- 14 пістолетів різного типу,
- 5 револьверів,
- 40 одиниць гладкоствольної,
- 2 підствольні гранатомети,
- 36 гранат різного типу,
- 24 запали різного типу,
- майже 13 000 набоїв різного калібру.

а також – тротил, електродетонатори, глушники до вогнепальної зброї, устаткування для виготовлення набоїв, 6 автомобілів, мобільні, чорнові записи та готівка, еквівалентом майже 900 000 гривень.

Увесь арсенал направлено на проведення експертизи для встановлення походження зброї. Організатору та п'яти його спільникам слідчі поліції повідомили про підозру за збут зброї за попередньою змовою групою осіб (ч. 2 ст. 28, ч.1 ст.263 ККУ). Фігурантів затримано в процесуальному порядку. За скоєне їм загрожує до 7 років позбавлення волі.

Департамент кримінального розшуку Національної поліції України



1 з 17



## Національна поліція України

*Kitsoft*

**Police officers have tracked down a criminal group that has organized the sale of firearms and converted weapons and ammunition across the country. The illegal activity has been documented, material evidence has been seized, and the suspects have been detained in accordance with the procedural procedure.**

As investigators of the Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police of Ukraine established, a criminal business selling firearms and converted weapons was organized by a resident of the Kyiv region. The "businessman" involved acquaintances from the Dnipropetrovsk region in the case.

Based on this fact, investigators of the Main Directorate of the Kyiv Region Police Department, under the procedural guidance of the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor's Office, entered information into the Criminal Investigation Department under Article 263 (Illegal handling of weapons, ammunition or explosives) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The police documented the members of the criminal group selling 8 weapons, including three Kalashnikov assault rifles, three SA-24 submachine guns with signs of alteration, a Sudaev-43 submachine gun, and a TT pistol. The dealers received almost 500,000 hryvnias for the "goods" they sold.

Having collected sufficient evidence, the National Police Criminal Investigation Department, investigators, explosives technicians, dog handlers and special police of the Kyiv region, in cooperation with the SBU, conducted a joint interregional special operation. During authorized searches at the residence of the group members and in their vehicles, an underground weapons depot was seized. The amount of seized items:

- 11 units of automatic weapons,
- 15 units of rifled,
- 14 pistols of different types,
- 5 revolvers,
- 40 units of smoothbore,
- 2 underbarrel grenade launchers,
- 36 grenades of different types,
- 24 matches of different types,
- almost 13,000 rounds of various calibers,

as well as TNT, electric detonators, firearm silencers, equipment for manufacturing cartridges, 6 cars, mobile phones, draft records, and cash, equivalent to almost 900,000 hryvnias.

The entire arsenal was sent for examination to establish the origin of the weapons. Police investigators informed the organizer and his five accomplices of suspicion of selling weapons in a prior conspiracy by a group of persons (Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). The suspects were detained in a procedural manner. They face up to 7 years in prison for their actions.

**Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police of Ukraine**

**Виявили 20 схронів та вилучили з незаконного обігу понад 1000 одиниць зброї та боєприпасів, - ДСР Нацполіції**

20 caches discovered and over 1,000 weapons and ammunition seized from illegal circulation, - National Police SSR

Джерело: <https://cv.npu.gov.ua/news/vyivlyly-20-skhniv-ta-vyluchyly-z-nezakonnoho-obihu-ponad-1000-odynyts-zbroi-ta-boieprypasiv-dsr-natspolitsii>

## Головне управління Національної поліції в Чернівецькій області

Kitsoft

**Також підозру отримали понад 30 фігурантів, причетних до збуту та зберігання зброї та боєприпасів. Такі результати відпрацювання, що проводили поліцейські упродовж тижня.**

Співробітники Департаменту стратегічних розслідувань Національної поліції України, його територіальні управління спільно зі слідчими підрозділами поліції в областях та з іншими правоохоронними органами провели заходи, спрямовані на протидію незаконному обігу вогнепальної зброї, боєприпасів та вибухових речовин.

Відпрацювання у сфері незаконного обігу зброї проводяться з метою недопущення її потрапляння до кримінального середовища та використання у злочинній діяльності. В умовах воєнного стану такі заходи є критично важливими, адже дозволяють своєчасно виявляти схрони, перекривати канали збуту та вилучати зброю і боєприпаси до того, як вони становитимуть загрозу для життя і безпеки громадян. Це системна робота, спрямована на контроль обігу зброї, запобігання тяжким злочинам і забезпечення безпеки в тилкових регіонах держави.

Оперативники ДСР, слідчі ГУНП спільно з підрозділами СБУ, працівниками прокуратур, фахівцями вибухотехнічної служби та управління внутрішньої безпеки у Збройних силах України ВСП ЗСУ провели понад 180 обшуків у різних регіонах держави. За їх результатами 32 особам повідомлено про підозру за фактами незаконного поводження зі зброєю – незаконне зберігання та збут зброї.

Також виявлено 20 схронів із вогнепальною зброєю та боєприпасами - як у прифронтових областях, так і на заході країни, зокрема у Волинській, Закарпатській, Івано-Франківській, Чернівецькій, Чернігівській.

Окремі схрони містили бойові комплекси, достатні для ведення бойових дій: автомати, гранатомети, протипіхотні міни, пластади, артилерійські снаряди та інші вибухонебезпечні предмети.

Загалом упродовж тижня відпрацювань вилучено:

- стрільницька зброя – 154 одиниці,
- гранатомети, гранати та міни – 904,
- набой різного калібру - понад 56, 5 тисяч,
- вибухові речовини – майже 80 кг,
- магазини та комплектуючі до вогнепальної зброї - 134.

Кримінальне провадження розслідується за статтею 263 Кримінального кодексу України – незаконне поводження зі зброєю, бойовими припасами або вибуховими речовинами. Санкція статті передбачає покарання до семи років позбавлення волі.

До відома: відповідно до ст. 62 Конституції України, особа вважається невинуватою у вчиненні злочину і не може бути піддана кримінальному покаранню, доки її вину не буде доведено в законному порядку та встановлено обвинувальним вироком суду.

**Департамент стратегічних розслідувань  
Національної поліції України**

## Головне управління Національної поліції в Чернівецькій області

*Kitsoft*

**More than 30 suspects involved in the sale and storage of weapons and ammunition were also suspected. These are the results of the investigation conducted by the police over the course of a week.**

Employees of the Strategic Investigations Department of the National Police of Ukraine and its territorial departments, together with investigative police units in the regions and other law enforcement agencies, carried out measures aimed at countering the illegal trafficking of firearms, ammunition, and explosives.

Training in the field of illegal arms trafficking is carried out to prevent them from entering the criminal environment and being used in criminal activities. In conditions of martial law, such measures are critically important, as they allow for timely detection of caches, blocking distribution channels and confiscating weapons and ammunition before they pose a threat to the lives and safety of citizens. This is systematic work aimed at controlling the circulation of weapons, preventing serious crimes and ensuring security in the rear regions of the state.

The operatives of the State Security Service, investigators of the Main Directorate of National Police, together with the units of the Security Service of Ukraine, prosecutors' offices, specialists of the Explosives and Explosives Service and the Internal Security Department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted over 180 searches in various regions of the country. According to their results, 32 people were reported on suspicion of illegal handling of weapons - illegal storage and sale of weapons.

20 caches of firearms and ammunition were also discovered - both in front-line regions and in the west of the country, in particular in Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv regions.

Separate caches contained combat kits sufficient for conducting combat operations: assault rifles, grenade launchers, anti-personnel mines, plastid, artillery shells, and other explosive items.

In total, during the week of work, the following was removed:

- small arms – 154 units,
- grenade launchers, grenades and mines – 904,
- cartridges of various calibers - over 56.5 thousand,
- explosives – almost 80 kg,
- magazines and accessories for firearms - 134.

The criminal proceedings are being investigated under Article 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – illegal handling of weapons, ammunition or explosives. The sanction of the article provides for a penalty of up to seven years in prison.

For your information: according to Article 62 of the Constitution of Ukraine, a person is presumed innocent of committing a crime and cannot be subjected to criminal punishment until his guilt is proven in accordance with the law and established by a court verdict of guilty.

**Department of Strategic Investigations**

**National Police of Ukraine**