Written Symposium "Time(s) and Parliaments"

Dmitry Erokhin, PhD, is a research scholar in the Cooperation and Transformative Governance Research Group of the IIASA Advancing Systems Analysis Program. His research interests include economic cooperation, digitalization, international business taxation, climate change adaptation, and disaster risk management. He received his bachelor's degree in Economics (BSc Volkswirtschaftslehre) from the University of Bonn (2018), his master's degree in Economics (MSc Economics) from the Vienna University of Economics and Business (2020), and his doctoral degree (PhD, International Business Taxation, Economic Track) from the Vienna University of Economics and Business (2023).

List of Publications

INTRODUCTION

Parliaments today face an unprecedented challenge of bridging multiple time horizons in policymaking. While legislators operate under short-term electoral mandates, they also have to address long-term megatrends like demographic shifts and climate change that extend well beyond typical political cycles. This misalignment between mandates and megatrends creates the legislative time-horizon problem and may drive short-term thinking (John & MacAskill, 2021). As a consequence, governments may reverse or abandon long-term plans. This may lead to underfunded or inconsistently implemented strategic projects in areas such as infrastructure, education, and sustainability.

Yet, strengthening foresight in parliaments offers a promising solution. When legislatures actively engage in futures thinking, they not only enhance the resilience of policies by preparing for shocks and emerging trends but also increase the legitimacy of democratic decision-making. Addressing long-range concerns signals responsibility toward future generations and helps to build public trust. Momentum is building internationally: whereas two decades ago, only Finland had a dedicated parliamentary "Committee for the Future”, today ten national parliaments have established similar committees or units to institutionalize long-term thinking (Koskimaa & Raunio, 2023). Events like the "World Summit of Future Committees” (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2023) and recent UN calls for anticipatory governance (UN Futures Lab & Global Hub, 2025) underscore a growing global movement for legislatures to take the long view. However, despite these advances, significant gaps remain in mainstreaming foresight into daily legislative work. Obstacles include limited institutional capacity, insufficient resources, political polarization, and challenges in translating foresight outputs into concrete policy measures.

Against this backdrop, this contribution examines how scenario-building methodologies can be tailored to help parliaments bridge short-, medium-, and long-term horizons in decision-making. It argues that, beyond simply providing information about possible futures, structured scenario-building can transform how parliaments deliberate, set priorities, and sustain policy follow-through over multiple legislative cycles.

FORESIGHT METHODOLOGIES: TYPOLOGIES AND APPROACHES

Strategic foresight uses various methods to systematically anticipate and shape the future. Three common typologies in futures studies include (Van der Duin, 2016; Börjeson et al., 2006):

• Predictive (forecasting): Focuses on "What will likely happen?” by extrapolating current trends or data to forecast probable outcomes. It is useful for short- to medium-term planning under stable conditions but may overlook deep uncertainties.
• Exploratory (scenario-based): Asks "What could happen?” by developing multiple plausible scenarios based on different assumptions. This approach embraces uncertainty, considering a range of alternative futures to test strategies against diverse possibilities.
• Normative (goal-oriented): Centers on "What should happen?” by starting with a desired future and working backward to identify pathways to achieve it (e.g., through backcasting). This method is explicitly prescriptive, guiding policy toward preferred outcomes such as sustainability or equity.

These approaches are complementary and often combined in practice. Predictive forecasts provide baselines, exploratory scenarios highlight risks and opportunities, and normative methods help set and achieve goals. In parliamentary foresight, all three play a role, but balancing exploratory scenario-building with normative backcasting is especially crucial. In addition, it is important to note that the choice of foresight methodology should be adapted to the policy area, timeframe, and the specific needs and capacities of the parliament. Additionally, the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders including the public, civil society, and external experts enhances both the credibility and relevance of foresight outcomes.

GENERAL METHODOLOGY FOR SCENARIO APPLICATION IN PARLIAMENTARY FORESIGHT

Effectively applying scenario analysis in parliamentary contexts involves a structured yet adaptable approach. The general methodology comprises four interconnected phases, guiding decision-makers from broad exploration to actionable policy:

• Identifying drivers and their values: The initial step is to comprehensively identify and evaluate the key drivers influencing a given policy area. Parliamentary foresight teams typically convene diverse experts, MPs, and civil society stakeholders to collaboratively pinpoint and prioritize critical factors across various domains (economic, social, technological, environmental, political). Each driver is clearly defined along with underlying values, assumptions, and metrics. This transparent articulation helps MPs understand diverse perspectives and the multifaceted nature of policy challenges. Best practices here include using horizon scanning tools, STEEP (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political) analysis, and structured interviews or workshops (Bengston, 2013) to ensure a comprehensive scan of uncertainties and values.
• Constructing plausible scenarios: Next, foresight teams craft a range of plausible exploratory scenarios illustrating distinct future pathways based on varying developments of the identified drivers (Rovenskaya et al., 2024). Typically, 2–4 contrasting scenarios are developed, each capturing a coherent narrative of how future circumstances might unfold. These scenarios help visualize multiple possibilities, recognize uncertainties, and understand that current trends can change significantly through policy choices and external influences. To enhance scenario credibility, teams may use participatory techniques such as scenario-writing workshops, cross-impact analysis, or scenario gaming (Mete, 2022; Duin, 2007) to stress-test assumptions and explore systemic interactions.
• Selecting a preferred vision: Building upon these exploratory scenarios, MPs then collaboratively define a preferred normative scenario or vision. This selected vision embodies a desirable future that legislators commit to pursuing, clearly outlining measurable targets and socio-economic conditions. By establishing a preferred vision, parliamentary foresight creates a focal point for political alignment, guiding subsequent policy and legislative action. It is critical at this stage to ensure broad buy-in from different political parties and stakeholder groups, as a shared vision increases the likelihood of sustained policy support (Ganske & Carbon, 2022; D’Aunno et al., 2019). Public consultation and deliberative forums can further legitimize the chosen vision.
• Applying backcasting to guide policy action: Finally, backcasting is employed to map practical pathways from the present to the chosen vision. This process involves setting intermediate milestones (medium-term goals) and immediate policy actions (short-term steps within the current or next parliamentary term). Crucially, the process identifies key decision nodes, i.e., critical moments such as election cycles or policy review periods, where MPs can strategically act, assess progress, and make course corrections as necessary. By laying out these actionable steps and checkpoints, parliamentary foresight translates long-term visions into tangible legislative and policy agendas, ensuring sustained commitment across successive parliamentary terms. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, such as regular progress reports and parliamentary hearings, are essential to keep the process transparent and adaptive to changing conditions.

This structured approach effectively bridges the gap between long-term planning and immediate parliamentary decision-making, fostering political consensus and actionable, resilient policy frameworks. Moreover, embedding scenario-based foresight within core parliamentary processes such as committee work, legislative drafting, and budget planning can help mainstream anticipatory governance and normalize long-term thinking within everyday political routines.

BRIDGING TIME HORIZONS IN PRACTICE: AUSTRIA'S BIRTH RATE CASE STUDY

To illustrate how scenario-building and backcasting can support parliamentary decision-making, consider the case of Austria’s declining birth rate – a real-world challenge with significant long-term implications. Like many European countries, Austria faces below-replacement fertility and an aging population. The total fertility rate (TFR) in Austria has hovered around 1.3–1.5 births per woman in recent years (Statistik Austria, 2024), well below the approximate 2.1 needed for generational replacement. This trend threatens future demographic balance, with potential impacts on the workforce, social security sustainability, and overall economic vitality. Policymakers are thus keen to explore how the birth rate might evolve over coming decades and what can be done to influence it positively.

A parliamentary foresight exercise tackling this issue would begin by scanning the landscape of key drivers affecting birth rates. In Austria’s case, an interdisciplinary team (including MPs, demographers, economists, sociologists) would identify factors across several domains, e.g., economic & financial factors including income stability and employment prospects for young adults; housing affordability for families; and the direct costs of child-rearing (childcare, education); social and cultural factors including societal attitudes toward parenting and family size, the sharing of gender roles in caregiving, and the strength of family support networks (such as reliance on grandparents), etc.

With these drivers identified, the foresight team would proceed to construct plausible scenarios for Austria’s fertility future. For instance, they might create an exploratory scenario set to 2040 (see Fig. 1): one scenario where bold family-friendly reforms and cultural shifts lead to a mild recovery in TFR, another where economic stagnation and inadequate support cause TFR to fall further, and a middle scenario with modest improvements. These scenarios would weave the drivers above into narrative storylines describing an Austria in 2040 that has sustainable demographic growth vs. an Austria that is graying rapidly. The purpose here is to inform MPs of the range of possible futures. Crucially, scenario analysis can dispel fatalism. It shows that policy choices (like investing in childcare or promoting work-life balance) could significantly alter the trajectory, rather than assuming the current trend is destiny.

Figure 1: Austria’s fertility scenario projections (illustrative example) / PDF, 110 KB

Building on these scenarios, the exercise can identify a preferred vision, essentially a normative scenario that the parliament decides to pursue (see Fig. 2). This could be a long-term vision for 2040 of achieving sustainable demographic balance, which implies raising Austria’s TFR to roughly 1.7–1.8 by 2040, coupled with goals like universal access to quality childcare and balanced gender roles in parenting and employment. This vision encapsulates a future where the birth rate recovery ensures a stable population without over-reliance on immigration, and social conditions are supportive of family life. It is ambitious moving from ~1.3 to ~1.7 TFR in under two decades, but it provides a clear target that can rally political will.

Applying backcasting to this 2040 vision, the team then charts how to get there. They set medium-term milestones for 2030–2035 that would indicate progress. For example, by the early 2030s Austria should aim for: (a) childcare coverage expanded by at least 40% (so more families have affordable daycare), (b) fathers’ parental leave uptake around 50% (indicating a major shift toward shared parenting responsibilities), and (c) significant improvement in housing affordability for young families. These milestones break the 2040 goal into tangible outcomes within 8–12 years – a timeframe closer to legislative planning. They also reflect multiple dimensions (services, cultural norms, economics) showing that the fertility issue should be tackled holistically.

Next, the backcasting exercise specifies immediate actions for 2025–2028 – steps to be initiated within the current parliamentary term. These might include introducing enhanced child allowances and more flexible parental leave policies (to reduce the financial burden of having children and allow parents to balance work and family), investing in expanding childcare infrastructure (building more daycare centers, training childcare professionals), incentivizing family-friendly workplace policies through tax credits or public recognition (encouraging employers to offer flexible schedules, remote work options), and strengthening migration and integration programs targeting young families (to attract and retain immigrants who may raise families in Austria). Each action is linked to one or more drivers identified earlier, for example, childcare investment addresses infrastructure, allowances address financial costs, workplace incentives address labor-market factors, etc. By laying these out, the parliament has a near-term legislative agenda that aligns with the long-term vision. These actions can be packaged into bills, budget items, or pilot programs relatively soon.

Finally, to align with the parliamentary cycle, the backcast plan highlights key decision nodes that legislators should strategically target. For instance, election cycles can serve as crucial moments for embedding family-policy commitments into political parties’ manifestos and coalition agreements, ensuring that these priorities remain central. Subsequent decision nodes might involve mid-term reviews, enabling legislators to assess initial policy impacts, such as changes in birth rates, and determine whether adjustments are necessary. Additionally, comprehensive assessments of policy effectiveness can be scheduled at regular intervals, providing opportunities to evaluate progress toward milestones. These decision nodes form a built-in monitoring and accountability mechanism, committing parliament to continuous evaluation and course-correction rather than merely initiating policies and moving on. This approach is essential for maintaining momentum on long-term initiatives beyond a single government’s term, ensuring that each subsequent legislature inherits a clear, structured roadmap with built-in checkpoints to sustain the envisioned goals.

Figure 2: Austria’s birth rate scenario building and backcasting timeline (illustrative example) / PDF, 99 KB

CONCLUSION

Bridging time horizons in parliamentary policymaking is both challenging and essential today. Democracies have to balance immediate demands with long-term needs. This contribution argues that combining scenario-building with backcasting is a powerful way to do so. By using predictive, exploratory, and normative foresight, legislators can better understand possible futures, imagine alternatives, and shape desired outcomes. Scenario planning broadens perspectives, while backcasting turns future visions into present-day actions. Together, they help parliaments plan coherently across short, medium, and long-term horizons.

Pluralistic backcasting engaging stakeholders to co-create visions and map pathways is not just technical but political, building coalitions and motivating action. The Austria birth rate case shows how demographic trends can become actionable policy steps through these methods, making the future more accessible for decision-makers.

For researchers, this approach raises new questions about adapting foresight to different parliaments and its real policy impact. For policymakers, scenarios and backcasting are practical tools for anticipatory, resilient governance and not just theoretical exercises. Ultimately, parliamentary foresight is about democratic responsibility ensuring today’s laws benefit both current and future generations. By systematically using these methods, parliaments can bridge the gap between present decisions and future needs.

Presentation: Erokhin — Bridging Time Horizons / PDF, 1 MB

LIST OF REFERENCES 

Bengston, D. N. (2013). Horizon scanning for environmental foresight: A review of issues and approaches. Gen. Tech. Rep. NRS-121. Newtown Square, PA: US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern Research Station. 20 p., 121, 1-20.

Börjeson, L., Höjer, M., Dreborg, K. H., Ekvall, T., & Finnveden, G. (2006). Scenario types and techniques: Towards a user's guide. Futures, 38(7), 723-739.

D’Aunno, T., Hearld, L., & Alexander, J. A. (2019). Sustaining multistakeholder alliances. Health Care Management Review, 44(2), 183-194.

Duin, H. (2007). Causal cross-impact analysis as a gaming tool for strategic decision making. Multidisciplinary Research on New Methods for Learning and Innovation in Enterprise Networks, 79-93.

Ganske, P., & Carbon, C. C. (2022). Re-thinking cluster policies: The role of shared vision and Place Leadership on the development of resilient clusters. Leadership, Education, Personality: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 4(1), 1-6.

Inter‑Parliamentary Union. (2023). Second World Summit of the Committees of the Future. Montevideo, Uruguay. Inter‑Parliamentary Union. Retrieved from https://www.ipu.org/event/second-world-summit-committees-future

John, T., & MacAskill, W. (2021). Longtermist institutional reform. In N. Cargill & T. M. John (Eds.), The Long View: Essays on policy, philanthropy, and the long‑term future. FIRST.

Koskimaa, V., & Raunio, T. (2023). Curtailing political short-termism in legislatures: A trade-off between influence and institutionalization?. European Journal of Futures Research, 11(1), 8.

Mete, S. (2022). Towards degrowth housing development? Lessons from a scenario-based gaming session in the Oslo region. Local Environment, 27(4), 517-536.

Rovenskaya, E., Strelkovskii, N., Erokhin, D., & Ilmola-Sheppard, L. (2024). Future scenarios of commercial freight shipping in the Euro-Asian Arctic. Futures, 163, 103446.

Statistik Austria. (2024). Demographic indicators (annual data). Statistik Austria. https://www.statistik.at/en/statistics/population-and-society/population/demographic-indicators-and-tables/demographic-indicators-annual-data#:~:text=Total%20fertility%20rate%20

UN Futures Lab & Global Hub. (2025, June 12). UN 2.0 Week 2025: Delivering foresight for impact [Event page]. UN Futures Lab. https://un‑futureslab.org/un-2-0-week-2025-foresight-day-event/

Van der Duin, P. (Ed.). (2016). Foresight in organizations: Methods and tools. Routledge.

Marion Foster, PhD, is a policy researcher focused on the intersection of international relations, foreign policy, and historical inquiry. Her work explores how historical experience shapes the contemporary security strategies and alliance behavior of small states in Europe. She holds a PhD in Public Policy from the University of Texas at Austin as well as Master’s degrees in International Affairs and in Peace Studies.

Neutrality has been a defining factor of Austria’s foreign policy since the country regained its sovereignty after World War II and Allied occupation. Enshrined in a constitutional law passed by parliament in 1955 (Office of the Federal Chancellor, 1955), Austria’s adoption of permanent neutrality had its roots in the geopolitical exigencies of the Cold War, especially the Soviet Union’s desire to prevent the emergence of a "German bloc” in central Europe and to establish a neutral buffer zone between the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the states of the Warsaw Pact (Senn, 2023; Bischof & Ruggenthaler, 2022; Gehler, 2005).

Over time, the legal and political stance of neutrality came to underpin the notion of a specifically Austrian identity in international politics, based on the country’s perception as an impartial actor in between the blocs of superpower confrontation and as a mediator in international conflicts (Gebhard, 2013; Rathkolb, 2020; Karner, 2005). However, during the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and Austria’s accession to the European Union raised questions about the strategic viability of neutrality in a changed European security environment (Bischof & Ruggenthaler, 2022; Rathkolb, 2021).

The adoption of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Communities into the European Union and laid the groundwork for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which appeared to conflict with an expansive interpretation of Austria’s neutrality (Maurer, 2023; Senn, 2023) and gradually led to the reduction of neutrality to its core military obligations, namely the prohibition against joining military alliances or stationing foreign troops on Austrian territory (Wohnout, 1992; Khol, 1994). Subsequent constitutional adaptations enabled Austria to engage in EU-led military missions and to align itself with the goals of European foreign policy (Gehler, 2005; Hauser, 2017).

Even as its political and legal interpretations changed, the constitutional law on neutrality was not repealed and a comprehensive, robust public debate about Austria’s future security stance did not occur. As a result, critics have argued, on the one hand, that neutrality has been eroded without a clear democratic mandate (Hauser, 2017) and, on the other hand, that Austria has turned into a "free rider” on European security, benefiting from the defense investments of its neighbors without contributing its fair share (Österreich ist Trittbrettfahrer, 2022). These tensions only intensified with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which prompted two other formerly neutral states, Sweden and Finland, to abandon their alliance-free posture and join NATO instead.

The Austrian parliament represents a key arena where national identity and foreign policy values are publicly articulated and discussed. It thus emerges as a critical site for understanding whether Austrian neutrality is simply being reaffirmed in symbolic terms or whether it is being reimagined in ways that enable the country to meet new security challenges in a more integrated and, increasingly, militarized Europe. This essay seeks to illuminate this question by examining how Austria’s concept of neutrality has evolved since the end of the Cold War within parliamentary discourse. Using qualitative discourse analysis, the essay explores the concepts of neutrality that were and are articulated in parliamentary discussions at key turning points of Austrian foreign policy:

• First, in the context of the decision to open negotiations for accession to the European Communities in 1989;
• Second, during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union in 2008; and
• Finally, in the framework of debates on Austria’s new security posture following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹ 

The essay’s findings are based on close textual analysis of plenary debate transcripts from Austria’s National Council (Nationalrat), with particular attention to how neutrality is described, invoked, and positioned in relation to its contribution to national security as well as its compatibility with European integration. The analysis also seeks to identify shifting patterns in emphasis over time. It thus contributes to a broader inquiry into the role democratic deliberations play in influencing foreign policy.

CONCEPTS OF NEUTRALITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

The analysis of parliamentary debates across the three focal periods specified above reveals a range of conceptions of Austrian neutrality, which operate along two central axes of tension: first, the contribution neutrality makes to Austria’s national security and second, its compatibility with an increasingly integrated European foreign and security policy. The relevant conceptions can be summarized as falling into the following broad categories:

Table 1. Summary of Neutrality Concepts / PDF, 62 KB

NEUTRALITY AS A SECURITIY STRATEGY 

This concept of neutrality has its roots in the Cold War security landscape of central Europe. It emphasizes the idea of Austria as a stabilizing buffer between the opposing military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It also articulates the belief, implied in Austria’s active neutrality policy, that the best guarantee for a small state’s security amid bloc confrontation was to prove itself useful to the great powers by providing "good offices,” such as mediation in international conflicts, and by fostering East-West dialogue.

The concept of neutrality as a security strategy for Austria was particularly pronounced in the parliamentary debate of 1989, when it was invoked to reaffirm the country’s continued role as a stabilizing factor for peace and security in Europe.

"Even in the current period of global détente between East and West, and particularly in Europe, Austria's permanent neutrality has not lost its significance for stability in the heart of Europe." —Ludwig Steiner (Parliament of Austria, 1989) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

Following EU enlargement and the end of the ideological division of Europe, the invocation of Austria’s neutral status as a viable contribution to national security declined in parliamentary debate because the strategic rationale associated with the neutrality’s buffer and bridge functions lost its. Nevertheless, some nostalgic references to Austria’s Cold War role continue to persist in parliamentary discourse even though they reflect a symbolic reaffirmation of past achievements more than a forward-looking practice of active international engagement.

"Austrian history, the achievement of neutrality, the achievement of freedom from occupation, these are values that are infinitely precious and important to the people of Austria ... neutrality policy has its purpose." —Karl Nehammer (Parliament of Austria, 2023) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

NEUTRALITY AS AN OBLIGATION

This concept focuses on the legal duties of neutrality as enshrined in Austrian law, namely the prohibition against joining military alliances or hosting foreign troops on the country’s territory. In addition, it often refers to a secondary, political obligation to pursue policies in peacetime that allow Austria to remain neutral in the event of violent conflict. It is thus tied not only to Austria’s constitutional self-understanding but also cited as a foundation of the country’s credibility and of its unique status within the international community of states.

"That is precisely why … we have attached so much importance to the fact that all the agreements now reached … express Austria's clear expectation that, even as a member of the European Communities, Austria will be able to fulfill the legal obligations arising from its status of perpetual neutrality, but above all that it will be able to continue its policy of neutrality, its unmistakable contribution … to peace and security in Europe." —Peter Jankowitsch (Parliament of Austria, 1989) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

Even as Austria integrated into the EU and its evolving foreign and security policy, the concept of neutrality as a duty and guideline for the country’s foreign policy. At the same time, this concept also introduces a certain tension with EU foreign policy mechanisms, particularly when it comes to the imposition of sanctions or common security missions. Thus, it sometimes serves to draw the symbolic and legal boundaries that limit the extent to which integration into a common European foreign and security policy is possible.

"The essential core of our neutrality is that we still retain sovereignty to decide what and how we join or help in all our accession negotiations or assistance commitments." —Peter Wittmann (Parliament of Austria, 2008) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

At other times, the notion of neutrality as duty and obligation is raised to criticize the legal and political hollowing out of neutrality through Austria’s participation in EU security structures, including in peacekeeping or defense coordination. In this sense, neutrality as a legal obligation is invoked to express concerns that Austria has moved too far toward integration and has thus neglected or violated its duty of neutrality.

"Now you come here and support a reform treaty … which even hints at the possibility of preventive war of aggression by the EU outside the European Union. And you claim that this is not an erosion of neutrality?" —Heinz-Christian Strache (Parliament of Austria, 2008) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

NEUTRALITY AS A NORMATIVE VALUE

This concept interprets neutrality as a constructive and value-based contribution to a European order of peace. While rooted in Austria’s post-1955 tradition of "active neutrality,” in contemporary discourse it serves to associate neutrality with purportedly European values such as diplomacy, non-violence, and a readiness to engage in dialogue. It therefore recasts Austrian neutrality as a distinctive contribution to a common European security architecture—a European order of peace—that is consistent with the view of the European Union as a normative power in international politics.

"For us … neutrality is … an instrument of peace in Europe. … We want to contribute culturally, economically and politically to an order of peace in Europe." —Andreas Khol (Parliament of Austria, 1989) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

Framing it as a contribution to an emerging order of peace in Europe posits that neutrality continues to reinforce Austria’s national security by building a peace-oriented national identity. At the same time, this framing also aligns well with the country’s participation in European integration. It is thus invoked in connection with the flexible adaptation of neutrality to EU membership, emphasizing its compatibility with the pursuit of general EU goals such as the strengthening of a rules-based international order and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

"The question in Europe is no longer neutrality versus Europe, but rather a common European peace policy based on international law, with mandates from the United Nations, versus the presumption of what may be more than just one military superpower acting unilaterally in violation of the letter and spirit of international law …"—Peter Pilz (Parliament of Austria, 2008) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

NEUTRALITY AS AN OBSTACLE

A final concept, which has gained ground in parliamentary discourse over the past decade, frames neutrality not as a virtue but as a hindrance to effective security and defense cooperation within the European Union. This notion marks a conceptual break with the traditionally positive interpretations of Austrian neutrality. It portrays neutrality as outdated and counterproductive in an era of collective security challenges, such as hybrid warfare and transnational threats.

"Finland and Sweden … have recognized that neutrality alone does not protect us. What protects us is a strong partnership, an alliance with like-minded partners who are all committed to our community of values."—Beate Meinl-Reisinger (Parliament of Austria, 2023) [Note by the Parliamentary Administration: Translation by the author]

The concept of neutrality as an obstacle to both national security and further European integration remains marginal at this point, but it indicates a significant discursive shift and may thus illustrate the growing pressures on traditional neutrality conceptions arising from within democratic institutions.

CONCLUSION

Austria’s neutrality has evolved from a core pillar of the country’s strategic posture during the Cold War into a more ambiguous and contested concept. The analysis of relevant debates within the National Council in 1989, 2008, and 2023-2024 reveals that parliament plays a role in sustaining and symbolically reaffirming public images of neutrality but not necessarily in reimagining its function within a transformed European and global security environment.

Traditional conceptions of neutrality—as a legal duty and as the cornerstone of a peace-oriented identity—continue to dominate. These narratives serve several stabilizing functions, such as to reassure the public of continuity in foreign policy, to reinforce Austria’s post-World War II self-image as a moral and peaceful state, and to portray neutrality as a consensual value. The symbolic reaffirmation of neutrality in parliamentary discourse is complemented by a degree of semantic flexibility, especially in aligning neutrality with the notion of specifically European values of peace and diplomacy. This flexibility in interpretation reconciles Austria’s neutral status with the country’s participation in the European integration project.

However, this largely symbolic use of neutrality remains vague and thus fails to specify the concrete value-added that Austria’s neutrality brings to a purported European order of peace. Specific proposals about how neutrality should function in a world of more fluid collective defense arrangements and novel challenges, ranging from hybrid threats and cyber warfare to climate change, remain few and far between in parliamentary debate. Similarly, calls for Austria to completely renounce neutrality will remain marginal as long as they are not coupled with realistic proposals on alternative alignment options that can win over a majority of the public and policy elite.

Ultimately, the findings of this essay suggest that if neutrality is to be more than a nostalgic reference point, it must be re-articulated for contemporary challenges. This requires not just quiet constitutional adjustments, but an open, inclusive, and forward-looking debate—one in which parliament could play a much more active role.

¹ Since a plenary debate on Austria’s new security strategy is pending, the essay analyzes several relevant discussions that have taken place in the National Council on Austria’s role in a transformed European security landscape in 2023-2024.

LIST OF REFERENCES 

Bischof, G. & Ruggenthaler, P. (2022). Österreich und der Kalte Krieg: Ein Balanceakt zwischen Ost und West. Leykam Verlag.

Bundesverfassungsgesetz: Neutralität Österreichs, Federal Law Gazette n° 211/1955 (1955).

Gebhard, C. (2013). Is Small Still Beautiful? The Case of Austria. Swiss Political Science Review, 19(3), 279-297, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12042.

Gehler, M. (2005). Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik. Von der alliierten Besatzung bis zum Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts. Studienverlag.

Hauser, G. (2017). ESDP and Austria: Security Policy between Engagement and Neutrality. In G. Bischof et al., Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context (pp. 207-245). Routledge.

Karner, C. (2005). The "Habsburg Dilemma” Today: Competing Discourses of National Identity in Contemporary Austria. National Identities 7(4), 409-432, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940500334382.

Khol, A. (1994). Die österreichische Neutralität und die Teilnahme an der GASP. In M. Gehler (2002), Der lange Weg nach Europa. Bd. 2: Dokumente (pp. 682-683). Studienverlag.

Maurer, A. (2023). Österreichische Europapolitik. In M. Senn et al. (Eds.), Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs (pp. 699-728). Springer VS.

Parliament of Austria (2023). Stenographisches Protokoll. 200. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, Freitag, 24. Februar 2023, XXVII. Gesetzgebungsperiode, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/NRSITZ/200/fname_1590795.pdf.

Parliament of Austria (2008). Stenographisches Protokoll. 55. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, XXIII. Gesetzgebungsperiode, Mittwoch, 9. April 2008. https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXIII/NRSITZ/55/fname_113800.pdf.

Parliament of Austria (1989). Stenographisches Protokoll. 110. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, XVII. Gesetzgebungsperiode, Donnerstag, 29.6., und Freitag, 30.6.1989. https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XVII/NRSITZ/110/imfname_160821.pdf.

Rathkolb, O. (2021). The Paradoxical Republic: Austria 1945-2020 (2nd ed.). Berghahn Books.

Rathkolb, O. (2020). Die Zweite Republik (seit 1945). In T. Winkelbauer (Ed.), Geschichte Österreichs (4th ed.). Reclam.

Reimon: Österreich ist "Trittbrettfahrer in europäischer Sicherheispolitik". (2022, May 18). Kurier, https://kurier.at/politik/inland/reimon-oesterreich-ist-trittbrettfahrer-in-europaeischer-sicherheitspolitik/402011436.

Senn, M. (2023). Österreichs Neutralität. In M. Senn et al. (Eds.), Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs (pp. 23-50). Springer VS.

Wohnout, H. (1992). Protokoll über die Informationsreise nach Brüssel, 19.-21.10.1992. In M. Gehler (2002), Der lange Weg nach Europa. Bd. 2: Dokumente (pp. 526-532). Studienverlag.

Dr. Christoph Ivanusch is a postdoctoral fellow in the ERC Advanced Grant project SYNCPOL at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, LMU Munich. His research interests include political communication, political systems and computational social science.

Dr. Leonce Röth is a postdoctoral fellow in the ERC Advanced Grant project SYNCPOL at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, LMU Munich . Previously, he was interim professor for methods at University of Cologne and has worked on policy-making in multi-level systems.

Prof. Dr. Klaus H. Goetz holds the Chair in Political Systems and European Integration at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, LMU Munich. He is the Principal Investigator of the ERC Advanced Grant SYNCPOL. He has been co-editor of West European Politics since 2000.

Acknowledgements: This paper is part of the ERC Advanced Grant SYNCPOL — Synchronised Politics: Multiple Times and Political Power (Number 101054122), funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

INTRODUCTION

What is the role of national parliaments in EU policy making? National parliaments are part of a complex multi-level governance system in the European Union and fulfill a crucial function for its democratic legitimacy (e.g., Auel & Christiansen 2015; Crum & Fossum 2009; Gattermann & Hefftler 2015; Meissner & Crum 2025; Rauh & De Wilde 2018). Accordingly, there is an ongoing academic debate about national parliaments’ effective role in EU policy-making processes. The literature focuses on several key aspects, such as the (changing) position of national parliaments and the related effects on democratic representation in the EU (e.g., Auel & Christiansen 2015; Leino-Sandberg & Raunio 2025; Pollak 2014; Raunio 2011; Winzen 2022); cross-national variation in national parliamentary behaviour (e.g., Gattermann & Hefftler 2015; Lehmann 2023; Raunio 2005); or the role perceptions of national MPs (e.g., Borońska-Hryniewiecka & Sacriste 2025; Kinski 2021a, 2021b). Despite this vibrant scholarly debate, we still lack a systematic understanding and large-scale comparative evidence on how national parliaments influence EU institutions and vice versa in policy making. Thus, we ask: Do debates in national parliaments drive issue attention and temporal priorities within the EU's multi-level system? Or do EU institutions, such as the European Commission, set the agenda and the political timescape (Meyer-Sahling & Goetz 2009)?

In principle, two main dimensions structure the EU’s multi-level system: a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension refers to the streams of influence between EU institutions and national parliaments or member states (e.g., Haverland & Liefferink 2012; Koop et al. 2022; Princen 2007, 2011). The horizontal dimension concerns the diffusion of policies and practices across national parliaments or member states (e.g., Blatter et al. 2021; Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2019; Gilardi et al. 2021; Kuhlmann 2021). Both dimensions are integral to understanding how policy making unfolds within the EU’s multi-level system.

To examine how national parliaments and EU institutions shape each other’s issue attention and temporal priorities, we employ the conceptual lenses of communicative agenda setting and, in particular, time setting. Communicative agenda setting refers to the process by which political actors influence, and compete over, which issues receive attention in the political system (McCombs & Shaw 1972; Green-Pedersen & Walgrave 2014). In parallel, we define communicative time setting as the process by which political actors influence, and compete over, when political action should be taken on specific issues. These concepts allow us to investigate whether national parliaments drive attention and set priorities for political action in the EU, or whether EU institutions are the primary driving forces.

RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND METHODS

In our study, we have assembled a large-scale comparative data set comprising a full corpus of national parliamentary speeches from the EU27 and the United Kingdom, as well as all public speeches by the European Commission – Commission Presidents and Commissioners – between 2009 and 2022. This novel data set enables us to investigate agenda-setting and time-setting dynamics between the European Union’s national parliaments and its key executive institution – the European Commission.

To map the salience of political issues – migration, health, and environmental protection – and the corresponding temporal preferences for political action in this large-scale corpus, we use state-of-the-art computational text analysis techniques. First, we apply open-source transformer-based models, fine-tuned on data from the Comparative Agendas Project (Sebők et al. 2024) to classify sentences from the individual parliamentary and Commission speeches into political issues. This allows us to detect the salience of migration, health and environmental protection in our speech corpus.

Second, we use zero- and few-shot classification with open-source Large Language Models (Alizadeh et al. 2025; Burnham et al. 2024; Laurer et al. 2024) to identify temporal preferences in the sentences. Specifically, we detect explicit calls for fast action, which represent the intended "fast” timing of a proposed policy response (Röth et al. 2024; Röth et al. 2025). In our conceptualization, such calls for fast action need to entail a reference to a social dynamic and to the timing of a policy response. For example, "We therefore need these common environmental goals, a joint approach, and a prompt decision” or "Asylum procedures should be carried out quickly…” would represent such calls for fast action in the areas of environmental protection and immigration respectively. Using zero- and few-shot classification models, we can reliably detect such invocations of time pressure in both parliamentary speeches and Commission speeches.

The resulting data offers unique insights into the structuration of key political debates at both the national and EU levels over time. Based on this data, we then statistically model the dynamics of agenda setting and time setting between member state parliaments and EU institutions. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) models, we analyze who drives attention to political issues (i.e., agenda setting) and who shapes the temporal priorities of political action (i.e., time setting) across member states, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

In this paper, we present initial results based on the analysis of parliamentary debates in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Italy, as well as public speeches by the European Commission. Here, we primarily focus on communicative time setting between the selected national parliaments and the European Commission.

As a first step, we examine descriptive patterns in the data. Figure 1 illustrates the development of high time pressure invocations (i.e., calls for fast action) related to immigration between 2014 and 2017 – a period that covers the full trajectory of the European "refugee crisis.” The findings show that the Italian parliament was the first among the analyzed institutions to exhibit an increase in calls for fast action on immigration, with notable spikes as early as spring and autumn/winter 2014, as well as in spring 2015. The national parliaments of Austria and Germany followed some months later, with a marked increase in time pressure invocations during the summer and autumn of 2015. By contrast, the European Commission and Denmark began to invoke heightened time pressure only in autumn and winter 2015/16. These patterns correspond closely to the timing of refugee arrivals in each country and suggest a potential time-setting effect exerted by certain member states on the European Commission.

Figure 1: Development of calls for fast action on immigration (2014-2017) / PDF, 285 KB

To more closely investigate these descriptive findings, we apply vector autoregression (VAR) models, which enable us to statistically model the reciprocal influence between national parliaments and the European Commission. In the case of immigration, the results suggest that national parliaments indeed exert a combined time-setting effect on the European Commission. Specifically, when national parliaments across the EU invoke increased time pressure on immigration (as measured by the pooled mean), the European Commission tends to issue more frequent calls for fast action in the subsequent months. We find little to no evidence for a reverse effect – i.e., the Commission does not appear to influence time pressure invocations on immigration in national parliaments. However, we also find substantial heterogeneity as the influence of individual national parliaments on the Commission varies considerably.

Figure 2: Time setting effects of national parliaments on the European Commission in the area of immigration. / PDF, 86 KB

Similarly, we observe substantial variation when analyzing time-setting dynamics in the areas of environmental protection and health. In these policy domains, we find no consistent combined effect of national parliaments on the European Commission, nor any clear reverse effect. Instead, the results reveal significant variation across individual national parliaments. These findings underscore the need for further and deeper research to disentangle the time-setting dynamics between national parliaments and the European Commission across different policy areas.

Figure 3: Time setting effects of national parliaments on the European Commission in the areas of health and environmental protection. / PDF, 94 KB

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

National parliaments play a crucial role for democratic legitimacy in the EU multi-level system, but our understanding of how and to what extent national parliaments influence EU institutions – and vice versa – in policy making remains limited. To close this gap, we have provided large-scale comparative evidence on how national parliaments can shape the timescape in the EU multi-level system. More precisely, we looked at communicative time setting – the process by which political actors influence and compete on when political action should be taken on specific issues.

Building on state-of-the-art computational text analysis techniques, our preliminary findings for the national parliaments of Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Italy, as well as the European Commission, have revealed the complexity of policy making in the European Union. While we have found that national parliaments (can) act as communicative time setters for the European Commission – i.e., shape the perception and invocation of time pressure by the European Commission – in the area of migration, this does not appear to apply to other policy domains (i.e., environmental protection, health). Furthermore, we find substantial variation across national parliaments.

These findings contribute to the ongoing debate about the role of national parliaments in the EU’s multi-level system. As central arenas of political discourse within the member states, national parliaments function as representative institutions for policy preferences. This also extends to temporal preferences for political action and the perception of time pressure on specific issues. In this way, national parliaments play a key role in shaping the timescape of European politics by communicatively influencing how time pressure is perceived – at least with regard to some political issues.

On a cautious note, however, and as discussed above, our current findings are based on a preliminary analysis of a specific sample of national parliaments (Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Italy). While this already yields valuable insights, our assembled data set also allows for a full analysis of all national parliaments from the EU27 and the United Kingdom. Combined with additional robustness checks, this broader analysis will provide a more comprehensive and reliable investigation of the underlying dynamics between national parliaments and the European Commission.

LIST OF REFERENCES 

Alizadeh, M., Kubli, M., Samei, Z., Dehghani, S., Zahedivafa, M., Bermeo, J. D., Korobeynikova, M., & Gilardi, F. (2025). Open-source LLMs for text annotation: A practical guide for model setting and fine-tuning. Journal of Computational Social Science, 8(1), 1-25.

Auel, K., & Christiansen, T. (2015). After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the European Union. West European Politics, 38(2), 261–281.

Blatter, J., Portmann, L., & Rausis, F. (2021). Theorizing policy diffusion: From a patchy set of mechanisms to a paradigmatic typology. Journal of European Public Policy, 29(6), 805–825.

Borońska-Hryniewiecka, K., & Sacriste, G. (2025). The domain of the right? Explaining national parliamentary preferences on EU-related self-empowerment. Parliamentary Affairs, 78(1), 158-181.

Burnham, M., Kahn, K., Wang, R. Y., & Peng, R. X. (2024). Political debate: Efficient zero-shot and few-shot classifiers for political text. arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.02078.

Crum, B., & Fossum, J. E. (2009). The Multilevel Parliamentary Field: A framework for theorizing representative democracy in the EU. European Political Science Review, 1(2), 249–271.

Gattermann, K., & Hefftler, C. (2015). Beyond Institutional Capacity: Political Motivation and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Early Warning System. West European Politics, 38(2), 305–334.

Gilardi, F., & Wasserfallen, F. (2019). The politics of policy diffusion. European Journal of Political Research, 58(4), 1245-1256.

Gilardi, F., Shipan, C. R., & Wüest, B. (2021). Policy diffusion: The issue‐definition stage. American Journal of Political Science, 65(1), 21-35.

Green-Pedersen, C., & Walgrave, S. (2014). Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems: A Comparative Approach. University of Chicago Press.

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Kinski, L. (2021a). European representation in EU national parliaments. Springer Nature.

Kinski, L. (2021b). What role for national parliaments in EU governance? A view by members of parliament. Journal of European Integration, 43(6), 717–738.

Koop, C., Reh, C., & Bressanelli, E. (2022). Agenda‐setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission? European Journal of Political Research, 61(1), 46-66.

Kuhlmann, J. (2021). Mechanisms of policy transfer and policy diffusion. In Handbook of policy transfer, diffusion and circulation (pp. 43-57). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Laurer, M., Van Atteveldt, W., Casas, A., & Welbers, K. (2024). Less annotating, more classifying: Addressing the data scarcity issue of supervised machine learning with deep transfer learning and BERT-NLI. Political Analysis, 32(1), 84-100.

Lehmann, F. (2023). Talking about Europe? Explaining the salience of the European Union in the plenaries of 17 national parliaments during 2006–2019. European Union Politics, 24(2), 370-389.

Leino-Sandberg, P., & Raunio, T. (2025). From Bad to Worse: The Continuous Dilemma Facing Parliaments in European Economic and Fiscal Governance. Government and Opposition, 60(1), 86–103.

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Rauh, C. and De Wilde, P. (2018). The opposition deficit in EU accountability: Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states. European Journal of Political Research, 57: 194-216.

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Röth, L., Goetz, K., & Triculescu, R. (2024). The invocation of time pressure in political communication. Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. Unpublished manuscript.

Röth, L., Ivanusch, C., Goetz, K., & Triculescu, R. (forthcoming). Responding in time: The European Commission’s communicative responsiveness to public opinion and functional pressure in the case of migration (2002-2024). Journal of European Public Policy.

Sebők, M., Máté, Á., Ring, O., Kovács, V., & Lehoczki, R. (2024). Leveraging open large language models for multilingual policy topic classification: The Babel machine approach. Social Science Computer Review, 0(0).

Winzen, T. (2022). The institutional position of national parliaments in the European Union: Developments, explanations, effects. Journal of European Public Policy, 29(6), 994–1008.

David Thaler is a master’s student in Political Science at the University of Vienna. His main research interests include Austrian politics, electoral research, party competition and quantitative methods.

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INTRODUCTION

Issue Ownership, understood as the identification of a party with a specific topic based on competence (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996) or automatic association (Tresch et al., 2015; Walgrave et al., 2009), is a well-established concept in the research on electoral behavior and party competition (Lefevere et al., 2015). The effect Issue Ownership has on parties’ behavior outside the electoral arena, e. g. in parliament, is still under-researched. The increase of electoral volatility (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2017) leads to greater fluctuation of the parties represented in parliament, potentially changing the thematic emphasis on certain topics in parliamentary work. Thus, the question arises: what is the impact of parliamentary representation of the issue-owning party on the issues’ presence in parliament?

This research question is rooted in the field of Issue Competition, dominated by two different theoretical approaches. The aforementioned Issue Ownership Theory proposes that parties emphasize issues on which they are seen as competent by the voters (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). The "Riding the Wave”-Theory offers an alternative explanation. Its proponents argue that parties put their focus on issues which are important to the electorate (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994). Both concepts are mostly focused on electoral campaigns. Issue Trespassing is a concept related to Issue Ownership. It describes a party addressing an issue over which a different party holds ownership with the goal of taking over said issue.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Existing research shows that the absence of the issue owning party in media discussions increases the effectivity of Issue Trespassing (Walgrave et al., 2009). A similar effect may occur when the issue owning party is not represented in parliament. One of the main risks of Issue Trespassing is to increase the salience of the issue, which in turn may help the issue owning party (Abou-Chadi, 2016). Following this argumentation the main hypothesis reads as follows:

H1: If the issue owning party loses parliamentary representation, parliamentary Issue Trespassing on the owned issue increases.

To investigate the effect in more detail, multiple interaction hypotheses are added. One open question is which parties are more likely to utilize Issue Trespassing. Previous research shows that both ideological proximity (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2015) and issue proximity (Meyer & Wagner, 2016) influence issue engagement. Competition over votes is closely related to these measures and makes for a compelling argument. Thus, the first interaction hypothesis reads:

H2: Higher competition over votes with the issue owning party increases the effect proposed in Hypothesis H1.

High issue salience increases the likelihood of Issue Trespassing in campaigns (Damore, 2004). It also makes Issue Ownership attacks more likely (Poljak & Seeberg, 2024). Issue Ownership attacks are similar to Issue Trespassing, but do not include the goal of taking over the issue. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

H3: High issue salience increases the effect proposed in Hypothesis H1.

The previous hypotheses were based on the Unitary Actor assumption, which postulates high intra-party cohesion and unitary voting behavior. But previous research has shown, that Member of the Parliament’s (MPs) specialization (Meyer & Wagner, 2021) and their position in the party hierarchy (Ennser-Jedenastik et al., 2022) influence their behavior. Based on that, the next hypothesis reads:

H4: Being a member of the committee responsible for the issues in question increases the effect proposed in Hypothesis H1 on the level of individual MPs.

The literature offers two theoretical approaches to explain MPs’ behavior. Dyadic representation assumes that MPs first and foremost represent interests of the constituency in which they won their mandate. This is closely linked to winner takes all electoral systems and low party cohesion. On the other side, partisan representation postulates that MPs first and foremost represent their parties’ opinion. This is linked to proportional representation and high party cohesion (Masket & Noel, 2012). These approaches mostly focus on voting behavior. But since parliamentary behavior outside of voting is less consequential, a form of dyadic representation may occur in otherwise atypical systems. This leads to the following final hypothesis:

H5: Having won one’s mandate in a constituency where the issue owning party is strong increases the effect proposed in Hypothesis H1 on the level of individual MPs.

CASE SELECTION AND DATA

The hypotheses will be tested using the case of the Green party in Austria. The Green party was not represented in the National Council during the 26th legislative period and it holds very clear ownership over the issue Environment (see Figure 1). According to Haselmayer and Jenny (2018) Austria can be regarded as a fairly representative Western European democracy. The observation period lasts from October 2013 to October 2024, covering the 25th, 26th and 27th legislative periods of the National Council.

Figure 1: Issue Ownership Environment / PDF, 70 KB

The necessary data for the analysis comes from multiple sources. The Open Data offer by the Austrian Parliament provides data on all written questions during the observation period. Written parliamentary questions are chosen to operationalize parliamentary behavior for multiple reasons. Because their use is not limited, a relatively high number of observations is available. Compared to legislative proposals they are less strongly influenced by the parliamentary agenda and they are less complex to analyze than parliamentary speeches.

The AUTNES Online Panel Study (Partheymüller et al., 2024) supplies data on Issue Ownership and on the competition over votes. Measures of the salience of the topic Environment in daily newspaper coverage are generated using data from the APA Online Manager (www.aom.apa.at). This measure is used to operationalize issue salience because it depicts both salience in the general population as well as the MPs perception of the salience and it is available in much finer grading than comparable survey data. Detailed election results are taken from wahldatenbank.at (www.wahldatenbank.at).

RESEARCH DESIGN

Since the dependent variable is binary, logistic regression is the method of choice for hypotheses testing. Each written question equals one row in the dataset. The analysis includes questions from all parties who were present in the National Council during the entirety of the observation period, namely the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the liberal NEOS. Apart from the independent variable Topic_Environment the main model includes the variables Greens_not_in_National_Council, Competition_over_Votes, Salience_Environment_Media and Member_Environmental_Committee. To test the hypotheses, interaction terms of Greens_not_in_National_Council with the variables Competition_over_Votes, Salience_Environment and Member_Environmental_Committee are added in additional models. Two control variables are added to the model, In_Government and Party. For these main models, the number of observations is 32350. The variable Strength_Greens_Constituency is analyzed in separate models including all previously mentioned variables, because its inclusion in the main model would drastically reduce the number of observations, which for these additional models is at 9000.

RESULTS

The results show that the absence of the Green party in the National Council increases the likelihood of a parliamentary question, which is initiated by any party other than the Greens, being about the topic Environment by 1.7%. This means that the analysis confirms the main hypothesis H1.

A higher grade of competition over votes between parties does increase the effect of the absence of the Green party. Thus, hypothesis H2 is confirmed (see Figure 2). The effect of the absence of the Green party decreases with increasing salience of the topic Environment. This is opposite to the effect proposed in hypothesis H3, which therefore must be dismissed (see Figure 3). Whether the initiating MP is a member of the environmental committee does not significantly change the effect of party absence. Accordingly, hypothesis H4 must also be dismissed (see Figure 4). Increasing strength of the Green party in the regional electoral district, where the initiating MP won his or her mandate, does increase the effect of the absence of the Green party. Thus, hypothesis H5 is confirmed by the analysis (see Figure 5).

Figure 2: AME Competition over Votes / PDF, 38 KB
Figure 3: AME Salience Environment / PDF, 41 KB
Figure 4: AME Member Environmental Committee / PDF, 44 KB
Figure 5: AME Strength Greens RED / PDF, 42 KB

The corresponding regression tables can be found here: Regression Tables / PDF, 221 KB

CONCLUSION

The analysis showed that the absence of the issue owning party from parliament does make issue trespassing in parliamentary behavior more likely. In general, higher competition over votes, higher issue salience and membership in the parliamentary committee, which oversees the issue, increase the probability of a parliamentary question being about the issue. If the issue owning party is strong in the regional electoral district, where the initiating MP won his or her mandate, this probability decreases. The results are less clear when it comes to the details of issue trespassing during the absence of the issue owning party. No significant interaction effect was found for competition over votes, committee membership and strength of the issue owning party in the regional electoral district. For issue salience the effect was opposite to the expectation: during the time the issue owning party was absent, the effect of issue salience decreased.

These partly inconclusive results offer potential for further research. One option would be to analyze different forms of parliamentary behavior, like legislative proposals or speeches. Quantitative text analysis could be a promising method to investigate the latter.

Presentation: Thaler — ISSUE WITHOUT OWNER? / PDF, 515 KB

LIST OF REFERENCES 

Abou-Chadi, T. (2016). Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 417–436. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000155

Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1994). Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership Over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 58(3), 335–357.

Budge, I., & Farlie, D. (1983). Party competition: Selective emphasis or direct confrontation? : An alternative view with data. In H. Daalder & P. Mair (Eds.), Western European party systems. Sage. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/41171

Chiaramonte, A., & Emanuele, V. (2017). Party system volatility, regeneration and de-institutionalization in Western Europe (1945–2015). Party Politics, 23(4), 376–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815601330

Damore, D. F. (2004). The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Campaigns. Political Research Quarterly, 57(3), 391–397. https://doi.org/10.2307/3219849

Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Haselmayer, M., Huber, L. M., & Fenz, M. (2022). Who talks about what? Issue strategies across the party hierarchy. European Journal of Political Research, 61(3), 842–852. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12500

Green-Pedersen, C., & Mortensen, P. B. (2015). Avoidance and Engagement: Issue Competition in Multiparty Systems. Political Studies, 63(4), 747–764. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12121

Haselmayer, M., & Jenny, M. (2018). Friendly fire? Negative campaigning among coalition partners. Research & Politics, 5(3), 2053168018796911. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018796911

Lefevere, J., Tresch, A., & Walgrave, S. (2015). Introduction: Issue Ownership. West European Politics, 38(4), 755–760. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1039375

Masket, S. E., & Noel, H. (2012). Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan versus Dyadic Legislative Representation. Political Research Quarterly, 65(1), 104–123. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912910388188

Meyer, T. M., & Wagner, M. (2016). Issue Engagement in Election Campaigns The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints. Political Science Research and Methods, 4(3), 555–571. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.40

Meyer, T. M., & Wagner, M. (2021). Issue Engagement Across Members of Parliament: The Role of Issue Specialization and Party Leadership. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 46(3), 653–678. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12308

Partheymüller, J., Aichholzer, J., Kritzinger, S., Wagner, M., Plescia, C., Eberl, J.-M., Meyer, T., Boomgaarden, H., & Müller, W. C. (2024). AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017-2024 (SUF edition). AUSSDA. https://doi.org/10.11587/HNUFCC

Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825–850. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111797

Poljak, Ž., & Seeberg, H. B. (2024). Attacks and Issue Competition: Do Parties Attack Based on Issue Salience or Issue Ownership? Political Communication, 41(2), 269–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2023.2264224

Tresch, A., Lefevere, J., & Walgrave, S. (2015). ‘Steal me if you can!’ The impact of campaign messages on associative issue ownership. Party Politics, 21(2), 198–208. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812472576

Walgrave, S., Lefevere, J., & Nuytemans, M. (2009). Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances. Political Communication, 26(2), 153–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600902850718

Teresa Torzicky is an Austrian expert in educational innovation and impact measurement. After earning a PhD in medical physics and working for several years as a teacher, she joined Teach For Austria and later served as expert and team lead at the Innovation Foundation for Education in Vienna. Since 2024, she has been heading the civil society initiative "BID – Strengthening Education Together," which advocates for systemic change and democratic strategies in the education system.

Jakob Schneider studied Law, Sinology, and Cognitive Science at the University of Vienna and subsequently worked as a communications and brand expert. Through the Social Leadership Program of Teach For Austria, he entered the teaching profession.

Lukas Zimmermann completed his studies in Political Science at the University of Vienna. He then worked in the fields of communications and school administration. He is currently working as a teacher at a middle school in Vienna.

In an era marked by rapid digital transformation and rising social segregation, democratic institutions face pressing new challenges. BID – Strengthening Education Together firmly believes that education is a strategic lever to protect and revitalize civic engagement, promote inclusion, and reinforce democratic resilience. With this in focus, we invite parliamentarians, policymakers, researchers, educators, and civil society to join the BID-1000, which is a new design of a participatory process that aims to foster a longterm strategy for the Austrian education system.

THE CONTEXT: DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION MEETING SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

Digitalization is reshaping public life: communication channels, work environments, civic participation, and even interpersonal relations are increasingly mediated by technology. While these changes hold enormous potential, they also propel risks—unequal access to digital infrastructure, algorithmic bias, disinformation, and growing digital divides marked by age, educational level, and socio-economic status.

Simultaneously, social segregation is worsening: economic inequality, residential fragmentation, and under-resourced schools concentrate disadvantage in specific communities. Young people in segregated neighborhoods frequently face barriers in the digital and education spheres, limiting their opportunities and weakening social cohesion.

Both of these aspects have negative influence on the quality of political and societal dialogue and thereby foster degradation of democracy. With the BID-1000 the initiative BID – Strengthening education together is suggesting a solution to the above described situation.

WHAT IS THE BID-1000?

The BID-1000 is a long-term, nationwide impact and development process designed to:

• Engage 1000 actors across Austria (including educators, students, researchers, policymakers, NGOs, parents, and school leaders)
• Co-create education solutions based on shared challenges and democratic values
• Generate scalable insights for policy, practice, and public discourse

CORE OBJECTIVES

• Democratize Education Policy
  Bring underrepresented voices—especially those of students, teachers, and marginalized communities—into strategic education planning.
• Foster Systemic Innovation
  Support cross-sector experimentation and reflection that goes beyond isolated pilot projects, focusing on scalable, transformative ideas.
• Build Trust through Dialogue
  Enable respectful, structured exchange between people with diverse perspectives—across political, regional, and social boundaries.
• Generate Impact Evidence
  Use rigorous evaluation and transparent reporting to assess what works, why, and for whom—informing both policy and practice.
• Generate a long-term strategy
  BID – Strengthening education together aims to foster a long-term strategy for the education sector in Austria with implementing the BID-1000 dialogue process.

KEY ELEMENTS OF BID-1000

• 1000+ Stakeholders: Participating across different phases—through workshops, interviews, deliberative forums, and digital collaboration tools.
• Thematic Fields: The process focuses on key challenges like digitalization, teacher shortage, equity, school leadership, and civic education.
• Parliamentary Dialogue: Structured reflection loops with parliamentary actors to integrate findings into the political process.
• Open Knowledge Platform: All insights, tools, and methods are shared transparently to foster wider societal engagement.

ABOUT BID — STRENGTHENING EDUCATION TOGETHER

BID is a civil-society initiative based in Austria that seeks to strengthen education policy through democratic innovation, systemic thinking, and measurable impact. By bridging research, lived experience, and policymaking, BID works toward an education system where every young person—regardless of background—has the tools to participate in society, flourish personally, and contribute thoughtfully to democratic life.

INVITATION & CALL TO ACTION

We call on parliamentarians, committee staff, and researchers to partner with civic organizations, youth networks, and evaluators to design education policies that:

• Address digital exclusion and social fragmentation with evidence-based, participatory practices.
• Measure impact—not only outputs, but true shifts in agency, trust, and inclusion.
• Embed democratic dialogue and reflection across all levels of policymaking, education, and civic life.

Join us on the Austrian Day of Parliamentary Research to explore how to ensure that Transition is not only about change—but about engaging all members of society in shaping it.

Presentation: Torzicky, Schneider, Zimmermann — Dialogue in Transition / PDF, 1022 KB

LIST OF REFERENCES 

Democracy Dies in Darkness - Fake News, Big Tech, AI: Hat die Wa(hre) Nachricht eine Zukunft;? Clemens Pig; Brandstätter Verlag (2023)

Mediendemokratie in guter Verfassung? Die verfassungrechtliche Pflicht zur Intermediärsregulierung?; Torben Klausa; Duncker & Humbolt GmbH (2025) FairFassung - So geht Demokratie Essay für eine Reform des Grundgesetzes; Clemens Oswald (2024)

Die Zukunft der Demokratie; Herfried Münkler; Christian Brandstätter Verlag (2022) mehr demokratie wagen - für eine Teilhaben aller; bruno s. frey & oliver zimmer; Aufbau Verlag GmbH (2023)

Bürger:innenräte und Parlamente in Österreich; Christoph CLAR / Christoph KONRATH / Marlies MEYER; Öffentliches Recht – Jahrbuch 2023 herausgegeben von Univ Prof. Gerhard Baumgartner; Institut für Rechtswissenschaften, Alpe Adria Universität Klagenfurt (2023)

Triggerpunkte: Konsens und Konflikt in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft; Steffen Mau, Thomas Lux, Linus Westhäuser; Suhrkampfverlag Berlin (2023)

Demokratie: Wofür es sich jetzt zu kämpfen lohnt; Gabriele von Arnim, Lukas Bärfuss, Marcel Beyer et.all; Rowohltverlag (2024)

Das Wahlverhalten Österreichs / Alle Nationalratswahlen frei zugänglich im Web | Redaktion Österreichisches Pressebüro (12.06.25)

Österreichischer Demokratie Monitor 2024 (12.06.25)

Addie Erwin has served as Data Officer at the Inter‑Parliamentary Union since 2017, overseeing the IPU’s authoritative PARLINE database on national parliaments and coordinating a global network of Parline correspondents. She leads data collection, quality control, and technical developments of Parline, and manages monitoring and reporting on SDG indicators 5.5.1a and 16.7.1a. Prior to joining IPU, she worked at the OECD as a Policy Analyst focusing on public governance and women’s representation in public life.

Poster: Erwin — Parline database today / PDF, 437 KB

Dr. Katrin Praprotnik is a political scientist at the Department of Public Law and Political Science at the University of Graz. She is the editor of the Handbook The Political System of Austria: Basic Knowledge and Research Insights (Böhlau 2023) and runs the website politikmonitor.at, which tracks the implementation of election promises in Austria. Praprotnik’s research focuses, among other things, on political parties and party competition, political representation and participation, as well as the political system of Austria. Her research is published in journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, Party Politics, and Regional Studies.

Poster: Prapotnik — Politikmonitor.at / PDF, 698 KB

Benjamin Riesch is a research associate at the Institute of Government (University of Vienna) in the projects "Party Congress Politics” and "Intra-Party Politics and Economic Policies” since October 2024. He studied Political Science and Mathematics (BA) at the University of Heidelberg as well as Statistics (Mag.rer.soc.oec) and Political Science (MA) at the University of Vienna. Benjamin Riesch previously worked as a student assistant at the Institute of Government (2023-2024) on Austrian constitutional legislation. His research interests include electoral behaviour and party competition. He is currently working on the use of text-as-data methods and large language models to analyse political texts.

Poster: Riesch — Negative Campaigning in the National Council / PDF, 988 KB