



Parliament
Austria

Antisemitism 2022

Overview of Main Findings | Summary Report

Vienna, March 2023

ANTISEMITISM 2022

Overview of Main Findings - Summary Report

Study Commissioned by the Austrian Parliament
Vienna, March 2023



Client: Austrian Parliament
Scientific Director: Eva Zeglovits
Authors: Evelyn Dawid and Eva Zeglovits

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 2022 STUDY

In 2018, the Austrian Parliament had a comprehensive data collection on the topic of antisemitism conducted in the country for the first time. The results were initially presented descriptively in a report. A later (more complex) analysis of the data firstly brought to light the various contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in Austria - academics speak of dimensions - in an empirically-validated manner and, secondly, shed light on explanatory factors for antisemitic attitudes. All results are available for download at www.antisemitismus2018.at.

The antisemitism survey was repeated in 2020, with additional topics arising on the one hand from the discussion after the presentation of the first study and on the other hand from the then-current events surrounding the coronavirus pandemic. The influence of conspiracy myths and media (especially social media) was newly surveyed. The results from 2020 are available for download at www.antisemitismus2020.at.

The third antisemitism survey presented here is essentially a repetition of its predecessor studies and thus provides data that allow a comparison over time. Once again, current developments are taken into account: The close look at the influence of conspiracy myths is maintained but this time also with reference to the war in Ukraine and other crises of our time (inflation, climate change, migration movements, energy shortages along with the coronavirus pandemic and its consequences). This time, focus is on the culture of remembrance and the awareness of the problem of antisemitism among the population. Finally, the study is particularly interested in one group: people under the age of 25, who are represented in greater numbers in the sample than before, in order to be able to develop sustainable measures against antisemitism in Austria. The results for this group are presented in a visually highlighted way: identified as "**In Focus: 25^{minus} - Adolescents and Young Adults**". As in

previous years, the total sample was again increased in a separate sample by including people living in Austria with a family migration history that originated in Türkiye or an Arabic-speaking country. The results for the supplementary group are also clearly visible throughout the report: identified as "[Supplementary Group: Turkish- or Arabic-speaking People in Austria](#)".

There are more details in the long version of the report.

1.2 CONTEXT OF THE 2022 SURVEY

Social science studies are always influenced by their social, political and economic environment. Anyone interpreting the results should have the context in mind. In calm times, this influence is usually rather weak, as can be seen in surveys conducted on a regular basis: The results vary only slightly in the short and medium term. In contrast, things look different in turbulent times, as can be seen from the three antisemitism surveys conducted by the Austrian Parliament.

In 2018, there was what today is often described as "normality": comparatively stable calm and supposedly secure prospects for the future. 2020 was then not only the first year of the pandemic (which turned everything upside down and into question), but in Vienna there was also a terrorist attack, immediately before the survey, in which four people were killed and 23 injured, some seriously. While the attack was not directed against Jewish institutions, that was not clear at the time of the questioning. All that was known was that the bomber was a Muslim and that he had chosen the area around Vienna's main synagogue for his attack; this brought back memories of the deadly terrorist attack in 1981 that had targeted Jewish visitors to that synagogue. The results of the 2020 study differed in some respects significantly from those obtained two years earlier. Antisemitism seemed by and large lower, at least for the moment. Although the changed context was an obvious explanation, it could not be substantiated.

With the new repetition in 2022, a third point in time is now available, which can help better to classify the results of the two predecessor studies. And indeed, the values for antisemitism in Austria have again approached the level of 2018; in some cases, they have reached it or even exceeded it. On the one hand, this progression confirms that antisemitism in its various manifestations represents a basic attitude: that is, it is extremely stable in the long term. On the other hand, it also shows that a dramatic change in context can have a strong influence even on basic attitudes, at least in the short term. This applies even if it is only on the response behavior, which may be more oriented toward what is socially desirable.

Reading the results of the present study, one should be aware that it was conducted in a time of multiple crises. These include the pandemic, which is still having (lingering) effects, the war in Europe, very high inflation rates, uncertain energy supplies, climate change, domestic political crises and rock-bottom confidence in political institutions and the media.¹

Crises fuel conspiracy myths, which in turn are very often closely linked to antisemitism², as the 2020 study also clearly showed. The current crises could, therefore, also have an impact on antisemitism in Austria.

1.3 SURVEY

The **Austrian representative survey** was methodically conducted in exactly the same way as in 2020 and had the following key data:

- Population: Austrian population aged 16 and over
- Survey area: the whole Federal Territory
- Data collection method: telephone interviews (CATI), online interviews (CAWI) total n=2,000 interviews
- Disproportionate stratification by age, with the aim that the under-25-year-olds could be evaluated in more detail with a case number of n=400
- The questionnaire was estimated to take 15 minutes, but proved to be much longer in the (telephone) execution.

In the overall figures, young people were again weighted according to their share in the basic population.

The telephone interviews were conducted by IFES on the basis of random numbers (RLD method), while the online interviews were recruited by Demox Research from an existing online pool. Together, these two methods provide a representative picture of the Austrian resident population aged 16 and older. Comparisons over time are possible due to the stability of the methods.

The same operationalization as in 2020 was used in the **supplementary group**. It is composed of:

1. Persons with a "family migration history of Türkiye" who were either born in Türkiye themselves or at least one of their parents was born in Türkiye.
2. Persons with a "family migration history of an Arabic-speaking country" who were either born in one of the countries listed below or at least one of their parents was born in one of these countries. Countries were selected in which either Arabic is an official language or the majority of the population speaks Arabic. The countries in question were compared with statistical information to determine how many people from these countries live in Austria. This resulted in the following possible countries of origin: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and South Sudan, Syria or Tunisia.

Post-stratification quotas were set for the two parts of the supplementary group, as was done in 2020 for the telephone interviews; for example, it was determined in advance how many interviews (e.g., with men and women, respectively) may be done.

The interviews in the supplementary group were conducted by telephone by bilingual interviewers; the respondents could choose whether they preferred to give the interview in Turkish, Arabic or German. IFES was responsible for the telephone interviews.

In addition, online interviews were also conducted by Demox Research for the first time in 2022. In total, 974 interviews were conducted, of which 491 people were from the Arabic-speaking group and 483 from the Turkish-speaking group. The sample can be described as representative of the respective group, if one disregards very recent immigrants.

¹ See, for example, the current results of the Democracy Monitor, which is conducted with the support of Parliament, among others: <https://www.demokratiemonitor.at>.

²cf. Lamberty 202

As in the 2018 and 2020 reports, a predominantly descriptive approach was taken to analyze and present the results. The responses are presented in frequency or cross tabulations.

The special focus on young people in this report succeeds in two ways: first, the group of 16- to 25-year-olds is explicitly shown in many tables, and second, results for this group (also in greater depth) are presented in a visually-highlighted way: identified as "**In Focus: 25^{minus} - Adolescents and Young Adults**".

The results for the supplementary groups are also clearly visible throughout the report: identified as "**Supplementary Group: Turkish- or Arabic-speaking People in Austria**".

2 ANTISEMITISM IN ITS MANIFESTATIONS

2.1 COMPARISON OVER TIME 2018-2020-2022

One of the purposes of this study is to document antisemitic attitudes in Austria over time and to depict developments. In a comparison over time, it is noticeable that the year 2020, with its special context (in particular, the terrorist attack in Vienna a few days before the start of the 2020 survey), stands out in almost all questions, while relatively similar response patterns can be observed in the years 2018 and 2022.

2.2 MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND IMPORTANT INFLUENCING FACTORS

Forms of manifestation of antisemitism

Antisemitic attitudes are linked to certain thematic areas, which give rise to the following manifestations of antisemitism that are currently empirically demonstrable in Austria:

- In the case of **conspiracy antisemitism**, conspiracy myths that assume the existence of worldwide Jewish networks receive the highest level of approval: 36 percent find the statement *"The Jews control the international business world"* (very/rather) true, and 30 percent the statement *"The power and influence of the Jews in the international press and politics are becoming increasingly apparent again today"*. With regard to Austria and the inflation crisis, the level of agreement is lower: *"Jews have too much influence in Austria"* (19%) and *"Jewish elites in international corporations are often behind current price increases"* (18%).
- Agreement with the statements of **guilt-reversal antisemitism** is similarly high: at 36 percent, the highest agreement is with the statement that makes the descendants of the victims of National Socialism into today's perpetrators: *"Jews today try to take advantage of the fact that they were victims during the Nazi era"*. In contrast, the reversal of guilt with reference to the past *"It is not just a coincidence that the Jews have been persecuted so often in their history; at least in part they themselves are to blame for this"*, is found by 19 percent to be (very/rather) true, and by 22 percent the alleged refusal of assimilation *"Jews have little interest in integrating into the respective country in which they live. This is the background for their constant problems"*.
- The approval rates for statements of **racist antisemitism** are lower at 10 to 21 percent - especially low for statements that reflect known racist stereotypes: *"You can't expect a Jew to be decent"* (10%) and *"When I meet someone, I know in a few minutes whether that person is Jewish"* (12%). At 21 percent, the statement *"Jews are basically Israeli citizens for me and not Austrians"* received the highest level of agreement.
- **Holocaust-related antisemitism** includes 1) the extreme position of Holocaust minimization, which is perceived as (very/rather) true similarly often as the statements of racist antisemitism (11%: *"In the reports about concentration camps and persecution of Jews in World War II, many things are exaggerated"*), and 2) the opposition to commemorating the victims of National Socialism, which receives much more agreement (34%: *"I am against the fact that people keep rehashing the fact that Jews perished in World War II"*).

- **Israel-related antisemitism** combines - before the projection surface of the Middle East conflict - the thought patterns of the other manifestations of antisemitism. The statement *"The Israelis basically treat the Palestinians no differently than the Germans treated the Jews during World War II"* (30%) receives the highest level of approval, while the statement *"When the State of Israel no longer exists, peace will reign in the Middle East"* (14%) receives the lowest.
- The unbiased basic attitude toward Jews - referred to here as **non-antisemitism** - is more widespread than antisemitism in its various manifestations: 65 percent rate the statement *"Jews have contributed a lot to cultural life in Austria"* as very or somewhat true, 42 percent rate the statement *"Because of the persecution of the Jews during the World War II, we have a moral obligation today to stand by the Jews in Austria"* and 46 percent the statement *"Jews are unfairly targeted when there are crises"*.

The study also included a number of other statements on antisemitism that could not be clearly assigned to any of these six manifestations. In this brief report, one more statement should be singled out, which the literature also refers to as religious antisemitism: The statement *"Jews are still responsible for the death of Jesus Christ"* is rejected by 55 percent of people living in Austria, 15 percent agree, and 30 percent give no answer.

Factors influencing antisemitism

Conspiracy myths

In order to test the influence of the belief in conspiracy myths on antisemitism, the agreement with four statements that can be assigned to the area of conspiracy myths was examined. In terms of content, they represent the ideas that politics and the media are controlled; this was updated around conspiracy myths about the war in Ukraine. Per se, however, these myths do not relate directly to antisemitism. Combined into an index, it is thus possible to classify respondents according to their propensity for conspiracy myths.

Anti-Jewish conspiracy myths form the core of conspiracy antisemitism. But the other manifestations of antisemitism are also more pronounced the more the respondents believe in conspiracy myths (even if these conspiracy myths per se have nothing to do with Jews), especially guilt reversal and Holocaust-related antisemitism.

Highest level of formal education

For almost all antisemitic statements, people with higher education express significantly less agreement or significantly stronger disagreement, with the school-leaving examination ("*Matura*") often making the decisive difference. Again and again, people who have attended only compulsory school stand out for their above-average antisemitic attitudes, especially in the case of Israel-related antisemitism. Conversely, graduates of universities or technical colleges are especially often non-antisemites. When considering the influence of education, it should be kept in mind that people with higher formal educational qualifications tend to be more socially desirable in their response behavior. Education can protect not only against adopting an antisemitic attitude but also against expressing it.

Basic knowledge about Jews

Informal education has an even greater effect on antisemitic attitudes than formal education. People who know how many Jews were murdered in the Holocaust, know about Jewish religious festivals and can also estimate how large the area of Israel is are significantly less likely to have antisemitic attitudes than those who do not. Two correct answers (out of three) are also sufficient to show significantly weaker antisemitic attitudes.

Global crises, anti-Americanism and antisemitism

Given the global crises and their immediate effects that people are currently facing, the question arises whether and how people's concerns co-occur with antisemitism. It can be observed that particularly high concerns about climate change and war tend to be associated with non-antisemitism, concerns about immigration tend to be associated with conspiracy antisemitism, and concerns about the coronavirus pandemic tend to be associated with racist and Israel-related antisemitism.

Anti-Americanism and antisemitism also repeatedly go hand in hand, not least of which in social media. The literature again describes the belief in conspiracy myths as a common denominator. This connection is also reflected in the data of this study: The more the U.S. is perceived as a threat to world peace, the stronger the antisemitism. This connection is evident in all manifestations of antisemitism and strongest in conspiracy antisemitism, where belief in conspiracy is the common basis.

2.3 PERCEPTION OF ANTISEMITISM AND NEED FOR ACTION

Six out of ten people report having heard antisemitic remarks, most frequently in social media. Three out of four respondents see antisemitism as a problem that affects society as a whole. There is widespread agreement that the fight against antisemitism is primarily a matter of the civil courage of each and every individual. Only then are the media, politics and schools called to account. Of all of the political institutions, it is above all the Federal Government, but also the European Union and Parliament, that seem to the respondents to be best suited to take action against antisemitism - much more so than the Federal States or the municipalities. Four out of ten people see an acute need for action with regard to antisemitic content in social media. Otherwise, satisfaction with what politicians are doing to combat antisemitism, to actively remember National Socialism and for the Jews living in Austria prevails on the whole.

2.4 MAIN RESULTS FOR ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS (25MINUS)

In Focus: 25^{minus} - Teenagers and Young Adults

Antisemitism in its manifestations

Adolescents and young adults are the focus of this antisemitism survey. They sometimes show themselves to be more antisemitic than the over-25s, sometimes less so, and sometimes the two groups are in agreement. **A consistent pattern matching the manifestations of antisemitism cannot be discerned.** For example, the Generation 25^{minus}, on the one hand, finds the Holocaust-trivializing statement most often true and comparatively less often not true; but on the other hand, it most often advocates commemorating the Jewish victims of the Holocaust.

Conspiracy myths have an even stronger effect on antisemitic attitudes among adolescents and young adults than among the population as a whole. Only for the non-antisemitism of Generation 25^{minus} does the conspiracy belief play a smaller role. This is also difficult to interpret, because in this case, conspiracy believers are quite united with conspiracy skeptics, but those in the middle show less non-antisemitism.

Some of the young respondents were still attending school or studying at a university or technical college at the time of the survey. The **influence of the educational institutions** was thus more directly recorded here than in the case of respondents whose school years or studies date back further. Apprentices and students at a middle school (without a baccalaureate) stand out in all manifestations of antisemitism in that they perceive many of the antisemitic statements as (very/rather) true much more often and as (very/rather) not true much less often. At the same time, they particularly often give no answer, which suggests great uncertainty. They thus regularly show a more pronounced antisemitic attitude than their peers who have completed no more than compulsory schooling. This is the one clear difference from the results for the population as a whole. The second: Again and again, it is not the academically educated (or those still studying) who are the least antisemitic among the boys, but rather the students or graduates of a secondary school with a school-leaving examination. Somewhat simplified, one could say that among youth it is primarily the males living in the cities without a high school diploma who are conspicuous for their agreement with antisemitic statements.

School lessons

More than two-thirds have **"talked about the Holocaust and the crimes of the Nazi era"** (68%), significantly more than half have **"visited a memorial"** (56%) and around half have **"talked about antisemitism"** (50%) or **"had a conversation with contemporary witnesses or watched a video about it"** (48%). The **"Middle East conflict"** is discussed much less frequently in school (by a good quarter of the young respondents), and **"Jewish life today"** even less frequently (by just under a fifth). Nine percent report that they were not taught any of this at school.

A look at the different **types of schools** shows clear differences: students and graduates of vocational schools and middle schools (without the school-leaving examination) report particularly rarely to have heard about the Holocaust, National Socialism, Jewish life or the Middle East conflict in their school years.

If antisemitism, the Holocaust, National Socialism or the Middle East conflict are discussed in **school lessons**, this always reduces agreement with antisemitic statements and increases their rejection. Interviews with contemporary witnesses (even on video) and discussions about the Middle East conflict are particularly effective in reducing all manifestations of antisemitism. With regard to conspiracy antisemitism, a visit to a Holocaust memorial site has a particularly positive effect. If antisemitism itself is addressed, Holocaust-related antisemitism in particular can be diminished and non-antisemitism increased.

2.5 MAIN RESULTS FOR TURKISH- OR ARABIC-SPEAKING SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP

For the present study, the total sample was augmented by persons who were either born in Türkiye or an Arabic-speaking country or at least whose parents were born in Türkiye or an Arabic-speaking country (Türkiye n= 483, Arabic-speaking country n= 491, total supplementary group n=974). The Arabic-speaking respondents have a family migration history that originated primarily in Egypt (27%), Syria (21%) or Iraq (12%).

The supplementary group **consistently displays much stronger antisemitic attitudes than the Austrian population as a whole**. This is most evident in Israel-related antisemitism, and the difference is smallest in non-antisemitism.

Of Turkish- and Arabic-speaking respondents, **the majority is people who were born, grew up and went to school in Austria** (53%), a quarter are immigrants themselves and have lived in Austria for more than 10 years, while 14 percent came to the country in the last 10 years. Turkish and Arabic speakers who came to Austria in the last 10 years display weaker antisemitic attitudes compared to those who were born here or have lived here for a long time. This pattern tends to be broken where Austria or the National Socialist past are explicitly addressed. In addition, newly immigrated persons often refuse to answer the question. In contrast, respondents who were born in Austria or have lived here for more than 10 years show similarly strong antisemitic tendencies. Only Israel-related antisemitism is somewhat more widespread among immigrants who have lived here for a long time than among those born here.

The **tendency toward general conspiracy myths** is even more pronounced in the supplementary group than in the population as a whole: around four out of ten people in the supplementary group fall into the group with a high tendency toward conspiracy myths, while only around three out of ten do so in the population as a whole. Further, this propensity for conspiracy myths has an even more powerful effect on antisemitic attitudes. Turkish and Arabic speakers with a high propensity for general conspiracy myths are consistently disproportionately more antisemitic than those with a low propensity. Of the supplementary group, the tendency toward conspiracy myths is particularly strong in the case of conspiracy antisemitism, Israel-related antisemitism and the guilt-reversal antisemitism.

Religious respondents consistently show a significantly stronger antisemitic attitude than non-religious respondents. This is particularly evident in the case of racist antisemitism.

The supplementary group reports having heard antisemitic remarks more often than the overall population (70% vs. 61%). Half of the respondents see antisemitism as a problem that affects society as a whole (Austrian average: 73%). According to Turkish and Arabic speakers in Austria, the **fight against antisemitism** must be waged primarily by Jews themselves and by the media. With regard to political institutions, they expect the European Union and the Austrian Federal Government to take measures against antisemitism. Compared to the population as a whole, the supplementary group is more dissatisfied with the steps already taken by politicians. They feel that the current activities against antisemitism, for the active remembrance of National Socialism and for the Jews living in Austria, are excessive.

3 TABLES

Table 1: Empirical manifestation of "non-anti-Semitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
<i>"Because of the persecution of the Jews during World War II, we have a moral obligation to stand by the Jews in Austria today."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	14	28	22	20	16
Generation 25 ^{minus}	15	34	20	16	15
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	13	28	27	20	12
<i>"Jews have contributed a lot to cultural life and science in Austria."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	32	33	10	6	18
Generation 25 ^{minus}	20	32	15	13	21
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	19	32	22	13	14
<i>"Jews are unfairly targeted when there are crises."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	21	35	16	10	19
Generation 25 ^{minus}	24	32	17	14	13
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	14	24	31	18	14

Table 2: Empirical manifestation of "conspiracy antisemitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
"Jews dominate the international business world."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	10	26	23	21	21
Generation 25 ^{minus}	8	18	23	31	19
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	28	27	23	14	8
"Today, the power and influence of Jews are again becoming increasingly evident in international press and politics."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	7	23	23	23	26
Generation 25 ^{minus}	8	12	25	29	27
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	22	31	23	11	13
"Jews have too much influence in Austria."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	5	14	27	34	19
Generation 25 ^{minus}	7	11	25	42	14
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	19	28	26	17	10
"Jewish elites in international corporations are often behind current price increases."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	5	13	20	34	28
Generation 25 ^{minus}	6	10	20	35	28
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	20	23	25	15	17

Table 3: Empirical manifestation of "racist antisemitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
"You can't expect a Jew to be decent."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	3	7	13	64	13
Generation 25 ^{minus}	6	13	16	53	12
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	12	19	26	36	7
"When I meet someone, I know in a few minutes if that person is Jewish."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	3	9	20	57	11
Generation 25 ^{minus}	6	11	24	49	10
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	14	21	30	29	7
"Jews for me are basically Israeli citizens and not Austrians."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	8	13	18	46	15
Generation 25 ^{minus}	8	13	22	46	11
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	16	20	25	30	9

Table 4: Empirical manifestation of "guilt reversal antisemitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
"Jews have little interest in integrating into the particular country they live in. This is the main reason for their constant problems."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	7	15	25	33	20
Generation 25 ^{minus}	10	14	22	36	18
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	19	29	23	17	13
"It is not just by chance that the Jews have been persecuted so often in their history; at least in part they are to blame for that."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	5	14	22	37	22
Generation 25 ^{minus}	7	13	21	46	14
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	15	26	28	20	11
"Jews today are trying to take advantage of the fact that they were victims during the Nazi Era."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	12	24	23	24	17
Generation 25 ^{minus}	9	16	28	31	16
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	25	31	23	12	9

Table 5: Empirical manifestation of "Holocaust-related antisemitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
"In the accounts of concentration camps and persecution of Jews during World War II, much is exaggerated."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	4	7	19	56	14
Generation 25 ^{minus}	8	8	23	48	13
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	15	25	27	22	11
"I am against the fact that people keep rehashing the fact that Jews died in World War II."					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	14	20	20	33	12
Generation 25 ^{minus}	12	13	28	34	14
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	18	31	25	15	11

Table 6: Empirical manifestation of "Israel-related antisemitism"

	fully applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat applies <i>in %</i>	somewhat does not apply <i>in %</i>	does not apply at all <i>in %</i>	not specified <i>in %</i>
<i>"When the State of Israel no longer exists, there will be peace in the Middle East."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	4	10	25	39	22
Generation 25 ^{minus}	9	14	22	32	23
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	21	26	25	19	9
<i>"With the policies that Israel is making, I can well understand why people would have something against Jews."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	6	17	24	28	25
Generation 25 ^{minus}	10	11	25	29	24
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	24	29	23	14	10
<i>"The Israelis are treating the Palestinians basically no differently than the Germans treated the Jews in World War II."</i>					
AUSTRIA REPRESENTATIVE 2022 (n=2,000)	9	21	21	18	31
Generation 25 ^{minus}	9	23	22	14	31
SUPPLEMENTARY GROUP (n=974).	31	26	21	11	11

Table 7: Assessment of political activities

"In which of the following areas is policy clearly doing too much, rather too much, just right, rather too little, or clearly too little?"		clearly too much	rather too much	just right	rather too little	clearly too little	not specified
		in %	in %	in %	in %	in %	in %
Operation of Holocaust memorials	Austria representative	7	11	53	10	3	16
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	7	9	41	18	7	20
	Supplementary group	15	23	35	13	3	12
Protection of Jewish institutions (e.g. schools, synagogues)	Austria representative	6	8	47	17	3	19
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	9	9	28	24	8	22
	Supplementary group	18	19	36	14	4	9
Having good relations with the State of Israel	Austria representative	6	8	48	11	3	25
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	9	9	22	18	10	31
	Supplementary group	20	21	33	11	3	12
Promotion of Jewish life in Austria	Austria representative	7	10	42	12	3	26
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	8	11	28	21	6	26
	Supplementary group	22	19	31	11	5	12
Support for the surviving dependents of Holocaust victims	Austria representative	8	12	39	12	4	24
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	6	8	29	19	9	30
	Supplementary group	15	16	38	15	5	11
Restitution of property looted from Jews by the Nazis	Austria representative	7	9	34	17	7	26
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	7	9	21	19	11	33
	Supplementary group	14	14	37	14	6	15
Preventing the spread of antisemitic content on social media	Austria representative	4	5	27	28	13	22
	Generation 25 ^{minus}	4	9	18	33	16	20
	Supplementary group	13	17	34	17	7	13