



Brussels, 22 July 2026
(OR. en)

11674/26
ADD 6

FREMP 239
JAI 965
AG 114
POLGEN 189

COVER NOTE

From:	Secretary-General of the European Commission, signed by Ms Martine DEPREZ, Director
date of receipt:	17 July 2026
To:	Ms Thérèse BLANCHET, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union
No. Cion doc.:	SWD(2026) 905 final
Subject:	COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union

Delegations will find attached document SWD(2026) 905 final.

Encl.: SWD(2026) 905 final



Brussels, 17.7.2026
SWD(2026) 905 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

2026 Rule of Law Report
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany

Accompanying the document

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

2026 Rule of Law Report

The rule of law situation in the European Union

{COM(2026) 900 final}	- {SWD(2026) 901 final}	- {SWD(2026) 902 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 903 final}	- {SWD(2026) 904 final}	- {SWD(2026) 906 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 907 final}	- {SWD(2026) 908 final}	- {SWD(2026) 909 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 910 final}	- {SWD(2026) 911 final}	- {SWD(2026) 912 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 913 final}	- {SWD(2026) 914 final}	- {SWD(2026) 915 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 916 final}	- {SWD(2026) 917 final}	- {SWD(2026) 918 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 919 final}	- {SWD(2026) 920 final}	- {SWD(2026) 921 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 922 final}	- {SWD(2026) 923 final}	- {SWD(2026) 924 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 925 final}	- {SWD(2026) 926 final}	- {SWD(2026) 927 final}	-
{SWD(2026) 928 final}	- {SWD(2026) 929 final}	- {SWD(2026) 930 final}	-
	{SWD(2026) 931 final}		

ABSTRACT

The level of perceived judicial independence is now very high among both the general public and companies in Germany. Reflections regarding reforms to further strengthen the resilience of the justice system continue at the Federal and *Länder* level. With the new Pact for the Rule of Law and a joint campaign to attract qualified personnel, significant steps have been taken to increase resources of the judiciary and address recruitment challenges. Further efforts to improve digitalisation of justice are on-going, while in practice regional divergences as regards the maturity of digitalisation persist. Specialised commercial courts and chambers have been created in over half of the *Länder* and have become operational. Certain challenges have been identified regarding restrictions to the right to legal assistance in specific circumstances. The justice system overall continues to perform efficiently in civil and commercial cases, with changes to criminal and administrative procedural rules under consideration.

The planned revision of the strategic anti-corruption framework and gift policy for the federal administration remains pending. Germany will strengthen sanctions of legal persons, including for corruption crimes. High-level corruption is addressed, and no systemic weaknesses have been identified. Work to establish a fully-fledged legislative footprint is still to be advanced to further enhance transparency in an environment of strong industry interest representation. The federal Lobbying Register is effectively enforced. Some shortcomings remain in the enforcement of conflicts of interest and asset declaration rules for parliamentarians and Government officials as well as for whistleblower protection and political party and campaign finance. Linking the fully electronic Competition Register to the Company Data Register could facilitate investigations of data of companies involved in public procurements, as recommended by the evaluation of the Company Register law.

The independently functioning media regulators assumed new enforcement responsibilities regarding youth protection. Reprimands issued by the self-regulatory body reached a very high level. Reforms to further strengthen the independent functioning of the public service broadcasters entered into force, and future funding remains under discussion. The business environment for media service providers remained overall stable, while plans to adopt new measures to support media pluralism are progressing. There have been no further steps to establish a codified right of the press to information from federal authorities. The overall protection framework for journalists has remained stable, but reports of physical and online attacks raise concern. Work is ongoing with the aim to establish anti-SLAPP safeguards in legislation.

The length of stakeholder consultations and use of impact assessments continues to vary in practice among Ministries. No steps were taken to adapt the tax-exempt status of non-profit organisations, which still creates obstacles for civil society in practice. Civil society organisations continue to face some challenges to their operations and funding schemes for organisations in the area of democracy promotion are currently under review.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, based on the recommendations in the 2025 Rule of Law Report and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, the Commission concludes the following:

- Significant further progress has been made on increasing the resources of the judiciary and addressing recruitment challenges, through the new Pact for the Rule of Law and a joint campaign to attract qualified personnel. In view of addressing remaining challenges, it is recommended to Germany *to take forward the implementation of the Pact for the Rule of Law as regards both human resources and digitalisation and continue measures to address recruitment challenges, taking into account European standards on resources for the justice system.*
- No progress has been made to step up efforts to strengthen the ‘legislative footprint’ to provide a comprehensive public record to register lobbying input and to extend the scope to the parliamentary phase of the legislative procedure. As gaps remain, it is recommended to Germany *to step-up efforts to provide a comprehensive public record of lobbying input in the legislative process.*
- No further progress has been made on advancing with creating a legal basis for a right to information of the press as regards federal authorities, as internal preparations have not been pursued further. Therefore, it is recommended to Germany *to advance with creating a legal basis for a right to information of the press as regards federal authorities, taking into account European standards on access to official documents.*
- No progress has been made to adapt the tax-exempt status for non-profit organisations, which still affects civil society in practice. Therefore, it is recommended to Germany *to take steps to adapt the tax-exempt status for non-profit organisations with a view to addressing the challenges which the currently applicable rules present for the organisations’ operation in practice, taking into account European standards on funding for civil society organisations.*

I. JUSTICE SYSTEM¹

Independence

The level of perceived judicial independence in Germany is now very high among both the general public and companies. Overall, 82% of the general population and 77% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 2026². The perceived judicial independence among the general public has significantly increased in comparison with 2025 (72%), and has increased in comparison with 2022 (76%). The perceived judicial independence among companies has significantly increased in comparison with 2025 (70%), and remains at the same level as in 2022 (77%).

Reflections regarding reforms to further strengthen the resilience of the justice system continue at the Federal and *Länder* level. Following the reform to strengthen the resilience of the Federal Constitutional Court in December 2024³, three new appointments to the Constitutional Court took effect in October 2025. Regarding other efforts to strengthen the resilience of the justice system, at Federal level two initiatives concerning lay judges are pending. First, to confirm their obligation to respect constitutional values and second, to allow them to continue exercising their functions after expiry of their five-year mandate, if the two-thirds majority typically required for the election of a successor cannot be achieved⁴. At the level of the *Länder*, ongoing initiatives concern the resilience of their Constitutional Courts (broadly mirroring the reform at the Federal level)⁵ and of their judges’ election committees, where they exist⁶. As regards the right of Ministers of Justice to instruct prosecutors in individual cases, there are no plans at Federal level to change the system, while in two *Länder* further initiatives in this respect have been taken⁷. Stakeholders⁸, as well as a recent research project focussing on potential vulnerabilities in the current system⁹, highlight further areas for action, including judicial appointments, notably the more

¹ An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found [here](#).

² Figures 48 and 50, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).

³ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 3.

⁴ A draft law on the respect of constitutional values by lay judges had been presented under the previous legislature but was subject to discontinuity following the elections. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 2. See also Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025b).

⁵ Such reflections, at different stages, exist in Berlin, Brandenburg, Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt (implemented in May 2026), Hamburg, Niedersachsen. Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers. EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers (2026a), additional written input, pp. 53-56.

⁶ Reflections are currently on-going in Schleswig-Holstein. In Thüringen, the Judges’ Election Committee continues to operate in its old composition, as the two-thirds majority necessary to re-appoint the members chosen among members of parliament could not be reached. Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers.

⁷ In Sachsen, the Ministry of Justice is examining whether to formalise requirements for instructions to improve transparency. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Minister of Justice issued a declaration in December 2025 that she would make use of instructions only if the handling of the case by the public prosecutor’s offices and the Office of the Attorney General is legally untenable (which however does not bind future Ministers of Justice).

⁸ Country visit Germany, German Judges’ Association, Federal Bar, Bar Association, Federal Supreme Court, National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (GFF). Bar Association, Liberties (2026), written inputs, pp. 4-7 and pp. 303-304 respectively.

⁹ Judicial Resilience Project, available here: [The Judicial Resilience Project](#).

formalised involvement of the Councils of Judges (*Präsidialräte*) and the budgetary autonomy of the judiciary. The Federal Ministry of Justice has pointed to the on-going work on a Federal Justice Cloud (see below) as an additional safeguard for resilience as regards the IT infrastructure and is examining further areas for action also based on the recommendations of the Judicial Resilience Project, including as regards the role of Councils of Judges¹⁰. At their conference in June 2026, the Ministers of Justice of the *Länder* reiterated the importance of a continuous review of the resilience of the legal foundations of the justice system and consider further measures if needed¹¹.

Quality

Significant further progress was made on the recommendation to increase resources of the judiciary and address recruitment challenges, through the new Pact for the Rule of Law and a joint campaign to attract qualified personnel¹². Following the announcement in the coalition agreement¹³, the Federal Government and the *Länder* agreed in June 2026 on a new ‘Pact for the Rule of Law’ which will provide EUR 240 million of Federal funding to the *Länder*, to create around 2 000 new posts in their judiciaries. The aim of the pact which consists of three pillars on human resources, digitalisation and improvements to the efficiency of procedures, is to overall strengthen the effectiveness of the justice system¹⁴. Stakeholders have welcomed this announcement, in particular in view of the 2 000 posts for prosecutors and judges in criminal matters they have identified as currently needed¹⁵. This continues to have an impact on the efficiency in criminal cases, with over one million open cases at the end of 2025 and increased instances of releases from pre-trial detention due to lengthy proceedings¹⁶. The expenditure for the judiciary in relation to GDP remains stable at a relatively high level¹⁷ and almost all *Länder* have continued to create some additional posts in their judiciaries¹⁸. To make the judiciary more attractive and in view of upcoming waves of retirements, the *Länder* have launched a joint campaign aimed at attracting young people to the judiciary and, will now examine options to further expand this campaign¹⁹. Regarding judicial salaries, as in previous years, the Federal level and most *Länder* have applied or plan to apply the most recent collective bargaining agreement for the civil service to the judiciary²⁰. However, entry-level salaries for judges and prosecutors continue to be slightly

¹⁰ Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice.

¹¹ Conference of the Justice Ministers (2026a).

¹² The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Germany to “[t]ake measures to increase the resources of the judiciary and address recruitment challenges, taking into account European standards on resources for the justice system.” Some progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and 2024, and no progress in 2023.

¹³ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, pp. 4-5.

¹⁴ Ministry of Justice (2026a). German Government (2026), written input, p. 1. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers. Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025a).

¹⁵ Country visit Germany, German Judges’ Association, Federal Bar, Bar Association. German Judges’ Association (2026a).

¹⁶ German Judges’ Association (2026), written input, p. 13 and information during the country visit Germany.

¹⁷ Figure 34, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

¹⁸ This ranges, in 2026, from five in the Saarland to almost 76 in Nordrhein-Westfalen. EU Affairs Committee of the of the Conference of Justice Ministers (2026), additional written input, pp. 10-14.

¹⁹ The campaign, called “Unser Recht braucht dich” (our law needs you), includes an advertising clip which aired in cinemas across Germany and a [website](#), reached around two million persons. Further measures could include advertising in audio or print media. Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers. Conference of the Justice Ministers (2026b).

²⁰ German Government (2026), written input, pp. 6-8. This would correspond to a salary raise of 2.8% as of April 2026, further 2% in March 2027 and 1% in 2028. In Hessen, which is not part of the bargaining

below the average national gross salary²¹ and regional disparities persist²². A judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of September 2025 found that the level of salaries in the Land of *Berlin* for civil servants (including judges and prosecutors) between 2008-2020 was in most instances unconstitutional²³. Further similar cases are still pending at the Federal Constitutional Court, and all *Länder* are examining the follow-up required, including due to the further development of the criteria for adequate salaries by the Federal Constitutional Court²⁴. Stakeholders continue to highlight that additional measures to ensure adequate salaries are needed, also in view of this jurisprudence, as the judiciary faces a serious challenge to recruit qualified personnel²⁵. Overall, significant further progress has been made on the recommendation.

Further efforts to improve digitalisation of justice are ongoing, while in practice regional divergences as regards the maturity of digitalisation persist. The level of digitalisation of justice is overall good in civil, commercial, and administrative cases²⁶, while procedural rules allowing for the use of digital tools and availability of digital solutions to conduct and follow proceedings remain more limited in criminal cases²⁷. The implementation of the digitalisation initiative, on-going since 2023, has continued, with flagship projects such as the Federal Justice Cloud²⁸, and the remaining budget under the initiative is set to be allocated to further projects by the end of 2026²⁹. Under the second pillar of the new Pact for the Rule of Law, an additional EUR 210 million of Federal funding for digitalisation has been allocated for the time period of 2027-2029³⁰. The implementation of the e-file for all new cases has been achieved by the January 2026 deadline in all *Länder*, except in Sachsen-Anhalt where an extension of the deadline by one year was requested³¹. Stakeholders continue to report important regional discrepancies in the level of digitalisation, linked for example to the differences in quality and availability of tools as well as the level of digital skills among the *Länder*³². There have been no further steps in view of introducing digital

community of the German *Länder*, similar raises are also foreseen. EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers (2026a), additional written input, pp. 15-21.

²¹ Figure 35, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. This figure does not take into account any additional benefits provided to judges and prosecutors, such as special pensions, general exemption from social security contributions, housing benefits or other financial benefits.

²² German Judges' Association (2026c).

²³ The reasoning is based on the "alimentation principle" emanating from Art. 33(5) of the Basic Law. Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 17 September 2025, 2 BvL 5/18 u.a. The judgment requires relevant legislation to be revised by end March 2027 and back payments in certain cases.

²⁴ Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers and additional written input (2026), pp. 22-28.

²⁵ The lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis private sector salaries is a further challenge in this respect. German Judges' Association and Association of German Administrative Judges (2026), written inputs, p. 13 and p. 9. German Judges' Association (2026b).

²⁶ Some gaps remain in the availability of digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings for civil, commercial and administrative cases. Figure 40-44, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

²⁷ Figures 40 and 45, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

²⁸ The Justice Cloud allows a central provision and use of software applications for the Federal and *Länder* level. A minimum viable product is expected for 2027. German Government (2026), written input, p. 10.

²⁹ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 5.

³⁰ This money would be spent based on results-oriented budgeting, implementing a number of lessons learned from the current digitalisation initiative. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice and German Government (2026), written input, p. 10.

³¹ However, in some fields, transitional measures still apply, as well as certain technical issues in the practical use of the e-file. German Government (2026), written input, pp. 12-15. Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers.

³² Country visit Germany, Judges' Association, Federal Bar, Bar Association, Federal Supreme Court.

documentation of main proceedings in criminal cases, which remains a key demand by certain stakeholders³³. Another area pointed out as a challenge is the limited online publication of judgments and lack of an optimised country-wide portal to access laws and court decisions³⁴. In this respect, the Government has announced the creation of an online database for judgments, which would cover judgments of the Federal Courts and is expected to be launched in 2028, with the eventual possibility to also link it to the courts in the *Länder* at a later stage³⁵.

Specialised commercial courts and chambers have been created in over half of the *Länder* and have become operational. Following the entry into force of the law providing for their establishment in April 2025³⁶, in nine *Länder*, Commercial Courts and/or Commercial Chambers have been created, with the others having concluded that there is no necessity for such a court or chamber, mainly due to low case numbers³⁷. The number of incoming cases at the different courts varies but is relatively low at this stage³⁸. Some business stakeholders continue to express certain hesitations as regards the high threshold for the disputed value to be heard at a commercial court³⁹. As regards the traditional, separate institution of chambers for commercial matters (*Kammern für Handelssachen*), composed of one ordinary judge and two lay judges with expertise in commercial matters, the Conference of the Justice Ministers created a working group that gathered input from representatives of the judiciary, lawyers and businesses. This working group – whose establishment responds to a notable decline in incoming cases – is tasked with making proposals for the future of these chambers in terms of their organisation, personnel and overall legal framework. It will present its findings in autumn 2026⁴⁰.

Certain challenges have been identified regarding restrictions to the right to legal assistance in specific circumstances. A reform of the Residence Act adopted in December 2025 abolished mandatory legal representation in pre-removal detention cases⁴¹. While the Government underlines that the right to legal assistance in such cases remains guaranteed⁴², stakeholders have criticised that the practical difficulties for persons detained facing removal in obtaining timely legal representation mean that it is extremely challenging in practice if it is no longer mandatory⁴³. As regards legal assistance in international criminal matters, a draft law presented in September 2025 intends to improve legal protection by providing for the right to appeal against the admissibility of an extradition decision⁴⁴. However, stakeholders

³³ Bar Association, Federal Bar (2026), written inputs, p. 13 and pp. 14-15, respectively. It is expected that this topic could be examined under the expert commission on the criminal procedure (see below).

³⁴ Currently, decisions are often only accessible via fee-based databases. Liberties (2026), p. 301. See also Figure 46, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. European Semester (2026), Germany Country Report, p. 14.

³⁵ German Government (2026), written input, p. 11.

³⁶ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 6.

³⁷ Rheinland-Pfalz remains open towards the possibility provided in the law of cooperation with a Commercial Court in a neighbouring Land. Country visit Germany, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers.

³⁸ When there are no incoming cases falling in the specific competence of commercial courts/chambers, the judges concerned continue to handle regular civil cases.

³⁹ Country visit Germany, DIHK.

⁴⁰ Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025c). Country visit Germany, DIHK.

⁴¹ The reform abolishes Art. 62d of the Residence Act and will enter into force on 1 June 2026.

⁴² Federal Bar, Bar Association (2026), written inputs, p. 18 and p. 18, respectively. Country visit Germany, Ministry of the Interior, Federal Bar, Bar Association.

⁴³ Country visit Germany, Federal Bar, Bar Association. Federal Bar and Bar Association (2026), written inputs.

⁴⁴ Draft law on legal assistance in international criminal matters. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice.

have criticised the limitations of the appeal in the draft law, as it does not provide for a full appeal, only a re-examination by the same chamber with short deadlines and limits to the right to an in-person hearing⁴⁵.

Efficiency

The justice system overall continues to perform efficiently in civil and commercial cases, with changes to criminal and administrative procedural rules to simplify proceedings under consideration. The disposition time decreased in litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance (from 249 days in 2023 to 232 days in 2024) and remained stable in administrative cases (from 391 days in 2023 to 389 days in 2024). At the same time, the number of pending administrative cases at first instance remained stable from 2022 till 2024⁴⁶, while for pending litigious civil and commercial cases it has increased slightly (from 0.8 in 2023 to 0.9 per 100 inhabitants in 2024). Previously high clearance rates in administrative cases have seen a notable drop (from 109 % in 2023 to 99 % in 2024), whereas they increased in litigious civil and commercial cases (from 97 % in 2023 to 100 % in 2024)⁴⁷. Following the implementation of the ‘leading decision’ procedure in October 2024⁴⁸, the first such decision, issued by the Federal Supreme Court in November 2024, has led to the intended acceleration of proceedings on the same issue at the lower courts. However, this does not yet provide a solution to address mass civil cases directly at lower instances more effectively⁴⁹. Meanwhile, efforts to improve procedural efficiency have been initiated in the field of administrative proceedings, with the Government submitting a draft reform of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure to the Federal Council in May 2026⁵⁰. To enhance the efficiency of criminal court proceedings, the Federal Government together with the *Länder* has established an expert commission comprising academics and practitioners⁵¹. Its final report with reform proposals is expected in autumn 2026⁵². These processes to reform different procedural codes are also part of the Pact for Rule of Law, in view of simplifying and speeding up judicial proceedings⁵³.

⁴⁵ Federal Bar (2025). Bar Association, Federal Bar (2026), written inputs, p. 30 and pp. 12-13, respectively.

⁴⁶ At 0.7 per 100 inhabitants.

⁴⁷ Fig. 5, 7, 10-11, 13-14 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.

⁴⁸ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁹ So-called mass cases are usually a large number of individual lawsuits, giving rise to the same key legal issues and asserting similar claims, such as following the so-called *Dieselgate* scandal or relating to consumer disputes in insurance or bank contracts. Country visit Germany, Federal Supreme Court. The leading decision Federal Supreme Court (2024) VI ZR 10/24 concerns the so-called ‘Data Scraping’.

⁵⁰ The draft proposes to expand the use of single judges at lower instance courts and three-member panels (instead of five-member panels) at the Federal Administrative Court and to partly permit ‘text-form’ submissions via email in administrative proceedings, in place of the current ‘written form’ with a handwritten signature. Ministry of Justice (2026).

⁵¹ With the main focus on enhancing efficiency and accelerating the main hearing, the six working groups also address appeals, penalty orders without oral proceeding, evidence-gathering, the transfer of evidence from public prosecutors’ investigations to court proceedings, defence rights, and victims’ rights. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice, EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers. Stakeholder have broadly welcomed this step. Country visit Germany, German Association of Judges, Bar Association, Federal Bar. The German Federal Bar is hoping to implement the audio-visual documentation/recording of the main hearing in this context, which is also welcomed by the German Bar Association.

⁵² German Government (2026), written input, p. 20.

⁵³ Ministry of Justice (2026a).

II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

The perception among experts, citizens and business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains relatively low. In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Germany scores 77/100 and ranks 6th in the European Union and 7th globally⁵⁴. This perception is relatively stable over the past five years.⁵⁵ The 2026 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 58% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 71%) and 12% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 49% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 25% consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 37%). Furthermore, 35% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 38%), while 30% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%)⁵⁶.

Revisions of Germany's Federal strategic anti-corruption framework and its gift policy remain pending. The revision of the 2003 'Federal Government Directive Concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration' remains to be finalised, and the Government indicates that it will take the EU Anti-Corruption Directive into account to ensure alignment⁵⁷. The revision of the 2004 rules on the prohibition to accept favours and gifts also remains pending and is postponed to the end of 2026⁵⁸. The new comprehensive report on integrity, providing specific data on corruption suspicion and cases in the federal public administration of the year 2024, was published in September 2025⁵⁹.

A proposed legislative reform aims to increase corporate penalties, including for corruption offences. In October 2025, the Government proposed amendments to the criminal code and the Administrative Offence Act to improve detection and to increase maximum corporate fines, including for corruption and foreign bribery offences⁶⁰. Key elements of the planned reform include the quadrupling of maximum corporate fines and the broadening of the scope of liability for companies, which would still require the intentional

⁵⁴ The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50).

⁵⁵ In 2021, the score was 80, while, in 2025, the score is 77. The score significantly increases/decreases when it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points) and is relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.

⁵⁶ Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026).

⁵⁷ The Directive entered into force on 1 June 2026. Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior. It was originally expected to be finalised by the end of 2022 but has since encountered several delays. UNODC (2020), p. 30, encouraging a public consultation. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 7. The strategy is limited to corruption prevention. GRECO (2019b), p. 4, considers it a solid framework.

⁵⁸ Country visit Germany, Ministry of Interior. The revision, planned since 2021, aims to assess if legal certainty could be increased by more updated, harmonised rules, providing officials with practical examples.

⁵⁹ Ministry of Interior (2025a), reporting (p. 18) 32 new corruption cases in 2024 (2023: 22) concerning 40 individuals within and beyond the Federal administration. 30 cases of Federal offices were closed.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Justice (2025), Proposal amending the Criminal Code – Transposition of the EU Environmental Crime Directive 2024/1203. OECD (2021), recommending ensuring company penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, Germany decided for an all-crime approach, German Government (2025a), pp. 48-49. Stakeholders supported a profit-based fine as a better deterrent instead of a fixed amount as maximum fine that Germany opted for. Country visit Germany, Transparency International. OECD (2025b).

commission of a crime by the manager⁶¹. In practice, corporate liability in foreign bribery prosecutions is still rarely enforced, with an action plan to address the 2021 OECD recommendations on corporate liability due in June 2026⁶². In February 2026, the Government adopted a joint action plan against organised crime to implement its commitments to tackle, among others, financial crimes⁶³ by strengthening Germany's financial investigation and law enforcement capacities. This could serve to address the needs identified by stakeholders, such as increasing risks of strategic corruption by third country and non-state actors to secure strategic influence over policy⁶⁴. Gaps in the Beneficial Ownership Transparency Register are planned to be addressed by July 2027, including with enhanced public access to, and verification of, beneficial ownership information⁶⁵.

Germany continues to provide an effective criminal justice response to corruption. The treatment of corruption at the level of investigation, prosecution or final adjudication is effective, including as regards high-level corruption cases and no systemic weaknesses have been identified by stakeholders⁶⁶. No cases led by the EPPO on corruption-related investigations have been reported for 2025⁶⁷. Enforcement efforts of the new provision of bribery of parliamentarians have resulted in a first conviction⁶⁸. In 2025, the level of human and financial resources as well as the high specialisation of staff for corruption cases within the police, the financial intelligence unit, the prosecution service, and courts are found to be overall sufficient to carry out their tasks effectively⁶⁹. The 2025 Situation Report by the Federal Criminal Police Office illustrates in an annual analysis recent trends, developments and statistics on corruption and Germany's efforts to repress it⁷⁰. The detected financial damage caused by corruption has notably decreased compared to the previous year⁷¹. Of those who have been found to have accepted a bribe, 67% (+10% in the previous year) have been public officials. The Supreme Audit Office reports no specific findings on corruption or transparency⁷².

The mandatory federal Lobbying Register is effectively enforced, providing for more transparency in the decision-making process⁷³. With 6 278 interest representative entries

⁶¹ Art. 30(2)(1) Act on Regulatory Offences. Corporate fines are to increase from EUR 10 to 40 million.

⁶² Federal Criminal Police Office (2025), p. 5: one case in 2024 and more cases of commercial corruption (Arts. 335a, 299 Criminal Code). Germany is a top enforcer against foreign bribery committed by natural persons, yet corporate liability for criminal offences is still rarely enforced, see OECD (2021), recommendations and OECD (2025b).

⁶³ Ministry of Finance, Press release (2026); Ministries of Finance, Interior, Justice (2026).

⁶⁴ Transparency International (2025a), pp. 4-5.

⁶⁵ Country visit, Germany, Ministry of Justice. German Government (2025a). The register is not public so far; access is granted only for a legitimate interest. The Commission opened formal infringement procedures for failing to fully transpose the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive by 10 July 2025, pertaining to access to ownership data of legal entities and trusts.

⁶⁶ Country visit Germany, Prosecution Service, Federal Police, Transparency International.

⁶⁷ EPPO Annual Report 2025 (2026), pp. 28-29. EPPO (2026), written input.

⁶⁸ OLG München (2025), involving former members of the Parliament at Federal and *Länder* level. Art. 108e StGB. Transparency International (2025b). OCCRP (2025).

⁶⁹ Country visit Germany, Ministry of Interior, Federal Criminal Police Office, Prosecution Service.

⁷⁰ For 2024, 2 926 police-registered corruption cases (i.e. 23.8% decrease compared to 2023). Federal Criminal Police Office (2025). The data is not segregated by the 16 *Länder*, identifying regional discrepancies.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, by approximately 36.8% amounting to EUR 36 million in 2024.

⁷² German Court of Auditors (2026), additional written input, pp. 1-2.

⁷³ At the regional level, ¾ of the 16 *Länder* lobbying registers in place, with the city state Hamburg having most recently in 2025 decided to establish one, Bürgerschaft Hamburg, Committee for Justice (2025). For a *Länder* overview, see Transparency International (2024).

by the end of 2025, the number of registered lobbyists in the federal register is relatively stable⁷⁴. The Parliament Administration at the Federal level is monitoring and verifying all published data content to ensure correctness and consistency and follows up on external reports on breaches of the Lobbying Register Act. In 2025, new digital features were rolled out to further facilitate the registration and monitoring process. The new features include automatic alerts regarding discrepancies when data is entered and an automatic public email notification system to inform the public about changes in interest representatives' data entries and new position papers⁷⁵. Regarding interest representatives' obligations to disclose along with their register entries current or previous roles ('revolving doors')⁷⁶, such disclosures regarding a role as a public or elected official over the past five years were made for less than 3% of the individuals named in the register entries⁷⁷. Until the end of 2025, sanctions were imposed in six cases in proceedings which lasted around six months⁷⁸. The Federal Parliament will publish its second report on the maintenance of the electronic, machine-readable Lobbying Register, which was created in 2022 and will be mandatory for all interest representatives⁷⁹, as from March 2027. Stakeholders view the register as a positive tool providing for more transparency⁸⁰. Efforts to link the Lobbying Register to the future joint digital legislative portal for the Government and Parliament, as previously reported, are still work in progress⁸¹.

There has been no progress to provide for a more comprehensive public record on lobbying input to legislation ('legislative footprint'), beyond the already existing transparency measures⁸². Since June 2024, Federal Ministries are required to disclose the influence of lobbyists on the law-making process (executive footprint)⁸³. Although largely welcomed by stakeholders, the obligations do not yet encompass reporting on in-person meetings between lobbyists and officials⁸⁴. The Government and stakeholders are identifying systematic shortcomings in the practical application of the executive footprint, with three

⁷⁴ Country visit Germany, Parliament Administration.

⁷⁵ German Government (2026), written input, p. 22.

⁷⁶ Country visit, Germany, Transparency International, LobbyControl, while welcoming the obligation, call for an extension of cooling-off periods to three years.

⁷⁷ Country visit Germany, Parliament Administration. ZDF/AbgeordnetenWatch (2025). AbgeordnetenWatch (2025). Transparency International (2025c), p. 25: 73 of 564 revolving door cases in the past five years concerned parliamentarians; the register shows only those moves to the private sector that are compliant with the Act; the obligation to report is on the lobby organisations. LobbyControl (2025a).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* Since 2024, 61 proceedings for administrative offences were initiated for non-registration or false or unconfirmed data entries. 21 have been completed by the end of 2025, 15 were closed, and two additional fines are not yet binding. Administrative fines can be imposed of up to EUR 50 000.

⁷⁹ Transparency International, noting the register's positive value in displaying the level playing field of NGOs versus industry representation.

⁸⁰ Country visit Germany, LobbyControl, Transparency International, Allianz Rechtssicherheit. Note however GRECO (2024), recommendation (i), paras. 9-16, pp. 3-4, to introduce rules for members of Parliament on how to interact with lobbyists and other third parties seeking to influence the parliamentary process.

⁸¹ 2024 and 2025 EU Rule of Law Report, Germany, pp. 16-17 (2024), p. 9 (2025). For the timeline, see above.

⁸² The 2025 Report recommended to Germany to "step up efforts to strengthen the 'legislative footprint' to provide a comprehensive public record to register lobbying input and to extend the scope to the parliamentary phase of the legislative procedure". No further progress was previously assessed on the recommendation in 2025 and some progress in 2024.

⁸³ More than one third. The Government prepares 80-90% of legislative drafts, i.e. the majority of proposals are covered by the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries. GRECO concluded in 2025 that recommendation iv was met.

⁸⁴ Including all written contributions received and topics of discussion for a meaningful disclosure. Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), p. 353. LobbyControl (2024): the disclosure of lobbyists' arguments that did not influence the respective draft law is equally in the public's interest.

quarters of new legislation lacking information on lobbying input⁸⁵. Stakeholders also highlight good practices, including by the Ministry of Justice⁸⁶. No rules or guidelines exist for members of Parliament to attach a ‘legislative footprint’ to reports or legislation, including a list that would demonstrate the range of outside expertise and opinions received⁸⁷. Stakeholders call for a comprehensive federal transparency law⁸⁸. While the Federal Government rejected a motion of opposition members of Parliament to introduce a legislative footprint on 16 October 2025⁸⁹, the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament and the *Länder* continue to work on the digitalisation of the law-making process, envisaging a publicly available joint, digitalised portal, which is expected to be finalised by 2027 with a testing phase planned for 2028⁹⁰. The creation of such a joint digital legislative portal for Government and Parliament could present an opportunity to include a fully-fledged legislative footprint. Against this background, there has been no further progress on the recommendation.

Oversight and enforcement of conflicts of interest and asset declaration rules remain a challenge. Disclosure obligations for members of Parliament on conflicts of interest and their financial interests remain limited and notably do not include *ad hoc* disclosures in plenary debates substantial investments in companies below 5%, and the time spent on remunerated side jobs⁹¹. Stakeholders continue to remark the lack of a fully independent oversight body considering the Parliament Administration’s structural subordination to the Parliament Presidium as well as its limited mandate to investigate breaches⁹². Enforcement remains an obstacle with several cases of non-compliance and significant publication delays of side job remuneration having raised public attention⁹³. Allegations of nepotism for the employment of

⁸⁵ Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice referring to Federal Statistics Office evaluation. LobbyControl (2025). Transparency International (2025d). Allianz für Lobbytransparenz (2025): of 120 legislative drafts submitted to Parliament (June 2024-June 2025), an executive footprint was illustrated in 30 and missing in 90 drafts (75%). Of the 30 with an executive footprint, more than one third of the draft legislative proposals stated no influence had been exerted. Notably, only lobbying input that contributes to a significant extent or that has led to changes of the core aspects of the legislative proposal must be disclosed (Art. 43(1)GGO), providing for a wide discretion for Ministries preparing the drafts. LobbyControl (2025b). LobbyControl to publish an analysis in 2026. AbgeordnetenWatch (2026), suggesting more awareness-raising in ministries.

⁸⁶ LobbyControl (2025b): e.g. the Act against unfair competition (21/1855), indicating in its executive footprint several paragraphs to which amendments were introduced upon interest representatives’ contributions.

⁸⁷ Experts’ statements made in public hearings are published (Section 70 Rules of Procedure of the Federal Parliament). For lobbyists, there is an obligation to upload their inputs in the register, yet it is not connected to the legislative outputs or ongoing work. GRECO (2024), para. 9-16, concluding that the reform addresses recommendation (i). German authorities consider the disclosure of the content and objective of lobbying as a ‘more effective’ alternative than the disclosure of all individual contacts.

⁸⁸ Country visit Germany, LobbyControl, AbgeordnetenWatch. Transparency International (2024).

⁸⁹ Federal Parliament (2025a).

⁹⁰ The Government to finalise the technical parts by end 2026; the Parliament to finalise in the course of 2027. Country visit Germany, Parliament Administration.

⁹¹ Members of Parliament are obliged to disclose shareholdings above five percent in private corporations or partnerships, with certain exceptions. See Art. 45(2)(6), 45(3) Member of the Bundestag Act. Financial interests are only subject to notification in the context of their parliamentary committee work. GRECO (2021), p. 4. Ministers and parliamentary state secretaries are also not yet under any unequivocal obligation to disclose conflict of interests on an *ad hoc* basis, GRECO (2023), recommendation vi, pp. 8-9. AbgeordnetenWatch (2024).

⁹² Country visit, Germany, LobbyControl, Transparency International. GRECO (2022), p. 9.

⁹³ *Ibid.* AbgeordnetenWatch (2025a): despite a 3-months deadline, not all declarations on parliamentarian’s side jobs were published by end October, i.e. seven months after the start of the new parliamentary term, due to the necessity to review the disclosure requirements and to process the data. Federal Parliament (2025b) for data on initiated investigations, breaches, sanctions applied and amounts paid to the Federal

relatives of members of Parliament in other deputies' offices have been in the public's focus in 2026, triggering parliamentary debates⁹⁴. The asset disclosure rules for Government top executives also remain limited in terms of oversight and transparency⁹⁵.

While the legislative scope is broad and disclosures are increasing, some obstacles for whistleblower protection in practice remain. The Act for the Better Protection of Whistleblowers encompasses breaches related to all types of corruption crimes without the need of a link to the EU budget⁹⁶. In practice, several reporting offices exist at the Federal Government level, including in anti-corruption units⁹⁷. The Federal Office for Justice, which administers the Federal external reporting channel, published its second annual report in 2025 reporting a significant increase in disclosures⁹⁸. Practitioners and stakeholders consider the legal framework and whistleblower disclosures to be essential to uncover large-scale corruption, economic crimes, and other wrongdoings, indicating however that restrictive court interpretation impacts the granting of whistleblower protection status and that rather high compliance requirements raise difficulties for SMEs⁹⁹. Following two external evaluations¹⁰⁰, the Government is still considering conducting an internal evaluation of the Act for the Better Protection of Whistleblowers, as originally planned two years after its entry into force in July 2023.

The new political party sponsoring rules are expected to show effect in 2027, while other shortcomings persist in party and campaign finance. Specific reports on political party sponsoring, required since 1 January 2025¹⁰¹, will be published and annexed for the first time to the general 2025 parties' financial accountability reports in 2027¹⁰². These new reporting requirements aim to increase transparency in party financing and prevent hidden campaign finance at federal and *Länder* level. Challenges in practice relate to the inaccessible, non-machine-readable format of the publicly available data and the significant time lapse until the reporting of party income, which make outside monitoring more difficult¹⁰³. To reduce the time lapse, an internal administrative decision of the Parliament Administration aims at having financial accountability reports published already during its review process in the future¹⁰⁴. Stakeholders also note that party and campaign donations are still not capped, with a tendency of an increasing number of large-scale donations being reported¹⁰⁵. Furthermore, the employment of relatives and close associates by members of Parliament for taxpayer-

budget in the last electoral term. AbgeordnetenWatch (2025b). GRECO (2024), recommendation (iv), paras. 21-27, pp. 5-6.

⁹⁴ Federal Parliament (2026b).

⁹⁵ GRECO recommendation (viii) is not implemented, GRECO (2025), paras. 47-51, p. 11.

⁹⁶ Apart from all crimes also misdemeanours are covered in as much as they concern important legal interests.

⁹⁷ Also the '*Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistung*' and '*Bundeskartellamt*' provide reporting channels.

⁹⁸ Federal Office for Justice (2025) for 2024. Of the 1 802 reports (in 2023, 410), 71 cases (in 2023, 90) were transferred to prosecutors, 143 (in 2023, ca. 160) to other authorities.

⁹⁹ Country visit, Germany, Prosecution Service, Transparency International. Whistleblowers helped to unveil major scandals, such as the Cum-Ex, Wirecard and tax leaks. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ Including by the Federal Statistical Office.

¹⁰¹ Section 24 (8a) PartG, introduced in 2025, lowering donation reporting requirements from EUR 50 000 to 35 000. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 12.

¹⁰² Parliament Administration (2026), written input, p. 1.

¹⁰³ Country visit Germany, LobbyControl, Transparency International. See also LobbyControl (2023). Transparency International (2023).

¹⁰⁴ Parliament Administration (2026), written input, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵ LobbyControl, AbgeordnetenWatch, Transparency International (2025). LobbyControl (2026) and (2025c), reporting about EUR 24 million as a record amount in campaign donations in the 2024/25 Federal elections. Transparency International (2025a).

funded jobs¹⁰⁶ and the collection and channelling of party donations through foundations present a challenge, circumventing transparency rules¹⁰⁷. The Parliament Administration's oversight and investigative enforcement powers remain limited, with stakeholders proposing the establishment of an independent control body¹⁰⁸.

An evaluation of the law on the Competition Register was carried out, laying out avenues for synergies between different registers for the investigation of data of companies participating in public procurement. Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU show that 26% of companies in Germany (EU average 30%) think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender in practice in the last three years. 63% of businesses perceive the level of independence of the Federal public procurement review body (the Federal Cartel Office) as very or fairly good, which has significantly increased in comparison with 2025 (53%)¹⁰⁹. The Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Germany reports 18% of single bids for 2025 (EU average 27%). In 2025, the Government conducted an evaluation of the law on the Competition Register, which allows potential contracting authorities to identify bidders' past corruption fines and convictions. The evaluation recommends considering linking the already fully electronic Competition Register to the Company Data Register to create further synergies for the investigation of company data¹¹⁰. In the context of ongoing draft revisions proposed in October 2026 to accelerate public procurement procedures while increasing the threshold for direct awards¹¹¹, business stakeholders point to the lack of competition in 'below-the-threshold' procurements and increased corruption risks, which could affect the level playing field for businesses¹¹². The 2025 report of the Federal police also identifies the services and construction sectors as particularly exposed to corruption-related offences¹¹³.

III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM

The independently functioning media regulators assumed new enforcement responsibilities. The 14 media regulators continued to operate independently, with stakeholders reporting that they continue to function well¹¹⁴. The 6th Interstate Media Amendment Treaty entered into force in December 2025. The reform aims to modernise protection of minors by strengthening technical safeguards and to enhance media supervision and law enforcement by expanding the powers of the media regulators to ensure more effective compliance with youth protection rules¹¹⁵. Despite the growing number of tasks, the Government reported that the Courts of Auditors found that the state media authorities are adequately financed¹¹⁶.

¹⁰⁶ Federal Parliament (2026). See also above in "conflict of interest" section.

¹⁰⁷ Country visit Germany, GFF.

¹⁰⁸ Country visit Germany, LobbyControl, AbgeordnetenWatch. It does not have access to donors' tax information for data verification and is subordinated to the Parliament's Presidium. UNODC (2020), p. 67. Transparency International (2023).

¹⁰⁹ Figure 59, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

¹¹⁰ Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy (2025), p. 11. See also 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 21.

¹¹¹ Law 21/1931 of 1 October 2025. Law 21/1934 of 1 October 2025, increasing thresholds from EUR 15 000 to EUR 50 000.

¹¹² German Chamber of Commerce DIHK (2025). Country visit, Germany, Transparency International.

¹¹³ Federal Criminal Police Office (2025).

¹¹⁴ Vaunet (2026), written input, pp. 14-15; Country visit Germany, ZDF and ARD; 2026 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Germany, p. 17; 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 13.

¹¹⁵ German Government (2026), written input, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ German Government (2026), written input, p. 32.

Self-regulation of the media is well established, and reprimands increased, reaching a very high level. In 2025, the number of complaints on press publications that the German Press Council¹¹⁷ received increased for the third year in a row to 2 636 (compared to 2 215 in 2024). The most frequently raised complaints concerned alleged serious breaches of journalistic due diligence, followed by infringements of the protection of privacy as defined in the Press Code. The number of non-binding public reprimands issued by the Press Council also increased to 102 in 2025¹¹⁸.

Reforms to further strengthen the independent functioning of the public service broadcasters entered into force, while future funding remains under discussion. The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) 2026 reports a low risk for the independence of public service media¹¹⁹. In December 2025, the Interstate Reform Treaty entered into force. It aims to modernise the structure of the public service broadcasting corporations and improve efficiency, including through increased flexibility in programme offerings¹²⁰. The Treaty also further strengthens the independent functioning of public service broadcasters by strengthening the dismissal and appointment procedures of members of the management bodies¹²¹. A license fee remains the main source of funding for public service broadcasters. The decision by the *Länder* not to follow the recommendation of the independent expert commission (KEF) to increase the license fee by 3.2% for the 2025-2026 period has been challenged by the public service broadcasters before the Federal Constitutional Court, and the case is still pending. In the meantime, in February 2026, the KEF presented an updated, lower proposal for the adjustment of the licence fee as of 2027¹²². This ongoing challenge has contributed to delays in the adoption of the Interstate Broadcasting Financing Amendment Treaty, which had been proposed in 2024 to adjust the funding procedure from 2027¹²³.

The business environment for media service providers remained overall stable, and plans to adopt new measures to support media pluralism are progressing. Access to ownership information about media service providers continued to be provided via a public database¹²⁴. However, some stakeholders expressed concerns about concentration in the media market¹²⁵. The 2026 MPM reports a very high risk to the plurality of media providers and a high risk to the plurality in digital markets¹²⁶. Work is currently ongoing to adopt the Digital Media Treaty. The first part of the Treaty, whose draft was agreed upon by the *Länder* in June 2025, aims to cover aspects such as state advertising, with a view to align with the European Media Freedom Act. In October 2025, the *Länder* agreed on the objectives for a planned second part of the Digital Media Treaty. These include strengthening the economic foundation of private media, reinforcing the discoverability of media content, and

¹¹⁷ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 13. The Press Council (the self-regulatory body for press and online media) is widely accepted in the print and online media sectors. Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 16; Vaunet (2026), written input, p. 15; Country visit Germany, Press Council.

¹¹⁸ Presserat (2026b).

¹¹⁹ 2026 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Germany, p. 28.

¹²⁰ Country visit Germany, Media authorities of the *Länder*, ZDF and ARD.

¹²¹ German Government (2026), written input, pp. 33-34.

¹²² It envisages an increase from EUR 18.36 to EUR 18.64, instead of EUR 18.94. KEF (2026).

¹²³ Country visit Germany, Media authorities of the *Länder*, ZDF, ARD and Journalists Association; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 15.

¹²⁴ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 15; Vaunet (2026), written input, p. 17.

¹²⁵ European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 17; Media Ownership Monitor, Germany.

¹²⁶ 2026 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Germany, pp. 20-21.

safeguarding media pluralism via a reform of the media concentration rules¹²⁷. Some stakeholders criticised a lack of level playing field between the media sector and online platforms and expressed concerns about the continued shift in advertising spending from the media sector to online platforms, which could pose a threat to media pluralism¹²⁸.

There has been no further progress on the recommendation to establish a codified right of the press to information from federal authorities¹²⁹. Following the early parliamentary elections in 2025, internal preparations for a codification of the right of the press to information from federal authorities were not pursued further¹³⁰. The establishment of a statutory framework remains under consideration, but no concrete proposals have been presented¹³¹. Stakeholders expressed concerns about the absence of a clear legal basis for access to information from federal authorities¹³². Therefore, no progress has been made on the recommendation.

The overall protection framework for journalists has remained stable, but reports of physical and online attacks raise concern. An increased risk to the journalistic profession, standards, and protection was reported by the 2026 MPM partly due to a rise in observed attacks taking place during demonstrations¹³³. Since the last rule of law report, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists issued one new alert concerning Germany¹³⁴, while the Mapping Media Freedom platform recorded 98 new alerts related to media freedom. The alerts mainly concern cases of attacks or threats against journalists, as well as the obstruction of journalistic activity, of which many took place during the coverage of demonstrations¹³⁵. Police statistics on politically motivated crime for 2025 show a total of 486 registered offenses within the broad target category of "media", representing an increase of 14.89% (compared to 423 offenses in 2024)¹³⁶. The public authorities at federal and *Länder* level continue to take measures to ensure journalists' safety, including during protests and demonstrations. This involves exchanges between the police and the media, as well as training on press law to the Federal Police and Federal Criminal Police Office officers¹³⁷. However, some stakeholders expressed concerns that the level of

¹²⁷ German Government (2026), written input, pp. 34-35.

¹²⁸ Reporters without Borders (2026), written input, p. 20; Vaunet (2026), written input, p. 18; Country visit Germany, Vaunet and Publishers Association.

¹²⁹ The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Germany to "[a]dvance with creating a legal basis for a right to information of the press as regards federal authorities, taking into account European standards on access to official documents." Limited progress was previously assessed on the recommendation in 2025 and, no further progress in 2024 and some progress in 2023.

¹³⁰ German Government (2026), written input, p. 2. At the same time, the coalition agreement has committed to review the broader freedom of information legislation to benefit both citizens and the public administration. German Government (2025a), p. 59. The press's constitutional right to information from federal authorities—which, according to established case law, derives directly from Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law—remains unchanged.

¹³¹ German Government (2026), written input, p. 2; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 19; Country visit Germany, Vaunet.

¹³² Transparency International (2026), written input, p. 19; Vaunet (2026), written input, p. 18; European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, pp. 19-20; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 21.

¹³³ 2026 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Germany, pp. 11-12.

¹³⁴ Council of Europe Safety of Journalist Platform (2026).

¹³⁵ Mapping Media Freedom (2026).

¹³⁶ Federal Criminal Police Office (2026).

¹³⁷ European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 18; Country visit Germany, Vaunet, Media authorities of the *Länder*.

protection varies across the *Länder*¹³⁸. Some stakeholders reported persisting challenges related to effective investigations of threats or attacks as well as concerns related to the protection of their personal data, which sometimes discouraged journalists from filing criminal complaints after threats or attacks¹³⁹. In addition, potentially inadequate safeguards to prevent unjustified law enforcement access to electronic communications data in recent draft legislation have also been raised by stakeholders, citing risks to the protection of journalistic sources¹⁴⁰.

Work is ongoing to establish anti-SLAPP safeguards in legislation. Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) targeting journalists are generally not seen as a major concern for the media sector¹⁴¹. Since 2024, the Government co-finances a civil society helpline that offers psychosocial support to victims of SLAPPs. In 2025 the contact point reported 48 support requests¹⁴². In December 2025, the Government submitted to Parliament a draft law aiming to transpose the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive. The draft establishes rules to ensure that abusive proceedings against critical expression or reporting are swiftly concluded and unfounded claims dismissed at an early stage¹⁴³. Moreover, it will be made possible to collect data on SLAPP cases¹⁴⁴. Stakeholders regretted that the draft law, unlike a previous draft, covers only cross-border cases and not domestic cases and does not contain protection provisions for intimidation attempts that precede litigation¹⁴⁵.

IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES

The length of stakeholder consultations and use of impact assessments continues to vary in practice among Ministries. While the recommended consultation period for draft laws at the federal level is four weeks, no centralised statistics on consultation length are available, also due to the absence of a central consultation platform¹⁴⁶. The National Regulatory Control Council (NKR)¹⁴⁷ as well as stakeholders, including from the business sector, continue to report notable variations in practice between Ministries as regards the length of consultation periods¹⁴⁸. The NKR further underlines that impact assessments usually remain limited to

¹³⁸ European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 18.

¹³⁹ For example, cases where local authorities refuse to restrict access to journalists' personal data in the population register, or in criminal proceedings, where access to case files may expose private home addresses to opposing parties. European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 18.

¹⁴⁰ Stakeholders are particularly concerned about potentially inadequate safeguards in the draft law on IP address retention and the draft reform of the Federal Intelligence Service Act, both of which aim to expand authorities' competencies relating to data storage, surveillance, and cyber capabilities. European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 18; European Federation of Journalists (2026), written input, p. 17; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, pp. 17, 21; Country visit Germany, Journalists Association.

¹⁴¹ European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, p. 20; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 20; Country visit Germany, Press Council, ZDF and ARD.

¹⁴² Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 20.

¹⁴³ German Government (2026), written input, p. 36.

¹⁴⁴ Country visit Germany, Joint Office of Media Authorities and BKM.

¹⁴⁵ Country visit Germany, Journalists Association and Publishers Association; European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), written input, pp. 20-21; European Federation of Journalists (2026), written input, pp. 17-18; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 20.

¹⁴⁶ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴⁷ The National Regulatory Control Council (NKR) is tasked to review draft legislation with regards to the costs imposed and whether less burdensome alternatives exist. According to its annual Report 2025, the four-week deadline for consultation of the NKR was only met in 48% of cases in 2024-2025, while in 26% of cases the deadline was less than five days. NKR (2026), p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Country visit Germany, NKR, GFF, Federal Bar, Bar Association, DIMR.

assessing compliance costs of proposals, instead of broader cost-benefit analyses. As part of the federal modernisation agenda, the role of impact assessments at an early stage of the process is intended to be strengthened¹⁴⁹. OECD indicators show that Germany performs below the EU average for engagement of stakeholders in policy-making, but above-average for regulatory impact assessments¹⁵⁰. As regards parliamentary hearings, the German Institute for Human Rights (DIMR), which is the National Human Right Institution accredited with A-Status, continues to highlight the lack of follow-up to the recommendation by the Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institution's Sub-Committee for Accreditation to formalise the institute's participation therein¹⁵¹.

On 1 January 2026, Germany had four leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights pending implementation, a decrease of five compared to the previous year¹⁵². At that time, Germany's rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had been implemented was at 86% (compared to 71% in 2025; 14% remained pending), and the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 2 years and 5 months (compared to 3 years and 8 months in 2025)¹⁵³. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2025 there was 1 case awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to none in 2024)¹⁵⁴. By 17 June 2026, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had remained at 4¹⁵⁵. As regards the implementation of national judgments, individual cases of non-implementation or disregarding by public authorities of binding court judgments have been raised as a concern¹⁵⁶. As part of the revision of the Administrative Procedural Code, the Government is proposing limited adjustments to improve enforcement of administrative court decisions against public authorities, notably raising the maximum level of the possible fine and allowing courts to impose repeated fines¹⁵⁷.

More than half of companies surveyed in Germany express confidence in the effectiveness of investment protection. 56% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are protected by law and courts, a figure which has slightly decreased in comparison with 2025 (58%)¹⁵⁸. As regards authorities relevant for economic operators 50% perceive the level of independence of the Federal Cartel Office as very or fairly good when it is deciding in competition matters, a figure which has significantly decreased in comparison

¹⁴⁹ Country visit Germany, NKR. German Government (2025b), pp. 19-22.

¹⁵⁰ OECD (2025a), p. 153.

¹⁵¹ DIMR (2026), written input.

¹⁵² For an explanation of the supervision process, see the [website](#) of the Council of Europe.

¹⁵³ All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵⁴ Council of Europe (2026), p. 162. The payment was made on time, and the confirmation was provided on 19 January 2026. Subsequently, on 29 April 2026, the Committee of Ministers closed the procedure.

¹⁵⁵ Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).

¹⁵⁶ Most notably a ruling of the Berlin Administrative Court of 2 June 2025 that found rejections at border controls to be unlawful (the decision in the main proceedings is still pending). Liberties (2026), pp. 305-306. This case also resulted in significant online attacks against the judge as well as the lawyers and NGOs supporting the applicants. German Judges' Association, German Association of Administrative Judges (2026), written inputs, p. 12 and p. 12 respectively.

¹⁵⁷ Ministry of Justice (2026). The maximum fine is increased from EUR 10 000 to EUR 25 000. It is furthermore envisaged that the fine does not benefit the concerned administrative authority.

¹⁵⁸ Figures 52 and 53, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 28% and 23% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive the frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process and concerns about quality, efficiency or independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.

with 2025 (56%)¹⁵⁹. The Federal Administrative Court has jurisdiction in several business-related cases, including in cases related to public concessions, public contracts and economic regulation. A number of judicial mechanisms to improve efficiency are available in these cases, including the possibility to apply interim measures, joint examination of similar cases and the consolidation of multiple appeals¹⁶⁰.

There has been no progress on the recommendation to adapt the tax-exempt status of non-profit organisations, which still creates obstacles for civil society in practice¹⁶¹. The authorities confirm that, following an examination of the recommendation, there are no intentions to reform the legal framework regarding tax-exemptions for non-profit organisations, as they consider the rules in place to be sufficient¹⁶². However, civil society organisations (CSOs) continue to experience challenges in practice related in particular to the uncertainty as to what type of political activity unrelated to the non-profit purpose of their organisation is permissible, to the limits to the catalogue of grounds for non-profit status and to limitations on the use of ‘political means’ to achieve the organisation’s stated purpose¹⁶³. In this context CSOs continue to report cases of instrumentalisation of the current system’s ambiguity as an intimidation strategy by certain political parties who report CSOs to the tax authorities for alleged political activity¹⁶⁴, which continues to create a chilling effect in view of their wiliness and capacity to participate in public debates. Overall, no progress has been made on the recommendation.

Civil society organisations continue to face some challenges to their operations, and funding schemes for organisations in the area of democracy promotion are currently under review. In December 2025, Germany’s civic space rating was downgraded from ‘narrowed’ to ‘obstructed’ by Civicus¹⁶⁵. Concerns persist regarding restrictions to the rights of freedom of expression and assembly including excessive use of force by police and suppression of protests¹⁶⁶, as has been raised by several UN Special Rapporteurs and the UN Human Rights Council¹⁶⁷, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights¹⁶⁸ and

¹⁵⁹ Figure 60, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

¹⁶⁰ Figures 66 and 67, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place at lower instance administrative courts.

¹⁶¹ The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Germany to “[t]ake steps to adapt the tax-exempt status for non-profit organisations with a view to address the challenges which the currently applicable rules present for the organisations’ operation in practice, taking into account European standards on funding for civil society organisations”. No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025, 2024, 2023.

¹⁶² Reference is notably made to an existing administrative decree (*Anwendungserlass zur Abgabenordnung*) which provides certain clarifications as regards what constitutes “occasional political activity”. German Government (2026), written input, pp. 2-3 and Country visit Germany, Ministry of Finance.

¹⁶³ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 18. DIMR (2026), written input. Liberties, European Civic Forum (2026), written inputs, pp. 313 and p. 7, respectively. Country visit Germany, Allianz Rechtssicherheit. An overview of key concerns with the current system by an alliance of over 200 CSOs can be found [here](#).

¹⁶⁴ European Civic Forum (2026), written input, p. 7. Country visit Germany, Allianz Rechtssicherheit.

¹⁶⁵ Germany’s score is 60/100. Ratings by Civicus are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed, and closed.

¹⁶⁶ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, pp. 18-19. Liberties (2026), written input, p. 314.

¹⁶⁷ UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of opinion and expression (2026); Letter by the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (2025b) and Press release (2025a), reacting to the response by the German Government (2025c).

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum of 15 April 2026, following the visit by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in October 2025, following up to a letter of 6 June 2025. Germany responded to the letter on 23 June 2025, considering the criticism to be unfounded.

national stakeholders¹⁶⁹. The German authorities note that these freedoms may be restricted under certain conditions as also provided under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and that measures are generally subject to judicial control¹⁷⁰. In some cases, courts have subsequently found the police's use of force or disruption of events to be unlawful, with appeals in a number of cases still pending¹⁷¹. A media analysis published in December 2025 has shown a proliferation of anti-CSO narratives from political actors and in broader public discourse, which is also observed by stakeholders¹⁷². CSOs further raise concerns regarding the increased questioning of their funding by Government programmes and perceived attempts to delegitimise their activity¹⁷³. As regards funding for civil society, the Government has announced a further development and reorientation of the '*Demokratie Leben*' programme, which supports initiatives promoting diversity, tolerance and democracy for the period 2025-2032, by summer 2026¹⁷⁴, which has drawn criticism from some stakeholders¹⁷⁵. The engagement strategy for the voluntary sector adopted in December 2024 continues to be implemented, with stakeholders welcoming the round table with the Federal Chancellery established to discuss issues related to voluntary engagement in view of the 'Future Pact for Engagement'¹⁷⁶

¹⁶⁹ Country visit Germany, DIMR, GFF, Allianz Rechtssicherheit. European Civic Forum, Liberties (2026), written inputs, p. 4-9 and pp. 316-318, respectively. DIMR (2026), written input.

¹⁷⁰ Country visit Germany, Ministry of Justice. German Government (2026a), additional written input.

¹⁷¹ European Civic Forum (2026), written input, p. 5. Liberties (2026), written input, p. 317.

¹⁷² Maecenata Foundation (2025). European Civic Forum (2026), written input, pp. 4-5. In 2025, trust in NGOs declined to 40%, down by 2 percentage points compared to 2024. Edelman Trust Barometer (2025).

¹⁷³ See also a study by Maecenata Foundation (2026) showing that around 47% of all parliamentary questions during the current legislature mentioning CSOs engage in rhetoric delegitimising their activity (compared to 32% and 10% in the two preceding parliamentary terms). Liberties (2026), written input, p. 316.

¹⁷⁴ 2025 Rule of Law Report, pp. 18-19. European Civic Forum (2026), written input, p. 5. DIMR (2026), written input. CSOs note that recipients received in the most recent funding agreements more restrictive conditions, including as regards responsibilities for third parties (e.g. speakers at events) and requirements to pre-approve publications or statements with any political content. Country visit Germany, GFF, BBE.

¹⁷⁵ Country visit Germany, GFF, Allianz Rechtssicherheit, DIMR, Bündnis Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (BBE). BBE (2026).

¹⁷⁶ The "*Zukunftspakt Engagement*". Country visit Germany, BBE. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Germany, p. 19.

Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2026 Rule of Law Report can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2026-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation_en.

AbgeordnetenWatch (2023), Lobby register 2.0? Full lobby transparency still does not exist (*Lobbyregister 2.0? Volle Lobbytransparenz gibt es immer noch nicht*), <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/kampagnen/lobbyregister-20-volle-lobbytransparenz-gibt-es-immer-noch-nicht>.

Abgeordnetenwatch (2024), These are the additional earnings of members of the Bundestag (*Diese Nebeneinkünfte haben die Abgeordneten im Bundestag*), <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/nebentaetigkeiten/diese-nebeneinkuenfte-haben-die-abgeordneten-im-bundestag>.

AbgeordnetenWatch (2025), The hidden lobby networks of corporations (*Die verdeckten Lobbynetzwerke der Konzerne*) (15 July 2025) <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/lobbyismus/die-verdeckten-lobbynetzwerke-der-konzerne#:~:text=JavaScript%20muss%20aktiviert%20sein%2C%20um%20dieses%20Formular%20zu%20verwenden>.

AbgeordnetenWatch (2025a), Transparency on hold: Federal Parliament cannot keep up with the publication of side incomes (*Transparenz stockt: Bundestag kommt mit Veröffentlichung von Nebeneinkünften nicht hinterher*) (30 October 2025), <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/nebentaetigkeiten/bundestag-kommt-mit-veroeffentlichung-von-nebeneinkuenften-nicht-hinterher>.

AbgeordnetenWatch (2025b), Breach of transparency obligations: Julia Kloeckner and the exclusive lobby club (*Verstoß gegen Transparenzpflichten: Julia Klöckner und der exklusive Lobbyclub*) (9 June 2025), <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/interessenkonflikte/julia-kloeckner-und-der-exklusive-lobbyclub>.

AbgeordnetenWatch (2026), Good intention, bad practice; why the ministries fail with the lobbying footprint (*Gut gedacht, schlecht gemacht: Warum die Ministerien beim Lobby-Fußabdruck versagen*) (6 March 2026), <https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/kampagnen/warum-die-ministerien-beim-lobby-fussabdruck-versagen>.

Allianz Rechtssicherheit (not dated), Demands for changing the legal situation (*Forderungen zur Änderung der Rechtslage*), <https://www.zivilgesellschaft-ist-gemeinnuetzig.de/forderungen/>.

Bar Association (2026), input by the German Bar Association for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.

Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (BBE) (2026), Newsletter of 26 March 2026, <https://www.b-b-e.de/bbe-newsletter/newsletter-nr-5-vom-26-maerz-2026/#engagementpolitik1>.

Bürgerschaft Hamburg, Committee for Justice (2025), Report: Another milestone for more transparency and trust in politics: After the transparency portal Hamburg is now getting also a lobbying register (*Bericht: Ein weiterer Meilenstein fuer mehr Transparenz und Vertrauen in die Politik: Nach dem Transparenzportal bekommt Hamburg nun auch ein Lobbyregister – Antrag SPD/Gruene*) (22/17692), https://www.buergerschaft-hh.de/parldok/dokument/90016/22_17692_bericht_des_ausschusses_fuer_justiz_und_verbraucherschutz_ueber_die_drucksachen_22_17395_ein_weiterer_meilenstein_fuer_mehr_transparenz_und_vertrauen.

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Germany, <https://monitor.civicus.org/country/germany/>.

Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025a), Liberties Rule of Law Report, <https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/rolreport2025-main/45330>.

Civil Liberties Union for Europe (Liberties) (2026), input from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 2026 Rule of Law Report, <https://www.liberties.eu/f/wtaqoq>.

Conference of the Justice Ministers (2026a), Preserving the rule of law and strengthening the resilience of the judiciary (*Den Rechtsstaat bewahren und die Resilienz der Justiz stärken*), <https://www.justiz.nrw.de/sites/default/files/2026-06/TOP%20I.20.pdf>.

Conference of the Justice Ministers (2026b), Rule of law campaign of the Länder to promote the recruitment of young talent in the judiciary (*Rechtsstaatskampagne der Länder zur Förderung der Nachwuchsgewinnung in der Justiz*), <https://www.justiz.nrw.de/sites/default/files/2026-06/TOP%20I.19.pdf>.

Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025a), Pact for the rule of law – three pillars for a strong justice system (*Pakt für den Rechtsstaat – drei Säulen für eine starke Justiz*), <https://www.justiz.nrw.de/sites/default/files/2025-11/TOP%20I.28%20-%20Pakt%20f%C3%BCr%20den%20Rechtsstaat.pdf>.

Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025b), Constitutional loyalty of lay judges (*Verfassungstreue ehrenamtlicher Richterinnen und Richter*), <https://www.justiz.nrw.de/sites/default/files/2025-11/TOP%20I.24%20-%20SN%20Verfassungstreue%20ehrenamtliche%20Richter.pdf>.

Conference of the Justice Ministers (2025c), Future of the chamber for commercial matters (*Zukunft der Kammer für Handelssachen*), <https://www.justiz.nrw.de/sites/default/files/2025-06/TOP%20I.24%20-%20Zukunft%20der%20Kammer%20f%C3%BCr%20Handelssachen.pdf>.

Council of Europe (2026), *Supervision of the execution of judgments decisions of the European Court of Human Rights – 19th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers – 2025*, <https://rm.coe.int/2025-annual-report/48802b1633>.

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2025), *Human Rights Commissioner O’Flaherty’s visit to Germany: focus on migration, freedoms of assembly and expression, antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred*, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-commissioner-o-flaherty-s-visit-to-germany-focus-on-migration-freedoms-of-assembly-and-expression-antisemitism-and-anti-muslim-hatred>.

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2026), *Memorandum following the Commissioner’s visit to Germany from 13 to 17 October 2025*, <https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-germany-following-visit-from-13-17-october-2025-by-micha/48802b4fc7>.

Council of Europe: *Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists*.

Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer (DIHK), Position to the draft law on the acceleration of public procurement (*Stellungnahme zum Vergabebeschleunigungsgesetz*) (28 July 2025), <https://www.dihk.de/resource/blob/135050/3663e6f5eeaeef6479c3499f8cc31412f/recht-dihk-stellungnahme-vergabebeschleunigungsgesetz-data.pdf>.

Directorate-General for Communication (2026), *Flash Eurobarometer 582 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption and businesses’ perception of the independence of national justice systems in the EU and in selected enlargement countries in 2026*.

Directorate-General for Communication (2026), *Special Eurobarometer 573 on citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2026*.

Edelmann Trust Survey (2025), *Trust and the Crisis of Grievance Germany Report*, <https://www.edelman.de/sites/g/files/aatuss401/files/2025-01/2025%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Germany%20Report.pdf>.

EU Affairs Committee of the Conference of the Justice Ministers (2026), *additional written input for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

European Civic Forum – Germany (2026), *input from the European Civic Forum for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), *input from the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), *Mapping Media Freedom, Germany country profile*, <https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/>.

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026), *Media Pluralism Monitor 2026*, <https://cmpf.eui.eu/projects-cmpf/media-pluralism-monitor/>.

European Commission (2024), *2024 EU Justice Scoreboard*.

European Commission (2025), *2025 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany*.

European Commission (2026), *European Semester Country Report Germany*.

European Commission (2026), *2026 EU Justice Scoreboard*.

European Federation of Journalists (2026), *input from the European Federation of Journalists for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

European Implementation Network (2026), *Input from the European Implementation Network for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

European Public Prosecutor's Office (2026), *Annual Report 2025*, <https://www.eppo.europa.eu/assets/annual-report-2025/index.html>.

European Public Prosecutor's Office (2026), *input from EPPO for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

Federal Bar (2025), *International legal assistance in criminal matters: BRAK criticises new rules (Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen: BRAK kritisiert Neuregelung)*, <https://www.brak.de/newsroom/newsletter/nachrichten-aus-berlin/2026/ausgabe-2-2026-v-2112026/internationale-rechtshilfe-in-strafsachen-brak-kritisiert-neuregelung/>.

Federal Bar (2026), *input from the Federal Bar for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

Federal Criminal Police Office (2026), *Politically motivated crime 2025 (Politisch motivierte Kriminalität 2025)*, <https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/PMKZahlen/PMKZahlen>.

Federal Criminal Police Office (2025), *Federal Situation Report - Corruption 2024*, <https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/Korruption/korruptionBundeslagebild2024.html?nn=28078>.

Federal Ministry of the Economy and Energy (2025), *Evaluation of the law on the competition register (Evaluierung des Wettbewerbsregistergesetzes)* (10 July 2025), <https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Evaluationen/Gesetze-Verordnungen/evaluierung-des-wettbewerbsregistergesetzes.html>.

Federal Office for Justice (2025), *Annual report of the External Federal Reporting Channel (Bundesamt fuer Justiz, Externe Meldestelle des Bundes)*, https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/MeldestelledesBundes/Jahresbericht_2024.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

Federal Parliament (2025a) Motion: Strong democracy – Creating transparency and strengthening parliamentary control (*Antrag: Starke Demokratie – Transparenz schaffen und parlamentarische Kontrolle staerken*), 21/2231 of 15 October 2025, <https://ds.server.bundestag.de/btd/21/022/2102231.pdf>.

Federal Parliament (2025b), *Report of the President of the Federal Parliament pursuant to Art. 51 (6) of the Law of Members of Parliament (Bericht der Praesidentin des Deutschen Bundestages nach § 51 Absatz 6 des Abgeordnetengesetzes)* (21/185 of 21 May 2025), <https://ds.server.bundestag.de/btd/21/001/2100185.pdf>.

Federal Parliament (2026a), Debate on „Demokratie Leben“ – Protect engagement, maintain support structure (*Debatte zu Demokratie leben – Engagement schützen, Förderstrukturen erhalten*) <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btp/21/21069.pdf#P.8396>.

Federal Parliament (2026b), Debate on employment of relatives by AfD members of the Parliament (*Aussprache zur Verwandtenbeschäftigung bei AfD-Abgeordneten*), <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2026/kw09-de-aktuelle-stunde-verwandtenaffaere-1149754>.

German Association of Administrative Judges (2026), *input from the German Association of Administrative Judges for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

German Constitutional Court, judgment 17 September 2025, *Beamtenbesoldung Berlin*, 2 BvL 5/18 u.a.

German Court of Auditors (2026), *additional written input*.

German Government (2025a), Coalition Agreement (*Koalitionsvertrag*), https://www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/sites/www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/files/koav_2025.pdf.

German Government (2025b), Modernisation agenda for the State and administration (*Modernisierungsagenda – für Staat und Verwaltung*), https://bmds.bund.de/fileadmin/BMDS/Dokumente/Modernisierungsagenda_barrierefrei-neu.pdf.

German Government (2025c), *Germany's response to the Joint Communication AL DEU 2/2025*, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=39294>.

German Government (2026), *input from Germany for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

German Institute for Human Rights (DIMR) (2026), *input from the German Institute for Human Rights for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

German Judges Association (2025), Prudence needed in the election of constitutional judges (*Besonnenheit bei Verfassungsrichterwahl nötig*), <https://www.drb.de/newsroom/presse-mediencenter/pressemeldungen-auf-einen-blick/pressemeldung/news/besonnenheit-bei-verfassungsrichterwahl-noetig>.

German Judges' Association (2026), *input from the German Judges' Association for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

German Judges' Association (2026a), Bottleneck criminal justice (*Flaschenhals Straffjustiz*), <https://www.drb.de/newsroom/presse-mediencenter/nachrichten-auf-einen-blick/nachricht/news/flaschenhals-straffjustiz>.

German Judges' Association (2026b), The justice system is falling behind in terms of income (*Justiz wird beim Einkommen abgehängt*), <https://www.drb.de/newsroom/presse-mediencenter/nachrichten-auf-einen-blick/nachricht/news/justiz-wird-beim-einkommen-abgehaengt>.

German Judges' Association (2026c), Judges' remuneration 2025 at Federal and Länder level according Constitutional Court criteria of 17 September 2025 (*R-Besoldung 2025 in Bund und Ländern nach BVerfG-Kriterien vom 17. Sept. 2025*), https://www.richterbesoldung.de/fileadmin/Richterbesoldung/Dokumente/2025/DRB_Musterberechnung_R-Besoldung_2025_Tabelle.pdf.

GRECO (2019a), 3rd Evaluation, *Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Germany*, <https://rm.coe.int/third-evaluation-round-second-addendum-to-the-second-compliance-report/168094c73a>.

GRECO (2019b), 5th Evaluation Round - Evaluation Report Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a0b8d7>.

GRECO (2021), 4th Evaluation Round – Interim Compliance Report on Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a26425>.

GRECO (2022), 4th Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report on Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a9173f>.

GRECO (2023), 5th Evaluation Round – Compliance Report on Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee>.

GRECO (2024), 4th Evaluation Round - Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-prevention-of-corruption-in-respect-of-members/1680b0d2fd>.

GRECO (2025), 5th Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report on Germany, <https://rm.coe.int/grecorc5-2025-8-final-eng-2nd-compliance-report-germany-public/488027d7cc>.

Institute for Economic Research (ifo) (2025), A comparison of judicial budgets: Development, structure and action required for a resilient rule of law (*Justizhaushalte im Vergleich: Entwicklung, Struktur und Handlungsbedarfe für einen resilienten Rechtsstaat*), <https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/content/titleinfo/1852081>.

KEF (2026), KEF recommends a significantly smaller increase in the broadcasting fee (*KEF empfiehlt deutlich geringere Anhebung des Rundfunkbeitrags*), <https://kef-online.de/presse/detail/kef-empfoehlt-deutlich-geringere-anhebung-des-rundfunkbeitrags>.

LobbyControl (2024), Traffic Light coalition finally decide on lobbying footprint (*Ampel-Regierung beschließt endlich Lobby-Fußspur*) (6 March 2024), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/lobby-fussspur/ampel-regierung-beschliesst-endlich-lobby-fussspur-114234/>.

LobbyControl (2025), Lobby influence on the law-making process still not transparent (*Lobbyeinfluss auf Gesetzgebung noch immer intransparent*) (23 October 2025), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/lobby-fussspur/lobbyeinfluss-auf-gesetzgebung-noch-immer-intransparent-122894/>.

LobbyControl (2025a), Change of sides: The soft fall of Christian Lindner – also due to Springer and KKR (*Seitenwechsel: Christin Lindners weicher Fall – auch dank Springer und KKR*) (14 November 2025), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/seitenwechsel/lindner-123206/>.

LobbyControl (2025b), Current lobby footprint with almost no impact (*Derzeitige Lobby-Fussspur fast wirkungslos*) (10 Dezember 2025), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/lobby-fussspur/derzeitige-lobby-fussspur-fast-wirkungslos-123475/>.

LobbyControl (2025c), Policy paper: Party donations, straw men and Elon Musk in the election campaign (*Policy Paper: Parteispenden, Strohmaenner und Elon Musk im Wahlkampf*) (1 August 2025), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/parteienfinanzierung/policy-paper-parteispenden-strohmaenner-und-elon-musk-im-wahlkampf-122016/>.

LobbyControl (2026), Party donations 2025: AfD large-scale donations are exploding (*Parteispenden 2025: AfD-Grossspenden explodieren*), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/parteienfinanzierung/parteispenden-2025-afd-grossspenden-explodieren-123936/>.

LobbyControl/ AbgeordnetenWatch/ Transparency International (2025), Party financing – Open Letter: Transparency organisations demand the introduction in the coalition agreement of a ceiling for party donations (*Parteienfinanzierung – Offener Brief: Transparenz-Organisationen fordern Parteispendendeckel im Koalitionsvertrag*) (13 March 2025), <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/parteienfinanzierung/offener-brief-transparenz-organisationen-fordern-parteispendendeckel-im-koalitionsvertrag-120019/>.

Maecenata Foundation (2025), The anti-NGO discourse – attacks on civil society in the media and public sphere (*Der Anti-NGO-Diskurs – Angriffe auf die Zivilgesellschaft in der medialen Öffentlichkeit*), <https://www.maecenata.eu/2025/12/02/anti-ngo-diskurs-social-media-analyse/>.

Maecenata Foundation (2026), The anti-NGO discourse: small questions – big impact? (*Der Anti-NGO-Diskurs: Kleine Anfragen – große Wirkung?*), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/108344/ssoar-2026-buttner_et_al-Der_Anti-NGO-Diskurs_Kleine_Anfragen_.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2026-buttner_et_al-Der_Anti-NGO-Diskurs_Kleine_Anfragen_.pdf.

Media Ownership Monitor, Germany (2026), <https://germany.mom-gmr.org/en/>.

Ministry of Finance (2026), Press release: Federal Government adopts action plan against organised crime: legal, technical and human resources of the customs and the Federal Office of the Police will be strengthened (*Bundesregierung beschliesst Aktionsplan gegen Organisierte Kriminalität: Zoll und Bundeskriminalamt werden rechtlich, technisch und personell gestärkt*) (25 February 2026), <https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2026/02/2026-02-25-aktionsplan-gegen-ok.html>.

Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice (2026), New Era for Internal Security: Refocusing of the fight against organised crime as well as financial and drug crimes (*Zeitenwende der Inneren Sicherheit: Neuaufrichtung der Bekämpfung von Organisierter Kriminalität sowie Finanz- und Rauschgiftkriminalität*), https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/Zoll/aktionsplan-gegen-organisierte-kriminalitaet.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=9.

Ministry of Justice (2025), *Proposal amending the Criminal Code – Transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law* (17 October 2025), https://www.bmjbv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzgebung/RefE/RefE_Umweltstrafrecht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

Ministry of Justice (2026a), Pact for the Rule of Law (*Pakt für den Rechtsstaat*), https://www.bmjbv.de/DE/themen/pakt_fuer_den_rechtsstaat/pakt_fuer_den_rechtsstaat_ueberblick_no_de.html.

Ministry of Justice (2026b), Government proposal for a seventh law amending the code of administrative procedure and other laws (*Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung eines Siebten Gesetzes zur Änderung der Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung und anderer Gesetze*), https://www.bmjbv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzgebung/RegE/RegE_7_VwGOAendG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.

Ministry of the Interior (2025a), *Integrity in the Federal public administration - Annual Report 2024*, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/oeffentlicher-dienst/BMI25073-Integritaetsbericht-2024.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.

Ministry of the Interior (2025b), *Reply to the letter of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights of 6 June 2025*, <https://rm.coe.int/reply-of-german-minister-of-interior-to-the-commissioner-s-letter/1680b678ee>.

Ministry of the Interior (2026), *additional written input for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

National Regulatory Control Council (NKR) (2026), Annual Report 2025 (*Jahresbericht 2025*), https://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Web/NKR/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Jahresberichte/2025-jahresbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5.

Oberlandesgericht Muenchen (2025), Press release: Criminal proceeding against Eduard L. for suspicion of bribery of members of Parliament (*Pressemitteilung: Strafverfahren gegen Eduard L. wegen des Verdachts der Bestechung von Mandatsträgern*) (30 July 2025), <https://www.justiz.bayern.de/gerichte-und-behoerden/oberlandesgerichte/muenchen/presse/2025/49.php>.

OCCRP (2025), *Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project: Former German lawmakers on trial over alleged bribes from Azerbaijan* (16 January 2025), [https://www.occrp.org/en/news/former-german-lawmakers-on-trial-over-alleged-bribes-from-azerbaijan#:~:text=Reported%20by,%2DAzerbaijani%20Relations%20\(GEFDAB\)](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/former-german-lawmakers-on-trial-over-alleged-bribes-from-azerbaijan#:~:text=Reported%20by,%2DAzerbaijani%20Relations%20(GEFDAB).).

OECD (2021), *Working Group on Bribery, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 - Two Year Follow-Up Report: Germany*, <https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/germany-phase-4-follow-up-report.pdf>.

OECD (2025a), *Better regulation practices across the European Union 2025*, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/09/better-regulation-practices-across-the-european-union-2025_a3dfd5e6/6f007516-en.pdf.

OECD (2025b), *OECD Working Group on Bribery, Public Summary Record of the Plenary Meeting 25-27 June 2025*, <https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/fighting-foreign-bribery/oecd-working-group-on-bribery-public-summary-record-june-2025.pdf>.

Parliament Administration (2026), *input from the Parliament Administration for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

Presserat (2026a), *History of the Press Council (Geschichte des Presserats)*, <https://www.presserat.de/pressefreiheit.html>.

Presserat (2026b), *2025: More than 100 reprimands for the first time (2025: Erstmals mehr als 100 Rügen)*, <https://www.presserat.de/jahresberichte-statistiken.html>.

Reporters without Borders (2026), *input from Reporters Without Borders for the 2026 Rule of Law Report – Germany*.

Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (2025a), *Press release: UN experts urge Germany to halt criminalisation and police violence against Palestinian solidarity activism*, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/un-experts-urge-germany-halt-criminalisation-and-police-violence-against>.

Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (2025b), *Letter to Germany AL DEU 2/2025*, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30045>.

Transparency International (2023), *Statement on the hearing for the Political Parties Act (Stellungnahme anlässlich der Anhörung zum Parteiengesetz)*, <https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/979884/5a65362863a0fb68ccf61995d2f64927/20-4-344.pdf>.

Transparency International (2024), *Lobbyranking 2024: Slow progress in most of the Laender (Lobbyranking 2024: Zaghafte Fortschritte in den meisten Bundesländern)*, <https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/lobbyranking-2024>.

Transparency International (2025a), *Key demands for more transparency and a strong anti-corruption policy (Kernforderungen für mehr Transparenz und eine starke Antikorruptionspolitik)*, https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen/2025/BTW_2025_Kernforderungen_TI-DE_Erlaeuterungen.pdf.

Transparency International (2025b), *First conviction for strategic corruption: Transparency Germany welcomes historic judgement in the Azerbaijan affaire (Erste Verurteilung wegen strategischer Korruption: Transparency Deutschland begrüsst historisches Urteil in der Aserbaidtschan-Affaere)*, 30 July 2025, <https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/erste-verurteilung-wegen-strategischer-korruption-transparency-deutschland-begruesst-historisches-urteil-in-der-aserbaidtschan-affaere-1>.

Transparency International (2025c), *Scheinwerfer: The magazine against corruption (Scheinwerfer: Das Magazin gegen Korruption)* (December 2025), https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen/2025/Scheinwerfer-107_Geldwaesche.pdf.

Transparency International (2025d), Alibi-footprint instead of a real executive footprint (*Alibi-Fussspur statt echtem exekutivem Fussabdruck*) (2 June 2025), <https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/ein-jahr-exekutiver-fussabdruck>.

Transparency International (2026), *input from Transparency International Germany for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of opinion and expression (2025), *Preliminary observations*, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/statements/20260206-eom-stm-europe-central-asia-region-sr-protection-right-en.pdf>.

UNODC (2020), United Nations Convention against Corruption - Country Review Report of Germany for the Review Cycle 2016-2021, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2020_11_06_Germany_Final_Country_Report.pdf.

VAUNET (2026), *input from VAUNET for the 2026 Rule of Law Report*.

ZDF/ AbgeordnetenWatch (2025), Revolving doors in the Federal Parliament (*Drehtuereffekt im Bundestag*) (15 July 2025), <https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/lobbyregister-bundestag-drehtuereffekt-bekannte-lobbyisten-100.html>.

Annex II: Country visit to Germany

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March and April 2026 with:

- *Abgeordnetenwatch*
- Allianz Rechtssicherheit
- ARD
- Association of Private Media (VAUNET)
- *Bündnis Bürgerschaftliches Engagement*
- Committee for EU Affairs of the Conference of the Justice Ministers
- Court of Audit [in writing]
- Federal Administrative Court [in writing]
- Federal Bar
- Federal Constitutional Court
- Federal Criminal Police Office
- Federal Supreme Court
- German Association of Journalists
- German Bar Association
- German Chamber of Industry and Commerce
- German Institute for Human Rights
- German Judges Association
- German Newspaper Publishers and Digitalpublishers Association
- *Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte*
- Joint Office of the Media Authorities and Media Authorities of the Länder
- Lobbycontrol Germany
- Media Association of the Free Press
- Ministry of Education, Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of State for Culture and Media
- Ministry of the Interior
- National Regulatory Control Council
- Parliament Administration
- Press Council
- Prosecution Service
- Transparency International Germany
- ZDF

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:

- Civil Liberties Union for Europe
- Civil Society Europe
- End FGM EU
- European Civic Forum
- European Partnership for Democracy

- Human Rights Watch
- ILGA-Europe
- International Federation for Human Rights
- Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association
- Transparency International EU